The political and security situation in the Middle East changed radically during 2011. The “Arab Spring” began in December 2010, with street protests in Tunisia that led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. By the end of January, Egyptian protesters had ousted President Hosni Mubarak. Demonstrations broke out in other Arab countries during the spring and summer, including Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Morocco, Libya, and Syria. These demonstrations achieved further political changes, including dismissal of the Jordanian government and agreement by President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen to step down from office. Violence escalated in some areas, notably in Libya and Syria, with the crisis in the latter prompting the deployment of the first Arab League peace operation since the 1970s.

The wave of change continues, so the extent to which it will transform the political landscape of the Middle East is not yet clear. Some important developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict are already evident, however. With the overthrow of Mubarak and the revolt against Bashar al-Assad, Israel’s relationships with its two largest neighbors are less predictable than they have been for decades. Instability and anti-Israeli sentiment are also evident in Jordan. To Israel’s north, the situation in Lebanon remains tense, and in November an exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Lebanon, the first since 2009, underscored the fluid security environment. The Palestinian issue has shifted significantly: the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) decided to pursue its case for statehood at the UN; meanwhile, on the ground, Palestinians began to employ new modes of political action. Israel is concerned by regional developments, but has offered no alternative proposal for progress toward regional peace and continues to approve construction of settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Peace operations in the Middle East are being pushed to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and to interact with a broadening range of regional actors. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) have faced new challenges, notably the mobilization of Palestinian refugees who marched toward Israel in May and June 2011 and were fired upon by Israeli soldiers. The internal security situation has deteriorated in both Syria and Lebanon, and UNIFIL troops were attacked three times inside Lebanon during the year.

### UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

- **Authorization and Start Date**: 19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426)
- **Force Commander**: Major-General Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)
- **Budget**: $545.5 million (1 July 2011–30 June 2012)
- **Strength as of 31 October 2011**: Troops: 12,488
  - International Civilian Staff: 353
  - National Civilian Staff: 666

For detailed mission information see p. 252

### Background

UNIFIL is the largest UN peace operation in the region. First established in 1978 by Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL was tasked with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces and helping the government of
Lebanon to reestablish control over the south. In May 2000, UNIFIL assisted in the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind a Blue Line identified by the UN.

The Lebanese government was unable to deploy forces in the south, and in 2004 the Security Council again demanded extension of Lebanese governmental authority. It also called for withdrawal of Syrian troops, accomplished in 2005, and the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
War erupted in Lebanon in July 2006 when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol and abducted two soldiers. Israel bombed Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory; Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel. Over a thousand Lebanese and 161 Israelis were killed, and thousands were displaced.

The war ended with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution established a new mandate for UNIFIL, adding to its original responsibilities the tasks of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, ensuring that no foreign forces would be present in Lebanon without government consent, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in preserving an area free of unauthorized armed personnel between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and fully implementing the Taif Accords. Resolution 1701 allowed for the expansion of UNIFIL up to 15,000 troops and the inclusion of a maritime task force.

Divisions among members of Saad Hariri’s government of national unity relating to this issue had become increasingly pronounced during 2010, and on 12 January 2011 the government collapsed when eleven ministers from the March 8 coalition resigned. The infuriated March 14 leadership described this as a “coup.”

The collapse of the Hariri government was followed by a five-month governmental vacuum, during which the prime minister-designate, Najib Mikati, struggled to form a new cabinet. The political atmosphere worsened. The March 14 coalition held a large political rally at which all speakers denounced the existence of arms outside the control of the state. Meanwhile, the March 8 leadership was vocal in its denunciation of the STL, which Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah condemned as an “Israeli project.” The Lebanese press speculated feverishly about when the STL would issue indictments, and what would happen when this occurred. Dialogue between the main political camps broke down.

Lebanese internal security deteriorated during this period. Seven Estonian cyclists were kidnapped in the Bekaa on 23 March and held captive for 113 days. Illegal construction accelerated, leading to violent clashes between offenders and state authorities. The uprising in Syria contributed to tensions. At the political level, the Syrian government accused March 14 members of parliament of supporting the Syrian opposition, and on the ground, Syrian nationals began to cross into north Lebanon. Lebanese leaders’ responses to the crisis in Bahrain contributed to sectarian tensions.

UNIFIL’s area of operations south of the Litani River remained largely calm for most of the year. However, in late November a rocket was fired from southern Lebanon, prompting the Israeli army to return fire. UNIFIL called for restraint from both parties and deployed additional troops in the area to discourage further incidents. The event was followed by further rocket fire in December, raising concern about the escalating security breaches in southern Lebanon.

Key Developments

Lebanon’s stability was threatened in early January 2011 by a political crisis relating to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
After forty-two years in power, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s regime crumbled in August 2011, as Libyan rebel forces took control of Tripoli and sent the dictator and his remaining supporters into hiding. The UN General Assembly subsequently ceded Libya’s seat to the National Transitional Council (NTC) in September, recognizing the body as the country’s legitimate representative. Qaddafi was killed on 20 October during the Battle of Sirte, a month-long offensive waged by NTC forces against his final stronghold. Three days later, NTC chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil pronounced the end of the uprising and declared Libya “liberated.”

Antigovernment protests erupted in Benghazi in February 2011 and quickly spread to neighboring regions in the east. Decades of political repression, socioeconomic disparity, and entrenched patronage fueled opposition to the regime. Qaddafi’s regime responded by harshly cracking down on protesters, triggering further dissidence across the country and the defection of a number of top officials. The international community widely condemned Qaddafi’s use of force and on 26 February the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970, demanding an immediate end to the violence, levying sanctions against the regime, and calling for the International Criminal Court to investigate the regime for war crimes. The following day, the opposition in Benghazi formed the NTC in an effort to coordinate resistance efforts.

On 17 March, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, calling for member states to protect civilians by all means necessary, authorizing the use of force, and imposing a no-fly zone over Libya. NATO eventually assumed responsibility for conducting air strikes through Operation Unified Protector, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France playing particularly central roles. The NATO campaign was initially opposed by a number of states. The African Union, led by South Africa, was especially critical, calling instead for a political solution to the conflict. Moreover, NATO faced internal divisions over the scale and intensity of operations, with only eight of its twenty-eight member states participating. By mid-April, however, NATO had ramped up its attacks, striking Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli among other high-profile targets. The mission’s activities have highlighted the thin boundary between protection of civilians and peace enforcement in international peace operations.

In April the European Union announced the creation of EUFOR Libya, a military operation designed to support humanitarian relief in the country. The mission’s mandate stated that deployment was predicated on a request for assistance from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). However, because the assistance was never requested, the mission never deployed.

NTC forces made rapid gains throughout June and July, due in part to NATO military assistance and arms shipments from France. At the same time, the divide between supporters and critics of the NATO operation widened as the international community increasingly called for a political solution to the conflict, with a possible role for Qaddafi in negotiations. Such a settlement seemed unlikely, however, as NTC forces swiftly entered Tripoli on 22 August and captured the capital shortly thereafter. Following the rebels’ ultimate victory at the Battle of Sirte, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2016, ending authorization for Operation Unified Protector as of 31 October.

During the conflict, UN diplomatic and mediation efforts were carried out by Special Envoy Abdel-Elah al-Khatib, appointed by the Secretary-General to broker a political solution. In April, Ian Martin was appointed Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on postconflict planning in Libya and, with support from the UN system (in addition to the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration), developed a pre-assessment plan for UN engagement in the postconflict period. While the initial analysis included contingencies for both military and police, the NTC has since made clear that it would not be receptive to foreign military personnel on Libyan soil, though it is open to police assistance. The NTC has also requested the UN’s aid in planning for elections.

On 16 September, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2009, establishing the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for an initial period of three months and subsequently extended it for an additional three months. This political mission will assist the NTC in a number of efforts, including restoring the rule of law, drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and extending state authority.

Box 3.5 Libya

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<th>NATO Operation Unified Protector</th>
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Throughout 2011, UNIFIL enjoyed freedom of movement with the exception of some small-scale incidents in which local people blocked UNIFIL patrols. UNIFIL reports that the attitude of the local population toward the peace operation has remained largely positive.

UNIFIL was attacked three times outside its area of operations, however. On 27 May, an explosion caused by a remotely controlled roadside bomb hit a UNIFIL logistics convoy north of Saida. The attack injured six Italian peacekeepers, two of them seriously. A further attack on UNIFIL troops occurred on 26 July, when another roadside bomb exploded near Saida, injuring six French soldiers. A third roadside bomb injured five French peacekeepers in December. These direct attacks on UNIFIL troops were the first since January 2008. Responsibility for these attacks has not yet been established.

Attacks against the peacekeepers have contributed to concerns that major European countries will withdraw their troops from UNIFIL. Italy has already scaled down its presence, and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France wrote to Lebanese counterparts in August calling on Lebanon to “confront the dangers” facing the force, and warning that France “may reconsider its participation in UNIFIL” if it is attacked again. After the December attack, the French ambassador to Lebanon said that France would decide whether to reduce its troop contribution to UNIFIL after the completion of a UN strategy review of the mission, expected in early 2012. Italian foreign minister Franco Frattini also hinted in April that UNIFIL’s mandate might need to be revised as a consequence of regional changes, though this seems unlikely to occur.

UNIFIL and UNDOF were also affected by Palestinian demonstrations staged to mark the Nakba (the “catastrophe” of Palestinian displacement in 1948) and Naksa (the “setback” of Israel’s victory in June 1967). Palestinians have traditionally commemorated these events, but their destabilizing effect was greater in 2011 than in previous years because Lebanese and Syrian authorities permitted demonstrators to access areas adjacent to the Blue Line and separation area.

In Lebanon, 8,000–10,000 people, mainly Palestinian refugees, held a ceremony at the southern village of Maroun ar-Ras on 15 May. After the event, about a thousand demonstrators marched toward the Blue Line. Some unearthed mines, threw stones and petrol bombs, and sought to scale the technical fence. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded with live fire. Seven demonstrators were killed and 111 were injured, making this the “most deadly incident in the Blue Line area” since the adoption of Resolution 1701. The LAF then sought to disperse the demonstration. UNIFIL was present but not directly involved, as it had received a request from the LAF “to avoid close contact with the demonstrators so as not to potentially aggravate the situation.” UNIFIL’s subsequent investigation found that both the demonstrators and the IDF had violated Resolution 1701. In Syria, parallel demonstrations took place. About 4,000 demonstrators gathered in the “family shouting place,” opposite Majdal Shams, and about 300 passed through a minefield and crossed the cease-fire line and IDF technical fence. Four were killed by IDF fire and approximately forty others were wounded.

Further Palestinian demonstrations were planned for Naksa Day on 5 June. In preparation for this event, the UNDOF force commander met Israeli and Syrian authorities. UNIFIL convened a special tripartite meeting and held separate coordination meetings with both the LAF and the IDF. UN political and peacekeeping operations established special communication networks. In Lebanon, the planned Naksa demonstration was called off because the LAF decided to deny demonstrators access to the area south of the Litani. Demonstrations did occur, however, on 5 June in Syria. This time, up to twenty-three people were killed and many more were wounded. UNDOF monitored developments and the force commander engaged with IDF and Syrian authorities on the ground in an effort to de-escalate tensions.
**Political and Regional Dynamics**

Lebanon remains highly vulnerable to crisis provoked by events elsewhere in the region, although its domestic political atmosphere has calmed slightly since Najib Mikati unveiled his cabinet in mid-June 2011. The cabinet is dominated by the March 8 coalition, and although Hezbollah has been assigned only two ministerial portfolios, the party clearly plays a major role in policy formation. Polarization between the main political camps has not decreased, though the Mikati government has been able to make progress in several practical areas, notably in relation to the electricity crisis. However, the government only narrowly averted a crisis in November when Mikati announced that Lebanon would pay its share of the costs for the STL out of the budget for the prime minister’s office. In the absence of action by Lebanese authorities to act on the tribunal’s indictment, the STL may move to try the four indicted members of Hezbollah in absentia.

The crisis in Syria poses a grave threat to Lebanon’s security and stability. Outgoing UN Special Coordinator Michael Williams warned in September 2011 that Lebanon must “prepare for the storm” hailing from Syria. Williams highlighted several threats, including the risk that Syrian Sunnis might turn against Alawites or Christians in Syria: “That could have consequences in Lebanon.” Williams also identified the economic impacts of the crisis in Syria and the possibility of increased refugee flows as potential threats to Lebanon.

Lebanese political actors of all stripes are aware of the potential impact of change in Syria on the balance of political and military power inside Lebanon. March 8 parties would lose an important political ally if Assad were to be removed from power. In November the government voted against the Arab League suspension of Syria and “disassociated” itself from sanctions imposed against the regime. Hezbollah could also lose its logistics route through Syria and therefore be unable to transport military hardware from Iran. Although Hezbollah already possesses a substantial arsenal inside Lebanon, resupply in the event of conflict with Israel may become more difficult. In December Hezbollah’s leader made a rare public statement in support of the Assad regime. How March 8 and particularly Hezbollah would respond to further change in Syria is far from clear.

The March 14 response to the Syria crisis was muted during the summer of 2011. The leadership of the “new opposition” was abroad, and Syrian accusations that March 14 members of parliament were supporting the anti-Assad uprising may have contributed to the coalition’s nervousness. In early October, March 14 leaders voiced strong criticism of Syrian incursions into Lebanon, which Kataeb party leader Amin Gemayel described as “very dangerous” and “an attack on Lebanese sovereignty.”

In December, in the face of growing armed resistance and international pressure, Syria signed an agreement to allow Arab League observers into the country to monitor the implementation of a regional peace agreement. The agreement seeks to bring an end to the crisis, which, according to UN estimates, had killed over five thousand people by December. Approximately 50 Arab League monitors entered the country on 26 December as violence continued. Activists argued that the Syrian government limited the observers’ movements, and in the six days between the start of the mission and the end of 2011 more than 150 people were killed in the continued crackdown. The Arab League responded by arguing that the operation had achieved important objectives including the agreement to release thousands of political prisoners and the withdrawal of military tanks from cities. However, as 2011 came to a close the Arab Parliament, an advisory body independent of the Arab League, called for the withdrawal of the observers, arguing that the mission was providing cover for the continued violence perpetrated by the Syrian government. At the time of writing, the mission’s findings were expected to be released in early January.
Israeli political actors are also awaiting the outcome of the uprising in Syria with anxiety. Despite its hostile rhetoric, the Assad regime had maintained stability in the Golan for many years. This stability has already faded. If the Assad regime were to be removed from power, Israel could face more forceful challenges to its occupation of the Golan. Israeli actors are also concerned about the possible impact of change in Syria on the stability of Lebanon.

UNIFIL’s relationship with the Lebanese authorities has not deteriorated since the formation of the Mikati government. The government affirmed its commitment to Resolution 1701 in its 7 July ministerial statement, and on 16 July Mikati visited UNIFIL headquarters, where he expressed support for the peace operation. UNIFIL has made progress in addressing technical issues, both bilaterally and within the tripartite forum, and notes that technical cooperation between the parties has recovered from the crisis caused by the LAF-IDF clash of August 2010.

Further substantial progress toward implementation of Resolution 1701 looks almost impossible in the current political climate, however. The resolution calls for “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that . . . there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.” It is hard to imagine the current Lebanese government taking steps to implement this provision. While the government of Israel believes that Hezbollah is building its arsenal, it has failed to respect the Blue Line (as called for in Resolution 1701), for example, by ending air violations. In the long run, UNIFIL’s credibility may be eroded if no further progress is made toward implementing outstanding provisions of 1701.

The Israeli-Palestinian impasse is another destabilizing factor, both within the occupied territory and in countries hosting Palestinian refugees. Palestinians around the region have begun to interact with each other more intensively, inspired by the Arab Spring, through use of social media and Internet-based telecommunications. This has facilitated dialogue across borders, making coordinated political mobilization easier. The events of May and June 2011 highlighted the potential impact of mass mobilization of Palestinian refugees. Further demonstrations would pose substantial new challenges, both for the IDF and for peacekeeping operations in the region.

Progress toward a permanent cease-fire and long-term solution to the Israel-Lebanon conflict would probably require interim steps, which the outgoing UN Special Coordinator argues could include “undertakings by the Israelis for example [to] diminish or suspend” overflights, accompanied by “undertakings on behalf of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah that . . . would correspond with decommissioning arms.” However, no agreement is likely unless Palestinians make progress toward statehood and there is change in Damascus: “Any breakthrough . . . has to take place in a regional context which is more propitious.”

**UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

| Authorization and Start Date | 31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350) |
| Force Commander | Major-General Natalio C. Ecarma (Philippines) |
| Budget | $50.5 million (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) |
| Strength as of 31 October 2011 | Troops: 1,040 |
| International Civilian Staff: 41 |
| National Civilian Staff: 103 |

For detailed mission information see p. 235
second, the Palestinian protests that led to breaches of the cease-fire line (as described earlier).

UNDOF has faced new restrictions since April 2011, when the Syrian authorities denied the Golan observer group access to several villages, “ostensibly to ensure the safety and security of the military observers.” In response to new challenges, UNDOF has raised its alert status, affecting the readiness and availability of troops, and has increased patrols in the separation area. UNDOF has also established a new, permanently occupied position and taken measures to improve force protection, including fortification of UN positions. UNDOF has also begun crowd-control training to support self-defense of UNDOF soldiers and installations.

On 30 June the Security Council renewed UNDOF’s mandate and called on the Secretary-General to provide an assessment and recommendations regarding the operational capacity of UNDOF to ensure that the peace operation is best configured to fulfill its mandated tasks. The assessment found that the mission was appropriately configured for its mandate and did not require changes, though it did find some areas where adjustments would strengthen UNDOF’s capacity.

**UNTSO**
The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to monitor observance of cease-fires negotiated between Israel and its neighbors. UNTSO provides observers and logistical and financial support to UNIFIL and UNDOF, as well as a small observer group in Egypt at the request of its government. UNTSO did not undergo any formal changes to its mandate or authorized strength during 2011, nor did it suffer casualties or injuries. Operations by the Golan observer group were affected by the demonstrations on Nakba and Naksa Days, with more personnel needed at some duty stations and observing positions, and at UNTSO headquarters. The UNTSO’s situation center was also activated to monitor the situation.

**EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah)**
- **Authorization Date**: 5 November 2005 (Agreement on Movement and Access); 12 December 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP)
- **Start Date**: 30 November 2005
- **Head of Mission**: Colonel Alain Faugeras (France)
- **Budget**: $2 million (1 October 2010–30 September 2011)
- **Strength as of 30 September 2011**
  - Civilian Police: 5
  - Civilian Staff: 32

**EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS)**
- **Authorization Date**: 14 November 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP)
- **Start Date**: January 2006
- **Head of Mission**: Henrik Malmquist (Sweden)
- **Budget**: $11 million (1 October 2010–30 September 2011)
- **Strength as of 30 September 2011**
  - Civilian Police: 17
  - Civilian Staff: 32

**EUBAM Rafah**
The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) was established in 2005 to help implement the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access by providing a third-party presence at the Rafah crossing point. When Hamas forces took control of
Gaza in June 2007, EUBAM suspended its operations. The Council of the EU has continued to extend the mission’s mandate.

The EU welcomed the decision by Egyptian authorities to open the Rafah crossing on 28 May 2011. However, the Egyptian decision did not directly affect the overall situation of the EUBAM. As a third-party mission, EUBAM Rafah must be invited by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in order to be reactivated, and so far neither party has made such a request. The EU is nonetheless currently assessing the implications of the opening of the Rafah crossing point on a permanent basis, and following closely the implementation of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement in this regard. The mission has a redeployment plan to increase its strength should conditions allow.

**EUPOL COPPS**

The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) is a European Common Security and Defense Policy mission based in the West Bank. The mission assists the Palestinian Authority in building Palestinian policing and criminal justice institutions and increasing the safety and security of the Palestinian population.

EUPOL COPPS aims to ensure that the Palestinian Civil Police have sufficient capacity to sustain an efficient, transparent, and accountable policing organization within a sound legal framework. EUPOL COPPS promotes “civilian police primacy,” meaning that the civilian police should have ultimate charge over policing, and that civilian control of security forces should be guaranteed. EUPOL COPPS also assists the Palestinian Authority in building professional capacity within judicial institutions, enacting modern legislation, and facilitating reform.

**TIPH**

Established by Israeli-Palestinian agreement in 1994, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is mandated to provide security for Hebron residents and promote stability through monitoring, reporting, and assistance. TIPH is coordinated by Norway and staffed by personnel from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. There have been no changes to TIPH’s mandate since December 2010.
MFO Sinai
The Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai) was established in 1981 following withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force II and the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The MFO supervises implementation of security provisions of this treaty. On 1 September 2005, the MFO took on responsibility for monitoring the deployment of guards along the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza border.

There have been no changes to the MFO’s mandate in 2011. The overthrow of the Mubarak regime in January led to disruption of supplies in Egypt, which presented the MFO with logistical challenges. The security situation in the Sinai has deteriorated significantly since January, requiring the MFO to implement movement controls and upgrade force protection at its main camps and remote sites. A terrorist attack took place across the Egypt-Israel border in August 2011, leading to temporary suspension of MFO verification missions in the area.

NTM-I
The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) was established in 2004 at the request of the Iraqi interim government, under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1546. In December, the NATO Secretary-General announced that despite intense negotiations, it was not possible to extend NTM-I’s mandate in Iraq and that the mission would close by the end of 2011. The NTM-I operated under the political control of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. The mission sought to help support Iraq in developing a credible and self-sustaining security sector. During the period of its operations, the NTM-I trained over 5,200 Iraqi officers and noncommissioned officers and over 9,000 Iraqi police.

Notes
1. “The role that Syria has played and will continue to play with Hezbollah has removed one—I repeat, ‘one’—of the important raisons d’être of the UNIFIL mission. In an apparent paradox, if Hezbollah feels weakened by the absence of the strength provided by Syrian ‘cover,’ weaponry and ‘guardianship,’ it could become more aggressive. It could get out of control. And if that happens, UNIFIL’s mandate will need to be changed. If UNIFIL is no longer useful, let’s remove it. If it does have a use, its mandate needs to be up-dated to keep pace with a crisis whose endgame is not yet clear. . . . UNIFIL has played its role of settling the crisis well since 2006. It could be an excellent deterrent in the face of a new crisis in the region. But that’s not an easy decision, nor one that can be taken for granted. Certainly not on the basis of resolution 1701.” Interview with Foreign Minister Franco Frattini on the Syrian crisis and UNIFIL, Il Foglio, Rome, 28 April 2011; translation available at the website of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.esteri.it.
3. Ibid., para. 10.
5. Interview with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams, “Era of One-Man Rule over in Arab World—UN Envoy,” Reuters, 29 September 2011.