Since the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991 and the collapse of the central state, Somalia has faced over two decades of chronic instability, clan-based violence, civilian displacement, and widespread food insecurity.  In 1992, in response to the rapidly deteriorating situation, the UNSC to impose a full arms-embargo and establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNSOM I) to support UN humanitarian relief operations. Eight months later, the UNSC followed up by voting to authorize the deployment of a US-led multinational peacekeeping force (UNITAF) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enable the flow of humanitarian assistance.

In 1993, the UNSC voted to have the UN assume control of a broadened statebuilding and security mission in Somalia, but in the face of a mounting international casualties (including the famous US “Blackhawk down” incident), public support for the mission collapsed and western forces withdrew from the country. Finally, in 1995, UN peacekeeping forces completely withdrew from Somalia and the UN established the Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to continue monitoring the situation and engaging with Somalia’s political process. Over the next decade, UNPOS played a role in facilitating and supporting a series of peacemaking processes, including the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led Somali National Reconciliation Conference that ultimately resulted in the establishment of the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. At the same time, Somaliland and Puntland in the north established fairly effective local administrations with relative autonomy, a sharp contrast to the south central region.

In 2006, The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of moderate and extreme Islamist groups, took control of Mogadishu and oversaw the first period of relative stability and security in fifteen years. Ethiopia perceived the emergence of an Islamist state on its border as a threat to its security and, with the support of the United States, launched an operation to topple the ICU and install the TFG in Mogadishu. Following its retreat, Al Shabaab began to emerge from the hard-line elements of the ICU and launched an insurgency that has continued to plague Somalia to this day.

In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect the fledgling TFG, create a space for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and lay the groundwork for a possible future UN Peacekeeping mission. The UN then brokered an agreement between the TFG and an alliance of opposition figures and ICU members leading to the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the selection of the former leader of the ICU, Sharif Shaikh Ahmed, as President of the TFG.

In the summer of 2011, Somalia made a number of significant political and security advances. In August, Al Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu, followed by a string of other urban centers. Though the TFG’s charter was supposed to expire in August 2011, the lack of progress on key political benchmarks coupled with a crippling famine that led to upwards of 260,000 deaths according to the 2013 estimates by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, which resulted in the transitional period being extended by another year. The year that followed, a great effort was made to meet outstanding political benchmarks and, on August 1, 2012, the National Constituent Assembly adopted a Provisional Federal Constitution following a contentious, and arguably rushed, process. While the transitional period may have come to an end with the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia, the provisional constitution also left significant core political questions unresolved.

In January 2012, the improved security situation also allowed the SRSG to move from Nairobi to Mogadishu, allowing the UN to better engage with Somali political leaders. In September 2012, the newly sworn-in Federal Parliament of Somalia elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new President of the Federal Government of Somalia. The election of President Mohamud, a former civil society actor, came as a surprise to most and generated optimism in Mogadishu and donor capitals, as well as an increase donor appetite.

That same month, Sheik Ahmed Mohamed Islaam “Madobe” and the Ras Kamboni Militia fought alongside Kenyan AMISOM forces to push Al Shabaab from the key port city of Kismayo. As southern Somalia’s largest port city, the loss of Kismayo, and the revenue it produced, was a strategic blow to Al Shabaab. This event also created space for the Jubbaland communities to start to organize themselves as a federal state, over the objections of the FGS, and set the parameters for the federalization discussions that were to follow.

 Political

2013 and 2014 saw significant developments in Somalia’s political evolution, as well as a notable expansion of the UN’s role. With UNSCR 2102 (2013), the Security Council created the UN Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) and put itself on a course to significantly increase its presence in Somalia. At the same time, the UN signaled it intended to shift focus from humanitarian projects to development assistance. In March 2013, the Security Council declared that UNPOS had fulfilled its mission and called for its dissolution to make way for an expanded political mission.

The transition from UNPOS to UNSOM followed from the January 2013 UN Strategic Review that called on the UN to take a greater peacebuilding role, to facilitate meaningful Somali ownership, to establish a greater ground presence in Somalia. The review also called for the creation of a new integrated political mission that would operate until conditions allowed for a peacekeeping mission. On June 3, 2013, UNSOM was launched as a political mission under the Department of Political Affairs within the UN Secretariat and headed by the Special Representative for Somalia Nick Kay, a veteran of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Where UNPOS was primarily based in Nairobi with a limited deployment of international staff to south-central Somalia, UNSOM is headquartered in Mogadishu and has opened regional offices in Garowe, Kismayo, and Baidoa.

UNSOM is mandated to provide support and policy advice to the Federal Government and AMISOM on peacebuilding and statebuilding, particularly in the areas of: security, rule of law (including the disarmament and reintegration of combatants), the development of a federal system (including the constitutional review process and preparations for the 2016 national elections), the coordination of donor support, and a range of human rights issues. This is a significant shift from UNPOS, which held a reconciliation mandate, and was read by many as a refocusing from the regions to Mogadishu.

As an integrated mission, UNSOM a combined resident and humanitarian coordinator post and is coordinating the activities of the country team. This merger met resistance from many humanitarian workers who fear integration will erode the UN humanitarian mission’s perceived neutrality and hamper its ability deliver services. Somalia’s humanitarian situation remains dire and, in the summer of 2014, the UN warned of potential famine with echoes of the 2011 crisis. How UNSOM maintains its ability to provide the humanitarian support required, often in Al Shabaab controlled territory, while also advancing its statebuilding mission will remain a delicate balance for the foreseeable future.

UNSOM’s mandate to support and coordinate with AMISOM has been an ongoing source of tension between the UN and the AU. The two organizations have divergent views on the role their civilian components should play in extending state authorities into newly reclaimed areas. The African Union has sought a much broader mandate for AMISOM that would have included a role in “[assisting] the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia” and “[supporting] the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016.” As the organization with the greatest presence on the ground, the African Union feels it should play a greater role in statebuilding. The Security Council ultimately authorized a more limited role, highlighted the UN’s preference that AMISOM focus on its core security functions. At the same time, UNSOM’s mandate potentially encroaches on areas that AMISOM views as within being its domain, particularly on matters of security sector reform.

Another persistent challenge facing the UN is Somalia’s unpredictable security environment. On June 19 2013, three days before SRSG Nick Kay was due to arrive, Al Shabaab carried out a deadly attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu resulting in the deaths of at least 22 people. Following the attack, serious questions were raised about the security of the facility and the UN and Somali Government’s ability to prevent a similar attack in the future. In April 2014, the compound was reopened and UN deployed a guard unit to Mogadishu of about 400 Ugandan troops charged with protecting UN staff and facilities. While the troops are not peacekeepers, their arrival did mark the first return of blue helmets to Somalia since 1995.

 In May 2014, the UNSC signaled its commitment to Somalia by extending UNSOM’s mandate one year. Members of the UNSC followed this a few months later with a visit to Mogadishu, the first such visit since 1994.

The European Union (EU) has also played an important role in supporting the coordination of international assistance and increasing alignment to the priorities of the Somali Government. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Alexander Rondos (who took his post in January 2012 and currently has a mandate through October 2014), and the EU Special Envoy for Somalia, Michele Cervone d’Urso, played an instrumental role in facilitating the formulation of a “New Deal” Compact for Somalia. In September 2013, the EU hosted the ‘New Deal for Somalia’ conference in Brussels, which brought together representatives from the major contributing states, international financial institutions, aid groups, and Somali leadership to discuss mechanisms for increasing the alignment of international assistance.

The resulting “Somali Compact” was a set of mutually agreed upon development priorities backed by 1.8 billion Euro. In order to increase donor predictability and mutual accountability, a Somali Donor and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was established to guide peacebuilding and statebuilding activities in Somalia. The SDRF is composed of four “financing windows”: the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Special Financing Facility (supported by Norway), and an African Development Bank fund.

The Somali Compact faced early questions about the consultation process that led to its drafting and the degree to which it has buy-in outside of Mogadishu. This, coupled with an unmet Somali expectation that the Compact would result in rapid on-budget economic support and donor concerns about the credibility of Somali financial mechanisms, resulted in persistent skepticism that has slowed the Compact’s implementation process. In the summer of 2014, there are signs that implementation of the Compact may be starting to once again gain momentum and evidence of a meaningful shift in donor rhetoric around Somali ownership.

Over the past year, the FGS has seen both important political progress and significant setbacks. Much of the political discourse in Mogadishu has centered on the emergence of new federal state entities and more fundamental questions of what a Somali federal system might look like. These questions were left unanswered in the Provisional Constitution, but will be central to the final constitution that is scheduled to be completed in 2016. In addition to a state in Jubbaland, the FGS established a technical committee to facilitate the formation of a “South West State” made up of three regions: Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle. In July 2014, the FGS endorsed the formation of a Central State made up of Galgaduud and Mudug, though this has caused a rift with Puntland over which federal state will control territory in North Mudug.

In September 2013, the FGS convened a “Vision 2016” conference to discuss timetables for national elections in 2016, the formation of federal states, the completion of the constitutional process, and the establishment of the commissions necessary for all this work to be undertaken. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, few of the benchmarks set out at the conference have been met. Before the constitution can be finalized, there many hotly disputed issues that must be resolved.

While there has been political progress in some areas, the FGS has also repeatedly been rocked by scandals and shake-ups. In November 2013, the newly-appointed Governor of the Central Bank resigned following a July UN Monitoring Group that charged mismanagement and corruption, as well as claims by the governor of threats on her life. This was a serious blow to the credibility of the FGS, and the President in particular, and raised serious questions among donors about the government’s ability to manage budgetary support. This incident was followed by a reshuffling of the cabinet and the ouster of the Prime Minister in December 2013. Continued political infighting and a July 2014 UN Monitoring Group Reporting accusing the President and several around him of illicitly diverting Somali assets continue to undermine donor confidence and risk hampering much needed coordination in the months ahead.

Security

In the past year, the security environment across much of Somalia has deteriorated significantly. At the same time, there has been a re-energized AMISOM effort to reclaim and hold territory in the south-central regions of the country. In March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2093, which expanded AMISOM’s mandate to include assisting the Federal Government in expanding its authority in areas recovered from Al Shabaab. Even with its revised mandate, for most of 2013 AMISOM continued to lack adequate resources to attempt retaking additional territory from Al Shabaab. An October 2013 Joint AU/UN Review found that the security situation remained too precarious for a UN Peacekeeping Mission.

In September 2013, an attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi claimed the lives of at least 67 people and demonstrated Al Shabaab’s ability to reach into neighboring countries.  The African Union Peace and Security Council promptly called for additional resources for AMISOM and a one-third increase in the force size. In November 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 2124 to extend AMISOM’s authorization until October 31^st 2014, increase the force’s troop ceiling to 22,126 uniformed personnel, and its expand logistical support.

Following this move, AMISOM updated it Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to allow for an aggressive offensive against Al Shabaab starting in early 2014 and it quickly made significant territorial gains in the Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan regions. This success created considerable challenges for AMISOM and Mogadishu, who were then faced with how to consolidate gains made and stabilize newly secured communities. It also resulted in an estimated 73,000 internally displaced people by June of 2014. In August 2014, Somali and African Union forces launched a fresh offensive (Operation Indian Ocean) aimed at securing Al Shabaab held ports in order to deny the organization access to the sea and the resources it provides. Questions over how FGS and AMISOM will provide basic services once these areas have been captured remains a relevant.

AMISOM is currently made up of forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Ethiopian forces formally joined AMISOM in January 2014, which was viewed as a significant step in centralizing command in control. At the same time, Ethiopia’s inclusion in AMISOM, along with the rehatting of Kenyan forces in July 2012, opened the organization to charges of impartiality, with Somalis voicing concerns that their neighbors might pursue their own regional security interests at the expense of Somalia’s sovereignty. Mogadishu was particularly unhappy with Kenya’s support for the formation of an interim Jubba Administration in June 2013 and accused Nairobi of trying to establish a buffer state. In 2014, Kenya announced it was handing over its security duties in Kismayo to forces from Sierra Leone.

While AMISOM has taken important steps to minimize civilian harm, it continues to come under criticism for failing to establish a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as repeatedly called for by the Security Council. Also damaging to AMISOM’s credibility have been persistent reports of sexual abuses by AMISOM soldiers against Somali civilians. The AU has pushed back forcefully against these allegations and established a Board of Inquiry to investigate charges of sexual impropriety.

As AMISOM continues to claim additional territory, resources are also being dedicated to developing a Somali force capable of assuming security responsibilities. In December 2013, the European Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) relocated its headquarters and training activities from Uganda to Mogadishu.  Since it was launched in 2010, EUTM has trained and mentored over 4,600 members of the Somali Armed Forces (SFA). The EUTM has focused on training Non-Commissioned Offers and specialist, but in 2014 began programs to train Military Police Officers and develop Somali trainers. Somali Forces currently participate in joint operations with AMISOM, including in Operation Indian Ocean. AMISOM, with the support of the UN, EU, and US, has continued its efforts to strengthen and professionalize Somali Forces. Nonetheless, the slow pace at which government-friendly militias are being integrated into national security forces remains an area of concern.

After repeated requests by subsequent Somali governments and the AU, in March 2013 the UN Security Council endorsed a partial lifting of the arms embargo it imposed on Somalia in 1992. In order to support the FGS’s efforts to secure areas reclaimed from Al Shabaab, the Security Council supported lifting sanctions against arms sold or supplied to the government with the intent of developing the Somali Armed Forces. Restrictions on the sale of heavy weapons were kept in place. In order to address concerns over the FGS’s ability to control the flow of weapons, the resolution requires that the government notify the Council’s Sanctions Committee for Somalia five days in advance of any delivery with details of the transaction.

In February 2014, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group issued a report that accused the FGS of “systematic abuses” in weapons management, claiming to have identified cases where procured weapons were being redirected to clan militias. The group recommended the embargo either be restored or that reporting requirements be tightened.  The Security Council decided to pursue the latter option and unanimously adopted an eight-month extension of partial suspension in March 2014, while condemning violations.

While joint AMISOM-SFA operations have reclaimed key territory over the past two years, and Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in a US airstrike in September 2014, the economic and political conditions that have emboldened Al Shabaab persist. In fact, the security situation in many urban areas has worsened over the past year, particularly in Mogadishu where Al Shabaab has assassinated a number of prominent FGS officials, as well as carried out high-profile attacks on Villa Somalia (the Presidential palace), the Parliament, and the Supreme Court. As Al Shabaab continues to lose control of towns, it has increasingly turned to asymmetric attacks and denial tactics to prevent the government and international actors from providing basic services in newly reclaimed areas.

The picture of Somalia today is a mixture of encouraging indicators and warning signs. While AMISOM has successfully reclaimed territory and the FGS, with the support of the UN, has taken a number of important political steps, it remains unclear how those gains will be consolidated and how the remaining major political questions will be resolved. If the current positive momentum is to be maintained, a greater degree of risk taking will be required on all sides. UNSOM has made laudable progress, given the security situation, in expanding its physical footprint in Somalia, but it will need to find ways to continue to increase its engagement both in and outside Mogadishu. Similarly, the UNSOM and AMISOM will have to find ways to leverage their competitive institutional advantages to help the FGS build local governance and provide basic services in newly reclaimed parts of the country.

Somali political leaders in Mogadishu will need to continue to engage with regional actors and have serious discussions about the degree to which power will ultimately be distributed to the periphery. If Mogadishu hopes to meet its constitutional objectives by the end of 2016, serious and difficult decisions will need to be made in the near future. At the same time, international donors must show a willingness to increase Somali ownership over funding priorities, or risk undercutting a government that maintains a fragile grip on power. If international stakeholders are able to support the development of state’s fledgling political order, Somalia has a real chance to break free of the cycle that has gripped it for the past 23 years.

Since 1991, when Somalia was swept by clan-based violence after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime, the country has been characterized by chronic instability, violence, poverty, chronic cycles of food crises, and civilian displacement on a catastrophic scale. In response to the cycles of instability in Somalia, the UN Security Council authorized a series of peacekeeping operations, including a US-led multinational force in 1992, with the UN assuming control for the operation in 1993. Heavy casualties among both UN and US forces precipitated the withdrawal of US and Western forces. By March 1995, the last remaining UN peacekeepers had left Somalia.

In April 1995, the Security Council established the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, to monitor the political situation and maintain contact with key political leaders. Over the years, UNPOS’s political role was expanded and the mission was involved in facilitating a number of peace processes, including the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004.

In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of moderate and extreme Islamist groups, came to power in Mogadishu. Ethio pia, concerned about the emergence of an Islamic state on its border, deployed troops to Somalia, ousting the ICU and reinstalling the TFG. Following the operation, al-Shabaab—a hard-line group in the ICU—launched an insurgency. Fighting in 2007 and 2008 displaced over 1 million people.

In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect the TFG, support political dialogue, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the reestablishment of Somali security forces. AMISOM was first conceived as a bridging mission to pave the way for a larger UN peacekeeping deployment, but disagreement at the most senior levels of the UN, as well as skepticism among UN member states, meant that no UN force was ever authorized.

The August 2008 UN-brokered Djibouti Agreement was a major step forward in the peace process and led to the election of Shaikh Sharif Shaikh Ahmed—former leader of the ICU—as president of the TFG. This coincided with the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and heralded a brief period of calm in Mogadishu. However, the calm subsided as al-Shabaab renewed its attacks. Corruption and chronic infighting within the government, particularly between the president and the speaker of parliament, resulted in upheaval within the TFG and little progress toward the achievement of key transitional benchmarks.

Although the Djibouti Agreement called for the deployment of an international stabilization force, the proposal lacked sufficient support to establish a multinational force with full military capabilities. In January 2009 the UN Security Council instead authorized the provision of a logistics support package to AMISOM, while reiterating its intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was subsequently established to deliver logistics support.

The European Union deployed its EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in April 2010 to strengthen the Somali security sector. EUTM operates mainly in Uganda and focuses on developing strong command and control structures and capacities for Somali officers as well as a strong, internal training capacity, in order to ensure the independence and sustainability of Somali security forces in the long term.

In 2011, amid a famine in Somalia that created hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced thousands more,¹ the transitional process—which was meant to be concluded by August 2011—was extended by one year to August 2012 due to a lack of progress. To that end, the president and the speaker of parliament endorsed the Kampala Accord, committing themselves and the TFG to a new transitional roadmap with UNPOS support. The agreement was considered highly ambitious, putting a one-year timeline on efforts that had not been concluded in the first three years of the transitional period. Donor support for the roadmap activities was tied to a demonstration of success.

Security

The year 2012 saw significant changes in the overall security dynamics in Somalia, primarily due to increased support to AMISOM, which for years has lacked the capacity to implement its broad and complex mandate and secure anything more than small sections of Mogadishu.

In January 2012 the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a new strategic concept for the AMISOM mission, which was developed with UN support. The concept included a commitment to the deployment of additional troops, primarily from Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti, as well as the re-hatting of Kenyan ground forces already operating in the southwestern region of Somalia. In February the UN Security Council authorized a troop ceiling increase to over 17,700. By August, AMISOM force strength was approaching mandated levels.

AMISOM forces, in conjunction with Somali security forces and other allied groups,² have consolidated their gains in Mogadishu and reclaimed control in a number of key towns. Since the departure of al-Shabaab, security has markedly improved in the capital. The removal of al-Shabaab by AMISOM forces from Kismayo—a port town and a major source of al-Shabaab revenue—is a particularly important victory, but competition for economic influence has erupted within Kismayo, and the government will have to prove to business and clan interests that government control is to their benefit. While the overall security situation has improved, al-Shabaab is now resorting to asymmetrical attacks, posing a significant threat to the local population.

The gains in security allowed UNPOS to start relocating to Mogadishu in January after operating from Nairobi for seventeen years. This relocation has improved the ability of the mission to engage with political leaders, but movement remains limited and asymmetrical attacks continue to present a threat throughout Mogadishu. With over 1 million Somalis still iving as refugees, there continue to be large numbers of Somalis displaced inside the country who are unable or unwilling to return to their home areas, a factor compounded by the ongoing risk of asymmetric attacks and ongoing military operations throughout south-central Somalia. Armed factions, controlled by local “powerbrokers,”³are commoditizing camps of internally displaced persons in a mafia like system of extortion and aid diversion, further threatening the situation.

In the wake of a difficult transitional period, AMISOM is consolidating its strategic gains, and developing more professional and durable capacities inside Somalia. Newly operationalized AMISOM command and control structures, and the engagement of additional staff officer capacity at force headquarters, have increased AMISOM’s capacity to develop and implement operational plans and consolidate its hold over Somali territory. Since March, the AU’s Military Operations Coordination Committee, established as the strategic level coordination mechanism for AMISOM, has reviewed the implementation of operation plans, submitted by the force commander.

While AMISOM made progress, the ultimate goal remained in developing Somali security forces capable of taking over security responsibilities. By the end of 2012, EUTM had completed training more than 2,300 Somali troops, including more than five hundred noncommissioned officers. With the assistance of the international community, including the EU and UNPOS, Somali National Security Forces have restructured into standard combat units and have partnered with AMISOM forces in successful operations launched in the Afgooye and Afmadow areas. AMISOM will continue to play an important role in the training and development of professional standards and procedures for Somali security forces.

The AU has undertaken some efforts to minimize civilian harm during its operations, including the implementation of an indirect fire policy to better control the use of mortars and artillery and discussions about the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking and Response Cell (CCTARC). However, the indirect-fire policy—established prior to the re-hatting of Kenyan forces—has not been adapted to account for the threats posed by Kenyan air strikes, and the CCTARC has yet to be implemented.

In October, Uganda—the country that has led and provided core troops to AMISOM from the outset—threatened to withdraw forces as a result of a UN Group of Experts allegation that the Ugandan government has provided support to M23, an armed group operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.⁴

On 7 November,⁵ the Security Council reauthorized AMISOM until 7 March 2013 to maintain its presence in the areas set out in its January strategic concept in order to establish secure conditions for legitimate governance, reconciliation, and the provision of humanitarian assistance across Somalia. The Council also extended the logistical support package to an additional fifty civilian personnel. Following an AU request, the Council underlined the importance of swiftly deploying the civilian staff to areas recently liberated from al Shabaab.

Political Developments

Since June 2011, UNPOS has focused on providing support to the implementation of the Kampala Accord and the Roadmap on Ending the Transition.⁶ The 20 August 2012 deadline for the end of the transitional period created a great deal of political activity in its final months. UNPOS, and UN Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) Augustine Mahiga, intensified engagement with the Somali political leaders in the capital and throughout the country to facilitate a successful transition.

In particular, UNPOS was instrumental in reaching out to traditional elders, providing financial support to the elders’ meetings in the capital, and engaging the group in discussions about their role in the transition. This role included the selection of members of the Constituent Assembly in July 2012, and of members of parliament in August. The mission played an important role in keeping key political players engaged and committed to the transition process during the year between the Kampala Accord and the end of the transition period.

A provisional constitution was adopted on 1 August by the Constituent Assembly. The transitional president endorsed the national security and stabilization plan on 8 August. The plan, reportedly, has broad buy-in at local levels. Related institutions—including regional and district-level security committees—are in the process of being established. However, discussions on key provisions relating to government decentralization, federalism, and resource-sharing have been deferred until the post transition period. Similarly, there was a formal suspension of discussion on issues such as legislation governing elections, political parties, and the Somali economic zone until after the transition.

In September 2012, the new federal parliament was established. The subsequent election of Hassan Shaikh Mohamoud as the new president went relatively smoothly, though there were some reports of efforts to buy and coerce votes. SRSG Mahiga was vocal in speaking out about the attempted bribery and the importance of a legitimate election process.⁷ An assassination attempt on President Mohamoud only two days after he took office underlined the continued fragility of Somalia’s political process. Nevertheless, in October Somalia’s parliament approved a prime minister, further cementing the political gains in 2012. The new government, which includes two women, was sworn in on 15 November.

UN Strategic Review

In light of the end of the transition period in Somalia, the UN is in the process of a comprehensive review of its strategy and presence in Somalia. This strategic review process, which is guided by the authorities’ needs, is expected to be completed by 31 January 2013.

The process seeks to establish a common understanding of the challenges and identify opportunities to ensure a common approach among UN entities in Somalia. It also seeks to develop options on the future configuration of the AU-UN partnership in Somalia. The review will include conflict analysis as well as an assessment of the political, security, economic, and governance factors and issues relating to the delivery of basic services and the reestablishment of rule of law.

With the recent gains in security coupled with the end of the transition period, Somalia has entered a period of positive momentum. Security is improving in the capital and beyond. Business owners and investors are slowly returning, and concrete political gains have fostered a sense of optimism in Mogadishu. However, despite significant security gains, al-Shabaab continues to remain a serious threat, and the security achievements have to be consolidated by an expeditious political response. In this regard, the consolidation of government control in areas outside the capital, the establishment of key pieces of legislation, the reform of security institutions, the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and the establishment of rule of law will require the continued commitment and national ownership by Somalia authorities and engagement and support of AMISOM, UNPOS, and other international stakeholders if the government is to succeed.

Notes

1. Today, thousands of internally displaced persons remain in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia. There continue to be over 1 million Somali refugees in nearby countries. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php.

2. Allied groups include Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian troops as well as local militias. 3. Refugees International, “Stealing from Those Who Have Nothing: The Powerbrokers of Mogadishu,” 9 October 2012, http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/stealing-those-who-have-nothing-%E2% 80%98gatekeepers%E2%80%99-mogadishu.

4. “Uganda Threatens to Pull Out of Somalia over M23 Rebels,” Hiiran Online, 26 October 2012, http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/oct/26550/uganda_threatens_to_pull_out_of_somalia_over_m23_ rebels.aspx.

5. AMISOM’s mandate expired on 31 October, which coincided with Hurricane Sandy in the Northeast United States that caused an unprecedented three-day closure of the UN’s headquarters in New York. Meeting under “unusual circumstances,” the Security Council quickly authorized a seven-day extension of AMISOM prior to the November extension.

6. Kampala Accord, 9 June 2011, http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20 UNPOS/110609%20-%20Kampala%20Accord%20%28signed%29.pdf and Somalia End of Transition Roadmap, http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110906%20-%20Initialled %20Roadmap%20%28The%20Annex%29.pdf.

7. UNPOS, “Open Letter to Somali Parliamentarians,” 6 September 2012, http://unpos.unmissions .org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D7dwdO9ESE4%3d&tabid=9705&mid=12667&language=en-US.