SOMALIA

3.8 Mission Reviews

Somalia

BACKGROUND

Since the early 1990s, Somalia has been plagued by chronic instability, the effect of an ongoing civil war and a near total lack of a state security apparatus. Severe drought and flooding have added starvation to the list of life-threatening challenges for nearly 3.7 million Somalis, fueling a humanitarian crisis across several regions of the country.

Over 800,000 Somalis are refugees in neighboring countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia. A further 1.45 million are internally displaced, and roughly a third of the Somali population (some 2.85 million people) is currently dependent upon humanitarian assistance for survival.

In 2006 there was a period of relative stability when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) briefly took control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu and a number of major Somali cities. However, in late 2006 Ethiopian forces – concerned about the emergence of an Islamic state on its southern border, and tacitly supported by the US – overthrew the ICU and installed the internationally backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the capital. The defeat of the ICU – which had delivered a modicum of security – and widespread anger over the Ethiopian occupation precipitated a spike in violence forcing thousands more people to flee and making aid perilously difficult to distribute inside the country.

It was in this context that the UN Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peace support mission – called AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia) in February 2007. AMISOM was given a mandate to support political reconciliation, protect the TFG and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, AMISOM numbers were small, and the mission was grossly under-resourced to take on the complex counter-insurgency task that had been set for them.

In response to calls by the AU and AMISOM leadership, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in the troop ceiling from 8,000 to 12,000 in December 2010. As of July 2011 the troop strength stands at just over 9,000 soldiers. However, the remaining 3,000 troops are expected to deploy later in 2011.
While the Security Council continues to resist the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to replace AMISOM, it did approve the creation of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). The UNSOA mandate authorizes the UN to provide logistical support and crucial supplies to the thinly stretched AU mission. Currently UNSOA is providing engineering and construction support, medical assistance, aviation and transport support, as well as communications and public information capacity building.

In late 2008 the UN Political Office for Somalia facilitated talks between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).⁶ The talks resulted in the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces (in early 2009) and set the stage for the Djibouti agreement, which, in turn resulted in the establishment of a coalition government and a general “roadmap” for recovery in early 2009. They also illustrated a sharp split between the moderate opposition represented by the ARS and the hard-line opposition groups, most notably Al Shabaab.

This more legitimate, inclusive incarnation of the TFG brought with it a brief period of optimism and relative calm in Mogadishu. Since that time, however, there has been a return to acute violence, led by Al Shabaab forces that have continued to seek the military overthrow of the TFG.

### TFG Politics

Elected in 2009 by the Somali parliament, the TFG is currently lead by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who led the ICU at the time the courts were overthrown. His election coincided with the withdrawal of Ethiopian soldiers from Somalia, and with the signing of the Djibouti peace agreement. The new president brought a modicum of legitimacy to the institution that had been called a “hologram” by some critics.⁷

The Office of the Prime Minister (PM) has seen considerably more turnover in recent years and the relationship between the president and various PMs, as well as the overall relationship between the TFG and the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) has been fraught with conflict. This is particularly problematic as the transitional period was slated to end in August of this year in line with the Djibouti Agreement and the Transitional Federal Charter and a number of critical transitional tasks – such as the adoption of a Somali constitution – have yet to be completed. This has forced a re-examination of the transitional timelines.

Following a January 2011 IGAD⁸ request, the TFP voted to extend its mandate by three years in order to complete work on the constitution and better consolidate parliamentary functions and processes. In March, the TFG followed suit, announcing a more modest one year extension of its tenure, to expire in August 2012. The perceived failure on the part of the parliament to consult President Sharif prior to extending their mandate has exacerbated divisions between the president and parliamentary speaker.
The SRSG for Somalia was also the central convener of the breakthrough meeting between the ARS and the TFG, which resulted in the Djibouti Peace Agreement in 2008. UNPOS continues to coordinate the quarterly meetings of the International Contact Group – a group first convened in 2006 and currently composed of over 30 countries and 10 participating organizations – which supports Somali peace and reconciliation efforts. Over the years UNPOS’s mandate has steadily broadened. Today UNPOS responsibilities include the implementation of the Djibouti peace process and the coordination of international efforts to promote that process; assisting the re-establishment, training and retention of the Somali security forces (military, police and judiciary); providing good offices and political support for the efforts to establish lasting peace and stability; coordinating

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**AU Liaison Offices**

There are currently twelve Liaison Offices in Africa under the aegis of the African Union (AU) located in Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya (covering Somalia), Liberia, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan (in Khartoum and Juba) and Western Sahara. The Liaison Offices are mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), and fall within the scope of the Peace and Security Department (PSD). Although the mandate of each Liaison Office varies dependent upon the particular situation in the host country, the work of the offices generally focus on representation, participation and facilitation.

Primarily, the Liaison Offices provide the AU with physical representation on the ground. The offices’ regular monitoring reports help to keep the PSC and the AU Commission informed of political, social, economic and humanitarian developments in the host country, and in turn, directly contribute to the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the overall African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The offices also provide the AU with the capacity to follow up on the implementation of commitments in peace agreements of various host countries. Through its Liaison Offices, the AU can participate in meetings and other mechanisms on the implementation of peace agreements and help provide support to post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding activities.

The Liaison Offices help the AU facilitate its mandate of prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa by providing advice and assistance on administrative and thematic matters by negotiating, liaising and coordinating between national authorities and missions of other regional or international organizations hosted in the region. In doing so, the Liaison Offices typically work in conjunction with or in the support of other regional and international organizations. This is the case in Somalia, where the head of the Liaison Office in Somalia, Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, works in collaboration with the UN SRSG for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, and the Facilitator of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kipruto Kirwa.

While the AU Liaison Offices generally maintain a low profile, they offer a valuable service by providing the organization with situational awareness in areas in or emerging from crisis. However, lack of adequate funding as well as limited staff strength thwart the Offices’ capacity for engagement. Previously, the Liaison Offices were supported by a pooled funding arrangement agreed upon by the African Union Commission, the governments of Norway, Denmark, the UK and Sweden. Although Norway, Denmark and the UK provided additional funding in 2010, the Joint Financial Agreement was not renewed and external funding in the future remains uncertain.

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1 The African Union Liaison Office for Somalia is funded outside the Joint Financial Agreement.
counter-piracy initiatives in the region; working with the TFG to improve its capacity to address human rights issues, justice and reconciliation, and; coordinating the work of the UN in Somalia. The mission also has an important role in the mobilization of resources and international support for peacebuilding, security sector reform and long-term economic recovery.

While the initial expansion of its mandate in 2009 was not accompanied by an increase in staff, the mission has slowly seen an increase in staffing resources. Furthermore, UNPOS has managed to increase the number of staff operating inside the country (as opposed to those working remotely from Nairobi) throughout 2011, a fact that has improved communication with key stakeholders inside Somalia.

The UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) recently authorized more than 30 international staffers to take up residence in accommodations built on the AMISOM base in Mogadishu. The World Food Programme, UN Mine Action, UNSOA, DSS and UNPOS have a combined (and rotating) number of some 60 staff, including international personnel, operating from Mogadishu on a daily basis.

This is a positive development, though it does not fulfill recent calls from the TFG to move all UN entities working on Somalia from neighboring Kenya to Mogadishu. As chronic violence – including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings and grenade attacks against civilians – continues, the UN is gradually deploying to Mogadishu with the aim to re-locate in full once the security situation permits. UNPOS is also deploying more staff to its regional offices in “Somaliland” and “Puntland.”

Coordination Amongst Key External Actors

From September 2007 to June 2010, UNPOS was under the leadership of SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, a retired Mauritanian diplomat and a highly polarizing figure among UN staff working on Somalia issues. With his departure, the Secretary-General appointed Augustine Mahiga – a former Tanzanian representative to the UN, and former UNHCR staffer – as the new SRSG. Since his arrival there has been considerable improvement in the relationship between UNPOS and the UN headquarters team in New York, as well as a rapprochement between UNPOS and the UN humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia.

Still, integration amongst the various elements of the UN “family” in Somalia continues to be minimal. UNPOS, UNSOA and the UN Country Team have recently cooperated on the development of an integrated strategic framework (ISF) designed to establish a common UN analysis of the situation in Somalia, and agreed on the key objectives for the coming year.

The Secretary-General expressed his desire to see much more integration between these three UN entities. A closer cooperation with the Country Team has been achieved through a senior management team and the continuing working groups of the ISF process, and UNPOS has developed a close working relationship with UNSOA, which may lead to fuller integration between the two entities in the near future. A number of UN officials hope that full integration will improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the UN system in Somalia, but there are concerns by others that it may cause friction between political elements such as UNPOS and the UN humanitarian agencies, as it has in the past.

There have been divisions between IGAD and UNPOS regarding the most logical next steps in the management of the incomplete transitional tasks. Nevertheless, in February of this year UNPOS, IGAD and AMISOM all endorsed a joint regional strategy outlining their common objectives and priorities with regards to the political, humanitarian, security and financial issues impeding the peace process.
Security Situation

In a sustained offensive – first launched in February 2011 – the TFG and AMISOM forces succeeded in re-capturing Mogadishu, although poor command and control over TFG forces also led to a number of civilian casualties. In August 2011, Al Shabaab retreated completely from the city, including from the critical Bakara Market area, that the militants have used as a launching site for attacks, and to derive income from the illegal taxation of vendors.

Joint operations carried out by Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama and other TFG allied armed actors, have also made some gains beyond Mogadishu, militarily weakening Al Shabaab forces and reducing their ability to launch large scale offensives. This has forced Al Shabaab to employ more improvisational tactics, the result of which has been an increase in the use of IEDs and suicide bomb attacks.

AMISOM forces continue to sustain heavy casualties in spite of the increased numbers of troops and moderate improvements in the quality of the mission’s equipment and logistical capacity. The peacekeepers continue to lack effective intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities, as well as critical logistical capabilities such as helicopters.

Security sector reform has moved forward this year, with developments in both the military and police sectors. In January 2011 the European Union completed the training of 1,000 Somalia recruits, and the training of an additional 986 recruits began in February. An additional 1,000 recruits were trained in Ethiopia and inside Somalia. Somali soldiers are now regularly receiving their stipend and the TFG introduced a biometric database to help eliminate payroll fraud and corruption. The EU decided in July 2011 to continue its training mission in 2012.

Police trainers from AMISOM, Somalia and Djibouti completed the training of 499 Somali police recruits, including 83 female officers. With funding from Japan, the UN Development Programme facilitated the payment of arrears owed to Somali police dating back to 2009, and UNPOS is working to ensure future payments are made on time. A continuing dependence on outside funding and management support highlights the need for significant internal capacity building in order for Somali security structures to become self-sustaining institutions.

Instances of piracy off the Somali coast have continued especially in the Indian Ocean, while the Gulf of Aden has seen much fewer attacks due to the heavy international naval presence there. The high ransoms and the inability of domestic security services and international naval crews to effectively stop large numbers of pirates in the vast area of the Indian Ocean has led to a spike in attacks in 2011. While international donors have invested heavily in the effort to deter pirate attacks, there has also been some progress made in prosecuting and incarcerating pirates, including developing the appropriate legal frameworks both in Somalia and regionally. Still, impunity and lack of law and order persists, allowing piracy to survive and thrive along the coast.

UNPOS has leveraged the piracy issue as a means to unify disparate political actors around a common cause and enemy. UNPOS, together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Maritime Organization, has brought together representatives from Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug to discuss counter-piracy strategy alongside the TFG, thereby forging a limited working relationship between bodies that are not usually meeting each other.

Political Situation

While the security situation continues to evolve and – in some cases – improve, political progress is limited. Notable improvements include more reliable payment of TFG troops, and a concerted effort to root out corruption through the implementation of strict punishment for those found in violation (including the death penalty in some of the most serious cases). The heads of the Army, Police and Intelligence services were all dismissed in March 2011 on allegations of corruption and mismanagement.

As the transition period ends, key tasks of the Djibouti Agreement continue to go unfulfilled and key actors are still deeply divided about the management of this process. On 26 January, UNPOS issued a press statement declaring unanimous agreement about the necessity for the transitional period to end – and an election to take place – in August 2011, as required under the terms of the Djibouti Agreement. Just five days later, the IGAD Heads of
State defied this supposed “unanimity” by issuing a communiqué calling for the TFP to delay elections and extend its term, which it did in February.

Months of infighting between the president and the speaker of the parliament followed regarding the necessity of August 2011 elections. Discussions — overseen by SRSG Mahiga and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni — finally resolved the issue when, on 9 June, the president and the speaker of the parliament agreed to the terms of the Kampala Accord. Under the agreement, the transitional period will be extended by one year, with the election of a new president and parliamentary speaker scheduled for August 2012.

This new agreement calls for the establishment of a single, unified “roadmap” for the stabilization and development of the country. Importantly, the Accord also calls for the development — with the support of UNPOS and other international actors — of clear benchmarks, achievable timelines, and mechanisms to ensure compliance.

UNPOS, along with the AU and a number of regional leaders will provide oversight, support and — if necessary — institute “appropriate measures” to promote compliance with the roadmap if the parties fail to fulfill their commitments. These external actors will need to help the TFG and the TFP to demonstrate progress and win back the trust and faith of the Security Council and key donors.

One casualty of the Kampala Accord, however, was Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and his cabinet of well-regarded technocrats. The prime minister was widely respected — locally and internationally — as an effective reformer whose approach transcended the murky clan divisions that dominate Somali politics.

The Kampala provision requiring his resignation was based on an agreement between the president and the speaker of the parliament — Sharif Hassan — also to win parliamentary support for the Accord and to unify the TFG by replacing Mohamed with a PM more acceptable to parliament. Mohamed’s forced resignation triggered protests throughout Somalia and in Somali diaspora communities all over the world.

Bickering between the transitional federal institutions continues to be a serious stumbling block to progress. At present, many donors are reluctant to commit resources to the development of Mogadishu, where political actors continue to be perceived as corrupt and ineffective. Observers hope that the appointment of the new, American trained economist — Abdiweli Mohamed Ali — as Prime Minister might help restore confidence.

SANCTIONS COMMITTEE

In an April 2011 report the Secretary-General encouraged Security Council members to take further steps to disrupt Al Shabaab’s capacity to re-supply and re-arm its fighters through a stricter enforcement of the arms embargo. On 29 July, the Security Council renewed the mandate of the sanction’s committee and monitoring group for 12 months and strengthened its focus on the issue of piracy. In conjunction with the discussions regarding a specialized anti-piracy court, expanding the sanctions listing criteria to specifically target piracy leaders may represent a fresh approach to enforcing the embargo and advancing peace in Somalia.

CONCLUSION

Somalia has seen a number of modest yet tangible gains this year. Nevertheless, the continuing inability of Somali political leaders to demonstrate real unity of purpose does raise questions about the viability of the TFG as a precursor to responsible, credible government. The forced resignation of the popular and proactive Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has also diminished the legitimacy of the TFG and, arguably, UNPOS in the eyes of regular Somalis and the vocal Somali diaspora.

The international community continues to pay lip service to the indispensability of the TFG. However, the reluctance to provide robust, or even predictable funding for the re-building of Mogadishu, may indicate a growing ambivalence on the part of donors that are tired of the infighting in the capital, contrasted with the parallel leadership of Somaliland and Puntland, where clear progress is evident. The Kampala agreement has extended the lifespan of the TFG by one year, but with cornerstone tasks — like the writing of a constitution — still so far from completion it seems unlikely that the TFG will be ready for a genuine transition to full-grown government.
The AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities

Following the 2007 Kenyan post election violence, the AU Panel, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, brought the government and main opposition party together under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). The Dialogue called for the establishment of a mechanism to address justice, accountability and longer-term issues of governance and the rule of law, as well as for a comprehensive review of the constitution. In an August 2010 referendum, voters approved a constitution limiting the president’s powers. In addition to a Coordination and Liaison Office that assists the Panel in implementing the Dialogue’s agreements, the independent firm South Consulting monitors and evaluates progress made.

At a December 2010 Panel meeting to take stock of implementation thus far, participants hailed the new constitution as an important step to restore confidence in Kenya’s electoral institutions. Other advancements include the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. But the Panel also acknowledged the need to implement the remaining reforms outlined by the KNDR in order to prevent violence in the upcoming 2012 elections. Participants questioned the government’s political will to take on outstanding tasks, particularly in addressing widespread impunity.

Indeed, the government repeatedly failed to set up a special tribunal to try those responsible for instigating the 2007 violence. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, established as part of the KNDR agreement, thus recommended that the matter be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In December 2010, the ICC’s head prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, indicted six high-profile individuals for crimes against humanity. Hearings are set for September 2011.

In its April 2011 report, South Consulting noted that while 78 percent of Kenyans favor the ICC’s intervention, most also want to see other perpetrators of violence tried. The report further found that ongoing personalization and politicization of the ICC process has obscured justice and hinders dialogue on reforms. The Panel continues to support reform processes and has reiterated calls on the political elite to commit to these goals and to allow the ICC process to go forward.

NOTES

3 The ICU was a group of sharia courts that joined together and took de-facto political leadership of much of Somalia in 2006.
4 S/RES/1964 (22 December 2010).
6 The ARS was an alliance of political and armed groups that stood in opposition to the TFG.
8 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is composed of the heads of state of seven African countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD’s mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: Food Security and environmental protection; Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and; economic cooperation and integration. (http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=1)