The crises in Sudan continued to present fundamental challenges to the UN’s peacekeeping deployments during 2009. Despite the presence of over one-third of the UN’s total peacekeepers in the field, the situations facing civilians and peacekeepers in both Darfur and the south remain extremely unsettled, an area of particular concern as Sudan enters a volatile period in advance of its first nationwide elections in over two decades.

In the absence of a plausible peace agreement, violence and insecurity were widespread in Darfur. While open conflict between rebel groups and government forces leveled, the incidence of armed crime and banditry spiked, acutely impacting civilian populations and the delivery of humanitarian aid. In the face of consistent operational obstruction by the conflict’s protagonists, the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—still only partially deployed by year end—had limited impact on the ongoing insecurity and increasingly became the object of attacks, multiple kidnappings, and car-jackings throughout the year.

Insecurity in Darfur was perpetuated by an overall lack of political progress. Multiple attempts aimed at negotiating a more inclusive settlement with Darfur’s rebel groups were fruitless, and relations between Sudan and regional foe Chad remained tense throughout the year. Complicating the political picture—both in Sudan and internationally—was the indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir and the government of Sudan’s subsequent expulsion of thirteen humanitarian aid nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Darfur.

Flaring intercommunal violence in the south ahead of major Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation milestones—national elections in 2010 and the 2011 referendum on the south’s independence—brought international attention back to the north-south conflict. The violence in the south resulted in more than 2,000 deaths and over 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), making the conflict in the south more intense compared to that in Darfur during the year. While the decision by The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the disputed Abeyi region partially resolved one of the sticking points of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, continued disputes on border demarcation, disputed census results, and difficulty passing election-related legislation plagued north-south relations,
implicating the feasibility of free and fair elections.

While the CPA ended the war between the north and the south, its implementation process has a substantial effect on the situation in Darfur as well as the broader region, and thus neither peacekeeping theater should be viewed in isolation. Nevertheless, by year end the viability of the CPA was deeply in question. Considering the very real potential for a relapse into conflict and the potential for broader regional implications, Sudan will remain a preoccupation for the international community for some time to come.

Darfur: Background

UNAMID emerged in part from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was deployed in June 2004, a year after the commencement of large-scale hostilities in Darfur. Initially a force of 60 observers with 300 troops to protect them, AMIS was later expanded to 6,171 personnel and given a more robust mandate, including protection of civilians. The mission lacked the capacity to implement this mandate, however, and was constrained financially and logistically.

The government of Sudan, strongly resistant to a UN operation in Darfur, agreed in mid-2007 to the deployment of a hybrid AU-UN force. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized the deployment of UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission was to be composed of 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers each, and to incorporate AMIS personnel already in the field.

UNAMID is mandated to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with cease-fire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic, and assist with implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). However, the DPA was signed by only one of the three major rebel movements, and the security situation deteriorated in its wake as the movements fragmented.

UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008 amid ongoing hostilities and displacements and in the absence of a credible peace agreement. From the start, relations with Khartoum were a strong focus, with difficult and slow-moving negotiations ensuing over UNAMID’s use of land, air, and water rights, and over a status of forces agreement. Meanwhile, it was necessary to establish communications and support mechanisms for the hybrid AU-UN model, including the staffing of a Joint Support Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa, but this did not become operational until November 2008.

The deployment of UNAMID—in compliance with demands by the Sudanese government and as stipulated in Resolution 1769—was to have a “predominantly African character.” However, existing African battalions in Darfur and those poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of “self-sustainability,” limiting their ability to carry out the mandate. Thus, UNAMID’s first urgent task was to help African battalions meet the required standards in order for the
mission to reach its full deployment. Meanwhile, the security situation continued to deteriorate in Darfur, with the DPA under severe questioning and as rebel groups splintered into a complex constellation.

Nevertheless and because of ongoing insecurity, immense logistical issues in reaching Darfur, and particularly the continued operational and administrative obstruction of the Sudanese government in granting visas and meeting customs requirements, by the end of 2009—almost two years since the mission had been authorized—UNAMID’s uniformed military personnel stood at about three-quarters deployed. This, however, represented a 40 percent growth in UNAMID’s military deployment during 2009. Similarly, UNAMID’s police contingents were just over 69 percent deployed at the end of 2009, with thirteen of the nineteen mandated formed police units on the ground.

Furthermore, throughout 2009, UNAMID consistently lacked a number of capabilities vital to the implementation of its mandate, including eighteen medium-lift helicopters. Five Ethiopian attack helicopters were set to arrive in theater by the end of 2009, following the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding in May.

Darfur: Key Developments

Security

Even with increased contingents, UNAMID’s impact on the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the various rebel groups in Darfur was limited. UNAMID’s difficulties were compounded by the persistent constraints placed on its freedom of movement imposed by the government of Sudan and the various rebel groups. By the end of November, government and other forces had barred the mission’s operations over forty times, often issuing threats of attack should UNAMID defy its land and air restrictions. This obstinacy was also extended to the NGO community operating in Darfur, whose UNAMID-funded quick-impact projects were frequently blocked.

In this contrast, UNAMID continued its military operations. In the second half of 2009 the mission instituted its first long-range patrols to monitor the security situation and to protect and build confidence among the population. Similarly, UNAMID expanded its around-the-clock patrols of IDP camps, from only one location during 2008 to seventeen by the end of the year. However, security during day-to-day activities outside the camps, such as gathering water and fuel, remained lacking.

Beyond the conflict between the SAF and rebel groups, an alarming rise in attacks, kidnappings, car-jackings, and violent robberies aimed at UNAMID military and civilian staff, as well as humanitarian aid workers in Darfur, severely hampered their operations. Between August and October alone, nearly twenty UNAMID vehicles were car-jacked; in addition, the mission reported multiple instances of robbery and four kidnappings of NGO aid workers and UNAMID staff for ransom. In response, UNAMID continued to impose curfew and other restrictions on nighttime driving for civilian staff. The gravest of these attacks happened in December, when ambushes on UNAMID’s Rwanda contingents saw five peacekeepers killed. The criminality and banditry also hampered recruitment of civilian staff for the mission. At the end of October, UNAMID’s civilian staff complement stood at only 70 percent deployed.

While UNAMID was initially deployed to address an ongoing, high-intensity conflict, it has become apparent that a heavy military focus is not particularly suited to addressing the evolving conflict in Darfur as it takes on a less intense but equally disruptive and violent character.

The absence of a credible rule of law system in the Darfur region to address the myriad security issues facing both the civilian population and the international presence added to the instability. Ironically, what rule of law and security institutions that do exist in Darfur were frequently involved in obstructing the mission from achieving its goals via unwarranted arrests and intimidation.

UNAMID continued supporting the development of the security and justice sectors in
Darfur, training over 200 community police throughout the year and making operational 59 community policing centers. However, access to justice remained limited throughout, with multiple cases of prolonged pretrial detention reported. To address this paucity, UNAMID, in collaboration with UN partners and the government of Sudan, began work on establishing mobile courts in eight localities throughout Darfur that lack judicial services.

Political
The political situation surrounding Darfur during 2009, and throughout Sudan more generally, should largely be viewed in the context of the International Criminal Court’s 4 March issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir for alleged war crimes perpetrated in Darfur. This arrest warrant—the first issued by the ICC for a sitting head of state—had a divisive impact: the UN Security Council did not use its power to stop the warrant from being issued, while there were legitimate concerns from many countries and the African Union that pursuit of justice through the ICC could block a political settlement to the Darfur conflict.

Unsurprisingly, the overall political situation remained tense, and commitment toward striking an agreement absent on all sides. In response to the ICC indictment, the government of Sudan expelled thirteen NGO aid groups operating in Darfur. While UNAMID and the government instituted stopgap measures to ensure the continued delivery of critical humanitarian aid, the feasibility of extending aid provision in the absence of the NGO community remained in question.

A lack of forward progress on the political front was not on account of a lack of effort put forth by the international community. The first half of 2009 saw a flurry of political activity surrounding Darfur. During February the government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—the largest and most powerful of Darfur’s rebel groups—agreed in Doha, under Qatari mediation and AU-UN Mediator Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, to a set of concessions that would hopefully lead the way for more substantive peace talks. JEM was joined in these preliminary negotiations by the Sudan Liberation Army–Unity (SLA-Unity) and the United Resistance Front (URF) in April. Nevertheless, this initial positive sign failed to deliver tangible progress, with rebel groups again fragmenting and refusing to attend talks by the end of the year.

Also, in Doha, the government of Sudan and Chad reached an agreement in early May to stop arming their militias and opposition groups in the border region, a move seen as central to establishing peace in Darfur. The parties also chose to reconvene the Dakar Contact Group, as agreed during negotiations in 2008, and develop an action plan for the deployment of a border observation force. Yet the force was not discussed further and the situation between the two showed little improvement, with Chadian armed forces and the SAF periodically engaging in attacks along the border. December, however, did see steps toward normalization of relations, with high-level visits to both capitals.

For its part, the African Union attempted to find an African-led solution to the Darfur crisis in early 2009, assigning former South African president Thabo Mbeki as head of the AU Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Broadly citing the conflict in Darfur as a manifestation of the historical inequity in Sudan, the AUPD aimed to address issues of accountability and reconciliation in Darfur. In its report, the AUPD called for a “global political agreement” whereby all stakeholders would commit to peace in Darfur. Further, the AUPD called for the establishment of hybrid criminal courts—to comprise judges from Sudan as well as other African nations—to try the alleged perpetrators of the most serious crimes committed during the Darfur conflict. The AUPD’s proposition was initially rejected by the government of Sudan, which said that the creation of any such court would violate its constitution and undermine its sovereignty.

The United States assigned a Special Envoy to Sudan, Major-General Scott Gration, at the start of the year, demonstrating the new US administration’s policy focus on ending the crises in Sudan. Despite the Gration-facilitated 23 August signing of a unity deal between four
major rebel factions (the URF and three Sudan Liberation Army [SLA] splinter groups) in Addis Ababa, work toward aligning the rebel movements in Darfur into a cohesive front did not go far. Negotiations in Doha were set to resume in early 2010.

Meanwhile, in August, the AU-UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rodolphe Adada, resigned from the mission, citing that the main challenges now facing Darfur were political. Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari was chosen to replace Adada in late 2009.

**Elections**

Persistent insecurity and a lack of progress toward a negotiated settlement in Darfur have serious implications for the holding of planned national elections in April 2010. While voter registration supported by UNAMID began in November 2009, the process in Darfur was marked by low turnout on account of insecurity and reports of voter intimidation at registration sites. Further, the results of the 2008 census remain in dispute, especially in regard to the IDP populations in Darfur. As a result, many feel that the polls may underrepresent their views. Yet, excluding Darfur from the elections could perpetuate the conflict there, historically rooted in issues of underrepresentation.

**North-South: Background**

The Security Council first authorized the creation of a mission to Sudan—the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)—on 11 July 2004, in Resolution 1547, and charged it with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in supporting the CPA that had ended the decades-long conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include monitoring and verifying troop redeployments, assisting with formation of SPLA/SAF joint integrated units (JIUs) to help secure contested regions, promoting rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referendums, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specifically includes coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary.

The CPA is time bound, with a referendum on the south’s independence scheduled for 2011.

**North-South: Key Developments**

**Security**

The year saw a precipitous deterioration of the security situation in the south. Whereas in previous years security issues emerged largely out of flashpoints along the north-south border, during 2009 it was persistent intercommunal fighting within south Sudan that served to destabilize the region. Owing to perceived personal insecurity and decades of conflict, the southern population is rife with weapons, and intercommunal violence related to cattle rustling and land and water rights is a frequent occurrence. But the nature and scale of the violence during 2009 suggest that other drivers were at play ahead of crucial CPA milestones.

The violence was not contained to any one part of the south, but the spiraling situation in Jonglei state was an area of particular concern for UNMIS throughout the year. Following a series of deadly clashes in April and May, and as part of its stabilization plan for Jonglei, UNMIS deployed platoon-strength military and police contingents to temporary operating bases in Akobo and Pibor. This brought a measure of security to civilians in Jonglei state and ensured the delivery of humanitarian aid, but the temporary nature of these bases meant that their contribution to stability was short-lived. Indeed, a late September attack in Duk Padiet in Jonglei state saw more than a hundred deaths, among whom were regional leaders of the SPLA/M and the South Sudan Police Service.
(SSPS), while the southern government’s infrastructure and equipment were also targeted.

Attacks launched by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda in the Equatoria states also had a considerable impact on the civilian population—killing an estimated 200 and displacing nearly 50,000 people by October 2009. In response to the violence perpetrated by the LRA, the Security Council in November suggested that UNMIS, along with the other UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the region (the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo [MONUC] and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad [MINURCAT]), coordinate their strategies to protect vulnerable civilian populations from the persistent LRA threat.

The contested oil-rich border region of Abyei was a continued source of concern for UNMIS throughout the year. Following a dramatic escalation of violence in Abyei during 2008 that saw the dissolution of JIUs during the battle, the two parties signed the Abyei Road Map Agreement, which referred the matter of border demarcation to The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In advance of the PCA decision in July 2009, UNMIS undertook contingency planning and reconfigured its force to deal with any violent fallout from the decision. In the end, the PCA’s decision on the Abyei border—granting the Heglig oil fields to the north and territory to the south—was accepted by both sides and did not result in a return to violence. Yet, at the end of the year, the technical process of drawing the border line, a key CPA implementation point, was stymied by practical disputes from both sides.

Overall, the persistence of violence in the south throughout the year led to an increasingly negative public perception of UNMIS in relation to its mandate to protect civilians. While UNMIS contains a significant military element, it is essentially a traditional monitoring operation. UNMIS was designed to oversee the disengagement of the parties to the conflict and their redeployment to respective sides of the border in relation to implementation of the CPA, not particularly to protect civilians from sudden outbreaks of non-CPA related violence. The mission is thusly deployed to bases at the sector level, as developed by UNMIS itself, rather than at the state level, where proximity to civilian populations would be heightened. UNMIS has neither the explicit mandate nor the appropriate resources to intervene in such instances of violence. Further, the SPLA and SSPS maintain the

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For detailed mission information see p. 319
primary responsibility of protecting the civilian population.

Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law
While many speculated that the escalation of violence in the south during 2009 was a function of Khartoum employing destabilizing proxies in advance of CPA milestones, the widespread insecurity served to highlight the southern government’s lack of critical rule of law and security sector capacity to address these issues across the territory. This is, of course, of particular concern as the notion of an independent south draws closer.

In this vein, the Justice and Security Sector Advisory Coordination Cell (JSSACC) became operational in the south during 2009. Under the JSSACC structure, UNMIS and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) aim to assist the southern government in developing an architecture for the proper role of the security sector in the south and simultaneously assist in developing the requisite governance and judicial structures to support security actors. UNDP will largely be responsible for judicial advising. UNMIS will play an advisory role directly to the southern government’s National Security Secretariat, the body that sits just below the National Security Council. There, UNMIS will help define the role of the security sector (the SPLA and SSPS) at both the federal and state levels, and create a donor platform for coordination and direction of funds. This is of crucial importance, as delineating the role of the SSPS in relation to the SPLA was a point of considerable concern during the violence of 2009, in which the SPLA served primarily as first responder and law enforcer.

UNMIS continued supporting the development of the southern government’s rule of law and security structures, including providing training to an estimated 17,000 of the approximately 33,000 SSPS officers. UNMIS also served in an advisory support role to the southern government’s Ministry of Legal Affairs. Nevertheless, the mission has historically encountered difficulties in finding member states that are willing to invest in SSPS development prior to the 2011 referendum. Further to training, UNMIS continued to support the SSPS logistically through the building of police stations, instructing on asset management, and providing uniforms.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities began in February, through the assistance of the UN’s first integrated DDR unit, which combines the efforts of UNMIS, UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). By the end of the year, over 15,000 former combatants had been demobilized, and it is hoped that ultimately 180,000 SAF and SPLA members will be demobilized and reintegrated. However, the extent to which DDR will continue is in question, as tensions between the north and south remain high ahead of the elections and referendum.

Elections
With the end of the CPA implementation process in sight, the political commitment by both the dominant National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM has never been lower. SPLM protests in support of electoral reform in Khartoum in late November saw the arrest of SPLM leadership, sparking unrest in the south, that saw the destruction of NCP offices and a considerable rise in north/south tensions. While preparations for the twice-delayed national elections dominated the political agenda throughout the year, the feasibility of the country’s nationwide polls in over two decades was increasingly thrown into question as negotiations on critical points of the CPA were met by stalemate. While the NCP sees the agreement’s mandated national elections as a legitimizing process and a prerequisite for the 2011 referendum, SPLM representatives see the two as separate processes, with the referendum on secession superseding all else.

US Special Envoy to Sudan, Major-General Scott Gration, was able to mediate an agreement between the NCP and the SPLM in August committing the parties to working constructively toward implementing the remaining portions of the CPA. Among the outstanding CPA sticking
points that need to be resolved prior to the 2010 elections are demarcation of the border between north and south; resolution of the 2008 census results, which the south contends misrepresent actual populations and severely hamper its ability to impact any legislation; and passage of legislation relating to democratic reforms of the central government and reform of the media and National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) laws.

After months of deliberation, in late 2009 the parties agreed that the referendum on the south’s secession would be decided by a simple majority with two-thirds of the overall population participating in the vote, departing from the prior assertion that secession would be predicated on a 75 percent majority. But by this time the acrimony between north and south had grown even further, with NCP opposition parties walking out of parliament on several occasions and SPLM leader and Government of National Unity vice president Salva Kiir publicly alluding to the south’s independence as an ultimate goal. This sentiment was reinforced by Kiir’s decision not to directly challenge President Bashir in the upcoming elections.

In this context, UNMIS along with other UN partners, and at the request of both north and south, supported preparations for the elections in both the north and the south, including coordinating donor funds contributed to the National Electoral Commission (NEC), facilitating dialogue between stakeholders and the NEC, and providing voter awareness programs.

Beyond the issues of political will for the elections, UNMIS’s support for the process was met by dual resource and logistical challenges. This was especially true for UNMIS assistance in the south, where capacity to oversee elections remained extremely limited. According to UNMIS estimates, facilitating elections across Sudan’s vast territory would require considerable mission electoral staff. By the end of September, UNMIS’s electoral section was mandated a maximum staff of only 248 members, though it was hoped that with additional UN volunteers, its staff would reach to 325. Meanwhile, the sheer size of Sudan, its lack of infrastructure, the scheduling of the elections during the country’s rainy season, and the complexity of the polls—choosing candidates for political office at six different levels—for a population characterized by high illiteracy and little to no institutional memory of voting, all mitigate against smooth elections. Voter registration did begin in November with UNMIS support, though it was extended for two weeks owing to logistical delays.

**Conclusion**

The year 2010 will be pivotal and sensitive one for Sudan’s future, and will require the concerted attention of UN peacekeepers and the broader international community. Balancing the priorities of the dual yet interrelated crises in Sudan has presented a significant difficulty for the international community over the past five years and, considering the ongoing potential for more violence, will remain crucial in the coming months. Of similar importance is considering what a future Sudan configuration may look like and what type of international peace operation will be the appropriate response to mitigate the outbreak of violence that could accompany such dramatic change. Ultimately, however, avoiding a return to conflict throughout Sudan rests on the will of the parties to constructively engage with each other, something that was elusive at the year’s end.