The political stalemate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) deepened severely during 2009, paralyzing progress on the reforms necessary for autonomous rule. This was a significant cause for concern for the international community; fourteen years had passed since the signing of the Dayton Accords, yet BiH remained precipitously close to its conflict past, with ethnic and nationalist rhetoric on the rise. Beyond providing for an inhospitable operational climate, the rancorous political environment had a distinct impact on the peace operations in the country, which as a result delayed prospects for alteration or withdrawal.

Bosnia remains host to a complex peacekeeping architecture that evolved out of the Dayton Accords of 1995. Originally intended to be a short-lived international presence, the late 1990s saw the entrenchment of the roles of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF), an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative (OHR) in maintaining postconflict stability. The European Union has since taken on the bulk of security responsibilities, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replacing the IPTF in January 2003, and the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) taking over militarily from SFOR in December 2004. These transitions took place under the administration of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, head of the OHR, who was appointed in 2002 and also “double-hatted” as the EU’s Special Representative. He took a highly assertive approach to his mandate as High Representative, using his so-called “Bonn powers” to intervene in domestic politics and dismiss a number of elected politicians.

Christian Schwarz-Schilling replaced Ashdown during 2006, promising a more hands-off approach, while maintaining emphasis on BiH’s EU accession aims. With little progress made, Schwarz-Schilling was replaced by Miroslav Lajčák in July 2007, who pledged a moderate...
hand in administering Bosnia. While BiH made some strides in its peace process and toward both EU and NATO membership under the guidance of Lajčák, the political situation continued to deteriorate throughout 2008, with the OHR’s presence a focus of disdain among Republika Srpska local authorities. Lajčák left office in early 2009 amid a growing stalemate on fundamental issues of decentralization and transfer of authorities to central institutions.

It was within this context that Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko took office as the High Representative in March 2009, hoping to change the political paradigm in BiH. Nevertheless, the situation continued to sour and Inzko was almost immediately tested in May when a declaration adopted by the National Assembly of Bosnia’s Serb-dominated Republika Srpska called for the return of responsibilities to local authorities that the OHR had transferred to the state level—a move that would have marginalized the OHR and undermined the Dayton peace agreement. In response, Inzko invoked the “Bonn powers” for the first time since Lord Ashdown’s tenure, effectively abolishing the Bosnian Serb legislation and further heightening tensions, with Republika Srpska threatening its withdrawal from the government.

Nevertheless, during the year the Peace Implementation Council—the supra-OHR body—outlined five broad objectives that BiH must deliver on for the OHR to be drawn down and hand over to the less intrusive EU Special Representative: sustainable resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between the state and other levels of government; sustainable resolution of defense property; completion of the Brcko final award; fiscal sustainability; and entrenchment of the rule of law. While the notion of drawing down the OHR has been on the table for nearly three years, it has been annually pushed aside on account of a lack of reform progress.

Similarly, the Council of the European Union approved a tentative concept of operations for the transformation of EUFOR Althea into a nonexecutive capacity-building and training operation. However, with the progress on reform stalled and tensions high throughout the year, EUFOR maintained its authorized force strength and posture to ensure that it had the capacity to perform its twofold mandate: providing security in BiH as its priority, and serving as a

**EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)**

- **Authorization Date**: 12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)
- **Start Date**: December 2004
- **Head of Mission**: Major-General Stefano Castagnotto (Italy)
- **Budget**: $28.9 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009)
- **Strength as of 30 September 2009**: Troops: 2,014

**EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)**

- **Authorization Date**: 11 March 2002 (EU Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP)
- **Start Date**: January 2003
- **Head of Mission**: Brigadier-General Stefan Feller (Germany)
- **Budget**: $17.6 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009)
- **Strength as of 30 September 2009**: Civilian Police: 125
  - Civilian Staff: 27

**OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- **Authorization Date**: 8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council)
- **Start Date**: December 1995
- **Head of Mission**: Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (United States)
- **Budget**: $20.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009)
- **Strength as of 30 September 2009**: Civilian Staff: 16
rapid reaction reinforcement to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) if the need for its engagement should arise. EUFOR continued to assist the BiH armed forces in management and disposal of surplus weapons and continued to monitor and advise on the implementation of tasks already handed over to those forces. EU troops also continued to cooperate with US forces under the command of a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. Considering the situation, the UN Security Council renewed EUFOR Althea’s mandate for another year in November 2009.

The EUPM’s efforts to assist in the reform of the BiH police force and build its capacity remained constrained. Even so, the EUPM’s mandate was extended for another two years in the second half of 2009 and a provisional work plan for the operation showed a significant shift toward addressing the main threats to security in BiH—organized crime, smuggling, and corruption. However, the shift in focus will require the continued deployment of international judges in BiH, as the local authorities have not invested in developing the judiciary or the corrections systems necessary to process criminals. Meanwhile, the OSCE mission to BiH continued to work—with only limited progress—on its broad assistance programs supporting democratization, education, human rights, and security cooperation aimed toward BiH’s hoped-for Euro-Atlantic integration.

The stark political situation in BiH at the end of the year drew realistic fears regarding the possible effects of the dissolution of BiH and the potential for a return to violence. In response to the growing instability, the European Union and United States deployed representatives for talks with political leaders on all sides aimed at breaking the political deadlock on reform. Unsurprisingly, the talks failed to achieve much progress, and at the end of the year the notion of a more unified BiH seemed distant.

NATO Headquarters Sarajevo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorization Date</th>
<th>28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
<td>Brigadier-General Sabato Errico (Italy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorization Date 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)
Start Date December 2004
Head of Mission Brigadier-General Sabato Errico (Italy)