Sudan continued to be one of the most challenging environments for peacekeepers in 2008. Following intense international pressure to deploy UN troops to Sudan’s Darfur region, the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) took over from the existing AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in December 2007. But its deployment began slowly, marred by insecurity, lack of cooperation from the Sudanese government and sensitivities surrounding the composition of the force, as well as logistical challenges. UNAMID was intended to be one element of a three-pronged approach involving peacekeeping alongside humanitarian and peacemaking efforts. But the challenges of this approach became manifest as various parties continued to pursue military solutions to the conflict, the peace process stalled, and the security situation declined. An unprecedented rebel attack on the Sudanese capital and a serious attack on the mission itself demonstrated the difficulties that lay ahead for UNAMID. The question of Darfur’s participation in national elections scheduled for 2009 also remains unresolved.

The peacekeeping environment in southern Sudan remained equally difficult, despite the presence of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The south has seen relatively little in peace dividends, and deep-seated differences between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) have hampered the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Disagreements revolved around key aspects of the CPA such as border demarcation and the redeployment of troops. Interethnic rivalry, often exacerbated by the civil war and its aftermath, continues to disrupt both security and political stability in the south. As the 2009 elections and 2011 referendum approach, all of these issues become increasingly difficult to sidestep. In the meantime, implementation of the CPA continued to be overshadowed by the Darfur crisis and the 2008 indictment of President Omar al-Bashir by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
mandate, including protection of civilians. The mission lacked the capacity to implement this mandate, however, and was constrained financially and logistically.

The government of Sudan, strongly resistant to a UN operation in Darfur, agreed in mid-2007 to the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized the deployment of UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission was to comprise 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers each. It was to incorporate AMIS personnel as well as those provided through UN light and heavy “support packages” for AMIS agreed to during 2006.

### UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

- **Authorization Date**: 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769)
- **Start Date**: 31 December 2007
- **Joint UN-AU Special Representative**
  - Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo)
- **Force Commander**
  - General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria)
- **Police Commissioner**
  - Michael J. Fryer (South Africa)
- **Budget**
  - $1,699.7 million
  - (1 July 2008–30 June 2009)
- **Strength as of 31 October 2008**
  - Troops: 8,935
  - Military Observers: 138
  - Police: 2,342
  - International Civilian Staff: 743
  - Local Civilian Staff: 1,404
  - UN Volunteers: 246

For detailed mission information see p. 255

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UNAMID was mandated to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with cease-fire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and assist with the implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. However, the agreement was signed by only one of the three major rebel movements, and the security situation deteriorated in its wake as the movements fragmented. Talks launched by the AU and UN in October 2007 were boycotted by several key rebel leaders and immediately stalled. With ongoing hostilities and displacement, widespread insecurity, and only a precarious and partial peace agreement in place, conditions for the fulfilment of UNAMID’s mandate were inauspicious from the start.

Darfur: Key Developments
UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008 under the leadership of Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai, already in place under the old AMIS structure. As the force comprised only existing AMIS battalions, the initial impact of the transfer of authority was largely symbolic; even the old AMIS markings remained on vehicles and buildings for some time. From the start, relations with Khartoum were a strong focus; difficult discussions ensued, including over the use of blue “UN” helmets; land, air, and water rights; and the negotiation of the status of forces agreement. Meanwhile, it was necessary to establish communications and support mechanisms for the hybrid UN-AU mission, including the staffing of a joint support coordination mechanism in Addis Ababa, which had not been fully operational by December 2008. Failure to operationalize the joint mechanism was perhaps an indication of the UN’s desire to maintain full control of UNAMID, partially undercutting the notion of a hybrid arrangement.

The major immediate challenge, and the preoccupation of UN member states, was the deployment of the mission. In compliance with demands by the Sudanese government, Resolution 1769 stressed that the force would have a “predominantly African character.” However, existing African battalions in Darfur and those poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of “self-sustainability,” limiting their ability to carry out the mandate. Thus, UNAMID’s urgent task was to help African battalions meet the required standards as soon as possible.

In April 2008, an “enhanced deployment plan” was put in place, envisioning an ambitious deployment of 80 percent by the end of 2008, but delays continued, for three main reasons. First, ongoing insecurity, including banditry, significantly constrained the movement of equipment and personnel. Second, the Sudanese government continued to obstruct the deployment through various means, including a lack of blanket clearance for night flights, failure to provide requested land in a timely manner, and slow visa-processing and customs-clearance requirements, although some improvements were seen in the second half of the year. Third, and most significant, logistical challenges arose due to the 2,000-kilometers distance between Darfur and Sudan’s nearest port, and the poor quality of the roads, especially during the rainy season.
As a result, by the end of October 2008, UNAMID’s uniformed personnel stood at 11,416—just over a thousand more than were deployed at the close of AMIS—including 9,074 military personnel and 2,342 police. At the end of the year, UNAMID had registered 63 percent of its deployment. Recruitment of civilian positions was at 41 percent of full capacity.

The force lacked a number of capabilities vital to the implementation of its mandate, including eighteen medium-lift helicopters, six attack helicopters, one aerial reconnaissance unit, one medium transport unit, one heavy transport unit, and one multirole logistics unit.4 Meeting these crucial needs is essential, but by the end of 2008 no concrete agreements had materialized, hampering UNAMID from responding to growing insecurity.

UNAMID’s police have received praise for immediately developing a three-phase plan for patrolling camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs), culminating in a twenty-four-hour presence established inside the extremely tense Kalma IDP camp in southern Darfur in September 2008. However, for the police, just as for the military, progress has been constrained by gaps in capacity, including a shortage of radios and the continued unavailability of formed police units to provide protection. Of the authorized strength of nineteen formed police units, only twelve have been pledged and only one has been deployed.

Darfur: Security Situation

Meanwhile, UNAMID faces a deteriorating security environment, characterized by banditry, clashes among rebel groups, the militarization of IDP camps, ethnic clashes over resources, and fighting between government and rebel forces. In January and February 2008, attacks by government forces on villages in western Darfur, controlled by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), left 115 people dead and over 30,000 forcibly displaced, according to some estimates.5 In May, clashes between factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in north Darfur resulted in the displacement of 3,000 civilians. In August, an exchange of fire in the Kalma camp left 33 dead, after Sudanese government forces were sent to enforce a search warrant for weapons.

In May 2008, in the most dramatic incident of the year, the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, was brought directly into the conflict for the first time when approximately one thousand JEM fighters launched a surprise attack, infiltrating the city of Omdurman across the river from the capital. The attack led to many casualties and arrests and the government cut off diplomatic ties with Chad, which it accused of sponsoring the rebels. The event highlighted the regional tensions surrounding the cross-border movement of armed groups, which neither UNAMID nor the parallel UN and EU missions in Chad and the CAR are mandated to address. Three months earlier, Chadian opposition groups had attacked N’Djamena, allegedly with Sudanese support. They came close to toppling the regime of Idriss Déby and solidified his dependence on Darfur rebels linked to him by a common Zagawa lineage. The aftermath of the May attack saw a renewal of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and JEM in west Darfur and aerial attacks in other rebel strongholds, a
significant escalation of the low-level conflict between the government and the armed groups.

UNAMID was not spared the violence, as it was directly targeted. It suffered an attack on a supply convoy in its very first month and then, in April 2008, two UNAMID containers holding equipment for a Chinese engineering company were hijacked along a major supply route and not recovered. In July, in the most serious incident to date, seven UNAMID troopers were killed and nineteen were wounded after 200 militia members armed with machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons attacked a military and civilian police patrol in a government-controlled area of north Darfur. UNAMID’s lack of air assets rendered it unable to respond and protect its own troops. With its focus on staff security and recruitment of police officers and other personnel restricted, the speed of UNAMID’s deployment was further curtailed.

An Elusive Peace

UNAMID’s mandate to assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement is problematic because the agreement is ignored by parties on the ground, unrecognized by nonsignatories, and disliked by much of the population. Meanwhile, prospects for a new and more inclusive peace agreement remain remote. In December 2007, a meeting of the rebel movements under the auspices of the SPLM led to the creation of two new coalitions, significantly reducing the total number of factions (one has since collapsed). However, there remained a critical lack of unity among the movements on whether to proceed to peace talks. From March 2008, the UN-AU mediation focused instead on informal and confidence-building measures toward a cessation of hostilities, but failed to convince the main rebel movements to engage. After the UN and AU were criticized for appointing part-time mediators, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim sought to identify a single UN-AU joint chief mediator to be based in Sudan. In June 2008, the UN and AU announced the appointment of Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, foreign minister of Burkina Faso, providing hope for a renewed and focused leadership and direction.

But just before Bassolé was to commence his duties, the political landscape shifted with the announcement by the ICC Prosecutor of an application for a warrant of arrest against President Bashir, the very first indictment of a sitting head of state by the Court. UNAMID braced for a possible political backlash and a further deterioration of the security situation. Khartoum’s initial reaction was instead to search for a political solution, lobbying for the use of Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend the proceedings for one year, renewable. Meanwhile, the National Congress Party reached out to its partners in the Government of National Unity and opposition political parties to garner support and drew up plans for a multiparty mechanism to resolve the Darfur conflict. In early November the government launched the Sudan People’s Initiative and declared a cease-fire, following an earlier initiative led by Qatar. But prospects for the success of the initiatives were dampened due to a boycott by the main rebel groups. Whether such initiatives will contain the beginnings of an inclusive settlement or will convince Security Council members to implement Article 16 remains to be seen. But the ICC announcement compounded the challenges facing UNAMID.

In addition to the ICC announcement, Bassolé’s quest for an inclusive peace must confront the national and regional political realities that intersect with the Darfur crisis, not least the timeline for implementation of the CPA. Sudan’s fifth population and housing census was conducted in Darfur in April and May 2008, but there was widespread opposition, especially from IDPs, and insecurity prevented enumerators from reaching many areas. There is similar opposition in Darfur to the elections scheduled for 2009. Yet the exclusion of the region risks undermining Sudan’s democratic transition and the CPA.

Meanwhile, Chad and Sudan appeared to have mended fences following the JEM attack. A Contact Group established in support of the March 2008 Dakar Agreement has held discussions on the establishment of a border-monitoring mission. It is not clear, however, whether such a mission can be credible or result in
either government suspending its assistance to the other’s opposition groups.

**Humanitarian**

In this environment of insecurity, the humanitarian situation deteriorated in 2008, with 200,000 persons newly displaced during the first half of the year (bringing total IDPs in Darfur to 2.5 million). In the same period, over 120 vehicles were hijacked (more than double the number for the corresponding months of 2007), 8 humanitarian workers were killed, 103 were abducted, and 51 humanitarian premises were assaulted by armed men. Humanitarian access decreased to only 70 percent of the affected population, having declined over the previous three years. Some humanitarian organizations withdrew staff or suspended operations, while the World Food Programme was forced to halve food rations and warned of a possible suspension of food distribution. Meanwhile, international efforts toward the reconstruction and development of Darfur remained stalled, pending an improvement of the security situation and the start of a credible peace process.

**North-South: Background**

The Darfur crisis continues to complicate UNMIS’s tasks in implementing the CPA. The May attack from Darfur on Omdurman, for example, not only created a security and humanitarian crisis, but also had far-reaching political consequences. Less direct but perhaps even more difficult to address is the potential impact of efforts to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir before the ICC. The international community remains focused on Darfur, largely at the expense of the CPA, whose implementation has floundered.

The Security Council first authorized the creation of a mission to Sudan—the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)—in Resolution 1547, on 11 July 2004, and charged it with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in supporting the CPA. On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peace operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping to implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include monitoring and verifying troop redeployments, assisting with the formation of joint integrated units to help secure contested regions, promoting the rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referendums, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specifically includes certain tasks not directly linked to the CPA, including coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary.

**North-South: Key Developments**

**Security**

On 10 May 2008, approximately 300 armed pickup trucks loaded with JEM troops raced across the 1,200-kilometer stretch from Darfur to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, reaching Omdurman, on Khartoum’s outskirts. An estimated 465 people, including 57 civilians, lost their lives during the fighting. The attack and the security measures that followed had an immediate impact on UNMIS’s operations, restricting staff movement and impeding the return of displaced populations to their homes in the south. In spite of government restrictions, UNMIS launched investigations into human rights and humanitarian law violations alleged to have taken place during the attack, and publicly raised concerns that the trial of thirty accused JEM members convicted of participating in the attack may not have met international standards.

The attack had significant political fallout. While JEM forces were ultimately repulsed, they succeeded for the first time in bringing the Darfur conflict to the government’s doorstep, challenging the NCP’s political standing. The NCP reacted by jailing opposition leaders who had links to JEM, while rallying other opposition parties to decry the attack and establishing a temporary détente with the SPLM. The attack closely resembled a rebel assault on the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, three months earlier. Chad accused Sudan of supporting the rebels.
who carried out that attack. Given JEM’s close ties to the government in N’Djamena—and rumors that JEM had helped fight off the February attack—Sudan asserted that the JEM offensive was intended as retribution, and cut off diplomatic ties with Chad.

The Abyei region remains perhaps the most sensitive flashpoint in both local interethnic and national north-south conflicts. Neither side was willing to concede the oil-rich border area during the CPA negotiations, but both eventually agreed in a separate protocol to create the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), to determine the territory’s precise borders. A local referendum would then determine Abyei’s status. The NCP rejected the final ABC report immediately upon its release in 2005. The two parties have remained deadlocked over the issue, preventing either from establishing an effective civilian administration.

The security environment around Abyei began to deteriorate seriously in late 2007; reported incidents included the placement of roadblocks around oil fields, kidnappings, and incursions by rebel groups based in southern Darfur. The SPLM’s appointment, with the Sudanese government’s approval, of a temporary administrator generated concern among the Misseriya Arabs in the area. On 22 December 2007, a dispute over transit rights sparked a series of firefights between Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) units and the Misseriya that continued sporadically through May 2008.

On 13 May 2008, the killing of an SAF soldier at an SPLA checkpoint in the town of Abyei triggered the most severe violation of the CPA cease-fire since 2005. In spite of several agreements to de-escalate and redeploy troops away from the area, combat between the SAF and SPLA continued through 20 May, resulting in eighty-nine deaths and the destruction of most of Abyei. Approximately 50,000 civilians fled the town and surrounding villages. Both sides kept substantial forces in the area, and tensions remain high. On 7 July, a UN observer was fatally shot in the head thirty kilometers south of Abyei during a dispute between SAF and SPLA troops.

UNMIS forces were accused of failing to protect civilians caught in the fighting; the joint integrated units (JIU) deployed in the area effectively dissolved once fighting began. While Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi acknowledged some errors, he noted that peacekeepers sheltered more than a hundred civilians during the fighting. He also highlighted that UNMIS forces lacked both the mandate and the capacity to intervene or suppress combat on the scale seen in Abyei during May.

In the aftermath of the fighting, UNMIS helped broker a series of meetings that culminated in the adoption of a “road map” on 8 June that included provisions on the withdrawal of SAF and SPLA forces and deployment of new JIUs, the return of the displaced civilian population, the establishment of a civilian administration, and the distribution of oil revenues. Most significantly, the parties agreed to refer the border dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. As of September 2008, the parties have chosen four of the five members of the arbitral panel. But despite this, Abyei was the scene of another clash between SAF nd SPLA soldiers in December.

The role of the JIUs, meant to provide security in disrupted areas, will become increasingly important as the 2009 elections and 2011 referendum approach, especially because the JIUs will be responsible for preventing election-related violence and ensuring peaceful implementation of the results. According to the Secretary-General’s July 2008 report on Sudan, UNMIS had verified about 85 percent of the total authorized JIU strength, and was soliciting international support for training and equipping the units. The JIUs’ performance in Abyei, however, highlighted concerns about their practical effectiveness.

Continued distrust between the CPA signatories as well as concerns over interethnic conflicts have impeded disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, as have funding shortfalls, logistical difficulties, and a lack of local infrastructure and capacity. Slow development in the south and the lack of economic
opportunities, moreover, provide little incentive for soldiers to reenter civilian life. The parties made some progress in 2008, however. The National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Coordination approved a national reintegration policy, allowing the parties to agree upon a multiyear DDR project outline in June 2009. The northern and southern DDR commissions have created technical coordination committees, and begun joint operations in Blue Nile State.

In the meantime, moves by the ICC Prosecutor to try President Bashir place UNMIS in an extremely precarious position. UNMIS has neither the capacity nor the mandate to arrest Bashir, and indeed relies on the cooperation of Bashir’s administration to function. But working directly with an individual sought by the ICC for such extraordinary crimes could prove corrosive both to the mission’s and to the ICC’s perceived credibility, particularly given the mission’s mandate to promote human rights. Relationships with other regional actors, including neighboring states, the African Union, and the League of Arab States, may also become more delicate as the Sudanese government works to rally others to oppose any arrest warrant.

**Elections**
The year 2008 saw significant progress in the preparations for the 2009 national elections and the 2011 referendum as provided for by the CPA. After successive delays, data collection for the national census was completed on 6 May 2008 with extensive UNMIS support. While a number of irregularities and difficulties were reported, including a boycott in southern Kordofan, material shortages, and logistical and security problems, the Sudanese government reported a 90 percent nationwide coverage rate. As 2008 drew to a close, the results were yet to be released. Meanwhile, in July, after more than two and half years of delays, the National Assembly adopted the national election law.

Preparations remained behind schedule, however. The government has yet to pass a referendum law, more than a year after the envisaged timeline in the CPA. Moreover, more than a year and half after enacting the Political Parties Act, the government has yet to create the Political Parties Affairs Council as required under that act; as of September 2008, the government was a month late in forming the National Elections Commission.

For its part, UNMIS has begun to build its own electoral support capacity, adding technical staff in both Khartoum and Juba. Given the state of election preparations, however, it remains unclear how much and what kind of support the mission will be called upon to provide, leaving open the possibility that it may be forced to scale up its capacity suddenly as the elections draw near.

**Conclusion**
Overall the peace operations in Sudan continued to operate in a very hostile environment throughout 2008. Slow force generation, deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, a shortage of mission enablers (most notably helicopters), and a stalled peace process complicated UNAMID’s first year of operation and cast doubts on the concept of “hybridity” as a viable model for future peace operations. Meanwhile, the lack of progress in implementing key aspects of the CPA—primarily border demarcation, troop deployment, and wealth-sharing—occupied UNMIS throughout the year. Despite taking the initial steps toward the 2009 elections by conducting a census, the census itself was criticized for the way it was conducted in the war-torn Darfur region, raising more questions about the nature of the planned elections and its impact on the referendum in 2011. But it is the efforts by the ICC to prosecute President Bashir for crimes committed in Darfur that could have the most far-reaching consequences for UNAMID and UNMIS, with potential for wider regional repercussions.
Notes

1. This approach was outlined by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2007.