Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) made significant strides in peace consolidation during 2008, but remains split along Bosnian Serb and Bosniak/Croat ethnic lines. This division has impeded progress in crucial areas such as police reform and redrafting of the constitution, raising serious concern among the international community, and once again delayed the withdrawal of international administrators. Meanwhile, with the security situation stable throughout the year, the EU military operation in BiH, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), was able to begin ceding more responsibility to the BiH armed forces and began contemplating its eventual withdrawal.

Thirteen years since the end of its conflict, Bosnia remains host to a complex peacekeeping architecture that evolved out of the Dayton Accords of 1995. Originally intended to be a short-lived international presence, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF), an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative (OHR) entrenched their roles in the late 1990s to maintain postconflict stability. The European Union has since taken on the bulk of security responsibilities, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replacing IPTF in January 2003, and the EUFOR Althea military mission taking over from SFOR in December 2004. These transitions took place under the administration of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, head of the OHR, who was appointed in 2002, and also “double-hatted” as the EU’s Special Representative. He took a highly assertive approach to his mandate, intervening in domestic politics and dismissing a number of elected politicians.
Christian Schwarz-Schilling replaced Ashdown during 2006, promising a more moderate approach, while maintaining emphasis on BiH’s EU accession aims. With little progress made, Schwarz-Schilling was replaced by Miroslav Lajčák in July 2007.

Under Lajčák’s more stringent guidance, in 2008 the BiH government was able to break a two-year political deadlock on police reform that had hindered the country’s EU membership aspirations—specifically, the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), an EU preaccession treaty. EU standards require that all legislative and budgetary matters for police be vested at the state rather than the local level, and that technical criteria rather than ethnic divisions determine areas of police operations. The new agreement meets these EU standards and BiH signed the SAA on 16 June 2008. However, the police reform was in some respects only cosmetic, in that it created federal police oversight bodies to control...
and coordinate national police work, rather than merging the two separate Serb and Croat/Bosniak police forces. Further, the police reform bill did little to assuage the overall dysfunction and division within the BiH government, which delayed implementing the police reform package until the greater task of drafting a new constitution can be completed.

The signing of the SAA is, however, a significant milestone in BiH’s postconflict progress: it brings the country one step closer to diminished international oversight and administration, as it eliminates one of two criteria for transforming the OHR to the less intrusive EU Special Representative (EUSR). While it had been envisioned that the OHR would wind down its operations during 2008, that possibility seemed quite remote as the year drew to a close, with the difficult political work involved in stabilizing the political situation and agreeing to a new constitution registering little progress. During the course of the year, Lajčák reiterated on several occasions that the OHR would stay in BiH until all of its objectives were met.

The EUPM’s efforts to assist in the reform of BiH’s police force and build its capacity have been severely constrained since 2006 by the political deadlock on police reform. It is hoped that the police reform agreement, however cosmetic, will provide the opportunity for the EUPM to contribute substantially to the development of the BiH police in the coming year. As of October 2008, EUPM maintained 163 personnel in BiH; its mandate is due to expire at the end of 2009.

Despite a stable security situation in BiH throughout the year, at the regional level Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 brought with it the potential for instability. Consequently, EUFOR Althea maintained its authorized force strength to ensure that it had the capacity to perform its twofold mandate: providing security in BiH as its priority, and serving as a rapid reaction reinforcement to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) if the need for its engagement should arise. EU troops also continue to cooperate with US forces, which are commanded by a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.

Recognizing the progress registered in BiH’s military reform process, in 2008 EUFOR Althea handed over control of BiH military movements and weapon storage sites to the BiH armed forces. During October 2008, EU defense ministers agreed in principle to a plan to phase out EUFOR Althea in due course and replace it with a civilian mission and an “over the horizon” military force; a formal decision is expected in early 2009. In January 2008, BiH signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, bringing the country within one step of graduating from the Partnership for Peace Program and attaining full NATO membership.

The capture of the notorious former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in July 2008 was a significant international event that gave closure to the many BiH citizens impacted by the atrocities carried out by his regime. But Karadžić’s arrest also highlighted the fraught nature of ethnic and political relations in the country, as news of the arrest spurred nationalistic and secessionist rhetoric among the Bosnian Serbs. During November, the three main political parties of BiH struck an unexpected agreement stating their determination to collectively implement the reforms necessary for EU membership. This development was met with circumspection from the international community, which, only one month earlier, had cited the deep fissures among the political parties in BiH. Beyond this gesture, BiH remains dangerously divided along ethnic lines and the prospects for a unified government are still remote. With this in mind, the situation in BiH will require the close oversight of the international community until a workable system of government for BiH can be devised and accepted by all parties involved.