

### 3.3

## Sudan & South Sudan

More than a year after South Sudan's independence in July 2011, Sudan and South Sudan remain embroiled in border disputes, while conflict in Sudan's South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur states persists, creating a challenging environment in which the nine international peace operations deployed by the UN, AU, and EU operate.

Peace agreements that remain the basis for ongoing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan saw little forward movement in 2012 as deadlocks persisted. An intensifying dispute over the Abyei area and oil agreements nearly escalated to full-scale war between the two countries in April 2012. Tension was slowly diffused through UN- and AU-mediated agreements reached in September, including on oil revenues. However, for much of the year, both countries suffered the consequences of oil-related austerity measures. In addition, these agreements have yet to be implemented, leaving the potential for renewed violence in 2013.


Deteriorating security in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan worsened humanitarian conditions and further increased instability. Ongoing clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) rebel group intensified in the latter part of 2012. Ethnic conflict in Jonglei state in South Sudan underscored the extent of security reform necessary to stabilize the country.

In Darfur, the security situation remained precarious in 2012, posing a continuing risk to civilians and peacekeepers. While an offshoot of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group began negotiations with the government of Sudan in November, the

main faction of JEM and other rebel groups still refuse to support the peace agreement. Following a review of the activities and impact of the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Security Council in April announced a reduction in the mission's strength by 4,000 troops, to be completed within eighteen months.

### Background

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) settled a decades-long conflict between



### UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

• Authorization Date	8 July 2011 (UNSC Res. 1996)
• Start Date	9 July 2011
• SRSO	Hilde Johnson (Norway)
• Force Commander	Major-General Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria)
• Budget	\$839.5 million (1 July 2012–30 June 2013)
• Strength as of 31 October 2012	Troops: 6,405 Military Observers: 145 Police: 549 International Civilian Staff: 831 National Civilian Staff: 1,375 UN Volunteers: 352

*For detailed mission information see p. 385*

(UNMIS) in March 2005. The six-year interim period of the CPA ended after the CPA-stipulated referendum, which resulted in secession for South Sudan in July 2011. UNMIS was subsequently withdrawn and the Security Council authorized the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to provide assistance to the new state, with a focus on supporting the development of state institutions and South Sudan's capacity to govern its territory. The mission has a Chapter VII mandate authorizing it to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat and to deter violence. In 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also appointed Haile Menkerios, former head of UNMIS, as his Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, to help the parties settle outstanding CPA and postsecession issues.

In addition to the UN, the European Union also has operations in Sudan and South Sudan. Since 2010, Rosalind Marsden has served as the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan, and since 2011, also for South Sudan. The EUSR is mandated to support peace between the two states through liaising with relevant stakeholders and cooperating with the UN and AU toward mutual goals. The European Union also authorized an EU Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan under the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy in June 2012. Deployed in September 2012, EUAVSEC is mandated to strengthen aviation security at Juba international airport.

The CPA also included provisions for a referendum in the Abyei area, a resource-rich border region, to be held in 2011. However, progress toward the referendum was stalled and the security situation deteriorated as both states built up their security forces in early 2011. After AU-facilitated negotiations, an agreement was reached on 20 June 2011 that called for the establishment of a civilian administration for the Abyei area and the deployment of third-party security guarantors. In response, the Security Council established the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), under Resolution 1990, to monitor and verify a demilitarized zone, strengthen the



UN photo/Albert González Farrán

A UNAMID peacekeeper from Nigeria escorts UNAMID water trucks at the water point in El Daein, East Darfur, 9 October 2012.

The troops have to travel twice a day to the local borehole to collect water for the team site. Nigeria has a battalion (860 soldiers) deployed in El Daein that is tasked with providing security in the area.

Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM). In order to support implementation of the CPA, coordinate humanitarian assistance, promote human rights, and protect civilians, the Security Council authorized the UN Mission in Sudan

capacity of the Abyei Police Service, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and authorized it to use force to protect civilians.

The longest-running UN mission in the area, UNAMID, was authorized in 2007 after the 2006 Darfur Agreement attempted but failed to establish peace between the government of Sudan and various rebel groups.<sup>1</sup> UNAMID is tasked with protecting civilians, contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, and monitoring and verifying implementation of peace agreements, including the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) in July 2011. Since the signing of the Doha Document and departure of Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, the head of UNAMID also serves as the acting mediator for Darfur, a position created in 2008 by the AU and UN to help resolve the conflict. After the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) transferred authority to UNAMID in 2008, the AU opened liaison offices in Khartoum and Juba to follow up on implementation of the peace agreement.

In 2009, the African Union further established the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), led by former African presidents, including Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Abdulsalami Abubaker (Nigeria), and Pierre Buyoya (Burundi). The panel is mandated to oversee implementation of the CPA, facilitate negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, and provide advisory opinions on settling border disputes.

Although the Doha Document is meant to engender peace in the Darfur region, the rejection of the agreement by rebel groups besides the LJM means that conflict persists and the security situation remains unstable. Despite the death of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in December 2011, the alliance formed between JEM and two other major rebel groups against the Sudanese government remains largely intact, further complicating political negotiations for peace not only in Darfur but also in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states as well.

#### Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan

- Authorization Date 27 July 2011 (SG Letter S/2011/474)
- Start Date 1 August 2011
- Special Envoy Haile Menkerios (South Africa)
- Budget \$1.3 million (1 January 2012–31 December 2012)
- Strength as of 31 October 2012 International Civilian Staff: 4  
National Civilian Staff: 1

*For detailed mission information see p. 291*

#### EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan

- Authorization Date 18 July 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/556/CFSP)
- EUSR Rosalind Marsden (United Kingdom)
- Budget \$2.5 million (1 October 2011–30 September 2012)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 5  
National Civilian Staff: 7

#### EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan)

- Authorization Date 18 June 2012 (EU Council Decision 2012/312/CFSP)
- Start Date October 2012
- Head of Mission Lasse Rosenkrands Christensen (Denmark)

## Key Developments

### *Sudan and South Sudan*

Tension between Sudan and South Sudan, which escalated to the brink of war in April 2012, remained high throughout the remainder of the year due to unresolved issues including citizenship, oil revenue, and border demarcation. After the closure of UNMIS, issues relating to the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states were

### UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

- Authorization and Start Date 27 June 2011 (UNSC Res. 1990)
- Force Commander Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay (Ethiopia)
- Budget \$257.9 million (1 July 2012–30 June 2013)
- Strength as of 31 October 2012 Troops: 3,830  
Military Observers: 136  
International Civilian Staff: 84  
National Civilian Staff: 47  
UN Volunteers: 4

*For detailed mission information see p. 361*

### AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

- Authorization Date 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769)
- Start Date Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007
- SRSG (acting) Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane (Niger)<sup>a</sup>
- Force Commander Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)
- Police Commissioner James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana)
- Budget \$1,448.6 million (1 July 2012–30 June 2013)
- Strength as of 31 October 2012 Troops: 16,171  
Military Observers: 285  
Police: 5,037  
International Civilian Staff: 1,087  
National Civilian Staff: 2,935  
UN Volunteers: 445

*Note:* a. The SRSG also serves as the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur ad interim. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana) was appointed as Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID on 20 December and will replace acting SRSG Souleymane in early 2013.

*For detailed mission information see p. 313*

the economies of both countries. The security situation rapidly deteriorated in April when South Sudan's armed forces took over Heglig oil fields in Sudan, allegedly in response to Sudanese incursions and cross-border bombings. Fighting quickly escalated, resulting in shelling and firefights between the two armies, which dealt a significant blow to efforts by the UN and the AUHIP to maintain peace and security between Khartoum and Juba.

With the threat of an interstate war, the AUHIP adopted a roadmap on 24 April, bolstered by Security Council Resolution 2046, that threatened to consider imposing sanctions unless both sides took meaningful steps to de-escalate the conflict, including withdrawal of security forces, establishment of the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), and restoration of peace negotiations within two weeks.

After the majority of forces withdrew from the border areas in May and June, negotiations resumed in Addis Ababa, though progress remained slow. Original deadlines set in the AU's April communiqué were extended until 22 September, with negotiations eventually producing agreement on 27 September. The new agreement addressed a number of contentious issues, including oil and security arrangements, status of nationals, and economic matters. Although the 27 September agreement marked a step forward in efforts to end tensions, it failed to reach consensus on critical issues, including the status of the disputed Abyei area and the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states despite proposals by the AUHIP on a way forward on each issue. Few elements of the agreement were implemented by the end of 2012, including the resumption of oil production, which was set for January 2013 but indefinitely delayed in November over Sudan's condition that the SPLM-N be disarmed by South Sudan, which it holds accountable for the rebel group's activities.

The AUHIP proposed an additional six weeks of negotiating time that ended on 5

incorporated into mediation efforts by the UN and AU on the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, further complicating negotiations.

At the end of January 2012, in retaliation to a dispute over pipeline fees, South Sudan shut down oil production, threatening to derail



December 2012, and an additional two weeks in November to resolve the status of disputed border areas in Abyei. Since no agreements were made during the extensions, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to make a final determination. In December, the PSC reconfirmed its acceptance of the September 2012 AUHIP proposal, which recommended an October 2013 referendum on the status of Abyei, and announced that the proposal would be taken up at the AU's Heads of State and Government meeting in January 2013. Although the proposal requested the Security Council's endorsement, the PSC has not yet sought this endorsement, nor has the Security Council explicitly given its approval. Further negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in December 2012, led by the AUHIP's Thabo Mbeki and attended by UN Special Envoy Haile Menkerios, failed to progress any of the issues.

### *Abyei*

Due to hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan, the disputed Abyei area remained volatile in 2012, with no decision reached on its final status and the establishment of a civilian administration in the region.

Under the auspices of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, Sudan and South Sudan have taken part in negotiations on the Abyei area in order to implement the security arrangements called for in the 20 June 2011 agreement and reconfirmed in the 27 September 2012 agreement. Meetings throughout 2012 managed to register some progress. Parties were able to adopt a joint appeal for the sustainable return and restoration of livelihoods, and terms of reference for the Joint Military Observer Committee, which will be responsible for observing and monitoring the security situation and verifying and investigating allegations of threats to civilians. However, negotiations to establish the larger Abyei-area institutions, including the Abyei Police Service, the JBVMM, and the demilitarized border zone remain stalemated. Sudan's oil police, stationed to protect installations within Diffra's

#### **Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur**

- Authorization Date 30 June 2008 (SG Letter S/2008/438)
- Chief Mediator Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane (Niger)

*Note:* The SRSG also serves as the head of UNAMID. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana) was appointed as Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID on 20 December and will replace acting SRSG Souleymane in early 2013.

*For detailed mission information see p. 251*

#### **AU Liaison Office in Sudan (Khartoum)**

- Authorization Date 24 August 2007 (PSC/PR/Comm. [LXXXIX])
- Head of Office Ambassador Mahmoud Kane (Mauritania)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 11  
National Civilian Staff: 16

#### **AU Liaison Office in South Sudan (Juba)**

- Authorization Date 24 August 2007 (PSC/PR/Comm. [LXXXIX])
- Head of Office Ambassador Stanislas Nakaha (Burundi)
- Strength as of 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 10  
National Civilian Staff: 11

oil complex, also remain in Abyei in violation of the 20 June 2011 agreement and Security Council Resolution 2046.

As noted, in an attempt to spur progress on the future status of Abyei, the AU's Peace and Security Council endorsed the AUHIP's proposal for an October 2013 referendum, with voting rights granted to the Ngok Dinka, a tribe aligned with South Sudan, and only to those Misseriya nomads who have permanent abodes in Abyei, a determination that Sudan rejects. The 5 December 2012 deadline set by the AU for Sudan and South Sudan to resolve disagreements over Abyei passed

### Security Implications of Climate Change

Though climate change is not itself viewed as a primary driver of conflict, there is evidence that it can act as a threat multiplier,<sup>1</sup> and that climate-related disasters can also increase the likelihood of violence,<sup>2</sup> making this an important issue for present and future peace operations. Natural resource scarcities pose significant challenges to missions as they attempt to confront natural resource exploitation, improve governance over resources and the environment, and incorporate natural resources into peace and security objectives. The UN Security Council highlighted the nexus between climate change and conflict first in 2007 and then again in a July 2011 debate aiming to increase the Council's consideration of the issue.

Though direct linkages between climate change and conflict still lack clarity, indirect security impacts are already affecting many of the countries on the Security Council's agenda. The AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) faces the potentially destabilizing effects of water and land scarcity, and works to increase water access through the distribution of high-capacity containers in order to mitigate security risks sustained

by civilians traveling to collect water. Other missions, including the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), increasingly address competition over arable land as climate change exacerbates land degradation.

Operations themselves can put a strain on the environment through oil spills, production of waste and hazardous substances, and depletion of resources. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations engages in efforts to mitigate the security impacts of climate change, including through policy guidelines designed to assist mission staff in addressing environmental issues that could arise as a result of their mandates. The UN's Department of Political Affairs, along with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and other UN agencies, co-produced a set of manuals on natural resource management in 2012 as well as guidance notes for practitioners in 2010. The 2012 UNEP report *Greening the Blue Helmets* identified and highlighted environmental and natural resource considerations for UN peacekeeping. Following this report, UNEP announced that it would begin training for military, police,

and civilian staff in peacekeeping missions on natural resource management.

Missions also engage in preventive activities. The UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) is mandated to work with regional governments to mitigate and prevent conflict arising from scarcity issues like water disputes. The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) are also anticipating security challenges resulting from climate change by offering technical support to state authorities.

As the security implications of climate change grow clearer, the issue may become more firmly entrenched in Security Council deliberations and within UN field missions. Better awareness within the UN system, along with additional environmental staff with stronger capacities in the field, will help increase the success of mitigating these security implications. Climate change, however, does not occur in isolation, and a comprehensive approach that considers other political, social, and economic factors will ultimately be key.

Notes: 1. UNEP, *Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and Peacekeeping Operations*, Geneva, 2012, <http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/Introduction/EnvironmentalCooperationforPeacebuilding/GreeningtheBlueHelmetsReport/tabid/101797/Default.aspx>.

2. UNDP, "UN Disaster Risk Reduction Chief Commends Efforts to Tackle Disasters," 22 November 2011, <http://www.tl.undp.org/undp/UN%20disaster%20risk%20reduction%20chief%20commends%20efforts%20to%20tackle%20disasters.htm>.

without resolution, but the PSC has not taken further steps to compel either side toward a compromise, nor has the PSC taken action to implement the decision.

In the meantime, UNISFA continues to assist with preparations to ready the JBVMM, including through supporting integration, training, and predeployment of monitors. All parties have deployed monitors to the temporary headquarters in Assosa, Ethiopia.<sup>2</sup>

UNISFA also supported mediation efforts and increased patrols in advance of the 2012 annual migration by Misseriya nomads in order to prevent intercommunal conflict over limited resources. While some violent events were reported, the 2012 migration season ended in August without any major security incidents.

While tensions between Sudan and South Sudan have de-escalated, the establishment of Abyei-area joint institutions and an agreement

on the future status of the area remain critical to further reduce cross-border tensions and to handle increasing threats to law and order. Despite UN and AU efforts in 2012, political negotiations surrounding the Abyei area remain at an impasse, increasing the likelihood that UNISFA will remain in the region despite its intention as an interim force. In November the Security Council extended UNISFA's mandate for the third time, until 31 May 2013.

#### *Continued Conflict in the North:*

##### *South Kordofan and Blue Nile States*

Fighting between Sudan and the SPLM-N intensified in the latter part of 2012, and further complicated tense relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Following a rejection by the government of Sudan of an extension in the mandate of UNMIS, as recommended by the Secretary-General, the mission withdrew in 2011 before all provisions of the CPA were implemented in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, leaving limited opportunities for international stakeholders to engage with the parties. Along with clashes between Sudanese government forces and rebel groups, humanitarian agencies also raised concern over an ensuing food crisis as supplies ran low and the restriction on access to affected areas prevented agencies from assisting civilians.<sup>3</sup>

Informal negotiations in 2012 failed to break the political deadlock between the parties. The SPLM-N seeks an agreement that includes issues related to Darfur, release of political prisoners, and lifting of the organizational ban, while Sudan refuses many of these demands. Both sides remain unwilling to negotiate directly with each other.<sup>4</sup>

Absent any political agreements to settle the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, security in these areas will continue to deteriorate. Any political negotiations, however, will need to take wider regional implications into consideration as the various sources of tension between and within Sudan and South Sudan continue to negatively impact

one another. Heavy fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebel groups in October and November 2012 raised the prospect of increased aerial attacks in the region and continued violence into 2013.

#### *Security and Political Developments in South Sudan*

South Sudan's statebuilding agenda was significantly hindered by hostilities with Sudan as well as domestic security and financial difficulties in 2012. Border disputes remain unresolved and oil production at a halt, while violence in Jonglei state underscored both the lack of capacity of the state's institutions to provide security as well as the continuing grievances of minority ethnic groups. Working within these tense conditions, UNMISS assists the government in developing South Sudan's institutions, but does so amid a lack of resources, including military helicopters and engineering capacity. The mission is expected to reach its troop ceiling in March 2013, though the establishment of thirty-five county support bases will be staggered over five years instead of three.

The security situation in South Sudan posed significant challenges to nascent security institutions and UNMISS in 2012. The year saw heavy ethnic fighting in Jonglei state, including a January attack by the Lou Nuer armed group that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and vast population displacement despite efforts by UNMISS and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to stop the attack.<sup>5</sup> South Sudan also experienced large civilian movements, with the presence of an estimated 285,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 125,000 South Sudanese refugees returning from abroad.<sup>6</sup>

After the January attack in Jonglei, UNMISS was criticized by national and international actors over its failure to take more robust actions to protect civilians, despite employing early warning mechanisms and air reconnaissance to track the advance of the Lou Nuer armed group. UNMISS maintains that the protection of civilians, while a core

mission task, is primarily the responsibility of the government, which had been warned of the impending violence. At the same time, the mission continued to implement its strategy on the protection of civilians. The strategy sets five priority situations in which UNMISS will apply its protection mandate: incidents in the border areas that affect civilians; rebel militia activities; intercommunal violence; threats to civilians during security operations, including civilian disarmament; and activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). UNMISS also began to roll out training modules developed by the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support to improve its protection capabilities. However, asset shortages, especially military utility helicopters, have hindered UNMISS's ability to reach the most vulnerable populations.

In December, following violent outbreaks in the western city of Wau, UNMISS provided shelter to about 5,000 civilians who sought protection around the mission's base. The mission also deployed peacekeepers and personnel carriers to secure the Wau airport and to patrol the city and surrounding settlements.

In March, the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and the SPLA launched Operation Restore Peace, a civilian disarmament process. UNMISS and the government tried to encourage voluntary disarmament through extensive sensitization campaigns, and UNMISS deployed integrated monitoring teams composed of civilian, military, and police personnel to monitor disarmament processes. However, serious allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces during the disarmament process, including torture and rape, overshadowed the proceedings, during which over 10,000 weapons were collected.<sup>7</sup>

In 2012, South Sudan continued to establish various state institutions with support from UNMISS, including an expansion of the national constitutional review commission and establishment of a national electoral commission. As a result of a significant budgetary shortfall, South Sudan passed an austerity budget that limited expenditures, hindering

further statebuilding and cutting back already weak delivery of government services.

### *Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law in South Sudan*

Mechanisms for security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of state security forces in South Sudan continued in 2012 with technical and logistical support from UNMISS. However, the DDR process has been beset by numerous delays related to continued hostilities with Sudan and austerity measures in South Sudan. In 2012, UNMISS supported capacity-building efforts for the national security council and its executive Secretariat, while also providing training in security sector governance and oversight for senior SPLA and SSPS personnel. In September the government of South Sudan launched the national security policy drafting process, with UNMISS supporting the training of the drafting committee and provision of technical advice to six state security commissions.

The process to professionalize the SPLA and SSPS remains a top priority for UNMISS, the need for which was highlighted by the human rights abuses committed during the civilian disarmament processes. In December the SPLA opened fire on protesters, killing ten people in what the UN described as an "excessive use of force" and further calling into question the professionalism and readiness of South Sudanese security forces.<sup>8</sup> UNMISS focused on SSPS capacity building through support to the screening and registration of officers, co-location with SSPS leadership, and development of training curricula and courses. A national DDR document, finalized in April 2012, outlines the eight-year process through which an estimated 150,000 armed forces personnel will be demobilized and integrated into a national army.<sup>9</sup>

In October, EUAVSEC deployed its head of mission, Lasse Rosenkrands Christensen, along with a core team of ten members, to begin assisting the South Sudanese government improve security at Juba international



airport. The mission is expected to be fully operational, with forty-four international staff and twenty local staff, in early 2013. It will provide advice, mentoring, technical assistance, and training of security staff in order to support the government in building capacity.

South Sudan, with UNMISS's support, also continued efforts to establish rule of law, and improve justice and correctional institutions, which suffer from a lack of capacity and resources. UNMISS drafted prison regulations and internal auditing processes, while also conducting pilot projects to map the detained population. In November 2012 the AU Liaison Office in South Sudan announced a new agreement that will allow it to support prison sanitation in collaboration with the government.

In June, South Sudan requested that UNMISS's Chapter VII mandate be withdrawn,<sup>10</sup> and in November it expelled an UNMISS human rights investigator for publishing what the government called "unethical" reports.<sup>11</sup> Both actions call into question the relationship between the mission and government as the government struggles to implement the significant tasks of building the capacity of state institutions, especially security forces. In December the SPLA shot down a UN helicopter, killing all four of its crew and further straining the relationship. The UN stated that the incident was only the latest in a series of repeated SPLA attacks against mission helicopters as well as direct threats against peacekeepers. The UN called on the government of South Sudan to carry out an investigation to hold those responsible for the incident accountable.

### *Darfur*

Fifteen months since the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, progress on the implementation of its measures remains modest, despite efforts in 2012 to disseminate the document and prepare for internal dialogue. The security situation in Darfur remained unstable in 2012. UNAMID also suffered deadly attacks by armed groups, including an ambush in October that killed four

peacekeepers, and previous deadly attacks in January and April.

In order to monitor and report on civilian protection issues, UNAMID deployed civilian staff members to twenty-one team sites and provided security escorts for food distribution by the World Food Programme. UNAMID also developed a new strategy for protection of civilians that intends to leverage cooperation among state and civil actors to gain access to areas targeted by violence. However, the governor of northern Darfur, a region facing escalating violence, voiced concern about the strategy, arguing that protecting civilians was a direct responsibility of the state.<sup>12</sup>

In December 2012 a faction of JEM began negotiations with the government of Sudan, making it the second armed group to do so. Notwithstanding this development, the main arm of JEM, along with the two other main rebel groups, once again rejected appeals by the acting joint chief mediator and other Doha mediators that JEM integrate itself into the peace process. These challenges led to a one-year extension of the implementation timetable for the agreement. Cease-fire and final security arrangements remained unfinished by the 30 September deadline, due to disagreement over the verification of rebel forces. UNAMID continued to provide technical and logistical support for the dissemination of the Doha Document, while holding workshops for stakeholders to express their views.<sup>13</sup>

In February 2012 the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) was officially launched, replacing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and signaling a positive step forward. Established under the Doha Document, the DRA has responsibility for leading the implementation of the document, along with preparing for the eventual Darfur internal dialogue and consultations. With UNAMID's logistical support, over 900 Darfur stakeholders attended a July preparatory conference for the dialogue, voicing concerns about the precarious security situation. Much like other bodies arranged for by the Doha Document, the DRA lacks

sufficient funding, as Sudan's contribution remains absent. EUSR Marsden announced that the European Union is willing to provide financial assistance for the DRA, but only if Sudan contributes as well.

In July 2012, Ibrahim Gambari, UNAMID's joint special representative and joint chief mediator since January 2010, left his post. In December 2012, Ghanaian diplomat Mohamed Ibn Chambas was appointed to the position, and will take over from Aichatou Mindaoudou of Niger, who held the post in an acting capacity. In April 2012, citing improved security conditions, the UN announced its intention to reduce UNAMID troops by 4,000, to be completed within eighteen months.<sup>14</sup> Sudan, which has frequently obstructed the mission, welcomed the decision. However, some stakeholders, including a rebel force and residents of IDP camps, pushed back against the UN's security assessment, arguing that it was ignorant of the reality on the ground.<sup>15</sup> It remains to be seen how UNAMID's new configuration will affect its ability to implement mandated tasks, particularly the protection of civilians. Reports in December alleging an SAF attack on the LJM, the only rebel group to have signed the Doha Document, underscore the continuing violence in the area and pose further questions about the prospects for peace in Darfur.

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## Conclusion

While negotiations on various peace accords between Sudan and South Sudan continued throughout 2012, very little progress was made and peace operations in the two countries continue to struggle against fragile political and security realities.

Looking ahead, domestic issues in Sudan may further limit the government's commitment and capacity to implement the various agreements. Growing civil unrest over the economy and other government practices resulted in protests in July and in December, and police responses turned violent. President Omar al-Bashir's political base also appeared to weaken in 2012, after an alleged coup attempt was thwarted in November with the arrest of the former head of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service, leaving the ruling party's Islamist core expressing frustration over corruption and the need for political reform.

Ensuring coherence between missions and international partners will be crucial as violence continues in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur states, and as unresolved issues still pose a risk of reigniting hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan in 2013.

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## Notes

1. The Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) was the only signatory, but withdrew from the agreement on 3 February 2011 after Omar al-Bashir removed Minawi from his position as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority.

2. Sudan, South Sudan, and UNISFA have deployed thirty-two, thirty-five, and thirty-three monitors respectively. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei*, UN Doc. S/2012/583, 25 July 2012.

3. A three-month tripartite initiative that began on 5 August 2012 between the AU, the Arab League, and the UN, along with Sudan and the SPLM-N, raised cautious hope about opening up Blue Nile and South Kordofan states to the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, at the end of September the agreement had not been implemented, with each side allotting blame to the other. On 7 November, Sudan announced that it would not renew the initiative's mandate after it failed to achieve significant results, ending the deal.

4. The conflict between Sudan and the SPLM-N has also interfered with the resumption of oil production between Juba and Khartoum, as it did in November 2012 when Sudan added the disarming of the SPLM-N by South Sudan as a condition for oil transportation, a stipulation that South Sudan rejects as impossible, claiming that it does not control the rebel group.

5. "Number of People Affected by South Sudan Clashes Doubled—UN," *UN News Service*, 20 January 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40986&Cr=south+sudan&Cr1=&Kw1=South+Sudan&Kw2=&Kw3=#.UL-6Bq5ChwE>.

6. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, UN Doc. S/2012/140, 7 March 2012.

7. Amnesty International, "South Sudan Army and Police Forces Shooting and Raping Civilians," 10 March 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/south-sudan-army-and-police-forces-shooting-and-raping-civilians-jonglei-2012-10-03>.

8. "South Sudanese Army Shoots Dead 10 Protestors in Wau," *BBC News*, 9 December 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20658915>.

9. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, UN Doc. S/2012/486, 26 June 2012.

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