In 2005, the security situation in Iraq remained volatile while an elected Iraqi government gained power and a new constitution was approved by referendum. While the new government requested that the US-led Multi-national Force in Iraq (MNF-I) remain for at least another year, US forces passed the domestically significant mark of 2,000 field deaths, and twelve other troop contributors withdrew their contingents in 2005. The development of a domestic security force has been slow, but the reemergence of the Iraqi state offered some political space for them to grow further.

From May 2003 to June 2004, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by the United States under its obligations as an occupying force. An interim government reestablished Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004. On 30 January 2005, multi-party elections were held in Iraq for the first time in over half a century. Despite election boycotts from the Turkmen minority in Kurdistan and a low voter turnout among Sunnis, the elections were generally held to be a success, and a National Assembly (Majlis Watani) was formed. The December 15 elections on Iraq’s first full-term Parliament were relatively peaceful and turnout was over 70%.

The current mandate for the MNF-I forces in Iraq derives from Security Council Resolution 1546, passed on 8 June 2004. This stemmed from an exchange of letters between Iraqi interim prime minister Ayad Allawi and then US secretary of state Colin Powell, attached to the resolution, in which the interim government formally requested the force’s support. On 8 November 2005 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637 extending the mandate of the MNF-I until the end of 2006. The extension was requested by Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari in a letter to the Council. MNF-I forces have remained widely deployed across Iraq, with troop and police concentrations changing in accordance with military operations and insurgency intensity. In 2005, the predominately Sunni western region of the country experienced the most intense combat.

MNF-I works alongside not only domestic police and security forces, but the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I). After the 19 August 2003 bombing of UNAMI headquarters in Baghdad, which killed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one other UN staff members, most international UN
personnel were withdrawn to a regional headquarters in Amman. UNAMI nevertheless continued to play a significant role, bolstered by Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, who helped to broker transitional arrangements during this fragile period.

In 2005, a reduced UNAMI operated from Baghdad’s secure Green Zone, the Amman headquarters, and subregional offices in Iraq. It provided technical assistance in the run-up to the January elections, and the first meeting of the transitional National Assembly in March. After the transitional government was sworn in, UNAMI was closely involved in providing legal assistance and facilitating the creation of the new constitution. The poll on the constitution proved relatively calm, and was approved by a three-quarters majority, although this result was again marred by Sunni opposition. In addition to humanitarian activities, the UN faced the difficult task of offering neutral assistance to the Iraqi government while monitoring its human rights performance, particularly concerning trials of members of the former regime.

In security terms, the development of an Iraqi force capable of maintaining security has been slow. The MNF-I claims that there are now 75,000 troops in the army, 190 in the air force, and 110 in the navy, but widespread doubts exist as to the capability and loyalty of these troops—doubts often acknowledged by the MNF-I’s commanders. A counterterrorism force and a commando battalion have conducted numerous high-profile operations, but questions of human rights observance and abuses have emerged.

Similar questions remain over the police. By June 2005, the government claimed to have over 61,000 trained and equipped regular police and 31,000 officers in police commando, public order, and mechanized police battalions. The independence, loyalty, and efficacy of these units have been tested and questioned frequently. In both the military and police forces, the challenges appear to stem from insurgent penetration as well problems of training and equipment: 35,000 police officers were trained in seven months, with over 22,000 receiving eight weeks of basic training; the course has been extended to ten weeks, and seven basic police academies are graduating over 3,500 officers each month.

Support for training Iraqi security forces has been provided by NATO since 2003. The NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I) was deployed on 14 August 2003, in response to a request from Interim Prime Minister Allawi for assistance with developing Iraqi security forces. The mission was tasked with identifying training opportunities. In December 2004 NTIM-I was replaced by NTM-I, which had a broader mandate, including the reestablishment of Iraq’s higher-level military training institutions and

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**NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)**

- Authorization date: 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546)
- Start date: August 2004
- Head of mission: Lieutenant-General Martin E. Dempsey (United States)
- Budget as of 30 September 2005: $11.7 million
- Strength as of 30 September 2005: Troops: 155

**UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)**

- Resolution passage and start date: 14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500) (Security Council Resolution 1500)
- SRSG: Ashraf Jehagir Qazi (Pakistan)
- Budget: $144 million (2005)
- Strength: UN guard unit: 134
  - Military advisers: 5
  - International civilian staff: 221
an Iraqi training command. Also tasked with coordinating national contributions of military equipment, NTM-I has overseen a major influx of matériel ranging from 306 million rounds of ammunition to 24,000 radios.

Although responsibility for Iraqi security continues to lie with MNF-I, in 2005 it received both political and practical support from the UN and NATO. Progress toward the broader goal of Iraqi self-reliance in security and stability was modest at best.