The Levant region of the Middle East remains strategically important to both regional and great powers. In 2009 the region continued to struggle with the destabilizing effects of non-state actors, the fragility of weak states, the insecurity of porous and disputed borders and tensions caused by the unresolved conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the wider Arab world. While Lebanon and Israel have maintained a tenuous cessation of hostilities since the 2006 war, they have yet to arrive at a formal truce. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict remained resistant to mediation efforts in the face of Israeli measures in East Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank, Israeli-Hamas tensions, the chronic de-development and human rights situation in Gaza, and internal Palestinian divisions between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Palestinian Authority-controlled Palestinian areas in the West Bank.

In this bleak assessment there have however been signs of incremental progress in the region’s overall stability in the past year. Political tensions in Lebanon that turned into violent street clashes were calmed following the election of a government of national unity. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Palestinian Authority’s state-building agenda pursued by Prime Minister Fayyad has reinvigorated efforts to build institutions and refocused policies in core governance areas like economic governance and rule of law. The Obama administration’s increased focus on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has met with varied results – proximity talks did not start until May 2010 and there has been no successful transition to direct negotiations, but the fruits of a redoubled mediation effort will only become known over the next 12-18 month period.

The UN’s role in conflict prevention in this politically fraught region is complex and subject to often lightening quick changes in the political situation on the ground. This chapter will focus on the role in conflict prevention of UN political missions active in Lebanon, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

**UNSCO**

**Background to Mission**

Although United Nations involvement in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict dates back to 1948, it was only through the 1994 Oslo Accords that the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process (UNSCO) was established. UNSCO’s mandate was to coordinate and strengthen UN inter-agency cooperation to respond to the needs of the Palestinian people and to mobilize financial, technical, economic and other assistance. In 1999, UNSCO’s mandate was expanded to represent the UN Secretary-General in discussions with the parties and the international community and to improve UN development assistance in support of the peace process. Since 2002, the Special Coordinator has been the Secretary-General’s envoy to the Middle East Quartet, and an integral partner to the Road Map launched in 2003.

UNSCO is comprised of three offices in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza, and has a roving regional presence. In 2006 its coordination capacity was increased with the appointment of a Deputy Special Coordinator, who simultaneously acts as the Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator and leads the UN Country Team (UNCT), which consists of over 21 organizations.

Recent Developments

In December 2008 and January 2009, Israel launched “Operation Cast Lead” in response to rocket fire from Gaza. The conflict further exacerbated the humanitarian and security situation in Gaza, which had seen restrictions in imports and a ban on exports since 2006. Several regional parties sought to mediate during Cast Lead to urge ceasefires from Hamas and Israel, but eventually it was the passage of Security Council Resolution 1860 that provided the framework for an end to the violence. In the aftermath of the conflict, Egypt, as mandated by the League of Arab States, launched several rounds of intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks. The Quartet was not active in any of these mediation attempts. And UNSCO’s notable absence from the negotiations underlined its limited ability to influence the political processes both as an advisor to the parties and in working with the Quartet. However, behind the scenes UNSCO was
active in urging all parties to make progress and in promoting regional and international unity on the issues of discontent. In addition, UNSCO supported the engagement of the Secretary-General with the Security Council during the Gaza war and his peace mission to the region, including his visit to Gaza in the immediate aftermath of hostilities.

While the hardening of the security situation put a strain on the working relationship between UNSCO and the Israeli government, the mission continues to maintain channels of communication with a range of non-state and state parties – including Israel. The Special Coordinator, the Deputy Special Coordinator and their staff continue to cultivate constructive relationships with various ministries and departments of the Government of Israel as well as the Palestinian Authority including formal and informal communication and coordination channels. They also continue relations with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and members of the Quartet as well as with a wide network of interlocutors in civil society including NGOs and the media. UNSCO maintains an office in Gaza and has informal but regular political contacts with Hamas, that are officially restricted to the “working level,” and also engages with the local authorities on humanitarian issues.

Recent initiatives that UNSCO has facilitated include negotiating improved humanitarian and material access into Gaza. While access remains tenuous and insufficient due to tight Israeli security cordon, some materials that Israeli authorities have recently approved for entry include wood, aluminum and glass for winterization efforts – albeit in limited capacities. Construction materials such as concrete remain tightly regulated and as a result few of the buildings destroyed in Operation Cast Lead have been reconstructed. UNSCO has however negotiated approval for the completion of some existing UN projects in Gaza including a housing project in Khan Younis – though this falls short of the request to finish all existing UN projects including schools and hospitals. As noted by Quartet statements and Security Council briefings, the humanitarian situation in Gaza due to the Israeli and Egyptian blockade remains dire and prospects for reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority are rapidly deteriorating. In Jerusalem, Special Coordinator Serry has been active in defusing tensions between Israel and Palestine surrounding the contested religious site of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and in highlighting the dangers of “Hebronization” of the city due in particular to Israeli settlement activity in Palestinian neighborhoods.

The continued lack of progress on a political settlement is a clear impediment to UNSCO’s work in the region. However, in 2009 there seemed to be redoubling of preparatory work with the parties in whatever capacity is available on issues below the level of status discussions. UNSCO is working with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in its preparations to enter international agreements that do not require state party status, such as the Customs Union, as well as with legal preparation to lay the groundwork for future state party status through such mechanisms as gaining observer status in the WTO. In addition, UNSCO strives to maintain continued focus on all six final status issues, including Jerusalem, borders, refugees, security, settlements and water.4

The May 2009 re-appointment of Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister of the PA was among the most significant developments of the year and his state building agenda which focuses on security and institution building in the West Bank has been praised in both UNSCO’s Security Council briefs and the March 2010 Quartet statement.6 The UN has worked to support this agenda through a reorientation of its UN Medium Term Response Plan in support of statebuilding efforts, including specific initiatives that help to build the structures of a future Palestinian state. UNSCO has also assisted
implementation of the plan by working with the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in securing donor support for institution building, while at the local level, UNSCO is a co-chair of the Local Development Forum together with the PA, the World Bank and the Norwegians.

In November 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a freeze of settlement constructions in the West Bank and it appeared that proximity talks between Israel and the PA would commence. However, partial implementation of the settlement freeze led to the temporary suspension of the talks until May 2010, a cooling of relations between the US and Israel and a revival of US involvement in the Quartet. In addition, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza face increasing barriers with respect to access to East Jerusalem, which has serious economic and social implications.

The Obama administration’s recent re-emphasis on the Quartet created the space for a larger advisory role for UNSCO. As the only Quartet Envoy permanently based in the region, Special Coordinator Robert Serry is able to provide authoritative information and analysis to the Quartet based on the large Country Team network and extensive interactions with the parties. UNSCO has been able to play a part in promoting more balanced and substantive Quartet positions, as reflected in the June 2009 Trieste and March 2010 Moscow Quartet statements. UNSCO also maintains a roving regional presence in support of the peace process. As part thereof, Special Coordinator Serry often meets with the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams on issues involving Lebanon and Israel. In addition, Serry conducts outreach to regional players and organizations such as the Arab League to address regional dimensions of the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian issue.

**UNSCO’s Coordinating Role**

Following a policy decision by the UN Secretary-General that calls for an integrated approach for all UN field missions to maximize the UN’s efficiency and effectiveness, the mission has taken a pragmatic approach to integration with the UNCT. UNSCO thereby focuses on practical overlap by prioritizing communication between agencies to avoid redundancy and maximize effectiveness on shared agenda items. Specific examples include a high degree of integration of UNSCO with OCHA and the Office of the Quartet Representative on issues of movement and access from and to Gaza. Coordination between these organizations is often reflected in the monthly Security Council Briefing and in the development of common interagency positions on key issues as well as support provided to them on programming, access negotiations and other efforts.

One of the contributing factors to the mission’s successful integration with the UNCT is that UNSCO’s political and coordination officers share the same offices. This facilitates ease of communication and access on a variety of levels and issues between development coordination and political advising. In addition, successful donor coordination and donor outreach gives UNSCO significant leverage within the UN Country Team. To meet the growing demands related to UNSCO’s coordination role, the mission sought and received six new professional posts from UN Headquarters, increasing UNSCO’s coordination staff from three to twelve over the past 1½ years.

**Conclusion**

Lack of progress on the political track in the past 12-18 months is the most obvious hurdle for UNSCO in fulfilling its mandate. With the easing of Israeli policy on Gaza, UNSCO’s challenge will be to ensure its full implementation and to use it as a springboard for further progress, both on access to Gaza and on the other issues – including prisoners exchange, underlying security tensions, and especially Palestinian disunity – which collectively inhibit a normalization of conditions in Gaza. However, the combination of local, regional and international factors will continue to render strong mediation attempts difficult to sustain.

Regarding the peace process, UNSCO must seek to support the PLO and PA in their negotiating efforts in the face of a difficult domestic environment. The mission also must try to influence Quartet positions in favor of a substantive framework for negotiations encompassing not only the core issues of borders, security, settlements and water, but also Jerusalem and refugees – and for a more comprehensive approach to peace, efforts must also be extended to Syria and Lebanon. In parallel, with the PA’s statebuilding plan seeking institutional readiness for statehood by August
Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)

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<tr>
<td>Special Coordinator</td>
<td>Michael C. Williams (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Coordinator</td>
<td>Marta Ruedas (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>$8.4 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength as of early 2010</td>
<td>International Civilian: 21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Civilian: 51</td>
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For detailed mission information see p. 223

2011, UNSCO will need to continue rallying for UN support of this effort. Navigating the different dimensions of Quartet and Security Council engagement, and of negotiations and developments on the ground, will continue to pose a diplomatic balancing act for the Special Coordinator.

UNSCO had some success in engaging more closely with the parties to the conflict. Whereas in 2007-2008 UNSCO experienced difficulty in obtaining access to higher levels of the Israeli government, late 2009 and the early months of 2010 have shown a marked improvement in engagement with Ministry of Defense officials on access, though the engagement with Israeli authorities remains at a lower level than with Palestinian officials in the West Bank. A continual challenge for UNSCO is to assert its value added in its political and humanitarian/development coordination roles vis-à-vis the multitude of UN organizations that operate in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, whilst preserving its ability to serve as a credible interlocutor for all parties.

UNSCO

Background to Mission

Following the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces in May 2000, the Secretary-General established an office for his Personal Representative to Southern Lebanon to support international efforts to maintain peace and security in the region – a mandate that was expanded to all of Lebanon in November 2005. In the aftermath of the July 2006 war with Israel, the Secretary-General transformed the presence into the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), mandated to represent him politically and to coordinate the work of the UN in the country.

UNSCOL has a two-fold political mandate comprising both regional and internal elements: to oversee and report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, designed to lead to a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict; and to provide good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist domestic Lebanese parties to reach peaceful solutions to contentious issues. The objectives of Resolution 1701 include the extension of Lebanese government authority to all Lebanese territory, the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon and the implementation of the Taif Accords including disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. The Special Coordinator is mandated to engage Lebanese parties in support of Lebanon’s internal stability, territorial integrity and the extension of Lebanese government control throughout the country. In addition, UNSCOL provides a coordination function for the UN system in Lebanon, and engages in outreach to regional organizations such as the Arab League, the EU, as well as donor countries, neighbors and pertinent regional powers.

Through its mandated task of implementing Resolution 1701, UNSCOL also coordinates regularly with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL has primary on-the-ground responsibility for military obligations on Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River, while UNSCOL oversees non-military aspects of the Resolution throughout the country. Thus, UNSCOL is a semi-integrated mission, with UNIFIL operating under the separate authority of the force commander. However, many elements of Resolution 1701 have both a security and political dimension, in which case UNIFIL’s Force Commander and the Special Coordinator must work closely together with an informal division of labor.

UNSCOL maintains bilateral ties with Israel over the implementation of Resolution 1701 and in that regard works closely with the UN Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) in Jerusalem and Beirut on areas of overlap involving Israel and Lebanon.
Recent Developments

In May 2008 political tensions between the government and Hezbollah, which among other things prevented the country’s presidential elections, escalated and resulted in the worst violence since the end of the civil war in 1990. The fighting ended the same month after a power-sharing pact was reached that gave Hezbollah more seats in government, and Lebanon’s parliament elected General Michel Suleiman as president on 25 May 2008. While in June 2009, parliamentary elections were held, the creation of a national unity government was delayed – because of disagreements over power-sharing arrangements between the factions – until November 2009 when Saad Hariri, the son of assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, assumed the post of prime minister. Lebanon’s confessional system of basing political representation on ethnic and religious identity continues to both undergird the political system and contribute to factionalization and political tensions between Shi’is, Sunnis, Christians and Druze.

In the lead up to the 2009 parliamentary elections, UNSCOL used good offices to communicate with Lebanese parties to maintain stability during the electoral process and assisted UNDP in providing technical support to the elections. In this capacity, UNSCOL established an “electoral forum” to brief relevant parties on the functioning of the electoral process as well as technical aspects of the election and gather donor support. The forum has been well received both by the Lebanese government and the international community and has continued its work in preparations for the May 2010 municipal elections.

Since the establishment of the national unity government and other national institutions following the June 2009 elections, the UN’s role in offering good offices to the Lebanese in support of domestic stability may be less immediately relevant. The UN therefore focuses on working with the new government on state building and broader reform challenges.

In its mandated Resolution 1701 capacity, UNSCOL has helped to de-escalate tense situations and re-establish the informal truce between Lebanon and Israel on numerous occasions. Recent examples include responding swiftly alongside UNIFIL to inadvertent border crossings on both sides of the Blue Line by local shepherds and others and acting as a go-between for the Israeli and Lebanese government to de-escalate tensions and provide factual analysis. In terms of the implementation of the objectives Resolution 1701, several areas have seen little to no progress in the past year. In terms of the delineation of international borders, the status of Ghajar, a divided village on the Lebanon border, and Shebaa farms remains unsettled with prospects for a breakthrough in the next year unlikely. Another objective of 1701, the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon other than armed forces under authority of the Lebanese, presents a sizeable challenge as Hezbollah’s hold on the South has not decreased and it is now part of the national unity government. However, UNSCOL’s ability to talk to all Lebanese factions, including Hezbollah, allows the mission latitude in providing a “go-between” role for all parties to the conflict. In turn, UNSCOL’s Israeli interlocutors on resolution 1701 value its access and analysis.

Coordination

In keeping with UN efforts to strengthen mission integration with other UN field presences, UNSCOL has, in consultation with the UN Country Team (UNCT), established working groups in four key areas of development and political mission overlap: Palestinian Issues, Human Rights, Governance & Elections, Regional Disparities & Borders. Of these four groups, the latter has the most successful coordination between the political aspects of UNSCOL and the UNCT. The security of Lebanon’s borders and other entry points are key provisions of Resolution 1701 to prevent the entry of arms and related materiel without the consent of the government. As controlling illegal arms traffic on the borders is not simply a matter of policing, but has a socio-economic basis, the cooperation between the UNCT and Lebanese Armed Forces, facilitated by UNSCOL, has been essential. The working group on Regional Disparities & Borders conducted a socio-economic survey of the border communities and Special Coordinator Williams has marshaled key donors such as the US, UK, Germany, Denmark and the EU to create a common border position and raise funds for technical and financial assistance. The Secretary-General has also twice dispatched a team of border security experts (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment
UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC)

In April 2005, the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) was established by Security Council Resolution 1595 to probe the 14 February 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was killed along with 22 others in a car bombing in Beirut. UNIIIC’s mandate was later expanded to include assistance to the government with investigating further terrorist attacks in Lebanon. Initially conceived for a three months period, the UNIIIC continued its work until 28 February 2009.

While on the technical side the UNIIIC assisted the Lebanese authorities with legal, forensic and analytical expertise in the Hariri and the other cases, the Commission’s investigative activities over the years have led to arrests of key suspects. In late 2008 and early 2009, the Commission was preparing for a gradual transfer of its operations, staff and assets to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon with the view to complete the transition by the time the Tribunal would take up its work on 1 March 2009.

The Tribunal was established in 2007 by Security Council Resolution 1757 and is based in The Hague. It is mandated to continue to investigate and then prosecute perpetrators of the Hariri assassination as well as other cases that the UNIIIC assists in investigating if they are found to be linked to the Hariri case and are of similar nature and gravity. In its last report to the Council, the UNIIIC warned that – against high expectations in some quarters – the launch of the Tribunal did not mean that the investigations were completed. In the same report the UNIIIC urged the Office of the Prosecutor to continue gathering evidence to support any indictments before the Tribunal.

Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559

Authorization Date 14 December 2004 (UNSC Res. 1559)
Start Date 3 January 2005
Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)
Budget $0.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)
Strength as of 18 September 2009 International Civilian: 3

Conclusion

While relations between the political and development sides of the aisle have notably improved in the past two years, due mainly to the good working Team [LIBAT]) to assess border monitoring and propose measures to improve border control.

UNSCOL’s access to the highest level of the Lebanese government provides another platform for successful joint developmental and political initiatives. In terms of Palestinian and Human Rights issues, there has been progress in the reconstruction of the Nahr el Bared camp in 2009 as well as increased advocacy on issues such as the right for Palestinians to work and the provision of national IDs. The governance working group, which is chaired by UNSCOL, is organizing the electoral forums and helping to provide technical assistance to the May 2010 municipal elections.

The semi-integrated nature of the mission can often pose a challenge in terms of the public perception of UNSCOL’s role in conflict mediation. UNIFIL’s sheer size and scope with command of upwards of 12,000 international troops on the ground remains the face of the UN in Lebanon for most Lebanese. However, Special Coordinator Williams is very active in media outreach, widely recognized and afforded access at the highest levels of the Lebanese government. UNSCOL thus maintains a strong reputation as fair-minded with respect to domestic parties within Lebanon and regional counterparts.

While relations between the political and development sides of the aisle have notably improved in the past two years, due mainly to the good working
relationship between the Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator – who also acts as the Deputy Special Coordinator – the mission’s integration with the UNCT remains fragile and subject to personalities. However, while institutional differences remain, the successful initiatives in 2009 show that some coordination successes are starting to emerge.

Changes in the regional environment, such as an escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel, or a shift in the dynamics with Syria, could quickly change the internal balance in Lebanon and the tenuous cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon. The underlying and indeed long-term challenges of Lebanon’s confessional political system could also change UNSCOL’s level of involvement in Lebanon if governance challenges, such as presented by the parliamentary elections in 2009, arise. If such a sudden shift occurs, UNSCOL good offices will once again be called upon – in the meantime a tense status quo with regard to the disarmament and disputed border objectives of Resolution 1701 prevails.

NOTES

1 As of July 2010, Hamas has not signed the Egyptian-drafted reconciliation document, which was signed by all of the factions within the PLO, following several rounds of intra-Palestinian negotiations in 2009.

2 In June 2010, Israel announced steps to ease the Gaza blockade allowing more goods and construction materials to reach Gaza. The decision came in response to increased international criticism of the blockade following Israel’s raid on Gaza-bound aid ships on 31 May, which resulted in the death of nine passengers.

3 UNSCO was able to facilitate entry of the material from the Turkish flotilla to Gaza following engagement with the flotilla organizers, Turkey, Israel, and the de facto Hamas authorities in Gaza.
4 See February 18, 2010 Briefing to the Security Council by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe.

5 Salam Fayyad’s first appointment to the post by President Mahmoud Abbas in 2007 was not confirmed by the Palestinian Legislative Council.


7 The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee was established in 1993 by the Multilateral Steering Group of the multilateral talks on Middle East peace in the context of the Washington Conference to provide international policy coordination development assistance to the Palestinian people. It is chaired by Norway and co-sponsored by the US and EU. Members include the PA, Israel, the UN, the IMF, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

8 UN Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, April 13, 2010


10 The current Quartet Representative is Mr. Tony Blair. UNSCO seconds a staff member to his office


12 The Blue Line is a border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel published by the United Nations on 7 June 2000.


14 Although UNIFIL is not integrated into the UN Country Team it maintains observer status in the working groups.