

Haiti

Haiti entered 2011 still recovering from the massive earthquake that struck in January 2010, killing 230,000 and leaving 1.5 million homeless. The country has also struggled to respond to a growing cholera epidemic that began in late 2010—the outbreak of which was linked to UN peacekeepers serving with the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Thousands have died due to the outbreak while hundreds of thousands more have been infected, presenting serious public health challenges. The epidemic unleashed a wave of anti-UN riots during an already volatile period of political transition.

While the unstable political environment continued in the lead-up to the second round of presidential elections in March 2011, the election and inauguration of President Michel Martelly represented the first peaceful transfer of power to the opposition in Haiti's history. However, the president and parliament quickly entered a fractious and divisive period that stalled the formation of a government, political reforms, and recovery efforts.


MINUSTAH continued to provide critical political, security, and justice support to Haiti, and in October 2011 the UN Security Council approved a drawdown of MINUSTAH's post-earthquake police and troop surge. The drawdown came in conjunction with growing public pressure on the mission related to its role in the outbreak of cholera and the alleged rape of a Haitian teenager by mission troops. These events coincided with a change in leadership for MINUSTAH, with Mariano Fernández de Chile taking over as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) from Edmond Mulet, who returned to his duties in

New York as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.¹

Despite considerable progress in reconstruction, the overall environment in Haiti remains fragile and vulnerable to shocks, whether economic, political, or from a natural disaster.

Background

The 1991 military coup that ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide set in motion cycles of political, economic, and security unrest in Haiti that continue to challenge stabilization. In 2000 the returned Aristide claimed victory in an election that saw a voter turnout of approximately 10 percent. The opposition and members of the international community



UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

• Authorization Date	30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542)
• Start Date	1 June 2004
• SRSB	Mariano Fernández (Chile)
• Force Commander	Major-General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira (Brazil)
• Police Commissioner	Marc Tardif (Canada)
• Budget	\$793.5 million (1 July 2011–30 June 2012)
• Strength as of 31 October 2011	Troops: 8,915 Police: 3,637 International Civilian Staff: 568 National Civilian Staff: 1,355 UN Volunteers: 238

For detailed mission information see p. 207

contested the results. By 2003 a then–recently united opposition movement called for Aristide’s resignation, and in 2004 armed conflict broke out in the city of Gonaïves, spreading rapidly to other cities. Aristide resigned and fled, and soon insurgents held the majority of northern Haiti, threatening to take control of Port-au-Prince.

In response, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a US-led multinational interim force (MIF) in February 2004 to support police, provision of humanitarian assistance, rule of law, and protection of human rights. In June 2004 the UN’s peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH, succeeded the MIF with a mandate to support the transitional government in maintaining stability; assist in the reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP); disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate armed groups; support the rule of law; assist in the preparation and conduct of elections; and monitor and report on human rights.

MINUSTAH faced a daunting environment in its first years of operation, struggling to contain increasing gang violence and insecurity. During this period, the mission also supported national elections and René Préval’s successful bid for the presidency. As gang violence continued to grow, President Préval requested that MINUSTAH work with the

HNP to counter this threat. By mid-2007, joint operations between the HNP and MINUSTAH had managed to substantially reduce gang violence, allowing the mission and Haitian authorities to focus on building national justice and security capacities. These gains also encouraged stakeholders to consider scaling back MINUSTAH’s future role, and in 2008 the UN Secretary-General presented a consolidation plan for MINUSTAH’s eventual drawdown.

The January 2010 earthquake dealt a devastating blow to Haiti and the UN presence. In addition to the thousands of Haitians killed or displaced, 102 UN personnel lost their lives—the largest number of UN casualties ever in a single event. The earthquake required a rapid response from MINUSTAH, which quickly adapted to provide security, logistical, and political support to the Haitian state. To bolster the capacity of the mission, the Security Council authorized an additional 2,000 military troops and 1,500 police, and later an additional 680 police officers, bringing MINUSTAH’s authorized strength to over 13,000 troops and police. Haitian authorities, UN officials, and international partners all worked tirelessly to “build back better.”²

Recovery efforts were dealt a further blow in October 2010, when cholera began spreading along the Arbonite River. As there had been no cases of cholera in Haiti in nearly a century, anger was quickly directed at UN peacekeepers, resulting in violent protests. Widespread allegations that cholera was introduced by UN peacekeepers prompted the Secretary-General to task an independent panel of experts to determine the cause of the epidemic. In May 2011 the panel released its final report on the causes of the outbreak, citing contamination of a tributary of the Arbonite River, likely as a result of poor sanitation conditions at the nearby MINUSTAH camp.³ The report also confirmed that the Haitian cholera strain was very similar to South Asian strains of the disease, further substantiating the widely held belief that the disease had been introduced by Nepalese troops serving in MINUSTAH. While the report did not place direct blame for the cholera outbreak on UN

peacekeepers, several external reports have identified the strain as originating in Nepal.⁴ By October 2011 the epidemic had infected 470,000 and killed 6,600.⁵

Key Developments

Political Developments

It was in this chaotic and tense environment that Haiti held its preliminary round of presidential and legislative elections, on 28 November 2010. However, the elections were marred by fraud, with fourteen of the eighteen presidential candidates calling for a cancellation. Protesters soon took to the street and demonstrations turned violent when preliminary results were announced: Jude Célestin, the ruling-party candidate, and former first lady Mirlande Manigat would face a runoff vote, excluding Michel Martelly, the third-place candidate and popular Haitian musician. During the most insecure period in late 2010, MINUSTAH troops guarded government buildings in addition to securing the mission's base.

The protests and violence that followed the announcement of the preliminary results of the first round of presidential elections prompted President Préval to request an Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation team under joint authority of the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to assist in verifying the results. This team released a report in early January 2011 advising that certain vote tally sheets should be excluded from the official count. Doing so would put Martelly in second place, giving him a lead of only 3,000 votes over Célestin. In February the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council approved the OAS report's findings and announced that the runoff election between Martelly and Manigat would take place on 20 March.

Between the first and second rounds of elections, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier returned unexpectedly to Haiti after twenty-five years living in exile in France. After taking over from his father, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, Baby Doc ruled Haiti from 1971 to



Brazilian UN peacekeepers of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) stand guard at the entrance of a voting center as Haitians queue to cast their ballots, 20 March 2011.

1986, in an environment of corruption and terror. Arriving at the Port-au-Prince airport on 16 January 2011, Duvalier said that he had come to help his country, but Haitian authorities quickly opened investigations into alleged embezzlement and human rights crimes. On 18 March, just two days prior to the elections, exiled former leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide also returned to Haiti.

Despite the potentially destabilizing presence of these polarizing political figures, the runoff elections took place in a "generally calm and peaceful atmosphere,"⁶ with limited irregularities and violence. MINUSTAH provided logistical and security support to the Haitian authorities. The results were announced in April, showing that Martelly had won with 68 percent of the vote, and he was sworn in to office on 14 May. However, he quickly faced strong resistance from parliament, which rejected his first two nominees for prime minister and thus delayed the establishment of a new government and slowed reconstruction and political and justice reform.

In October, parliament approved Martelly's third nominee for prime minister, Garry Conille, a physician with a long career at the UN, including serving as chief of staff for the

Box 2.4 UN Peacekeeping Troop Reimbursement

One of the most contentious peacekeeping debates in 2011 revolved around the reimbursement rates paid to member states for the deployment of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, clearly demonstrating the divide between troop and financial contributors and testing the member state partnership on peacekeeping. This partnership has underpinned the growth in peacekeeping operations over the past fifteen years, with key actors demonstrating their willingness to provide the political and material support required for sustaining larger and more complex peacekeeping operations. However, political and economic tensions, notably the global financial crisis, have tested the limits of these agreements, demonstrated clearly in the intense negotiations in the past year over reimbursement rates.

Troop reimbursement is governed by the UN's Contingent Owned Equipment system, which determines member state compensation for providing resources to peacekeeping missions. Troop reimbursement rates are determined by member states and applied equally across

troop-contributing countries. Rates are determined for the deployment of troops, major equipment, and self-sustainment (the services that countries provide for their deployed troops).

These rates were last reviewed in 1992 and last increased in 2002, prompting calls from troop-contributing countries for their revision. Without an increase, and taking into account the costs of inflation, troop-contributing countries argue that they face a substantial financial burden in providing troops to UN peace operations, particularly in light of their expanding mandates. Troop contributors also call attention to the considerable difference between the costs of deploying UN peacekeepers compared with those of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, noting that the annual cost of deploying ISAF troops is more than the cost of the past twenty years of UN peacekeeping operations combined.¹ Financial contributors, however, cite the continuing challenges of the global financial crisis when calling for improved efficiency and effectiveness.

In 2011 this debate became a major point of contention for peacekeeping negotiations within the UN. After months of consultations that were labeled "very difficult and at times unorthodox" by the chairman of the UN's administrative and budget committee, the committee approved a onetime supplemental payment of \$85 million to troop-contributing countries.² The General Assembly adopted the peacekeeping budget, including the ad hoc payment, the same day.

In addition, the General Assembly tasked the Secretary-General with establishing a senior advisory group to consider issues related to reimbursement rates. The group is comprised of five individuals with relevant experience, five representatives of troop-contributing countries, five representatives of major finance-contributing countries, and a representative from each of the five regional groups.

Without meaningful progress on the issue of troop reimbursement, the UN runs the risk of continued and protracted "unorthodox" debates around these issues, further exacerbating the divide between troop and financial contributors.

Notes: 1. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, "Peacekeeping: Taking Stock and Preparing for the Future—A Concept Note," 8 August 2011.

2. UN General Assembly, "Following Days of 'Very Difficult and Sometimes Unorthodox' Negotiations, Fifth Committee Approves Budgets for 13 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Department of Public Information, UN Doc. GA/AB/3994, 1 July 2011.

UN's Special Envoy to Haiti, former US president Bill Clinton. While Conille's confirmation represents a significant step forward, the new government will be tasked with responding to a number of political controversies, including corruption allegations against the Provisional Electoral Council in the elections and discrepancies over constitutional amendments promulgated under former president Préval.

The political environment could be further undermined by the October arrest and overnight detention of Arnel Bélizaire, a member

of parliament whose name appeared on a list of post-earthquake prison escapees. Bélizaire has been a vocal critic of Martelly since taking office, and his arrest could reignite tensions between the president and parliament.

Security

While the security situation in Haiti remained largely calm throughout 2011, there were increases in incidents of civil unrest and major crimes, including murder, rape, and kidnapping. There were more than 400 protests and demonstrations in the first half of 2011, many

violent. While the majority were related to the elections, a significant number were motivated by poor living conditions, unemployment, and the cholera epidemic.⁷ MINUSTAH police were called in at least fifteen times in the first half of 2011 to respond to violent demonstrations. Crime reporting also increased in 2011, likely reflecting a higher level of public confidence with law enforcement.⁸

Gang violence remains a security risk, however. There are concerns that convicts who escaped after the earthquake may contribute to increased gang activities and that some gangs have established links to both political parties and drug traffickers.⁹ Haiti's second largest department, the West Department, has been the most heavily affected by gang violence, particularly the department's camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The issue is especially pressing in Port-au-Prince. In July, 2,100 MINUSTAH troops and police launched a joint program with the HNP to quell crime and violence in three vulnerable neighborhoods—Bel Air, Cité Soleil, and Martissant. Operation Phoenix resulted in the arrest of several gang members, including escaped convicts. MINUSTAH's force commander stated that the operation was intended to “reinforce trust and confidence between the residents, HNP and MINUSTAH.”¹⁰ A similar operation, Operation Hope, was conducted in October in Bel Air and Martissant and resulted in the arrest of seven criminals, including a number of prison escapees.

Controversy erupted in September when a video surfaced that allegedly showed Uruguayan peacekeeping troops raping a Haitian teenager. The video quickly circulated on Haitian mobile phones and prompted protests outside of MINUSTAH's base. President Martelly condemned the incident and Uruguayan president José Mujica issued a letter of apology to Martelly. The UN conducted a preliminary investigation, but authority for prosecution rests with the government of Uruguay, which has initiated an investigation and stated that if the allegations are true, the perpetrators will receive the “harshest sanctions.”¹¹

Rule of Law and Justice

In October 2010, then-SRSG Edmond Mulet called for the creation of a rule of law compact between Haitian authorities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and international partners based on a common understanding of needs and mutually agreed criteria to support the rule of law in Haiti. As an initial step, MINUSTAH provided assistance to the government of Haiti in preparing a national rule of law strategy. However, the political stalemate between the president and parliament delayed progress on the compact in 2011, though Martelly has identified rule of law as one of the pillars of his government.

Reform of the HNP continues, with the graduation of 877 cadets this year. The police force now comprises 10,000 officers, with an expansion to 14,000 envisioned. However, even with these additions the HNP will still fall well short of the 20,000 officers that experts advise are necessary. The vetting process, stalled in the wake of the earthquake, has also been restarted, with over 900 officers vetted in 2011.

Though HNP reform and capacity are improving, the pace is slow, and significant ground remains to be covered before the force is prepared to take on full security responsibilities. Institutional and operational reforms are still needed to expand the capacity and reach of the police, which is heavily concentrated in Port-au-Prince. The HNP is hampered by logistical constraints as well as gaps in critical skills, including border management and crowd control. In addition, in December the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and MINUSTAH released reports detailing cases of excessive use of force by the HNP, including cases where officers conducted extrajudicial executions. The UN urged the government to investigate the deaths, but the incidents raise concerns about the capacity and restraint of the police force. There are also some concerns that the vetting process has not been entirely successful in removing “rogue” officers.¹² Work has begun on a new five-year HNP reform plan to succeed

the first plan, which is set to end in 2011. However, the political impasse through much of the year has affected Haitian ownership of and engagement with the new plan. Responding to skill gaps in the HNP, MINUSTAH has provided specialized training and support to a donor-funded project to build a police academy, slated for completion in early 2013.

Haiti's prisons remain overcrowded, vulnerable to food shortages, and below international standards. To bolster corrections capacity, MINUSTAH conducts training for prison guards, and MINUSTAH police officers are present in all Haitian prisons, providing assistance on critical issues and challenges. A 2011 training program resulted in the graduation of 300 new guards. MINUSTAH has also worked to improve cell space, which increased 28 percent between March and September. In addition, the mission has worked with Haitian officials to end cases of illegal detention, with the release of 469 individuals in 2011.

In September, parliament submitted to the president a list of eighteen candidates for six vacancies on the Supreme Court. President Martelly initially returned the list to the Senate, but subsequently named the chief justice and one additional judge from the list. However, delays in appointments have stalled the formation of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, a key oversight body for the Haitian judiciary. The justice system continues to struggle, seen notably through the lack of progress in legal proceedings against Baby Doc Duvalier. Since the former dictator was charged in January 2011, the case has stalled, with only one judge assigned to investigate his crimes.¹³

MINUSTAH provides support to Haiti's justice system, assisting with caseload and record system management, and in the establishment of legal-aid offices and peace tribunals, low-level courts, and other infrastructure.

Post-Earthquake Recovery

Haiti continues to rebuild after the earthquake, though the list of pending activities is daunting. Immediately following the earthquake,

MINUSTAH shifted emphasis to provision of emergency relief and recovery support. The post-earthquake planning process led to the development of an integrated strategic framework (ISF), finalized in late 2010 and endorsed by the government in February 2011. The ISF, which also serves as the country's interim UN Development Assistance Framework, has identified five priority areas: institutional rebuilding, territorial rebuilding, social rebuilding, economic rebuilding, and an enabling environment.

The earthquake killed nearly one-third of Haitian civil servants and destroyed over 180 government buildings, including the national palace, the Supreme Court, the parliament, and nearly all ministries.¹⁴ MINUSTAH has provided technical and advisory support to state institutions at the national and local levels, and logistical support for reestablishing destroyed government offices. The mission has established temporary office sites for government ministries, identified sites for co-located HNP-UN police units, and constructed a temporary parliament office block, the latter of which was completed in April 2011. The mission continues to provide support to public infrastructure and basic services. In addition, MINUSTAH and the government of Haiti signed a memorandum of understanding in February on logistical assistance to support Haitian rule of law institutions and implementation of the resettlement strategy for Haitians displaced after the earthquake. MINUSTAH military engineering units engage in a broad range of earthquake recovery projects, including removal of damaged buildings and rubble, repair of roads, and river drainage.

MINUSTAH troops have also provided community policing throughout IDP camps, maintaining a continuous presence in seven of about a thousand sites. There are still 500,000 IDPs and, despite a steady decrease in the number of Haitians living in camps, the pace of resettlement has recently slowed, at least partially due to the delay in developing longer-term housing alternatives. Forced relocation and eviction are a concern, as by September

nearly 70,000 individuals had been forced to leave IDP camps by municipal authorities and private landowners.¹⁵ MINUSTAH and humanitarian partners are working closely with the Haitian government on the long-term relocation of those still residing in camps.

The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), co-chaired by the Haitian government and the UN's Special Envoy for Haiti, former US president Clinton, was designed to support the government's coordination of international support for post-earthquake recovery. In April 2011 an aid management platform, jointly overseen by the IHRC and the Ministry of Planning, was launched to track donor funds. Donor assistance remains a concern. Only 38 percent of funds pledged by international donors had been released by July of this year.¹⁶ In August the commission launched a major project to relocate IDPs in six camps to long-term housing in sixteen neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince, complementing other major relocation projects conducted by the Haitian government, the UN, and the World Bank. However, much of the commission's work is now on hold since its mandate expired on 21 October. Earlier in 2011, President Martelly requested a one-year extension for the commission, but parliament did not pass the legislation needed to extend its mandate.

The cholera outbreak has complicated post-earthquake recovery. Although humanitarian actors quickly mobilized to limit the spread of the disease and provide care to those infected, several large NGOs are in the process of drawing down their cholera support because of reduced donor funding,¹⁷ which could have negative consequences for cholera response.

Drawdown of Post-Earthquake Surge

In light of the important progress made since the earthquake, in October 2011 the Security Council extended MINUSTAH's mandate for one year and decided to reduce its strength by 1,600 troops and 1,150 police, to be completed by June 2012. The drawdown will reduce the

number of infantry troops on the ground, while maintaining military engineering capacity to continue support for reconstruction in Haiti. As the mission draws down, it will dedicate increasing focus to the Haitian political process and the consolidation of state authority. The Council noted that future reconfigurations of MINUSTAH would be informed by the security situation in Haiti and the capacity of national institutions.

This partial drawdown came amid growing Haitian frustration with MINUSTAH. Throughout 2011 public pressure mounted for a withdrawal of the mission, fueled by the cholera outbreak and the alleged sexual assault. It also came after the Haitian Senate adopted a resolution requesting that MINUSTAH withdraw over the next three years. Top MINUSTAH troop-contributing countries also committed to reducing the size of the mission's force.

Though President Martelly has repeatedly called for the mission to reorient its focus toward development, in September he said that Haiti still needed MINUSTAH's support in the face of continued instability.¹⁸ Martelly has stated his desire to rebuild the Haitian army, which was disbanded in 1995, in part to take over security responsibilities from MINUSTAH. His plan to do so, which showed an estimated cost of \$95 million, was leaked in September. However, it is unclear whether parliament or donors would support this proposal.

Conclusion

While MINUSTAH continued to provide important support and assistance to Haiti throughout 2011, pressure mounted for a withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission. In the wake of the alleged rape of a Haitian teenager, public demonstrations called for an end to what protesters called an "occupying" force. As MINUSTAH begins a partial drawdown to pre-earthquake levels, the mission, Haitian authorities, and international partners must consider the future role of international support in Haiti. In doing so, the capacity of

Haitian institutions, especially the HNP, for taking on full authority in the country should be the guide for the pace and structure of MINUSTAH's eventual departure. Political

actors will also need to demonstrate considerable political will to overcome the divides that stalled recovery, reform, and peace consolidation efforts in 2011.

Notes

1. Mulet was appointed SRSRG in the aftermath of the earthquake, and previously served with the mission in 2006–2007.
2. Reuters AlertNet, "Preview: Haiti, Donors Face Huge Task to 'Build Back Better,'" 28 March 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/node/349732>.
3. The report stressed that many factors contributed to the outbreak, including regular use of the Arbonite River for bathing, the salinity level of the river's water, the lack of immunity among the Haitian population, poor water and sanitation conditions, and the inability of medical facilities to prevent the further spread of the disease.
4. See, for example, Richard Piarroux, "Mission Report on the Cholera Epidemic in Haiti," December 2010; and Rene Hendriksen et al., "Population Genetics of *Vibrio cholerae* from Nepal in 2010: Evidence on the Origin of the Haitian Outbreak," *mBio*, July–August 2011.
5. UN News Centre, "Nearly 470,000 Cholera Cases Reported in Haiti over the Past Year," 21 October 2011, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40149&Cr=haiti&Cr1=>.
6. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2011/183, 24 March 2011.
7. International Crisis Group, "Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform," 8 September 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b026-keeping-haiti-safe-police-reform.aspx>.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.; and United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2011/183.
10. MINUSTAH, "Launching of Operation 'Phoenix' to Secure Port-au-Prince Key Neighborhoods," press release, 14 July 2011, <http://minustah.org/?p=31133>.
11. "Uruguay Apologises for Alleged Rape by Its Soldiers," *BBC News*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14817191>.
12. International Crisis Group, "Keeping Haiti Safe."
13. Tom Phillips, "Will 'Baby Doc' Duvalier Ever Face Justice in Haiti?" *The Guardian*, 22 September 2011.
14. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2010/200, 22 February 2010.
15. UN News Centre, "Haiti: UN Concerned at Forcible Evictions of Quake Survivors from Camps," 13 September 2011, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39526&Cr=&Cr1=>.
16. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2011/540, 25 August 2011.
17. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2011/183.
18. Randal C. Archibold, "Haiti Leader Is Opposed to Reduction of U.N. Force," *New York Times*, 22 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/martelly-opposes-reducing-un-force-in-haiti.html>.