Sudan and South Sudan, which together host nearly one-third of the UN’s total global troop deployment, experienced profound and dramatic changes in 2011 and remain among the most challenging theaters for UN peace operations. In 2011 an increasingly complex and diverse architecture for UN operations emerged, involving three separate peacekeeping missions and numerous political processes.

The secession of Sudan’s southern region as the Republic of South Sudan is a historical and structural political transformation with significant implications for UN peace operations. The January 2011 referendum proceeded peacefully, with substantial operational support from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with southerners voting overwhelmingly for independence. South Sudan’s procession to independence on 9 July 2011 was marked by notable political compromise and restraint by both Juba and Khartoum and concerted third-party engagement from the African Union, the UN, and key members of the international community. South Sudan’s independence prompted the closure of UNMIS and the authorization of a new peace operation, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

While the implementation period for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) came to a close in July 2011, key provisions from the CPA have yet to be implemented, most importantly those concerning the relationship and borders between north and south. Negotiations failed to reach agreement on the referendum for the status of the Abyei area, border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, and citizenship issues. Abyei in particular remained a hotly contested flashpoint, witnessing renewed hostilities and ongoing disagreement over eligibility to participate in its referendum.

In response to the violence and in the context of an agreement by the parties on temporary arrangements for the security and administration of Abyei, the Security Council authorized deployment of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in June 2011.

There has also been a deterioration of conditions in areas of the north covered by the CPA—the Southern Kordofan State and the Blue Nile State—with the eruption of severe hostilities between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and northern units of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army that may portend a return to protracted civil conflict. Coinciding with the conclusion of the UNMIS mandate, this outbreak of violence presented serious -
humanitarian and political challenges, while also compounding the problems faced in resolving north-south issues. The November bombing of a refugee camp in South Sudan, reportedly by SAF, led to further deterioration in the relationship between the neighboring states. Direct clashes in December between Sudan and South Sudan led to large-scale displacement and further raised concern about the possibility of a return to conflict.

With much attention drawn to north-south developments, the eight-year-old conflict in Darfur continued without significant progress. In some areas, intensification of hostilities between rebels and the government of Sudan caused civilian displacement and deterioration of security and humanitarian conditions. The UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has struggled with its mandate to improve the security situation and protect civilians. AU- and UN-led negotiations on Darfur, though they did result in the brokering of an accord between the government of Sudan and one rebel coalition, continued to face opposition from other rebel groups and erratic engagement from the government and the international community.

Progress on outstanding post-independence issues and resolution of the ongoing tensions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states will require intensive international engagement, from the UN, the AU, and other key stakeholders. In addition, maintaining the internal cohesion of the two states will be a central challenge for UN peace operations in 2012, as state authority is weak and violently contested in a number of areas.

Background

The 2005 CPA ended the decades-long conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM). On 24 March 2005, Security Council Resolution 1590 mandated UNMIS as a fully fledged peacekeeping mission focused on supporting implementation of the CPA. Its responsibilities included monitoring and verification of troop redeployments, investigating CPA violations and providing good offices for the resolution of disputes arising from CPA implementation, and supporting elections and referendums. UNMIS’s mandate also included coordination of humanitarian assistance, promotion of human rights, and protection of civilians.
The CPA interim period ended on 9 July 2011, which also brought an end to the UNMIS mandate. At its conclusion, UNMIS had deployed personnel across the whole of southern Sudan and in the CPA areas of Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan State through a system involving sectoral headquarters and numerous remote sites. Despite the persistence of important unresolved CPA issues and the onset of violent conflict, the government of Sudan indicated that it would not consent to an extension of the UNMIS mandate beyond 9 July 2011.

UNAMID was mandated in July 2007 to help provide security for humanitarian assistance and protect any civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence. The mission was also called on to monitor compliance with cease-fire agreements, investigate human rights abuses, and assist with implementation of the 2006 Darfur Agreement and any subsequent peace accords. After a notably delayed deployment, UNAMID neared full strength through 2010.

**Key Developments**

**Referendum and Conclusion of the Interim CPA Period**

On 9 January 2011, six years to the day after the CPA came into effect, southerners went to the polls for the referendum on independence. The official results, announced on 7 February, showed that over 98 percent of voters had opted for separation. The UN Secretary-General’s panel on the referendum, established in a monitoring capacity, found that the referendum reflected the free will of the people of South Sudan and that the process was free, fair, and credible. National and international observers, including the Carter Center and the European Union Observer Mission, publicly concurred with these findings. The results were immediately accepted by the National Congress Party (NCP) and were later endorsed by the national legislature.

Given the inherent risks in the referendum process and delayed preparations, the outcome was a significant achievement. Considerable technical and operational support was undertaken by the UN Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED), which brought together elections staff from UNMIS and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) into one team. UNIRED worked in partnership with the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission to overcome the daunting logistical challenges of conducting the vote across South Sudan—with its vast and inaccessible terrain, extremely limited infrastructure, and sparsely distributed population. The mission provided transportation and procurement of all referendum-related materials, assisted in the design of operational plans for conducting voter registration and polling, and provided referendum-related security training for the police forces of both South Sudan and Sudan.

The conclusion of the CPA interim period marked a transformation in the framework for UN and international engagement in regard to the peaceful resolution of issues between the north and the south. Secession created a new state, with previously internal issues now existing between two sovereign nations.

The AU has hosted the post-CPA negotiations, with the AU High-Level Implementation
Panel managing talks between the CPA parties. This process has received significant support from the government of Ethiopia, UNMIS leadership, and key AU member states. UNMIS Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Haile Menkerios was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Sudan and South Sudan in July 2011 to continue political engagement after the conclusion of the UNMIS mandate.

The Abyei dispute (addressed in detail later) is just one of many pending post-independence issues on the agenda for negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. There are also other contested areas along the north-south border that must be negotiated before border demarcation can take place, and pending issues on financial arrangements, including the sharing of oil revenues (the majority of revenues come from oil fields in the south) and access to oil pipelines and refineries (located in the north). On 18 September 2011, Sudan and South Sudan did reach agreement on the opening of ten border-crossing points during the first meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, which is designed to strengthen cooperation between the two countries.

The issue of citizenship also remains to be settled. Khartoum has taken the line that all those eligible to vote in the southern referendum automatically became citizens of South Sudan at the succession of the south. This has created uncertainty among the 1–2 million individuals from the south living in the north. It is estimated that since August
2010 approximately 150,000 southerners have left the north for the south. Many are now dependent on aid, due to the limited infrastructure and economic opportunities at their places of arrival in the south.

Relations between the two states deteriorated in November when Sudanese armed forces reportedly bombed two locations in South Sudan, including a refugee camp in Yida, which hosts more than 20,000 individuals fleeing fighting in the north. Sudan has denied the charges, but the incident raised tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, with each accusing the other of supporting insurgent groups in its territory. The UN and the AU urged restraint from both parties. However, following the bombings, direct fighting between Sudan and South Sudan erupted in the disputed Jau border region, leading South Sudan’s foreign minister to warn that the two states were on the brink of war.

Equally crucial to peace and stability will be the internal cohesion and dynamics within the two new states. Sudan is host to the lingering eight-year-old insurgency in Darfur and the recently erupted conflicts with the northern contingents of the SPLA in Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State. Similarly, South Sudan experiences regular and extremely violent intercommunal and factional conflicts, which has led the UN to report that the main political driver of conflict in post-CPA South Sudan will be internal tensions.

Continued Conflict in the North: Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States

For the first half of 2011, UNMIS maintained its support for implementation of the CPA in Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State, with particular focus on the organization of the Popular Consultations, the Southern Kordofan State elections, and the security arrangements for SPLA troops from the two states. The mission provided continued support to the redeployment of SPLA forces from above the north-south border into the south. At the March meeting of the Cease-Fire Political Commission, the mission agreed to concentrate its monitoring and verification efforts on determining the actual SPLA presence in Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State. The future of northern contingents of the SPLA was also taken up in the AU-managed post-CPA negotiations on security arrangements.

UNMIS supported and monitored preparations for the Popular Consultations, a CPA-mandated mechanism designed to provide citizens of the two states with the opportunity to express their views on the implementation of the CPA and deliver recommendations that would rectify any shortcomings in the constitutional, political, administrative, and economic arrangements of the agreement. In Blue Nile State, the mission provided logistical and material assistance and a series of preparatory workshops in support of public hearings that took place in January and February in 108 centers across the state, during which 69,429 people expressed their opinions on implementation of the agreement. In Southern Kordofan, preparations for the Popular Consultations were delayed in order to hold the state elections.

After a one-year delay, the Southern Kordofan elections were held in May 2011. UNMIS provided technical and logistical support and voter education training and materials. The elections pitted previous partners in the state power-sharing government, Ahmed Haroun from the NCP and Abdul Aziz al-Hilu from the SPLM, against each other in an environment of heightened tensions. Voting took place without incident between 2 and 4 May 2011. UNMIS SRSG Menkerios met with both candidates and urged the eventual winner to form an inclusive government to avoid a winner-take-all situation that could exacerbate tensions.

However, prior to the national electoral commission’s announcement that Haroun had won by a narrow margin, the SPLM declared that it was withdrawing and would not recognize the outcome. Post-election pronouncements that the government of Sudan intended to forcibly disarm SPLA soldiers in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan further increased tensions. Amid mutual accusations, fighting between the two forces broke out in Southern Kordofan’s capital, Kadugli, in June and
quickly spread across the state. Widespread fighting, including the use of aerial bombardment, led to large-scale displacement and serious abuses against the civilian population. Khartoum alleges that the SPLM continues to support SPLM-North, further contributing to north-south tensions.

With the NCP and the SPLM’s northern faction failing to reach an agreement to halt fighting in Southern Kordofan, hostilities spread to Blue Nile in September. Fighting between government and SPLA forces broke out in the state capital and again quickly spread across the state. At the same time, UNMIS was in the position of commencing liquidation and withdrawal as these conflicts broke out around it. The end of the mission’s mandate and the absence of a negotiated cease-fire or settlement meant that the UN and other stakeholders had limited opportunities to engage in peacemaking activities. The withdrawal also cast serious doubt over the future of the remaining CPA provisions in these areas, with some observers warning of a return to wide-scale civil war.

**Establishment of UNMISS**

Security Council Resolution 1996 established UNMISS on 9 July 2011 for an initial period of one year at an authorized strength of 7,000 troops and 900 police. UNMISS inherited the infrastructure, assets, and personnel from UNMIS, enabling the mission to deploy quickly. Broadly, UNMISS is charged with consolidating peace and security and helping to establish the conditions necessary for development in the Republic of South Sudan. The logic of the mission’s mandate is peace consolidation through state consolidation. As such, UNMISS is tasked with providing good offices, advice, and support on political transition; capacity building of key government institutions, including security sector reform; popular and inclusive participation in political processes; and the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of local conflicts.

Like its predecessor, UNMISS is authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence and to deter violence through proactive deployments and patrols, particularly when the government is not providing such security.

While UNMIS was largely guided in its priorities by the provisions and timeline of the CPA, the new mission is centered on supporting the new government and the institutional consolidation of the new state. The mission’s activities are focused on enhancing national capacities to meet political, security, and protection challenges in a way that helps the government extend its authority and create the space for statebuilding and socioeconomic development. UNMISS has no executive governing authority or direct responsibilities for establishing the institutions of the state. Rather, the mission is tasked with supporting and advising the government of South Sudan and providing technical advice on various processes.

One significant change from UNMIS to UNMISS is the structure and approach to mission deployments. No longer designed to monitor the redeployment of CPA forces, UNMISS pursues a more flexible approach, deploying military contingents and civilian experts based on the needs of local security and guided by detailed conflict tracking and early warning mechanisms. To do so, the mission is restructuring its deployment toward the state level and critical payams (counties). For instance, in late August 2011, after intercommunal fighting in the state of Jonglei resulted in the deaths of approximately 600 people, UNMISS deployed troops to sensitive locations and conducted roaming patrols and surveillance flights to deter further violence. Civilian experts were also deployed to politically engage local leaders and communities and provide good offices for reconciliation efforts.

Although the main emphasis of the mission is political, coordination and partnership with the UN Country Team, nongovernmental organizations, and donors will be vital given the breadth of needs evident in South Sudan, particularly since South Sudan may have only a short window to establish itself as a successful state.
Political and Security Developments in South Sudan

The security challenges facing South Sudan are daunting. There are frequent and severe conflicts among heavily armed tribal groups and between the SPLA and breakaway factions. In the first half of 2011, insecurity resulted in more than 116,000 internally displaced persons in the southern region. Rivalry and mistrust between communities is high. As the year came to a close, violence again erupted between feuding ethnic groups in Jonglei State, with UNMISS warning that thousands of armed men were moving toward Pibor. The movements prompted UNMISS to deploy a battalion of troops to deter violence and protect civilians, though rapid deployment was hampered by a lack of helicopters to transport troops.

The strongest and most visible of South Sudan’s institutions, the SPLA, plays the central role in providing security. Seen in some areas of the south as a partisan force, it is very often deeply integrated into local political power structures. It has on occasion obstructed or hindered humanitarian access and has committed transgressions against the civilian population during security operations. It is also extremely bloated from the integration of large numbers of opposition militias during the CPA period. One of the immediate—and most politically sensitive—priorities facing the mission is supporting the government in transforming the SPLA from a rebel group into a national army. This transition includes “right-sizing” the force through the demobilization of an estimated 150,000 SPLA members, including 70,000 soldiers and 80,000 police, prison officers, and other security actors, as well as through professionalization.

Abyei

The contested resource-rich region of Abyei remains the most combustible unresolved issue of the CPA and, to date, the most intractable. The CPA stipulated that the residents of Abyei would vote in their own referendum, to be held at the same time as the larger southern referendum, to determine whether to secede with the south or remain in the north. Abyei’s political weight is disproportionate to its geographical size and economic value. It looms large in the calculations of the two parties to the CPA, as both have important and relatively powerful constituencies connected to the area, constituencies whom neither side wants to disappoint.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authorization and Start Date</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Commander</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength as of 31 October 2011</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops: 2,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observers: 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Civilian Staff: 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For detailed mission information see p. 262
After the two parties failed to agree on the modalities for the Abyei referendum, the area witnessed a buildup of regular and irregular forces, and a deterioration of security, through the first months of 2011. This culminated in an outbreak of intense fighting between the SAF and the SPLA in May 2011, which displaced an estimated 100,000 Abyei residents southward and resulted in SAF forces taking over the town of Abyei and surrounding area. The UNMIS contingent in Abyei faced criticism for inaction; perceiving themselves to be outmanned and outgunned, the peacekeepers were unwilling to intercede forcefully between the fighting parties.4

In response to the situation in Abyei, the AU facilitated high-level meetings in Addis Ababa between the CPA parties, which were attended by President Omar al-Bashir and then–first vice president Salva Kiir. On 20 June the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed an agreement on interim security and administrative arrangements for Abyei. The agreement called for the establishment of a civilian administration for the Abyei area, though the parties have yet to agree on a chairperson. The agreement also called for the deployment of a new armored brigade from the Ethiopian Defense Force and an Ethiopian force commander. Based on the agreement, Security Council Resolution 1990 established UNISFA.

The agreement also called for both the SAF and the SPLA to withdraw troops from the Abyei area. Accordingly, monitoring and verifying the withdrawal is one of the primary tasks for the new mission. To date, however, full withdrawal has not taken place. In September, the government of Sudan and the SPLM agreed to withdraw their troops from the border by the end of the month, though Khartoum subsequently denied the agreement, maintaining that it would not redeploy troops until the 20 June agreement was implemented, including the establishment of the Abyei administration. South Sudan maintains that it will fully withdraw at the same time as Sudan.

UNISFA is further mandated to participate in relevant Abyei area bodies established under the agreement.5 Acting under Chapter VII, UNISFA is also authorized to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN and humanitarian personnel and of members of the joint observer teams, protect civilians, and protect Abyei from incursions. As in previous instances of fighting between the CPA parties, the fighting in Abyei was precipitated by the unregulated proximity and interaction between the two hostile forces. Thus, UNISFA’s ability to uphold its mandate to protect the Abyei area from unauthorized incursions will be an important factor in de-escalating tensions between the two countries.

In a further agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLM on border security, signed in June, the parties have agreed to establish a ten-kilometer demilitarized border zone, pending resolution of disputed areas and final border demarcation. This agreement also requested UNISFA to provide support for a joint border-monitoring verification mechanism, and in December the UN Security Council expanded UNISFA’s mandate to include support for border verification through investigations, monitoring, arbitrations, patrols, and security. The enhanced mandate expands the mission’s area of operations and tasks UNISFA to work with Sudan and South Sudan to further develop bilateral border management initiatives.

As of November, 2,872 of an authorized 4,250 UNISFA troops had arrived in the Abyei area. Despite logistical difficulties caused by the rainy season and denials of flight clearance, the mission’s deployment has been one of the fastest on record.

While UNISFA may prove effective at maintaining security and stability in the interim, the parties have still not reached a final settlement on the future of Abyei and negotiations are ongoing.

Darfur

In Darfur, despite the efforts of UNAMID and the AU- and UN-led mediation, progress
toward improved security and a comprehensive resolution to the conflict proved elusive in 2011. A resurgence of fighting between rebel groups and government forces in some areas displaced an estimated 70,000 people in early 2011. Throughout the year, UNAMID military and civilian staff, as well as humanitarian aid workers, have been the target of attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, car-jackings, and violent robberies. With much attention and engagement drawn to north-south developments, and given the discord among UN and AU member states over the best way to proceed in Darfur, various efforts and initiatives failed to gain traction.

The AU- and UN-led negotiations for Darfur in Doha succeeded in the brokering of an accord between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement in July 2011, but opposition from other rebel groups continued. Efforts are ongoing to bring other groups into the so-called Doha Agreement, but the continued fractiousness of the rebel groups and erratic engagement from the government of Sudan render the prospects for a comprehensive and credible agreement extremely challenging.

Efforts to shape the negotiations were pursued by the AU-UN mediation team and supported on the ground in Darfur by UNAMID. The mission implemented a series of consultations with a large number of stakeholders and facilitated civil society participation in Doha at a number of conferences aimed at forging consensus on key issues of the conflict.

UNAMID has also been engaging the government of Sudan politically so that certain unilateral measures can be taken in an effort to improve the situation on the ground. Such improvements, including lifting the state of emergency, are intended to create an enabling environment for an AU-conceived approach to localizing the peace process. This process is intended to empower the people of Darfur while limiting the role of rebel groups, who are often viewed as obstructionist. However, these attempts have not yielded any improvements to date, and the discord among AU and UN member states over the effectiveness and feasibility of such a strategy remains ongoing.

The Doha negotiations were dealt a further blow in September with the return of top rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim from Libya after the fall of the Qaddafi regime. Ibrahim led the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the region’s most heavily armed rebel group. In November, the JEM joined the Sudan Liberation Army and the SPLM-North in Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State in a political and military alliance, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, uniting the groups to overthrow the government of Sudan. However, just weeks after JEM joined the alliance, Ibrahim was killed in an airstrike, which may prove to be a major setback for rebel movements in the region.

In December, the International Criminal Court prosecutor announced that he would seek an arrest warrant for Sudan’s current defense minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for his part in atrocities committed in Darfur in 2003 and 2004. The impact on the government of Sudan and the conflict in Darfur are unclear,

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{• Authorization Date} & 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) \\
\textbf{• Start Date} & Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007 \\
\textbf{• Joint AU/UN Special Representative} & Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) \\
\textbf{• Force Commander} & Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) \\
\textbf{• Police Commissioner} & James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana) \\
\textbf{• Budget} & $1,689.3 million (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) \\
\textbf{• Troops:} & 17,723 \\
\textbf{• Military Observers:} & 239 \\
\textbf{• Police:} & 4,920 \\
\textbf{• International Civilian Staff:} & 1,124 \\
\textbf{• National Civilian Staff:} & 2,904 \\
\textbf{• UN Volunteers:} & 481 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)}
\end{table}

For detailed mission information see p. 225
but this could prove to further destabilize the already precarious environment.

### Conclusion

Enormous change took place in Sudan in 2011, and the consequences for regional stability and the implications for peace operations are not yet fully clear. Ongoing political processes and negotiations are certain to impact and make further demands upon UN operations. Another important factor for the future will be regional dynamics. Although for months Sudan appeared insulated from the popular protests sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, hardening economic conditions stimulated street protests in Khartoum in September. The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, though it removed an interventionist and often-destabilizing factor from Sudanese politics, could also exacerbate an already fragile situation.

Sudan and South Sudan will remain extremely challenging environments for peacekeeping operations in 2012, with multiple missions pursuing numerous priorities. While allowing for flexibility and responsiveness in achieving peace and stability, this approach also heightens the risk of strategic and operational incoherence.

### Notes

2. Referendum-related materials included 7.5 million ballot papers, 8,500 ballot booths, 4,300 voter registration kits, and 600 registration training kits.
5. The agreement calls for a joint oversight committee and a joint military observer committee to be stationed in Abyei, comprising an equal number of members and observers from the two parties. The agreement also calls for a power-sharing administration and a police force for the Abyei area; details for the latter are to be determined by the joint oversight committee.