A decade after the Dayton Accords brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it remains divided into Serb and Croat-Bosniak entities and organized crime is widespread. The country has become a test for the European Union’s external policies. In December 2004, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) was replaced by a European force (EUFOR)—which at 7,000 personnel is the largest EU deployment to date. The year 2005 was also the third and last year of the mandate of the EU Police Mission (EUPM), its biggest civilian operation. While both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO continue to have missions in BiH, the international presence there is not only about state building but also about offering the prospect of EU membership.

The EU has been involved in BiH since the outbreak of war there, and it has maintained a monitoring mission throughout the former Yugoslavia since 1993 (covered in the data on non-UN missions in this volume). But the prospect of membership has become explicit since the European Council’s 2002 decision to “double-hat” the international community’s High Representative in BiH, Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative (EUSR). While Ashdown has continued to press domestic politicians to proceed down the “road to Europe,” 2005 saw temporary setbacks as Bosnian Serb leaders blocked significant police reforms. While these difficulties were overcome by year’s end, they led to criticism of EUPM’s role in facilitating change.

In the meantime, EUFOR has successfully managed a complex operational relationship with NATO, which maintains a small headquarters in Sarajevo. EUFOR has also been proactive in tackling certain aspects of organized crime. Both EU missions were mandated to cooperate with the European and international agencies overseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction—their work raises policy questions over how peace operations can continue to contribute to long-term political transformations.

The EUPM was launched in January 2003 to replace the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF). It had no direct responsibility for law and order. Rather, it advised and monitored institutionally separate Bosnian Serb and Croat-Bosniak forces, an arrangement that reflected BiH’s complex postwar political structure. Although reduced from their wartime levels—during which they were effectively paramilitaries—the BiH forces remained overstaffed. The EUPM’s primary goal was to help them “develop a professional, politically neutral and ethnically unbiased law-enforcement system,” with the key

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**European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)**

- **Authorization date**: 11 March 2002 (Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP)
- **Start date**: January 2003
- **Head of mission**: Kevin Carty (Irish)
- **Budget**: $21.1 million
- **Current strength**
  - Civilian police: 367
  - Civilian staff: 53
political objective being the formation of single, statewide police.

The EUPM’s scale and activities represented a reduction from those of the IPTF, which was formed in 1996 after Dayton and shifted from limited oversight of the domestic police to include their democratization and modernization. The EUPM’s mandate was less expansive, and whereas the IPTF fielded 1,527 police officers in mid-2002, its successor has typically deployed just over 400 police officers, supported by approximately 50 international and 300 local civilian staff. It departed from the IPTF’s strategy of co-location, by which officers were present in all Bosnian police stations. EUPM members were placed in “medium-high level” offices only, and the mission concentrated on training and overall reform.

The EUPM’s advising and monitoring function precluded “executive powers or the deployment of an armed component.” Its public security role was confined to liaison with domestic police and EUFOR “in extremis.” Its authority rested on the right to request the sacking of “noncompliant” domestic officers by the High Representative. Since its inception, observers have criticized the EUPM for not using this authority more—it has made one request to date—and in tackling political obstruction more broadly. There is considerable anecdotal evidence of problems in the early phase of operations, including uncertainty over goals and local sensitivities.

Once established, the EUPM worked closely with the office of Lord Ashdown to create the State Investigation and Protection Agency to pursue war crimes and terrorist suspects. While it also succeeded in developing a single Serb Border Service, the impact of its training on the quality and effectiveness of rank-and-file police has been limited.

Progress toward the unification of the Serb and Croat-Bosniak police forces proved uneasy, and the EUPM’s contribution uncertain. Unification was a prerequisite for BiH’s progress toward a stabilization and association agreement (SAA) with the EU—widely interpreted as a step toward membership. The EUPM played a relatively small role in the activities of the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC), which set out a program of rationalization and unification at the close of 2004. Talks on implementing this broke down in May 2005, with Bosnian Serb leaders rejecting a unified police structure.

With a 15 September deadline to meet conditions for SAA talks, the EUPM publicly encouraged a renewed effort to break the deadlock, although it was temporarily distracted by a highly critical report on its performance from the International Crisis Group (ICG). When, on 5 October, the Bosnian Serb parliament belatedly voted to accept a unified police service, observers attributed the volte face to high-level political pressure, possibly linked to the EU’s decision to negotiate an SAA with Serbia and Montenegro.

Yet the move helped open the way for EU leaders to offer Bosnia SAA talks on 21
November. Two days later, the country’s leaders agreed to subordinate their political structures to a single presidency, replacing the Dayton system by which three presidents representing Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs had participated in a rotating presidency. This constitutional shift was welcomed as the most significant step yet to political stability.

As the successor to NATO’s Stabilization Force, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH derives from the Dayton Accords. After taking over from the original Implementation Force in December 1996, SFOR gradually reduced from 60,000 troops to 7,000, as stability grew. In parallel with this reduction, the percentage of US troops in SFOR declined from a third in 1996 to 12 percent in 2004, fueling discussions of the possibility of its transformation into an EU mission. These were slowed by doubts over European capabilities, exacerbated by political differences arising from the Iraq crisis.

EUFOR was finally authorized by the European Council in July 2004. UN Security Council Resolution 1575 confirmed the mission’s Chapter VII mandate. On 2 December, EUFOR duly replaced SFOR. Operation Althea is open-ended, to be terminated at the European Council’s discretion. Whereas senior US officials had argued that EUFOR would essentially “police” Bosnia, the EU has underlined the mission’s continuity with SFOR as a “deterrent” force, maintaining troop levels at approximately 7,000. While analysts think this number is higher than strictly necessary in military terms, EUFOR has also assumed the role of regional reserve for NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

EUFOR’s formal relations with NATO are labyrinthine, as the EU lacks autonomous command structures of its own. While its force commander is an EU officer, he is answerable to EU cells at NATO headquarters in Italy and Belgium. The operation commander is thus NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). But in issues regarding Althea, DSACEUR reports solely to EU bodies in Brussels, which in turn inform NATO of developments. Surprisingly, this structure has worked well in practice, and relations between the two organizations have proved effective in the field.

Non-EU nations are permitted to contribute troops to the mission, and 15 percent of EUFOR’s manpower comes from outside the European Union, most notably from Bulgaria, Canada, and Turkey. While there is no residual US presence in the mission, there have been significant public information efforts to emphasize the continuity from SFOR. EUFOR’s approval rating among all Bosnian citizens in the wake of the transfer was just over 44 percent, roughly on a par with other international organizations and its predecessor.

To maintain deterrence, EUFOR units are deployed throughout Bosnia in a pattern similar to that employed by SFOR. Additionally, a 500-strong integrated police unit (IPU) is based in Sarajevo, to be deployed as gendarmerie to handle civil crises. EUFOR has yet to face an outbreak of disorder, but exercises have been conducted through 2005 to demonstrate the IPU’s readiness and robustness. The larger Operation Rehearsal was held in January to simulate a NATO reinforcement, emphasizing the possibility of its intervention in any future crisis. EUFOR has also continued SFOR’s Harvest operations, targeting illegal weapons in collaboration with local authorities and police. It has been closely involved in intelligence-gathering against war...
crimes suspects and in operations against organized crime, from drug smuggling to illegal logging.

EUFOR’s force commander has also exercised statutory powers over Bosnia’s military, which, like the police, has remained divided on ethnic lines since Dayton. These powers were of particular relevance in April 2005, when Bosnian Serb recruits swore allegiance to the Bosnian Serb entity rather than the state at an induction ceremony. EUFOR required the Serb entity to suspend all recruit and conscript training at the base involved, removing a senior officer deemed to be responsible for failing to handle the incident satisfactorily. This incident was treated as further proof of EUFOR’s expansive interpretation of a strong mandate, contrasted with self-imposed limitations on the EUPM.

While EUFOR maintains security in BiH, NATO has a headquarters in Sarajevo. The US senior military representative in charge of this mission also commands US forces based in northeastern BiH, maintained under a bilateral agreement between Washington and the Bosnian government. These troops can be deployed in the pursuit of war crimes suspects, for which NATO headquarters shares responsibility with EUFOR.¹

Politically, NATO headquarters also assists and monitors BiH’s efforts to enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, a goal approved by the Defense Reform Commission in September 2005. The military corollary of the SAA, this would require unification of

### NATO Headquarters Sarajevo

- **Authorization date**: 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit)
- **Start date**: 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)
- **Head of mission**: Senior Military Representative, Brigadier-General Louis Weber (United States)
post-Dayton structures, as the Serb and Croat-Bosniak militaries have remained divided. Progress toward a single Bosnian army has been uneven but real: while Croat and Bosniak politicians approved the transition in January 2005, their Serb counterparts only did so in September. NATO headquarters also became involved in the induction ceremony incident, collaborating with EUFOR in censuring those involved.

In June 2005, NATO troops raided the house of the fugitive war crimes suspect, former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and in August it temporarily detained his son. But Karadzic remains at large (and is thought to move between Serbia and Montenegro and BiH), as does the former military commander Ratko Mladic. The long-term success of NATO headquarters and EUFOR is tied to their capture, a condition for BiH’s progress toward the EU and PfP.

Also involved in BiH’s security and political reform is the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which both assisted the Defense Reform Commission and has supported the collection and destruction of small arms in coordination with EUFOR. Mandated under Dayton, this mission is autonomous of the Office of the High Representative, and while it continues to maintain field offices across the country, is gradually reducing its role. In 2005 the OSCE mission declared that it would no longer involve itself in electoral procedures, formerly one of its main areas of responsibility. Nonetheless, it maintains a Department for Security Cooperation that is engaged in assisting BiH forces to comply with not only international standards, but also intelligence reform and political oversight of security affairs.

While both the OSCE and NATO continue to be proactive in maintaining peace in Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative may be wound down as early as 2006, with the EUSR formally becoming the principal international post in BiH. This may coincide with the end of Lord Ashdown’s tenure, expected in early 2006. While this process is not yet confirmed, and may be affected by the EU’s own uncertain political evolution, the Europeanization of Bosnia’s security continues.
While expanding its role in BiH and continuing its involvement in Kosovo within the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the EU has also maintained a police mission (the EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [EUPOL Proxima]) in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Launched in 2003 to operate until December 2004, its mandate was extended for one year as tensions grew around the country’s Albanian minority. But these tensions have dissipated, and the EU mission has concentrated on police and border service reforms in a largely stable environment.

The situation in FYROM has been a source of concern to the international community since it withdrew from Yugoslavia in 1991. Separatist aspirations among segments of the Albanian community (25 percent of the population) were exacerbated by limitations on their minority rights. From 1992 to 1999 the UN maintained a preventive deployment force there, complemented by an OSCE “spill-over mission” from Kosovo, which is still in place. Tensions mounted after Yugoslavia’s withdrawal from Kosovo, which encouraged ethnic Albanian radicals to become increasingly assertive in FYROM, taking control of the northwestern region of the country in 2001.

With Kosovo Albanians contributing to this insurgency, NATO deployed 3,500 troops to FYROM at the government’s request in August 2001. NATO maintained operations there until March 2003, when it was replaced by the EU’s first military mission—known as Concordia. This ran until December 2003 and its departure coincided with the deployment of Proxima. NATO has retained a headquarters in the capital, Skopje, a rear base for its Kosovo force. It also provides security sector assistance, as FYROM had the advantage of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace program as early as 1995.

Like the EUPM in Bosnia, EUPOL Proxima has no executive authority, but prioritizes training activities. These center on border security, public order, and organized crime. They also contribute to FYROM’s overall policy of decentralization, intended to give the Albanian community increased autonomy. In police terms, this involves a considerable devolution of authority to regional centers, and EUPOL personnel are located in both these and smaller stations, while four teams work alongside border police and within the interior ministry. While the mission originally focused on Albanian-majority areas, it has expanded its activities to promote police reform throughout the country.

The year in review began with questions about FYROM’s commitment to minority rights. In November 2004 the decentralization process received popular approval through a referendum, but disputes over the rights issue within the governing coalition led to the prime minister’s resignation. While elections in February 2005 saw minor violence, this did not escalate and the government has remained relatively stable since.

In this improved political environment, EU Ministers offered Macedonia membership talks in December 2005, and decided to replace Proxima with a security sector reform mission of approximately 30 staff. Additionally, the OSCE mission has been and will remain involved in police affairs. Nonetheless, critics have suggested that EUPOL has not had time institute a new police culture, especially within the border police.

**Box 4.10.1 The EU in Macedonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Authorization date: 29 September 2003 (EU Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Start date: December 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Head of mission: Brigadier-General Jürgen Scholtz (Germany)</td>
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<td>• Budget as of 30 September 2005: $13.2 million (2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strength as of 30 September 2005:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian police: 128</td>
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<td>Civilian staff: 28</td>
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**Note**

1. The headquarters is not usually defined as a peace operation and is thus not included in the non-UN data in this volume. However, its continued involvement in Bosnian political affairs leads to its coverage here.