The 2006 national elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which led to the election of Joseph Kabila as president, seemed to presage a new era for the country, one with the promise of political accommodation and a move toward democratic systems. Given substantial progress in 2005 and 2006 in consolidating the political process, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the international presence as a whole signaled an intent to focus efforts in 2007 on concluding the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and on launching a security sector reform (SSR) program. Also, MONUC and other actors such as the European Union have undertaken serious efforts to rebuild the country’s police force, leading to some improvements in the overall human rights situation, and in launching more coordinated economic recovery efforts.

Efforts on these fronts proceeded with mixed results, and were substantially complicated by renewed violence in the east, involving the government, the renegade general, Laurent Nkunda, and several militias. The violence dampened expectations, and cast renewed doubts over the outcomes from the hard-won peace. For much of the year, MONUC was compelled to reorient its efforts toward responding to mass displacement and humanitarian crisis in the Kivus. Indeed, the DDR process and the renewed violence were intertwined, as the government treated non-compliance with DDR agreements as an occasion for launching new military activity against insurgents. This generated some early successes for the government, though many within MONUC and other international observers were initially concerned that the government did not have the capacity to successfully implement its military strategy, and that its approach risked further fueling conflict, especially in the east. By December 2007, however, MONUC had determined that it would support renewed operations by the government in the east. The country entered a volatile new phase, and MONUC shifted its doctrinal and operational stance toward robust operational support to the elected government.¹

Background
Despite the signing of a 1999 cease-fire agreement, the multiparty war in the DRC, dubbed “Africa’s First World War,” only came to an end in 2002 with the signing of
and for the convening of national elections. Joseph Kabila became the president of the interim government, which also comprised four vice presidents, representing the president’s party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), and the unarmed opposition and civil society.

MONUC was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999), and given a mandate: to establish contact with the signatories of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement, including the state signatories; liaise with the Joint Military Commission; provide information on the security situation in its area of operation; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, children, and other war-affected persons. MONUC’s mandate has evolved from its initial role as an observer to a more robust posture, especially since the adoption of Resolution 1493 (2003), which authorized the mission to use force in the protection of civilians.

The crisis in the east in 2003, which was partially precipitated by the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the town of Bunia, threatened to degenerate into a humanitarian crisis as various militias battled each other to fill the void. This prompted the EU, at the request of the UN Secretary-General, to deploy the International Emergency Multinational Force, also known as Operation Artemis, in June 2003. Operation Artemis—the EU’s first out-of-area operation—was mandated to provide security for a three-month period, pending reinforcement of the thin MONUC presence in the area. In May–June 2004, a group of local dissidents led by General Laurent Nkunda overran the town of Bukavu in South Kivu, despite MONUC’s presence. MONUC’s perceived failure to prevent the takeover affected its credibility with the local population, who took to the streets protesting against the mission. However, public confidence in MONUC’s capabilities was partly restored when, in 2005, it mounted robust operations against “spoilers” in the area.
The mission has since maintained a strong presence in the volatile east.

Continued instability in the country’s eastern provinces delayed the planned transition to an elected government from 2003 until 2006, when the country held its first multiparty elections in forty years. The elections were facilitated by MONUC as well as by a second EU short-term military support operation, the EU Force Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), deployed from July to November 2006.

With its 16,665 troops and 994 police, MONUC is at present the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the field.

**Major Developments**

**Security and Political**

The government of President Kabila, emboldened by the legitimacy from the widely acclaimed presidential and parliamentary elections of 2006, entered 2007 determined to conclude the process of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating all of the armed groups in the country. The government issued an ultimatum to former RCD-Goma leader Azarias Ruberwa, General Laurent Nkunda, and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba that they allow their armed personal aides and militias to demobilize in March 2007. In their place, the government offered twelve police bodyguards to each leader. While Ruberwa complied, Jean-Pierre Bemba resisted the move, after which the government launched an attack on his headquarters in Kinshasa. According to diplomatic sources, over 600 people were killed, and Bemba was forced to seek refuge in the South African embassy before being granted permission to travel to Lisbon to seek medical treatment. Afterward, the remnants of Bemba’s forces were subjected to summary demobilization and dispersed out of Kinshasa.

The casualty toll from these clashes, however, paled in comparison to the deaths and displacements caused by renewed fighting in the troubled Kivu provinces. The fighting in the east during the second half of 2007 pitted rebels loyal to General Laurent Nkunda against several groups, including the national army (Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo [FARDC]) and the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda [FDLR]). The fighting also involved scattered groups of traditional Mayi Mayi, some of whom allegedly joined the government in the regional towns of Bukavu, Maniema, and Goma. The fighting and resultant displacements forced MONUC to concentrate 85 percent of its forces there to protect civilians and help stave off humanitarian disaster.

The continuing crisis prompted William Swing, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), to visit the area in September on a confidence-building tour designed to reassure local leaders and government officials in Kaleme, Moba, and Pweto of the determination of the international community to maintain peace in the region. Some success was noted after the visits of the SRSG to the Ituri area. MONUC subsequently called on the government to develop a coherent political, diplomatic, and military plan to address the situation in the two Kivus.

**Economic Reconstruction**

Despite the instability in the east, MONUC’s presence has paved the way for the commencement of immediate postconflict reconstruction and long-term peacebuilding activities in other parts of the country. The establishment of the Country Assistance Framework (CAF) in the poelection period was designed to harmonize the various programs and activities of the large number of agencies involved in reconstruction efforts. The CAF, which fused the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) with the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), is a coordinating framework aimed at reducing the transaction costs on the government of the DRC and among the various bilateral and multilateral agencies involved in reconstruction work in the country. It consists of over seventeen bilateral and multilateral members, including MONUC and other mem-
bers of the UN system. The CAF, which covers the period from 2007 to 2010, is tailored to the priorities identified in the country’s poverty reduction strategy paper, which covers the same period. Some bilateral donors have expressed concern that basing the CAF on the World Bank’s poverty reduction strategy provides too narrow a lens for development in a still-insecure setting like the DRC.

**DDR and SSR Effort:**

**The Brassage Process**

The original roadmap for security sector reform in the DRC, laid out in February 2004, had six key elements: (1) development of a comprehensive national security sector policy, (2) coordination of SSR and DDR bodies under this common vision and strategy, (3) a plan for police reform, (4) creation of laws concerning national defense and the armed forces, (5) execution of a realistic military integration plan linked to comprehensive DDR, and (6) a coherent, timely, effective, and sustainable plan for deployment of integrated FARDC units, and the refurbishment of military training.

Accordingly, MONUC established a joint commission (jointly chaired by the SRSG and the DRC government) that coupled with a contact group (chaired by the EU and Belgium) to review policy, track progress, support needs, and advise and assist the government. This process led to the creation of two primary national plans for SSR in the DRC, one for DDR, and one for integrating the army.

In its national DDR efforts, MONUC and the government adopted a model known as “brassage,” the core thrust of which was to reorganize former rebel units in two respects. First, the goal was to dismantle the rebel command and control lines, integrating former combatants to the new lines of FARDC authority. Second, the rapid disarmament and demobilization plan also involved the physical relocation of combatants to different regions of the country. The first phase of the brassage ran from September 2004 to September 2005, after which the second phase included limited military assistance by MONUC to the FARDC for enforced demobilization.

Under MONUC’s mandate to facilitate DDR, 44,046 former combatants had been disarmed by December 2006, while 96,478 had been demobilized. Of the latter number, 50,541 had chosen to be reintegrated into the new army, resulting in fourteen of an intended eighteen integrated brigades.

MONUC also facilitated the provision of basic police training to 53,000 Congolese, with 32,000 receiving basic equipment from the UN Development Programme (UNDP). While police training was initially focused on providing security for the 2006 elections, the initiative has continued. The adoption of Resolution 1756 (2007) renewed attention to strategic planning on justice and correction issues, which had received little attention in the past.

Despite the challenges in the east, the government pledged to launch an SSR program as part of its “governance contract,” placing particular emphasis on the rule of law.

In February 2007, a contact-group meeting in Pretoria transferred leadership of SSR programming to the Congolese government. In July 2007, the first government-led meet-
ing produced a ministerial vision for defense reform that consisted of four pillars: (1) creation of a deterrent force (often referred to as a rapid reaction force), (2) development of a “vision of excellence” for the army by restoring discipline, training, and judicial oversight, (3) creation of an army that contributes to the reconstruction of the country, and (4) creation of an army that is self-supporting and can feed soldiers and dependants. Accordingly, the contact group agreed to host a roundtable on SSR in October 2007. During this period, however, schisms and splits within the army structure became evident, over events in the east but also over visions for the future of and ownership over SSR. Tensions between actors, and an overall lack of coordination and leadership, delayed SSR progress. These issues culminated in the postponement of the planned roundtable when both the chief of staff and the minister of defense presented competing plans for reform, at various levels of clarity, reflecting deep policy divisions between major bilateral donors.

While MONUC is preparing to conventionally train former rebel combatants in the integrated fourteen brigades by September 2009—as the new national army—the Congolese government is itself carrying out a similar process with at least six more brigades, and has mobilized assistance through bilateral arrangements with other countries such as Angola, South Africa, Belgium, and the United States. Training was scheduled to start in September 2007 and continue until September 2009, and will be linked with the major guiding policy statement on development and security for the five-year period (2007–2011) as released during the presidential inaugural speech on 6 December 2006.

Meanwhile, MONUC and UNDP were also involved in an innovative, cross-border program for the disarmament and return of foreign forces on Congolese soil in a model called disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, resettlement, and rehabilitation (DDRRR). The UN facilitated the departure of 15,000 armed foreign elements during the first phase of this program. Significantly, the MONUC-UNDP initiative has followed these ex-combatants, including former members of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and the genocidal Interhamwe militia, as well as their families, to recipient countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, and has partly assisted in their resettlement and rehabilitation. A further 24,927 combatants, of whom 1,001 are women, have also been disarmed, while 20,000 militia in the Ituri region have been demobilized. This group of nearly 45,000 is now awaiting repatriation and resettlement to their countries of origin.

A significant complication in the DDR process arose with accusations of substantial corruption in the Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER). The government agreed to restructure the widely discredited commission.

Despite the aforementioned progress, by December 2007 there were still 34,786 troops from the Kinshasa garrison and the Republican Guards who needed to be demobilized. Furthermore, efforts to implement a DDR process in the east, which commenced on 4 January 2007 following an agreement struck in Kigali, Rwanda, collapsed soon thereafter.

The Mixage Process and Renewed Violence in the East

A new framework for DDR in the east emerged in December 2006, following a meeting in Kigali between General Nkunda and President Kabila’s special adviser, General John Nkumbi. This meeting resulted in an agreement to establish new brigades, under the aegis of the FARDC, through a process known as “mixage,” based on two principles. First, Nkunda would remain in command of his troops and be absorbed with his forces almost intact. Second, the newly created force of the FARDC was to be given the task of hunting down and eliminating the so-called negative forces—including FDLR combatants, Nkunda’s (and his alleged backer, Rwanda’s) longtime opponents. Integration began in mid-January 2007, and by 27 March the mixed brigades were deemed operational.
However, by April the relationship between Nkunda and the government had deteriorated so much that the government suspended integration of the last brigade, and the Mayi Mayi withdrew, accusing Nkunda of planning attacks against non-Tutsi groups. Shortly after, the mixed brigades loyal to Nkunda launched a series of offensives against the FDLR, allegedly committing numerous human rights abuses. On 5 May, Nkunda announced that the mixage process was over, blaming the government on numerous grounds, including a lack of logistical support for counter-FDLR operations, and failing to withdraw the arrest warrant against him.

Three major factors were responsible for the breakdown of the mixage process. First, no formal documentation existed, and both sides were unwilling to publicly clarify the terms of the “agreement,” particularly regarding timetables for disarmament. The complex relationships between the government and groups hostile to Nkunda, such as the Mayi Mayi, as well as with respect to broader communal tensions, made the agreement seem unworkable from the outset. Second, it was clear that Nkunda and his officers had exploited the Kigali agreement and used it to consolidate their positions, making it difficult for the FARDC to exert influence and control in the region. Third, the payout to combatants under this process was a paltry $50 per month over three months, compared to $300 for the same period that was paid to ex-combatants in Liberia, and even those monies were partially unavailable because of the restructuring of CONADER and difficulties with the World Bank. Thousands of troops were effectively strangled by this lack of funds and rendered susceptible to other readily available alternative sources for survival. Nkunda exploited the natural and mineral resources of the Kivus, as well as (allegedly) financial support from Tutsi businesspeople in eastern Congo, and was able to offer soldiers better stipends on a more regular basis than the government.

With the mixage process in tatters, Nkunda’s forces allegedly began targeting government officials and institutions, as well as humanitarian workers. Officials from CONADER were forced to flee the area. Emboldened by his military success, Nkunda subsequently announced the formation of a political party, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP).

The next months saw increased military buildup by both sides, escalating rhetoric, and mounting pressure from the international community for a political solution. Negotiations led nowhere and widespread violence broke out on 28 August 2007, when Nkunda loyalists attacked pro-Kinshasa elements. The fear of regional spillover led to a renewed round of diplomacy, and ultimately to the issuance of a joint Rwandan-Congolese communiqué on “a common approach to end the threat posed to peace and stability.” The communiqué appeared to signal new common ground on the approach to the FDLR, and by early December 2007 this had freed the government to pursue Nkunda, while addressing Rwanda’s long-standing concerns. On 21 November, in a joint press conference between MONUC’s force commander, General Babacar Gaye, and the FARDC’s chief of staff, General Dieudonne Kayembe, General Gaye stated simply that: “All peaceful ways have been explored without result . . . this is another phase where there is no solution but to force troops into brassage, without delay or conditions.”

This marked a significant shift from MONUC’s earlier position of not supporting operations against Nkunda. At the time of writing, MONUC was poised to support new operations by the government in the east. The consequences of such a posture, and of the operations that may ensue, will shape events in 2008, and perhaps beyond.

**Conclusion**

The year in review started with MONUC engaged in DDR, SSR, and economic recovery activities, in a context of cautious optimism about the process of stabilizing a hard-won peace. DDR through the brassage model ap-
Efforts to protect children in conflict and postconflict societies, especially those hosting UN peace operations, have made remarkable progress since the mid-1990s. The Secretary-General’s August 1996 note to the General Assembly, titled “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” (UN Doc. A/51/306), raised awareness about the issue and led to the appointment of a Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in 1997. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council that mentioned child protection rose significantly. The adoption of Resolution 1261 (1999) was significant, as it called for “training on the protection, rights, and welfare of children” to be included in UN activities. This resulted in the creation of a new category of peacekeeping personnel known as child protection advisers (CPAs).

The first CPAs were deployed in the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) during 2000. Operating under the overall guidance of mission heads, the principal tasks of CPAs included advising the senior mission leadership and other mission components on a comprehensive approach to child protection, advocating child rights and protection with other relevant partners on the ground, collaborating with child protection personnel both inside and outside the mission, and reporting on violations and other related issues. To date, CPAs have been deployed in seven missions, with a strength of sixty posts in six missions during 2007. Current large-scale CPA deployments include thirty-four posts in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and seventeen in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

In May 2007, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned a survey of the activities and impact of CPAs in field. The survey results were derived from responses by current and former CPAs, interviews held with stakeholders at UN headquarters, including the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and field visits to MONUC and UNMIS. Notably, the survey found the following:

- Monitoring and reporting activities of CPAs have brought attention to the needs of children affected by all stages of conflict, particularly in regard to the UN peace and security agenda.
- Collaboration with various partners has facilitated a general mainstreaming of child protection issues in other mission components.
- CPAs have been instrumental in implementing the UN’s zero-tolerance policy toward sexual exploitation and abuse.

While the accomplishments of the CPAs have been significant, they have also been limited by several factors, including the inability of CPAs to advocate and identify resources for national child protection institutions and raise awareness among the whole spectrum of mission components. The survey found that, despite clearly defined terms of reference for CPAs, the inconsistency in child protection mandates provided to each mission and the varied deployment of CPAs per mission have led to confusion over their role in relation to other actors. Other obstacles include dissimilar profiles and selection processes of CPAs, a nonexistent DPKO operational support capacity, and an inability to fully and consistently collaborate with other child protection professionals on the ground. The survey indicated that all of these issues can be resolved through increased coordination and clarification from the DPKO, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

**Box 3.2.1 Child Protection Advisers in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Efforts to protect children in conflict and postconflict societies, especially those hosting UN peace operations, have made remarkable progress since the mid-1990s. The Secretary-General’s August 1996 note to the General Assembly, titled “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” (UN Doc. A/51/306), raised awareness about the issue and led to the appointment of a Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in 1997. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council that mentioned child protection rose significantly. The adoption of Resolution 1261 (1999) was significant, as it called for “training on the protection, rights, and welfare of children” to be included in UN activities. This resulted in the creation of a new category of peacekeeping personnel known as child protection advisers (CPAs).

The first CPAs were deployed in the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) during 2000. Operating under the overall guidance of mission heads, the principal tasks of CPAs included advising the senior mission leadership and other mission components on a comprehensive approach to child protection, advocating child rights and protection with other relevant partners on the ground, collaborating with child protection personnel both inside and outside the mission, and reporting on violations and other related issues. To date, CPAs have been deployed in seven missions, with a strength of sixty posts in six missions during 2007. Current large-scale CPA deployments include thirty-four posts in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and seventeen in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

In May 2007, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned a survey of the activities and impact of CPAs in field. The survey results were derived from responses by current and former CPAs, interviews held with stakeholders at UN headquarters, including the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and field visits to MONUC and UNMIS. Notably, the survey found the following:

- Monitoring and reporting activities of CPAs have brought attention to the needs of children affected by all stages of conflict, particularly in regard to the UN peace and security agenda.
- Collaboration with various partners has facilitated a general mainstreaming of child protection issues in other mission components.
- CPAs have been instrumental in implementing the UN’s zero-tolerance policy toward sexual exploitation and abuse.

While the accomplishments of the CPAs have been significant, they have also been limited by several factors, including the inability of CPAs to advocate and identify resources for national child protection institutions and raise awareness among the whole spectrum of mission components. The survey found that, despite clearly defined terms of reference for CPAs, the inconsistency in child protection mandates provided to each mission and the varied deployment of CPAs per mission have led to confusion over their role in relation to other actors. Other obstacles include dissimilar profiles and selection processes of CPAs, a nonexistent DPKO operational support capacity, and an inability to fully and consistently collaborate with other child protection professionals on the ground. The survey indicated that all of these issues can be resolved through increased coordination and clarification from the DPKO, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

tions. The transfer of Katanga to the ICC coincided with reports of human rights violations by the FARDC and other militias involved in the war in the east. By late September 2007, international attention was also drawn to reports of increased incidents of gender-based violence by all sides to the conflict in the Kivus, including the FARDC.

As the year drew to a close, however, it was once again the crisis in the east that dominated political and security issues in the DRC. Whether the government-backed January 2008 peace conference in the provincial town of Goma succeeds in dealing with the crisis in the region, or whether the government reverts to a policy of forceful demobilization and disarmament will shape the prospects for peace consolidation. As became evident by late 2007, real security sector reform will be impossible given the instability in the east. For MONUC, the decision to support government operations in the east will likely substantially shape the challenges the mission may face in the year to come—and perhaps peacekeeping doctrine more broadly.

Notes
1. MONUC’s stance in supporting the elected government was reminiscent of that taken by the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), backed up by a contingent of UK Royal Marines, in supporting the elected government of Sierra Leone when the government and the mission were attacked by rebels in 1999.
5. Presentation by Major-General Cammeart, former MONUC commander, at the ISS, September 2007.