

### 3.4 Mission Reviews

## Western Balkans

Following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, a plethora of political missions emerged in the Balkans in the early 1990s. These ranged from minor civilian monitoring missions to large-scale political presence tasked with monitoring the implementation of peace agreements, promoting the rule of law, fair elections and institution building. While many of these initiatives have been phased out in recent years, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) continue to play relevant political roles in the Balkans to varying degrees.

The UN maintains a marginal presence in the region primarily through the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Although UNMIK is formally a peacekeeping mission, it is a *de facto* political mission as its functions have been largely political in nature following Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008. Through the UN Office in Belgrade (UNOB), the UN also has a presence in Serbia that conducts political reporting on developments in the country and the wider region. UNOB facilitates dialogue between the government of Serbia and the diplomatic community in Belgrade and serves as the main channel of communication between UNMIK and the governments of Serbia and Montenegro.

The OSCE maintains one of the largest footprints in the region. While its missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were established to prevent conflict and/or to sustain

peace, its missions in Albania, Serbia and Montenegro are substantively different, with a focus on the consolidation of democratic institutions and providing assistance on security-related issues.

The other major institutional player in the region is the European Union, which still has a military and police presence in BiH and Kosovo, and retains significant financial and political leverage through the EU accession framework. The EU has also appointed EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) in BiH, Kosovo and FYROM, with varying agendas depending on the respective country context.

As mandated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is in the process of a major institutional overhaul that affects its political presences. In FYROM, the EUSR's mandate expired in February 2011, and the EU is now represented by a single delegation that works primarily with the host country authorities in the context of the EU accession process. In BiH and Kosovo, the EU is in the process of strengthening its presence and the EUSRs will no longer be associated with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH and the International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo, respectively established following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.<sup>1</sup> Instead, the EUSRs will be "double-hatted" as the heads of the EU delegations for BiH and Kosovo with various economic and political instruments at their disposal.

The EU institutional overhaul was conceived in the context of national authorities garnering additional responsibilities. Escalating political instability

### Office of the High Representative (OHR)\*

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	21 November 1995 (General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Peace Agreement))
<b>High Representative</b>	Valentin Inzko (Austria)
<b>Principal Deputy High Representative</b>	Roderick W. Moore (US)
<b>First High Representative</b>	Carl Bildt (Sweden)
<b>Budget</b>	The OHR is funded by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), whose budget is about \$13.4 million (2011-2012)
<b>Strength as of July 2011</b>	International Staff: 13 National Staff: 130.5

*Notes: \*As of 1 September 2011, the EUSR is no longer double-hatted as the High Representative (HR). Peter Sørensen has replaced Valentin Inzko as the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Inzko will continue to serve as the HR.*

### EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR BiH)\*

<b>Latest Key Resolution</b>	18 July 2011 (date of issue); 1 September 2011 (date of effect) (Council Decision 2011/426/ CFSP)
<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	11 March 2002 (date of issue); 3 June 2002 (date of effect) (Council Joint Actions 2002/210/ CFSP and 2002/211/CFSP)
<b>Special Representative</b>	Peter Sørensen (Denmark) (Appointed by Council Decision of 18 July 2011)
<b>First EUSR</b>	Lord Paddy Ashdown (UK)
<b>Budget</b>	\$5.3 million (1 September 2010- 31 August 2011)

*Notes: \*As of 1 September 2011, the EUSR is no longer double-hatted as the High Representative (HR). Peter Sørensen has replaced Valentin Inzko as the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Inzko will continue to serve as the HR.*

in the region, however, has curtailed these plans and many fear that the duplicity of functions will serve to heighten confusion at a critical juncture.

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Office of the High Representative in BiH and the OSCE Mission in BiH were launched pursuant to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. As part of the agreement, NATO and the UN undertook military and police responsibilities (which were subsequently transferred to the EU) and the High Representative (HR) was given the mandate to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The OSCE was tasked with assisting local authorities in specific areas, such as security and arms control, human rights and elections.

In 1997, pervasive local obstructions prompted the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)<sup>2</sup> that was set up to review and define the goals of the peace implementation process, to expand the HR's powers. The so-called "Bonn powers" sanctioned the HR to remove public officials and to impose legislation when local authorities failed to deliver on Dayton's legal requirements.

A more comprehensive international strategy was devised early in the new millennia with the

intent of linking state building with EU accession. In 2002, Paddy Ashdown – who took office as both the new HR and EU Special Representative – heralded a new phase of streamlined international involvement with a focus on EU integration. In the course of his tenure, Ashdown, who frequently made use of his Bonn powers, made significant progress toward the consolidation of BiH as a state.

The Dayton agreement, by establishing the OSCE Mission to BiH and entrusting it with crucial tasks to foster security, human rights and democracy, including the organization of elections, also heightened the OSCE's political profile. After transferring its capabilities in electoral matters to BiH authorities in early 2002, the OSCE Mission has remained involved in the electoral process by focusing on providing expert advice and political support to the BiH Election Commission.

Most recently, the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), within the framework of its elections observation missions across the OSCE region, was invited to observe the 2010 October elections. The OSCE/ODIHR determined that the elections adhered to international standards with the exception of certain constitutional provisions precluding individuals not belonging to any of the major ethnic groups from election to the presidency or parliament. A



2009 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against these provisions has not been implemented.

The OSCE mission currently assists BiH to meet its commitments to Euro-Atlantic integration and in helping to consolidate democratic institutions. Going forward, the OSCE will continue to collaborate closely with the new EU Delegation, particularly in the areas of human rights, rule of law, the judiciary, education and support to civil society. The OSCE mission remains the largest civilian organization in the country, with 14 field offices.

In light of the need to provide various ethnic groups with critical safeguards after the war, Dayton established a tenuously loose state comprised of two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS). With no effective central government, Dayton also guaranteed ethnic groups powerful veto powers. One of the key challenges in BiH is creating a functional

state that will endure an eventual international withdrawal, however, the complex institutional structure in place has served to impair the state building process and created a chronic stalemate.

The statebuilding momentum created under Ashdown prompted the international community to begin devolving responsibilities to national authorities and to initiate plans for withdrawal of the OHR.<sup>3</sup> In the run-up to the 2006 elections, however, increasing nationalist rhetoric, talks of secession among leading politicians in Republika Srpska and a failed attempt at reforming Dayton to strengthen state-level institutions collectively served to delay a decision on the closure of the OHR. The PIC subsequently made OHR closure conditional upon a set of conditions, including a positive assessment of the political situation of BiH by the PIC, based on the Dayton Accords.

Failure by Bosnian authorities to comply with the aforementioned criteria prompted EU

## EU Special Representatives

The Council of the European Union appoints EUSRs under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, to advise and support national and regional political processes. As of August 2011, the European Union had eight EUSRs that are either based in Brussels or have an in-country presence in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sudan, Central Asia, Georgia, Afghanistan, the Great Lakes Region and the African Union. This marks a reduction from twelve last year, following the closure of EUSRs in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, the Middle East and the South Caucasus.

Indeed, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has generated debate about the continued need for EU Special Representatives. On one hand, merging the functions of the EUSR with those of the head of the EU delegation would streamline European Union activities in crisis countries. On the other hand, it has been argued that the consolidation may come at the cost of weakened political flexibility and leverage. The regional mandates of the EUSRs for Central Asia and Great Lakes provide additional versatility that country-specific ambassadors do not have.

Nonetheless, the decision by the European Union not to name EUSRs for the recent crises in Cote d'Ivoire (where there is EU Delegation) and Libya (where an EU Office under the EEAS was established in Benghazi in May 2011), or for the Horn of Africa, where the European Union runs anti-piracy operations – as well as ongoing discussions on whether to close the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region – suggest that further consolidation of EUSRs may be underway.

One option for reconciling EUSRs and EU Delegations is “double-hatting.” In Afghanistan and at the African Union, the EUSR also functions as the head of the EEAS delegation. Under this arrangement, the EU Delegation is financed from the EEAS administrative budget, but through it the EUSR can access the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, which, due to its size and different oversight arrangements, enables the EU to more flexibly finance its missions. Such an arrangement is currently under consideration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU maintains a sizable military and police presence. In Kosovo, too, the interim appointment of an EUSR from within the ranks of the EEAS suggests adaptation of EUSRs, rather than their replacement.

institutions and most EU members to reiterate calls to close the OHR and to enhance the EU's presence on the ground (including special sanctioning powers). The EU's insistence on OHR closure stems from an institutional preference towards negotiating EU accession with self-governing entities. In this context, the appointment of a strengthened EUSR would provide the framework for BiH to transition into full sovereignty, while empowering European nations to adequately respond in the event of any potential future violations of the Dayton Accords. The US, however, expressed concerns about the EU's ability to lead the reform process and continued to favor a strong OHR. In the absence of a general agreement on OHR closure, the European Council in March 2011 announced its intention to proceed with a new presence on the ground, led by a senior diplomat. It also approved a set of restrictive measures allowing member states to impose sanctions against persons whose actions are deemed to undermine Dayton.<sup>4</sup>

The transition process, which will involve the transfer of 29 EUSR staff currently working in the

OHR to the EU Delegation, is likely to occur at the end of August 2011, and will coincide with the expiration of HR Valentin Inzko's EUSR mandate (Inzko will nonetheless remain as the HR). The new EU office will have a budget of approximately EUR 100 million attached to the accession framework. The EUSR, who will be functioning as the head of the Delegation, will continue to provide political facilitation, especially on issues related to EU integration - including constitutional reform - and overall coordination.<sup>5</sup> While the EU continues to aim at closing down the OHR, the only change anticipated for 2011 is continued downsizing, including a budget cut of five percent by June 2011. Currently, the OHR maintains two regional offices in Brecko and Banja Luka.

The debate over the future of the OHR in BiH has flared up again in the context of political deterioration following the October 2010 elections. Tension between Croat and Bosniak parties increased dramatically after the formation of a new coalition government in the Federation that excluded the two most popular Croat parties. A

## OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE BiH)

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	8 December 1995 (MC(5).DEC/1)
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Fletcher M. Burton (US)
<b>Budget</b>	\$21.0 million (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 68 National Staff: 435

*For detailed mission information see p. 252*

decision by the Central Election Commission on 24 March 2011 annulling the government on procedural grounds prompted the HR to take action and revoke the annulment. While this initiative averted an institutional crisis, the political climate deteriorated amid calls for the creation of a third Croat entity.

Tension between the Republika Srpska and the international community, represented by the OHR, has also intensified. In April 2011, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution calling for a referendum on the validity of the HR powers and state-level judicial institutions. The resolution represented one of the most serious challenges to Dayton since its inception. HR Inzko expressed a willingness to utilize the Bonn powers to repeal decisions by the National Assembly in his report to the UN Security Council in May. Assurances by the High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton to initiate a “structured dialogue” on judicial reform averted disaster. While the crisis was defused, many saw this episode as an EU attempt to sideline the HR.

While there is no immediate risk of a return to violence, continued nationalist rhetoric demonstrates the pervasiveness of inter-ethnic animosities. Many challenges lie ahead, including much-needed constitutional reform to address the ruling of the ECHR - a key requirement for a credible EU membership application. Pervasive divisions over the form and status of the state remain a stumbling block and are likely to become a source of further political instability. Furthermore, intense political bickering over the formation of a new government more than ten months after the elections aggravates

the political situation. As for the international community, differing visions of Washington and Brussels regarding the future of the OHR are likely to increase international tensions, undermining the ability of these actors to effect change in local dynamics as domestic actors have in the past used international disagreements to hold back the reform process.

## KOSOVO

The unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, followed by Serbia’s refusal to recognize the new Kosovar institutions, created a complex dynamic for international actors.

There are two separate international frameworks in Kosovo. The first operates under the UN mandate and includes UNMIK, EULEX (the EU’s rule of law mission), OMiK (the OSCE Mission in Kosovo), and KFOR, NATO’s peacekeeping force, which are status neutral and abide by UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) that authorized international civil and military presences in Kosovo.

The second framework does not operate under a UN umbrella and is represented by the International Civilian Office, mandated under the 2007 Ahtisaari plan to assist Kosovo’s government in achieving full independence. The Ahtisaari plan envisioned a post-independent transition process in which EULEX and Kosovo’s institutions would progressively take on UNMIK’s civilian and rule of law responsibilities. The UN Security Council did not endorse the plan in 2007 and negotiations on Kosovo’s status reached an impasse in 2008. The ICO’s authority has been severely undermined as a result of this stalemate, and northern Kosovo has remained largely under Serbian control.

A coexistence between status-neutral and pro-independence actors was possible thanks to a so-called six-point plan agreed to by the government of Serbia and the UN Secretary-General in November 2008 whereby Serb-controlled territories in the north temporarily remain under a UN umbrella, with EULEX in charge of rule of law responsibilities. While Belgrade accepted the arrangement, Pristina strongly objected but promised to cooperate with EULEX on its deployment throughout the entire territory of Kosovo. The EU mission has come under criticism recently,

### EUSR in Kosovo\*

<b>Latest Key Resolution</b>	5 May 2011 (date of issue); 1 May 2011 (date of effect) (Council Decision 2011/270/CFSP)
<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	4 February 2008 (date of issue) (Council Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP)
<b>Special Representative</b>	Fernando Gentilini (Italy) (Appointed by Council Decision of 5 May 2011; Entry on duty 1 May 2011)
<b>First EUSR</b>	Pieter Feith (Netherlands)
<b>Budget</b>	\$1.0 million (1 May 2011-31 July 2011)

*Notes: \*As of 1 May 2011, the EUSR is no longer double-hatted as the International Civilian Representative (ICR). Fernando Gentilini has replaced Pieter Feith as the EUSR for Kosovo, although Feith will continue to serve as the ICR.*

### International Civilian Office (ICO)\*

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	15 September 2006 (Council Joint Action 206/623/CFSP, as the International Civilian Office/EUSR Preparation Team)
<b>International Civilian Representative</b>	Pieter Feith (Netherlands)
<b>Deputy ICR</b>	Christopher Rowan (US)
<b>First ICR</b>	Pieter Feith (Netherlands)

*Notes: \*As of 1 May 2011, the EUSR is no longer double-hatted as the International Civilian Representative (ICR). Fernando Gentilini has replaced Pieter Feith as the EUSR for Kosovo, although Feith will continue to serve as the ICR.*

particularly by Kosovo authorities, for failing to address corruption issues and to adequately promote the rule of law in the north.

Initially entrusted by the UN Security Council with civilian executive powers designed to maintain peace, UNMIK's functions have been substantially curtailed over time and are now largely diplomatic. These include *inter alia*: political reporting; ensuring a coordinated international civilian approach (including EULEX); engaging with local, regional and international stakeholders; facilitating the participation of Kosovo institutions in multilateral forums; and mediating between the different ethnic communities in northern Kosovo and Pristina. UNMIK's presence is still significant and, as of December 2010, they maintained a staff of 418. It has a headquarters in Pristina and is supported by

field offices in Mitrovica and Pejë/Pec. The Mission also maintains two offices in Skopje and Belgrade.

Under UN Security Council resolution 1244, the EU was responsible for developing a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region, and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, established in July 1999, was tasked to take a lead role in institution- and democracy-building, human rights, and rule of law issues. While all EU economic responsibilities were transferred to the Kosovo authorities following the declaration of independence, the OSCE Mission retained its focus on supporting democratic institution building under the UNMIK framework, including parliamentary and municipal development, promoting human and community rights and providing substantial assistance in the improvement of security and public safety. The Mission has also taken on an enhanced monitoring role in the context of UNMIK's downsizing. OMiK is currently the largest OSCE field presence, with 684 staff<sup>6</sup> and five field offices.

While the International Civilian Representative (ICR) in charge of the ICO has become an important international interlocutor with Pristina, the planned enhancement of the EU presence on the ground has made the future of this envoy uncertain. As of April 2011, the ICR is no longer "double-hatted" as EUSR, and thus reports only to the International Steering Board comprised of 28 countries that recognize Kosovo's statehood. A temporary EUSR has been appointed until September 2011 in order to prepare the groundwork for a strengthened EU presence. Current plans to phase out ICO in 2012 remain undefined both as a result of the situation in the north and a more prominent US role, however, downsizing is already in progress. On 26 June 2011, the ICO announced the closure of all of its regional offices, except for the Mitrovica outpost, where it will continue to assist in the establishment of the sixth municipality as mandated by the Ahtisaari plan.<sup>7</sup>

A September 2010 UN resolution, sponsored jointly by Serbia and the EU, that called for an EU-mediated dialogue to promote cooperation and improve the lives of the people has further relegated the role of ICO. The resolution was possible in light of intense diplomatic efforts of the EU and Serbia, following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July 2010 on

### OSCE Mission to Kosovo (OMIK)

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305)
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Werner Almhofner (Austria)
<b>Budget</b>	\$32.1 million (1 January 2011-31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 165 National Staff: 477

*For detailed mission information see p. 244*

the accordance with international law of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. Though an agreement on civil registries and freedom of movement was reached in early July 2011, outstanding political issues, especially the current tense situation in northern Kosovo, will continue to challenge Kosovo's statehood and the work of organizations such as EULEX and OMiK.

ICO's 2010 strategy to help establish Kosovo's institutions<sup>8</sup> in the north (where local institutions continued to function outside Kosovo's legal framework) without engaging UNMIK was a resounding failure and triggered an outcry by Kosovo Serbs. A diplomatic approach appears to be on the horizon, although it will face numerous hurdles. Some actors, including the Head of EULEX, have suggested the need to include northern Kosovo in the EU-sponsored dialogue; however, Pristina is strongly opposed and has threatened to increase its presence in the north unilaterally. Serbian authorities, for their part, have indicated a willingness to discuss northern Kosovo, but talks concerning partition have provoked strong opposition from both Pristina and the US.

In addition to the diplomatic challenges, Kosovo also faces major political deficits including weak democratic structures and widespread corruption. A number of political crises since September 2010 have raised concerns in relation to Kosovo's ability to function without continuing international involvement. Charges of massive fraud in snap elections in December 2010, for example, have undermined the legitimacy of the new government at a critical juncture. Allegations of organ trafficking involving prominent political figures by a December 2010 Council of Europe report have

further complicated the political process. Further investigations into these allegations are now in the hands of a special prosecutor attached to EULEX.

In November 2010, the head of UNMIK Lamberto Zannier<sup>9</sup> highlighted to the Security Council the continuous risk of instability in northern Kosovo that was illustrated by an outburst of ethnic tensions in 2010. At the time of writing, the unresolved tensions in the north were underscored by a flare of violence following the unsuccessful unilateral attempt by Kosovo police to take control of two northern boundary crossing points. KFOR has engaged in talks with all parties concerned in an attempt to resolve the crisis. If the situation in northern Kosovo remains unsettled, the potential for inter-ethnic and regional volatility will remain, complicating the EU regional agenda.

### FYROM

Both the OSCE and the EU maintain an important presence in FYROM to oversee the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) – an EU-sponsored peace accord that helped end the armed conflict between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in the country.

In February 2011, the mandate of the EUSR that has since 2001 assisted in the implementation of the peace agreement<sup>10</sup> was terminated.<sup>11</sup> A single EU Delegation now represents the EU, with a focus on monitoring progress on criteria for EU accession, including progress on police reform and the full implementation of the OFA.

The OSCE Mission to Skopje is the third largest mission in the region.<sup>12</sup> Established as the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje in 1992, it was called upon to assist in the implementation of certain aspects of the OFA in 2001, including *inter alia* the redeployment of police forces and the promotion of minority representation. The Mission continues its politico-security monitoring activities to date, and is currently engaged in police training, border management and the rule of law. The OSCE also assists the government in elections, public administration and education. The Mission works in close cooperation with the US, the Head of the EU Delegation and NATO headquarters in Skopje (NHQS).<sup>13</sup> Collectively these entities com-

## EUSR for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*

<b>Latest Key Resolution</b>	11 August 2010 (date of issue); 1 September 2010 (date of effect) (Council Decision 2010/444/CFSP)
<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	29 June 2001 (date of issue) (Council Joint Action 2001/492/CFSP)
<b>Special Representative</b>	Erwan Fouéré (Ireland) (Appointed by Council Joint Action of 17 October 2005)
<b>First EUSR</b>	François Léotard (France)
<b>Budget</b>	\$0.4 million (1 September 2010- 28 February 2011)

Notes: \*The mandate of the EUSR ended on 28 February 2011 following the establishment of the EU External Action Service (EEAS), and is no longer double-hatted as the head of the EU Commission Delegation to FYROM.

## OSCE Mission to Skopje

<b>Authorization Date</b>	14 August 1992 (15-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1, as the CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission)
<b>Start Date</b>	September 1992
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Ralf Breth (Germany)
<b>Budget</b>	\$10.0 million (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 48 National Staff: 121

For detailed mission information see p. 281

prise the “Security Principals” that make frequent joint statements on FYROM affairs.

On the tenth anniversary of the Ohrid Agreement, ethnic relations continue to be strained by mutual distrust. Increased tensions in 2010 sparked fear of a resurgence of ethnic violence. In February 2011, clashes related to the construction of a “church-shaped” museum in the center of Skopje left eight people injured. While it is unlikely that these incidents will escalate into widespread violence, there is the potential for additional instability.

The political climate remains somewhat tremulous as indicated by a parliamentary boycott in early 2011 following tax-related actions by the government against one of the main opposition TV

channels. Snap elections were held in June largely to defuse political tensions. In contrast with the 2008 parliamentary elections that were accompanied by widespread violence, these elections proceeded without any significant incidents and were deemed “transparent” by the OSCE (prior to the elections parties signed an important election code of conduct supported publicly by the Security Principals). While these developments represent progress, the country’s authorities have failed to deliver on key EU reforms in relation to the judiciary, public administration, media development and political dialogue. Increased government pressure on the media has also raised concern among international observers. Continued monitoring by the EU and the OSCE will be essential if ethnic tensions are to be contained and political stability maintained.

## OTHER MISSIONS IN THE REGION

In addition to its aforementioned presences, the OSCE remains substantially engaged in Albania, Serbia and Montenegro (in Croatia the OSCE maintains a small office assisting in war crime trials).

In **Albania**, the OSCE’s objectives are to promote democratization, the rule of law and human rights. The mission works on a wide range of issues, including legislative and judicial reform, local governance, electoral reform, capacity building (particularly in anti-trafficking and anti-corruption) as well as media and civil society development. The OSCE has also provided assistance to police forces alongside other actors such as the EU.<sup>14</sup>

Although Albania has made significant progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration (it joined NATO in 2009 and was granted visa-free travel to the Schengen area in 2010), it continues to struggle in transitioning towards a fully consolidated democracy.

Political tensions in Albania have increased since the 2009 elections that the opposition contested, inciting street demonstrations that ultimately turned violent. Both the EU and the Council of Europe have intensified mediation efforts to solve the political deadlock, but no solution has been found thus far. In May 2011, contested local elections and a subsequent controversial recount in Tirana further aggravated political instability that could also negatively impact Albania’s EU candidacy. While the OSCE does not have a mandate

### OSCE Mission to Montenegro

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	29 June 2006 (PC.DEC/732)
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Sarunas Adomavicius (Lithuania)
<b>Budget</b>	\$3.4 million (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 13 National Staff: 36

*For detailed mission information see p. 274*

### OSCE Mission to Serbia

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	11 January 2001 (PC.DEC/401, as the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Renamed the OSCE Mission to Serbia 29 June 2006 (PC.DEC/733)
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Dimitrios Kypreos (Greece)
<b>Budget</b>	\$10.7 million (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 35 National Staff: 143

*For detailed mission information see p. 277*

### OSCE Presence in Albania

<b>Authorization and Start Date</b>	27 March 1997 (PC.DEC/160)
<b>Head of Mission</b>	Ambassador Eugen Wollfarth (Germany)
<b>Budget</b>	\$4.5 million (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)
<b>Strength as of 30 April 2011</b>	International Staff: 21 National Staff: 76

*For detailed mission information see p. 298*

to promote political dialogue in Albania, it has renewed diplomatic efforts aimed at defusing political tensions and has called the parties to undertake a thorough electoral reform. In this context, the head of the OSCE Presence in Albania joined the US Ambassador and the head of the EU Delegation in a public statement issued in June 2011 calling upon all sides to respect the final results.

The OSCE Mission in **Serbia** was launched in 2001, following the demise of Slobodan Milošević. With the dissolution of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, the OSCE opened a separate, smaller mission in **Montenegro**. Both missions are involved with issues related to democratization, human rights, media development, security, the environment and the rule of law. The prevalence of organized crime and corruption continues to pose significant barriers in Montenegro's EU bid, although progress has been made in the past year, including the arrest of public figures.

The OSCE Mission to Serbia maintains two small presences in Bujanovac, southern Serbia, and in Novi Pazar, south-western Serbia. Tensions in the Sandjak region were aggravated in June 2010 pursuant to the controversial constitution of the first Bosniak National Council.<sup>15</sup> While violence is unlikely to erupt, many observers regard the area as a potential flashpoint. The OSCE's work in the region includes supporting the integration of minorities into state and local institutions. The Mission's most recent efforts in both southern and south western Serbia have centered on encouraging dialogue among local leaders, with the aim of forming functioning bodies enabling improved participation of minorities in policy-making.

The UN also maintains a small office in Serbia, UNOB, tasked with political reporting and liaison functions (particularly between UNMIK and Serbia). Following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, the office has been involved in the process of reconfiguring UNMIK.

## CONCLUSION

More than fifteen years after the war in the former Yugoslavia, the region remains mired in post-conflict stabilization and transitional political development. The EU integration process, which prompted the rationalization of overlapping mandates, has made limited progress and the region remains afflicted by political instability, minority rights issues and inter-ethnic challenges. Other than Croatia, which is set to sign the EU Accession Treaty by December 2011,<sup>16</sup> only Montenegro and Serbia are on target for EU membership (Serbia's case for accession was recently augmented by the arrest of war crimes fugitives Ratko Mladić in May 2011 and Goran Hadžić in July 2011).

The current climate presents critical challenges for the enhanced EU presence on the ground, particularly in light of several competing international mandates. Disagreements between the EU and the US over the status of the international civilian missions will only add to the confusion, making international coordination more difficult and providing local actors with an opportunity to delay essential reforms. Furthermore, the EU's internal divisions

(particularly in relation to Kosovo's status), combined with its record of indecisiveness in the region, have raised concern about the EU's ability to engage assertively. In this environment, more effective diplomacy by both the EU and the OSCE, and enhanced cooperation amongst international stakeholders, is required in order to effectively address the region's deep-seated and pervasive challenges.

## NOTES

- 1 Historically, both EUSRs had dual responsibilities as the High Representative in BiH and the International Civilian Representative in Kosovo in order to rationalize overlapping mandates and to utilize the incentive framework attached to the process of EU integration more effectively.
- 2 The Peace Implementation Council (and its executive arm, the Steering Board) was created in December 1995 to assist the High Representative. It meets periodically to review and define the goals of the peace implementation process.
- 3 HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling, appointed in 2006 presumably to phase out the mission, adopted a low profile and made little use of the Bonn powers.
- 4 Council of the European Union, *Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
- 5 The European Force (EUFOR) will continue beyond 2011 on an executive mandate with between 1,000 and 1,200 troops. The EU Police Mission will remain status quo for between six to twelve months, when it will become integrated under the structure of the EU Delegation (Personal interview with EUSR/OHR official in BiH).
- 6 Figure reflects the number of budgeted staff for OMiK, and may differ from statistics presented in this volume in section 5.2 Global OSCE Mission Statistics on filled staff positions.
- 7 "ICO to Restructure Its Presence in Kosovo Regions," ICO News Release, 26 June 2011, available at [http://www.ico-kos.org/ico/data/Image/110626\\_RO\\_closures\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ico-kos.org/ico/data/Image/110626_RO_closures_EN.pdf).
- 8 The Kosovo government's strategy included efforts at establishing a sixth municipality in North Mitrovica (as envisioned by the Ahtisaari plan), including new municipal elections and specific plans to introduce Kosovo customs, courts and police in the north.
- 9 On 1 July 2011, Lamberto Zannier was appointed OSCE Secretary-General and UNMIK's former chief of staff took on Zannier's responsibilities as acting head of UNMIK.
- 10 The EUSR also provided political guidance for the three European Security and Defense Policy missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia launched in 2003 that have completed their operations.
- 11 The EUSR was "double hatted" as the Head of the EU Commission Delegation since 2005.
- 12 The statement reflects the number of budgeted staff for the OSCE Mission to Skopje, and may differ from statistics presented in section 5.2 Global OSCE Mission Statistics on filled staff positions.
- 13 NHQS' mission is to advise the government authorities on military aspects of Security Sector Reform.
- 14 The EU's police mission was extended until 2012 to sustain work on border management and the fight against corruption and organized crime; Address by Head of EU Delegation to Albania, Ambassador Ettore Sequi, at PAMECA III Stakeholder's Committee, 10 June 2011, Tirana International Hotel, available at [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2011/20110610\\_01\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110610_01_en.htm).
- 15 A total of 19 Councils were elected in June 2010 with no major incidents, with exception of the Bosniak Council. National Minority Councils have ample competences in the area of education, culture, language and the media.
- 16 European Council, *Statement of President Barroso on Croatia after the European Council*, SPEECH/11/476 (24 June 2011), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/476&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.