Kosovo: In Search of a Public Order Strategy

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Through 2005, the international presence in Kosovo prepared for a transformation of its structure and role. Policy reflected a growing consensus that the province’s final status must be negotiated—and that while it has been under Serbian sovereignty and UN administration since 1999, its Albanian majority does not wish to accept either for much longer. Belgrade remains opposed to Kosovar independence, but an October report by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Kai Eide recommended that status talks should begin. Kofi Annan and the Security Council accepted this proposal with alacrity, and November saw the appointment of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari to oversee talks.

This represented a shift from the international community’s previous concentration on “standards before status,” which had emphasized the development of the rule of law and minority rights. While Eide reported mixed progress on standards issues, the initial impetus to move on status was influenced by a fear that the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had an uncertain hold on public order. This stemmed from an outburst of violence initiated by elements of the Kosovo Albanian community in March 2004, which saw rioting, the destruction of Serb homes, and attacks on international personnel, property, and vehicles.

Although this lasted for just three days, and caused limited casualties (including nineteen dead), KFOR’s performance was described by its next commander as a “defeat.” UNMIK, responsible for policing the province, has also received heavy criticism for its reaction to the violence. Significant numbers of troops and international police officers retreated in the face of disorder, leaving local leaders to end the violence.

This case study analyzes the factors that left KFOR and UNMIK unready for the March violence, and their efforts to move to a credible security posture thereafter. Kosovo offers important lessons about the vulnerabilities of peace operations, having experienced dilemmas increasingly common to other missions. These include the coordination of international organizations in the field, the balance between military and police in maintaining public order, and the search for local political consent.

That the international presence has struggled to resolve these issues in Kosovo is telling, for it has had unusually expansive mandates and resources. Even before the Security Council formally granted KFOR a Chapter VII mandate in Resolution 1244, NATO completed an agreement with the Yugoslav armed forces giving it “the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.” At its peak in late 1999, KFOR fielded 50,000 troops—more than were then involved in all peace operations in Africa combined.

In security terms, UNMIK was also given an unprecedented mandate for executive policing, and while its civilian police arm has shrunk since 2003, it still accounted for 31 percent of UN police personnel worldwide in November 2005. That both UNMIK and KFOR have been unable to assert full control in Kosovo
raises questions about the implementation of ambitious mandates, and the extent to which they can survive friction in the field.

These questions are timely, for while talks on Kosovo’s future may alter the environment in which the international presence operates, they will not mean its end. Although the UN has indicated a desire to withdraw from Kosovo, both the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been partners in UNMIK (dealing with economic and governance issues respectively) and are willing to have a continued role. EU membership is one key potential political incentive on offer to Kosovo. But the residual international presence is also likely to have a strong security element—international and local observers concur that KFOR (probably supplemented by EU police) must remain for perhaps a decade to guarantee the security of Kosovo and of the Serbs who now represent 5 percent of its population. How can the future international presence ensure that this guarantee is credible?

This focus on security should not detract from other outstanding problems. Kosovo’s economic situation is dire. By late 2005, gross domestic product was falling and unemployment was above 60 percent. Criticism has been aimed at the EU’s stewardship of economic reform within UNMIK, especially as international aid flows have been diverted elsewhere. Surveys indicate that 70 percent of Kosovo’s overall population is either “not satisfied” or “not satisfied at all” with current economic trends, almost twice as many as are unhappy with political developments (although this clearly reflects majority Albanian opinion).

Some in the international community hope that a political settlement would attract investment and allow international financial institutions to assist Kosovo as an officially designated “low-income country under stress.” But any hopes for the economy based on Kosovo’s future status require that this status be secure—a sustainable and effective ongoing peace operation in Kosovo must underpin its economic development.

Strategy and Reality, 1999–2004

Under Resolution 1244, KFOR and UNMIK were tasked with Kosovo’s security and administration, and the latter was also charged with shaping “provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.” This implied a security strategy, although it was neither explicit nor detailed. Intended to deter Yugoslavia after the ethnic cleansing of the summer of 1999, KFOR had the additional role of “ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task.” In turn, UNMIK’s projected responsibilities incorporated “civil law and order, including
establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.”

The international presence was thus deployed in the hope that it would oversee a transfer of security to domestic agencies, and the training of the Kosovo Police Service was duly launched in the fall of 1999. But this strategy foundered on two underlying security problems: the retreat of the residual Serb minority into enclaves, and the threat posed to the formation of Kosovar security forces by tensions in the Albanian community.

As KFOR entered Kosovo, it encountered a wave of attacks on Serbs and other minorities. Around half the Serb population fled, while the rest held on in a large contiguous area in the mountainous north of the province or in scattered towns and villages, mainly in its south and east. Further violence in 2000 and individual attacks suggested that Albanian radicals were focused on destroying or occupying Serb property (whereas Serb violence centered on retaliation, protests, and disruption). The international presence found itself responsible for the territorial defense of the Serb enclaves.

The Serb minority’s position also militated against its inclusion in any domestic security structures. Especially in northern Kosovo, the community has been supported by “parallel structures” financed by Belgrade, embracing not only education and healthcare but also a court system and (by some estimates) up to 1,000 plainclothes security personnel. After early confrontations with UNMIK and KFOR—including attacks on UN vehicles and efforts to bar NATO troops from some enclaves—the Serbs developed an ambiguous relationship with the international presence, requiring its defense but refusing to fully accept its administration.

Ambiguity likewise surrounded relations between the international presence and Kosovo’s two main Albanian movements. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had fought Yugoslav forces, and claimed 28,000 members in 1999. It was central to, but not solely responsible for, the burst of violence against Serbs. By contrast, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) publicly eschewed force and had developed a shadow government for Kosovo in the 1990s. After 1999, political competition between these factions spilled into low-level violence, including assassinations of senior LDK advisers.

UNMIK attempted to resolve this conflict through two forms of assimilation: an institutional bargain with the KLA and the development of political space for the LDK. In 1999, the KLA’s leader, Hashim Thaci, agreed to disband his paramilitaries in return for promises that some 5,000 of them would be drafted into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), ostensibly a nonmilitary formation intended to respond to civil emergencies. Others might
enter the KPS. While UNMIK did not co-opt LDK structures directly, it oversaw a series of elections in which the party was able to build on its popularity. In 2002, LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova became Kosovo’s first president. He had consistently refused to ally with Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK).

But if UNMIK’s tactics ostensibly had offered both the LDK and KLA leaderships’ postconflict roles, this political settlement proved unstable. The KPC—with just under 3,900 members at its formation—was associated not only with organized crime but also with efforts to promote a “greater Albania.”

From 2000 to 2003, and especially in 2001, Kosovo was affected by insurgencies in the neighboring Presevo valley in Serbia proper and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Senior KPC officers were directly involved in these conflicts, leading to a 2002 crackdown on their activities.

Having attempted to assimilate the Albanian paramilitaries, the international community was therefore forced to contain the consequences. In 2001, NATO both helped broker a cease-fire in the Presevo region and deployed troops in FYROM—the latter mission would be followed by EU military and police deployments in 2003.

Within Kosovo, containment proved less easy: KLA associations of “war veterans” continued to promote a hard-line political agenda, and former paramilitaries staffed private security companies that grew increasingly hostile to the international security presence and developing KPS after 2000.

Both the LDK and the PDK also maintained their own extralegal “intelligence services,” the activities of which only became subject of open public debate in 2005.

**A Coordinated Operation?**

Kosovo’s internal conflicts presented two challenges to KFOR and UNMIK in implementing Resolution 1244. First, the need to protect Serb enclaves raised operational questions about the transfer from military to civilian security. Second, the potential for destabilization arising from within the Albanian community prompted doubts about the ultimate goal of that process: domestic policing. These problems were exacerbated by the complexity of the international mechanisms established to implement Resolution 1244.

While KFOR and UNMIK were institutionally separate, both were internally convoluted. KFOR was hampered by differences between national contingents, while police issues were spread across UNMIK. In June 1999, after limited prior planning, it was agreed in New York that UNMIK should have a “pilar” structure: the UN took responsibility for civil administration and humanitarian affairs, the OSCE for governance issues, and the EU for economic matters. After some dispute over the proper place of civil order, it was decided that the UN should provide executive policing and police training in the field, but the OSCE would run UNMIK’s police school and (as domestic institutions grew) handle questions of political oversight.

While these organizations were not subject to a detailed strategy, structures were put in place for close organizational cooperation. All UNMIK pillars were subject to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, whose principal deputy headed an executive committee supported by a joint planning group. Relations between UNMIK and KFOR were to be maintained through direct links between the SRSG and NATO field commander, complemented by UNMIK liaison officers throughout Kosovo. Numerous ad hoc coordinating committees were formed as the mission continued.

These coordination mechanisms were initially bolstered by close cooperation on security issues—a matter of necessity. While UNMIK was tasked with providing regular police and ten special police units to handle disorder, these were largely deployed after the most intense violence in 1999. UNMIK police did not exceed 1,000 until that September, only reaching 2,000 the next February, by which time NATO had deployed gendarmerie units to compensate for the absence of policing. Confronting recurrent disturbances, KFOR and UNMIK did not attempt a
smooth transition of duties, but shared responsibility for public order. In 2002, NATO proposed that its force should be restructured to emphasize better cooperation with civilian police.

While structurally distinct, KFOR and UNMIK were therefore driven together by their security environment. But as that environment improved after 2000, both high-level and field coordination declined—communication within UNMIK also worsened, as the SRSG’s executive committee effectively ceased to function. The international presence allowed ad hoc cooperation to deteriorate, very far from the process envisaged in Resolution 1244. This deterioration was exacerbated by a decline in KFOR’s capabilities and slow progress by UNMIK in shifting responsibility to the KPS. Combined, these left the international presence with insufficient security resources.

**KFOR: From Defense to Deterrence?**

KFOR’s security role was overshadowed by the problem of the Serb enclaves, the protection of which was neither a straightforward military task nor a civil order issue. Its troubled deployment complete, KFOR aimed to secure Kosovo through establishing fixed positions across the province, and especially around Serb areas and Orthodox religious sites. This strategy of direct defense was coupled with protection of Serb convoys from the enclaves, coordinated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If this posture was an obstacle to transferring secu-
rity responsibilities to UNMIK, it was also a growing strain on KFOR’s manpower.

KFOR began to shrink in an unplanned fashion almost as soon as the force had reached full strength. In February 2000, NATO officials complained that some troop contributors were leaving “hollow battalions” in Kosovo, and that others were supplying relatively small contingents that lacked the robust capabilities of the original force. Through that year, KFOR’s average strength was approximately 20 percent below its 1999 peak of 50,000 (including 7,500 troops in rear areas). Many contributors insisted on supplying their own support units, creating a high degree of duplication and reducing force flexibility.

While NATO initially tried to reverse these trends, they continued. By the winter of 2003–2004, KFOR consisted of 18,500 troops, of which just 6,000 were combat troops. Its commanders had attempted to reorient its strategy and posture to reflect its decreasing size. In October 2001, KFOR launched an “unfixing strategy,” by which it began to move toward more flexible patrolling, replacing direct defense of Serb areas with the deterrent of rapid response to any incident. It was hoped that unfixing, meant to conclude in October 2002, might help Serb communities escape a siege mentality and accept police protection.

Unfixing was nonetheless opposed by Serb communities and delayed by specific acts of violence—it was incomplete in March 2004. Reform proposals foundered on many troop contributors’ disinclination to deploy their best forces in Kosovo. And there were operational obstacles to flexibility: KFOR’s posture was based on four multinational brigades with distinct areas of operation. Many national contingents had major caveats against their deployment beyond these—in 2000, US forces effectively refused an order from KFOR’s commander to reinforce embattled French units. Although KFOR maintained a central reserve, its posture remained static and its capacity for deterrence limited by 2004.

UNMIK Police and KPS:
A Stalled Transition?

While the military presence declined in a faster and less organized fashion than originally

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**Figure 2.1 KFOR Force Strength, 1999–2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>42,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>39,000</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>18,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>17,174</td>
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Note: Figures are for 31 December of each year, except 30 September 2005.
anticipated, both international and domestic police had difficulty handling the resulting transfer of authority. UNMIK police were credited with significantly improving the security situation as their deployment gathered pace. But the force proved unwieldy, typically including officers from over fifty countries, with divergent traditions and limited local language skills. They shared little mutual respect with many NATO contingents.

UNMIK police were further hampered by resource problems and a troubled relationship with the nascent KPS. As there had been no domestic police capacity in Kosovo in mid-1999, the mere existence of the KPS was a signal achievement for UNMIK. But while domestic officers started to serve with UNMIK police in late 1999, their training had been brief, and internationals were often inclined to ignore or overrule them. In 2001 it was officially projected that the KPS should take full responsibility for policing in 2006, but this process only advanced after cuts to the budget of UNMIK police in 2003.

Even by 2004, when the KPS numbered 5,000 officers, they largely held subordinate posts, and police stations were still under UNMIK command. Crucially, responding to serious public disorder remained an international responsibility. The KPS lacked riot-trained units in 2004, and its officers were ill equipped to support UNMIK’s special police units in this regard. Prior to March 2004, those units typically fielded just under 1,000 personnel (marginally below their original projected strength), in addition to around 350 KFOR gendarmes, involved in patrols and targeting organized crime.

**The Intelligence Gap**

While the international operations’ security resources were thus in decline before March 2004, they were further reduced by another serious shortage: information. From 1999 onward, KFOR was responsible for collecting and distributing political intelligence, while UNMIK field officers provided political reporting—both they and the KPS were involved in...
monitoring criminal activity. The International Crisis Group has claimed that both NATO and UNMIK had informal links with the LDK and PDK “intelligence services.” But international officials consistently complain of the near impossibility of gathering evidence on politically motivated crimes within the Albanian community.

Whatever the quality of information gathered, its distribution proved problematic. KFOR was reportedly wary of supplying information to UN officials for fear it might leak (possibly through the KPS). Within UNMIK, there was a widely recognized tendency to overoptimistic reporting, and overall joint analysis of material gathered was poor. The international presence failed to predict the March 2004 events despite growing evidence of potential unrest—the violence marked an intelligence failure.

**March 2004**
Unable to either find a satisfactory solution to defense of the Serb enclaves or effectively monitor and intervene in internal conflicts within the Albanian community, KFOR and UNMIK proved highly vulnerable when violence struck Kosovo on 17 March 2004. Exactly how well coordinated this uprising was remains disputed, but its roots are clear: in 2003, Kosovo’s economic growth had slumped, and with progress toward a political settlement conspicuously absent, Kofi Annan again warned in October 2003 of “an increase in violent incidents aimed against UNMIK law enforcement personnel and property.” By the year’s end, public satisfaction with UNMIK was below 30 percent.\(^{15}\)

While the March rioting thus represented a resurgence of violence against the Serb minority (with, as before, a particular focus on the destruction of property), it was also a protest against the international presence in Kosovo. Over 100 UNMIK vehicles were burned. As the rioting unfolded, the flaws inherent in KFOR and UNMIK’s posture became clear: many NATO contingents refused to move beyond their set areas of operation (although

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### Figure 2.2 Public Opinion in Kosovo, 2003–2005

![Graph showing public opinion trends in Kosovo from 2003 to 2005.](image)

**Source:** “Early Warning Report” Series (UNDP/USAID).
US forces were now an exception) and retreated to barracks.

UNMIK police had no crisis management structure in place, and while officers adopted ad hoc procedures, its special police units were not deployed strategically. Those that did deploy in the flash point of Mitrovica were outmaneuvered by rioters.

The long-standing failure to define security responsibilities translated into intense friction between KFOR and UNMIK police in many locations, with some NATO troops accused of barring UN officers from acting assertively. While a significant number of KPS members were prepared to engage the rioters, they lacked backing and direction from UNMIK, and their efforts remained incoherent. Having failed to foresee the violence, some KFOR contingents were confused by an inflow of unreliable, alarmist intelligence.

NATO partially compensated for these failings by transferring 3,000 troops from its security force in Bosnia to Kosovo—including additional gendarmerie. But the March events were proof of a troubled transition in terms of the post-1999 security framework. KFOR and UNMIK were inflexible, and Resolution 1244’s proposed shift from military to civil security had been undermined by insufficient resources and coordination.

From Violence to Final Status?
The violence over, KFOR attempted to publicize a renewed robustness: prior to assembly elections in October 2004, 360 French parachutists dropped near Pristina—including additional gendarmerie. But the March events were proof of a troubled transition in terms of the post-1999 security framework. KFOR and UNMIK were inflexible, and Resolution 1244’s proposed shift from military to civil security had been undermined by insufficient resources and coordination.

In adopting this new political course, the international presence has enjoyed certain political advantages. First, a new SRSG—Søren Jessen-Petersen—arrived in June 2004, and his emphasis on political progress has promoted acceptance of (if not affection for) UNMIK. In cooperation with KFOR’s incoming commander, Lieutenant-General Yves de Kermabon, he restored high-level coordination within the international community.

For a brief period, UNMIK also found a domestic political partner in Ramush Haradinaj, an anti-PDK KLA veteran and leader of a small party allied to the LDK. Haradinaj became prime minister under President Rugova in December 2004, adopting positive rhetoric and policies toward the Serb minority. However, he was indicted for war crimes in March 2005—his voluntary decision to give himself up to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague averted the possibility of renewed violence. The year 2005 also saw the rise of an avowedly peaceful protest movement demanding “Independence, not Negotiations.” Overall, the number of violent crimes reported in the first nine months of 2005 stood at 671, only 10 percent above the same period in 2003. Nevertheless, these included a March 2005 attempt to assassinate Rugova, and the last quarter of the year saw a spate of paramilitary roadblocks and intimidation in the west of the province.

A New Security Framework
In late 2004, a memorandum of understanding was drawn up recognizing that the KPS should have primary responsibility for public order, with UNMIK in reserve and KFOR in the last resort. UNMIK has transferred command of police stations to KPS since mid-2005 and developed KPS riot units, of which twenty-two will be functional by 2006 (supplemented by sixteen border police units). Their training and planning emphasized rapid response—over 300 potential targets for violence have been surveyed.

The KPS will expand its role further: some of its riot units are being trained as weapons specialist teams. However, UNMIK and the KPS have emphasized the need to defuse potential violence before it escalates, engaging with protest leaders so as to avoid
provocation. While this has been successful to date, there have been complaints that the KPS has been slow to receive key equipment, including body armor, for budgetary reasons, and serious violence in 2005 would have severely damaged its credibility.

Increasingly a reserve force (in addition to taking a role in monitoring the KPS’s performance), UNMIK police shrank from 3,604 officers in mid-2004 to 2,612 a year later. KFOR has maintained its strength at 17,000—increased by 2,000 for the October 2004 elections—and has once again concentrated on flexibility. It has aimed to iron out national caveats on issues such as deployment: one official described this process as “90 percent complete” in September 2005. Structurally, KFOR is moving toward a system of five “task forces” able to operate throughout Kosovo, with rationalized support units.

Concerns remain that a major crisis would divide national contingents anew. Efforts to link the improvement in high-level communication between KFOR and UNMIK with better lower-level coordination are intensifying. Nonetheless, the relationship between the domestic and international security forces may broadly be described as an effort to achieve the transfer of authority to the KPS that faltered before March 2004, combined with a more creative approach to “unfixing.” It is not a new strategy, but a more determined implementation of the former concept.

A New Political Framework

It is the second track of activities that represents a greater shift: a multitiered effort to build political consensus on security, while improving information-gathering. Since 2004, both KFOR and UNMIK have been readier to engage with local opinion than before. KFOR has used small groups of troops to gather information on local problems. The OSCE pillar of UNMIK has reached out to hard-line Serb and Albanian groups, such as the KLA “war veterans,” formerly excluded from political discussions.

A more formal consultation process has centered on the preparation of the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), combined with efforts to give Kosovars ownership over security issues through institutional and political mechanisms. These include new domestic ministries of the interior and justice—formally proposed in June 2005—although efforts to start these up by 1 November 2005 failed. Critics have claimed that this institution-building preempts a decision on Kosovo’s status, but UNMIK officials will continue to retain most powers over security affairs in the near term. A phased handover of responsibilities to the ministries through 2006 has been mapped out, conditional on the latter’s proving their readiness.

There is public concern that these new bodies will become heavily politicized—with significant implications should they take responsibility for the courts and the KPS. The development of the ministries arguably represents a new phase in competition between the LDK and the PDK. Whereas the international community was previously cut out of that competition, the ministries represent a significant prize. This has been underlined by discussions over whether the interior ministry will have responsibility for a domestic intelligence service, and the question of whether it can and should co-opt members of the LDK and PDK’s extralegal intelligence arms. The international community faces the dilemma of bringing them into a legal framework without compromising its credibility.

The OSCE pillar of UNMIK has promoted two governance measures to build public confidence in the reforms. Regarding the KPS, it has proposed the creation of an independent domestic police inspectorate, to be developed in close collaboration with international monitors. Second, it has emphasized the need for Kosovo’s assembly to debate and scrutinize the ministries, creating specific committees to track their work. While these may permit transparency, there have been complaints that the OSCE pillar has been poorly informed of the ministries’
development and reports of members of the current government lobbying to maximize ministerial autonomy and authority.

These problems have come to overshadow the future of the KPC, which while no longer a center of destabilization, remains a political problem. Although publicly perceived as an army-in-waiting, should Kosovo achieve sovereignty, the KPC’s roots in the KLA make it politically sensitive. The international community would prefer to disband the KPC, and shift some of its personnel into a new defense force—although it may not be called an “army,” as a gesture to Belgrade, and is unlikely to be more than lightly armed.

While there are thus significant institutional dilemmas to be resolved, UNMIK is also attempting to create a strategic consensus around the institutions through the ISSR. This was launched in June 2005 to promote consultations on the internal security problems Kosovo faces, building domestic political commitment to (and external donor confidence in) the arrangements made to tackle them. It will involve not only political parties but also civil society—including members of the Serb community. But while the ISSR has received considerable publicity, there have been problems in its funding, and some confusion as to how its consultations and conclusions will affect institutional change.

Despite these difficulties, UNMIK has arguably shifted to a more holistic approach to Kosovo’s security. While there was previously a lack of continuity between KFOR’s posture, the development of the KPS, and domestic politics, these have now been brought together through the empowerment of the KPS and the related political discussions. Yet concerns remain that the Serb minority have stood apart from this process—and there are fears that its members in the north may turn to violence during the final status talks.

Conclusion
It is too early to say whether Kosovo’s new security framework will succeed, and how it
will evolve after final status. Observers increasingly expect the EU, OSCE, and NATO to create a structure similar to that of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This could both compensate for a lack of domestic institutional capacity and allow continued international oversight of political developments. However, it might continue to encounter significant problems over security reform, as has the international presence in Sarajevo. But the development of KFOR and UNMIK to 2006 does offer broader lessons for public order strategies.

Did the international presence’s “defeat” of 2004 derive from flaws in its security posture, or from a political failure to understand and engage with Kosovo Albanian politics? The answer is both. KFOR and UNMIK did not develop a joint posture aimed at the most probable threat after 1999: civil disorder arising within the Albanian community.

In part, this reflected a growing divergence between their expansive mandates and the overall decline in their resources. But even by March 2004, the international presence still fielded a far greater pool of resources than most peace operations today. It was hampered by a lack of strategic coherence within either KFOR or UNMIK, and the decline in communications between them. Kosovo demonstrated the need for hybrid peace missions to develop clear command structures supported by effective contingency planning and intelligence-gathering and distribution (a highly sensitive area for the UN).

In situations such as Kosovo—where threats emerge from irregular, not conventional sources—such planning and intelligence efforts should concentrate on the nexus of criminality, political violence, and potential civil disorder. This is less a matter of robust military activity than an assertive approach to law and order. KFOR attempted to develop a system of military deterrence that was unsuited to a modulated response to public violence—UNMIK and the KPS did not evolve to fill the resulting public security gap. A strategy centered on law enforcement should have been instituted to realize Resolution 1244.

As has been made clear since March 2004, such a strategy requires the involvement of domestic forces and political actors—their probity and loyalty may not always be guaranteed. A more disciplined phased transfer of security responsibilities from the military to international and domestic police might have reduced these uncertainties and permitted their management. A combination of a tough public order framework with political engagement and intelligence activity should allow a peace operation to set the rules of the game for domestic players—and it is through those rules that peace can be maintained.
Notes

5. For a summary of economic problems, see John Bradley and Gerald Knaus, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan (Pristina: ESPIG, 2004).
6. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 10.
8. See p. 110 in this volume.
13. Ibid.
16. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 10.
17. OSCE staff report that, by the end of November 2005, 1,655 KPS members had received civil disorder training, including command-level officers.