The year 2010 in Afghanistan was shaped by the agreements reached at the London Conference held on 28 January, co-chaired by the government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the UN. The conference witnessed a renewal of the mutual commitment of the government of Afghanistan and the international community on the basis of President Karzai’s inaugural speech on 19 November 2009. The London Conference identified steps toward greater Afghan leadership in the areas of security, economic development, governance, and regional cooperation. It also set the grounds for the Kabul Conference, hosted in Afghanistan on 20 July.

On the military front, 2010 saw the deployment of 59,462 additional ISAF troops, the replacement of the commander of ISAF (COMMISAF), Stanley McChrystal, by General David Petraeus, a significant increase in both security incidents and civilian casualties, and the emergence of alliance fatigue, marked by the departure of the Dutch forces from Uruzgan Province. A further major event for the year was the parliamentary elections held in late September.

Background

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US-led coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) initiated military action in Afghanistan. They overthrew the Taliban government and aimed to kill or capture the leaders of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership escaped across the border to Pakistan. Many rank-and-file members of the Taliban reintegrated into their villages.

Following the fall of the Taliban regime, a group of prominent Afghans and world leaders met in Bonn, Germany, under United Nations auspices and signed the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, more commonly known as the Bonn Agreement, on 5 December 2001. In March 2002, in Resolution 1401, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to support the Bonn Agreement for establishing a permanent Afghan government.

To provide security in Kabul and the surrounding areas, the Security Council established the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), requested by the Bonn Agreement, under Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001). In 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF (which had previously rotated among participating troop contributors on an ad hoc
basis). From 2004 to 2005, ISAF gradually expanded to the provinces, taking command of existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in the northern and western regions. The same year, following the integration of nearly 12,000 US troops under the NATO chain of command, ISAF replaced OEF as the main combat force on the ground.

Following the 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections, the political benchmarks established by the Bonn Agreement were completed. In response to the expressed need for a follow-on framework of cooperation, the Afghan government and its international partners signed the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006, committing each to high-level benchmarks in the areas of security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), co-chaired by UNAMA and the Afghan government, was established to oversee implementation of the compact. UNAMA’s mandate was revised in 2007 and 2008, providing additional authorities and capacity for donor coordination and aid effectiveness.

This year, the forces have a joint government-ISAF transition plan, which aims to enable the government of Afghanistan to strengthen further its ownership and leadership across all government functions. ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability of the insurgency and support the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the NATO Training Mission, and the main focus is to increase the capability of ANSF to take the lead in providing security in Afghanistan. The large military operation of ISAF and the government focuses on Helmand and Kandahar, where insurgents are most active.

Key Developments

Parliamentary Elections
On 18 September, the second parliamentary elections of the post-Bonn era were conducted. Despite an enormous number of individuals putting themselves forward as candidates (2,753 candidates competing for 249 seats), only 3.6 million votes were cast, representing 40 percent of 9.2 million eligible voters. ISAF assisted the ANSF to provide security for candidates and voters for the parliamentary elections. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) assumed, respectively, the first and second line of security. ISAF played only an additional role.

From the outset, insurgents threatened to disrupt the electoral process, and from a total of 6,835 polling centers, 2,448 polling stations remained closed. Of the polling stations that opened, approximately 300 security incidents were reported on election day. These attacks resulted in at least 21 voters killed and 46 wounded. In addition, several election workers were kidnapped. However, in comparison with the presidential election in 2009, the number of security-related incidences decreased by 40 percent.

As a result of excessive fraud and corruption, 10 percent of the votes were nullified. Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission received 3,000 complaints. Underage voting, proxy voting, use of fake voter ID cards, and repeated voting were common forms of fraud throughout the country. People received bribes and threatening text messages and phone calls to vote for a particular candidate. In some polling stations, most of the ballot boxes were already half filled before the voting even started.

Despite the fraud, corruption, and low voter turnout, the fact that elections took place, in a country suffering from four decades of war, is an achievement. It is credible that people went to the polls despite threats from insurgents—threats such as that they would chop off the ink-dipped fingers of voters. Villagers carried ballot boxes on their backs and on mules to the voting centers—an illustration of the commitment of Afghan people to establishing peace in their nation.

Transition from McChrystal to Petraeus
In June 2010, President Obama replaced McChrystal with Petraeus after a Rolling Stone article revealed that McChrystal had made disparaging remarks about administration officials.
McChrystal had served for a year as COM-MISAF. Petraeus, before replacing McChrystal, was the commander of US Central Command. He was also the chief architect of the US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, which was partially adopted for Afghanistan under McChrystal. The appointment of Petraeus was seen as a demonstration of Obama’s commitment to reasserting authority over one of the highest and most challenging priorities of his presidency.

The change in leadership precipitated a public discussion over timelines regarding the withdrawal of troops. In a debate largely held in the international media, Petraeus argued that the July 2011 withdrawal date was premature. Petraeus emphasized that both the start date and the rate of withdrawal should be based on “conditions on the ground.” In response to criticism over how the millions of dollars spent on defense contracts fuel corruption (and perhaps even end up in the wrong hands), the new leadership also set up new guidelines for awarding billions of dollars worth of defense contracts.

Afghan National Security Forces Training
President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of security responsibility to the ANSF. The ANSF consists of 134,000 ANA, 109,000 ANP, and the Afghan Air Force. The eventual goal for the ANSF is to reach 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011. As of October 2010, the ANP has 1,000 female personnel. The goal is to increase this number to 5,000 by October 2014.

With a special focus on ANSF training this year, ISAF and NATO have set specific goals and brought significant changes and improvements to the training. These include improved retention and a rise in wages. The ratio of instructors to students has gone from 1 for every 79 trainees in 2009 to 1 for every 29 in 2010. This year a new training center opened in Kabul, adding to the existing Kabul Military Training Center. The new center houses the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and the Afghan Defense University (ADU). The ANSF trainers have a special emphasis on literacy and aim to bring Afghan forces up to a basic understanding of language and mathematics. To encourage self-sufficiency, ISAF now offers workshops to teach Afghans how to repair equipment and to source some of the equipment from Afghan businesses.

Despite many improvements, significant challenges remain. The public perception, performance, and proficiency of the ANA have been generally positive, while the feedback on ANP suffers. Problems in the ANSF include a lack of an ANA master plan for facilities development, inadequate program management, and insufficient quality control, which has been increasingly imbalanced by the sharp rise in the quantity of forces. Some of the main challenges in the ANP include low literacy rates, deceptive recruitment tactics, desertions, drug use, and corruption. ANP personnel have also been involved in smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion at checkpoints. The international trainers and Afghanistan government have set goals to address these challenges in the ANSF.

Security and Civilian Casualties
In 2010 there was a significant increase in the number of security incidents resulting in civilian casualties. The first two months of 2010 saw a 94 percent increase in the number of reported incidents compared with the same period in 2009. Suicide attacks occurred at a rate of about three per week, half of them in the southern region. Complex suicide attacks were reported at a rate of two per month, double 2009 rates. Insurgents, on average, assassinated seven civilians per week, a 45 percent increase compared with 2009. The first six months of 2010 saw 1,074 civilians killed and more than 1,500 injured. The figures included 209 female and 217 children casualties. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks were the first and second highest causes of civilian casualties, respectively. Responsibility for the civilian casualties breaks down as insurgents 61 percent; US/NATO forces 20 percent; Afghan government forces 10 percent. As a result of inadequate medical care, many of the injured cannot be adequately treated.

Alliance Fatigue
Although the ISAF consists of forty-seven contributing countries and 119,819 troops, more
than one-half of them from the United States, the mission faces alliance fatigue, especially among European allies. Generally, in Europe the war in Afghanistan is so unpopular that it has become a dangerous political gamble for governments to continue to support it. The Dutch coalition government collapsed when NATO asked the Netherlands to extend its mission until August 2011. The Dutch withdrew 2,200 troops in August 2010 and Canada is set to withdraw its 2,800 troops in 2011. When President Obama decided to escalate the war, originally the plan was to send 30,000 US troops, counting on European allies to send an additional 10,000 troops. However, Europe contributed only an additional 1,000 troops—500 German and 500 British. France’s President Sarkozy said, “France will not send another single soldier.” But he confirmed that France would maintain its 3,300 troops in the country. With the Dutch and Canada withdrawing and France not willing to contribute more troops, there is a fear that more European countries will follow this example and pull out. Alliance fatigue puts extra pressure on the United States in the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It also adds to the urgency of enabling the ANSF to be in charge of security in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The international community and the people of Afghanistan must collaborate in order to establish peace and stability, a credible government, and basic human rights in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan depends on the commitment of the international community and the government of Afghanistan to carry out the promises of the London Conference. This year, emphasis was on transition to “full Afghan ownership,” complemented by a long-term commitment of the international community. Military and diplomatic decisions shape the future of Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan and the international community are planning to lure moderate Taliban members back into Afghan society and create a fund to offer jobs, cash, and security to militants turning in their weapons. The question for 2011 is whether the ANSF will be adequate to take control of security in Afghanistan and whether integration of the Taliban and making peace with them is the path to solving the Afghan question.
Amid the third consecutive summer of strong anti-Indian protests in Jammu-Kashmir, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continues to monitor and report on the stressed situation. While little has changed in the past year regarding UNMOGIP’s role and the relationship between India and Pakistan, there is moderate hope that meaningful negotiations will soon get under way.

The UNMOGIP has been supervising the cease-fire since the Karachi Agreement was signed in July 1949. Minor adjustments occurred in 1972, when the Line of Control (LOC) was established in Kashmir between India and Pakistan as part of the Simla Agreement. Since the agreement, UNMOGIP has maintained military observers along the LOC and reports to the Security Council on an ad hoc basis. The mission is also tasked with patrols, inspections, and investigation of any alleged violations of the line, and, when permitted by the host countries, with performing other field tasks in the area.

The relationship between India and Pakistan has remained tense, although both sides agreed to start a dialogue on the Jammu-Kashmir issues, among others, in 2004. While talks started in 2007, they were abruptly ended by the 2008 attack in Mumbai by Pakistani terrorists. Relations are starting to improve again, with a face-to-face meeting held in Russia in June of 2009 between India’s Prime Minister Singh and Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari.

This year, the foreign ministers of both countries met in person for the first time since the Mumbai attacks, but no tangible developments occurred. India and Pakistan were able to agree on formal steps toward resuming negotiations, although the talks themselves have been slow to progress. Recently, negotiations have stalled over differences regarding preconditions, with India demanding that Pakistan take a stronger stance against domestic terrorism. However, Pakistan government officials reject any preconditions for talks and, for the talks to continue, have suggested that India show greater flexibility.

Distracted this summer by the floods emergency in Pakistan, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited the region, but had little to say on the Jammu-Kashmir conflict beyond urging both sides to be patient and willing to compromise. Security remains an issue of concern as anti-India protesters have been killed by Indian forces, and it seems only minor steps to improve the situation have been taken by either government. Ultimately, a major breakthrough is needed in the negotiations in order to bring hope for a solution to the Kashmir problem.

### Box 3.1 India-Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorization Date</td>
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<td>Start Date</td>
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<td>Chief Military Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength as of 31 October 2010</td>
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<td>Local Civilian Staff: 48</td>
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For detailed mission information see p. 287