Political
2013 and 2014 saw significant developments in Somalia’s political evolution, as well as a notable expansion of the UN’s role. With UNSCR 2102 (2013), the Security Council created the UN Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) and put itself on a course to significantly increase its presence in Somalia. At the same time, the UN signaled it intended to shift focus from humanitarian projects to development assistance. In March 2013, the Security Council declared that UNPOS had fulfilled its miss Read More...
Political
2013 and 2014 saw significant developments in Somalia’s political evolution, as well as a notable expansion of the UN’s role. With UNSCR 2102 (2013), the Security Council created the UN Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) and put itself on a course to significantly increase its presence in Somalia. At the same time, the UN signaled it intended to shift focus from humanitarian projects to development assistance. In March 2013, the Security Council declared that UNPOS had fulfilled its mission and called for its dissolution to make way for an expanded political mission.
The transition from UNPOS to UNSOM followed from the January 2013 UN Strategic Review that called on the UN to take a greater peacebuilding role, to facilitate meaningful Somali ownership, to establish a greater ground presence in Somalia. The review also called for the creation of a new integrated political mission that would operate until conditions allowed for a peacekeeping mission. On June 3, 2013, UNSOM was launched as a political mission under the Department of Political Affairs within the UN Secretariat and headed by the Special Representative for Somalia Nick Kay, a veteran of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Where UNPOS was primarily based in Nairobi with a limited deployment of international staff to south-central Somalia, UNSOM is headquartered in Mogadishu and has opened regional offices in Garowe, Kismayo, and Baidoa.
UNSOM is mandated to provide support and policy advice to the Federal Government and AMISOM on peacebuilding and statebuilding, particularly in the areas of: security, rule of law (including the disarmament and reintegration of combatants), the development of a federal system (including the constitutional review process and preparations for the 2016 national elections), the coordination of donor support, and a range of human rights issues. This is a significant shift from UNPOS, which held a reconciliation mandate, and was read by many as a refocusing from the regions to Mogadishu.
As an integrated mission, UNSOM a combined resident and humanitarian coordinator post and is coordinating the activities of the country team. This merger met resistance from many humanitarian workers who fear integration will erode the UN humanitarian mission’s perceived neutrality and hamper its ability deliver services. Somalia’s humanitarian situation remains dire and, in the summer of 2014, the UN warned of potential famine with echoes of the 2011 crisis. How UNSOM maintains its ability to provide the humanitarian support required, often in Al Shabaab controlled territory, while also advancing its statebuilding mission will remain a delicate balance for the foreseeable future.
UNSOM’s mandate to support and coordinate with AMISOM has been an ongoing source of tension between the UN and the AU. The two organizations have divergent views on the role their civilian components should play in extending state authorities into newly reclaimed areas. The African Union has sought a much broader mandate for AMISOM that would have included a role in “[assisting] the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia” and “[supporting] the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016.” As the organization with the greatest presence on the ground, the African Union feels it should play a greater role in statebuilding. The Security Council ultimately authorized a more limited role, highlighted the UN’s preference that AMISOM focus on its core security functions. At the same time, UNSOM’s mandate potentially encroaches on areas that AMISOM views as within being its domain, particularly on matters of security sector reform.
Another persistent challenge facing the UN is Somalia’s unpredictable security environment. On June 19 2013, three days before SRSG Nick Kay was due to arrive, Al Shabaab carried out a deadly attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu resulting in the deaths of at least 22 people. Following the attack, serious questions were raised about the security of the facility and the UN and Somali Government’s ability to prevent a similar attack in the future. In April 2014, the compound was reopened and UN deployed a guard unit to Mogadishu of about 400 Ugandan troops charged with protecting UN staff and facilities. While the troops are not peacekeepers, their arrival did mark the first return of blue helmets to Somalia since 1995.
In May 2014, the UNSC signaled its commitment to Somalia by extending UNSOM’s mandate one year. Members of the UNSC followed this a few months later with a visit to Mogadishu, the first such visit since 1994.
The European Union (EU) has also played an important role in supporting the coordination of international assistance and increasing alignment to the priorities of the Somali Government. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Alexander Rondos (who took his post in January 2012 and currently has a mandate through October 2014), and the EU Special Envoy for Somalia, Michele Cervone d’Urso, played an instrumental role in facilitating the formulation of a “New Deal” Compact for Somalia. In September 2013, the EU hosted the ‘New Deal for Somalia’ conference in Brussels, which brought together representatives from the major contributing states, international financial institutions, aid groups, and Somali leadership to discuss mechanisms for increasing the alignment of international assistance.
The resulting “Somali Compact” was a set of mutually agreed upon development priorities backed by 1.8 billion Euro. In order to increase donor predictability and mutual accountability, a Somali Donor and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was established to guide peacebuilding and statebuilding activities in Somalia. The SDRF is composed of four “financing windows”: the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Special Financing Facility (supported by Norway), and an African Development Bank fund.
The Somali Compact faced early questions about the consultation process that led to its drafting and the degree to which it has buy-in outside of Mogadishu. This, coupled with an unmet Somali expectation that the Compact would result in rapid on-budget economic support and donor concerns about the credibility of Somali financial mechanisms, resulted in persistent skepticism that has slowed the Compact’s implementation process. In the summer of 2014, there are signs that implementation of the Compact may be starting to once again gain momentum and evidence of a meaningful shift in donor rhetoric around Somali ownership.
Over the past year, the FGS has seen both important political progress and significant setbacks. Much of the political discourse in Mogadishu has centered on the emergence of new federal state entities and more fundamental questions of what a Somali federal system might look like. These questions were left unanswered in the Provisional Constitution, but will be central to the final constitution that is scheduled to be completed in 2016. In addition to a state in Jubbaland, the FGS established a technical committee to facilitate the formation of a “South West State” made up of three regions: Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle. In July 2014, the FGS endorsed the formation of a Central State made up of Galgaduud and Mudug, though this has caused a rift with Puntland over which federal state will control territory in North Mudug.
In September 2013, the FGS convened a “Vision 2016” conference to discuss timetables for national elections in 2016, the formation of federal states, the completion of the constitutional process, and the establishment of the commissions necessary for all this work to be undertaken. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, few of the benchmarks set out at the conference have been met. Before the constitution can be finalized, there many hotly disputed issues that must be resolved.
While there has been political progress in some areas, the FGS has also repeatedly been rocked by scandals and shake-ups. In November 2013, the newly-appointed Governor of the Central Bank resigned following a July UN Monitoring Group that charged mismanagement and corruption, as well as claims by the governor of threats on her life. This was a serious blow to the credibility of the FGS, and the President in particular, and raised serious questions among donors about the government’s ability to manage budgetary support. This incident was followed by a reshuffling of the cabinet and the ouster of the Prime Minister in December 2013. Continued political infighting and a July 2014 UN Monitoring Group Reporting accusing the President and several around him of illicitly diverting Somali assets continue to undermine donor confidence and risk hampering much needed coordination in the months ahead.
Security
In the past year, the security environment across much of Somalia has deteriorated significantly. At the same time, there has been a re-energized AMISOM effort to reclaim and hold territory in the south-central regions of the country. In March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2093, which expanded AMISOM’s mandate to include assisting the Federal Government in expanding its authority in areas recovered from Al Shabaab. Even with its revised mandate, for most of 2013 AMISOM continued to lack adequate resources to attempt retaking additional territory from Al Shabaab. An October 2013 Joint AU/UN Review found that the security situation remained too precarious for a UN Peacekeeping Mission.
In September 2013, an attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi claimed the lives of at least 67 people and demonstrated Al Shabaab’s ability to reach into neighboring countries. The African Union Peace and Security Council promptly called for additional resources for AMISOM and a one-third increase in the force size. In November 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 2124 to extend AMISOM’s authorization until October 31st 2014, increase the force’s troop ceiling to 22,126 uniformed personnel, and its expand logistical support.
Following this move, AMISOM updated it Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to allow for an aggressive offensive against Al Shabaab starting in early 2014 and it quickly made significant territorial gains in the Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan regions. This success created considerable challenges for AMISOM and Mogadishu, who were then faced with how to consolidate gains made and stabilize newly secured communities. It also resulted in an estimated 73,000 internally displaced people by June of 2014. In August 2014, Somali and African Union forces launched a fresh offensive (Operation Indian Ocean) aimed at securing Al Shabaab held ports in order to deny the organization access to the sea and the resources it provides. Questions over how FGS and AMISOM will provide basic services once these areas have been captured remains a relevant.
AMISOM is currently made up of forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Ethiopian forces formally joined AMISOM in January 2014, which was viewed as a significant step in centralizing command in control. At the same time, Ethiopia’s inclusion in AMISOM, along with the rehatting of Kenyan forces in July 2012, opened the organization to charges of impartiality, with Somalis voicing concerns that their neighbors might pursue their own regional security interests at the expense of Somalia’s sovereignty. Mogadishu was particularly unhappy with Kenya’s support for the formation of an interim Jubba Administration in June 2013 and accused Nairobi of trying to establish a buffer state. In 2014, Kenya announced it was handing over its security duties in Kismayo to forces from Sierra Leone.
While AMISOM has taken important steps to minimize civilian harm, it continues to come under criticism for failing to establish a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as repeatedly called for by the Security Council. Also damaging to AMISOM’s credibility have been persistent reports of sexual abuses by AMISOM soldiers against Somali civilians. The AU has pushed back forcefully against these allegations and established a Board of Inquiry to investigate charges of sexual impropriety.
As AMISOM continues to claim additional territory, resources are also being dedicated to developing a Somali force capable of assuming security responsibilities. In December 2013, the European Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) relocated its headquarters and training activities from Uganda to Mogadishu. Since it was launched in 2010, EUTM has trained and mentored over 4,600 members of the Somali Armed Forces (SFA). The EUTM has focused on training Non-Commissioned Offers and specialist, but in 2014 began programs to train Military Police Officers and develop Somali trainers. Somali Forces currently participate in joint operations with AMISOM, including in Operation Indian Ocean. AMISOM, with the support of the UN, EU, and US, has continued its efforts to strengthen and professionalize Somali Forces. Nonetheless, the slow pace at which government-friendly militias are being integrated into national security forces remains an area of concern.
After repeated requests by subsequent Somali governments and the AU, in March 2013 the UN Security Council endorsed a partial lifting of the arms embargo it imposed on Somalia in 1992. In order to support the FGS’s efforts to secure areas reclaimed from Al Shabaab, the Security Council supported lifting sanctions against arms sold or supplied to the government with the intent of developing the Somali Armed Forces. Restrictions on the sale of heavy weapons were kept in place. In order to address concerns over the FGS’s ability to control the flow of weapons, the resolution requires that the government notify the Council’s Sanctions Committee for Somalia five days in advance of any delivery with details of the transaction.
In February 2014, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group issued a report that accused the FGS of “systematic abuses” in weapons management, claiming to have identified cases where procured weapons were being redirected to clan militias. The group recommended the embargo either be restored or that reporting requirements be tightened. The Security Council decided to pursue the latter option and unanimously adopted an eight-month extension of partial suspension in March 2014, while condemning violations.
While joint AMISOM-SFA operations have reclaimed key territory over the past two years, and Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in a US airstrike in September 2014, the economic and political conditions that have emboldened Al Shabaab persist. In fact, the security situation in many urban areas has worsened over the past year, particularly in Mogadishu where Al Shabaab has assassinated a number of prominent FGS officials, as well as carried out high-profile attacks on Villa Somalia (the Presidential palace), the Parliament, and the Supreme Court. As Al Shabaab continues to lose control of towns, it has increasingly turned to asymmetric attacks and denial tactics to prevent the government and international actors from providing basic services in newly reclaimed areas.
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