

## Chad and the Central African Republic

International peacekeeping deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) are the result of long-term instability, massive internal displacement, and regional insecurity. In spite of the UN's partially deployed peacekeeping presence, banditry, impunity, and ongoing clashes between the Chadian armed forces and opposition groups in the east of Chad continued to threaten the safety of civilians, including humanitarian actors and over 260,000 refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan.<sup>1</sup> In the CAR, ongoing instability throughout the country resulted in further incidence of violence and internal displacement, as well as large-scale outflows of Central African refugees into southeastern Chad.

In March 2009 the European Union's peacekeeping mission (EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic [EUFOR TCHAD/RCA]) officially transferred authority to the UN's expanded, multidimensional mission (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad [MINURCAT]), though the UN force was about 50 percent deployed at the end of 2009. Meanwhile the UN-trained and supported *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* (DIS) police force had reached full deployment in all twelve refugee camps throughout the area of operations, yet the shortcomings of the justice sector limited the impact of its work. In June the Secretary-General transmitted proposals to the Security Council for the structure and resources required for the new UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), which he recommended should replace the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

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### Background

#### *Chad*

Instability in Chad has its roots in ethnic divisions, vast disparities in levels of development from one region to another, and widespread impunity resulting from a lack of law and order—particularly in the east of the country. President Idriss Déby was brought to power in a coup in 1990; subsequent elections have failed to result in representative governance structures.

The violence in eastern Chad is characterized by military clashes between the Chadian military forces and a number of rebel movements with shifting alliances. Widespread banditry, impunity, and a general lack of law and order all pose threats to civilians and have been a major impediment to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to refugees and the internally displaced. Government clashes with armed rebel groups, as well as cross-border attacks by armed militia originating in Sudan, and interethnic violence in the east have contributed to the internal displacement of over 160,000 Chadians.<sup>2</sup>

A predatory relationship between Chad and Sudan has further fueled the conflicts in both eastern Chad and Sudan's Darfur region. The two governments have accused each other of harboring, funding, and otherwise supporting the other's opposition groups. These accusations came to a head in 2008. In February of that year, a massive Chadian rebel offensive originating from inside Sudanese territory was launched on Chad's capital, N'Djamena. The attack was very nearly successful, overwhelming Chadian forces and prompting intervention by the French military.



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In the aftermath, the governments signed the March 2008 Dakar Agreement, which included a commitment to “ban any activity of the armed groups and prevent the use of the territories of any of the two countries to destabilize the other, and to normalize relations between the two capitals.”<sup>3</sup> The Dakar Agreement also provided for the formation of a Contact Group (cochaired by Libya, Eritrea, and the Republic of Congo) to monitor its implementation, and called for the creation of a “Peace and

Security Force” that would be drawn from Contact Group countries and tasked with monitoring and securing the Chadian-Sudanese border.

The viability of the Dakar Agreement was seriously challenged in May 2008, when Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels launched an unprecedented attack on the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, advancing as close as Omdurman on the outskirts of the city. Subsequent rebel offensives on both sides of the border continue to strain the relationship between the two countries. While the end of 2009 saw renewed contacts between the parties on securing the shared border, any marked improvement in security had not been seen.

#### *EUFOR TCHADIRCA and MINURCAT*

Between 2004 and 2006, refugee inflows from Sudan, as well as thousands of internally displaced Chadians, created a humanitarian emergency in eastern Chad, but prevailing banditry and violence against civilians and aid workers alike made the delivery of aid a difficult and dangerous task. International humanitarian agencies called upon the UN to deploy peacekeepers to provide security for the delivery of aid and to protect civilians against the constant threat of violent attack.

An initial proposal for a UN peacekeeping deployment in Chad and the CAR included a mandate to monitor activities on the border between Chad and Sudan, facilitate political dialogue, and protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Although this proposal was accepted by the CAR, Chad rejected it due to fears of being used by the UN as a rear base from which to launch operations into neighboring Sudan, where the international community was, at the time, struggling to intervene in the conflict.

After considerable negotiation, a compromise was struck between Chad, the United Nations, and the European Union (under pressure from France, Chad’s ally and protector). In September 2007 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1778, in which the UN committed to the deployment of 300 civilian police, 50 military

liaison officers, and a small number of civilian personnel. The new mission, identified by its French acronym, MINURCAT, was charged with selecting, training, and mentoring a Chadian police force called the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*.

Resolution 1778 simultaneously authorized the deployment of 3,307 EU soldiers (3,107 to be deployed in Chad, and 200 in northeastern CAR). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this European force—called EUFOR—had a mandate to establish broad area security in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, protect UN staff and humanitarian personnel, and contribute to the safety and security of civilians within the zone of operation.

The EU mission—which became operational on 15 March 2008—was committed to deploy for just one year, with the understanding that on 15 March 2009 the EU would transfer authority to an expanded MINURCAT operation. The expansion of MINURCAT's mandate to include the necessary military component, however, was not a foregone conclusion, as Chad continued to resist the idea of a UN military presence on its territory.

In December 2008 a report of the UN Secretary-General outlined a concept of operations for an expanded MINURCAT role and presence.<sup>4</sup> In January 2009 the Security Council adopted the concept of operations, and authorized an increase in MINURCAT troops to a maximum strength of 5,200 military personnel, 300 UN police, 25 military officers, and sufficient civilian staff to support a full, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. In addition to the formation and monitoring of the DIS, the expanded MINURCAT mandate includes responsibility for improving security conditions in the area of operation with a view to protecting civilians and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It also includes human rights monitoring and the promotion of the rule of law through support to weak Chadian judicial and legal systems.

Importantly, and controversially, the expanded MINURCAT mission does not have a mandate to initiate or engage directly in the resolution of the political roots of the conflict in

#### EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)

|                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| • Authorization Date              | 15 October 2007 (CJA 2007/677/CFSP),<br>25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) |
| • Start Date                      | January 2008   |
| • Head of Mission                 | Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash (Ireland)                                  |
| • Budget                          | \$65.8 million (October 2008–April 2009)                                   |
| • Strength as of<br>15 March 2009 | Troops: 3,307  |

#### UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| • Authorization and Start Date      | 25 September 2007<br>(UNSC Res. 1778)  |
| • SRSG                              | Victor Da Silva Angelo (Portugal)  |
| • Force Commander                   | Major-General Elhadji Mouhamedou<br>Kandji (Senegal)   |
| • Chief Military Liaison Officer    | François N'Diaye (Senegal)   |
| • Police Commissioner               | Major-General Geraldo Christian<br>Chaumont (Argentina)  |
| • Budget                            | \$690.8 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010)   |
| • Strength as of<br>31 October 2009 | Troops: 2,691<br>Military Observers: 23<br>Police: 256<br>International Civilian Staff: 429<br>Local Civilian Staff: 1,228<br>UN Volunteers: 134 |

*For detailed mission information see p. 206*

#### Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX)

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|---------------------------------------|--|
| • Authorization Date                  | October 2002   |
| • Start Date                          | January 2003   |
| • Head of Mission                     | Albert Akouéndengué (Gabon)                          |
| • Budget                              | \$42.0 million<br>(1 October 2008–30 September 2009) |
| • Strength as of<br>30 September 2009 | Troops: 371<br>Civilian Police: 150                  |

eastern Chad. The lack of a political mandate or framework in which to situate the mission led to strong calls for the elaboration of clear benchmarks for MINURCAT success, and, by extension, of the circumstances necessary in order to consider a responsible withdrawal of MINURCAT forces.

#### *Central African Republic*

The Central African Republic has been in a state of conflict for the past two decades, plagued by a history of mutinies, coup attempts, armed rebellions, and persistent intervention and interference from its neighboring countries.

BONUSCA, the UN's peacebuilding support office in the CAR, was deployed in 2000 with a mandate to support and strengthen democratic institutions and national reconciliation processes, and to mobilize international support in an effort to consolidate the gains won in the 1999 elections. During 2009, BONUSCA continued to work in the CAR, but with an expanded mandate to support security sector reform efforts, build rule of law, disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants, and promote and support an inclusive political dialogue among the government, rebels, and opposition leaders. However, as the UN Peacebuilding Commission intensified its involvement in the CAR, preparations were also under way for the transfer of BONUSCA into a new integrated peacebuilding office, BINUCA.

In 2002 the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) deployed the Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMUC) to address a serious deterioration in security conditions. This force, consisting of just 380 troops, was deployed with a mandate to protect critical infrastructure, monitor the border between Chad and the CAR, and support the reconstruction of CAR armed forces as well as the republic's national process of reconciliation.

In July 2008, in an effort to bring in a wider range of regional actors, the chronically under-resourced FOMUC mission transferred authority to the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX), led by the Economic Community

of Central African States (ECCAS). The MICOPAX mission is more multidimensional in nature and includes civilian police, civilian staff, and gendarmes alongside combat troops.

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## Key Developments

### *Political*

In the last quarter of 2008, Chad and Sudan exchanged ambassadors in compliance with the terms of the 2008 Dakar Agreement, and a high-level AU delegation traveled to N'Djamena to affirm support for the process. However, meetings of the Contact Group were first delayed and then halted indefinitely, and there has been no progress toward the establishment of the security force envisioned in the Dakar Agreement.

On 3 May 2009 a new agreement was signed in Doha between Chad and Sudan, in which the countries committed to refrain from providing support to armed opposition groups within each other's borders. However, a rebel offensive launched in the Sila region of eastern Chad the day after the signing undermined the agreement, and prompted renewed accusations from Chad of Sudanese support to Chadian armed groups. It also resulted in the relocation of humanitarian staff and DIS officers in the area of Koukou Angarana.

In the meantime, in March 2009 the International Criminal Court formally indicted Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for his alleged involvement in the atrocities against civilians in the Darfur region of Sudan. The government of Sudan responded by expelling thirteen international and three national humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from Sudan, and the potential strain on the delivery of humanitarian assistance prompted fears of a renewed flow of Darfurian refugees into Chad. The international organizations and NGOs, as well as MINURCAT and the residual EUFOR forces, conducted contingency planning exercises in preparation for the expected influx. However, no significant increase in new refugee arrivals was detected.

In Chad, some progress was made on the 13 August 2007 agreement between the government of Chad and opposition parties as they moved forward with certain electoral reforms. A new electoral commission was also expected to be established, but opposition groups rejected the government's proposal, asserting that the planned structure would not be sufficiently independent.

The nature of Chadian government relations with armed and political opposition groups also changed slightly in 2009. In January all but one of the Chadian armed opposition groups established a new coalition, and in May consensus was reached regarding a draft law on the status of the charter for opposition and political parties. Also in May, a significant victory of the Chadian armed forces over the armed opposition in eastern Chad shifted the balance of power between the rebels and the government.

In the Central African Republic, an inclusive dialogue in December 2008 between the government, the political opposition, and rebel leaders resulted in the signing of a decree by President François Bozizé establishing a new government. However, activities of armed groups renewed in the early months of 2009, as their leaders alleged that the government had failed to implement the recommendations of the dialogue and, in particular, that the new government established by President Bozizé in early 2009 was not sufficiently broad-based. Incidents of violence between government forces, rebels, and armed self-defense groups continued, and the security situation remains unpredictable throughout the country.

Between April and July 2009 the security situation in the Vakaga and Haute Kotto regions in northeastern CAR—the MINURCAT area of operations—deteriorated significantly, resulting in sporadic internal and regional displacement. A number of violent incidents in June 2009 prompted the relocation of humanitarian staff, and caused roughly 1,000 civilians to gravitate toward MINURCAT's base in search of protection. Clashes between CAR's armed forces and armed rebel groups outside the MINURCAT area of operations also prompted the outflow of over 18,000 refugees to Daha in southeastern

Chad, the remoteness of which has made the humanitarian response difficult. A further complicating element has been the presence of the Ugandan-based Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which in August launched attacks in Guli, Nguli Nguli, and Maboussou, displacing thousands of civilians. The security situation continued to deteriorate throughout the year, causing aid groups to halt their operations in Chad during the last months of 2009.

#### *From EUFOR to MINURCAT*

The EU forces in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR continued to carry out their responsibilities for establishing security and providing protection to civilians, UN staff, and humanitarian personnel until 15 March, when the UN assumed operational control of the 2,085 international peacekeepers. These included an assortment of 1,877 EUFOR soldiers from Albania, Austria, Croatia, Finland, and Russia who complemented larger EU contingents from Ireland, France, and Poland, the latter of whom committed to remain in Chad under UN command. Italian forces also remained in theater until May, when the deployment of a Norwegian level-two hospital was completed. The



A French EUFOR soldier changes his insignia to a MINURCAT badge during a hand-over ceremony, Abeche, Chad, 15 March 2009.

MINURCAT deployment benefited from the continuity and experience that the “rehatted” EU soldiers brought to the mission.

The EU peacekeeping mission in Chad and the CAR was viewed by many as a test case for future EU engagement in international peacekeeping, and the positive results and relatively smooth transition from EU to UN authority speaks well for the possibility of similar partnerships in the future. Close cooperation between the EUFOR and UN planners at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in New York allowed for a good exchange of information and the application of lessons learned, despite only two months between the authorization of the new mission by the Security Council and the 15 March deadline for the transfer of authority imposed by the EU. In particular, the presence of mission military leadership at UN headquarters during a portion of the planning stage aided in the elaboration of an achievable concept of operations, and allowed the officers to gain an understanding of the workings of UN headquarters. This was useful when the mission was confronted with deployment challenges in the field, in that MINURCAT military leadership knew who within the UN bureaucracy could resolve issues most quickly.

Nevertheless, by 31 December 2009, MINURCAT had deployed only 2,411 (46 percent) of its authorized troops. The mission also continues to suffer from a shortage of essential resources. A lack of engineering units and military helicopters is hampering the mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate. This is significant, as MINURCAT’s success is largely contingent on the ability to transport troops quickly across a vast area of operations.

Coordination among the international peacekeeping and political missions throughout the region continues to be good. MINURCAT and the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) maintain liaison officers in each mission to facilitate the exchange of information, and MINURCAT’s political and military leadership are in regular contact with their counterparts in MICOPAX. Discussions are under way between

MINURCAT, MICOPAX, and BONUCA with regard to the proposed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in the northeast (Vakanga and Haute Kotto regions) of the CAR.

### *DIS and Justice Sector Reform*

A core component of the MINURCAT mandate is the commitment to strengthening the capacity of the Chadian police and justice sector, particularly in the east. This is, in large part, a reflection of the fact that banditry and impunity represent the most common threats to civilians—including refugees and humanitarian actors—in eastern Chad. While military peacekeepers are trained and equipped to interpose themselves between civilian populations and rebel attacks, countering banditry brings with it different challenges. MINURCAT peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians if an instance of violence or looting happens in front of them, but the right to arrest suspects and conduct criminal investigations is the sole purview of the government. In other words, international peacekeepers—military, police, or civilian—cannot perform the function of local (in this case, Chadian) police officers, and thus are limited in their ability to confront banditry.

In order to circumvent the combined challenges of high levels of banditry, a weak, under-resourced Chadian police force, and a non-functioning judiciary, the Secretary-General proposed a new way to work with the Chadian police. He proposed that the UN would train, equip, and mentor 850 Chadian police officers, who would then be deployed to conduct policing duties in the refugee camps throughout eastern Chad, while military peacekeepers (first EUFOR, and then MINURCAT) would continue to provide broad area security and protection through presence and deterrence.

This UN-supported Chadian police force is called the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*. Training of DIS officers began in 2008, and deployment to key eastern towns, as well as all twelve refugee camps in eastern Chad, was completed in April 2009. Their jurisdiction extends up to ten kilometers in radius around the camps.

The work of the DIS has been positively received by Chadian civilians, refugees, and the humanitarian community alike. The officers are posted at the entrances of refugee camps, and conduct patrols throughout the camps to maintain law and order, institute arrests, and conduct investigations. They help UN agencies and implementing partners to maintain order on distribution days, and in some circumstances provide protection to humanitarian convoys.

Nevertheless, implementation of the DIS concept has faced certain challenges. Uneven levels of training and experience among the DIS candidates presented by the government, short UN training periods (initially just one month, though later increased to two), and isolated but serious violations of conduct and discipline standards have hampered the reputation and effectiveness of the DIS. In some locations DIS officers were—for reasons of expediency—deployed before proper accommodations had been prepared, and in others they were deployed ahead of their UN police mentors, leaving the new DIS officers without UN guidance and support.

Furthermore, the DIS chain of command has never been clearly articulated to Chadian civilians, refugees, or the humanitarian community. The DIS is—by design—a Chadian police force, meaning that it reports directly to the Chadian government, yet its relationship to the government's other security forces remains undefined. MINURCAT does not have command and control of DIS officers, but the UN role in training, mentoring, and equipping them has meant that most people incorrectly associate the DIS with the UN. As such, any failures or instances of indiscipline affect the reputation of MINURCAT.

Finally, the ability of DIS officers to conduct investigations or to refer cases to an effective justice system has been inherently limited, both by a lack of prior investigative experience and by a nonexistent justice sector. MINURCAT civilian police were slow to train and equip DIS officers to fulfill their mandated investigative role. After several months of deployment, however, on-the-job training in criminal law,

investigative techniques, rules and procedures, and judicial organization has begun in Farchana and Goz Beida. Importantly, a system for tracking DIS investigations is also in development.

### *Judicial Reform*

Limitations in developing the capacity of the DIS were compounded by the lack of effective, accountable judicial structures in eastern Chad. In order to address this gap, and in conjunction with the development of DIS policing capacity, MINURCAT's Judicial Advisory Unit (JAU) has been working to reform and develop the Chadian justice system.

With the support of MINURCAT, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Criminal Court of Abéché completed its first six-week circuit session in Abéché, Ati, Mongo, and Am Timan, with a docket of forty-two criminal cases ranging from murder and rape to conspiracy and infringement of constitutional order. The second session is slated to be held in November 2009 in the towns of Iriba, Biltine, Fada, and Faya. Court facilities are being rehabilitated and equipped in a number of locations, and plans for further rehabilitation as well as the development of a mobile court are in process.

The JAU's work plan for 2010 has prioritized the strengthening and clarification of the penal chain, the further development of judicial capacity, and the widening of access to institutions of justice. Rule of law working groups are slated to be established throughout the MINURCAT area of operations, and will include local traditional, judicial, and security authorities in an effort to combat impunity and strengthen the rule of law in eastern Chad.

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### **Conclusion**

MINURCAT's ability to deliver on its mandated tasks remains in question at the end of 2009 on account of several aspects of the mission's design. The military component of first EUFOR and now MINURCAT provided a measure of security from large-scale attacks on

the refugee camps and for the development of the DIS, but has proven to be a force largely inappropriate to address the primary security concerns of the civilian population. Meanwhile, although development of the DIS is a step in the right direction, its impact is rather limited in the absence of commensurate judiciary and

corrections structures. Finally, without a political mandate to address the conflict in Chad, the overall direction of MINURCAT is relatively uncertain, a reality that will continue to present itself as the international community considers the significant commitment the operation represents.

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**Notes**

1. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "Chad Statistical Snapshot," visited 18 December 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226>.

2. Ibid.

3. *Dakar Agreement*, 13 March 2008, para. 4.

4. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*, S/2008/760, 4 December 2008.