

## 3.2


# Somalia

Somalia made considerable political and security progress in 2012. The creation of a national constituent assembly and federal parliament heralded the end of the transitional period, while AU forces made significant gains in their operations against al-Shabaab. However, the delay of a number of political reforms and the continued security challenges—demonstrated most clearly in the assassination attempt against the new president only two days after his election—underscore that gains made risk reversal without dedicated national efforts and continued international support.

### Background

Since 1991, when Somalia was swept by clan-based violence after the collapse of Siad Barre's regime, the country has been characterized by chronic instability, violence, poverty, chronic cycles of food crises, and civilian displacement on a catastrophic scale. In response to the cycles of instability in Somalia, the UN Security Council authorized a series of peacekeeping operations, including a US-led multinational force in 1992, with the UN assuming control for the operation in 1993. Heavy casualties among both UN and US forces precipitated the withdrawal of US and Western forces. By March 1995, the last remaining UN peacekeepers had left Somalia.

In April 1995, the Security Council established the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, to monitor the political situation and maintain contact with key political leaders. Over the years, UNPOS's political role was expanded and the mission was involved in facilitating a number of peace processes, including the



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### UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)

• Authorization and Start Date	28 March 1995 (UNSC Report S/1995/231), 31 May 1995 (SG Letter S/1991/451)
• SRSG	Augustine P. Mahiga (Tanzania)
• Budget	\$17.4 million (1 January 2012–31 December 2012)
• Strength as of 31 October 2012	Military Experts on Mission: 3 International Civilian Staff: 55 National Civilian Staff: 32

*For detailed mission information see p. 426*



UN photo/Stuart Price

A Ugandan police officer serving with AMISOM stands atop an armored personnel carrier while waiting for his unit to be introduced during a visit to a Somali police station in the Yaaqshiid District, 7 August 2012.

formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004.

In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of moderate and extreme Islamist groups, came to power in Mogadishu. Ethiopia, concerned about the emergence of an Islamic state on its border, deployed troops to Somalia, ousting the ICU and reinstalling the TFG. Following the operation, al-Shabaab—a hard-line group in the ICU—launched an insurgency. Fighting in 2007 and 2008 displaced over 1 million people.

In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect the TFG, support political dialogue, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the reestablishment of Somali security forces. AMISOM was first conceived as a bridging mission to pave the way for a larger UN peacekeeping deployment, but disagreement at the most senior levels of the UN, as well as skepticism among UN member states, meant that no UN force was ever authorized.

The August 2008 UN-brokered Djibouti Agreement was a major step forward in the peace process and led to the election of Shaikh

Sharif Shaikh Ahmed—former leader of the ICU—as president of the TFG. This coincided with the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and heralded a brief period of calm in Mogadishu. However, the calm subsided as al-Shabaab renewed its attacks. Corruption and chronic infighting within the government, particularly between the president and the speaker of parliament, resulted in upheaval within the TFG and little progress toward the achievement of key transitional benchmarks.

Although the Djibouti Agreement called for the deployment of an international stabilization force, the proposal lacked sufficient support to establish a multinational force with full military capabilities. In January 2009 the UN Security Council instead authorized the provision of a logistics support package to AMISOM, while reiterating its intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was subsequently established to deliver logistics support.

The European Union deployed its EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in April 2010 to strengthen the Somali security sector. EUTM operates mainly in Uganda and focuses on developing strong command and control structures and capacities for Somali officers as well as a strong, internal training capacity, in order to ensure the independence and sustainability of Somali security forces in the long term.

In 2011, amid a famine in Somalia that created hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced thousands more,<sup>1</sup> the transitional process—which was meant to be concluded by August 2011—was extended by one year to August 2012 due to a lack of progress. To that end, the president and the speaker of parliament endorsed the Kampala Accord, committing themselves and the TFG to a new transitional roadmap with UNPOS support. The agreement was considered highly ambitious, putting a one-year timeline on efforts that had not been concluded in the first three years of the transitional period. Donor support

for the roadmap activities was tied to a demonstration of success.

## Key Developments

### Security

The year 2012 saw significant changes in the overall security dynamics in Somalia, primarily due to increased support to AMISOM, which for years has lacked the capacity to implement its broad and complex mandate and secure anything more than small sections of Mogadishu.

In January 2012 the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a new strategic concept for the AMISOM mission, which was developed with UN support. The concept included a commitment to the deployment of additional troops, primarily from Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti, as well as the rehatting of Kenyan ground forces already operating in the southwestern region of Somalia. In February the UN Security Council authorized a troop ceiling increase to over 17,700. By August, AMISOM force strength was approaching mandated levels.

AMISOM forces, in conjunction with Somali security forces and other allied groups,<sup>2</sup> have consolidated their gains in Mogadishu and reclaimed control in a number of key towns. Since the departure of al-Shabaab, security has markedly improved in the capital. The removal of al-Shabaab by AMISOM forces from Kismayo—a port town and a major source of al-Shabaab revenue—is a particularly important victory, but competition for economic influence has erupted within Kismayo, and the government will have to prove to business and clan interests that government control is to their benefit. While the overall security situation has improved, al-Shabaab is now resorting to asymmetrical attacks, posing a significant threat to the local population.

The gains in security allowed UNPOS to start relocating to Mogadishu in January after operating from Nairobi for seventeen years. This relocation has improved the ability of the

### AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

- Authorization Date 21 February 2007 (UNSC Res. 1744)
- Start Date 6 March 2007
- Force Commander Lieutenant-General Andrew Gutti (Uganda)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 Troops: 17,731  
Police: 364  
International Civilian Staff: 41  
National Civilian Staff: 51

### EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)

- Authorization Date 25 January 2010 (EU Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP)
- Start Date April 2010
- Head of Mission Colonel Michael Beary (Ireland)
- Budget \$4.5 million (1 October 2011–30 September 2012)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 Troops: 121  
National Civilian Staff: 21

### EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa

- Authorization Date 8 December 2011 (EU Council Decisions 2011/819/CFSP and 2012/329/CFSP)
- EUSR Alexander Rondos (Greece)
- Budget \$6.37 million (1 October 2011–30 September 2012)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 4  
National Civilian Staff: 4

### AU Liaison Office in Somalia

- Authorization Date September 2005
- Head of Office Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif (Chad)

### The African Union's Panel of Eminent African Personalities

After Kenya's disputed 2007 presidential election, the country descended into violence that left more than a thousand people dead. Rival leaders agreed in January 2008 to work with the African Union-backed Panel of Eminent African Personalities to forge peace. The three-person panel is chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and also includes former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa and Mozambican rights activist Graça Machel. The panel's efforts resulted in a February 2008 power-sharing agreement between the two major parties calling for a number of political and institutional reforms, including a comprehensive review of the constitution. In August 2010 a new constitution was passed by national referendum.

The 2008 agreement established the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process, featuring a ten-person negotiation team representing both major parties and chaired by Kofi Annan. The KNDR team holds regular review meetings several times a year on the status of implementation, with a focus on upcoming elections in March 2013.

The panel monitors compliance with the power-sharing agreement and engages

with key actors in Kenya. It also commissions reports from a consulting firm to monitor and evaluate the KNDR's progress. These reports, released several times a year, often criticize the performance of political leaders. In 2012, they addressed issues including the lack of political will for reconciliation, the need for new electoral laws, and the resistance of the police to institutional reform.

Transitional justice and the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in prosecuting crimes committed by political leaders in 2007 has been a persistent issue in the KNDR process. On multiple occasions parliament has blocked legislation to initiate trials of the accused, and there have been frequent reports of witness intimidation and bribery. In January 2012 the ICC indicted four prominent Kenyans, including the deputy prime minister, for crimes against humanity and

other offenses. Two of the accused are currently running for president. The panel has called on the political elite to cooperate with the ICC.

Violence struck the country again in 2012, with over sixty-five Kenyans killed in incidents in August and over 110 killed in a series of attacks in September. A member of parliament was arrested in connection with the latter violence. There is danger that fighting could escalate before the next elections. The situation has recently been aggravated by terrorist attacks in Kenya, blamed on the Somali-based Muslim militant group al-Shabaab, likely in response to Kenya's military operations in Somalia. In this difficult environment, the panel continues to monitor and support the KNDR process.

#### AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities

- |                      |                    |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| • Authorization Date | January 2008       |
| • Chair              | Kofi Annan (Ghana) |

mission to engage with political leaders, but movement remains limited and asymmetrical attacks continue to present a threat throughout Mogadishu. With over 1 million Somalis still living as refugees, there continue to be large numbers of Somalis displaced inside the country who are unable or unwilling to return to their home areas, a factor compounded by the ongoing risk of asymmetric attacks and ongoing military operations throughout south-central Somalia. Armed factions, controlled by local "powerbrokers,"<sup>3</sup> are commoditizing camps of internally displaced persons in a mafialike system of extortion and aid diversion, further threatening the situation.

In the wake of a difficult transitional period, AMISOM is consolidating its strategic gains, and developing more professional and durable capacities inside Somalia. Newly operationalized AMISOM command and control structures, and the engagement of additional staff officer capacity at force headquarters, have increased AMISOM's capacity to develop and implement operational plans and consolidate its hold over Somali territory. Since March, the AU's Military Operations Coordination Committee, established as the strategic level coordination mechanism for AMISOM, has reviewed the implementation of operation plans, submitted by the force commander.

While AMISOM made progress, the ultimate goal remained in developing Somali security forces capable of taking over security responsibilities. By the end of 2012, EUTM had completed training more than 2,300 Somali troops, including more than five hundred noncommissioned officers. With the assistance of the international community, including the EU and UNPOS, Somali National Security Forces have restructured into standard combat units and have partnered with AMISOM forces in successful operations launched in the Afgoye and Afmadow areas. AMISOM will continue to play an important role in the training and development of professional standards and procedures for Somali security forces.

The AU has undertaken some efforts to minimize civilian harm during its operations, including the implementation of an indirect-fire policy to better control the use of mortars and artillery and discussions about the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking and Response Cell (CCTARC). However, the indirect-fire policy—established prior to the rehatting of Kenyan forces—has not been adapted to account for the threats posed by Kenyan air strikes, and the CCTARC has yet to be implemented.

In October, Uganda—the country that has led and provided core troops to AMISOM from the outset—threatened to withdraw forces as a result of a UN Group of Experts allegation that the Ugandan government has provided support to M23, an armed group operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.<sup>4</sup>

On 7 November,<sup>5</sup> the Security Council reauthorized AMISOM until 7 March 2013 to maintain its presence in the areas set out in its January strategic concept in order to establish secure conditions for legitimate governance, reconciliation, and the provision of humanitarian assistance across Somalia. The Council also extended the logistical support package to an additional fifty civilian personnel. Following an AU request, the Council underlined the importance of swiftly deploying the civilian staff to areas recently liberated from al-Shabaab.



Augustine Mahiga (center), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), greets a Somali official, ahead of the swearing-in ceremony for members of the New Federal Parliament of Somalia, 20 August 2012.

UN photo/Stuart Price

### *Political Developments*

Since June 2011, UNPOS has focused on providing support to the implementation of the Kampala Accord and the Roadmap on Ending the Transition.<sup>6</sup> The 20 August 2012 deadline for the end of the transitional period created a great deal of political activity in its final months. UNPOS, and UN Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) Augustine Mahiga, intensified engagement with the Somali political leaders in the capital and throughout the country to facilitate a successful transition.

In particular, UNPOS was instrumental in reaching out to traditional elders, providing financial support to the elders' meetings in the capital, and engaging the group in discussions about their role in the transition. This role included the selection of members of the Constituent Assembly in July 2012, and of members of parliament in August. The mission played an important role in keeping key political players engaged and committed to the transition process during the year between the Kampala Accord and the end of the transition period.

### Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

International efforts to combat piracy off the Somali coast gained traction in 2012. Patrols by naval forces and increased protective measures by ships, including the addition of private guards, significantly reduced the number of successful hijackings near Somalia. However, Somali pirates continue to pose a serious threat to international security, and incidents in the region still constitute more than half the total number of pirate attacks worldwide.<sup>1</sup>

In March 2012 the European Union renewed the mandate of the EU Naval Force Against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia), also known as Operation Atalanta, until 2014, while significantly extending the area it covers. For the first time, EU naval ships are allowed to patrol Somali waters close to shore and EU forces may conduct operations on Somali territory. However, this new mandate does not allow for the deployment of troops on the ground. In May the mission conducted its first land raid using helicopters and warships to destroy pirate crafts and undermine onshore safe havens, with the full support of the Somali government. While this latest mandate development helps tackle onshore dynamics, there is a potential for mission creep

EU Naval Force Against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia)	
• Authorization Date	10 November 2008 (EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP)
• Start Date	8 December 2008
• Head of Mission	Rear Admiral Duncan L. Potts (Malta)
• Budget	\$10.9 million (1 October 2011–30 September 2012)
• Strength as of 30 September 2012	Troops: 1,556 National Civilian Staff: 30

and exacerbation of the already fractured security environment, which lacks sufficient coordination.

NATO's Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) has worked to develop the capacity of countries in the region while patrolling waterways since 2009. It used the lull in pirate attacks during the 2012 monsoon season to survey and gather information about the Somali coast and identify likely launch locations for pirates. In addition, the operation successfully thwarted a number of pirate attacks with the help of other maritime counterpiracy forces in the region. NATO allies agreed to renew the mission's mandate through 2014.

Antipiracy organizations including the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) continued combating piracy through a number of methods. The CGPCS prepared best practices for private security personnel operating off the coast of Somalia, and promoted communication among its members. SHADE, a voluntary coordination group for counterpiracy organizations, assisted with joint patrols and communication on warship movements among navies.

Political progress in Somalia along with the strides made against al-Shabaab

*(continues)*

A provisional constitution was adopted on 1 August by the Constituent Assembly. The transitional president endorsed the national security and stabilization plan on 8 August. The plan, reportedly, has broad buy-in at local levels. Related institutions—including regional- and district-level security committees—are in the process of being established. However, discussions on key provisions relating to government decentralization, federalism, and resource-sharing have been deferred until the posttransition period. Similarly, there was a

formal suspension of discussion on issues such as legislation governing elections, political parties, and the Somali economic zone until after the transition.

In September 2012, the new federal parliament was established. The subsequent election of Hassan Shaikh Mohamoud as the new president went relatively smoothly, though there were some reports of efforts to buy and coerce votes. SRS Mahiga was vocal in speaking out about the attempted bribery and the importance of a legitimate

### Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (continued)

could begin to alleviate root causes of piracy, including poverty and lawlessness onshore. A new prison facility funded by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) accepted its first detainees at the end of March 2012, helping to improve Somalia's capacity to prosecute pirates. However, given the small number of legal professionals, along with limited resources and a dangerous security environment, increasing Somalia's ability to domestically tackle the judicial aspects of piracy will be a long-term endeavor. As a result, regional efforts will continue to be crucial. The new Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC) in the Seychelles, funded by Britain, will help in this effort by enabling the international community

to target piracy kingpins and financiers and fight impunity.

Though attacks were down in 2012, pirates are already adapting their tactics to international pressure, a threat that could reverse the successes of the past year. Pirates acquired sophisticated weaponry, including mines and shoulder-held missile launchers, some smuggled out of Libya after the fall of the Qaddafi regime, and have also increased their operations farther

off the coast of Somalia to avoid naval forces. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is also increasingly threatening international security, and could lead to an overstretching of limited antipiracy resources. The success of the past year is not irreversible. Addressing the root causes of piracy, continuing maritime efforts, and bolstering onshore mechanisms will be necessary to ensure continued progress.

#### Operation Ocean Shield (OOS)

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|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| • Authorization Date | 17 August 2009                      |
| • Force Commander    | Rear Admiral Antonio Natale (Italy) |

*Note:* 1. "U.S. Reports That Piracy off Africa Has Plunged," *New York Times*, 28 August 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/africa/piracy-around-horn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html>.

election process.<sup>7</sup> An assassination attempt on President Mohamoud only two days after he took office underlined the continued fragility of Somalia's political process. Nevertheless, in October Somalia's parliament approved a prime minister, further cementing the political gains in 2012. The new government, which includes two women, was sworn in on 15 November.

#### UN Strategic Review

In light of the end of the transition period in Somalia, the UN is in the process of a comprehensive review of its strategy and presence in Somalia. This strategic review process, which is guided by the authorities' needs, is expected to be completed by 31 January 2013.

The process seeks to establish a common understanding of the challenges and identify opportunities to ensure a common approach among UN entities in Somalia. It also seeks to develop options on the future configuration

of the AU-UN partnership in Somalia. The review will include conflict analysis as well as an assessment of the political, security, economic, and governance factors and issues relating to the delivery of basic services and the reestablishment of rule of law.

#### Conclusion

With the recent gains in security coupled with the end of the transition period, Somalia has entered a period of positive momentum. Security is improving in the capital and beyond. Business owners and investors are slowly returning, and concrete political gains have fostered a sense of optimism in Mogadishu. However, despite significant security gains, al-Shabaab continues to remain a serious threat, and the security achievements have to be consolidated by an expeditious political response. In this regard, the consolidation of government control in areas outside the capital,

the establishment of key pieces of legislation, the reform of security institutions, the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and the establishment of rule of law will require the continued commitment and national ownership by Somali authorities and engagement and support of AMISOM, UNPOS, and other international stakeholders if the government is to succeed.

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## Notes

1. Today, thousands of internally displaced persons remain in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia. There continue to be over 1 million Somali refugees in nearby countries. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php>.

2. Allied groups include Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian troops as well as local militias.

3. Refugees International, "Stealing from Those Who Have Nothing: The Powerbrokers of Mogadishu," 9 October 2012, <http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/stealing-those-who-have-nothing-%E2%80%98-mogadishu>.

4. "Uganda Threatens to Pull Out of Somalia over M23 Rebels," *Hiiraan Online*, 26 October 2012, [http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/oct/26550/uganda\\_threatens\\_to\\_pull\\_out\\_of\\_somalia\\_over\\_m23\\_rebels.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/oct/26550/uganda_threatens_to_pull_out_of_somalia_over_m23_rebels.aspx).

5. AMISOM's mandate expired on 31 October, which coincided with Hurricane Sandy in the Northeast United States that caused an unprecedented three-day closure of the UN's headquarters in New York. Meeting under "unusual circumstances," the Security Council quickly authorized a seven-day extension of AMISOM prior to the November extension.

6. *Kampala Accord*, 9 June 2011, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110609%20-%20Kampala%20Accord%20%28signed%29.pdf> and Somalia End of Transition Roadmap, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110906%20-%20Initialled%20Roadmap%20%28The%20Annex%29.pdf>.

7. UNPOS, "Open Letter to Somali Parliamentarians," 6 September 2012, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D7dwdO9ESE4%3d&tabid=9705&mid=12667&language=en-US>.