

## Central African Republic

In 2005, the CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) saw not only an extension of its mandate, but also an increase in the challenges it faces. These included urban rioting and a serious deterioration of the security situation in the northern region of the country, which borders Chad and Sudan. Nonetheless, FOMUC has brought a degree of stability to the capital, Bangui, and other cities, contributing to Central African Republic's (CAR) first free and fair elections since 1993.

2001. Originally 200 strong, the mission, primarily consisting of Gabonese troops, focused on securing Bangui and protecting Patassé. On paper, its mandate included protecting the border with Chad, initiating disarmament, and restructuring the military.

General Bozizé gained asylum in France, but he soon returned to Chad, which had allegedly supported an ongoing rebellion by his supporters in the north of CAR. The regional dimension of the conflict was underlined by the presence of Congolese rebels and Libyan forces fighting for Patassé, having come to his aid in 2001. FOMUC was established to facilitate the Libyans' departure, and duly left soon after France's deployment. The broader elements of its mandate were unachievable given the continued violence, and FOMUC's troop strength grew to approximately 350 to handle its more limited tasks.

On 17 February 2003, soldiers loyal to Bozizé seized Bangui, causing three FOMUC fatalities. Patassé was abroad, and the general formed a transitional government, promising elections. While his forces had originally been fighting FOMUC, he now called for its presence to be increased. The former colonial power, France, also deployed 300 troops to Bangui to evacuate foreign citizens and help restore order.

While the African Union called for sanctions in response to the coup, General Bozizé reached out to Congo and Gabon. On 21 March, CEMAC held an emergency summit and chose to extend FOMUC's mandate, and to expand it to include securing the cities of Bouar, Sibou, and Carnot, as well as the northern region of the country. Its authority to reorgan-

### CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)

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| • Authorization date                  | 2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit)<br>21 March 2003 (Libreville Summit, Amended) |
| • Start date                          | December 2002  |
| • Head of mission                     | Brigadier-General Auguste Roger Bibayi Itandas (Gabon)                           |
| • Budget as of<br>30 September 2005   | \$9.6 million (2005)   |
| • Strength as of<br>30 September 2005 | Troops: 380  |

FOMUC was established at the Libreville Summit of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) in December 2002. It was a response to an attempted coup that October against President Ange-Felix Patassé by General François Bozizé, army chief of staff and a former ally accused of complicity in another attempted putsch in

ize CAR armed forces and disarm others was expanded, and its strength was formally raised to 380.

FOMUC was able to contribute to some military reform, but disturbances often threatened to outstrip the progress made. In 2003, ongoing banditry, poaching, and fears of a new insurrection led General Bozizé to request further support from France, which provided 200 more troops for professional training of CAR armed forces. By early 2004 a French-trained CAR mixed-intervention battalion was able to carry out a reasonably successful mission in the north, and in March France agreed to train and equip three more battalions and thirty gendarmerie units.

The UN Peacebuilding Support Office in CAR (BONUCA; established by the Secretary-General in February 2000) has assisted FOMUC and France in overhauling the security sector. Its contributions have included support to a national committee on good governance, help in drafting a military justice code, and a civilian police component that had trained 110 police officers and 286 gendarmes by June 2005. More broadly, BONUCA has supported the work of specialized UN agencies in CAR.

By December 2004, there was sufficient stability for a new constitution to be accepted by referendum, although the run-up to the vote was marred by violence in the north. The ensuing March 2005 elections, also assisted by BONUCA, were pluralistic and widely accepted as fair, and put President Bozizé in the lead for a runoff to be held in May. But before that could be held, violence escalated in April as self-described “former liberators” blockaded the main highway from Bangui to the north, demanding “bonuses promised.”

CAR and FOMUC forces responded robustly, leaving ten dead and fifteen injured—including four FOMUC wounded. Negotiations involving the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lamine Cissé, Bozizé, FOMUC’s force commander, and Chad’s ambassador in Bangui defused the situation. Bozizé went on to win the runoff with two-thirds of

votes cast, but the security situation in the north began to deteriorate in June, driving 11,000 refugees into Chad. These refugees reported unidentified gunmen indulging in looting and random violence.

FOMUC’s mandate was renewed to the end of 2005 by CEMAC on 2 June, with the expectation of further renewals. Its interpretation of the mandate has altered: in late August it declared that it would leave a residual presence in Bangui but concentrate its resources in support of CAR forces in the north. In accordance with this new interpretation of the mandate, one hundred troops were deployed in the northeastern town of Bria in October to combat banditry. While this task falls within its 2003 mandate, it raises major operational challenges: the FOMUC force commander announced that its primary center of operations would be 500 kilometers from the capital.

While the mission is thus shifting from defending the center of government to establishing law and order in the field, there is no clear political solution to the long-standing violence in the north. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has argued that the basic cause of CAR’s instability is a lack of funds to pay civil servants and soldiers. In October, civil servants began to strike in response to the government’s failure to pay workers. Moreover, while the AU lifted its sanctions in 2004, and the EU promised 100 million euros to CAR, the economic outlook remains troubled. The discovery of diamond mines in the southwestern region of the country may offer a solution, but CAR has been identified as a center for smuggling conflict diamonds, including those from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The new mines may prove a flash point in the future.

With drug smuggling also on the increase, and HIV levels rising, FOMUC’s relatively small force and its partners face major challenges in stabilizing CAR—a significant geographical and political link in the interwoven conflicts of central Africa.

### Peace Operations in Africa



## Sri Lanka

The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005 cast the Norwegian-supported peace process in Sri Lanka into doubt and raised public questions over the role of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The assassination marked the nadir of a year of steadily increasing tension. Meanwhile, the SLMM operated without enforcement authority in an environment where agreements are flagrantly violated.

After almost two decades of civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE)—a struggle over both Sinhalese-Tamil ethnicity and the governance of the Jaffna peninsula—in 2000, the LTTE began to explore peace talks and announced a unilateral cease-fire just before the end of the year. The ceasefire lapsed in April 2001, but was redeclared after the general election in December of that year. The government reciprocated with its own unilateral cease-fire offer, formalized in a memorandum of understanding in February 2002 and mediated by Norway and other Nordic countries. While talks broke down in 2003, the ceasefire to date has largely held.

The SLMM was established on 22 February 2002 when the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement. Based on the agreement, Norway and Sri Lanka concluded a status-of-mission agreement that, among other things, sets out the privileges and immunities of SLMM and its members. The SLMM comprises members from the five Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—and is mandated to oversee the CFA, which calls for a

<b>Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)</b>	
• Authorization date	22 February 2002 (Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam [LTTE])
• Start date	February 2002
• Head of mission	Hagrup Haukland (Norway)
• Budget as of 30 September 2005	\$2.1 million (2005)
• Strength as of 30 September 2005	Military observers: 60

cessation of military operations, conditions for the separation of forces, and the free movement of personnel and nonmilitary goods.

The SLMM is headquartered in Colombo and maintains six district offices and a liaison office in Killinochchi, as well as points of contact in various locations in the north and east. District offices operate mobile units and patrol in their areas of responsibility. The SLMM has the authority to inquire into complaints anywhere in Sri Lanka, but must rely on the goodwill of relevant parties to provide access and information, and to ensure safe conduct.

The year 2005 saw continual tension and a great deal of investigative work for the SLMM. In the period between 1 January and 31 October, more than 1,200 complaints were recorded against both parties in a ratio of more than four to one against the LTTE. The mission must investigate and rule on each of these complaints.

In December 2004, Sri Lanka was badly affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. As in

the case of Aceh, there were initial hopes that the impact of the natural disaster would help to overcome divisions and create the potential for a breakthrough in the stalemated peace process. The government and LTTE did agree on a joint mechanism for allocating relief funds, but the agreement was challenged in the Supreme Court and not implemented. Jockeying over control of the funds began, with the LTTE accusing the Sri Lankan government of deliberately failing to direct aid to Tamils and refusing to allow a visit by the UN Secretary-General to LTTE-held regions in January 2005. In February, the assassination of a senior LTTE leader launched a further cycle of violence, marked by widespread killings and reprisals in Batticola and Thannamunai in April through early May. The deterioration of conditions in the east has been described by commentators as a shadow war. The assassination of Minister Kadirgamar is alternatively seen as a last straw proving the failure of the cease-fire agreement, or a step that will force both parties to seek real concessions to avoid full-scale war.

The relevance of the SLMM has been challenged by these events. Polls have shown mixed attitudes—a loss of faith in the SLMM by those who believe that more violence is inevitable, and the recognition of the necessary and vital role for monitoring by those who still hope for peace. Escalating violence at the end of the year generated real concerns about a return to full-scale civil war.

Presidential elections held on 17 November 2005 were won by Mahinda Rajapakse, who appointed Ratnasiri Wickremanayake as his prime minister. Both have taken a hard line toward the LTTE in the past, and the new president once expressed the need to “re-view” the CFA, although he later invited Norway to continue its observer role. Meanwhile, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, the Secretary-General of the Secretariat for the Coordination of the Peace Process, resigned before the elections but continues to serve as an adviser to the process.