

Somalia

Somalia remained mired in violence in 2010 amid an overall deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. Increased insurgent attacks, including from Al-Shabaab, against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had dire consequences for civilians: more than 200,000 Somalis fled their homes and hundreds have been killed or injured within the past year. Al-Shabaab's brazen, Al-Qaida-inspired attacks—in particular a suicide attack against civilians in Uganda—highlighted regional effects of terrorism spreading from the conflict in Somalia. Meanwhile, tensions within the TFG and Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) raised concern among the international community about the government's effectiveness and legitimacy. On 21 December, the UN Security Council increased the authorized force of AMISOM from 8,000 troops to 12,000.

Background

Although Somalia served as the testing ground for post-Cold War peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in the early 1990s, it has nonetheless remained the world's most comprehensively failed state. International interest and interventions have ebbed and flowed over the past two decades and, despite some recent success in buttressing the TFG, immense humanitarian and security challenges continue to stymie the consolidation of state authority necessary for peace and stability.

In 1991, Somalia was swept with clan-based violence following the collapse of Siad Barre's regime. With no viable central government, militias fought for control over territory and resources. The humanitarian toll was immense: by early 1992, more than 300,000 people

had died of hunger and some 1.5 million were on the verge of starvation.

Peacekeeping

Four months after imposing an arms embargo, with violence increasing and a worsening humanitarian situation, in April 1992 the Security Council established the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The mission's narrow mandate was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and protect UN humanitarian operations.

Despite the presence of UNOSOM I, attacks on aid groups brought humanitarian operations to a standstill. As a result, US president George H. W. Bush deployed a US-led, Council-sanctioned multinational force, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to use "all necessary means" to create an environment for the resumption of humanitarian aid. The 37,000-strong force, authorized under Chapter VII, was largely successful in its goal to create safe humanitarian space, and in March 1993 control of the operation was turned back over to the UN in the form of UNOSOM II with a new and expanded "nation-building" mandate. UNOSOM II forces suffered heavy casualties and engaged in intense battles with militias, including one led by General Aidid, whose men killed twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers. In October 1993, a botched US attempt to capture Aidid left eighteen Americans dead and precipitated a withdrawal of US and Western forces. By March 1995, the remaining UN peacekeepers had ignominiously left Somalia.

Twelve years later, in February 2007, the Council authorized the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect the TFG, support political dialogue and national reconciliation, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the reestablishment of Somali security

forces. Although originally envisioned as a bridging mission that would base its exit strategy on the eventual handover to a multidimensional UN mission, by the beginning of 2011 AMISOM continued to be the only peacekeeping presence.

Political and Security

One of the first mildly successful attempts to restore a functioning government was the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), formed in Djibouti in 2000. However, much of Somali society viewed the government as unrepresentative and actively challenged it. As a result, in talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government replaced the TNG. The TFG president, Abdullahi Yusuf, soon requested a strong peacekeeping presence to support his government. IGAD decided to send an AU-sponsored mission, IGASOM, but it never materialized.

Beset by internal disagreements and external threats, the new government met in exile. For nearly half of 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)—a rival of the TFG—exerted control over Mogadishu and most of southern Somalia. Because they brought a modicum of stability, the UIC was broadly popular among Somalis. In December 2006, Ethiopia intervened to oust the UIC and prop up the TFG. A fierce, complex insurgency resulted, led by Al-Shabaab, a militia under the hard-line factions of the UIC. Many Somalis viewed the TFG as a puppet of Ethiopia, and Al-Shabaab gained popularity for espousing national resistance to foreign occupation. Large-scale fighting erupted in 2007 and 2008 and more than a million Somalis were internally displaced.

Against this backdrop, a group of disaffected UIC members, both government and diaspora leaders, came together to form the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) to oppose the Ethiopian presence and the TFG. As fighting ensued, the UN Political Support Office in Somalia (UNPOS) brought representatives of the ARS and the TFG together for talks in neighboring Djibouti, dubbed the Djibouti Process. The parties agreed on a political settlement



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AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Authorization Date	6 December 2006 (UNSC Res. 1744)
Start Date	March 2007
Force Commander	Major-General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda)
Budget	\$100.2 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010)
Strength as of 30 September 2010	Troops: 7,200 Civilian Police: 50

that allowed for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the establishment of an “international security presence” in their place, and inclusion of the ARS into the TFG. However, after joining the peace process, the ARS split into two groups: moderates and hard-liners. The hard-liners rejected the Djibouti agreement and were more determined than ever to fight the TFG and its backers, Ethiopia and AMISOM.

In early 2009, new signs of hope began to emerge: Ethiopia withdrew its forces and a moderate Islamist, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected president of the TFG. While initially diffusing much of the insurgency driven by Al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgent threat remained persistent. Unable to quell the insurgency, the government voted to implement sharia law in April 2009. But in June, the government declared a state of emergency and insurgents came close to taking the presidential palace. Throughout 2009, a spate of insurgent attacks, including suicide bombings and assassinations, brought Somalia back to a heightened state of insecurity, even though the government continued to operate out of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab and other hard-line Islamist insurgents continued to control much of the countryside in southern Somalia.

While the conflict in Somalia has been largely confined to its southern half, with Somaliland and Puntland remaining relatively peaceful, piracy off Somalia's coast knows no bounds, neither on nor offshore. Two major initiatives were active in 2009: the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) and the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The former reached operational capacity in 2009 to protect humanitarian-aid and commercial vessels; the latter helped coordinate funds and projects for restoring rule-of-law and security sector institutions to curb the spreading growth of piracy, whose origins are on land.

Key Developments

Political and Security

Two years after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the election of Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Somalia's security situation remained bleak. The government, while operating in parts of Mogadishu, still was unable to retain control of much of the capital, let alone the southern half of the country. Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups continued to hold vast swaths of territory, which they used to recruit and train fighters to violently oppose the TFG and AMISOM.

Al-Shabaab staged multiple bold attacks in 2010. On 11 July, three Al-Shabaab suicide

bombers killed seventy-six civilians who were watching the World Cup final in Kampala. The attacks were explicitly meant to "punish" Uganda for contributing the majority of AMISOM's troops.

In August and September, the Islamist militant group fought heavily against AMISOM and TFG troops, staging numerous attacks in and around Mogadishu, leaving hundreds dead. On 23 August, during Ramadan, Al-Shabaab attacked a hotel in Mogadishu, killing thirty-two people, including six parliamentarians. Another attack, at the Mogadishu airport as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Augustine Mahiga, was flying out after meetings with President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, further highlighted the group's ability to strike inside one of the few key centers controlled by the government.

As civilians are caught in the fighting and are killed or wounded, the intense conflict between AMISOM and Islamist militants has led to a backlash against the peacekeeping and government force. A number of incidents of civilian casualties from AMISOM and government counterattacks against insurgent attacks have contributed to weak popular support for the TFG. In one incident on 17 November, at least sixteen civilians were killed in Mogadishu's Bakara market after fighters from an armed group clashed with African Union troops.

The year 2010 was marked by some positive developments despite the country's severe humanitarian crisis and security situation. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's government made strides in reaching out to groups outside of the Djibouti process. The cooperation agreement between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), signed on 15 March, set into motion a series of positive developments, including inclusion of the group into the TFG and armed forces. Furthermore, members of other Islamist groups, including Hizbul Islam, have joined the government, and a number of prominent Al-Shabab commanders and fighters have renounced violence and defected to the TFG.

There was also increased concern from Somalis and the international community about infighting and feuds within the TFG, with UN

Special Representative Mahiga calling for government unity. On 16 May, President Sheikh Ahmed dissolved the cabinet, prompting the speaker of the parliament to resign. Four days later, however, the speaker and the cabinet were reinstated. By the beginning of July a new cabinet was formed, with ASWJ and diaspora members, but the prime minister resigned on 21 September after months of disagreements with the president.

The new prime minister, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohamed, named a new, leaner cabinet, cutting twenty-one offices and retaining only two members of the previous government. While this has been welcomed by some, others are unsure how the new cabinet will fare given its disregard for the clan-based power-sharing system.

The Independence Federal Constitution Commission launched the consultation process on the draft constitution, which will be issued in December 2010. Because the transition period stipulated by the Djibouti process is set to end in August 2011, many are concerned about the government's lack of progress in fulfilling the transitional agenda.

An international conference cohosted by the UN and the Turkish government in May 2010 (the Istanbul Conference on Somalia) highlighted Somalia's political, security, and reconstruction needs and underscored the importance of tackling the root causes of the region's piracy onshore by training and funding the Somali security forces and economic restructuring. Much like the Brussels conference of 2009, the Istanbul conference brought more than fifty member-states together to pledge support for the TFG and reinforce the message that the international community remains committed to helping Somalia recover. However, unlike Brussels, new pledges were not made; the TFG has received 76 percent of the total pledges from the earlier conference.

The EU Training Mission (EUTM), established to strengthen the Somali security sector, commenced in April. EUTM began a twelve-month training of more than 2,000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including nearly 100 ASWJ soldiers, at the Bihanga camp, 200 kilometers west of Kampala. In



Ugandan peacekeepers from AMISOM patrol in their armored personnel carrier (APC) around Somalia's house of parliament in the capital Mogadishu, 27 May 2010.

Ismail Taxta/Reuters

addition to specific military training, recruits learned about international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law and the protection of civilians, including the specific protection needs of women and children.

EU NAVFOR, or Operation Atalanta, continued to carry out its main tasks in 2010: protecting the World Food Program (WFP) and other vulnerable vessels and contributing to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. On 14 June 2010, the Council of the EU extended the operation's mandate for two years. The TFG also signed a bilateral cooperation agreement on countering piracy with the Puntland region in April.

Peacekeeping

AMISOM operated in an increasingly hostile environment, with frequent insurgent attacks. Despite this, the force maintained control of key installations in Mogadishu: the presidential palace, the airport, and the harbor, and Kilometer 4 (K4) (Sector 1) and the Military Academy and Mogadishu University (Sector 2). Overall, AMISOM, which is largely confined to operating in the capital, lacked the capability and resources to effectively implement its mandate.

Box 3.10 Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

Concerted international efforts to combat piracy off Somalia's coast continued in 2010 with forty-nine UN member states working in some manner toward providing a measure of security from piracy. The states involved ranged from the United States and China to Russia and Iran, with participation also coming from seven international organizations and three multinational coalitions (led by the EU, NATO, and the United States). While the members of this diverse group of countries are united to counter piracy, their motivations for doing so range from protecting humanitarian-aid vessels and cargo ships supplying the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to providing security to the vital Gulf of Aden shipping lanes. There have been measurable successes over the past year; however, substantial concern about piracy emerging from Somalia continues, and coordinating the activities of this wide range of actors remains a primary operational challenge.

UN Security Council Resolution 1897, passed in November 2009, extended the legal authority to the international community to combat pirates in Somalia's territory and territorial waters and commended the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

(CGPCS). The CGPCS is an international cooperation mechanism, a common point of contact on all aspects of combating piracy for the international community through quarterly meetings with stakeholders at UN headquarters. The CGPCS is composed of four working groups: operational coordination, chaired by the United Kingdom; legal matters, chaired by Denmark; strengthening shipping self-awareness, headed by the United States; and communications and media strategy, chaired by Egypt.

Similarly, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group, established in 2008, is a voluntary international military group—a vehicle for sharing best practices and informal discussions on combating piracy. While SHADE initially consisted only of the three multinational coalitions operating off Somalia, it rapidly expanded to involve bilateral deployments. This forum meets monthly at the expert level in Bahrain.

In 2010, China agreed to an increased coordination role in SHADE, boosting the profile of its antipiracy efforts. The International Maritime Bureau reported that increased international efforts contributed to a decrease in the number of pirate attacks in the first half of 2010, even as the capability of pirates

to mount attacks far from shore increased. This reality underscored the need for a further level of coordination in regard to addressing the root causes of piracy and ensuring a viable model for prosecution of detained pirate suspects. The justice and security sectors in Somalia lack the capability to adequately address either challenge, and the international community has yet to agree on a united approach.

UN Security Council Resolution 1918, adopted unanimously in April 2010, requested a report from the Secretary-General on possible approaches to prosecution of piracy suspects. The Secretary-General's response, delivered in August, outlined seven options, ranging from the enhancement of UN capacity-building activities to the establishment of an international tribunal under Chapter VII authority. As the Security Council considered these recommendations, Kenya announced in October 2010 that it was pulling out of a deal to try suspected pirates captured by the EU, accusing its European partners of failing to live up to their commitments. Balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of regional stakeholders and their international partners will doubtless be key to ensuring the viability of a future pirate-prosecution model.

AMISOM peacekeepers have insufficient equipment for protecting AMISOM installations, and instead of using concrete bunkers and barriers, the troops have resorted to sandbags. The UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOA), a field-support operation led by the Department of Field Support (DFS), continued delivering logistics and support capacity to AMISOM.

The resourcing and funding of AMISOM and the TFG remained problematic. The UN does not have the resources to adequately fund the TFG civil servants and police nor to reimburse countries providing troops to AMISOM.

While the EU pays allowances to AMISOM personnel, troops are currently paid less than that of UN missions. This is seen as an obstacle to incentivizing more countries to contribute troops to an already dangerous operation.

In response to the increased insurgent threat, many states pushed for more troops for the modestly sized AU force. On 5 July, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) committed to deploying 2,000 peacekeepers to AMISOM and reiterated its call for AMISOM to be turned into a UN mission. At the AU Summit in Kampala, some two weeks

after the suicide attacks, some states called for more robust rules of engagement (ROE) and a supplement of 14,000 troops to bring the authorized size of the peacekeeping force to 20,000. However, beyond approving the previous IGAD request for 2,000 troops, there was no agreement on a change in the ROE of AMISOM. Earlier, in February, the AU Peace and Security Council once again called for the UN to impose a no-fly zone and a sea blockade to prevent the entry of individuals and matériels for the insurgency. While this has not occurred, the UN arms embargo remained in place and instituted targeted sanctions in April.

The joint security committee, created as a part of the Djibouti process, with representatives from the TFG and the international community, continued efforts to support the institutional development of the security sector. The committee has urged the adoption of the National Security and Stabilization Plan and the Security Sector Assessment and for the government to act on its recommendations.

Conclusion

On 21 December, the UN Security Council extended AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and increased the authorized force by 50 percent,

from 8,000 to 12,000. Uganda indicated that it would provide the 4,000 additional troops. As in the previous resolutions, the Council reiterated its intent to create a UN peacekeeping operation, but Council members' appetite for making this a reality remained limited. The decision to augment the AU force came soon after an announcement from erstwhile rivals Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam that they would be joining together as allies in their fight against the TFG and AMISOM troops. Regardless, the violence and insecurity of 2010 has impacted civilians. Between January and 14 November, the WHO reported that there were 3,955 weapons-related casualties from the two major hospitals in Mogadishu, including 718 children less than five years of age. A third hospital reported 2,959 weapons-related casualties in the same period.

As Somalia enters 2011 and the TFG nears the end of its transitional period, the country's future relies as much on the political authority of the Somali central government as it does on neutralizing the growing terrorist threat of Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups. The outcome of increased AMISOM troop deployments and security-related, military responses remains unclear. As in the past, Somalia insurgent groups appear likely to increase attacks if more outside troops arrive.