Sudan remains one of the most challenging peace operation theaters in the world, playing host to the UN in the south, an AU-led mission in Darfur, and the newly authorized hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Efforts to resolve the crisis in Sudan’s western Darfur region, including providing adequate support to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remained a major preoccupation for the international community throughout the year. The compromise agreement that led to the authorization of a hybrid UN-AU peace operation—the first of its kind between the two institutions—was welcomed as a positive step in the tortuous search for solutions to the crisis, but implementation was painfully slow and marred by continuing Sudanese objections over the composition of the force. High-profile visits in September 2007 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and in October by a group of eminent elders led by former US president Jimmy Carter and Bishop Desmond Tutu, along with pressure from civil society groups, helped to highlight the gravity of the crisis and the need for international action. Secretary-General Ban identified Darfur as one of his priorities, and outlined a three-pronged strategy—the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force, revitalizing the peace process, and providing humanitarian and reconstruction support to the victims of the crisis—to resolve the conflict.

Meanwhile, on 11 October, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) suspended its participation in the government of national unity that was established after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The SPLM cited lack of implementation of key provisions of the CPA, such as boundary demarcation and wealth-sharing, as the reason for its actions. This move drew attention to the faltering north-south peace process, which has been overshadowed by the Darfur crisis, prompting calls for a balanced approach to ensure that efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis would not deflect attention from the implementation of the CPA, which is crucial to peace in Sudan. Meanwhile, the SPLM returned to the Government of National Unity in December but a clash between the SPLA and an Arab militia around the same time, which left an estimated one hundred people dead, was a manifestation of the continued tensions between the parties.

AMIS: Mandate and Functions

AMIS was initially deployed in June 2004 with 60 observers and a protection force of
300 troops. After several attacks in October of that year, the AU Peace and Security Council expanded the force to 3,000 and gave AMIS a more robust mandate, including protection of civilians and proactive deployment against hostile groups, but it lacked the capacity to do so. In March 2005, AMIS was again expanded, to 6,171 military personnel and 1,586 civilian police.

The Darfur crisis continued unabated throughout 2007, overwhelming the approximately 7,000 uniformed personnel in the region. AMIS’s deployment throughout the year was complicated by severe logistical and financial challenges and was disrupted by increased hostility from the various belligerent groups. This reality fed into the dominant debate of the year, over the nature and composition of a peacekeeping force to replace AMIS. Facing continued resistance from the government of Sudan to the deployment of a UN-led operation, a compromise was reached on the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), authorizing deployment of UNAMID, comprising 26,000 troops.

**AMIS: Key Developments in Darfur**

Peacekeeping efforts in 2007 were complemented by efforts to revitalize the peace process, which had ground to a halt soon after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. Consultations involving all parties, and led by Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson of the Joint UN-AU Mediation Support Team, culminated in a meeting of the various nonsignatories of the DPA in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 2007. While the Arusha meeting concluded with an agreement between the majority of rebel groups and Khartoum to continue talks in Sirte, Libya, in October 2007, Abdul Wahid Mohammed Nur, founder of the Sudan Liberation Movement, boycotted the proceedings. The Tripoli peace talks received a serious blow when, barely a week before the start of the talks, the Justice and Equality Movement and several other groups announced that they would also boycott the meeting. The announcements came after an October meeting of several rebel groups in Juba, in south Sudan, failed to reach a consensus on the proposed peace talks. At the time of writing, efforts were under way to jumpstart the stalled peace talks in Libya, and some progress had been achieved in the deployment of UNAMID, with the establishment of joint headquarters and the arrival of new police and troop units. But with no commitment of attack helicopters and other force enablers, coupled with difficulties with the government, especially over the composition of the mission, the prospects for a rapid deployment of UNAMID remained slim.

**Power- and Wealth-Sharing**

Progress in implementing the DPA was limited, despite the appointment of Minni Minawi—the only rebel signatory to the agreement—as special assistant to the president and chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. The process of establishing some of the key structures provided for in the DPA, such as the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission, lagged significantly, and the few
structures that were put in place hardly functioned. For instance, the Transitional Authority, established in October 2006, was only inaugurated in May 2007 amid a lack of clarity concerning its relationship with other local government entities in Darfur. Meanwhile, representatives of the Sudan Liberation Army–Minawi were appointed to several positions in the government of Khartoum. But the limited support for the DPA undercut the effectiveness of such appointments, as they were not representative of the various factions in Darfur.

Meanwhile, the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)—proposed by the Darfur Peace Agreement—commenced with several preconsultation meetings involving local groups in Darfur. The DDDC’s Preparatory Committee identified four stakeholder groups—native administration, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society, and intellectuals—and consultations were undertaken in order to identify representatives for each. Proper representation of all the stakeholders is viewed as key to the success of the DDDC, but the process has been complicated by the pervasive insecurity on the ground.

The deteriorating security situation forced AMIS to suspend efforts to assess the development and reconstruction needs as provided for by the DPA, significantly hampering wealth-sharing efforts. This led to the cancellation of a planned donor pledging conference that had been expected to follow the report of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. The conference
was viewed as a crucial step in raising funds to address the dire socioeconomic challenges that are partly believed to have precipitated the conflict.

Security Arrangements
Although AMIS maintained over 90 percent of its uniformed personnel on the ground, implementation of the security arrangements provided for by the DPA registered limited progress. Splintering and infighting among the rebel movements, as well as fighting against the government, undermined any efforts to implement the security provisions. Contrary to the DPA, the Janjaweed militia was not disarmed and remained active, persistently attacking innocent civilians throughout the year. Lack of access to areas controlled by nonsignatories to the DPA significantly limited verification of the locations of the parties and any monitoring of violations of the cease-fire agreement. In fact, by June 2007, verification of the parties’ locations had only taken place in two out of the eight sectors.1 The Cease-Fire Commission—a dual chamber for signatories and nonsignatories—was proposed as a compromise at the end of 2006, but was held hostage by government and rebel movements and proved largely ineffective during 2007. The government objected to the presence of representatives of the nonsignatories to the DPA on the commission, while the nonsignatories argued that the commission should be based on the N'Djamena Agreement of 2004.

These developments occurred at a time of increased hostility toward AMIS. Between March and September 2007, twenty AMIS peacekeepers were killed. The 29 September and 30 September attacks on an AU base in the town of Haskanita, which left ten peacekeepers dead, were the most deadly hostile actions recorded during this period. Although the motives of the attackers were unknown, the attacks reinforced the need for the hybrid UN-AU force to be sufficiently robust to deter such actions, as well as to adequately defend itself and the civilian population when faced with such hostility.

Interethnic and intraethnic fighting also surged in 2007, leading to the deaths of hundreds of civilians. The ethnic feuds were not limited to the rebel movements, but extended to Arab tribes believed by some to be the backbone of the Janjaweed. Additionally, there were reports of the government settling Arab nomads from neighboring countries in areas that were previously abandoned due to the conflict, raising significant concerns about the prospects of return for IDPs and refugees to those areas. A likely sticking point in the upcoming round of peace talks will therefore be the “right of return.” Increasing militarization of IDP camps also emerged as a major security concern, as the presence of armed persons served as a pretext for attacks on the camps.

Humanitarian Situation
The unstable security situation triggered a fresh wave of refugees and IDPs, swelling the ranks of existing IDP and refugee populations. An estimated 250,000 civilians were displaced during the first three quarters of 2007, with some humanitarian agencies reporting substantially more displacements. Several
thousand Chadian refugees crossed the border into Darfur due to cross-border fighting and massive displacement of civilian populations. Humanitarian access was hampered by the increased attacks on humanitarian workers and the poor road conditions during the rainy season. The deteriorating security situation led to the suspension of humanitarian activities in some areas, leaving thousands of civilians without any support systems. Despite these difficulties in providing aid, Darfur continued to play host to the world’s largest humanitarian operation, aimed at assisting approximately 4.2 million conflict-affected people.

**From AMIS to UNAMID**

Faced with serious financial and logistical challenges, AMIS was nonetheless the only international force operating in Darfur during 2007. The mission continued to implement its mandate, but with great difficulty, as its personnel were deliberately targeted and often went for months without their allowances. Meanwhile, efforts to implement the light and heavy support packages—agreed to at the end of 2006 to bolster AMIS—continued throughout the year. By September 2007, the full complement of the light support package had been deployed, and it was anticipated that implementation of the heavy support package would have been completed before the deployment of the hybrid force in early 2008. However, deployment of the support packages was delayed by a combination of factors, including the poor security situation, and lack of accommodation and other facilities meeting UN standards. After months of negotiations with the government of Sudan, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), authorizing the deployment of UNAMID. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mission is to consist of over 26,000 uniformed personnel: 19,555 military personnel (including 360 military observers and liaison officers), 3,772 police personnel, and 19 formed police units with 140 officers in each unit. The resolution emphasized the need to maintain the “African character” of the mission, a condition that was put forward by the government of Sudan. The fact that the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII and included a mandate to protect civilians was viewed by many as an important first step, as protecting the vulnerable civilian population is widely recognized as the most pressing security challenge in Darfur. On the other hand, many expressed concern about the fact that Resolution 1769’s section on the protection of civilians appeared to have been qualified, stipulating that the mission was authorized only to “take the necessary action” in protecting civilians and mission staff, rather than the usual authorization to “use all necessary means.” In July 2007, the AU and the UN agreed on the appointment of Rodolphe Adada and General Martin Luther Agwai as the joint special representative and force commander of the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force, respectively.

The creation and deployment of UNAMID poses several important and unique challenges. Foremost is the ability of the mission to maintain the African character of the force without compromising its effectiveness. While AU member states have demonstrated a definite willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions in their own backyards, their overall capacity is less clear. In particular, most potential African troop contributors lack the force enablers, such as attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers, that are essential to UNAMID’s effectiveness. In late 2007, offers from Sweden, Norway, and other countries to provide enabling contingents were being stymied by the government of Sudan. A second concern is that of command and control, especially regarding the strategic direction of the mission (an issue elaborated on in Chapter 2 in this Review). While the resolution emphasizes that the mission will adhere to the unity of command principle, there is no guarantee against rifts that may appear at the strategic level. As of November 2007, no mechanism had been established for resolution of potential disagreement between the AU and the UN. Third, the mandate does not specify how the mission will interact with the numerous humanitarian agen-
cies on the ground without compromising the neutrality principle, an especially crucial concern given the hostile environment in Darfur. The fourth challenge is how the mission will secure enough water to support its personnel without depriving the local population of the much-needed resource in the arid environment of Darfur. The fifth challenge concerns cooperation of the government of Sudan with respect to issues such as land acquisition and authorizing night flights. The issue of night flights—which the government denied AMIS—is especially crucial in light of UNAMID’s mandate to protect civilians, which will be significantly hampered if the mission’s movement is limited at night. Finally, coordination among the UN, AU, and various other actors, including the newly authorized UN-EU peace operations in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic, will be a critical challenge.

UNMIS: Background
The broad range of tasks and responsibilities that fall within the UNMIS mandate are typical of modern multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations. Authorized in 2005 by the UN Security Council, UNMIS has been charged with providing support to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This support has been manifested primarily in the mission’s role as honest broker, providing good offices to facilitate the dialogue between the strong central government of Sudan based in Khartoum, and the nascent government of southern Sudan in Juba. In addition to the mission’s Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, UNMIS has been made responsible for monitoring compliance with cease-fire agreements, and for supervision of the redeployment of armed groups—as well as police restructuring, human rights monitoring, and support of government efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants. It is mandated to support preparations for the 2009 general election, and for the 2011 referendum on southern independence. Working closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, and the World Food Programme, UNMIS officials have also coordinated the massive relief effort that has facilitated the return and reintegration of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons this year.

UNMIS: Key Developments and Challenges
Military and police deployments were largely implemented in 2007, with deployment of military peacekeepers and civilian police reaching 97 percent and 96 percent of authorized strength, respectively, as of August. UNMIS undertook a decentralization of mission authority from Khartoum to the southern capital of Juba, with a view to strengthening the level of contact between UNMIS officials and the southern authorities. The mission continued to struggle with severe recruitment and retention challenges among its civilian staff, most notably the lack of a head of mission beginning in October 2006 when Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jan Pronk was declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. This personnel problem was exacerbated by the growing international attention to the crisis in Darfur, and the intense pres-
sure for UNMIS to divert scarce human resources away from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to the support of the Darfur Peace Agreement in the west. Only in September was Ashraf Qazi appointed to the position of UNMIS SRSG.

**Power- and Wealth-Sharing**

The year in review saw limited forward movement in the development of southern governance institutions. The parties came to an agreement on the procedural rules for the National Petroleum Commission, but the persistent mistrust between them meant that the enforcement of wealth-sharing agreements continued to be a challenge. Wealth-sharing agreements were further complicated by the slow disbursement of development funding from the World Bank–administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund and lower-than-expected oil revenues, both of which resulted in a budget deficit for the government of southern Sudan and strikes by teachers and veterans unhappy about the delays in their wages.

The demarcation of the north-south border continues to be highly controversial and has achieved minimal progress. During 2007, the Technical Border Committee conducted visits to the border region, and plans were under way for an UNMIS-supported workshop on international best practices for the border demarcation process. It is currently hoped that the final demarcation of the border will take place in the second quarter of 2008. The status of the contested area north of Abyei continues to be unresolved, and persistent restrictions on the movement of UNMIS patrols have challenged fulfillment of the mission’s monitoring mandate in the area. Abyei, a region hotly contested by the north and south during the 2004 negotiations, and a potential flashpoint for interethnic violence, continues to threaten the success of the CPA.

While the lack of basic infrastructure and shortages of skilled professionals have hampered development of a functioning judiciary in the south, UNMIS, in conjunction with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and local authorities, has sponsored a number of capacity-building initiatives to support the development of judicial, police, and prison reform. Positive developments were reflected in the anticorruption efforts of Slava Kiir, president of the government of southern Sudan, including a significant reshuffling of the southern cabinet, and the dismissal of the southern minister of finance. Additionally, the establishment of the National Human Rights and National Civil Service Commissions, the functioning of the Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, and the agreement between the government of national unity and the government of southern Sudan with regard to the respective jurisdictions of the two levels of government, marked significant strides in the transition to stability in the region. Election preparations took a step forward as well, when the pilot census was successfully completed in April. The official census, however, was pushed back from the planned date of November 2007 to January 2008, and UNMIS continues to monitor and support developments around the census and other electoral assistance activities. Internally, UNMIS has undertaken steps to enhance its capacity to support elections processes in preparation for the January census and the 2009 elections.

**Security**

The security situation in southern Sudan remains tenuous in the face of ongoing interethnic violence, banditry, and violent confrontations over cattle and grazing rights. At the same time, the Lord’s Resistance Army—a Sudan-based Ugandan rebel group, four of whose leaders have been indicted by the International Criminal Court—was perceived by some as an ongoing security threat in 2007. UNMIS has attempted to address this generalized insecurity by working with local politicians and communities to promote community-based reconciliation, and by intensifying patrols in insecure areas. As refugee and IDP returns have continued to increase dramatically, there is further concern that competition over land and water resources, as well as over severely strained
services such as education and healthcare, will become a new source of tension, particularly in and around the overcrowded towns of Juba and Malakal. Militia attacks have contributed to insecurity on the primary roads around Juba, and a peacekeeper was killed in an attack on a civilian demining team in the eastern equatorial region in January 2007, compounding concerns about the safety of UN and humanitarian staff. In November 2006 a violent clash between the Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army factions in Malakal resulted in over 150 deaths and the temporary relocation of nonessential UN staff, while a similar clash south of Abyei in January 2007 over the integration of troops from other armed groups displaced over 2,000 civilians. In both cases, UNMIS negotiated with the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, as well as local leaders, to defuse the tensions and restore stability.

Security reforms were slow to materialize during the year in review, but by August the joint integrated units (JIUs)—which were created to provide the basis for national security under the terms of the CPA—had reached 77 percent of their expected strength. The capacity of the JIUs to deliver real security guarantees, however, has been uncertain. While a common code of conduct was agreed on by the parties in February, many JIUs lack discipline and logistical capabilities, and most continue to operate under parallel command and control structures. UNMIS has had a limited role in improving this situation, and in responding to specific shortcomings in the JIUs, as the joint defense board has not yet come to an agreement on a request for assistance. This weakness of the JIUs has been used to defend the slow pace of Sudan Armed Forces redeployment to the north, a crucial step that was meant to have been completed ahead of the 9 July 2007 deadline stipulated in the CPA. As of July 2007, only 66 percent of the troops stationed in south Sudan had been redeployed outside the region. Furthermore, there continues to be a significant Sudan Armed Forces presence in the contested areas of southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Abyei, as well as in the oil-rich Upper Nile.

The work of the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegation (DDR) progressed slowly and, despite some promising steps during 2007, the national DDR strategy was not completed. The council did meet for the first time, in December 2006, and established a technical subcommittee for DDR, which UNMIS will support. Notable progress on the ground included the formal absorption of southern Sudan’s defense forces into the ranks of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. In other positive security developments, the UNMIS civilian police continued to be co-located with local police officers, and worked to promote community policing strategies and international human rights standards. In June 2007, the first class of twenty-nine UN-trained police officers graduated from their program; they are expected to form the nucleus of the new Juba police force.

**Conclusion**

Efforts to deploy the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur—which became operational on 31 December 2007—and revitalize the peace process while ensuring implementation of the CPA remained the focus of international engagement in Sudan throughout the year. While the authorization of UNAMID is a positive step in bringing stability to the region, its success depends on how rapidly the uniformed and civilian components of the mission are deployed. Sudan’s continued intransigence, and the UN’s approach to overcoming it, delayed deployments in the final months of 2007. UNAMID’s ability to effectuate significant change in Darfur also depends on the ongoing political efforts to reach an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s visit to the region in the summer of 2007 highlighted the intense international pressure being placed on the parties to achieve a meaningful political solution to the conflict. However, during Secretary-
General Ban’s visit, Khartoum appointed Ahmed Haroun—a former government minister with a pending arrest warrant against him by the International Criminal Court—to chair a committee to oversee human rights violations in the country. One of the significant challenges in negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement in the year to come will be to address this lack of cooperation while maintaining an open dialogue with all parties.

Implementation of key provisions of the CPA in the north-south peace process, such as wealth-sharing, boundary demarcation, and disarmament of militias and other armed groups, achieved unsatisfactory progress. The postponement of the referendum planned for 2007 to January 2008 raised serious questions about the elections scheduled for 2009, as well as the 2011 referendum on the status of southern Sudan. Despite these delays and shortcomings, it is hoped that the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur will generate enough progress to allow for a rebalancing of attention to include the faltering north-south peace process. The challenge for the international community is how to ensure that resolution of one of the conflicts is not achieved at the expense of the other.

Notes