Sudan dominated the discourse surrounding global peace operations during 2010 and will continue to do so in 2011.

Host to two peacekeeping operations—one-third of the UN’s total deployment—Sudan will undergo a dramatic transformation during the coming year as the implementation period laid out in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) comes to a close with referenda on the South’s independence and the status of the oil-rich Abyei region. The referendum on the South will be open to votes from those who can prove they are from the South or can prove familial linkages there, including southerners living in the North and abroad. The planned vote on Abyei’s status stalled at the end of 2010, as disagreements on voter eligibility prevented the poll from being held. Whether in January 2011 the South votes for independence or unity with the North, the CPA’s subsequent expiry holds major implications not only for the people of Sudan itself but also for the UN peacekeeping operations there and for the international community more broadly.

The stakes are undeniably high for Sudan in the coming year, and a complex and coordinated effort will be needed to ensure that the country does not return to war. This reality and the potential for heightened instability in an already volatile Central Africa region elicited a tremendous amount of operational activity during 2010. Following contested general and local elections in April, preparing for the referenda and their potential outcomes became the main focus for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the range of bilateral and civil society actors engaged in the country.

Despite these efforts, preparations for the South Sudan referendum were severely delayed at the end of 2010, and lack of agreement on the modalities of the Abyei referendum left the vote on its status postponed. Acrimony between the North and South remained high, with clashes between the two sides’ armed forces and both North and South amassing military resources along border flashpoints during the last quarter of the year.

With attention focused on the North-South situation, the conflict in the Darfur region deteriorated significantly during the year. Darfur remained under a state of emergency throughout 2010, with conflict raging between the Khartoum government and rebels and between rebel groups themselves. The joint UN-AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID), reached full strength during 2010, but its impact on the conflict and ability to protect civilian populations remained extremely limited. Persistent obstruction by both the Khartoum government and rebel groups largely prevented the mission from executing its mandated task. UNAMID itself continued to be the object of attacks and banditry.

It is certain that Sudan will be transformed during 2011. Considering the low capacity of the government of South Sudan’s institutions and the situation in Darfur, the need for continued deployment of peace operations in Sudan can clearly be seen. Transitioning to confrontation with the potentially volatile post-CPA operational context and navigating tense political terrain will be central challenges.
The Security Council first authorized the creation of a UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in Resolution 1547 on 11 July 2004, charging it with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in supporting the CPA that ended the decades-long conflict between government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM). The CPA is a time-bound document, and the implementation period is scheduled to end in July 2011, following the referendum on independence and the Abyei region’s status.

On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include the monitoring and verification of troop redeployments, assisting with the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) to help secure contested regions, promoting the rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referenda, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specifically includes coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary.

Persistent intercommunal violence in South Sudan over the course of the past five years has led to an increasingly negative perception of UNMIS because it appeared to be failing to deliver on its protection-of-civilians mandate. While UNMIS has a significant military element, it was primarily designed to oversee the disengagement of the parties to the conflict and their redeployment to the respective sides of the border in implementation of the CPA, not particularly to protect civilians from sudden outbreaks of non-CPA-related violence. The mission is thus deployed to bases at the sector levels developed by UNMIS, rather than at the state level where proximity to civilian populations would be increased. Further, the SPLA and the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) maintain the primary responsibility for protecting civilians. As the CPA implementation period has progressed, UNMIS has increasingly assisted the signatories in their roles. In this vein, during 2009 and 2010, at the request of the...
CPA signatories, UNMIS’s role has expanded to supporting the parties as they approach the critical CPA milestones.

**North-South Developments, 2010**

**Presidential and General Elections**

Preparations for Sudan’s first multiparty elections in more than two decades consumed Sudanese politics and UNMIS activities during the first quarter of 2010. In advance of the elections and at the request of the National Elections Commission (NEC), UNMIS advised and provided technical support in drafting operational plans for polling and vote counting, designed voter registration and training materials, assisted in the procurement of materials necessary to conduct the polls, and provided crucial transport support. Alongside the African Union’s High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), UNMIS also worked to maintain an environment conducive to holding elections.

Following the resolution of multiple sticking points between the CPA signatories during February and March 2010—particularly those related to the 2008 census results and the allocation of National Assembly seats—elections at national and state levels were held during 11–15 April. The voting results released on 26 April were not surprising: the National Congress Party (NCP) and its leader President Omar al-Bashir retained their hold on power in the North, while Salva Kirr and the SPLM were overwhelmingly victorious in the South.

The run-up to the elections saw constriction of political freedoms in both North and South. UNMIS received multiple reports from political parties of obstruction of freedoms, unwarranted arrests, and intimidation by security forces. Following the polls, reports of irregularities, voter prevention, and fraud proliferated on both sides of the border. In the South, this led to several armed rebellions launched by those disenfranchised by the election results. The rebellion led by a renegade SPLA general, George Athor, in Jonglei State was particularly violent and saw the SPLA responding in force to put down the unrest in July. This reflected an increasingly proactive stance of the SPLA in an effort to demonstrate both authority and capability in the run-up to the referenda. However, the SPLA responses to the postelection violence were followed by reports of misconduct on the part of SPLA forces, accounts that could not be confirmed by UNMIS because regular members of the SPLA blocked their access to the conflict sites.

**Referenda Preparations**

Following the elections, in the second half of 2010 the focus of the CPA signatories and the international community quickly turned to the referenda on the South’s independence and the status of the border region of Abyei. UN Security Council Resolution 1919 of April 2010 mandated UNMIS and the international community to expand their activities “to provide technical and monitoring assistance including referenda observation capacity as requested by the Sudanese, to support popular consultations.” As requested, UNMIS served a lead role in the international community’s efforts to support the referenda and ensure their timely and transparent conduct.

Overall, conducting the referenda presents an immense logistical challenge to the UN and its international partners. South Sudan remains one of the most underdeveloped regions in the world. The territory of the South is larger in area than California, but has only about forty miles of paved roads. Further, the southern population is nearly 90 percent illiterate and has little institutional memory of voting. The lack of infrastructure and immense political challenges pose enormous obstacles to conducting the referenda.

With this in mind, UNMIS strengthened its strategic planning cell and established an integrated planning team at its headquarters in Khartoum in the first half of 2010. The newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios, outlined five goals for the period leading up to the referenda: (1) organizing the referenda in both Southern Sudan and Abyei; (2) organizing the popular consultations in Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan as stipulated in the CPA; (3) agreement...
on postreferendum frameworks and their implementation; (4) maintenance of security and protecting civilians; and (5) continued development of South Sudan’s governance and security institutions. Pursuing these goals, during the year UNMIS and the UN mobilized a significant amount of human and financial resources.

In the aftermath of the general elections in April, the UN consolidated its UNMIS and UNDP elections staff into one team, the UN Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED). UNIRED streamlined its reporting and operational structures and provided guidance and technical assistance to its main interlocutor, the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). The SSRC maintains ownership responsibilities for the planning, organization, and conduct of the referendum in South Sudan. UNIRED also provided assistance in the development of the regulatory framework for the vote, advice on operational planning, logistical support, training of referendum staff, PR campaigns, and cooperation with other international stakeholders.

To enhance its delivery of support and assistance for the referenda and expand UNMIS coverage across the vast South Sudan territory, the mission established referendum support bases at county level in each of the South’s ten states. The bases are staffed with both civilian and police UNMIS personnel to help monitor the referendum process and provide logistical support and technical advice. By October, an additional 600 security, logistics, and technical experts had been deployed in UNMIS on a temporary basis. Meanwhile, eight additional transport helicopters were added to UNMIS’s fleet to assist in referenda preparations and in the delivery of some 120 tons of referendum-related equipment and material. In total, UNMIS’s activities in support to the referenda required roughly $86 million in addition to the mission’s nearly $1 billion annual budget.

In response to the request made by the CPA signatories, in September the Secretary-General established a Panel on the Referenda in the Sudan. This monitoring body is to engage all relevant actors involved in the referenda, periodically report to the Secretary-General on the political and security situation, use its good offices to directly help the parties overcome stalemates on both pre- and postreferenda frameworks, and encourage the parties to overcome impediments to holding the referenda. The panel is chaired by Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, and will remain active for six months.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council remained highly involved in the progress toward the referenda and in deliberating potential alterations to UNMIS’s deployment and mandated tasks. In September, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on Sudan that included Security Council members and representatives from both North and South Sudan, and the international community pledged its support to the referenda and whatever outcome it produced. Reflecting the urgency of the South Sudan referendum and associated challenges, to give the members background for their deliberations the Security Council visited Sudan in October, assessing the situation on the ground and the status of the preparations. It was the Security Council’s third such visit since the signing of the CPA in 2005.

UNMIS continued to support the popular consultation process in Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State during the year. These are negotiations between the SPLM and the NCP regarding the implementation of the CPA, the distribution of power and wealth between the two states and the government of Sudan, as well as deliberations on land rights, religious and cultural freedom, and security. During 2010 progress was made in Southern Kordofan, where in June authorities adopted a code of conduct and streamlined the public description of the popular consultations. Meanwhile, in early September Blue Nile State established a twenty-member parliamentary commission to assess the CPA implementation.

Beyond the UN, a significant amount of international activity aimed at ensuring that the referenda proceed. The AU’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), headed by the former South African president Thabo Mbeki,
worked to assist in the parties’ implementation of the CPA. Throughout 2010, AUHIP worked with the CPA signatories on aspects related to creating postreferenda arrangements on security, citizenship, natural resources, currency matters, and international obligations. Negotiations on these matters between the two governments began in July 2010, but little if any tangible progress was made by the end of the year. However, a November meeting in Khartoum, attended by the parties as well as UNMIS representatives and the US Special Envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration, resulted in a draft agreement, Framework for Resolving Outstanding Issues Relating to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Future Relations of North and South Sudan, which ideally would guide future negotiations.

The European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission to Sudan (EOM) to observe and monitor the referenda. The EOM was deployed in two phases during 2010 and early 2011. First to arrive, in November, was an initial team of fourteen experts, sent to assess voter registration. These experts were located in both Juba and Khartoum. A larger contingent of roughly eighty observers, which arrived in December 2010, is monitoring the overall voting process. Bilaterally, a multitude of stakeholders worked with both the Khartoum and Juba authorities in an effort to organize the referenda in a timely manner and see that its results be respected on both sides of the border. While most of these activities of the international community were beyond the headlines, the activities by the United States government were notable. In September, the United States offered Khartoum an incentive package aimed at inducing the government to cooperate with the referenda preparations and outcome. In exchange for its cooperation, the United States would ease sanctions on Khartoum allowing for some investment and trade and restore diplomatic relations with the country. Conversely, the US proposed greater sanctions in the event of Khartoum’s resistance. Khartoum dismissed the offer as both a threat and external meddling in the business of a sovereign state. The US also has indicated that it may remove Sudan from its list of sponsors of terrorism if Khartoum recognizes the outcome of the South’s referendum, which by all indications will result in its independence.

Security Preparations

The security situation throughout South Sudan remained unsettled and extremely tense throughout the year. The unrest in the South that followed the general and state elections came in addition to already-high levels of intercommunal violence. Adding to this were intermittent attacks by the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army during the second half of 2010. These attacks displaced nearly 30,000 civilians in Western Equatoria State alone. Finally, and most worrying, in the months leading up to the referendum, reports of military buildup on both sides of the border proliferated, with clashes breaking out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA, with reports of aerial bombing of border areas in the south by the SAF. The persistent violence throughout the year drew significant attention to the still developing situation.
The joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission to Darfur (UNAMID) has an authorized strength of 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers. UNAMID was mandated in July 2007 to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with ceasefire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and assist with the implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

After a delayed deployment process that began in 2008, UNAMID neared full strength during 2010. Further, the mission also received several force-enabling helicopters from Ethiopia that increased its long-range capabilities. Despite these additional resources, the conflict in Darfur flared dramatically. In the face of ongoing violence and obstruction by both the government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the various Darfur rebel groups, UNAMID was able to contribute only marginally to the dire security and humanitarian situations there. The ongoing conflict had major implications for the already-suffering civilian population in Darfur, as violence yielded massive displacements and persistent obstruction severely hampered humanitarian aid activities in camps for the displaced.

Beyond the conflict between SAF and rebel groups, the trend of attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, carjackings, and violent robberies aimed at UNAMID military and civilian staff, and humanitarian aid workers in Darfur continued throughout 2010. Multiple UNAMID troops were killed in clashes throughout the year, taking the total UNAMID contingents lost in service to over 30 since 2008. This situation persisted throughout the year and was not confined to any one part of the operational area.

The grim security and humanitarian situation face by UNAMID and other actors was perpetuated by the lack of a credible peace agreement between the Darfur rebel groups and the Khartoum government. Despite efforts to convene the AU/UN-and-Qatar-mediated negotiations in Doha, the talks remained seized of the conflict for the better part of the year; with the largest Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), abstaining from May until December. Nevertheless, as talks on a potential cease-fire resumed in the final weeks of 2010, clashes were ongoing in Darfur.

Further complicating matters in Darfur during 2010, and throughout Sudan, was the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment for genocide in Darfur of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir. This followed the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir for alleged war crimes perpetrated in Darfur issued in 2009. The ICC indictment and arrest warrant had a divisive impact, as al-Bashir continued to travel Rome Statute signatories throughout the year despite the calls for arrest by many Western countries. Meanwhile, the government continued to crack down on dissenting political parties, shutting down radio stations in Darfur during the year and severely curtailing civil liberties in the region.

Clearly, 2010 was a difficult year for UNAMID and international partners in Darfur, and 2011 looks to be equally as challenging. The referendum in the South will undoubtedly impact the situation in Darfur and could serve to sharpen the already hostile attitudes of both the rebel groups and Khartoum government. At the close of the year, this situation was cause for serious concern, especially as UNAMID continued to struggle to execute its mandated goals and the future of the mission remained uncertain in the event of heightened intransigence from the Khartoum government.

Box 2.5 Darfur

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The nature of South Sudan’s security architecture and the deep divisions that remain among the communities there. Owing to perceived personal insecurity and decades of conflict, South Sudan’s population is rife with weapons and largely distrustful of security institutions. During the year, the SPLA did little to assuage these negative perceptions.

As the SPLA took on a more proactive security role during the year, UNMIS received multiple reports of transgressions against civilian populations during SPLA operations and of grave humanitarian violations committed during the SPLA’s forced-disarmament campaigns. In several instances, the SPLA—often threatening violence—blocked UNMIS from conducting observation patrols, both by land and by helicopter.

In addition to the restrictions on its movement imposed by CPA signatories, UNMIS’s mobility and rapid-reaction capabilities declined further on 31 October when India withdrew its six military helicopters deployed in UNMIS. The withdrawal of these resources represents a one-third loss of UNMIS’s military aerial capability.
Commercially contracted resources quickly replaced the Indian helicopters, but the replacements differ significantly from military equipment in ability to respond to a crisis.

Nevertheless, UNMIS continued to cooperate with the government of Sudan and the SPLA on security matters during the year. Joint UNMIS-SPLA security committees at regional, state, and county level were created to both ensure UNMIS freedom of movement as the sensitive referendum periods approached and support the exchange of situational information. Similarly, UNMIS and SPLA finalized during 2010 a strategy for protecting civilians. The protection strategy, going beyond approaches such as simply the use of force, takes a more holistic, mission-wide view.

During 2010, the joint UNMIS/UNDP Justice and Security Sectors Advisory and Coordination Cell (JSSACC) was launched. This represented a significant increase in the UN’s support to security and justice sector reform activity in the South. The JSSACC aims to assist the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in developing security sector architecture in South Sudan and simultaneously assist in developing governance and judicial structures to support security actors. Ultimately, it is hoped that this work will lay the foundation for long-term development of the justice and security sectors beyond the CPA implementation period. The JSSACC also serves a crucial donor support coordination to GOSS.

Police training took on a new gravity and operational profile in 2010. The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is expected to take a lead role in maintaining order during and after the referenda. To facilitate in building up the SSPS, in January 2010 the Dr. John Garang Unified Training Academy was opened outside Juba, and by December more than 5,700 SSPS officers had completed an intensive, year-long training supported by UNMIS and the UNDP. Of those cadets, 1,500 also received training in crowd and riot control and special weapons training. Further, by December more than 14,000 members of the SSPS had received referendum-security training provided by the UN. This is in addition to 10,000 officers who had received such training in advance of the April elections.

To build confidence in the police, UNMIS police contingents were co-located with SSPS commissioners in each of the ten states during the year. Despite these activities, concerns remain as to the professionalism and capacity of the SSPS: the reality is that South Sudan lacks a cultural history of policing. In the past, the SPLA has largely been the only guarantor of security.

**Political Developments**

Despite all this operational activity and the resources dedicated by the UN and the international community, the conduct of the referenda ultimately falls back on the CPA signatories. While both the North and South repeatedly gave assurances that they were committed to holding the referenda on 9 January 2011, by the end of 2010 words had not translated to actions, preparations remained dangerously behind schedule, and the potential for renewed conflict mounted.
Following months of disagreements and delay, the SSRC—comprised of representatives from the North and South—was approved by the Sudanese government in late June 2010. The SSRC is responsible for planning, organizing, and conducting the referendum in Southern Sudan. While the formation of the SSRC represents a step in the right direction, its activity was paralyzed until September, when the parties were finally able to agree on several key posts. Even with that, negotiations in the SSRC itself, facilitated by AUHIP, UNMIS, and the US on critical pre- and postreferendum arrangements such as border demarcation, citizenship, and revenue sharing—all potential areas for violent conflict—had seen no progress by mid-December. Meanwhile, the Khartoum government insists that it will be impossible for the referendum to proceed without the border being demarcated.

In a significant step forward, delayed voter registration for the South Sudan referendum began in November with significant support from UNMIS. The registration period ended on 8 December 2010, with some 3 million southerners registering for the poll.

Progress toward arrangements for the resource-rich Abyei referendum fared even worse. By mid-December, the Abyei Referendum Commission had yet to be formed, drawing speculation at year’s end as to whether the referendum would happen as planned. This is an area of extreme concern as Abyei has been a contested and often volatile region throughout the CPA period. While the parties agreed to a Permanent Court of Arbitration decision on the region’s border during 2009, the physical demarcation of that border remains unresolved, further heightening the prospects of Abyei serving as the flashpoint for postreferendum violence.

To put it generally, the experience in Sudan over the course of the past five years has reflected a tendency for political elites to wait until the last minute to settle disputes. It is not immediately evident that this is what will happen over the South’s independence. The population has yet to reap dividends from the CPA implementation period and view their independence as an end goal promised in the CPA. If independence is not delivered, willingness to move forward with any other formulation remains uncertain.

Conclusion
While all signs from the referendum point to independence for the South, final results are not expected until mid-February 2011. Even then, the changes will not be fully implemented until July 2011, when the CPA officially expires. Indeed, there remain many outstanding issues, chief among them Abyei, left to be negotiated. For UNMIS the future shape of the mission will depend on negotiations between the parties and on how South Sudan chooses to proceed internally during the first half of the year. By the beginning of 2011, developments on the ground, while tense, did not necessitate a robust response from UNMIS. Nevertheless, it is likely that a UN mission will be in Sudan for some time. The need for any new formulation to address a drastically changed political environment and one that can aptly balance between peacekeeping and increased attention on longer-term peacebuilding activities should be primary concerns. Negotiations were ongoing to enhance the mission’s military component. What is certain is that Sudan will continue to remain a strategic concern for peacekeeping in 2011.