

ANNUAL REVIEW OF
Global Peace
Operations

2007



This volume is a project of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) International Security Institutions program. The CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University.

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This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.



Additional support for the project was provided by the International Peace Academy.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF Global Peace Operations 2007

A PROJECT OF THE
Center on International Cooperation



Published in the United States of America in 2007 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

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ISBN: 978-1-58826-509-8

Printed and bound in Canada



The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

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Foreword

Peace support operations remained high on the international agenda over the past year, and we have been reminded of their importance in promoting human security in Africa and globally. While the United Nations remained the lead player, 2006 witnessed the continued involvement of the African Union, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in peace operations that were characterized by varying degrees of cooperation.

Since its inception in 2002, the AU has played and continues to play a crucial role in the search for solutions to some of Africa's most intractable conflicts. In Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, the AU has been involved in the quest for peace with varying degrees of success. However, it is the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that has propelled it into the peace operation sphere.

The AU-led peace operation in Darfur registered the highest level of institutional cooperation involving several peacekeeping platforms; as the UN, EU, and NATO provided various forms of support—making it a unique case of partnership, but not without its challenges. Nonetheless, AMIS, more than anything else, demonstrated the crucial need for stronger institutional cooperation and complementarity with a specific focus on the evolving relationship between the AU and UN. While the UN remains the primary institution to undertake global peace operations, the exponential growth in peace operations demonstrates the compelling need for cooperation based on comparative advantage.

The deployment of AMIS was a clear illustration of the determination of the African Union to fully assume its responsibilities. This deployment also brought to light the current limitations of the AU in terms of managerial capacity, finance, and logistics, which need to be addressed within the framework of the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF).

In 2006, the various peace operation platforms were engaged in several theaters. The AU launched a successful mission in support of elections in Comoros, and continued to support plans for a peace operation in Somalia. The UN missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Haiti, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Burundi were actively involved in the peace processes in those countries with varying degrees of success.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN oversaw that country's first-ever presidential and parliamentary elections involving over 25 million registered voters in a vast territory with limited infrastructure. The European Union sent its second peace support mission to DRC; the first being Operation Artemis deployed in 2003.

Elsewhere, the UN mission in Lebanon was expanded to deal with the new tasks that resulted from the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In Afghanistan, NATO continued to support the government in consolidating peace and had to contend with the resurgence of insurgent activities. The return of international troops to Timor-Leste was a demonstration of the challenges of consolidating peace. Timor-Leste's relapse into violence served as a

stark reminder of the need for sustained international engagement in postconflict societies such as Sierra Leone and Burundi—the first two cases under the purview of the newly established Peace-building Commission.

I am convinced that this second volume of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and subsequent volumes will continue to inform and shape the policy discourse and

deepen our understanding of this crucial aspect of international security. Through its in-depth analysis and data on UN and non-UN peace operations, the *Annual Review* enhances our understanding of the crucial need for cooperation and complementarity, and will no doubt remain an invaluable reference tool for all involved in the often-elusive search for peace.



Said Djinnit
Commissioner for Peace and Security,
African Union

Preface

This volume of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* is the second in a series from the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. It has been developed in cooperation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and with support from the African Union's Peace and Security Department. I am grateful to both organizations for their cooperation, encouragement, and most of all their willingness to foster transparency through collaboration with an editorially independent publication like this one. United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno and African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit deserve particular thanks in this regard.

The *Annual Review* has quickly established itself as an important reference tool in peacekeeping. Demand for the publication among the UN's peacekeeping staff and among member states' military advisers and political officers highlights the need the project meets; there is growing recognition of the *Review* in academic circles as well, and frequent references to it by leading newspapers and magazines seeking to provide more nuanced accounts of the story of peacekeeping.

All of this was made possible by financial and substantive support from a number of governments: thanks are due to the UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the government of Canada, the government of Germany, the government of Norway, and the government of Sweden. Other governments, including those of India, Bangladesh, and the United States,

have offered to cooperate in supporting outreach and dissemination of the *Review*, for which we are grateful.

Last year's *Review* was met with much acclaim, but we were acutely aware of one major weakness: its data sections concentrated heavily on the United Nations. As we had contemplated when launching the series, this year's volume begins the process of expanding our data collection with new figures on EU, AU, NATO, and other operations, thanks to continued collaboration with SIPRI, a new collaboration with IISS, and most importantly new collaboration with the AU's Commission for Peace and Security. Along with more extensive field research, these new sources of data provide a richer picture of the evolving international architecture for peace operations, within and beyond the UN.

A publication like this is made possible first and last by the editorial team. That team was led again in 2006 by Ian Johnstone, whose skilled guidance has helped to establish the *Review* with policy, practitioner, and academic audiences alike, and whose thematic essay in this year's volume fuses academic insight and policy relevance with rare acuity. The new series coordinator, Alhaji M. S. Bah, brought with him to CIC his expertise on the AU and his organizational skill, shepherding the process to conclusion even while becoming a new father. Richard Gowan, in a new role as program coordinator for CIC's overall work on international security institutions, helped to draw strategic insight from a mountain of collected data and analysis. Ben Tortolani filled in numerous research gaps and orchestrated

the revision process. Tania Belisle-Leclerc generated much of the data in the first place with unflappable good humor, and Catherine Bellamy edited the entire text and saved us from several mistakes. My very sincere thanks to them all.

We are also indebted to CIC staff members Sara Batmanglich, Alex Evans, Victoria DiDomenico, Melissa Lucas, Rahul Chandran, Katherine Haver, Saloni Meghani, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard for their invaluable support. We are particularly grateful to Barnett Rubin and Shepard Forman for their unflinching support and guidance.

Several people in the UN and its peace operations provided help along the way. We thank in particular: David Harland, Fatemeh Ziai, David Haeri, Salman Ahmed, Lieutenant-General Randir Kumar Mehta, Roxaneh Bazergan, Jolanda Profos, Paul Keating, Anna Shotton, Ugo Solinas, Kelly Fleck, Renata Dwan, Rafael Peralta, Ermina Van Hoyer, Ayaka Suzuki, Lisbeth Cultey, Vudithe Moise, Luis Sergio Mendes, Michael Gaouette, Huria Ogbamichael, Karen Smith, Said Conde, and Nishkala Suntharalingam. Gratitude also goes to the many UN desk officers who reviewed drafts of the mission reviews and notes. We are also thankful for the cooperation of members of DPKO's Military Division, Police Division, Office of Operations, and Office of Mission Support, including the Cartographic Section and especially Roy Doyon. We remain grateful to staff within the Office of Programme Planning, Budget, and Accounts for their continued support.

We benefited from the support of a number of officials from the AU, AMIS, the Darfur Integrated Task Force, and the UN Assistance

Cell to the AU. We are particularly grateful to Geoffrey Mugumya, Monique Mukaruliza, El-Ghassim Wane, Bereng Mtimkulu, Major-General Ishaya Isah Hassan, General Henry Anyidoho, Ambassador Hasan Djibril, Ambassador Sam Ibok, Ambassador Ki-Doulaye Corentin, Solomon Gomez, Tamba E. Juana, Ahmed Rufai Abubakar, Colonel Mayell Mbaye, Colonel Ebrahima Bah, Blance Munah Hyde, Elizabeth Mgya, Abdourahman A. Ibrahim, Oscar Munanura, Memekia Bewketu, Michael Munyoki, Abdel Haireche, Salvatore Nkeshimuna, Kwesi Anning, and Biscut Tessema.

The International Peace Academy remains an invaluable partner on this project, and we are particularly indebted to Elizabeth Cousens, Ernst Felberbauer, Jennifer Gregoire, Adam Lupel, Amy Scott, Beatrice Agyarkoh, and Marvin Elisa Trujillo. We are grateful to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for their continued cooperation on this project and in particular Sharon Wiharta and Kirsten Soder. We are also indebted to Christopher Langton, Nigel Adderley, Jean-Yves Haïne, and Roderick Feltzer at the International Institute for Strategic Studies for their invaluable support.

Gratitude also goes to Evliana Berani, Veronica Lie, Andrew Sherriff, Alexander Ramsbotham, Anja Kaspersen, Jonathan Rich, Timothy Heath, Victoria Holt, Alistair Edgar, Matthew Ripley, Heidi Hulan, Robert Blackhurst, Roland Zinzus, Thomas de Waal, Fred Wooldridge, and Justin Haccius. We are particularly grateful to Daniel Keohane for his advice on European issues.


Finally, we remain grateful to the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers, especially Steve Barr, for assistance, support, and patience.

Bruce D. Jones,
Codirector Center on International Cooperation

Mission Acronyms

AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
BONUCA	UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic
CISPKF	CIS Peacekeeping Force in Georgia
EUBAM Rafah	EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah
EUFOR Althea	EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUFOR RD Congo	EU Force Democratic Republic of Congo
EUPAT	EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM	EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL Kinshasa	EU Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUSEC DR Congo	EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
FOMUC	Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale
IMT	International Monitoring Team
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JPKF	CIS–South Ossetia Joint Force
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force
MAPP	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
MFO Sinai	Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MNF-I	Multinational Force in Iraq
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission in Iraq
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in the Hebron
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNTOP	UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization

PEACE OPERATIONS 2006



OSCE - BiH
12/1995
EUPM
01/2003
EUFOR ALTHEA
12/2004
NATO HQ Sarajevo
12/2004

MAPP
02/2004

MINUSTAH
06/2004
OAS Special Mission for
Strengthening Democracy
in Haiti
06/2004

MINURSO
04/1991

UNIOSIL
01/2006

UNMIL
09/2003

UNOCI
04/2004
Operation Licorne
02/2003

BONUCA
2/2000
FOMUC
12/2002

MONUC
11/1999
EUPOL Kinshasa
04/2005
EUSEC DR Congo
06/2005
EUFOR RD Congo
06/2006


United Nations Missions, Location of Headquarters

BONUCA: UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic, Bangui
MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, Laayoune
MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Port-au-Prince
MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kinshasa
ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi, Bujumbura
UNAMA: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Kabul
UNAMI: UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Baghdad
UNDOF: UN Disengagement Observer Force, Camp Faouar
UNFICYP: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Nicosia
UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon, Naqoura
UNIOSIL: UN Integrated Office in Sierre Leone, Freetown
UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Addis Ababa and Asmara
UNMIK: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Pristina
UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia, Monrovia
UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan, Khartoum
UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste, Dili
UNMOGIP: UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, Srinagar and Rawalpindi
UNOCI: UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan
UNOMIG: UN Observer Mission in Georgia, Sukhumi
UNTOP: The UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building, Dushanbe
UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization, Jerusalem

Non-UN Missions, Location of Headquarters

AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan, Khartoum - AU
AMISEC: African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission, Banda Aceh - EU and ASEAN countries
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia, Sukhumi
EU BAM Rafah: EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, Rafah
EUFOR ALTHEA: European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
EUFOR RD Congo: Operation EUFOR RD Congo, Kinshasa
EUPAT: EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
EUPOL COPPS: EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, Ramallah
EUPOL Kinshasa: European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa, Kinshasa
EUSEC DR Congo: EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FOMUC: CEMAC (Central African Monetary and Economic Community) Multinational Force in the Central African Republic, Bangui
IMT: International Monitoring Team, Cotabato City
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force, Kabul - NATO

Dates following the abbreviated mission names represent dates of effect (for UN missions), and start dates (for non-UN missions).



Non-UN Missions, Location of Headquarters

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force, Trans-Dniester - CIS
 KFOR: Kosovo Force, Pristina - NATO
 MAPP: Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, Bogotá - OAS
 MFO: Multinational Force and Observers, Rome
 MNF-I: Multinational Force in Iraq, Baghdad
 NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, Sarajevo
 NTM-I: NATO Training Mission in Iraq, Baghdad
 OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, Port-au-Prince
 Operation Astute, Dili
 Operation Licorne, Abidjan
 OSCE - BiH: OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
 RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands, Honiara - Pacific Islands Forum
 SLMM: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Colombo
 South Ossetia Joint Force, Tskhinvali - CIS
 TIPH 2: Temporary International Presence in Hebron, Hebron

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

**Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.*



Strategic Summary 2006

The year 2006 saw profound changes in the political and strategic environment for peace operations, many of which could not have been predicted at the start of the year.¹ There have been significant successes, such as the UN's oversight of elections in Haiti and, most strikingly, the Democratic Republic of Congo. But these have been balanced—and frequently eclipsed—by severe challenges. The latter included the return of international troops and police to Timor-Leste after its reversion to violence; the intense opposition faced by NATO forces in Afghanistan; and the need to sustain the African Union's troops in Darfur while the Sudanese government blocked the deployment of a UN force to the region. And there were surprises, notably the deployment of a large European-led UN force to Lebanon.


The year's challenges resulted in a major new expansion of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping deployments. From January 2000 to September 2005, the number of UN military and police personnel on duty worldwide grew from 18,600 to 68,500, while those deployed by regional organizations fell from 108,300 to 48,000. The previous edition of this *Review* warned that these trends were “already straining the capacity” of the UN. But in the twelve months from 1 October 2005 to 31 October 2006, the number of UN troops, military observers, and police personnel rose to 81,000—and if all current mandates were fulfilled, and civilian staff added in, the UN would eventually have 140,000 peacekeeping personnel in the field. This would almost double the UN's previous peak of 77,000 during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the decline in deployments by regional organizations has been

reversed. In the twelve months up to 30 September 2006, the number of troops deployed by NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and other regional organizations jumped from 52,700 to 68,000—a rise of 28 percent, largely driven by increases in NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

Alongside this increase in military activity, 2006 also witnessed new dilemmas for the policing and peacebuilding elements of peace operations. The importance of these had been recognized in the 2005 World Summit's decision to establish the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Standing Police Capacity within the UN—both the Group of Eight (G8) and the EU also pursued policing initiatives. But Timor-Leste's relapse into violence raised hard questions about failings in earlier international peacebuilding efforts there, and also led to a new mandate to deploy 1,608 police—the Security Council also envisaged sending 3,300 police officers to Darfur. While the Peacebuilding Commission took up the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, the international community struggled to identify ways to reconstruct the Lebanese state without provoking a confrontation with Hezbollah. (For trends in civilian and police deployments, see the information box on p. 9.)

Given the diversity of peace operations and the rapidity of their evolution, it is risky to generalize about the state of peacekeeping. But it is clear that the rate of growth raises a basic question: Is the present level of activity sustainable? This is a matter of global strategic concern—peace operations increasingly involve the flow of personnel between as

Top Twenty Largest Peace Operations: 31 October 2006



well as within regions, be they Bangladeshi troops in Africa, Europeans in Afghanistan, or Chinese in Lebanon. The scale of deployments challenges our preconceptions about the resources required. In 2004, US scholars Michael O'Hanlon and Peter Singer estimated the need for a "total pool of 200,000 international peacekeepers," including at least 20,000 police.² As of September 2006, there were over 140,000 UN and non-UN troops and police deployed worldwide *in addition to 162,000 troops in Iraq*. UN mandates called for about 35,000 more. Both the demand for and the supply of personnel is challenging previous predictions—as well as the resources of the international community.


In this context, it is necessary to analyze the trends that may affect the deployment and effectiveness of peacekeepers, including the distribution of peace operations worldwide and the sources of troops for those missions. It is also necessary to highlight the extent to which current circumstances have caused international institutions and states to approve innovative hybrid peace operations—but also to blur the line between peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, making new deployments harder.

Diversifying Deployments

The overall growth in peace operations has been driven by the geographical diversification of the military deployments of the UN, NATO, and the EU. For the UN and NATO, this has involved increased engagement in the Greater Middle East. As of September 2005, the UN maintained 51,400 (82 percent) of its troops and military observers in Africa, and only 3,200 (5 percent) in the Middle East. The Lebanese crisis transformed its presence in the latter: by September 2006 it had 6,400 soldiers in the region, and the UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was mandated to reach 15,000.

However, the increased importance of the UN's operations in the Middle East was offset by its continued role in Africa. In the year ending at September 2006, the UN military presence on the continent grew from 51,400 to 54,500, increasingly concentrated in its four large-scale missions in DRC, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. Although the UN reduced its role elsewhere in Africa, withdrawing troops from Sierra Leone in December 2005 and drawing down its mission in Burundi through 2006, Africa still represented 75 percent of its global

Troop Deployment by Organization: 1996–2006



deployments at the end of October, relative to 14 percent in the Middle East.

In August 2006, the Security Council mandated an expansion of the Sudan mission (UNMIS) for Darfur by 17,300 military personnel, 3,300 civilian police, including up to 16 formed police units, and 3,000 civilians, although it had not won Khartoum's consent for this mission by the end of November. If UNIFIL was to reach its full authorized strength, African missions would still account for three-quarters of the UN's military commitment in terms of personnel. Even if UN peacekeeping thus faced major political challenges in the Middle East, this has not been balanced by a reduction of its obligations across Africa—exacerbating the strain it faces.


NATO experienced a far clearer shift in its deployment patterns. In September 2005, NATO oversaw missions of 17,200 troops in Kosovo and 12,400 in Afghanistan—a year later, the former force had shrunk slightly, while the latter had grown to 20,000. In October 2006 NATO took command of 12,600 US troops in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it still faces constraints in the Greater Middle East, demonstrated by the rejection of proposals that it should deploy to Lebanon.

The EU's diversification was smaller in scale, and focused on Africa. In the third quarter of 2005 it fielded 6,700 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but none outside Europe, although it had civilian missions in Africa and Asia and had intervened in the DRC in 2003. In September 2006 its presence in Bosnia had fallen to below 6,000, while it had committed 2,400 troops to reinforcing the UN in Kinshasa—although most of the latter were being held in reserve in Gabon and Europe.

While NATO and the EU have significantly altered their global military profiles, the third major regional organization in peacekeeping, the AU, has remained more static. In March 2006 it launched a short-term and successful combined military and police mission of 1,226 to support elections in Comoros, but it primarily remained focused on its operation in Darfur.

While the AU has supported a transfer to a UN mission in Darfur, it has aimed to go elsewhere. In 2005 the AU's Peace and Security Council had explored options for a deployment alongside the UN in the DRC. In 2006 it authorized an East African sub-regional organization, the Inter-Governmental

UN Military Deployments to Regions: 31 October 2006



Authority on Development (IGAD), to deploy up to 8,000 peacekeepers to Somalia in expectation of an AU follow-on force. Although Uganda had pledged 3,000 troops to IGAD and despite the UN Security Council's authorization of the mission in December, the deployment was blocked by financial, logistical, and political obstacles.

Elsewhere, ad hoc coalitions continued to make equally important contributions to peacekeeping, as in the deployment of an Australian-led multinational force to Timor-Leste in May 2006. And despite their rapid growth, the combined military deployments of the UN, NATO, the EU, and the AU in September 2006 still only represented 70 percent of the US-led and UN-mandated multinational force in Iraq.


Diversifying Troop Contributions

A second major shift in peace operations in 2006 concerned the supply of troops. The reinforcement of UNIFIL brought the first large-scale increase in European contributions to the UN since the Bosnian war. This should be seen in the context of further increases in European deployments through

the EU and NATO, as well as significant increases in East Asian contributions to the UN. Nonetheless, the majority of UN peacekeepers continued to come from South Asia and Africa. In September 2005, 46 percent of UN military personnel were from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal—a year later, the four countries still accounted for 45 percent of forces.

Although UN deployments in Africa grew in 2006—and would grow far more in the case of a Darfur deployment—the number of African UN peacekeepers actually fell slightly, from 19,100 to 18,600, between September 2005 and September 2006. Nevertheless, Africa remained the second largest regional contributor to UN operations, providing 27 percent of forces, a 4 percent drop from 2005. In the same period, the AU force in Darfur remained level at 7,000, despite plans to expand it by an additional 4,000. This may reflect the fact that, in quantitative terms, African forces come from a relatively small number of states—and as the table below shows, fewer than ten provide the bulk of both UN and AU forces. While the importance of smaller contributors with considerable peacekeeping experience (such as Ghana, Kenya,

Military Contributions to UN Missions by Region: 2000–2006



and Tunisia) and untapped sources should not be underestimated, the difficulties in increasing the total of AU-led deployments reflect strains on a core group of militaries needed to sustain them.

If South Asia and Africa continued to supply the bulk of UN forces worldwide, two other regions appeared important to the UN's ongoing operational expansion. The first of these was East Asia and the Pacific. By September 2006, this region supplied 3,500 UN peacekeepers. If this contribution was still only a tenth of South Asia's, it was nonetheless twice the figure of a year before. It was also set to grow further, as China and Indonesia had pledged up to 1,000 troops each to UNIFIL.³ Even before the Lebanon deployment, China had more than doubled its UN commitments, from 700 troops and military observers in September 2005 to 1,500 by June 2006.

In that China's active army of 1,600,000 is nearly half as large again as India's, there has been speculation as to whether it may develop a peacekeeping role comparable to that of the South Asian states. To date, China has concentrated on offering enablers, such as medical units and engineers. It remains to be


Selected African Military and Police Contributions to Peace Operations: 31 August 2006

	AU	UN	Total
Nigeria	2,240	2,411	4,651
Rwanda	1,840	324	2,164
South Africa	769	2,089	2,858
Senegal	624	1,892	2,156
Ghana	563	2,674	3,237
Kenya	121	1,358	1,479
Ethiopia	–	2,574	2,574
Morocco	–	1,548	1,548
Benin	–	1,268	1,268
Namibia	–	643	643
Niger	–	547	547
Subtotal	6,157	17,328	23,485
<i>Other African Country Contributions</i>	770	2,393	3,163
Total	6,927	19,721	26,648

seen whether China will move toward deploying a fuller range of forces. But it may prove particularly important to the UN, the only organization through which China has as yet deployed.

The reverse is true for Europe, the second region contributing to the expansion of peace-

Top Twenty Military Contributors to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations: October 2006



keeping. Here, NATO, the EU, and the UN all offer institutional frameworks for deployments. We have seen that the NATO role in Afghanistan drew a considerable number of European peacekeepers into the Greater Middle East. The expansion of UNIFIL had a similar effect. European forces were already better represented in the UN's Middle Eastern missions (UNIFIL, UNDOF, and UNTSO) than in the UN's African operations before the Lebanese crisis. UNIFIL's growth meant that by the end of September 2006, Europeans made up 70 percent of the expanding force.

But as in Africa, European deployments have been driven in quantitative terms by a core group of states using the variety of institutions available (as well as single-nation deployments such as France's Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire, and ad hoc multinational frameworks, such as in Iraq), as shown in the table below, which compares UNIFIL with the main deployments of the EU and NATO. Six European nations (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) supplied half or more of the forces in each case. The percentages are higher for operations outside Europe—although the addition of US forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in October 2006 affected the ratio there considerably. Therefore,

the relative expansion of European peacekeeping across all institutions relies heavily on the capacities of these countries.

Just as the UN has overseen a major influx of South Asian troops into African missions since 1999, it is now an institutional channel for Europeans to deploy into the Greater Middle East; NATO offers another. This reflects significant political obstacles to expanding the region's own peacekeeping capacities. As of September 2006, the Middle East provided 3,000 peacekeepers to the UN, an increase of 600 compared to the year before—all but 31 of these were from Jordan. While Qatar promised a contingent of 300 troops to UNIFIL, the politics of the region's conflicts and the lack of a regional institutional framework both militate against a major increase in Middle Eastern peacekeeping capacity.

While NATO has provided a mechanism for new European deployments, the US decision to transfer 12,600 troops to ISAF in October 2006, represented a significant shift, as US practice since 2001 had been to reduce the number of troops in NATO missions. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will act as a precedent for further US deployments through NATO and other formal multilateral structures. Meanwhile, Central and Latin

Military Contributions by Selected EU Countries: 30 September 2006

	EUFOR RD Congo	EUFOR ALTHEA	ISAF	KFOR	UNIFIL	TOTAL
Mission Size	2,370	5,935	32,600	16,160	5,147	62,212
<i>Selected EU Contributors</i>						
Italy	50	888	1,600	2,200	1,074	5,812
Germany	730	861	2,750	2,900	0	7,241
France	1,090	477	1,000	2,100	1,531	6,198
Netherlands	40	301	2,000		0	2,341
Spain	130	350	600	750	614	2,444
United Kingdom		573	5,000	400	0	5,973
<i>Combined Contribution from Selected EU Countries</i>	2,040	3,450	12,950	8,350	3,219	30,009

American states provided 10 percent of UN forces, concentrated in the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH), the only military peace operation in the region.

Overstretch: Symptoms and Solutions

As military deployment patterns altered through 2006, two trends emerged across global peace operations. The first was an increasing reliance on “hybrid” operations—those that mixed and matched the capacities from different organizations into common responses—to respond to the risk of overstretch. The second was an increase in the political problems in winning consent for operations—problems associated with the increasing use of force by and against missions.

Hybrid Operations

Hybrid peace operations are not new.⁴ Since the 1990s, there has been a complex interaction of organizations in the Balkans and West Africa, and the UN has entered into hybrid arrangements with multinational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Striking examples of hybridity in 2006 were the DRC, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Lebanon, although in each it took a different form. In the DRC, the UN and the EU deployed troops separately, but in coordination. The EU’s force was deployed at the UN’s re-

quest, for UN purposes, and carried out joint operations with MONUC in Kinshasa. Similarly, a balance has been found between the new UN police and Australian-led forces in Timor-Leste.

In Sudan, where the UN, NATO, the AU, and the EU have joined forces to develop a complex peacekeeping framework, the UN deployed UNMIS, a multidimensional operation, to oversee the north-south peace agreement. In Darfur, the AU deployed AMIS and received strategic lift support through NATO, while the EU provided additional lift, police and military advice, and (most crucially) funding.⁵ EU personnel worked in a cell within the AU command and control structure, while the UN provided planning resources for the AU (since 2004) through its assistance cell, and expanded its support to include a package of police, military, political advisers, and hardware.

Coordinating this level of complexity proved challenging. The establishment of a partner technical support group and a liaison group in Addis Ababa improved coordination among those involved, but the focus was on operational issues instead of strategy. The African Peace Facility, an EU financial instrument, proved to be a useful financing mechanism for AMIS, but the need to replenish this brought to the fore significant challenges for

Police and Civilian Deployments

If military peace operations remained level in Africa and grew in the Middle East, police missions have followed another pattern. The number of UN police grew by 29 percent, from 6,200 to 7,900, in the year ending 30 September 2006; the Security Council resolutions for Timor-Leste and Darfur meant that there was a theoretical requirement for 12,000 personnel. The majority of those police actually deployed were in three non-African missions: Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Haiti combined accounted for 54 percent of the total. But there has been a significant growth in the use of police in African missions, for which the total rose from 2,300 to 3,800 in the period under review. These were largely concentrated with the major UN military formations in Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan. Conversely, there were no UN police in the Greater Middle East, except for eleven in Afghanistan, although the EU had a police training mission in the Palestinian territories.

While the focus of UN policing is thus moving to Africa, the sources of personnel are more diverse than in the case of the military, with Africa, Europe,

and Central and South Asia providing roughly a quarter each. However, when non-UN police missions are taken into account, the shift toward Africa in terms of deployments and contributions becomes clearer still. While the EU reduced its residual police presence in the Balkans to fewer than 200, the AU expanded its police presence in Darfur to 1,425 (including 234 female officers) and deployed 30 officers to the Comoros in 2006. This increase in the use of international policing has received external support—the EU and UN assisted the AU police in Darfur. The AU's deployment of a significant number of female police officers is also an important development.

The distribution of civilian political, peacebuilding, and monitoring missions is even more complex. The UN was responsible for four such missions at the start of 2006—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. A fifth, in Burundi, is under preparation, and long-term UN peacebuilding missions are likely to become the norm as larger African operations draw down. Among other international organizations, the EU's civilian missions are the

most varied, with legal advisory teams for Georgia and Iraq, border monitors for Moldova and the Palestinian territories, and demobilization monitors in Aceh, Indonesia. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was negotiated in part at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum, and staffed by observers from ASEAN nations alongside EU personnel.

AMM, though not a formal ASEAN operation, as command and management of the mission remained with the EU, is indicative of the particular complexity of civilian missions in Asia, where the UN presence is slight relative to Africa and the Middle East. The result is a variety of small-scale institutional and ad hoc initiatives, including monitors from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on the Philippine island of Mindanao, and from the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The fragility of such arrangements was highlighted in 2006 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) demanded that all EU citizens be removed from the SLMM, in response to it being declared a terrorist organization by the EU.


the AU and EU. By November, there was growing recognition of the need for better-developed interinstitutional arrangements. The UN was advocating and the AU approved a three-phase process leading to a hybrid force, the leadership of which would be jointly appointed by the UN and AU.

In the case of Lebanon, no formal hybrid structures were involved. But the rapid mobilization of the first wave of European troops for UNIFIL was negotiated through the European Council in Brussels, and those deployed relied on their own logistical arrangements rather than on those of the UN. Their lines of communication between the field and New


York ran through a special cell designed to supplement UN procedures. In its earliest phase, the upgraded UNIFIL looked like an EU-led multinational force operating under a UN logo—this began to change as China and South Asian forces deployed to the mission through standard UN structures.

That Europe skirted the UN's mechanisms irritated many, raising concerns about "privileged" missions. Yet many UN officials were simultaneously concerned about their own overstretched capacity. Nonetheless, the UN has found itself at the nexus of new institutional arrangements with both the AU and the EU, suggesting that it may be more adaptable

Global Police Deployments to Regions: 31 October 2006



Contributions of UN Police by Region: 31 October 2006



than its critics generally maintain.

Coordination questions were not confined to the AU, EU, and UN. NATO was confronted with logistical challenges and slow force generation in its engagement in Afghanistan. As NATO took on more responsibilities through 2006, debate regarding command structures,

policy harmonization, national caveats, and simple manpower and equipment availability dominated discussions among NATO officials. Some complained about a lack of “rapid response” capacities, a function in large part of excess demands on NATO’s limited supply of helicopters—others put these problems

down to an inequitable distribution of the burden among contributors. In September 2006, calls from NATO's Supreme Command for 2,000 reinforcement troops nearly went unmet, until Poland volunteered 1,000.

The Challenge of Consent

But in Afghanistan—as in Lebanon, the DRC, and Darfur—the biggest obstacles to operational efficiency were often *political*. ISAF's capacity problems reflected troop contributors' domestic political sensitivities over its mandate to confront the Taliban alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Similarly, when Secretary-General Annan requested rapid deployment of an EU standby force for the DRC, debates among potential contributors ran on for three months. But when large numbers of peacekeepers were required for Lebanon, they were available to deploy rapidly. Yet the likelihood that Hezbollah might oppose the deployment of peacekeepers generated a tough debate over UNIFIL's rules of engagement. Politicians and the media weighed the risks of an international and domestic backlash from either inflicting Muslim casualties or stumbling into a confrontation with Israeli forces. Generating domestic support for long-range operations remains a challenge for troop contributors.

Thus, while ISAF fought the Taliban, UNIFIL aimed to avoid conflict with Hezbollah and Israel. But the challenge of consent was not confined to these missions. From Timor-Leste to Haiti and the DRC, peacekeepers also confronted the challenge of political, military, and other groups who were dissatisfied with the results of transitional political processes or elections. In the DRC, this meant deploying additional combat capacity to provide security during elections and their aftermath, and also mounting robust operations to protect civilians—operations that resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. In such environments, peacekeeping can seem to blur into war-fighting, affecting public opinion both where troops are deployed and in their home countries.⁶

The most acute challenge of consent in

2006 came not from a nonstate actor, but a state: the Sudanese government's protracted rejection of the transfer from the AU to the UN in Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 expanded the mandate of the UN mission in Sudan to include Darfur, and was adopted under Chapter VII, but required Khartoum's consent before any deployment. Khartoum's refusal to acquiesce was a serious political challenge to the UN, especially in light of the 2005 World Summit's commitment to "a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The UN's inability to deploy to Darfur was seen as damaging both to the norm and the institution. In spite of the shift of emphasis toward deploying an AU-UN hybrid in late 2006, questions remained over whether the Sudanese government would give its consent to command structures that vested decisionmaking power in the UN—the precise structure of a mission can prove open to negotiation as well as its basic deployment.

Sudan's stance was also a challenge to the AU, which was in the early stages of developing its security architecture to tackle conflicts involving gross violations of human rights, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by its own members. The fact that the AU's Peace and Security Council continued to seek Sudan's consent for the transition to the UN, highlighted the gap between the interventionist provisions of the AU's Constitutive Act and the political complexities of implementing them. Similarly, it was not clear how the AU planned to deal with the demand for rapid deployment of a peace operation to Somalia after the transitional government, backed by Ethiopian troops and aircraft, ousted the Union of Islamic Courts from Mogadishu and other areas it controlled. As peace operations expanded through 2006, so did the level of resistance to them.

Conclusion

Problems over hybrid operations, reports of violence from the DRC to Afghanistan, the

breakdown in Timor-Leste, and the failure to get the UN fully into Darfur all cast long shadows over peace operations in 2006. But any analysis of the performance of peace operations in this period must take one fact into account: there was no general collapse. The previous edition of this *Review* noted that the UN seemed to be facing chronic problems in deploying its forces. UNMIS was far behind schedule in deploying to southern Sudan, and MONUC had been denied requests for extra troops for the DRC by the Security Council. In early 2006, it appeared possible that the EU would not accede to the UN's request for help in the DRC, that some NATO countries would not go to Afghanistan at all, and that AMIS would withdraw from Darfur.

The reality may have been grim, but it was not as bad as it could have been. MONUC managed to run the DRC polls against huge odds, the UN found a way to deploy rapidly to Lebanon, and EU and NATO members

accepted responsibilities beyond Europe. Australia mounted an effective response in Timor-Leste. The AU struggled in Darfur, but held on. By the end of the year, deployments to peace operations, including operations in Iraq, had surpassed recent predictions of need, and new troop and police contributors had emerged in Asia. If hybrid operations were developing through trials and (sometimes tragic) errors, new modes of cooperation resulted.

Peacekeeping has thus managed to adapt to high-profile crises over the past year. But if peace operations are to be sustained at their current level, crisis-response mechanisms alone will not be enough. The international community also needs to deepen its shared understanding of how to consolidate hard-won peace agreements and translate them into lasting stability. This is a precondition for balancing global demand for peace operations with resources, and the subject of Ian Johnstone's thematic chapter in this *Review*.

Notes

The information provided in the graphs and tables in this section, where not cited otherwise, has been aggregated from the data presented in Chapters 5 through 9 of this volume. For scaling purposes, the tables and graphs in this section do not take into account personnel deployed in the Multinational Force–Iraq.

1. This summary focuses on global trends in peace operations in 2006. For an excellent and incisive recent analysis of longer-term trends, see William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, *Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

2. Michael O'Hanlon and Peter Warren Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity," *Survival* 46, no. 1 (2004): 82.

3. In the event, operational requirements meant that these pledges did not need to be fulfilled in their entirety. For more on this issue, see p. 82 of this volume.

4. For an earlier discussion of hybrid operations, see Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping" (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, 2005).

5. Additional direct financial, logistical, and planning support was provided by Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Netherlands, and Norway.

6. For a detailed analysis of questions surrounding the use of force in peace operations, see Ian Johnstone, "Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations," *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

1

Consolidating Peace: Priorities and Deliberative Processes

Ian Johnstone

While efforts to suppress violence in Afghanistan, Darfur, and Lebanon dominated the peace operation headlines in 2006, most of the world's peacekeepers were doing something different. From Haiti to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Aceh, soldiers and civilians were engaged in the less attention-grabbing but equally important work of helping to consolidate peace.

"Peace consolidation" is not a term of art, and in this chapter it is not meant to describe a specific phase or set of activities in a peace process. The expression is used here as a way of discussing the particular role peace operations can play in planting the seeds of self-sustaining peace, without drawing a sharp line between "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding." It assumes that, because there is always pressure to end an operation quickly—or at least to move from one phase of a peace process to the next—the period when an integrated military, police, and civilian presence is on the ground presents a relatively limited window of opportunity. Peace operations cannot themselves complete the long-term enterprise of consolidating peace, but they can begin the process—they can lay the foundations for effective peace consolidation.

The starting point in understanding how to lay those foundations is to acknowledge that peace consolidation is an inherently political exercise, whose central goal is to channel conflict from violent into peaceful forms of settlement.¹ Recent experience has highlighted the importance of making an early start in three areas—governance (including economic governance), security, and justice. Peace operations play a variety of roles in

each area, ranging from active patron, informed by international standards of legitimacy, to passive observer, deferring at every step to local ownership and local conceptions of legitimacy. The central argument of this chapter is that the best way to determine where on that spectrum an intervention should fall, and how to move from one point to another, is through genuine deliberation among internal and external actors. By guiding the engagement of the relevant actors, deliberative principles can help to set priorities and allow for midcourse corrections, while cultivating the sort of conflict resolution and participatory governance that sustainable peace requires.

Peace Consolidation: Priorities and Recent Practice

The spectrum of peace operations extends from pure observer missions to transitional administrations with full governing powers.² Most operations fall between those extremes. Indeed, there has been an evolution: in the early 1990s, multidimensional missions like those in El Salvador and Mozambique were formally mandated only to monitor and assist; in the mid-1990s, missions in Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia had a degree of executive authority; in the late 1990s, the United Nations was given governing powers in Kosovo and East Timor. The United States had similar authority in Iraq in the early days of the occupation, but most peace operations since then have employed more of a "light footprint," the strategy used in Afghanistan. Yet even assistance missions, like those in Haiti and Liberia today, sometimes become

involved in governance functions without formally assuming executive powers. Thus the distinction between patron and passive observer, the weight of the footprint, the line between consent and coercion, and even the “gradations of sovereignty” in postconflict societies tend to come in shades of gray rather than either/or dichotomies.³

The result is that all peace operations face a basic dilemma: on the one hand, the more proactive the external role, the harder it is for local state structures to gain legitimacy and effectiveness; on the other hand, rigid adherence to “local ownership” can mean deferring to local power brokers that may lack the legitimacy and capacity to deliver sustainable peace. Where the balance should lie is rarely self-evident from the start of an operation, and is never static. If the UN was too heavy-handed in the early days of its mission in East Timor, its approach in Haiti in 2005 was probably too passive. If a “light

footprint” was the right way to support Afghanistan’s nascent governance institutions, it was not the way to provide security beyond Kabul.

How then to strike the balance is a core challenge for peace consolidation. Because neither internal nor external actors have privileged insight into that question, and because it may vary based on the function (security versus governance, for example), the process must be interactive. It requires genuine deliberation among local actors, and between local and external actors. Deliberation means more than consultation and dialogue; it is one of three principal modes of public policy decisionmaking in democratic societies, along with bargaining and voting. It is aimed at building consensus through reasoned exchange and, when agreement is not possible, makes it easier to live with disagreement in a pluralistic society.

The argument that deliberative principles can usefully guide the engagement of all



José Ramos-Horta, then foreign minister of Timor-Leste, speaks at a UN Security Council meeting, 5 May 2006.

(AP/David Karp)

actors in a peace process is developed further at the end of this chapter.⁴ First, however, a review of recent practice in three areas—transitional governance, transitional security, and transitional justice—illustrates the value of deliberation to peace consolidation. These are not priorities per se, but rather frameworks within which specific peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities occur, from police training to elections to economic reconstruction. The central point is that the process by which all of these activities are undertaken is as important as the outcome. And while many of them are long-term endeavors, not all good things can be done at once and most peace operations face constant time pressure, from the UN Security Council (or other mandating organization), donors and local leaders. The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission may help to extend time horizons, but it is nevertheless important that an early start be made in each of these areas, as soon as the worst of the fighting is over. Deferring action may mean failure to seize the moment when international commitment is greatest. Even more serious, noninclusive politics and institutions may become entrenched, making it hard to reverse course once the failings are perceived.

Transitional Governance

Cultivating legitimate and effective governance cannot be engineered through a series of predetermined steps. However, the nature of governance arrangements between the end of the worst fighting and the establishment of permanent institutions can have a profound effect on the prospects for sustainable peace. Not mere placeholders until legitimate government can be established, transitional arrangements shape the political landscape for competing groups in a postconflict society. If well designed, they can foster the sort of nonviolent contestation, conciliatory politics, and consensus building that are at the foundation of sustainable peace.⁵ They hold the promise of what Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis call “participatory peace,”⁶ which may but will

not necessarily evolve into more robust forms of democratic governance.

Interim institutions, moreover, do real work: they prepare for elections, write constitutions, manage the budget, and appoint people to the ministries that administer the transition, such as Defense, Interior, and Justice. Terrence Lyons favorably compares the transitional arrangements leading to elections in El Salvador, and Mozambique, with those in Angola, Bosnia, and elsewhere.⁷ The former helped to demilitarize politics in their respective societies, while the latter did little to cement peace, let alone democracy. Lyons highlights the importance of creating political parties and independent electoral commissions, but also makes the broader point that interim institutions can be used to foster peaceful political competition. Liberia recently completed a two-year period of transitional government, setting the stage for peaceful elections, the relatively smooth assumption of power by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and a productive first year in office. It is too soon to judge the three-year power-sharing arrangement that preceded recent elections in the DRC, but from the perspective of today, it looks more successful than anyone would have dared hope a few years ago.

Similarly, the process of writing and adopting a constitution can be as important for sustainable peace as the principles and structures it enshrines. An inclusive, deliberative process is especially important in postconflict societies, because the future governance of the country cannot be left entirely in the hands of those who fought the war.⁸ The making of Afghanistan’s constitution is illustrative. The “interim authority” that was selected to govern Afghanistan at the 2001 Bonn meeting handed over to the more inclusive transitional government that came out of the Emergency Loya Jirga held in 2002. This gathering of 1,051 elected and 500 appointed delegates, though not perfectly representative, debated some of the most difficult and controversial issues facing the country.⁹ That

set the stage for the drafting of a constitution by a 35-member commission, following extensive public consultations with an estimated 178,000 people. The constitution was formally adopted in a 502-representative Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004, paving the way to elections in 2004–2005. While this transitional exercise involved back-room deals and pressure tactics, as well as traditional forms of consultative governance, it did produce a government that enjoyed substantial respect among the Afghan population—at least until the lack of progress in improving security became apparent.¹⁰ By way of comparison, the rushed and improvised constitutional process in Iraq was far less successful in animating an inclusive debate about the future of that country.¹¹

This is not to say that long-term power-sharing is easy, as the case of Sudan illustrates. The north-south conflict ended in a comprehensive agreement that embodies a partnership between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). By mid-2006 the partnership was under serious strain, and the two parties had all but stopped engaging each other politically. Thus when President Omar al-Bashir (of the NCP) rejected the decision of a boundary commission regarding the oil-rich region of Abyei, Vice President Salva Kiir (of the SPLM) figuratively threw up his hands rather than demand that Bashir justify his position before the world and the Sudanese people.

The Darfur peace agreement (DPA) is even less promising as a vehicle for sustainable power-sharing. Negotiated in Abuja over a period of two years and then rushed to conclusion in May 2006, the agreement became increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground. Opposition to the DPA, which was signed by the government of Sudan and only one rebel faction, mobilized almost immediately, to the point where much of the population of Darfur became contemptuous of both the rebel faction who had signed the agreement

and the African Union peacekeepers who were overseeing its implementation. It quickly became clear that the political process would only be salvaged by addressing the concerns of the other rebel groups through direct negotiations, and by convening a more inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue involving hundreds, loosely modeled on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga.

The Darfur situation also illustrates the importance of interaction between local and external actors. The disconnect between the AU mediators and Sudanese parties in Abuja, on the one hand, and the people of Darfur, on the other, led to an agreement that was not implementable. Similarly, the distance between the NCP leadership in the government of Sudan, and external actors pushing for the UN to take over from the AU in Darfur, led to a serious impasse over the proposed transition. Given that there is neither the will nor the capacity to impose a solution in Darfur, both the DPA and the transition require that local dynamics be reconciled with international expectations and human rights norms.

Interim institutions can also be useful in getting a start on good *economic* governance. This is increasingly seen as important to a peace process because many conflicts are fueled in part by competition over resources, and because the ability to deliver basic services is a measure of a state's authority. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia had a rocky start because the initial plan, designed by the United States, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and EU, was too intrusive and therefore was rejected by the UN Security Council. A protracted consultative process with the Liberian transitional government, the UN, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) resulted in a compromise that included cosigning authority for international experts, but also considerable emphasis on local capacity building. Moreover, the details of implementation were not spelled out in the initial plan, leaving room for deliberation among the members of

Box 1.1 The Effectiveness of Peacebuilding: Empirical Studies

The year 2006 saw the publication of two important studies on the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis published *Making War and Building Peace*, a comprehensive analysis of all UN and non-UN peace operations between 1945 and 1999. They identify three key factors that impact the prospects for success of a peace operation, in what they call the “peacebuilding triangle”:

- The level of hostility between the factions, measured by the amount of deaths and displacement, as well as the type of war and number of warring parties.
- The local capacities remaining after the war, measured by per capita gross domestic product or energy consumption, and past experience with democratic governance.
- The level of international assistance—as measured by type of mandate and number of troops committed.

Their core finding is that the deeper the hostility and the less the local capacity,

the greater the need for international assistance to establish a lasting peace. This, combined with qualitative analysis of a number of cases, leads Doyle and Sambanis to a seven-step plan for effective peacebuilding: establish internal security, seek the cooperation of neighbors, identify some “quick wins” in delivering basic services, build the rule of law and constitutional consent, guarantee property rights, foster democratic participation, and promote genuine moral and psychological reconciliation.

In an August 2006 study of seventy-four cases, Paul Collier and his associates compare the political, economic, and military aspects of postconflict situations. They come up with three interesting findings on the risk of a relapse into conflict:

- An election reduces the risk substantially in the year of the election itself, but increases it even more substantially in the following year.
- Economic development substantially reduces risks, but it typically takes a

decade, and so there is a need for an interim strategy for risk containment.

- United Nations peace operations bring the risks down. Moreover, in a typical country, doubling expenditure on peacekeeping would reduce the risk over the course of the decade from 40 percent to 31 percent.

Based on their results, Collier and colleagues propose a “politics+” strategy, in which the plus would be long-term economic development through substantial aid and rapid reform, combined with a commitment to the provision of security by external peacekeepers throughout the first postconflict decade. Finally, the lower the per capita income, the higher the postconflict risks, at the outset of the peace. According to the authors, this provides a clear and uncontroversial principle for resource allocation among postconflict countries: resources per capita should be approximately inversely proportional to the level of income in the postconflict country.

Sources: Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, CSAE WPS/2006 12, 17 August 2006.

the tripartite steering committee, composed of government actors, international actors, and civil society representatives. Early signs of GEMAP’s impact are positive, as government revenue is rising.

Transitional Security

In the early days of a peace process, security is not up for discussion: either outsiders impose it, or a peace agreement obliges it. The primary function of most peace operations is to help provide security, and increasingly they are being given robust mandates—if not always the capacity—to do so. But peace-

keepers cannot be expected to keep the peace forever; at a certain point they must hand over to local forces. Peace operations necessarily become involved in that transition, even though the lead actors in security sector reform (SSR) tend to be bilateral partners.

As Barnett Rubin argues, the security transition and the political transition are mutually reinforcing; control over security institutions is central to building a legitimate state, while building effective security institutions requires credible political leadership.¹² And because SSR is not only about equipping and training, but also about governance—about who over-

sees the security sector and whose interests it protects—the parties to the conflict and security establishments cannot deliberate in secret, alone. Representative assemblies, local governments, and the broader population must be engaged. This lesson was well-learned in Sierra Leone, where the Office of National Security has taken the lead in facilitating inclusive decisionmaking processes, including consulting local communities.¹³ The talks on SSR in Afghanistan, on the other hand, lacked transparency.¹⁴ In contrast to the constitution-making process described above, the security arrangements in Afghanistan were driven more by a desire to enlist allies in the war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, than by a genuine effort to build national security institutions dedicated to supporting the central government.

The connection to governance is also borne out by Salman Ahmed's comment that the most difficult part of SSR is agreeing on the ethnic and regional composition of national forces, and reducing their size to fiscally sustainable levels.¹⁵ The outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste in early 2006 was as much a problem of the neglect of the new defense force, mishandling of the new police, and inattentiveness to governance issues, as it was a matter of not staying long enough to support the new security institutions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC and other international actors have been struggling to create an effective Congolese army, in part through joint operations. This has proven to be controversial, because the "integrated" Congolese brigades, composed of former militias of different ethnic groups, have become a source of human rights abuses. In Iraq, the building of broadly representative security institutions has proven to be enormously difficult and, in the view of one observer, may be making matters worse by exacerbating communal tensions.¹⁶

Policing and police reform constitute a further illustration of the deeply political nature of security sector reform. In Haiti, beginning in early 2005, the main security threat came not from a single organized opposition to the transitional government, but rather from disparate



(REUTERS/Carlos Barria)

MINUSTAH peacekeepers from Uruguay guard the transport of ballots north of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 6 February 2006.

armed gangs engaged in low-level politically motivated or criminal violence. The threat could have been dealt with through low-intensity military operations, high-intensity police operations, or some combination. The choice had implications beyond the immediate challenge of providing security, because ultimately the consolidation of peace entails reducing the role of the military in internal security. Thus the process of transitioning from security provided by external military forces, to external police forces (typically formed police units), to local police forces, is at its core a process of forging a social contract between the local police and population. This social contract is not going to emerge simply from the successful imposition of law and order; it is an interactive, evolutionary process. And external actors have an important role to play, because many postconflict societies see domestic popular demand for an "iron hand" in dealing with rising violence and crime.¹⁷ This can be coun-

tered by imparting the ethos of community policing, which has become a major strategy in peace operations.

Multinational institutions, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), EU, and UN, have begun to develop principles for security sector reform, all of which place a premium on “local ownership” in addition to stressing the importance of good governance.¹⁸ Good security sector governance is widely understood to mean limiting the role of the military in internal security, ensuring that all security forces are under civilian control, meeting basic standards of accountability and transparency, and insisting on respect for basic human rights. These standards cannot be imposed by outsiders, nor can they be adopted wholesale by national security forces in the early stages of a peace process. But they can be the starting point for an inclusive dialogue about the security requirements of a given society. While a peace agreement may set the path, midcourse adjustments must often be worked out along the way, as the political transition unfolds and legitimate local authorities emerge to lead or partner in the process. External actors have a role to play not only in equipping and training, but also in giving advice on security sector governance, through a process that ideally engages all national and international “stakeholders,” as the new UN mission is doing in Timor-Leste.¹⁹

Transitional Justice

There is a tendency in peace operations to defer action on justice, given the more pressing security and governance demands in the immediate postconflict period. This is misguided, for two reasons. First, failure to address justice issues at an early stage can undermine both security and transitional governance: a “rule of law vacuum” can be seized on by spoilers and criminal groups;²⁰ and local leaders may appear to be benefiting from a culture of impunity, undermining the confidence of the broader population in the peace process. Second, the assumption that a

tradeoff must be made between peace and justice is based on too narrow a reading of both concepts. Broadly speaking, there are three goals of transitional justice: accountability, truth and reconciliation, and restoration (both individual and societal). These goals may be given different priorities in different societies, or in the context of particular conflicts. None can be achieved quickly, and often the question is whether they should be pursued simultaneously or sequentially. It is important for a society to begin a discussion about what sort of justice is appropriate soon after the fighting ends. External actors have a role in encouraging that discussion. There are international standards that ought to be promoted, and normative red-lines that ought not to be crossed, such as amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.²¹ The exercise of agreeing on transitional justice mechanisms should be a collaborative one, with domestic and foreign actors working together to map the range of options and to catalyze policy and public deliberations on which to pursue.

A closer look at each of the three goals illustrates the complexity of the relationship between local and external actors. Whether based on a theory of retribution or deterrence, accountability reaffirms the shared norms of a society by expressing condemnation of those who committed the crimes, and condemnation of the crimes themselves. But rushing to punishment can undermine a peace process. Fear of being arrested by peacekeepers and handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one reason why the Sudanese government opposed a transition to a UN mission in Darfur. The Lord’s Resistance Army only entered into peace talks with the government of Uganda when its leaders were given assurances by the mediators that they would not be handed over to the ICC (though the ICC indictments stand). Without Nigeria’s offer of asylum to Charles Taylor, there likely never would have been a peace agreement in Liberia. This does not mean that deferring or ignoring criminal justice is always wise—the indictment of Taylor by

the Special Court for Sierra Leone removed him from the political process in Liberia—but it does suggest that instant accountability is not always possible. On the other hand, the prospect of prosecution, whether by the ICC, hybrid tribunals like in Sierra Leone (and proposed for Burundi), or national courts, now affects the dynamics of almost all peace processes. It raises questions about whom one engages with: Should indicted war criminals be treated as legitimate participants in the political process? To what extent should their “stake” in the outcome be a consideration?

The second broad purpose of transitional justice—truth and reconciliation—is important when the facts about the past are in doubt, or in order to “lift the veil of denial” about widely known or unspoken truths.²² Unlike trials that depend on making a choice between individual guilt and innocence, truth commissions can hear different points of view about the pattern of abuses and the political, social, and economic conditions that may have led to them. If truth commissions promote reconciliation, as advocates claim, it is not because they lead to forgiveness about the past, but because they are exercises in deliberative politics—a way to stimulate public debate about how to address the past and carry on.²³ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone served this purpose to an extent, and the recently launched TRC in Liberia has been designed to do the same. Belated efforts are now under way to set up a truth commission in Burundi. The UN is consulting not only government officials, but also religious leaders, political parties, and nongovernmental organizations on the form that truth commission should take.²⁴

Restoration, a third goal of transitional justice, relates directly to rule-of-law reform. Societal restoration is about reconstructing the social, political, and legal systems destroyed by violence.²⁵ Peace operations have an obvious role to play, although rule-of-law mandates tend to be vague. Scott Carlson, in a UN lessons-learned study, makes a compelling case for a more “robust” approach to

counter the fact that transitional or newly elected governments often lack the legitimacy and capacity to take the lead in rule-of-law reform.²⁶ In Haiti, MINUSTAH shifted toward a more proactive approach to justice reform in late 2005, when it became apparent that sustained progress would require greater involvement of international personnel throughout the entire system. This meant more hands-on mentoring of magistrates, prosecutors, and other justice officials, and it had the effect of opening the system to closer scrutiny. Restoration, it should be stressed, may involve resurrecting traditional approaches to justice rather than importing models from elsewhere. In Liberia and southern Sudan, many citizens—especially in rural areas—are inclined to look to customary law and “community-based” systems for justice, rather than formal courts and processes.²⁷ Yet the leadership in each place has concerns about resurrecting traditional systems, in part because they are hard to reconcile with international human rights norms. This suggests that the planning and implementation of reform programs requires not only internal deliberation, but also engagement by external actors to ensure that international standards are respected while nascent institutions are built.

Timor-Leste is an instructive case for all three goals. The UN Secretary-General established a commission of inquiry to gather information on possible violations of human rights committed in the period leading to and immediately after the vote on independence in September 1999. That report put in motion a process that led to the establishment by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) of a hybrid special panel on serious crimes and a truth commission, whose 2,000-page report was issued in mid-2005; national trials in Timor-Leste; the creation of an ad hoc court by Indonesia; the creation of a “truth and friendship commission” by the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia; and finally a “commission of experts” to review all those efforts and make recommendations on what more could be done. The most interesting

Box 1.2 Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Burundi—A Minor Success with Major Consequences*Carolyn McAskie*

Burundi suffered from terrible ethnic conflict for many years, but unlike other peacekeeping “clients,” it was never a failed state. Throughout the darkest days of conflict, it had a functioning government and an army that, despite its faults, had control of the territory. What it lacked was capacity, due to extreme poverty, years of war, and the flight of people and resources.

The Burundi peace talks began in 1993 with political help from the UN, and gained steam in 1995 when former Tanzanian president Mwalimu Julius Nyerere launched the round of consultations that led to the Arusha peace process. In Arusha, the Burundian parties slowly realized they could talk to each other, but it would take eighteen months after the signing of the Arusha Agreement and intense pressure from Nelson Mandela (who had replaced Nyerere as mediator following his death), to push them into a transitional government.

Burundians always assumed there would have to be a UN peacekeeping force at some time, but it was difficult to persuade the Security Council or the senior ranks of the Secretariat that this would be realistic. South Africa therefore

pushed for the African Union’s first ever peacekeeping mission in 2003 and then for the UN to take over in 2004. By the time the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) arrived on the ground, the parties had been engaged on one level or another for years, and formally for the six years since 1998.

ONUB’s mandate was to ensure completion of the Arusha peace process before the end of the transitional period and the beginning of elections. It undertook a complex set of tasks to ensure security, encourage the legislative process, and improve the human rights situation, including the position of women. Support for elections became the most visible element of ONUB’s work, but only part of it. The success of the mission was due to the fact that external players—political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian—worked together in a coherent way, particularly with Burundi’s neighbors. An important challenge for the post-conflict period will be for these elements to continue to work together coherently to support the consolidation of peace.

In the process of negotiating peace, Burundians dealt courageously with issues of power and ethnicity, building

institutions that embodied an evolution away from ethnic bias and toward ethnic balance. In years of dialogue, the parties discovered that their demons diminished as they spoke to each other. In consolidating peace, Burundi’s external partners must deal equally boldly with social and economic needs, to ensure that frustration and exclusion do not draw Burundi into conflict again. Over the past decade, the world has come to better understand the link between lack of development, and conflict. Helping to set societies on a sound social and economic footing must receive the same high-level international attention as does the traditional peace and security agenda.

Hope is being placed in the UN Peacebuilding Commission, created in December 2005. Burundi has been identified as one of the commission’s first clients, making it the beneficiary of a strategic process to bring donors and international institutions together with Burundians to consolidate peace. A concerted effort to help the government meet the expectations of the population would be a strong signal to Burundi and other countries in conflict that there are gains to be made from peace.

Note: Carolyn McAskie is UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi. Original article published in *International Insights* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs) 6, no. 1 (September 2006).

finding is that both governments, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, place more emphasis on “restorative” than “punitive” justice, and seem to be more willing to accept what has been accomplished than are the international experts who have investigated and the victims and families who were consulted.²⁸ (The position of the Timorese government is driven in part by a desire not to jeopardize improving relations with Indonesia.) The UN recom-

mended a multidimensional approach for the new mission in Timor-Leste, which includes ongoing monitoring, institutional capacity building, support for “accountability” measures, and compensation to victims.²⁹ Complemented by the mission’s governance and security functions, the approach embraces a broad conception of justice that ultimately is designed to build an inclusive political community in Timor.³⁰

As Secretary-General Annan put it, “re-establishing justice systems, planning rule of law reforms and agreeing on transitional justice processes are . . . necessary subjects of serious public consultation and debate.”³¹ International actors have a role to play in these debates, both as mediators to help decide what kind of justice and for whom, and as advocates for international standards. They also have a critical role to play in helping to build a functioning legal system, not least because it can create the conditions for peaceful political contestation. While it may not be possible to guarantee rights of political participation, assembly, and expression in an immediate postconflict environment, some belief that basic rights will be guaranteed in the future are necessary to create political space for deliberation.

Deliberative Principles and Methods

Thus there is a substantial body of recent practice to suggest that the transitional period in a peace process be used to foster deliberation among and between local and external actors. Genuine deliberation means more than dialogue; it is a fundamental democratic value, the most important characteristic of which is reasoned exchange. Its guiding principle is reciprocity—the notion that decisions must be justified in terms that all who are bound or seriously affected can accept, even if they disagree with the decision itself: “you make your claims on terms that I can accept in principle . . . I make my claims on terms that you can accept in principle.”³² Deliberation is valued both because it leads to better outcomes when there are disputes about public policy, and because it signals mutual respect. It makes both reaching agreement and living respectfully with disagreement easier.

Deliberative democracy is not incompatible with liberal democracy, but the differences are important in light of recent critiques of the so-called peacebuilding consensus, with its emphasis on the establishment of electoral democracies and market-oriented economies.³³ Rather than assuming there is some predetermined

end-state toward which all postconflict societies must be pushed, deliberative principles are aimed at informing the process that determines what the end-state should be and how to get there.³⁴ Moreover, in a peace operation, outsiders make decisions that have a profound—sometimes even binding—effect on local citizens. In the spirit of accountability, deliberative principles should guide the engagement of outside actors as well as local systems and institutions.

The ideal of deliberation—that participants have equal standing and voice, and that the debates occur unaffected by relationships of power and coercion³⁵—is not met in any society, let alone one coming out of conflict. But two of its underlying principles—participation and publicity—can usefully inform the relationships among the relevant actors. The process of formulating, implementing, and revising a peace consolidation strategy should be as participatory as circumstances permit. Typically this will be limited to the parties to the conflict and the most powerful outside actors in the early stages, but can become more inclusive as the postconflict situation stabilizes. Inclusiveness is important because those who wield the greatest decisionmaking influence in a postconflict society are not always seen as legitimate by the local population or powerful outside actors.

While it is never possible to consult all who are affected by every decision (just as it is never possible for all citizens to participate directly in democratic decisionmaking), another basic deliberative principle—publicity—is an indirect way of engaging a broader range of stakeholders. The publicity principle holds that the reasons for decisions should be accessible and understandable, and the debates that lead to them should be as transparent as possible. The notion that positions must be stated publicly in terms that all can accept is a device for engaging parliamentarians, opposition groups, and civil society, turning them into an audience at whom the justifications must be directed. Direct participation is not necessary for deliberative principles to have an impact: the audience effect

impels the speaker to account for the concerns of all who have a stake in the outcome of the deliberations.³⁶

None of this is easy, of course, and deliberation is no panacea. Nobody imagines that it can supplant the influence of power; the ambition is more modest. To the extent that political struggles take place through deliberation (as opposed to bargaining, and pressure), it levels the playing field by reducing the impact of power. Moreover, an immediate postconflict environment is too fraught to expect peaceful, broadly inclusive political competition. If anything, fostering such competition can be divisive—an obstacle to the sort of consensus-building and conciliatory politics that is required. Thus the deliberative processes themselves may have to evolve, from confidential exchanges among the most powerful actors, to public exercises of justification and reason-giving, to a more stable process in which decisions are made in institutions that lend themselves to inclusive, open—perhaps confrontational but nonviolent—political contestation.

It is not possible to come up with a checklist of operational devices to incorporate more and better deliberation in any peace process—they are too context-specific. Nevertheless, the above review of recent practice, as well as the case studies in this volume, offer some illustrative suggestions:

- One of the principal functions of the political head of any mission is to foster deliberation. Some are much better at this than others; former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi is reputed to be one of the best.
- Use the transitional period to engage actors other than the parties to the conflict, and provide platforms for them to participate in decisions, like the Loya Jirgas in Afghanistan and the proposed Darfur-Darfur dialogue in Sudan.
- Encourage transparency in decisionmaking on important matters of public policy, in order to take advantage of the audience effect, indirectly holding decisionmakers accountable. The publication of decisions by the steering committee that oversees Liberia's GEMAP program is an example.
- In exercising good offices, draw on expert opinion and empirical data, in order to pressure the parties to deliberate on the basis of assessable evidence rather than self-serving claims. Resolution of the north-south boundary disputes in Sudan, for example, could benefit from expert opinion on the historical boundary and the location of oil reserves.
- Start with interim constitutions and even legislation, because they automatically come up for reconsideration at times and in institutions that are likely to be more conducive to genuine deliberation compared to an immediate postconflict period.
- Encourage truth commissions as a first step in seeking transitional justice, because they are themselves devices for public deliberation about what happened and why, and how to move forward. The commissions in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste serve as examples. The broad-based consultations on setting up a truth commission for Burundi illustrate the value of inclusiveness even in designing the institution.
- Include the leadership of peace operations in committees set up to oversee implementation of a peace agreement. The presence of impartial third parties can generate deliberation on issues the parties would rather avoid, and can ensure that all perspectives get a fair hearing. The cease-fire commission for the north-south peace process in Sudan is a positive example; removal of the nonsignatories to the Darfur peace agreement from the cease-fire commission there serves as a negative example.
- Use these joint bodies to engage with civil society and local communities, as the commissions on security arrangements did in Aceh. Engaging civil society directly in the implementation of a peace agreement can have the incidental benefit of creating new cadres of political actors while opening political space for dealing with matters that do not relate directly to the peace process.
- Seek to revive or cultivate traditional de-

liberative mechanisms. Local reconciliation initiatives in Liberia and Sudan are examples, as are the transitional justice approaches adopted in Mozambique in the early 1990s. Sometimes this requires local community empowerment, as the World Bank has attempted in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan with respect to the allocation of development funds.

- Some UN Security Council visits to mission areas can be seen as deliberative exercises, where engagement is direct and on the basis of reciprocity, rather than “megaphone diplomacy.” Security Council missions to Haiti in 2005 and the DRC in 2006 are examples.
- Finally, it is possible to imagine the UN Peacebuilding Commission as a venue for not only coordination, but also deliberation: a forum for reasoned exchange between members of the commission and national counterparts. In fact, when Burundi and Sierra Leone, the first two “clients” of the commission, presented their strategies, they were encouraged to attend each other’s sessions—a nod to deliberative principles.

Conclusion

The debate between those who would place democratization at the center of peacebuilding

and those who see it as a “pipedream” has not been resolved.³⁷ While the built-in conflict-management potential of representative democratic institutions is widely acknowledged, there is ample evidence that rushing to elections can be destabilizing. This chapter has focused on a different element of democracy. I have argued that laying the foundations for sustainable peace depends as much on deliberative mechanisms as it does on representative ones. Clearly there are limits on the scope and impact of deliberation in a post-conflict society. Most decisions will be made on the basis of bargaining, voting, arm-twisting, and less subtle forms of coercion, though hopefully not violence. In the early days of a peace process, deliberation may begin at a low level, with few participants and not much publicity, but it can build over time as deliberative habits and institutions take hold. Moreover, deliberation between local and external actors is a way for the latter to practice what they preach, enhancing the legitimacy of their intervention while cultivating the sort of democratic practices that self-sustaining peace requires. In sum, deliberative principles and methods are a way of holding the parties in a peace process accountable to the larger population, and may be the only way of holding outsiders accountable to the people on whose behalf they purport to be acting.

Notes

I am very grateful to the following people for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this chapter: Salman Ahmed, Sarjoh Bah, Rahul Chandran, Gillian Cull, Richard Gowan, David Haeri, Bruce Jones, and Richard Ponzio. Any errors of fact or judgment are my own.

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2. Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); Simon Chesterman, *You the Peoples: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).

3. On gradations of sovereignty, see Robert Keohane, “Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations of Sovereignty,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stephen Krasner, “Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 85–120.

4. For a similar argument that focuses primarily on internal deliberations rather than deliberation between local and external actors, see Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 87–112.

5. Terrence Lyons, "Transforming the Institutions of War: Post-Conflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Failed States," in Robert Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
6. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 18–19.
7. Lyons, "Transforming the Institutions of War." On interim consultative institutions, see also Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr, *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
8. Vivien Hart, "Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict," *Peace and Change* 26, no. 2 (April 2001): 153–176.
9. Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSF for Afghanistan, New York, 19 July 2002.
10. See Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," pp. 102–103; Richard Ponzio, "Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan (2001–2005)," paper presented at the nineteenth annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, 8–10 June 2006.
11. For critiques of the constitutional process in Iraq, see Hamid Barrada and Philippe Gaillard, "Le Grand Interview: Lakhdar Brahimi," *Jeune Afrique* no. 2375, 16–22 July 2006; International Crisis Group, "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry," Middle East Briefing no. 19, 26 September 2005; US Institute for Peace, "Iraq's Constitutional Process: An Opportunity Lost," Special Report no. 155, December 2005.
12. Barnett Rubin, "The Politics of Security in Post-Conflict Internationalized State Building," in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, eds., *Building States to Build Peace* (forthcoming), p. 31; Barnett Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security?" *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 180.
13. See Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, "Workshop on Peace Consolidation in Sierra Leone," Freetown, Sierra Leone, 30 June–1 July 2006.
14. Rubin, "Politics of Security," p. 24.
15. Salman Ahmed, "No Size Fits All: Lessons in Making Peace and Rebuilding States," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005): 165.
16. Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 2 (2006). See also, James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, *Report of the Iraq Study Group*, December 10, 2006.
17. Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Reform Agenda," *Conflict, Security, and Development* 5, no. 3 (2005): 303.
18. OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005); EU, *Concept for ESDP Support to Security Reform* (2005); United Nations, *DPKO Policy Directive on Law Enforcement Agencies* (2006); UNDP, *Strategic Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Reform* (2002). The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested the Secretariat to conduct "a process of joint policy-making on security sector reform best practices," which the UNDP and DPKO are leading in collaboration with other UN entities. UN doc. A/60/19.
19. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006)*, 8 August 2006, para. 114; S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006.
20. Scott Carlson, *Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Lessons Learned study (2006), p. 4.
21. The UN registered a reservation to the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone because it granted amnesty for those categories of crimes.
22. Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of the Truth Commissions* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 25.
23. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 185.
24. United Nations, *Seventh Report of the SG on the UN Operation in Burundi*, S/2006/429, 21 June 2006, para. 8. The UN has also been engaged in consultations about a "special chamber" for war crimes, which will likely take the form of a hybrid tribunal.
25. Martha Minnow, "The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?" in Robert Rotberg, ed., *Truth v. Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 253.
26. Carlson, *Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work*.
27. On Liberia, see International Crisis Group, "Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System," 6 April 2006, p. 1. My conclusion on southern Sudan is based on interviews in Juba, September 2006.
28. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Justice and Reconciliation for Timor-Leste*, S/2006/580, 26 July 2006, para. 19.
29. S/2006/628, 8 August 2006, paras. 73–90, 125–126.

30. See Rama Mani, "Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (2005): 511–526.

31. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 19.

32. Gutmann and Thompson *Why Deliberative Democracy?* See also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Stephen Macedo, ed., *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a fuller analysis of the relevance of deliberative democracy theory to international affairs, see Ian Johnstone, "Deliberation and Legal Argumentation in International Decision-Making," in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, eds., *The Faultlines of Legitimacy* (New York: United Nations University Press, forthcoming 2007).

33. Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," pp. 88–89; Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Oliver Richmond, "UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004): 83–101; Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004).

34. Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," p. 90.

35. Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

36. Even if the public reason-giving is insincere, paying lip service to shared interests can moderate behavior, because the speaker feels impelled to make some effort to match words with deeds. Jon Elster calls this the "civilizing force of hypocrisy"; Jon Elster, ed., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

37. For a summary of the debate, see Ponzio, "Transforming Political Authority."

2

Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace

Alhaji M. S. Bah and Ian Johnstone

Sudan presented the most complex, combined peacekeeping challenges to the international community in 2006. It hosted two operations, one run by the United Nations to oversee the north-south peace process, and the other by the African Union to manage the Darfur crisis. Faced with a frequently hostile government in the north and a largely indifferent one in the south, the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) struggled to hold the parties to the terms of a comprehensive peace agreement they signed in early 2005. The African Union mission (AMIS) faced even greater obstacles. Despite (or perhaps because of) the peace agreement signed by the government of Sudan and one rebel faction in May 2006, security and humanitarian conditions in Darfur worsened. The long-planned exit strategy for AMIS—a handover to the UN—was blocked by the unyielding opposition of the government, whose good faith was further cast into doubt by a major military offensive in the fall. While debate and planning for such a transition occupied much of the year, it was not until the end of 2006 that key outside actors began to forge a common position. In November, the UN increased its support for the AU and agreement was reached in principle on a hybrid UN-AU mission, but it took another month of diplomatic pressure to get the Sudanese government to agree to the concept. As 2007 approached, the north-south peace process was faltering and questions remained about the will and ability of the international community to make good on its commitment to protect civilians in Darfur.

Background

Signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement

(SPLM) in January 2005, the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) has as its centerpiece a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan after six years. In the interim period, the south is granted significant autonomy, while the NCP retains its authority in the north—including the continuation of Islamic law (*sharia*) (at least until elections are held in 2009). The two parties are to share power and wealth, while carrying out agreed security-related measures and resolving disputes over areas in southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile States, and Abyei.

Darfur has been in crisis since February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M)—later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—took up arms against the government to protest years of political and economic marginalization. The government of Sudan reacted by mobilizing the Arab militia, known as Janjaweed. Negotiations in 2004 produced a humanitarian cease-fire agreement between the government and two rebel groups. The AU then launched peace talks in Abuja, which progressed unevenly. This was due in part to a split in the SLA between a faction led by Minni Minawi, with support from the Zaghawa ethnic group, and a faction led by Abdoul Wahid al-Nour, with significant support from the Fur, the largest ethnic group in the region. High-level engagement and intense pressure from the United States during the final round of negotiations produced the Darfur peace agreement (DPA), signed by the government of Sudan and the SLA faction led by Minni Minawi, on 6 May 2006.

Meanwhile, in January 2005, an international commission of inquiry established by the UN Security Council found that crimes

against humanity and war crimes were probably committed in Darfur and that, while the government had not pursued a policy of genocide, some individuals may have committed acts with genocidal intent.¹ In March 2005 the Security Council referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The prosecutor began investigations of fifty-one individuals identified by the commission. The Security Council also adopted a sanctions regime targeted at individuals who impede the peace process or commit atrocities.

UNMIS: Key Developments in the North-South Peace Process

UNMIS is in most respects a typical Chapter VI multidimensional peacekeeping operation, but faces unusual difficulties in dealing with a strong central government and a nascent southern government, neither of which wants the UN to play a proactive role in managing their relations. The mission was established by the Security Council in March 2005 to support implementation of the CPA. It provides good offices, monitors the cease-fire between north and south, oversees the redeployment of armed groups, assists with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and has a mandate to restructure the police forces, monitor human rights, promote the rule of law, facilitate the return of displaced persons, and prepare for elections and referenda. UNMIS operates under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, though it does have Chapter VII authority to protect civilians.

At the start of 2006, UNMIS had only reached 40 percent of its authorized military strength, which rose to 78 percent by early March and close to full strength by the middle of the year. Police deployment followed a similar pattern, while civilian recruitment was further behind schedule, with a vacancy rate of 36.5 percent at the end of September. UNMIS operates in difficult conditions. In addition to a massive area to be covered, roads are often impassable during the rainy season, and the northern government in particular has



Map No. 4255.10 UNITED NATIONS
October 2005

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

imposed restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as other obstructions like customs delays. At times during 2006, security conditions rendered certain places off limits or only accessible with force protection. However, some of the UN's difficulties in Sudan were self-inflicted. Procurement and recruitment faced major delays. By September 2006, resignations and contract nonrenewals had reached a rate of one person per day, outstripping the pace of hiring. Though nominally "unified," the mission suffered from inordinately poor coordination. The expulsion of SRSJ Jan Pronk in October, after being declared persona non grata (see below), did

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

• Authorization and start date	24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590)
• SRS	To be appointed. On 27 October 2006, the UN Secretary-General confirmed that responsibility of SRS Jan Pronk would be handed over to his officer in charge, DSRS Taye-Brook Zerihoun, until the end of 2006, when the SRS would be completing his mission. On 18 December, the SG appointed Jan Eliasson as Special Envoy for Darfur.
• Officer in Charge	DSRS Taye-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia)
• Force commander	Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh Lidder (India)
• Budget	\$1.079 billion (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 8,914 Military observers: 705 Police: 665 International civilian staff: 742 Local civilian staff: 1,874 UN volunteers: 159

For detailed mission information see p. 323.

not seem to affect day-to-day operations significantly, but it did reinforce the sense of UN vulnerability to government pressure.

Power and Wealth Sharing

The CPA is, at its core, a deal between two political-military elites. The personal connection between John Garang and Ali Osman Taha, the architects of the peace agreement, who later became vice presidents in the government of national unity (GNU), was to be the driving force of implementation. The death of Garang in mid-2005 resulted in the erosion of relations between the two parties. Taha has been weakened by hard-liners in the NCP who have felt cornered by international pressure due to the situation in Darfur. Meanwhile, the SPLM, under its new leader, Salva Kiir, seems unwilling or unable to confront the NCP. Neither side is working hard “to make unity attractive,” the guiding CPA principle. Few of the fifty commissions called for in the agreement function well, if at all. Matters are often referred to the presidency, but remain unresolved.

The net result is an impasse on three issues that could make or break the peace process, all of which center on oil: Abyei, delineation of the north-south boundary, and the sharing of oil revenues. The first is the most volatile. Abyei sits in an oil-rich region that straddles the north and south, and will be critical to both sides after the referendum that is scheduled for 2011. The NCP refused to accept a boundary-commission decision rendered in July 2005, and there was no sign of movement by the end of November 2006. Meanwhile, no progress had been made on delineating the rest of the north-south border, which could also affect the distribution of oil reserves, as well as the outcome of the 2011 referendum. Disputes over oil revenues, half of which go to the government of southern Sudan during the interim period, add another layer of complexity to a tense relationship.

UNMIS’s ability to impact the resolution of these issues is constrained by its lack of presence in the commissions and committees set up to deal with them. This is part of a larger problem. Under the CPA, the parties agreed to deal with most matters bilaterally. The UN can cajole and offer advice, but unless the parties are receptive, there is little more it can do. The NCP in particular has been stalling on implementation of the CPA, and has little interest in turning to the UN for help in resolving its disputes with the SPLM. The heavy international focus on Darfur throughout the year only caused the NCP to harden its stance. Meanwhile, UNMIS has been urging the SPLM to become more assertive in the CPA commissions, and more generally in the GNU “partnership,” but to little avail. The SPLM, reportedly experiencing serious internal divisions, seems to lack both the capacity and inclination to reverse the NCP’s stalling and its determination to limit UNMIS’s role.

While direct engagement with the parties on the core issues was not making much headway in 2006, UNMIS sought to move forward on DDR, security sector reform, human rights, the rule of law, and preparation for elections. But again, with an assistance mandate only,

UNMIS's effectiveness depended on the receptivity of the northern and southern governments. One small success toward the end of the year was the reconvening of the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), which serves as a vehicle for including groups (political parties and civil society) in the political process, in addition to the signatories of the peace agreement. Against a backdrop of increasing marginalization of UNMIS, this sort of progress was seen as a small step toward opening political space in the north. With elections scheduled for 2009, UNMIS was starting to think more about how it could work with all political actors, including opposition parties.

Meanwhile, the government of southern Sudan has adopted its interim constitution, passed a budget (almost half of which is devoted to building SPLA capacity), and established a minimal administrative presence throughout the south. However, the SPLM has little incentive to govern in an inclusive way, given its dominance of the southern legislative assembly. UNMIS can partly address this through its rule of law, human rights, and civil affairs activities, all of which were starting to get off the ground in the latter half of 2006, though with few tangible results, such as local reconciliation initiatives. The much-delayed release of recovery funds, administered by the World Bank, should also help in the south, in terms of both building capacity and delivering a peace dividend.

Security

Although UNMIS had reached its full deployment of uniformed personnel by the middle of 2006, the security situation worsened. There are four interrelated sources of insecurity in the south: other armed groups, ethnic clashes, an undisciplined SPLA, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Tension in the east of the country was also a concern throughout much of the year, but in October the government of Sudan and the Eastern Front signed a peace agreement following four months of talks facilitated by Eritrea. Widely viewed as a deal between the governments of Sudan and

Eritrea that sidesteps many of the demands of the former rebels, it remains to be seen whether the peace will hold.

The term "other armed groups" (OAGs) refers to those who were meant to have joined either the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA by March 2006. Approximately 15,000 combatants were integrated into the SPLA by that date. This left out at least thirty groups aligned to the SAF during the war. Meanwhile, only 38 percent of SAF personnel had redeployed north from the Upper Nile region, leaving an explosive mix of SAF, SPLA, and other armed groups in close proximity. While direct fighting between the armies of the north and south were rare throughout 2006, a major clash occurred in Malakal on 28 November, which began as a confrontation between the SPLA and an SAF-aligned OAG. This was the worst incident between SAF and SPLA forces since the signing of the CPA, highlighting the volatile security situation caused by the continued presence of militias.

Intercommunal violence was a serious and growing problem throughout the year. Competition over land, water, and grazing rights, exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms, could easily escalate. While the spontaneous return of about 1.5 million displaced persons by October 2006 had not caused major security problems, the larger numbers scheduled to come back in 2007 could. Concerned that SAF-supported militias were exploiting these tensions, in early 2006 the SPLA decided to disarm some youth members of a local militia by force, killing many. This incident, in addition to ill-discipline in the SPLA, raised alarm bells in UNMIS. Later in the year, the SPLA shifted to a more voluntary approach to disarming civilians, facilitated by UNMIS.

The LRA—the Ugandan rebel group whose leaders were indicted by the ICC—was a major security problem at the start of 2006. Talks sponsored by the government of southern Sudan in September appeared to bring that problem under control, but the SPLA struggled to maintain security at LRA assembly points.

UNMIS has a number of tools at its disposal to address the growing security threats. The mission's force commander chairs the Cease-Fire Joint Military Committee, reputed to be one of the few CPA-related bodies that functions well. When it reached full deployment, UNMIS began to take a more proactive role in defusing conflicts involving armed groups. It can react quite quickly to prevent escalation, although shortage of air assets limits mobility. Consistent with the "unified mission" concept, some of these interventions take a team approach, involving military personnel, police, and civilians. UNMIS is the first UN operation to have "protection" and "relief, reintegration, and recovery" units—an institutional innovation designed to ensure better integration with political and security concerns. Although the mission could respond robustly to threats to civilians under its Chapter VII mandate if necessary, its capacity to manage a major breakdown in security is doubtful.

Other security-related tasks performed by UNMIS include DDR and security sector reform. The DDR process is led by the northern and southern governments, and little progress had been made by October 2006, given that neither side has an incentive to tackle disarmament seriously until south Sudan's status is resolved in the 2011 referendum. An interim DDR program for children, women, and disabled soldiers had made some progress by the end of the year, but was disappointingly slow. UNMIS has been constrained given the political sensitivities and the emphasis on "national ownership." The UN's only explicit SSR mandate is to restructure and train police forces. Its effort is concentrated in the south, where a strategy to work with local police on community policing had begun to take shape. The 665 UN civilian police officers do not have an explicit monitoring mandate, but co-location and joint patrolling began in the middle of the year as a form of on-the-job training. The Sudan police resisted the involvement of UNMIS in their activities, but the GNU police,

after a year of pushing, accepted a human rights training package.

Thus, while the security situation in the south is not dire, there are disturbing signs. Communal tensions could rise alongside increased returns and new displacement caused by oil exploration. The problem of armed combatants—not integrated into a formal structure—has yet to be resolved, especially as the SAF has continued to use them to provoke instability along the border with the south. The restrictions of movement around Abyei, by the SAF since the start of the mission, and by the SPLA since September 2006, are worrying, as are command and control problems in the SPLA. As the year drew to a close, the possibility of large-scale fighting between north and south seemed remote, but its likelihood could increase in the lead-up to the scheduled 2009 elections and 2011 referendum, as the parties jockey for position and power.

AMIS: Key Developments in Darfur

Since October 2004, AMIS has had a peace-keeping mandate but little capacity to operate as anything more than an observer mission. It was established in May 2004 by the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a small mission of 60 military observers, supported by a protection force of 300. Its original mandate was to monitor compliance with the N'djamena Agreement (a humanitarian cease-fire), assist with confidence-building measures, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In October 2004 it grew to a force of over 3,000, and assumed a stronger mandate, including protection of civilians under imminent threat. As the limits of its capacities quickly became apparent, AMIS continued to operate as an observer force. In March 2005 it was expanded again, to an authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police. At the end of October 2006, AMIS's strength stood at over 7,000 uniformed personnel. While African countries provided troops, the European Union

**Box 2.1 Developing Standing Capacities for Peace Operations:
The African Standby Force and G8 Initiatives**

In 2003 the African Union adopted a policy framework to establish the African Standby Force (ASF) as part of a broader continental security architecture. This was followed in March 2003 by the adoption of a roadmap for operationalization of the ASF. The ASF will comprise multidisciplinary (military, police, and civilian) regional standby brigades from central, eastern, northern, southern, and western Africa. The policy framework outlined six intervention scenarios, ranging from military advice, to a political mission, to intervention in situations involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Under the plan, advisory and complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions (Chapter VI) will deploy in thirty days, while those requiring robust military intervention will do so in fourteen days.

The ASF will be developed in two phases. The first phase, initially planned to be completed by 30 June 2005 (now extended to 2006), focused on developing strategic-level management capacity by the AU and the regional economic communities (RECs) to undertake advisory and Chapter VI peace operations, and preventive deployment. The second phase (2005–2010) is focusing on developing the strategic management capacity of the AU and RECs for complex peace operations, including robust military intervention. To date, progress on establishing the police and civilian components has lagged behind progress on the military component.

Progress in establishing the regional standby brigades has been varied. Eastern,

West, Central, and Southern Africa have adopted their policy and legal frameworks, established the planning elements and provided military officers. These regions have all identified the location of logistics depots, but more in-depth studies need to be carried out to determine the feasibility of the locations. They have also received troop pledges of 3,500–4,000; 6,500; 3,655; and 4,000–6,000 respectively. North Africa has made slow progress relative to the other regions. The absence of a subregional political institution has been partially responsible for delays in this region.

The staffing of the Planning Element—the hub of the ASF—at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa has been slow; although its first chief of staff, Major-General Ishaya Isah Hassan, was appointed at the end of 2005.

In 2006, the AU Peace Support Operations Division, in collaboration with the RECs, organized workshops on doctrine, logistics, training and evaluation, command and control, standing operating procedures, and a draft policy framework on the civilian and police components of the ASF. These core policy areas were harmonized at a follow-on workshop in October 2006, and were presented to the African Chiefs of Defense Staff for approval. Much more work remained to be done on the financial, health, and legal aspects of the ASF. As the ASF development unfolded this year, the EU, Group of Eight (G8), and other bilateral partners funded the workshops and provided military and civilian experts to work with their African counterparts.

In 2004, during its summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the G8 launched an action plan to expand global capacity for peace support operations. At the same time, the US government announced a new initiative on global peace operations, which aims to train and equip a total of 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010. The plan would initially focus on Africa to bridge the gap between increasing demand and existing capacities. Under this initiative, approximately \$660 million are to be provided for training, equipment, and logistical support, with 75 percent of training efforts aimed at African armed forces. In the 2006 fiscal year, 44 percent of the \$100 million went to twelve Africa-only projects. While the ECOWAS secretariat was the beneficiary of the majority of assistance to regional organizations, many of the ECOWAS are being replicated for the African Union. The GPOI funds also support three peace operations training centers: The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, the École de Maintien de la Paix in Mali, and the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya. Previous G8-focused initiatives are elaborated in a joint Africa-G8 plan to enhance African capabilities for undertaking peace operations, one goal of which is to support the development of the African Standby Force. While Italy has established the Center on Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as part of the G8 plan, other initiatives remain largely uncoordinated.

AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

• Authorization date	28 May 2004 (Agreement with Sudanese Parties) 30 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1556)
• Start date	June 2004
• Acting head of mission	Monique Mukaruliza (Rwanda)
• Force commander	Major General Luke Aprezi (Nigeria)
• Police commissioner	Daniel Moenyana (South Africa)
• Budget	\$208.4 million (April–December 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 4,980 Military observers: 773 Civilian police: 1,346

For detailed mission information see p. 369.

provided logistics and financial support, NATO provided strategic airlift, and the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and others provided additional bilateral assistance—an indication of an emerging division of labor of sorts.

From late 2004 to mid-2005, AMIS was quite effective, due in large measure to good cooperation from the rebel groups in Darfur. The Janjaweed were less cooperative, but tended to operate at night and so there were few opportunities for direct confrontation with AMIS. As the security situation deteriorated in late 2005 and pressure for a peace agreement grew in early 2006, there was public discussion for the first time about handing over peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN. The rationale for the transition, which had been the AU exit strategy from the start, was the UN's greater capacity for the sort of multidimensional operation that would be required to oversee a comprehensive peace agreement.

With the signing of the Darfur peace agreement, and the government of Sudan's continued resistance to a transition to a UN operation in Darfur, AMIS adopted a new concept of operations in mid-2006. Subsequently, the AU proposed an expansion of the force by 4,000 troops, bringing the total to approximately 11,000. But it was not clear

where they would come from, how quickly they could be deployed, or what funding arrangements would be in place. Partly to fill the gap, the AU and UN jointly agreed on a package of support to AMIS, consisting of 105 military, 33 police, and 48 civilian advisers, as well as 36 armored personnel carriers and other equipment. In meetings in Addis Ababa and then Abuja in November, agreement was reached on a so-called "heavy support package" of some 3,000 personnel.

The Darfur Peace Agreement and Its Implementation

The year 2006 began with a deteriorating security situation in Darfur, doubts about AMIS's ability to sustain a robust operation, and determination to reach a peace agreement between the government and rebel groups. Under pressure from the United States to complete the AU-led Abuja talks, the Darfur peace agreement was signed in early June. Modeled on the north-south comprehensive peace agreement, it addresses the contentious issues of security, power, and wealth sharing. It calls for disarmament of Janjaweed militia. Minni Minawi was appointed special assistant to the president, the fourth highest position in the GNU, as well as chair of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. The DPA calls for a referendum, by July 2010, to decide whether Darfur should be a region with a single local government, or a collection of three states. The DPA parties have agreed to establish a reconstruction and development fund, to which the GNU is to contribute \$700 million over three years.

The appointment of Minni Minawi widened the rift with the SLA-Wahid and JEM, who had rejected the DPA, as it failed to address some of their key demands, such as individual (as opposed to group) compensation, the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, a vice-presidential position reserved for Darfur, and justice for those who experienced atrocities. Efforts by the AU and others, including threats of sanctions against the leaders of the two groups, failed to bring them on board. However,



Sudanese women demonstrate in Khartoum against the possible transfer of peacekeeping in Darfur from the African Union to the UN, 8 March 2006.

some individuals within the two nonsignatory groups signed a Declaration of Commitment (DoC) in support of the DPA.

The post-DPA period witnessed an increased splintering and realigning of the rebel groups, with conflicting and competing demands. The National Redemption Front (NRF) and G19 were the most notable groups to emerge during this period. Meanwhile, the government of Sudan and SLA-Minni used the DPA to mount attacks on the nonsignatories. Starting in August 2006, the government amassed thousands of troops and weaponry in the region, and attacked several towns and villages. While hostilities between the DPA signatories decreased, fighting between them and the nonsignatories increased. In addition, AMIS itself increasingly became the target of attacks by the latter.

Compounding these growing security problems, the humanitarian and human rights situation deteriorated significantly in the post-DPA period. With approximately 14,000 aid workers and about 85 nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), Darfur hosted the biggest humanitarian operation in the world. Fighting between the various rebel groups, the government of Sudan, and the Janjaweed militia created more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and forced humanitarian agencies to withdraw from affected areas. By August 2006, humanitarian access had dropped to its lowest level since 2004. Attacks against civilians and UN and NGO staff increased during the year, with violent deaths in the first half of 2006 up nearly 400 percent over the same period in 2005.² In late November, as the government placed new obstacles in the way of humanitarian action, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs told the Security Council that the crisis in Darfur was “closer to the abyss” than at any time since 2004.

To carry out the new tasks emanating from the DPA, such as monitoring buffer zones and grazing routes, as well as the protection of civilians, AMIS developed a new concept of operations in June 2006. By then, its ability to carry out even its monitoring mandate had

(SALAH OMAR/AFP/Getty Images)

Box 2.2 Sharing the Front Lines: Aid Workers Under the Gun

Between 1997 and 2005, nearly as many humanitarian aid workers lost their lives to violence as did uniformed peacekeepers. All told, 947 civilian aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured by armed attacks during the nine-year period. These are among the findings of a joint study by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and the Humanitarian Policy Group/Overseas Development Institute (ODI): *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations* (see <http://www.cic.nyu.edu> or <http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg>).

Drawing on the most comprehensive global dataset to date of reported major incidents of violence against aid workers, the study found that the absolute number of attacks on aid workers each year has nearly doubled since 1997. The proliferating numbers of violent incidents have contributed to the widespread perception that aid workers are

increasingly targeted, and that the risk of violence against them is higher today than ever before. The study's statistical analysis, however, reveals that the situation is not as dire as it appears. By calculating yearly estimates of the population of aid workers in the field (a population that increased roughly 77 percent from 1997 to 2005), the study demonstrates that the global incidence of violence against aid workers rose only slightly over 1997–2005.

The analysis also shows that, with the exception of Iraq in 2003–2004, Somalia was the most dangerous environment for aid workers, followed by Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, North Caucasus, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan in particular has had an upswing in violence recently, as aid workers increasingly fall victim to violence in Darfur. From the start of 2005 to the third quarter of 2006, Sudan led

the field, with the highest number of attacks committed against aid workers (thirty-seven incidents involving ninety-four victims). In these contexts, however, local aid workers, relative to their numbers in the field, are suffering increasing casualties, while their international colleagues are becoming relatively less at-risk.

Perceptions of increased risk have led to greater reliance on local actors and national staff to deliver aid. So-called remote management programming allows operations to continue, but often results in less effective and less strategic programming. The study argues that humanitarian organizations have failed to fully consider the impact and ethics of remote management. Recommendations are offered for strengthening operational security and aid management in insecure environments, including through development of local capacity.

Violent Incidents Against Aid Workers by Year

Year	Total Incidents	Total Aid Worker Victims	UN	ICRC	IFRC	NGO	Donor/Other	Killed	Wounded	Kidnapped	Nat'l	Int'l
1997	34	77	26	9	10	31	1	39	8	32	43	34
1998	26	69	24	26	5	14	0	36	15	18	54	15
1999	31	66	16	8	4	38	0	29	15	20	41	25
2000	41	94	31	10	0	51	2	58	25	11	74	20
2001	29	94	28	11	3	52	0	27	20	47	66	28
2002	47	88	17	7	5	58	1	38	23	25	73	15
2003	62	145	31	8	20	86	0	86	49	8	118	27
2004	66	140	18	0	11	107	4	60	55	24	109	31
2005	72	174	24	4	5	139	2	61	95	17	159	15
Totals	408	947*	215	83	63	576	10	434	305	202	737	210

*The figure of 947 includes those killed in the bombing of the UN's Baghdad headquarters in August 2003, but not the estimated 150 people injured in that incident. Records are insufficient to determine the number and affiliation of the injured.

diminished, for a variety of reasons. It had limited access to areas controlled by groups opposed to the DPA, and could not maintain a twenty-four-hour presence in some IDP camps. The politicized environment and the insecurity meant that AMIS could not execute its strategy of protection by presence, a strategy that had worked well in the past. Despite the deployment of over 90 percent of the mission's authorized personnel, the financial and logistical challenges were acute. Financial shortfalls left mission personnel without salaries and allowances for months on end. Aiming to restructure and enhance the existing force, the AMIS force commander requested six additional battalions in September 2006. However, given the logistical and financial constraints (and hesitations on the part of donors), initial efforts centered on the possibility of two additional battalions.

A new cease-fire commission and joint commission were inaugurated in June 2006 to monitor the cease-fire under the DPA and previous agreements. This forced AMIS to experiment with two cease-fire commissions, one for the N'djamena Agreement and the other for the DPA. This experiment was dogged by controversy, as the DPA parties objected to the participation of nonparties in the two new bodies. The government of Sudan declared the NRF a terrorist group, and claimed the government could not guarantee the security of nonsignatories on the CFC. AMIS suspended representatives of the nonsignatories on 16 August in an attempt to put an end to the paralysis of the two bodies. As a result, AMIS increasingly came to be seen as biased in favor of the DPA parties. The parties referred to the decision as an act of war—an implicit threat against AMIS personnel and property.³ Moreover, the suspension severed the only link AMIS had with these groups, making it difficult for the mission to verify cease-fire violations and attacks on its personnel in areas controlled by the nonsignatories. However, a meeting of the DPA Joint Commission in November approved a proposal for the establishment of a two-

chamber CFC: one for the DPA and DoC signatories and another for nonsignatories. A proposal for a third chamber involving all the parties was left to the discretion of the force commander.

The AU established a DPA implementation team (DPAIT) to work closely with the chair of the proposed Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), loosely modeled on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga. The DDDC was designed as a bottom-up approach to remedy the top-down approach of the Abuja talks, and to encourage dialogue among the people of Darfur for identifying problems, proffering solutions, and choosing their leaders (with external partners acting as facilitators).

One of the DPA implementation strategies is to undertake quick-impact projects to rebuild schools and clinics, sink boreholes, and expedite the establishment of a compensation committee. Nonetheless, the vast majority of people rejected the DPA, making its implementation and the convening of the DDDC problematic. The chairperson of the DDDC's preparatory committee was finally appointed in September 2006, but little progress had been made by the end of October.

The Politics of Transition

The increased insecurity in the post-DPA period—and the need to implement the agreement—increased the motivation for transition to a UN force. While AMIS had done a laudable job since its initial deployment, the mission could not address the intractable political and security problems given its human resource, financial, and logistics constraints. On 10 January 2006, the PSC decided in principle to hand over the operation to the UN. The UN Security Council welcomed the decision and requested the Secretary-General to embark on contingency planning in consultation with the AU, the GNU, and other stakeholders. The PSC reiterated its position in March and extended the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006, while stressing that the transition would require the consent of

the government of Sudan and the continued African character of the mission.

A UN Security Council mission visited Sudan and Chad in June to boost efforts to implement the DPA, and to pave the way for the transition. The Council's visit was followed by a joint AU-UN technical assessment team, led by UN Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno of the UN and AU Commissioner Said Djinnit. The Security Council and the assessment mission concluded that AMIS should hand over to a larger, more robust, multidimensional UN operation, and that AMIS should be strengthened in the interim. President Omar al-Bashir rejected the proposed transition, arguing that the AU had no right to hand over its mission, especially since the DPA deliberately left out such a reference.

Claiming that the government of Sudan was capable of restoring security and protecting the civilian population in Darfur, President Bashir presented the UN Secretary-General with a plan to deploy 27,550 government troops and police, along with 4,000 Sudan Liberation Movement (i.e., SLA-Minni) fighters to the region, signaling the government's intent to pursue a military option.

The GNU was not united in its rejection of the proposed transition. While members of NCP vehemently opposed the transition, SPLM leader Salva Kiir openly voiced his support, as did Minni Minawi, the DPA nonsignatories, and the vast majority of Darfur's population. The AU as an organization has been steadfast in its public support for a transition, but in private dealings with the government of Sudan, some North African countries have been equivocal.

Based on recommendations presented by the UN Secretary-General, on 31 August the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, expanding the mandate of UNMIS to include support for implementation of the DPA and the N'djamena Agreement, and to use all necessary means to protect civilians. UNMIS would be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel, 3,300 civilian police, including 16

formed police units (of 125 each) and 3,000 civilians. The resolution also called for the UN to support AMIS, pending the transition to a UN force. Twelve members of the Council voted in favor of the resolution, while China, Russia, and Qatar abstained.

Although the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII, the Security Council invited the GNU to consent to the UN deployment. The government of Sudan forcefully rejected the deployment, reiterated its threats to wage a jihad (holy war) on any UN troops deployed to Darfur, and demanded that the AU leave Darfur at the expiration of its mandate, on 30 September 2006, unless it accepted financial assistance from the League of Arab States and the GNU, though the government of Sudan later retracted this ultimatum. The government claimed that the UN would not be impartial, as the international community had not condemned the DPA nonsignatories for their violent acts. An unstated worry of the government of Sudan was that the "international community" was pushing for regime change, and that a UN force would arrest senior government officials indicted by the International Criminal Court. Perhaps even more worrying to the NCP was the fear of Darfur gaining independence.

In October, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jan Pronk reported on his personal blog that the SAF had lost two major battles in Darfur in September 2006, with hundreds of casualties, many prisoners taken, and some soldiers refusing to fight. The report prompted first the Sudanese military and then the government (without consulting the SPLM) to declare Mr. Pronk *persona non grata* on 20 October. He left three days later for "consultations with the Secretary-General" in New York. It was there decided that Mr. Pronk would continue as SRSG until the end of the year, based outside of Sudan. His deputy, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, would assume day-to-day responsibilities pending the appointment of a new SRSG.

In mid-November, a meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General in Addis Ababa led to an agreement “in principle” on a hybrid UN-AU force. This was confirmed at an AU PSC meeting in December, as part of a three-phase process: UN light support to AMIS, followed by a larger support package and eventual transition to a hybrid force. With January 1 approaching—a critical date because it marked the end of the AMIS mandate as well as the term of Kofi Annan—pressure grew for the deployment of an expanded force and a re-energized political process in Darfur. At the end of December, the government finally agreed to the hybrid force. But with continuing reservations about the size, as well as command and control arrangements, it was clear that it would take some time to get a major UN presence on the ground.

Meanwhile, violence that had been spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic for much of the year prompted the dispatch of a UN technical assessment mission

to consider the possible deployment of a multidimensional presence to both countries. On 22 December, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the conditions for a UN peacekeeping operation did not exist, mainly because the rebel groups would oppose it. He went on to state that, if the Council decided to deploy a mission, it should be a robust force with a mandate to monitor the borders and protect civilians.

Conclusion

In late 2006, international attention was focused on Darfur, while the north-south peace process was faltering. The outline of a unified international strategy was starting to emerge for both conflicts, but it was not clear whether either would come to fruition or succeed.

The strategy on Darfur had three elements: broadening support for the DPA, enhancing the capacity of AMIS, and convincing the NCP to accept a transition to a UN mission. On the



(Jehad Nge/Corbis)

An AU peacekeeper guards a water station in Darfur, 6 September 2006.

first, it was clear the government of Sudan would not agree to renegotiate the DPA, but some aspects of it could be “revisited,” such as individual compensation, the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, and more equitable power-sharing. It was hoped that this, plus other inducements, would bring the nonsignatories on board and would win the support of the broader population.

By the end of October, progress had already been made on enhancing AMIS in the form of a new concept of operations, changes in the mission leadership, and the UN light-support package. However, there was a disconnect between the Security Council’s approval in August of a much larger, more robust UN operation, and the minimal enhancements of AMIS described above. If 20,000 uniformed personnel were seen as necessary to bring a measure of security to Darfur, then the latter hardly seemed like an alternative, even as a stop-gap measure. Moreover, with the government of Sudan having successfully resisted pressure for a speedy transition to the UN, it was better placed than ever to dictate terms on what happened in Darfur. Whatever new capacity AMIS may acquire, its political weaknesses vis-à-vis an emboldened government raised troubling questions about whether it would be able to turn the tide on its declining effectiveness.

As for the prospects of a transition, with nobody volunteering troops to intervene coercively, the consent of the government was essential. Better diplomacy, including among major outside players like the United States and China, might well have prevented matters reaching stalemate in September. The NCP’s genuine worries about losing Darfur (seeing a parallel with the south), and about ICC prosecutions, could have been addressed, at least to the extent that a UN presence in the region would not have a decisive impact one way or the other. Moreover, formal consent of the government without any intention to cooperate would not be a sound basis for deploying a UN force, of any size. The NCP needed incentives to give up the military option. In those

circumstances, only so much could be achieved by “megaphone diplomacy” (as the UN Deputy Secretary-General put it). A consensus seemed to be emerging at the end of the year that a more nuanced approach was required, combining carrots and sticks, with China and Arab and African countries delivering reassuring messages to complement the tougher messages coming from the United States and United Kingdom.

In October 2006 the United States raised the level of its political engagement by appointing a senior envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios. Meanwhile, the five Security Council permanent members were working to forge a common message in their dealings with the Sudanese government. Similarly, Secretary-General Annan put together a set of “common principles” to guide the efforts of the UN, AU, and League of Arab States behind the scenes. The November meeting in Addis Ababa saw a convergence among the outside actors, with the UN and AU leading the process and the P5, EU, and LAS committing to support it. This seemed to bear fruit in the form of the government’s agreement on a hybrid mission.

Overlaying the three elements of a strategy on Darfur was how to ensure it did not detract from the north-south peace process. While there is logic in delinking the two, given that the international focus on the former seemed to be to the detriment of the latter, the government of Sudan had an incentive to keep them linked. The NCP may ultimately be able to live with losing the south if it can be assured of enough access to oil; it could not tolerate the loss of Darfur. It might therefore be tempted to give ground on north-south issues in order to gain SPLM support on Darfur.

There is an even more fundamental linkage between the two issues. Whether the north-south process leads to unity or secession (both sides seem to be working on the assumption that it will be the latter), the top priority for UNMIS and other international actors is to ensure that the end result occurs

peacefully *and is sustainable*. For that to happen, not only must the parties to the conflict settle the core issues that divide them, but the governments they lead (in the north and south) must also meet minimal standards of participatory governance. While all eyes are focused on the crisis in Darfur, the 2009 elections also warrant attention now because they have the potential to transform the political landscape. If converting the SPLM into an inclusive government is likely to be difficult,

the challenge in the north is much greater. The NCP has little incentive to transform its style of governing, especially if it has given up on ever “making unity attractive” to the south. But peace will not be sustainable unless all groups feel they have a stake in the future of the country. The conflict in Darfur stems from a long and brutal history of marginalization. Unless that is rectified by building a more inclusive political community in the north, any peace is likely to be short-lived.

Notes

1. United Nations, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General*, 5 January 2005, para. 641.
2. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Summary of Insecurity Incidents February–July 2006 Versus February–July 2005,” 1 August 2006.
3. Personal interviews with AMIS personnel, Khartoum and El-Fasher, Sudan, 13–20 August 2006.

3

Mission Reviews

Aceh

More than a year after the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [GAM]), conditions appear promising in Aceh. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), a joint effort of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, and five countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), successfully monitored the decommissioning and demobilization of GAM troops and relocation of Indonesia's military and police forces. Peaceful elections were held on 10 December 2006, a remarkable achievement given Aceh's troubled history. However, challenges remained in implementing some elements of the memorandum. New legislation on the governing of Aceh had been promulgated, but there was opposition to provisions perceived as inconsistent with the memorandum of understanding. A human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) have not been established, and economic recovery and reintegration were uneven. AMM was scheduled to withdraw on 15 December 2006, with a sense of accomplishment, but a number of political, economic, and justice questions remained unsettled.

Background

On 15 August 2005 the government of Indonesia and GAM signed a memorandum of understanding that ended thirty years of secessionist violence in Aceh. The memorandum followed the breakdown of the 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), which led to the declaration of martial law in Aceh in December 2003. In October 2004, President Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono won Indonesia's first national democratic election. Despite campaign promises to end the war in Aceh, Yudhoyono extended martial law. Then, on 26 December 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami struck the northern and western coasts of Aceh, killing some 200,000 people and displacing over half a million. As humanitarian agencies arrived in Aceh, GAM and the government held five rounds of negotiations facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in Helsinki, which led to the signing of the memorandum of understanding eight months later.

AMM: Mandate and Functions

The memorandum of understanding mandated the AMM to monitor implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement. In September 2005, AMM was deployed by the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). AMM's tasks include monitoring the demobilization of GAM and the decommissioning of its armaments, relocating nonorganic military and police troops,¹ and reintegrating active GAM members. It also has responsibilities for monitoring the human rights situation and legislative reform, ruling on amnesty cases, and managing alleged violations of the memorandum of understanding.

AMM is a civilian mission within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic guidance of AMM under the responsibility of the European Council.

The costs of the mission are financed from the EU budget and by contributions of EU member states and participating countries. The legal basis for AMM is found in two key documents: the August 2005 memorandum of understanding and the European Council's Joint Action of 9 September 2005.

On 15 August 2005, an initial monitoring presence (IMP) was established; twelve days later it was deployed to prevent a potential vacuum after the signing of the memorandum of understanding. It consisted of eighty monitors from EU and ASEAN countries deployed across five locations for the period between the signing of the memorandum and the full deployment of AMM. The timely presence of the IMP provided an early demonstration of the EU and ASEAN countries' commitment to the peace process, while contributing to confidence building among the population of Aceh. AMM became operational on 15 September 2005, the date on which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of military and police forces began. With an initial mandate of six months, AMM was extended three times, for three-month periods, at the request of the parties, through to 15 December 2006.

During the decommissioning phase, AMM numbered approximately 220 international unarmed personnel. The decision to field a civilian rather than military mission was made in view of Indonesia's sovereignty concerns. Upon completion of the security arrangements, AMM downsized to eighty-five people, of which almost two-thirds came from EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland, and the rest from the five participating ASEAN countries. The mission, whose headquarters is in Banda Aceh, established eleven district offices geographically distributed throughout Aceh. Monitors conduct their tasks by patrolling and communicating with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required. The approach of AMM is to act as a facilitator and to build confidence between the parties. In its final phase, the mission numbered only thirty-six monitors, based in Banda Aceh.



EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)

- Authorization date 9 September 2005 (Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP)
- Start date August 2005
- Head of mission Pieter Feith (Netherlands)
- Budget \$19.7 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Civilian observers: 36

While the EU has previously carried out peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh represents the first ESDP mission in Asia. As such, AMM is breaking new ground and may serve as a model for the way the EU will conduct crisis operations in the future. For ASEAN, participation in AMM signals a move away from past policies of “noninterference” in the activities of member states, and toward an emerging common security or defense mechanism. The nature of the

arrangement—with ASEAN countries participating but not ASEAN as an organization—reflects a tentative and significant step toward a peacekeeping role for the organization. The combination of EU and ASEAN monitors has provided increased legitimacy for AMM. ASEAN personnel contributed cultural awareness and regional knowledge, while the EU presence provided diplomatic and financial weight, as well as managerial coherence. Both the EU and ASEAN reiterated their full respect for the territorial integrity of Indonesia and the future of Aceh within it. The government of Indonesia welcomed the arrangement.

AMM: Key Developments and Challenges

Security

Decommissioning and relocation were carried out remarkably smoothly in four parallel processes between 15 September 2005 and 5 January 2006. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding, GAM handed over all of its 840 weapons to AMM, and on 27 December 2005 it officially disbanded its military wing. The government of Indonesia fulfilled its commitments by relocating a total of 25,890 nonorganic military and 5,791 nonorganic police out of Aceh. The number of police and military forces remaining in Aceh, as verified by AMM, is within the maximum strength specified in the memorandum of understanding: 14,700 for the Indonesian military (the Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) and 9,100 for the police. Since the completion of the security arrangements, Aceh has been violence-free, with the exception of a few incidents, but these have not threatened to derail the peace process.

Regular meetings of the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA), which comprises government of Indonesia, GAM, and AMM representatives, were held throughout the decommissioning/relocation phase at the

provincial and district levels (D-COSAs) and continue to be held as forums for discussion and building trust between military, police, and GAM field commanders. The COSA and D-COSA meetings have been a crucial element in building confidence between the parties themselves, as well as between the parties and the local communities.

AMM has also used the D-COSAs as an opportunity to explain the memorandum of understanding to the parties at the field level and to civil society. Tim Sosialisasi Aceh Damai, commonly known as Timsos, or the Socialization Team, was formed as a mechanism through which GAM and the government of Indonesia would jointly design and disseminate to stakeholders information about the peace process, preventing the parties from spreading propaganda. The donors (the World Bank, the UN Development Programme [UNDP], the US Agency for International Development [USAID], the International Organization for Migration [IOM], and AMM) have done most of the work to prepare a public information campaign, while GAM and the government of Indonesia have signed off. This facilitated the rapid dissemination of information about the memorandum of understanding to the district and village levels. It also provided a forum for donors to support the peace process, without the appearance of their logos on the material.

The fact that both parties were prepared to carry out their security-related commitments in good faith is the most significant factor in the smooth implementation of the decommissioning, demobilization, and relocation of troops. Without a good faith effort by both parties, no amount of outside monitoring could have achieved the current results. However, AMM's role in reinforcing this good faith was significant. Its dissemination of information to the parties at all levels of implementation, as well as its creation of a forum for airing grievances, acted as confidence-building measures. It also built awareness and support for the peace process within

the wider civilian community. Additionally, AMM provided an international spotlight on the Aceh conflict, signaling the commitment of the international community to its resolution. Both parties understood that their international reputations were at stake, and that millions of dollars of aid money would leave the province should the violence continue. While AMM can be credited with successfully completing its mission with regard to security arrangements, it is the cooperative efforts of the two parties that allowed AMM to achieve this success.

Political Process

The memorandum of understanding specifies that new legislation, the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LOGA), be promulgated and enter into force no later than 31 March 2006. This deadline was not met by the government of Indonesia, as it took longer than expected to secure parliamentary approval. The LOGA was initially drafted in Aceh by the provincial legislature (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah [DPRD]) after consultation with elite politicians and businessmen in the capital, Banda Aceh. The process, however, lacked input from Acehnese outside the capital city. The draft was then sent to the national parliament in Jakarta, where it was the subject of significant debate and editing, with little participation from GAM or civil society leaders in Aceh.

The LOGA was finally approved by the national parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [DPR]) on 11 July 2006, and then signed into law by the president on 1 August. Because of the lack of consultation and consensus building during the process, the law was received with widespread protests. GAM sent a letter to the government, AMM, and the CMI detailing the provisions of the law it viewed as not consistent with the memorandum of understanding. Sixty nongovernmental organizations in Aceh formed a coalition protesting the law, and organized public demonstrations. The government provided some



(AP/Binsar Bakkara)

A Free Aceh Movement member surrenders his weapons to the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 15 September 2005.

clarification, but by the end of October had not yet indicated that it would revise the law. Peaceful elections were held on 10 December 2006, the first time Acehnese were able to elect the governor, vice governor, and 19 district heads in free and fair elections. This key test of Aceh's new autonomy resulted in a decisive victory for GAM gubernatorial candidate Irwandi Yusuf and running mate Muhammad Nazar. Interpreting its mandate narrowly, the AMM claimed its mission had been fulfilled by monitoring the process of legislation reform, as the LOGA had been promulgated and elections held.

Justice

While steps have been taken toward fulfilling the memorandum of understanding's provisions regarding justice and human rights, overall progress is slow. In accordance with the memorandum, 1,789 GAM prisoners were re-

leased immediately upon its signing. However, there are still some sixty-five unresolved cases that AMM is in the process of ruling on. The key issue for these cases is the uncertainty over whether the charges are related to GAM activities or to criminal acts committed by Acehnese.

The first of the three provisions in the memorandum of understanding regarding human rights requires the government of Indonesia to adhere to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. On 30 September 2005 the Indonesian government passed two bills formally ratifying the two covenants.

However, there has been little movement to fulfill the second human rights provision of the memorandum of understanding, which calls for a human rights court to be established. Similarly, the truth and reconciliation commission specified in the memorandum has yet to materialize. Until the president appoints members of the national-level TRC, the commission in Aceh cannot be established. Five civil society seminars have been held to discuss the form the TRC will take when it is established. It appears that Aceh will choose a modified South African-style model, in which perpetrators who tell the truth will be granted amnesty.

Informally, AMM staff claim that neither party has pushed for the implementation of either a human rights court or a TRC, as there have been human rights violations committed by both sides, and neither side is eager to be brought to justice. AMM maintains that it has been restrained in encouraging implementation of the human rights provisions of the memorandum of understanding, as its responsibility is to monitor the progress of the parties. The implication of this reasoning is that AMM should remain in Aceh until the parties fulfill their human rights obligations.

Economic Recovery

Economic recovery is complex, as tsunami reconstruction is occurring in parallel to reintegration activities. Moreover, both have been slow. In February 2006 the governor of Aceh

formed the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh [BRDA]), to manage reintegration assistance. The relationship between the BDRA and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi [BRR]) is not well defined. There is confusion about how to provide assistance to villages that are both tsunami- and conflict-affected. Many Acehnese are frustrated with the lack of transparency in both the reconstruction and the reintegration processes, and with the lack of progress since the tsunami and the signing of the memorandum of understanding. Combined with unemployment, this frustration has the potential to become an obstacle to the peace process.

Conclusion

AMM was scheduled to leave Aceh on 15 December 2006, five days after the elections. While it can be said that AMM has succeeded in monitoring the decommissioning, demobilization, and relocation of troops, other aspects of its mandate remain incomplete. For example, AMM is meant to monitor the reintegration of GAM ex-combatants, which remains unfinished. It is supposed to monitor the fulfillment of human rights commitments made by the parties in the memorandum of understanding; however, no movement has been made on a human rights court, nor on a truth and reconciliation commission. And AMM is supposed to monitor the process of legislation change. While the LOGA has been promulgated, it has been met with widespread dissatisfaction. The December elections marked a significant step toward stable peace in Aceh, a remarkable achievement in view of the thirty-year civil war that the peace process brought to an end. However, key elements of the memorandum of understanding remain to be implemented, which will require close cooperation between the new governor and Jakarta.

AMM did not enter Aceh with a clear exit strategy, and as the year drew to a close, the EU in particular was seeking a rapid exit. If such a strategy had been formulated, based on

substantive benchmarks—rather than on improvised indicators related to speed—it is likely the mission would have remained beyond the end of 2006 to ensure a sustained peace.

Note

1. “Nonorganic” refers to military and police forces not based in Aceh, but sent to Aceh to support the military offensive.

Afghanistan

On 20 December 2005, the first freely elected Afghan parliament in over three decades was sworn in, marking the end of the Bonn process. In the light of an election that had progressed relatively smoothly, there was cautious optimism about the future of Afghanistan. Nine months later the mood had changed. Civilian and military casualties had soared, suicide bombings were occurring regularly, and citizens and leaders publicly questioned the ability of the central government to exert control over the provinces. Against this backdrop, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, was in the process of taking command over the majority of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the remaining provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). ISAF was engaged in combat in the south against an increasingly strong insurgency. Meanwhile, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) became co-chair of the board of a new five-year governance and development “compact,” designed to help the government project authority throughout the country.

Background

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, a US-led coalition launched a military campaign against Al-Qaida and drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. This led to the Bonn process, which laid out a two-year roadmap for development of a constitution and national elections. The final benchmark was achieved on 18 September 2005 with the election of the Wolesi Jirga (lower House) and the provincial councils, who later selected members of the Meshrano Jirga (upper House).

The Bonn agreement included a request for the Security Council to deploy a multinational force to assist with security. Security Council Resolution 1386, of 20 December 2001, authorized ISAF to operate in and around Kabul, under United Kingdom command. ISAF was originally deployed with a different command structure and mandate than the US-led coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which continued to conduct military operations against Al-Qaida.

On 28 March 2002, to lead international civilian activities, the Security Council, through Resolution 1401, authorized the creation of UNAMA under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi. UNAMA was mandated broadly to monitor the benchmarks of the Bonn process and to assist the Afghan government in reaching those objectives.

ISAF: Mandate and Functions

The structure of ISAF evolved considerably between 2002 and 2005. At deployment in 2002, operating under the limited mandate for security in Kabul, the UK was in command of a 5,000-strong force for six months. This was followed by Turkey for a further six months, after which Germany and the Netherlands were scheduled to take over joint command in January 2003. Prior to assuming command, the Germans and the Dutch made a formal request to NATO for support in command and control, which was approved on 17 October 2002.

In April 2003, a few months before the German/Dutch command was scheduled to hand over, Germany approached the NATO

Military Council and requested a feasibility study on whether ISAF could operate under NATO control in order to avoid the disruptions of handover and searches for lead nations. On 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to assume complete command and control, which occurred formally on 11 August 2003.

In September 2003, in response to numerous requests from Afghan president Hamid Karzai and UNAMA, ISAF concluded that it lacked critical military capacity for expansion. Despite these shortages, and internal resistance from some alliance members, the Security Council passed Resolution 1510, on 13 October 2003, providing the mandate to expand. The process of expansion lurched forward unevenly; in early 2004, ISAF assumed command of the PRT in Qunduz, and laid out a plan for a gradual four-phase expansion, through the north and west (phases 1 and 2, scheduled for 2005), the south (phase 3, 2006), and partially in the east (phase 4, 2007). In October 2005 the NAC took the controversial decision to expand ISAF to the volatile south, and assumed command of the majority of forces in Afghanistan ahead of schedule in 2006.

ISAF has grown progressively over the years, from the original 5,000 deployed in 2002 to a force of more than 32,000 today, including approximately 12,600 US troops absorbed in September 2006. The operation is structured with distinct yet cooperative units. ISAF headquarters, in Kabul, provides direction and planning to all units and acts as the focal point for liaison with the UN, the Afghan government, and other relevant parties. Five regional commands cover ISAF: north, west, south, east, and capital. Each regional command also has responsibility for its PRTs, which operate within a quasi-independent structure, commanded by a lead NATO nation. There are currently twenty-five PRTs, all of which are under NATO command. In addition, the Air Task Force plans and conducts ISAF air operations, and forward bases provide logistical, medical, and security support to PRTs in each region. Since January 2004, NATO has



International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| • Authorization date | 20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386) |
| • Start date | December 2001 |
| • Head of mission | General David J. Richards
(United Kingdom) |
| • Budget | \$102.4 million (October 2005–
September 2006) |
| • Strength as of
October 2006 | Troops: 32,600 |

For detailed mission information see p. 381.

had a senior civilian representative based in Kabul to advise the government and serve as correspondent for the NAC.

The PRTs have evolved to become ISAF's main force element throughout Afghanistan. They are designed and staffed to provide civil and military support to provincial governments, to promote a secure and safe environment, and to work closely with UNAMA and the international community. These objectives are accomplished through a mix of patrolling, monitoring, and mediation that vary by location, depending on the country providing the

PRT. Throughout most of the year, many states retained significant caveats on their troops, restricting the types of missions they could undertake and where. At the NATO summit in late November, most of the caveats were removed, although large contributors like Germany and Italy continued to avoid combat missions in the south.

The core mandate of ISAF has remained consistent in its focus on security and stability. The Commander's Intent has incorporated a broad reading of this mandate, stating that ISAF "seeks to reinforce the people of Afghanistan's belief that long-term peace and growing economic prosperity . . . is possible."¹ ISAF works to resolve conflict, reduce tension, defeat the residual insurgency, and support and train the Afghan national security forces. Although the scope of ISAF operations has expanded with its assumption of responsibility for security across Afghanistan, in principle the mandate will remain distinct from the remnants of OEF, which continue to conduct "kinetic" operations.

Innovatively, ISAF also identified three key areas of work under the theme of assistance to secure economic growth: securing mineral resources, border crossing points, the transport network, water and power supply; supporting the government of Afghanistan in its counternarcotics campaign; and assisting the government in executing its development strategy.

ISAF: Key Developments and Challenges

Mission Expansion, NATO Takeover

The peace operations in Afghanistan have been *sui generis*. That ISAF's mandate places it in a position of assistance and support to the government of Afghanistan was in clear contrast with coalition forces that conduct "full-spectrum operations . . . to defeat Al Qaeda and associated movements, establish an enduring Afghan security structure and reshape its posture for the Long War."²

The year 2006 ushered in significant change in the role and operational footing of ISAF. As noted, in December 2005, NATO

agreed to deploy ISAF forces to the south and the east, executing the third phase of its plan for expansion. NATO formally assumed responsibility for those areas on 31 July 2006, increasing ISAF's mission staffing requirement to 15,000 personnel.

In September 2006, NATO commanders took the unusual step of publicly calling for an additional deployment of 2,000 troops, improved air support, and more equipment in the face of rising violence. Initial responses were negative, but intense diplomacy at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in New York led to contributions from Poland, Romania, Britain, and Canada, reaching the 2,000 mark. Germany, Italy, and Spain, which all have large contingents in the more secure north and west, have declined both to redeploy to the south or the east, and to add further troops in these areas.

On 28 September 2006, NATO further announced that it would take command over 12,000 US forces in eastern Afghanistan, bringing the total number of troops under NATO command to over 32,000. This process marked the completion of the fourth phase of the NATO expansion. As the year drew to a close, approximately 10,000 soldiers—primarily within special operations in the east, and involved in training the Afghan National Army (ANA)—remained under US command.

Security and the Upsurge in Violence

There was a significant upswing in insurgent activity in Afghanistan. The frequency of suicide bombings also rose, with more than sixty attacks in 2006, up from seven in 2005. Meanwhile, ISAF units deployed to the south were engaged in serious combat against a determined opposition, confirming the fears of NATO allies that were reluctant to expand the mission to the south and east. Fatality figures among military forces were rising; the injury totals for the first nine months of the year already exceeded those for 2005.

Civilian casualties and the social cost of conflict as a result of insurgent attacks and military responses remained a concern. For example, NATO's operation in Panjwaii district, known as Operation Medusa, caused an

estimated 500–1,500 “Taliban fatalities”; local reports suggested that there were civilian casualties, and government figures counted at least 2,500 displaced families. Operation Medusa was launched only a few months after President Karzai stated at a press conference, speaking on the subject of Afghan casualties, that “the international community [must] reassess the manner in which this war against terror is conducted.” A task for security actors into 2007 and beyond will be to assess at what level the costs of aggressive counterinsurgency operations are acceptable when those costs are borne by already disgruntled civilians. The operation in Panjwaii was hailed as a military success by NATO commanders, who noted that they were able to reopen a key highway and establish a permanent presence. However, it did not appear to have diminished the vigor of the insurgency.

Insurgent activity extended beyond targeting ISAF and coalition forces. On 10 September 2006, a suicide bomber assassinated Hakim Taniwal, the governor of Paktia province; this was followed by a second suicide bomber at his funeral the next day. Frequent storming of towns that lack a government presence demonstrated the freedom of the insurgency

movement to operate, as happened in Mian Nishin on 18 June, and in Garmsir on 11 September. The coalition-led response to such incidents was swift, and towns were quickly recaptured. Based on the frequency of such events, it seemed that these insurgent attacks were demonstrations of strength rather than attempts to secure territory.

In conjunction with this rise in violence, the level of resentment against the international intervention soared. The crash of a US military vehicle on 29 May sparked riots where, for the first time in public, members of the group that had led the resistance to the Taliban—Panjshiris—were arrayed against President Karzai, NATO, and the coalition. Expert testimony before the US House of Representatives in September quoted civilians as saying: “The people have totally lost trust in the government,” and “the people have no hope for this government now.”³

The ANA has performed well, especially during the 2005 elections. It consequently came under increasing direct attack by insurgents, particularly in areas where it had conducted joint operations with OEF forces. The remainder of 2006, and early 2007, will test the effectiveness and resiliency of ANA forces, which now number approximately 26,900 troops. Reform of the police sector progressed less well in 2006, with Secretary-General Annan acknowledging that the Afghan police had limited ability beyond Kabul, and lacked leadership, equipment, and facilities—a situation compounded by the absence of a functioning judicial and penal system. There does not appear to be a consistent strategy for training police at the provincial level, with individual PRTs providing uncoordinated assistance.

Table 3.2.1 Military Fatalities in Afghanistan, 2005–2006

	2005	2006	Percentage Increase
January	2	1	50
February	2	17	850
March	6	13	217
April	19	5	26
May	4	17	425
June	29	22	76
July	2	19	950
August	33	29	88
September	12	37	308
October	10	17	17
November	7	9	12
December	4	4	10
Total	130	191	147

Source: <http://www.icasualties.org/oef>.

UNAMA: Mandate and Functions

UNAMA was initially mandated to assist Afghans to create political legitimacy through democratization, maintain peace and stability by negotiating disputes, monitor and report on human rights, advise on institution building, and assist in aid coordination. The mission was divided into two pillars. The first pillar,

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

- Authorization and start date 28 March 2002 (UNSC Res. 1401)
- SRSO Tom Koenigs (Germany)
- Senior military adviser Brigadier Philip Jones (United Kingdom)
- Senior police adviser Roberto Bernal (Philippines)
- Budget \$68.4 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006
 - Military advisers/liaison officers: 11
 - Police advisers: 3
 - International civilian staff: 191
 - Local civilian staff: 769
 - UN volunteers: 30

For detailed mission information see p. 243.

“RRR,” remained focused on relief, recovery, and reconstruction, while the second, “Political Affairs,” had responsibility for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and elections, and later expanded its activities to include verification of political and human rights. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSO) has special advisers on human rights, gender, drugs, rule of law, police, military, demobilization, and legal issues.

UNAMA successfully discharged its initial responsibility to shepherd through the commitments made in Bonn. Two Loya Jirgas were convened peacefully, and both presidential and parliamentary elections were accomplished with fewer incidents than expected. UNAMA’s role in economic governance has also been important, both through work at the provincial level, and through convening the Afghan Development Forum, as well as arranging the January 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan.

UNAMA: Key Developments and Challenges

Development and Governance

The January 2006 London Conference led to the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year agenda

for security, governance, rule of law, human rights, counternarcotics, and economic and social development. The compact is a departure from previous development frameworks. It established an action plan, and measurable, time-bound political and developmental benchmarks. Participating countries and organizations pledged a total of \$10.5 billion to Afghanistan over a five-year period.

The compact seeks to establish a joint coordination and monitoring board, to be co-chaired by the government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, which will form an important part of the responsibilities of UNAMA. In conjunction with its mandate to help build legitimate government institutions and promote political stability, and to provide targeted technical assistance to the security sector, gender, counternarcotics, and human rights monitoring, this new function will require an effective mission. The UN responded to these challenges with innovative steps, such as the recruitment of governance officers within UNAMA—a move that recognizes the need to play an active state-building role in Afghanistan. UNAMA also continues to support the Disarming Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process, and assists the parliament and numerous coordinating bodies. However, it has moved away from deliverables, and toward a monitoring and support role.

The year 2006 also saw continued economic recovery. In addition to positive macroeconomic fundamentals, the completion of key infrastructure projects—such as the road from Jalalabad to Torkham—is helping to facilitate economic growth and the revenue capabilities of the Afghan government. President Karzai’s christening of a new Coca-Cola bottling plant on 10 September provided a widely publicized example of the potential for international investment in Afghanistan.

Optimism on this front, however, has been tempered by the rapid growth in the narco-economy. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime predicts that this year’s poppy harvest will break all previous records, reaching 6,100 tons, or 92 percent of world supply, and

exceeding global consumption by 30 percent, potentially allowing drug barons to stockpile and thereby weather and profit from any successful eradication programs.⁴ There are signs that some of the economic growth is driven by the lucrative profits of the drug trade, impeding the establishment of law and order. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the government continues to lack the institutions and service-delivery capacity necessary to project power into the provinces and thereby secure the allegiance of its citizens away from warlords and drug barons.



(Corbis/Syed Jan Sabawoon)

An Italian ISAF soldier distributes notebooks and pens to Afghan students in a Kabul school, 19 October 2006.

Conclusion

As the year 2006 drew to a close, it remained to be seen whether NATO's assumption of command would be enough to counteract the challenge of the Taliban. Statements of long-term commitment from leaders in Canada and the UK may be tested by significant casualties. The effect of the upsurge in violence on reconstruction activities had not yet played out: it was unclear whether economic gains made between 2002 and 2005 would be reversed, and whether infrastructural improvements would be damaged or lost. In late 2006, there was increasing concern over Taliban movement between Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and the location of its command structures beyond the reach of ISAF and the Afghan government.

Meanwhile, there is a healthy appetite for peace in Afghanistan, though tempered with frustration and disenchantment. The challenge is not only to provide security to Afghans, but also to ensure that the fragile institutions of government can create a governance relationship with citizens to strengthen the legitimacy of the state. A serious, multiyear commitment to this goal by international agencies and security actors would offer room for hope.

Notes

1. ISAF, "Commander's Statement of Intent— ISAF IX," <http://www.jcfsb.nato.int/isaf>.
2. See <http://www.cfc-a.centcom.mil/information/coalition%20forces%20in%20afghanistan.htm>.
3. Barnett R. Rubin, "Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink," written testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C., 21 September 2006, p. 2.
4. "Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2006," <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf>.

Democratic Republic of Congo

The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) remains the UN's largest and most complex peacekeeping mission. MONUC has assisted in a transitional process as an outcome of a peace agreement, while conducting a low- to medium-intensity peace enforcement operation in the eastern parts of the country. In the meantime, a major humanitarian crisis has emerged in the southeastern province of Katanga. Despite the odds, the period from late 2005 to late 2006 was one of relative achievement for MONUC. Assistance with organizing a successful constitutional referendum of 25 million registered voters, and a registration drive that led to mostly orderly presidential and national (parliamentary) elections, were major accomplishments. While the presidential elections were peaceful, an outburst of violence between supporters of the two leading presidential contenders after the results were announced required MONUC and a standby force, the EU Force Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), to intervene on the streets of Kinshasa. Subsequent violence, both prior to and in the aftermath of the run-off at the end of October 2006, served to highlight the challenges ahead in consolidating peace, despite the achievement of the milestone the elections represented.

At the same time, MONUC has intensified its joint operations with the DRC's military forces, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), in the eastern part of the country. The robust campaign showed some important successes: Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the situation, by the end of September 2006, as being stable in the Kivus and relatively calm

in Katanga, but still volatile in Ituri. These joint operations have come at a significant price. Although partially achieving the goal of weakening militias and foreign armed groups that threaten local populations in the Kivus and Ituri, they have also tarnished MONUC's reputation by association with the FARDC—seen by many as no better than the marauding groups it is fighting. Security sector reform, and the accompanying extension of state authority, remain pressing concerns of MONUC, the EU, and bilateral partners.

Background


The war in the DRC formally ended in 2002 with the signing of the Global All-Inclusive Accord, after several years of intermittent fighting despite the signing of a cease-fire agreement in 1999. A transitional government was established, with Joseph Kabila as president, and with four vice presidents, representing the president's party (the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy [PPRD]), the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie [RCD-Goma]), the Movement for Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the unarmed opposition and civil society. A government of national unity and transition was installed in June 2003, and a two-year timeline was agreed on for convening elections, involving a referendum on the constitution, followed by legislative and presidential ballots.

However, insecurity in eastern parts of the country destabilized the transition from 2003 to 2006. A crisis in Bunia (Ituri) in the spring of 2003 led to the deployment by the

EU of a Security Council–mandated, French-led emergency force (Operation Artemis). The force had a mandate to provide security for a three-month period, pending reinforcement of MONUC’s presence in the area. An even more serious challenge to the DRC’s peace process came in May–June 2004, when dissidents overran the town of Bukavu in South Kivu. MONUC’s inability to prevent this takeover led to rioting and serious violence throughout the DRC, some of which was directed at MONUC. The dissidents withdrew in June, but only after a loss of credibility for the peace operation and the transitional government. Robust military action by the UN and the FARDC, starting in early 2005, combined with improved regional relations and political progress toward the constitutional referendum of 2005, brought the security situation under relative control.

MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo: Mandate and Functions

MONUC continued to operate under the robust mandate granted to it earlier in 2004 and 2005. On 6 September 2005, Security Council Resolution 1621 authorized MONUC to acquire 841 additional police personnel, including six formed police units of 125 officers each to train the Congolese police and provide security during the elections. Through Resolution 1635 (2005), the Council authorized a temporary increase of 300 military personnel in order to allow the deployment of an infantry battalion in Katanga. This was enhanced on 7 April 2006, through Resolution 1669, with the redeployment of an infantry battalion, a military hospital, and fifty military observers from the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB). By the time of the July elections, MONUC’s strength had reached 17,416 troops and 1,119 police personnel, including five (out of the six authorized) formed police units. While these rather small enhancements were useful, it illustrated the unwillingness of the Security Council to significantly expand MONUC, despite the enormity of tasks required for the impending elections



Map No. 4255.8 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS
September 2006

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

• Authorization and start date	30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279)
• SRSG	William Lacy Swing (United States)
• Force commander	Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)
• Police commissioner	Daniel Curé (France)
• Budget	\$1.094 billion (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 16,627 Military observers: 763 Police: 1,107 International civilian staff: 959 Local civilian staff: 2,063 UN volunteers: 656

For detailed mission information see p. 222.

and the continuing insecurity in large parts of the country.

On 25 April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1671, authorizing the EU to deploy a standby force (EUFOR) to the DRC, for the four months following the first round of presidential and national parliamentary elections. Composed of about 2,000

mainly French and German troops and having a Chapter VII mandate, it was there to help MONUC provide security and protect civilians. Most of the troops were deployed “over the horizon” in Gabon, but some 800 were stationed at the airport in Kinshasa. Four hundred troops were rapidly deployed during the events of August 2006 to suppress the fighting that erupted between supporters of President Kabila and those of Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba. Joint patrols in the aftermath of those incidents, and EUFOR’s increased deployment in Kinshasa ahead of polling on 29 October, had significant political value, although its military impact should not be exaggerated.

The EU also has a police presence in the DRC, the first civil mission for crisis management the EU has sent to Africa within the framework of its European Security and Defense

Policy (ESDP). Established in April 2005, its mandate is to advise the Congolese Integrated Police Unit and to ensure its actions are consistent with democratic policing standards. Composed of about thirty people, it operates under the overall policy guidance of the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello. The EU has also sent five experts to occupy posts in defense institutions in the DRC, including that of the Ministry of Defense and joint general staff. Called EUSEC DR Congo, the objective of the mission is to provide advice and assistance on security sector reform.

Key Developments

Elections

MONUC achieved a significant milestone with the successful organization of the constitutional referendum in December 2005. Of the more than 25 million voters who were registered, more than 15 million participated—voting in favor of the constitution. While MONUC acknowledged irregularities in certain areas, and low turnout in key opposition strongholds, the result was nonetheless groundbreaking. The people of the DRC had never experienced such an intensive registration exercise, nor gone to the polls in such numbers.

This was followed by the passing in parliament of an electoral law, in March 2006, that established 169 electoral constituencies and provided for two rounds of presidential elections (if required), as well as national parliamentary elections. It was clear throughout this process that MONUC needed to play a leading role together with members of the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) in pushing the process along. MONUC, together with UNDP and other international and local partners, including the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), prepared an integrated operational plan. Two hundred thirteen parties and groupings registered candidates for the legislative elections, while thirty-three candidates did so for

EU Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)

- Authorization date 27 April 2006 (Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP)
- Start date July 2006
- Head of mission Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany)
- Budget \$21.2 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 2,370

For detailed mission information see p. 379.

EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)

- Authorization date 2 May 2005 (Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP)
- Start date June 2005
- Head of mission General Pierre-Michel Joana (France)
- Budget \$4.8 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Military advisers: 24
Local staff: 10

the presidential elections. The leader of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), Etienne Tshisekedi, remained out of the race, despite repeated interventions by local and international actors and belated resolution of the UDPS's demands.

The national legislative and presidential elections, held on 30 July 2006, suffered only minor episodes of violence and boycotts, none of which were deemed to have had a significant impact on the results. MONUC, together with other international partners, deployed to about a hundred territorial capitals and cities. Hundreds of monitors were deployed, with finalization of the electoral list and the establishment of polling stations (numbering some 50,000) taking place until the last day. One hundred seventy different types of ballots, printed with the assistance of the government of South Africa, were distributed throughout the country by MONUC, from designated regional hubs. Concurrently, MONUC trained several thousand national police officers, and certified over a thousand police instructors. The preliminary electoral results put the overall turnout at 71 percent, with 17.9 million registered voters (out of 25.4 million) casting their votes. President Kabila emerged as the leading candidate, with 44.81 percent, followed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, with 20.03 percent, as the runner-up. The results of the parliamentary elections were roughly the same, which means that Kabila's presidential victory in October enables him to command a majority in the National Assembly.

The announcement of the first-round results was marred by three days of violence and exchanges of fire between elements loyal to President Kabila and those loyal to Bemba. With the intervention of MONUC and EUFOR, and mediation by the SRSG of MONUC and the CIAT, the violence was quelled. It was nonetheless a sign of the extreme tensions underlying the political process in the DRC. A second round of presidential elections was held on 29 October. The lead-up to the run-off was tense, with some violence, but the polls were

conducted in relative peace. A turnout of 65 percent resulted in a victory for Kabila, with 58 percent of the votes, 2.5 million more than his rival Jean-Pierre Bemba. However, the voting showed a sharp east-west divide, with Kabila losing badly in Kinshasa. Bemba challenged the results, and his supporters purportedly set fire to the Supreme Court building, where the allegations of fraud were being considered. The outcome of the elections stood and—following an ultimatum delivered by Kabila—Bemba began withdrawing his forces from Kinshasa on 24 November. In late November, Bemba formally conceded defeat and vowed to go into political opposition “to preserve peace and save the country from chaos and violence.” This quite remarkable outcome gives President Kabila the opportunity to demonstrate that he can be the unifying leader that the country needs. The job was not made easier by a serious outburst of violence in eastern DRC by dissidents loyal to Laurent Nkunda, a former general in the Congolese army. UN and FARDC troops managed to restore a degree of calm, but the situation remained very tense until representatives of Kabila and Nkunda held talks hosted by Rwanda in early January 2007. It was hoped that a Great Lakes security and development pact, signed by eleven countries, would help stabilize the region following the landmark DRC elections.

Security

The FARDC, composed of units of the former combatants, has a reputation as one of the worst human rights violators in the DRC. At the same time, it represents the only local instrument of force to extend state authority in the country. While joint operations by MONUC and the FARDC have been necessary, they have tarnished MONUC's reputation by association. During 2006, MONUC continued and intensified its cooperation with the FARDC. In Ituri, joint operations were conducted in the Djugu and Fataki areas between March and May, and in Tchei in May. A joint operation in Irumu was postponed due

to a mutiny in a unit of the FARDC, highlighting the tenuous discipline in the Congolese army. Owing to the weak state of the FARDC, MONUC launched a sensitive and high-risk operation by its Guatemalan special forces against militias of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Garamba national park in January 2006. The Guatemalans sustained heavy casualties: eight soldiers were killed. The operation cast into relief the dangerous conditions under which MONUC personnel have been fighting, and underlined the need for continued assessment of their preparedness for battle.

In May 2006, seven Nepalese peacekeepers were taken hostage (and one killed) by militia members loyal to Ituri warlord Peter Karim. The hostages were eventually released in June and July 2006, after protracted negotiations and a deal with the Kinshasa authorities to reward Karim with a position in the FARDC military command.

In continuing action against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in North Kivu, over a hundred fighters in the Beni area were killed during a joint MONUC-FARDC operation, which resulted in the disintegration of this group and the surrender of almost a hundred combatants. However, elsewhere in North Kivu, MONUC had to launch operations to clear Rwindi and Kibrizi of rebels allied with the Laurent Nkunda militia, with which many FARDC elements had earlier been cooperating, after several towns fell to the Nkunda-allied forces in January 2006.

In Bunyakiri in South Kivu, the FARDC and MONUC continued their joint campaign against the Democratic Forces for Liberation of the Congo (Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda [FDLR]), causing the displacement of over a thousand of its combatants and their dependents from South to North Kivu. Meanwhile, instability and violence in Katanga continued. Fighting between the FARDC and the Mayi Mayi caused massive displacement in central Katanga (up to 350,000 internally displaced persons). MONUC tried to defuse this situation by seeking the agreement of the FARDC com-

mand and the Kinshasa authorities to obtain the surrender of the Mayi Mayi leader, Kyungu Mutanga Gédéon. One positive development was that Fidele Ntumbi and his associated groups, as well as other Mayi Mayi militias, surrendered their weapons to MONUC. As the end of the year approached, MONUC was formulating a strategy on how to deal with the crisis in Katanga, which would focus on the largely ineffective DDR process.

Thus, MONUC was able to substantially disrupt the operations of the various armed groups, especially in the Kivus. The scale of the threat posed by foreign armed groups had declined considerably by the end of the year. However, a major weakness has been the lack of political follow-up to these operations. While MONUC can be faulted for a lack of political strategy, it is primarily the responsibility of the political leaders of the DRC.

Security Sector Reform

Despite pronouncements by the international community and DRC authorities, not much progress occurred in security sector reform in 2006. The Joint Commission on Security Sector Reform convened, but was unable to address the structural changes required to overhaul the weak and undisciplined FARDC. Deficiencies in the brassage process were highlighted by two episodes (mentioned above) in the eastern DRC: in January in North Kivu, FARDC elements joined up with those loyal to Nkunda; and in February near Irumu, Ituri, the FARDC caved in prior to combat. These were not isolated events. Similar incidents were accompanied by harassment of local civilians and widespread looting and pillaging. While much of this ill-discipline can be attributed to the lack of payment of salaries and an inadequate chain of command, there is also a prevailing culture of corruption within the higher command of the FARDC.

MONUC and the EU were in discussions to produce a joint program for long-term reform of the military and the police in the DRC. It is unclear how active a role the newly elected DRC government will allow the international community to play. Part of

the difficulty with security sector reform (SSR) to date was that a weak transitional government could not take the lead or even serve as an effective partner. The DRC lacks a “patron” in the process, like the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone. The result was brassage of different units of the FARDC by different states and organizations on the basis of their own varying standards. By the end of October 2006, the DRC government had created fourteen integrated brigades, at least in name, with the aim of raising this number to eighteen. Six were functioning at the time, and six more were in the process of being made functional, although, judging by the varying quality of the first six (which range from effective to dismal), mere establishment of integrated brigades may not be enough. These integrated brigades represent the first step in SSR and must be accompanied by the adequate and timely payment of salaries to all ranks, as well as better oversight of the military.

Fight Against Impunity

Due to the lack of a properly functioning military and police, coupled with a weak justice

and prison system, insecurity in the DRC has continued, with very limited attempts at punitive action against those who engage in human rights abuses, let alone commit everyday crimes. Military justice is becoming a priority and, in fact, the FARDC has made some progress by bringing blatant violators to court through the military justice system.

MONUC reached a significant milestone in 2006 by being the first UN peacekeeping operation to actively facilitate the transfer of a suspect, warlord Thomas Lubanga, to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Nonetheless, the fight against impunity has been an uphill battle in the face of continued bad news throughout the year, including the transfer of senior military commanders responsible for violations to other positions in the FARDC, the discovery of a mass grave in North Kivu, the excessive and frequent use of force by state authorities, and harassment of political opponents by those authorities. Displacement of civilians in Katanga, Ituri, and elsewhere continued with abuses committed by both FARDC and rebel personnel. Meanwhile, discussions continued



(UN Photo/Martine Perret)

MONUC peacekeepers patrol on Lake Albert, 8 October 2006.

Box 3.3.1 From ONUC to MONUC

When the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) reached its highest strength, 18,536 troops, in August 2006, it was still below the peak of 19,898 soldiers achieved by the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), in July 1961. The expansion of MONUC has invited comparisons with the earlier operation, deployed from 1960 to 1964, which was the UN's first in sub-Saharan Africa and by far its biggest during the Cold War. In both cases, the UN has made robust use of force: while MONUC is mandated to use "all necessary means" against militias in the country's east, and has lost 98 soldiers to date, ONUC launched three campaigns in the secessionist province of Katanga, suffering 249 fatalities over four years. Both missions have also had ambitious state-building tasks: ONUC staff were in part intended to replace the departing Belgian colonial administration, and even included agronomists; MONUC supported a complex transitional process leading to elections in 2006.

A comparison of ONUC and MONUC is made possible by a 1966 study of the former published by the Brookings Institution. It reveals distinct differences

between the two forces. The first is in their deployment: whereas MONUC's mandated and actual size has grown gradually since 1999, ONUC deployed extremely quickly in its first month. The mission was mandated on 14 July 1960 and by 20 August had fielded 14,295 troops, a number that rose to 19,443 by the end of the year. This rapid deployment was facilitated by US airlift, on which the mission relied heavily; during the entire four years the United States transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo within the Congo.

ONUC relied not only on US planes, but also on US funding. The United States paid 41.5 percent of the mission's total cost, \$411 million, in contrast to its current contribution of 26 percent of the peacekeeping budget. But ONUC was a much cheaper mission than MONUC: its annual cost of roughly \$100 million is the equivalent of \$650 million today, whereas MONUC's projected requirements for the 2005–2006 financial year were \$1,094 million.

The missions also differ markedly in terms of force origin: in 1960, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld prioritized involving African troops, and in December 1960, 75 percent of ONUC

forces (14,700 soldiers) were from African states. This percentage would decline due to disputes over the mission, but the African contribution never fell below a third of the total deployment. By contrast, African troops currently represent just 20 percent of MONUC soldiers. ONUC was important as the first mission in which South Asian personnel proved crucial to the UN. From 1961 to 1963, India was the largest troop contributor to ONUC—as it would be forty-five years later to MONUC.

One problem common to both missions has been sustaining command and control across a vast territory. ONUC maintained a multinational headquarters in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), while single-nation commands were responsible for specific provinces. But as the UN launched antimercenary operations in Katanga in 1961, it created a stand-alone multinational command in the region. MONUC likewise formed a divisional headquarters in the east when it began antimilitia operations there in February 2005. If ONUC left this precedent for MONUC, it remains to be seen whether MONUC will follow a similar exit pattern: ONUC drew down from 19,782 to 0 in sixteen months, in 1963–1964.

Source: "United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960–1964: An Analysis of Political and Military Control," The Brookings Institution, 1966.

about operationalizing the nascent Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Challenges Ahead

As noted above, MONUC was in the rare position of supporting implementation of a peace agreement and organizing elections in a massive country, while at the same time conducting fairly intense military operations. MONUC plays a major, sometimes leading, role in these "joint"

operations, but it lacks the mandate and capacity to engage in the fighting by itself. Ultimately, the Congolese government is responsible for extending its authority throughout the country. This, of course, has to be done in a manner that does not alienate a local populace who already view the FARDC as the poorly assembled composite of the former rebel armies. MONUC's dilemma is clear: endeavor to extend state authority via cooperation with the FARDC, the sole means of doing so, or allow the eastern part

of the country to continue to exist in lawlessness, thereby causing untold suffering for hundreds of thousands of civilians. In this context, real restructuring and reform of the FARDC is essential.

Another significant challenge for MONUC concerns the manner with which it employs force during combat. Compared to two years ago, when MONUC ignominiously allowed itself to be faced down by the Nkunda-Mutebutsi forces in Bukavu in June 2004, the mission has acted far more robustly. This began in 2005, culminating in a change in the rules of engagement in early 2006. However, MONUC's greater willingness to take risks, sometimes imperils the lives of its own personnel. The botched military operation involving Guatemalan special forces demonstrates one of the dilemmas inherent in the use of force in modern peace operations: mandates that are not matched by capacity, because of lack of experience, lack of equipment, or poor chain of command.

Conclusion

Undeniably, the DRC is more peaceful today than it was several years ago. The most evident sign of this is the relative ease with which trade, commerce, and traffic now flow across the country. Despite MONUC's mixed performance, some of this improvement is attributable to its efforts. While the mission

simply muddled along in many areas, the emerging, more robust military approach diminished the justifications of neighbors to intervene. From the perspective of today, the three-year power-sharing arrangement leading to successful elections confounded the skeptics.

This better state of affairs was not due to a comprehensive, overarching strategy on the part of the international community; a host of factors, including less meddling by neighbors, helped. The relative inattention of the international community, other than in response to major episodes like in Ituri in May 2003, Bukavu in June 2004, and perhaps Katanga in early 2006, has allowed the Congolese political class to act with impunity and little regard for the well-being of the country. The elections are likely to be seen as a turning point, but the political culture in the DRC will not change overnight, especially given the regional divide and Kabila's limited support in the western part of the country, including Kinshasa. The year drew to a close with MONUC and UN headquarters developing a postelection strategy that would focus on good governance and the rule of law (including in the management of resources), while helping the new government to maintain security and increasing the pace of security sector reform. Pressure on MONUC to militarily draw down should be resisted if the DRC's highly tenuous peace is to be irreversible.

Haiti

In 2006 the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) oversaw the delayed elections of a new president and parliament, ending a two-year period of transitional government initiated by the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004. While the count following the presidential poll sparked public disorder, it was followed by a period of tenuous calm in the slums of the capital, Port-au-Prince. But the third quarter of the year saw a renewal of violence and kidnappings in the city. MINUSTAH responded through direct police and military action, while assisting the new government to plan reforms of the dysfunctional national law and order apparatus.

The Haitian state remains extremely weak, and the UN's activities have evolved to compensate for the absence of local capacity to develop policy and legislation, although the mission has no executive mandate for policy implementation. Yet the chances for stability are inhibited by the fragility of Haiti's political system, its status as a conduit for drug smuggling and the fact that four-fifths of the population lives on \$2 a day or less.

MINUSTAH: Mandate and Functions

MINUSTAH began operations in June 2004, replacing and incorporating elements of a US-led multinational interim force that had deployed that March after an insurgency in the north of the country spread into the capital, culminating in the resignation and exile of President Aristide. A transitional government was established under the premiership of Gérard Latortue, largely consisting of opponents of Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party, which

had held power since 1996. Security Council Resolution 1542 mandated MINUSTAH to support the government through direct security operations, to assist in vetting and reforming the national police, and to help the Haitian authorities conduct DDR programs for all armed groups. It also authorized the mission to monitor human rights and to "develop a strategy" to reform the judiciary.

In addition to security and justice issues, the mandate directed MINUSTAH to help the government develop a national political dialogue and organize presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections. In June 2005, Security Council Resolution 1608 authorized a temporary expansion of the mission to secure the first polls, but also requested the Secretary-General to devise "a progressive drawdown strategy of the MINUSTAH force levels for the postelection period, in accordance with the situation on the ground."

However, 2006 has seen MINUSTAH reinforce rather than reduce its role. Resolution 1658, of February 2006, directed the Secretary-General to consult with the incoming government on the mission's future role. In August the Security Council passed Resolution 1702, which only marginally reduced MINUSTAH's mandated military presence and kept its police strength level, instructed the mission to continue pursuing police reform and DDR, and expanded its responsibilities for "monitoring, restructuring, reforming, and strengthening the justice system," in part through "the provision of experts to serve as professional resources." The mission has transitioned from assisting the political process necessary to establish a democratically elected

government, to helping that government stabilize and reform the Haitian state.


Background

Prior to 2006, MINUSTAH was confronted by interlinked political and security challenges arising from the fall of Aristide. Any legitimate political process toward elections required the participation of Lavalas—which maintained a significant following among the urban poor—but the transitional government did not wish to create any political space for the former president’s followers. It excluded Lavalas members from the interim administration as well as from an agreement on the political process that led to the elections of late 2005. The government and the UN faced violent opposition from gangs, many ostensibly loyal to Aristide, in the slums of northern and central Port-au-Prince.

In 2005, MINUSTAH was also concerned about the danger from former members of the Haitian military (the ex-FAD’H), which had been disbanded in 1995. These former members had seized police stations outside Port-au-Prince, but their purported leader, Ravix Remissainthe, was killed during a joint operation by Haitian police and UN forces in April 2005. While demonstrations by ex-FAD’H in 2006 were ill-attended, UN officials believe that the demobilized soldiers still represent a potential if diminished threat.

Another significant challenge to law and order came from the Haitian National Police (HNP) itself. Its members are known to play a major role in drug trafficking, and to conduct summary executions. The force’s director has stated in public that he believes that 25 percent of his officers are seriously corrupt. MINUSTAH thus aimed to take on the gangs alongside the HNP, while trying to reform the latter. Plans to vet police officers moved slowly prior to 2006, not least because the HNP lacked clear staff records, necessitating a new registration process.

Anti-gang operations had troubling consequences: in July 2005, UN military and police



UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

• Authorization date	30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542)
• Start date	1 June 2004
• SRSG	Edmond Mulet (Guatemala)
• Force commander	Lieutenant-General José Elito Siqueira Carvalho (Brazil)
• Police commissioner	TBA
• Budget	\$489.2 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 6,642 Civilian police: 1,700 International civilian staff: 417 Local civilian staff: 529 UN volunteers: 165

For detailed mission information see p. 213.

forces mounted a large-scale operation in the Cité Soleil slum district, which appeared to result in a number of civilian deaths, as a result of either crossfire or revenge attacks. Although operations in two other slum areas met with some success, the gang threat mounted in late 2005, as MINUSTAH faced well-targeted assaults on its positions. More destabilizing still was a spike in kidnappings of Haitian civilians: there were 241

cases in December 2005, compared to 193 in the previous three months combined.

If the rise in violence in late 2005 was in part motivated by the approach of the presidential elections, originally planned for October, the polls also faced severe political obstacles. MINUSTAH prioritized ensuring the participation of Lavalas, despite the government's disapproval, and finally persuaded the party to put forward a presidential candidate, Marc Bazin, in August 2005. But political calculations were altered by the decision of René Préval, a former ally of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and president from 1996 to 2001, to enter the race as the candidate of a loose political coalition, Lespwa. Préval was soon recognized as the leader in a race that involved thirty-three candidates. But the transitional government and its allies on the Provisional Election Commission (CEP) remained keen to maintain power by minimizing progress toward an election. Voting was postponed four times, before finally being scheduled for 7 February 2006.

MINUSTAH had difficult relations with the transitional authorities across a number of other areas. Reform of the justice sector proved problematic, with the government instituting legislation that appeared to solidify rather than prevent political control of the judiciary. On disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), MINUSTAH struggled to engage the gangs: while it was estimated that there were 13,000 guns in the hands of illegally armed groups, MINUSTAH had collected fewer than a hundred by mid-2006.¹ On economic issues, an interim cooperation framework had been agreed by the government, MINUSTAH, and donors, but its implementation was undermined by a lack of strategic coordination, the slow disbursement of pledged funds, and the agreement's excessively complex structure (involving twenty-two specific-issue working groups). The February elections thus came after a period of limited progress toward lasting stability in Haiti. The mission had also been shaken by the death by suicide of its force commander,

General Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar, in early January.

MINUSTAH: Key Developments and Challenges

Electoral Process and Outcomes

That the February 2006 elections took place at all reflected a shift in the international community's policy. Resolution 1608, of June 2005, mandated temporary increases in MINUSTAH's military and police strength to secure the polls. In September, MINUSTAH and concerned governments concluded that voting would only occur if the UN were to not merely assist the process, but take full de facto responsibility for it. The international community persuaded the government to appoint a new executive director of the CEP to work with MINUSTAH, which allowed voter registration to be coordinated with the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti.

MINUSTAH reoriented its operational structure to facilitate the vote. An election task force was created, which allowed coordination between the work of elements of MINUSTAH to develop security and logistics for the polls, overseen by a joint electoral support center—similar operational centers were set up in all ten of Haiti's departments. Military attention was focused not only on the capital's slums, but also on logistical efforts such as transporting ballots throughout the countryside, while the mission's civil affairs officers were tasked with new electoral responsibilities. Polling-time security was a primary concern, and MINUSTAH trained 3,600 electoral guards (technically government employees, but paid through the UN Development Programme [UNDP]) to reinforce national and UN forces, although the latter took the lead in securing the highest-risk departments. Nonetheless, a sudden improvement in security in Port-au-Prince in the days immediately before the vote may have been largely attributable to the influence of René Préval.

Polling day was largely calm, with a turnout of 60 percent, but the ensuing vote-counting proved tense, as it first appeared that Préval had, and then had not, passed the 50 percent mark—necessary to avoid a run-off vote. As his share of the vote fell and claims mounted that the CEP was rigging the count against the ex-president, Préval's supporters in Port-au-Prince grew increasingly agitated. Protesters invaded the Montana Hotel, which was acting as a media center for the CEP and a haunt of the international community. Two days of protests later, the CEP decided to pro-rate all blank ballots, giving Préval a majority of 51.21 percent.

Calm was restored in Port-au-Prince, and was sustained during the parliamentary elections of 21 April 2006. The results demonstrated that while Préval's personal popularity might be high, Lespwa's was weaker. Lespwa won eleven of thirty senatorial seats, but only twenty of the ninety-nine places in the lower House of Deputies. This limited legislative base was worrying, given that Préval's first presidency had been afflicted by conflicts with parliament. Nonetheless, both he and his cabinet (which included a number of ministers who had spent recent years outside Haiti) won parliamentary approval in May 2006.

Postelectoral Security and Justice

Five days before the presidential vote, Kofi Annan informed the Security Council that, given the “difficult” security situation in Port-au-Prince and lack of public confidence in the HNP, MINUSTAH still had a “pivotal” security role. UN officials soon found the incoming government much easier to work with on security issues, compared to its predecessor. Nonetheless, the exact balance of duties between national and international authorities remained complex.

Port-au-Prince remained relatively stable until June 2006, when violence began to re-emerge with the massacre of at least twenty-two people in the Martissant slum area. In contrast to the transitional government, the Préval government maintained a dialogue with

OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti

• Authorization date	OAS Permanent Council Decision CP/RES.806 taken on 16 January 2002. In June 2004, OAS General Assembly amended the mandate through A/RES.2058.
• Head of mission	Denneth Modeste (Grenada)
• Budget	\$13 million (October 2005 to September 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Civilian police: 2 International civilian staff: 18 Local civilian staff: 103



Brazilian members of MINUSTAH guard a Port-au-Prince polling center, 7 February 2006.

(Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

the gang leaders, while UN forces gradually increased their presence in the most at-risk areas. In spite of rumors that Aristide loyalists attempted to assert control over the gangs in Cité Soleil, the leaders preferred to keep talking to the government. Protests calling for Aristide's return occurred, but with little momentum.

In late July, the authorities made a further gesture to Lavalas supporters by releasing Aristide's former prime minister, Yvon Neptune (who had been imprisoned without charge by the transitional administration and had been on a hunger strike), on humanitarian grounds. But a fight between gangs over an electricity generator for a television during the World Cup precipitated far broader violence, much of it aimed at MINUSTAH. There was a new outbreak of kidnappings, although these did not reach the levels of December 2005.

MINUSTAH moderated its initial response in line with specific requests from Préval and his advisers to avoid upsetting negotiations with the gangs. But in August 2006, with violence rising, the president stated that those who did not disarm voluntarily would have their weapons confiscated "in a violent manner." His prime minister amplified this message by stating that the gangs should accept DDR, and "if you refuse, you'll be killed."

MINUSTAH was simultaneously reexamining its force posture. Since late 2005, members of the mission had been asking for enhanced police and SWAT teams to avoid collateral damage. Resolution 1702 of 15 August 2006, set force levels of 7,200 troops and 1,915 police for MINUSTAH and called on states "to provide specific expertise in anti-gang operations" to help retrain the HNP. But with the government advocating action, the mission had to make use of its existing resources to restore stability.

On 11 September 2006, MINUSTAH began temporarily redeploying troops from outside Port-au-Prince into Cité Soleil, while setting up vehicle checkpoints along Route Nationale 1, a major artery through the capital's northern slums on which kidnapping was rife. This deployment was supplemented by formed police units under temporary military command. These moves were intended to restrict the gangs' freedom of movement rather than target their leaders. The approach reaped early successes, with a number of gang leaders renewing negotiations with the government or trying to move out of Port-au-

Prince. Traffic began to move along Route Nationale 1. UN officials predicted that this phase of operations could be completed in four months. But two Jordanian peacekeepers were killed in November, and the rate of kidnappings intensified that month.

The short-term success pointed to three longer-term challenges. The first was MINUSTAH's cooperation with the HNP. Having expanded its own presence in Port-au-Prince, MINUSTAH aimed to increase the presence of national police at checkpoints and on patrols in the slums. This built on a broader policy of coordination, by which MINUSTAH police have been co-located at HNP stations (many of them retaken from militias by UN forces) and have routinely accompanied HNP personnel on operations. Yet a high level of mutual mistrust remained, with UN officials wary of passing information to the HNP, and HNP officers complaining that calls for backup were frequently ignored.

These frictions have complicated efforts toward institutional reform of the HNP. Progress has been made on planning the vetting and certification process. Completion of the initial registration of HNP staff is expected by the first quarter of 2007, and new recruits are already the subject of *de facto* vetting. But concerns have mounted that elements in the HNP may attempt to derail the process, which may undercut morale throughout the force and may result in the sacking of up to 2,000 armed and angry police officers. While members of the government declare themselves committed to certification, they complain that MINUSTAH is too narrowly focused on the issue, and is ignoring the HNP's limited resources.

The second challenge highlighted by operations in Port-au-Prince was that of DDR, as the promise of reintegration was held out as an incentive to the gangs. After the earlier slow progress on DDR, MINUSTAH and UNDP officials had argued for a new approach emphasizing grassroots conflict management. Resolution 1702 called for a "comprehensive community violence reduction programme,"

Box 3.4.1 Civilian Police Capacity

The growing number, scale, and scope of police functions in peace operations has meant that demand has vastly outstripped supply. A number of states and organizations have taken steps to increase global civilian police capacity, including the UN, the Group of Eight (G8), and a consortium of European governments.

At the World Summit of September 2005, the heads of state and government endorsed creation of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in the United Nations, which had earlier been requested by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping. A “standing” capacity of experienced officers and advisers on the UN payroll was seen as a necessary next step beyond the existing “standby” system of 100 on-call officers, because few experienced law enforcement personnel are readily available for rapid deployment.

The SPC will serve as a vanguard in starting new operations, and provide expert advice to existing operations. The startup function includes planning for police operations, setting up the headquarters, developing detailed implementation plans, assessing the existing capacity of local law enforcement agencies, and advising them on reform and restructuring.

The SPC would remain in the mission area for about 120 days, until the UN police component is fully staffed and operationally effective. When not required to start up new operations, the SPC would provide targeted and time-limited advisory services to existing operations, with a focus on enhancing indigenous law enforcement institutions.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations issued a policy directive on 1 May 2006, setting out the functions and organization of the SPC for an initial twelve-month period. Twenty-five professional staff are being recruited, plus two support personnel. It will be based at UN headquarters in New York initially, but move outside North America after the first year. An evaluation of the SPC will be conducted at the end of the year to consider its performance and determine whether it should be expanded to 100 personnel.

By contrast, the Center on Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) is not an operational entity, but a training center established in March 2005 as the Italian government’s contribution to the G8’s 2004 action plan for building global peacekeeping capacities. This envisaged training some 7,500 gen-

darmerie by 2010. CoESPU’s role is to “train the trainers” and develop doctrine and disseminate lessons learned through liaising with states and international organizations. It is expected that some 3,000 students will have passed through CoESPU by 2010.

There is also a separate operational cell in Vicenza. In January 2006, five European governments (Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal) inaugurated a thirty-officer headquarters located in the same barracks as CoESPU. This is the standing element of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), which is intended to deploy up to 800 personnel in thirty days. It had been first proposed in 2004 by the Dutch presidency of the EU, but it is not a formal EU body. Decisions regarding its deployment will be taken by a high-level committee of representatives of the states involved, and the EGF is potentially available not only for EU missions, but also for those of NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and ad hoc coalitions. Its costs are borne by the states involved. The EGF headquarters undertook a number of exercises in 2006, but has not directed an actual deployment.

including efforts to employ ex-gang members. While the government had set up a new national disarmament commission by September 2006, MINUSTAH had no time to implement its plans for community dialogues before the authorities delivered a number of gang members to the UN for reintegration training. MINUSTAH had an eight-day package ready, but encountered difficulties with the authorities in identifying participants and cataloging their weapons.

Finally, the September operations and negotiations pointed toward broader problems

with the Haitian justice system. While it was widely speculated that the government offered gang leaders amnesty, the judiciary would have been hard-pressed to handle their cases. Nine-tenths of those in Haiti’s overcrowded prisons have yet to reach trial, and the legal system is weakened by corruption and a shortage of trained magistrates and prosecutors. After Resolution 1702 authorized MINUSTAH to take a more proactive approach to judicial reform, the government presented draft legislation on the independence and training of the judiciary in September. But it

was unclear how quickly this could be enacted, and MINUSTAH's ability to expedite other reform initiatives was even less clear than in the case of the HNP, especially given the time necessary for legal training.

Postelectoral Economics and Politics

In confronting these extensive security and institutional challenges, MINUSTAH and the government also faced the question of how long Préval could maintain public support for difficult reforms. Despite the violence in Port-au-Prince, the president's popularity appeared to hold up, and it was hoped that a pacification of the slums would increase his standing. Ministers emphasized the need to communicate the reasoning behind police and justice reform through the media. Yet it was widely predicted that unless the government could demonstrate tangible economic improvements within one to two years of its election, it would face increasing popular opposition.

In July 2006, the new government presented a social appeasement program of job-creating public projects. Rapid job creation had been a neglected feature of the 2004 interim cooperation framework (receiving as little as 13 percent of its intended funding), and in September 2005 MINUSTAH had identified it as a priority for the immediate post-electoral period. But while some donors, including the US Agency for International Development (USAID), did undertake job-creating projects, information-sharing remained poor and MINUSTAH failed to carry through plans to coordinate a package of projects to follow the polls. Although the mission's own financial resources were limited, it emphasized the use of quick-impact projects during and after the elections. Lacking funds for the social appeasement program, the government adopted a longer-term plan. Resolution 1702 attempted to compensate for earlier confusion by requesting MINUSTAH to improve its coordination with the UN country team and donors to address "urgent" development needs. Its budget for quick-impact projects was duly raised from \$1.5 million to \$2 million for

the new financial year, and in December, MINUSTAH appealed for \$98 million of new aid to Haiti.

Unable to bolster his support through economic means, Préval was also facing political complications. Lespwa's weakness was compounded by growing divisions within the party, and the parliament sat for four months without passing one law. In September, with the approach of a recess that would last until 2007, the government announced a series of extraordinary sessions to pass a budget and make initial progress on judicial reform. Debates lacked focus, with members of the opposition (some known to be connected to the drug trade) attempting to carve money from the budget for the reestablishment of the army. MINUSTAH has not developed substantial links with much of the parliament.

The government and MINUSTAH are also faced with political difficulties arising from Haiti's constitutional requirement for frequent elections, originally an antidote to dictatorship. Resolution 1702 indicated that municipal elections should be held "as soon as feasible." On 3 December, balloting for some 11,000 positions in municipal and local government was carried off successfully. But the election problem will continue: seven further polls are scheduled for the next five years, at a combined cost of \$105 million—some for as few as ten senatorial seats. MINUSTAH officials have advocated constitutional reform to reduce this burden, but wonder if it can be pushed through a parliament that will not pass regular legislation.

Conclusion

A year after the spike in violence in Port-au-Prince at the end of 2005, MINUSTAH can claim a number of significant achievements in 2006: the logistical and political efforts that enabled the elections to take place with the participation of Lavalas and Préval, an overall (if variable) improvement in the capital's security situation, and a much-improved working relationship with the new govern-

Box 3.4.2 Colombia

While the Organization of American States (OAS) has maintained its mission in Haiti through 2006, it has also expanded the small Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, the MAPP). MAPP was mandated in 2004 to help verify the demobilization of the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). This process gathered pace in the first half of 2006, and by September a total of 30,915 paramilitaries had been demobilized. Nonetheless, MAPP has warned that the AUC seems to have concealed some arms. It has also noted the emerging threat of “a new generation of paramilitaries,” an amorphous collection of criminal gangs and militias. In September 2006 the Secretary-General of the OAS recom-

mended that the mission play a greater role in reintegration efforts to counter this new threat. The mission’s continuation was supported by the US State Department, which helps fund MAPP alongside a consortium of governments led by the Netherlands.

This funding has allowed for an expansion of the mission from 44 civilian personnel in late 2005 to 85 by the third quarter of 2006, comprising 34 full-time international staff, 17 local staff, and 34 consultants. This expansion followed a harsh appraisal by the OAS in late 2005 (spurred by mounting criticism from Colombian nongovernmental organizations) that MAPP had previously lacked the resources to go beyond basic demobilization verification. Having received new funding and staff, the

mission has increased its assistance to community efforts to help former combatants. In an unusual initiative, the authorities in Medellín, a significant center of violence and drug trafficking, have provided funding for an expansion of MAPP’s office there to engage in such projects.

Uncertainty remains over how these initiatives will influence the paramilitaries’ evolution. The Colombian government has also moved into negotiations with the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); while MAPP has no direct involvement, it is possible that any demobilization might require some form of verification similar to that for the AUC.

ment. It has made progress—most obviously on police and justice reform—although the substantive implementation of many reforms still lies ahead.

Nonetheless, MINUSTAH and Haiti still face severe problems: endemic poverty and corruption, coupled with potential political deadlock. While the gang threat in Port-au-Prince may recede, the challenge of the drug trade remains. It is not clear that the government can develop its security or bureaucratic

capacities to handle these threats. This creates a new problem for MINUSTAH: its longevity. Rather than initiate a postelectoral drawdown of the mission, the UN Security Council has kept its police and military components almost level and widened its tasks. MINUSTAH is expanding, for the lack of a domestic alternative. It remains uncertain how long the Security Council will sustain this, and how it will affect Haiti’s political evolution.

Note

1. Robert Muggah, *Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration* (Small Arms Survey, October 2005), p. xxiv.

Liberia

Liberia made a fresh start in 2006 with the inauguration of a president who represents, for many, a clear break from the country's violent past. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first elected female president in Africa, quickly demonstrated a commitment to change. A well-crafted strategic partnership between the government, the UN, and other international actors successfully launched Liberia on the "consolidation phase" of the peace process, following two years of transition. While the internal security situation remained relatively stable, important strides were made in governance—including economic governance—and tentative steps were taken in the justice sector. On the other hand, security sector reform proceeded slowly, and crime, including reported incidents of rape, was on the rise. The regional security situation remained fragile, with continuing instability in Côte d'Ivoire being the major source of concern. As the year came to a close, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was poised to help a proactive government consolidate Liberia's hard-earned peace.

Background

UNMIL was deployed to oversee implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) signed on 18 August 2003 by the Liberian government, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), Liberian political parties, and civil society. The CPA brought an end to nearly fourteen years of civil war, broken only by two years of relative peace between the 1997 elections that brought Charles Taylor to

power, and 1999, when violence erupted again.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered peace talks in June 2003 between the Taylor government and the two main rebel groups. Taylor was indicted for war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, abruptly ending the negotiations. A cease-fire, agreed to on 17 June 2003, failed to prevent heavy fighting in the capital, Monrovia. Pressure for international intervention mounted amid rising concerns over the humanitarian situation and the intensifying war. With Taylor in asylum in Nigeria in August, an interim regime took charge, followed by the installation of a transitional government in October 2003.

The conflict had serious consequences for both the country and the subregion. An estimated 250,000 people died in Liberia during its fourteen years of violence. Almost half the population was internally displaced, while over 300,000 fled to neighboring countries. Despite Liberia's wealth in mineral deposits, timber, and rubber, decades of graft and mismanagement left over 80 percent of the population below the poverty line. At the war's end, unemployment was nearly 85 percent, illiteracy was high, and economic opportunities were scarce.

The subregion has faced more than a decade of violence, with linkages between the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire. Charles Taylor supported the opposition rebels in Sierra Leone, while Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire allegedly backed the two Liberian rebel groups. Toward the end of 2003, Côte d'Ivoire remained divided, creating a

source of insecurity along the border with Liberia. Although Sierra Leone's civil war had ended in 2002, concerns remained as the country prepared for what observers view as crucial presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007. Concerns also persisted over the stability of Guinea, especially given the lack of clear succession plans after the departure of the country's ailing president.

UNMIL: Mandate and Functions

The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), authorized by the UN Security Council on 1 August 2003, preceded UNMIL by two months. UNMIL, operating under Chapter VII, was given a mandate to oversee the cease-fire agreement; develop and implement a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) program; provide security at key locations; protect UN staff and Liberian civilians under imminent threat; provide humanitarian and human rights assistance; support security sector reform; assist in extending state authority throughout the country; and support the implementation of the peace process, including assistance to the 2005 national elections. In 2006, UNMIL shifted away from tasks that had been completed, such as the disarmament and demobilization of factional forces, toward the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, security sector reform, judicial reform, the establishment of safeguards for human rights, and the consolidation of state authority. The only additional mandate was the authority to arrest former president Charles Taylor should he return to Liberia, and to transfer him to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the Special Court (Resolution 1638, of November 2005).

In early 2006, an interdepartmental assessment mission recommended that UNMIL's mandate be extended for a two-year "consolidation phase" dedicated to helping the newly elected government establish its authority and launch a program for national reconstruction and development. The drawdown of UNMIL was to be based on a set of benchmarks that



UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

• Authorization and start date	19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509)
• SRSG	Alan Doss (United Kingdom)
• Force commander	Lieutenant-General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor (Nigeria)
• Police commissioner	Mohammed Ahmed Alhassan (Ghana)
• Budget	\$714.9 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 14,570 Military observers: 200 Police: 1,076 International civilian staff: 516 Local civilian staff: 839 UN volunteers: 251

For detailed mission information see p. 314.

the UN identified in September 2006, which align with the four main pillars of the government's strategy: security, economic revitalization, basic services and infrastructure, and the rule of law and good governance. The Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendations, including "the

phased, gradual consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal of UNMIL's troop contingent, as the situation permits and without compromising the security of Liberia" (Resolution 1712, of September 2006). The approach, developed in close consultation with the government and a broad cross-section of national and international stakeholders, signaled the UN's commitment to remain engaged for a substantial though not an indefinite period. Responsibility for security would be progressively handed over to the Liberian government, while the UN and others would help to build its capacity for effective governance and economic recovery.

UNMIL: Key Developments and Challenges

Security

Through a combination of robust military patrols and operations in the border areas, as well as joint patrolling with the national police, UNMIL's presence brought significant improvements in the security environment in 2006. The fragile internal security situation at the start of the year worsened in March with the arrest of Charles Taylor. Taylor was indicted by the Special Court in 2003 for his alleged support to the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Under a deal involving ECOWAS, the African Union, the United States, and others, he was granted asylum in Nigeria on condition that he not meddle in the internal affairs of Liberia. On coming to power, President Johnson-Sirleaf initially stated that the transfer of Taylor to the Special Court was not a priority for her government, as it had to focus on managing a battered country. Due to international pressure, especially from the United States, on 17 March 2006 the Liberian government made a formal request to Nigeria's authorities that they hand Taylor over. On 28 March, Nigeria announced that Taylor had disappeared from the presidential mansion in Calabar. He was apprehended on 29 March in northeastern

Nigeria as he attempted to cross into Cameroon. Taylor was delivered to Liberian authorities in Monrovia, who handed him over to UNMIL, and on that same day he was flown to Freetown and placed in the custody of the Special Court.

His appearance at the Special Court on 3 April 2006 made Taylor the first former African head of state to appear before an international tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Concerned that his presence would threaten security in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1688 (2006), approving his transfer to The Hague for trial by the Special Court, using International Criminal Court facilities. The transfer occurred when the United Kingdom offered to allow him to serve his prison sentence in the UK, if he were to be convicted. Taylor's trial is set to commence in April 2007.

In order to address security concerns raised by the arrest of the former Liberian leader, UNMIL engaged in robust patrolling in Monrovia, deployed a quick reaction force to border areas, and increased its troop presence in Taylor's former strongholds. It also redeployed some rapid reaction elements to boost the small contingent of UNMIL troops that were providing security at the Special Court. Ultimately, Taylor's transfer to The Hague removed a significant long-term security threat to the subregion.

Other security concerns in 2006 were a result of disgruntled former combatants and rising crime. On 26 July, during the country's independence-day celebrations, a mysterious fire broke out at the Executive Mansion, where the president was hosting a luncheon for several heads of state from the region. After the government's initial dismissal of key members of her cabinet and security officials, an investigation undertaken by South African forensic experts with the assistance of UNMIL later concluded that the fire had been caused by an electrical fault. In August, some 500 ex-combatants who had illegally occupied the Guthrie rubber plantation were



(AP Photo/Pewee Fiomoku)

President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf greets a crowd, 17 January 2006.

evicted in a joint operation involving armed Liberian police and UNMIL soldiers.

Although the UN Secretary-General reported in September that no significant threatening military activity was observed along the borders with Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, the possible movement of armed groups across the border with Côte d'Ivoire, and the recruitment of former Liberian combatants, remained a concern. UNMIL increased its presence in the border areas, and conducted concurrent patrols with the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), as well as with Sierra Leonean security agencies.

An Elected Government: Moving Forward

The new government was sworn in on 16 January 2006, marking the end of the two-year transitional period. UNMIL played a crucial role in overseeing the national elections, and in resolving tensions over the results of the run-off presidential election. The installment of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's administration marked a dramatic change in governance style. The new president has

placed qualified personnel in key positions and is tackling the sensitive issue of corruption. The relationship between the government and UNMIL, which was previously strained under the transitional government, has become a more productive and equal partnership.

In the posttransitional period, UNMIL's core role is to assist the new government in extending and consolidating its authority. Johnson-Sirleaf unveiled a 150-day plan in April, which served to jumpstart reforms and recovery by targeting the four main pillars identified above: peace and security, the economy, infrastructure and basic services, and governance and the rule of law. The government claimed to have reached over half of the plan's targets by late June. The underlying pillars also serve to guide long-term planning by the government, including the development of an interim poverty reduction strategy paper to be completed by the end of 2006 with assistance from the UN.

Other achievements of the government included establishing the Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee, launching

the Liberia Emergency Employment Program, the return of all internally displaced persons, and drafting an anticorruption policy. The government appointed fifteen county superintendents in April 2006, an important step in the extension of state authority. Ministries began functioning again, with strong individuals in leadership positions. However, the middle and lower ranks of the civil service lacked qualification, training, and experience, inhibiting the capacity of the government to implement policies. Although UNMIL support teams facilitated the return of government officials to the counties, the lack of accommodation, facilities, and basic necessities led many to return to Monrovia. The UN served as the driving force for recovery, but many are looking to the new administration to now take the lead.

Judicial reform continues, but at a very slow pace. UNMIL spearheaded efforts to develop a rule-of-law task force and law-reform commission, and provided technical advice on writing and enacting legislation. It also assisted in rebuilding infrastructure to restore the formal judicial system. However, it was difficult to keep officials in the counties. UNMIL has provided training and advice for justices of the peace, magistrates, court clerks, and county judicial officers. UN staff posted in the counties monitored the judicial process and advised the national government on needed reforms. In a pilot project aimed at reducing the large backlog of legal cases, UNMIL hired a dozen national prosecution consultants and eighteen national defense consultants. UNMIL also assisted the government in developing a five-year strategy to reform the Ministry of Justice, and is in the early stages of developing a national strategy for reform of the entire judicial sector. The Independent National Commission on Human Rights was expected to begin functioning by the end of the year. Due to a lack of access to formal courts, much of the population continued to rely on traditional law, raising questions about how these two systems can be reconciled.

Economic Governance and Recovery

After a rocky start, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)—the core feature of which is cosigning authority for international officials in key ministries—made substantial progress in 2006. Many international experts were recruited to focus on improving management and building national capacity. Government revenue rose due to better fiscal management and governance. Other ministries not involved in GEMAP indicated interest in similar programs. Importantly, the elected government demonstrated a commitment to the process. Although it is too early for a definitive evaluation, GEMAP appears to be on track. This was a positive sign for a government heavily indebted, at nearly \$4 billion, and contributed to demonstrating fiscal responsibility in order to obtain debt relief and targeted budget support, and attract donor and foreign investment.

The government made an important step in drafting and debating its first national budget. Although the budget is small (approximately \$120–130 million), the process demonstrated good governance practices and an empowered national legislature. The budget focused on education, health, and the judicial system. The government remained largely dependent on international contributions for reconstruction efforts.

Progress was also made toward lifting sanctions on timber and diamonds, which could stimulate economic growth if under government control. The government worked to meet Kimberly Process requirements, but illegal diamond mining continued. UNMIL assisted in monitoring and mapping these activities. The UN Security Council temporarily lifted the ban on timber in June 2006, with Resolution 1689, allowing countries to import timber under continued monitoring, while tying the permanent lifting of the sanctions to the passing of appropriate forestry legislation. UNMIL assisted in drafting that legislation and manned checkpoints in Monrovia to monitor

Box 3.5.1 GEMAP

In September 2005 the Liberian transitional government and nine international partners, including the UN, World Bank, European Commission, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP). In May 2006 the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Fragile States Group of the World Bank conducted a review of this innovative program, with a view toward drawing lessons learned.

GEMAP is a response to mismanagement of public finances in postconflict Liberia and the threat it represented to the peace process there. Conceived and initiated by international donors, it was based on a shared diagnosis of Liberia's problems and an analysis of options on how to deal with those problems. GEMAP represents a robust intervention in Liberia's economic governance and, as such, was controversial when initiated. Its

key features are the provision of international experts with cosignature authority and management contracts in selected ministries and state-owned enterprises; authoritative oversight mechanisms; and linkages to the peace implementation process and to UN Security Council sanctions.

The principal findings of the UN/World Bank review are as follows:

- Robust economic interventions are highly political and should be approached as such.
- Empirical data can be a useful way of building a united international approach to postconflict economic governance.
- Careful analysis should be given to the motivations of national authorities in the crafting of incentives and threats, including economic sanctions on individuals.
- An inclusive stance with stakeholders highlights the role of civil society, both in building national constituencies of

support and in securing regional and international backing.

- Communication strategies should emphasize the program's goal of restoring sovereign authority, not undermining it.
- A basic level of security is important in any postconflict transition process.
- The initiation and planning of a robust intervention should address implementation of the program in order to enable timely operationalization.

The authors of the study do not make a straightforward recommendation that GEMAP ought to be seen as a model for elsewhere, but they do suggest that it highlights the significance of economic governance in postconflict transitions and offers some insights on how to address the matter.

Source: Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey, "Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)," UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and World Bank, May 2006, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons>.

the movement of timber. On 20 October, the Council issued a statement indicating that there was no basis for reinstating the sanctions on timber, in view of the fact that the government had met the condition of passing forestry reform legislation.

UNMIL is a member of the task force to help the government reestablish control over rubber plantations. In May 2006 the task force called for repossession, which began with the Guthrie plantation, noted above, where an interim management team was put in place. Reclamation of the plantation helped to boost efforts by the new government to regain control of the country's vast natural wealth. Meanwhile, restoration of infrastruc-

ture and public services proceeded slowly. Access to electricity and clean water in Monrovia was limited. Discussions began on how to rehabilitate the country's road network. Under an innovative program, the World Bank was planning to provide \$68 million to support a pilot project for UNMIL troops to reconstruct vital infrastructure. If successful, this project could serve as a model for other peacekeeping missions.

Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform proceeded more slowly than expected due to a lack of funding and the government transition. UNMIL is primarily responsible for the restructuring and

Box 3.5.2 HIV/AIDS and UN Peacekeeping

In February 2006, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping commended efforts to tackle the challenge of HIV/AIDS in peace operations, but emphasized “the need to raise awareness among United Nations peacekeeping personnel.” That month, the issue’s importance was highlighted in the final report of a 2005 survey of HIV/AIDS knowledge, attitude, and practice among 667 uniformed personnel* in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Preliminary analysis of the survey (reported in last Review) suggested that three-quarters of those interviewed had a “comprehensive knowledge” of HIV. But closer investigation indicated that only 51 percent actually had this level of knowledge. There were wide disparities, ranging from 56 to 100 percent, in reported levels of predeployment training among the different contingents, military observers, and police officers; of those who had been deployed for at least a month, 88 percent had received awareness training in the mission area.

HIV testing has always been a controversial issue for peacekeeping. Eighty percent of those interviewed had undergone an HIV test specifically as part of their predeployment preparation, though differences were noted on whether it was mandatory or voluntary, and only around

half had received any counseling; 84 percent expressed an interest in having an HIV test in the mission area. Nearly half knew at least one person who had died as a result of AIDS, but 88 percent considered themselves to be at low risk or no risk of contracting HIV.

One-hundred-twenty respondents reported having had sex while deployed, of whom one in five admitted to having exchanged money, gifts, or services for sex. The actual figures for sexual activity are probably higher as investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse undoubtedly influenced responses. Nearly all knew where to get condoms, but of those that reported having had sex in Liberia, around a fifth did not use condoms consistently.

The deployment of peer educators within contingents and initiating peer education programs within UNMIL were key recommendations of the report. It also underscored the importance of voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) as a central element in behavior change and noted that peacekeepers do not operate in a vacuum so there is a need for outreach programs to the local community.

The UN has underlined that HIV/AIDS should not only be addressed in terms of mission personnel but should also be integrated into mandated mission

functions. In July 2005, the UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Unit in Khartoum agreed to an interim DDR program with commissions from north and south Sudan. This noted that “HIV/AIDS awareness is vital for the reintegration process” not least because it led local authorities to “focus on combatants and their families, rather than on combatants alone.”

In March 2006, a joint mission to Sudan by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNAIDS, and UN Population Fund identified a number of obstacles to addressing HIV/AIDS in the context of wider DDR efforts. These included a slow overall disbursement of funds, inadequate expertise in national commissions, and the limited capacities of local NGOs. However, a peer education kit had been translated into Arabic, and the mission emphasized the need to train peer educators and include condoms in transitional packs given to demobilizing individuals. While VCT services should be supported, the mission emphasized that the provision of treatment would have to be through a system of referrals, linking with the National AIDS Control Programme and longer-term initiatives.

*The survey included contingent personnel from Ghana; Ireland, Namibia; Nigeria; Philippines; Sweden; officers from the Bangladeshi and Pakistani contingents; the Nigerian formed police unit; military observers and UN police officers. Findings were analyzed for each specific group but are presented here in terms of statistically weighted overall findings.

Source: Roxanne Bazergan, “HIV/AIDS Knowledge, Attitude and Practice survey: UN uniformed peacekeepers in Liberia,” United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, 28 February 2006. The full report is available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>.

reform of the Liberian National Police. As of 16 October 2006, 2,191 new officers had been trained, and nearly all former officers had been decommissioned. Deployment of officers into the fifteen counties (454 officers in total) remains difficult due to lack of facili-

ties and amenities. The police remain heavily dependent on UNMIL for transportation, communications, and logistics. Although the police are set to reach a strength of 3,500 by mid-2007, capacity to manage internal security demands remains uncertain, especially amid

reports of rising crime and vigilante groups. UNMIL has encouraged communities to act as monitors and report crimes rather than resort to vigilantism. Both UNMIL and the national police have increased their patrols in high-risk areas. An additional UN formed police unit deployed in September to help provide security and to assist with training the new police force.

Military restructuring is back on track after a long delay due to lack of finances for deactivating former soldiers. The deactivation process was completed in December 2005, and the recruitment process for the new military began in January 2006. In February, President Johnson-Sirleaf appointed the outgoing commander of an UNMIL military contingent, Nigerian general Luka Nyeh Yusuf, as commander of the new Armed Forces of Liberia, tasked with restructuring. DynCorps International, a private US firm, is primarily responsible for recruiting and training the new military, an effort funded by the US government. The first batch of 110 new recruits began training in mid-July. However, only 563 of over 7,000 applicants have qualified for training. UNMIL assisted with the vetting of applicants and a public information campaign, but is not directly involved in training the new military. The aim is to have the first battalion of a 2,000-strong military force operational by mid-2008.

Reintegration and Reconciliation

In the latter part of 2006, UNMIL redefined its strategy for reintegration using a more comprehensive and long-term approach. In mid-August, some 39,000 ex-combatants had yet to enroll in reintegration programs. Roughly half of those are expected to be absorbed through programs sponsored by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), while bilateral funding should be forthcoming for the remaining caseload. Concerns persist over high un-

employment, especially among ex-combatants, and related problems of crime, security, and lack of control over natural resources. Furthermore, reintegration assistance has been required for returning refugees and resettled IDPs.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), formally inaugurated in June 2006, has deployed nearly 200 statement-takers in the counties. The process of statement-taking began on 10 October. However, leadership and management problems exist, as well as internal divisions between commissioners. There has been no national public information campaign. Funding pledges from international partners exist, but international partners have been reluctant to disburse funds due to lack of progress, and remaining pledges are on hold until the commission proves it can function effectively.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Liberia has made progress, albeit in small steps. The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the appointment of county governors, other efforts to strengthen and extend the reach of state institutions, ongoing reforms of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Liberian National Police, and other institutions, were all significant achievements. While the TRC is designed to set the country on the path to reconciliation, the pursuit of justice through trials remains a possibility. High unemployment, especially among the country's youth, lack of viable programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration phase of the DDRR program, and the faltering peace process in Côte d'Ivoire all pose significant challenges to the country's future. Finally, the consolidation of peace will require equitable ethnic, regional, and gender representation in public and private institutions.

Middle East

The year 2006 was a dramatic one in the Middle East. Political tensions continued to surround Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and the UN's investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Developments in the broader region, especially around the Security Council's consideration of Iran's reported nuclear weapons program, generated further tensions. Renewed fighting between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, created an international crisis. All UN and non-UN peace operations in the region were affected to some extent, particularly the UN's mission in Lebanon, which was completely transformed—with important implications both for the region and for UN peacekeeping more generally.

UN Interim Force in Lebanon: Background

Established in 1978 by Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 to assist in the provision of security in southern Lebanon following Israel's invasion of the area, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was given a three-part mandate: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The first real opportunity to implement that mandate came in 2000, when Israel withdrew its forces behind a "Blue Line" identified by the UN. Based on an assessment by UNIFIL, the Security Council confirmed that the withdrawal was in accordance with Resolution 425. UNIFIL's mandate was renewed, and the

mission was augmented by an infantry battalion to monitor the line. In the subsequent years, the Lebanese government was not able to deploy forces to the south, as called for in 2000 and reaffirmed in Resolution 1559, of 29 July 2005. That resolution also called for "the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias," as well as withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which Syria did several months later. Also, the UN's continuing investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Hariri under authority of resolution 1644 (2005) evolved into an agreement with the Lebanese government to establish a special tribunal to try those responsible. The Security Council welcomed this in late November and requested the Secretary-General to finalize the arrangement. In view of the political crisis in Lebanon at the end of 2006, it was clear that actually establishing the tribunal would be a challenge.

UNIFIL: Mandate and Functions

For a period of several years, following Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, UNIFIL's troop strength was gradually reduced in line with its limited mandate to observe developments along the Blue Line. The 2006 *Annual Review* queried UNIFIL's continuing utility, given the mismatch between its mandate and what it would take to fulfill the remaining elements of Resolutions 425 and 426, namely that the government of Lebanon assert its sovereignty throughout the whole of Lebanese territory. In the end, following active conflict during July and August 2006, UNIFIL saw a radical revision of its mandate, troop

strength, troop configuration, reporting structure, and rules of engagement—in effect, an entirely new mission born within the structure of an existing operation.

As set out in Resolution 1701, UNIFIL's mandate—in addition to existing responsibilities under Resolutions 425 and 426—has six new elements:

- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities.
- Accompanying Lebanese troops as they deploy throughout the south.
- Coordinating its activities with the Lebanese and Israeli governments.
- Ensuring humanitarian access to civilians and the safe return of displaced persons.
- Assisting the Lebanese armed forces in undertaking their extensive responsibilities (as set out in operative paragraph 8), which include preserving an area free of armed personnel (other than UNIFIL and Lebanese troops) between the Blue Line and the Litani River; fully implementing the Taif Accords, which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon; and ensuring that there are no foreign forces in Lebanon without government consent.
- Assisting the government of Lebanon in securing its borders (as set out in operative paragraph 14).

To implement these functions, UNIFIL's authorized troop strength was raised to 15,000. As of 30 November 2006 strength stood at 10,884, up from the approximately 2,000 troops present before the crisis.

In addition, UNIFIL is authorized to “take all necessary action . . . to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel . . . and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”

While not explicitly adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this language gives UNIFIL the authority to act robustly. Precisely how robustly it could or should act was



UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| • Authorization and start date | 19 March 1978
(UNSC Res. 425/426) |
| • Force commander and head of mission | Major-General Alain Pellegrini
(France) |
| • Budget | \$143.5 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007) (note: includes \$50 million in commitment authority for expansion of mission) |
| • Strength as of 30 September 2006 | Troops: 5,147 (10,884 as of 30 November 2006)
International civilian staff: 100
Local civilian staff: 305 |

For detailed mission information see p. 275.

a subject of intense debate as troop contributors were solicited and the concept of operations and rules of engagement were formulated.

In short, although UNIFIL is not explicitly mandated to disarm Hezbollah or secure

Lebanon's borders, it is mandated to help the government of Lebanon fulfill its explicit responsibility to ensure that its territory is free of unlawful armed forces and that its borders are secure. The relationship between UNIFIL's specific tasks and its responsibility to assist the government will doubtless be a source of debate within the mission and among member states. Indeed, before agreeing to deploy forces, leading troop contributors sought rules of engagement that would make clear that the mission itself would not engage directly in the disarmament of Hezbollah.

UNIFIL: Key Developments and Challenges

Hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah broke out on 12 July 2006, when Hezbollah launched several rockets across the Security Council–delineated Blue Line (which marks the boundary between Israel and Lebanon) and crossed into Israel, killing three soldiers and capturing two others. Israel launched major air strikes in response, and Hezbollah responded with further rocket attacks. The fighting escalated into a full-scale confrontation, ultimately involving Israeli ground troops penetrating southern Lebanon while Israeli air strikes destroyed infrastructure and Hezbollah targets throughout the south and sections of Beirut, with Hezbollah firing an estimated 3,700 rockets into Israel.

In his July report on UNIFIL, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented that the fighting had “radically changed the context” in which UNIFIL operated. The fighting also injured sixteen UN personnel and killed five, when a UNIFIL observation post was hit by Israeli artillery. A political clash between the UN and Israel ensued when Annan suggested that the post had been deliberately targeted, but he quickly accepted assurances to the contrary from Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert.

The fighting occasioned heated diplomatic activity in the region and internationally, with US, European, and Arab foreign ministers as well as Secretary-General Annan traveling to the region and to an international

meeting in Rome to seek consensus on the principles of a cease-fire. Differences between several member states' positions on whether the fighting should be immediately halted, or allowed to continue long enough to dismantle Hezbollah's armed capacity, impeded early agreement on a cease-fire. However, as civilian casualties mounted, especially on the Lebanese side, international and Arab pressure for a cease-fire mounted.

After thirty-four days of fighting, hostilities were brought to a close when a cease-fire was announced. According to the 12 September 2006 report of the Secretary-General, official Lebanese figures showed 1,187 people killed in the fighting and 4,092 wounded, and Israeli figures showed 160 people killed and a further hundred wounded. On the Lebanese side, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 900,000 people had been displaced by the fighting, with 90 percent of those returning to their homes at the end of hostilities; Israel reported 300,000 residents displaced during the period in which 3,970 rockets struck Israel. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated damage of \$3.6 billion to the Lebanese infrastructure and economy; no comparable figures for economic losses in Israel were available.

The cease-fire was forged after intensive diplomacy following, first, the Secretary-General's proposal for a peacekeeping operation to oversee an end to hostilities and, second, the Lebanese government's proposal to deploy its own forces to the south—in implementation of a key provision of Resolutions 425 and 426, which had created the original UNIFIL operation. On 31 July 2006, the Security Council, in Resolution 1697, extended UNIFIL's mandate for one month to allow for exploration of alternatives.

On 11 August 2006, the Council adopted Resolution 1701, which called for a full cessation of hostilities and laid out a set of broader political processes relating to the question of Israeli prisoners as well as unresolved territorial claims, including in the area of the Shebaa farms. The resolution created a

buffer zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and set out new parameters (of mandate, troop strength, and posture) for a radically reconfigured UNIFIL. In addressing the Council in advance of it adopting the resolution, Secretary-General Annan noted international disappointment and frustration that the Council had not been able to act earlier.

The passage of Resolution 1701 had been preceded by an international and regional debate over the authorizing body and composition of a potential peacekeeping force. In initial reaction to the Secretary-General's proposal, the Israeli government was cautious and explicitly rejected the possibility of a UN force, as did some senior US government officials. In some capitals, discussion turned to the prospect of a NATO or an EU-led multinational force. Concerns about the notion of a force composed of Western nations led to discussion of a two-stage process, whereby first a multinational force led by European countries and including Turkish and Egyptian contingents would lay the foundation for a

broader force to be deployed later. The Lebanese government pushed for a UN force, arguing that it would be more legitimate and that the inclusion of some non-Western troops was important in terms of local acceptance of the force. In addition, after initial enthusiasm, some of the European potential contributors began to express reservations about having the political lead in a mission that would confront the difficult challenge of Hezbollah's role. As a result, the UN option quickly displaced consideration of other alternatives. Israeli agreement to a UN mission came after it became clear that the mission would not be a regular Blue Helmet, UN-commanded operation: the combination of a substantial European presence and a separate command structure created a perception in Israel that a new UNIFIL could be sufficiently firm to guarantee cross-border security (though UN officials in the region note that difficulties in establishing the command structure, and the debate over rules of engagement, have already dented Israel's confidence).



Secretary-General Kofi Annan and UNIFIL Commander, Major-General Alain Pellegrini visit the UNIFIL base in Naqoura near the port city of Tyre, Lebanon, 29 August 2006.

Debate then shifted to the question of whether the force should be mandated under Chapter VII, which was resisted by the Lebanese. A compromise position saw UNIFIL's new mandate being set out under Chapter VI, but with a far broader and stronger mandate and incorporating very firm language about the ability of UNIFIL to "take all necessary action . . . to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind," and to protect UN personnel and civilians.

The new UNIFIL's mandate was also the consequence of a compromise over the question of whether the mission should be authorized to disarm Hezbollah. Opposition to an explicit mandate of this type, both from the government of Lebanon and from leading troop contributors, led to there being no explicit language to that effect. However, operative paragraphs 11 and 12 leave ample room for interpretation to allow UNIFIL to exercise force in support of the government of Lebanon's responsibility to exercise its authority throughout the territory and to ensure that the territory is free of unlawful armed forces. To date, the major European troop contributors have expressed hesitancy with respect to active engagement with non-state forces, and the rules of engagement contain no explicit reference to a mission role in directly disarming Hezbollah.

After some initial hesitation, due to concerns about the ambiguity in the mandate, the new UNIFIL saw pledges of several thousand European and other troops. This included 1,000 from China—which (if fully deployed) would make it the largest Chinese deployment to UN peacekeeping to date. Italy pledged 3,000 troops, followed quickly by France, which had initially offered to lead the force, then pledged only 200 troops, raised later to 2,000. It was agreed that Italy would lead the force for several months starting in February 2007, after which France would take over. Germany's parliament voted to send 2,000–3,000 troops to the UN mission, which along with several other European countries would comprise a Maritime Task Force consisting of about 1,750 naval personnel, four

frigates, and ten fast patrol boats, as well as support units. These deployments constituted the first major European participation in a UN-commanded peacekeeping operation since the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia in the early to middle 1990s.

That being said, one of the conditions for participation that the European governments insisted on was a command structure supplementing the normal Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) mechanism. Alongside detailed negotiations over the rules of engagement and over the participation of troops from Muslim countries (to date, pledges have been received from Qatar, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia), France and Italy led negotiations over a strategic military cell (SMC) to be established in New York. The centerpiece of the SMC lies in the deployment of a three-star general as director of the SMC, who liaises directly with the force commander of UNIFIL and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. As of late October 2006, thirteen of an envisaged twenty-seven military staff from participating nations had arrived in New York to staff the cell. The design of the SMC calls for the participation of military officers from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) on a pro rata basis, as well as one officer from each of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In this regard, the SMC offers an interesting variant on proposals discussed in New York earlier in 2006 about a revival of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee and a broadening of participation of that committee to include TCCs.

As the new UNIFIL is being brought up to strength, three broad challenges face the mission. First, it will undoubtedly encounter differing interpretations of its mandate to assist the government of Lebanon in restoring sovereignty throughout the south. Whether narrow or broad, interpretations of that mandate will likely shape the operational challenges and political perception of the mission among the local population.

Second, both operational and political realities for the mission will likely be affected

by progress on other elements of Resolution 1701, which call for the Secretary-General to secure agreement in principle from Israel and Lebanon on a long-term solution, including by dealing with the continuing question of the Shebaa farms (see below). As a measure of progress made by 12 December, the Security Council issued a statement welcoming the “imminent” withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the deployment of Lebanese armed forces to the south for the first time in three decades. The Council also expressed deep concern at Israeli incursions into Lebanese airspace, as well as unverified reports of the illegal movement of arms into Lebanon from Syria.

Third, the management of the mission will be shaped by an untried and untested but potentially dynamic structure, the strategic mission cell. The relative success or failure of that cell as a reporting mechanism may in turn have broader implications for, first, European militaries’ perception of the DPKO and, second, the broader memberships’ perception of the merits and demerits of special management structures being established for specific missions. It has not gone unnoticed that it was a robust operation in the Middle East, not Africa, that saw large-scale European participation under the UN and the adoption of a special management arrangement. On the other hand, if the SMC, as planned, gains participation from all the major troop contributors, it may provide part of an answer to the long-standing demand from troop contributors for more active engagement in UN command and control structures.

Other Missions

The events of July–August 2006, as well as the passage of Resolution 1701, had implications for other missions in the area as well.

TIPH

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) was established by agreement of the parties in 1994 after a political crisis that arose when an Israeli opened fire on

Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

• Authorization and start date	15 January 1997 (Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron) 21 January 1997 (Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron)
• Head of mission	Arne Huuse (Norway)
• Budget	\$2.5 million (October 2005–September 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 9 Civilian police: 7 International civilian staff: 23

Palestinians at the Mosque of Ibrahim. The function of TIPH—which was withdrawn in August 1994, then reestablished in 1996—is to provide security for the residents of Hebron and to promote stability in the city through monitoring and reporting as well as various assistance activities. Despite its broad mandate, TIPH is a very small mission with nine military observers, armed only with pistols for self-defense.

TIPH has had a difficult history in Hebron since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. In 2002, two TIPH observers were killed by a Palestinian gunman, who was eventually arrested by Israeli police. Relationships with settlers have often been troubled, with frequent incidents of stone-throwing, causing minor injuries to TIPH staff.

Tensions between Palestinians and TIPH arose in February 2006 when caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed appeared in the Danish press. The protests that followed elicited the immediate evacuation of the eleven Danish observers from Hebron, and in the following week, during an attack on TIPH headquarters by a band of some 300 stone-throwing Palestinian protesters, the remainder of the mission similarly evacuated to Tel Aviv. By the end of April, and once the situation had cooled sufficiently, the TIPH staff began returning to Hebron, to resume their normal monitoring activities, albeit in circumstances

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

- Authorization and start date 29 May 1948 (UNSC Res. 50)
- Chief of staff and head of mission Major-General Ian Campbell Gordon (Australia)
- Budget \$30 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Military observers: 151
International civilian staff: 106
Local civilian staff: 121

For detailed mission information see p. 363.

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

- Authorization and start date 31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350)
- Force commander and head of mission Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)
- Budget \$39.9 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 1,047
International civilian staff: 36
Local civilian staff: 107

For detailed mission information see p. 257.

have knock-on effects for these two missions. The expansion of UNIFIL's observer and other functions will undoubtedly require amplified efforts by UNTSO, although no formal changes to its mandate or authorized strength are expected. As for UNDOF, the fact that Resolution 1701 calls for proposals to delineate the international borders of Lebanon, "especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area," may well have longer-term implications for UNDOF. Whatever else is claimed about the Shebaa farms, they fall largely within UNDOF's area of operations. This was among the reasons supporting the Security Council's certification of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, although the Shebaa farms had not been vacated. Delineation of the borders between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria could have implications for UNDOF's area of operations, and for the 1974 disengagement agreement on which the mission was established.

MFO Sinai, EUBAM Rafah, and EUPOL COPPS

The Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai) was established in 1980 in the context of Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, and has since operated as a US-led multinational force, created by agreement of the parties. Until 2005 it was mandated to observe developments in three designated areas of the Sinai. In 2005 its mission was amended to add a fourth function: observation and oversight of the Egyptian government's new commitments to patrol and prevent penetration of the Israel-Gaza boundary, in the context of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza.

During the same period, the European Union created a seventy-person civilian monitoring mission, the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah), to observe from the Palestinian side developments along the Rafah boundary. The Rafah crossing point was opened on 25 November 2005, and by early February 2006, 100,000 people had used the crossing. However, Israel demanded that it

still characterized by the elevated tensions that sometimes disrupt TIPH's activities.

UNTSO and UNDOF

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to observe cease-fire lines, and today provides observers and logistical support to UNIFIL and the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF). UNDOF was established under the 1974 disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria, to provide a buffer between their forces in the Golan Heights. There were no major developments for UNTSO and UNDOF themselves during 2006, but the major revision of UNIFIL's mandate and operational structure, and the passage of Resolution 1701, will likely

be closed in late June following the outbreak of hostilities sparked by a Palestinian attack on an Israeli army outpost that killed two Israeli soldiers and resulted in the kidnapping of a third. Israel launched a large offensive into the Gaza Strip three days later. During July and August, the crossing was open only sporadically, and was the subject of armed attacks. By early September, Italian foreign minister Massimo D'Alema was hinting that the EU could be forced to withdraw its monitors should the crossing remain closed. Also during 2006, the EU Policy Mission for the Palestinian Territories deployed and began assisting the Palestinian Authority in establishing effective police arrangements.

Conclusion

Following the revision of UNIFIL's mandate and the reconfiguration of its presence, peacekeeping in the Middle East entered a new phase. Remarkably, there are now international peace operations on all of Israel's borders, except that of Jordan. The re-establishment of a robust, European-led UN presence in southern Lebanon saw political commentators in Israel for the first time talking about the possibility of a UN peacekeeping solution for the West Bank and Gaza. However, early difficulties surrounding UNIFIL's rules of engagement, and hesitancy about confronting Hezbollah, led to a quick resumption of skepticism. Nevertheless, between the quasi-hybrid operation in Lebanon (a European-led multinational force in UN clothing), and the separate but intersecting presences maintained along the Rafah boundary, the Middle East has emerged as an important laboratory for global peace operations. Given the elevated political significance of the Middle East, it has the potential to impact—through success, or through failure—both Arab and Western perceptions of the UN, the EU, and more broadly, the effectiveness of peace operations as a credible tool for managing international peace and security.

Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai)

• Authorization date	3 August 1981 (Protocol to the Treaty of Peace)
• Start date	April 1982
• Head of mission	James A. Larocco (United States)
• Budget as of 30 September 2006	\$59 million
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 1,687 Civilian staff: 15

EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)

• Authorization date	5 November 2005 (Agreement on Movement and Access) 12 December 2005 (Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP)
• Start date	October 2005
• Head of mission	Major-General Pietro Pistolese (Italy)
• Budget	\$13.2 million
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Civilian police: 72 International civilian staff: 6 Local civilian staff: 8

EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

• Authorization date	14 November 2005 (Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP)
• Start date	January 2006
• Head of mission	Jonathan McIvor (United Kingdom)
• Budget	\$5.8 million
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Civilian police: 9 International civilian staff: 3 Local civilian staff: 4

Timor-Leste

In 2005 the UN's presence in Timor-Leste was winding down with a sense of job well done. Peacekeepers had withdrawn and the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), the small political mission, was scheduled to end in May 2006. Although not without its critics, the UN appeared to have successfully laid strong foundations for sustainable peace in the recently established state. As 2006 closes, the picture is much different. Responding to two months of riots, shootings, and the disintegration of state security, the Timorese government invited military and police assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal. International troops were deployed in May under Operation Astute. Three months later, the Security Council established the multidimensional UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), the fifth UN mission on the island since 1999, and the third since independence in May 2002. Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that the magnitude of the tasks facing UNMIT meant it was "likely to stay for many years." UNMIT will have to address issues that were either incompletely dealt with or hedged during the transitional administration phase. Although all elements of the mission are interconnected, its success will be measured largely by its effectiveness in helping to reestablish the police and military.

Background

Soon after representatives of the Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin) declared independence in 1975, Indonesia invaded and then annexed East Timor. After twenty-four years on the UN's agenda, in January 1999 Indonesia proposed

a referendum to offer the people of East Timor a choice between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. The UN conducted the "consultation" on 30 August 1999, with 78.5 percent of voters rejecting the Indonesian proposal. Pro-Indonesian militias immediately launched a campaign of violence, which was not contained by the Indonesian authorities. In addition to large-scale casualties, East Timor was physically devastated and Indonesian administrators—including the majority of people with higher skills and education—left the territory.

Under intense pressure, President B. J. Habibie agreed to an international security presence to quell the violence. On 15 September 1999, the Security Council authorized the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In October, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to administer the territory for a transitional period, and to take over from INTERFET in early 2000. UNTAET assumed full governing powers over East Timor. Partly in response to complaints about its heavy-handedness, it set up a series of power-sharing transitional arrangements with the Timorese leadership starting in mid-2000. East Timor progressively assumed governing authority. On 20 May 2002, the country became independent, with Alejandro "Xanana" Gusmão sworn in as its first president.


Following independence, UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), with a mandate to provide security, assist in the development of

a local police force, and engage in “capacity building” and other forms of support to public administration. Most of the UN’s executive functions were handed over to the new Timorese government. However, pending establishment of a fully functioning domestic police service, UNMISSET retained interim law enforcement authority. UNMISSET also maintained a substantial military presence of 5,000 (at its peak) to deter continuing threats from militias based in West Timor. A new Timorese defense force was created, but a large number of demobilized Falintil were not incorporated into the new army. This laid the foundations for the trouble that was to emerge in 2006.

UNOTIL, Operation Astute, and UNMIT: Mandates and Functions

In May 2005, UNMISSET was replaced by UNOTIL, a much smaller mission than its predecessors, composed of 180 international staff. The creation of UNOTIL was itself a political compromise between members of the Security Council. Led by the United States, some members argued that the peace-keeping phase in Timor-Leste was largely complete, while others, including the Timorese government, argued that further support was needed to strengthen fledgling state institutions. UNOTIL’s one-year mandate was basically a continuance of UNMISSET, with a focus on security and support for public administration, justice, and law enforcement institutions and for promotion of democratic governance and human rights. The purpose of the mission was to guide the transition from a large peace-keeping operation to coordinated development assistance. With numerous bilateral and multilateral programs in Timor-Leste, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) organized regular consultative group meetings with donor countries and the Timorese government. Capacity-building initiatives continued, albeit in smaller scale.

A major focus of UNOTIL was police training. As the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) was judged capable of delivering basic



Operation Astute

• Authorization date	20 June 2006 (UNSC Res. 1690)
• Start date	May 2006
• Head of mission	Brigadier Mal Rerden (Australia)
• Budget	n/a
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 1,085 Civilian police: 445

For detailed mission information see p. 384.

UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

• Authorization and start date	25 August 2006 (UNSC Res. 1704)
• SRSG	Atul Khare (India)
• DSRSG	Finn Reske-Nielsen (Denmark)
• Police commissioner	Rodolfo Asel Tor (Philippines)
• Budget	\$49.96 million (commitment authority)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 18 Police: 463 International civilian staff: 80 Local civilian staff: 227 UN volunteers: 34

For detailed mission information see p. 333.

policing services, UNOTIL concentrated on training, including for specialized units such as border patrol and forensics. However, strain between the PNTL and the armed forces precipitated renewed violence. Compared to the police, the Falintil–Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) was relatively neglected by the international community including UNTAET and UNMISSET, poorly funded by donors, and sidelined by the Timorese prime minister. It was an institution without a role.¹ As many of its everyday functions were assumed by the PNTL, alleged unfair treatment ignited discontent. In February 2006, 594 officers went on strike over discrimination and promotions. The decision of the chief of the defense force to sack them in March 2006 prompted demonstrations by officers that took on a violent character.

By late May, security had collapsed so completely that then-foreign minister José Ramos-Horta requested military and police assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal—key bilateral donors—to help stabilize the situation. The Security Council expressed “understanding” for this request, and over 2,000 troops and police from these countries began to deploy as the Australian-led Operation Astute. Under the operation, the Australian Defense Forces (ADF), with assistance from the New Zealand Defense Forces (NZDF), arrived in Dili on May 26, calming the situation to some extent.

Security Council Resolution 1704 was passed on 25 August 2006, paving the way for UNMIT. Authority for policing was transferred from Operation Astute to the UN. Among UNMIT’s assignments are: supporting the 2007 elections, institutional development of the police and armed forces, justice sector development, relocating displaced persons, and using good offices to help reconcile a fractured polity. Restoring public security is a mission priority, and UN civilian police will be its most visible face. At full strength it will include some 1,608 officers. UN police will provide interim executive policing support,

while simultaneously reconstituting the deeply politicized, institutionally weak PNTL.

UNOTIL, Operation Astute, and UNMIT: Key Developments and Challenges

The acrimony precipitated by the dismissal of 594 soldiers escalated in April and May, and increasingly acquired an ethnopolitical character, as armed groups from Timor’s eastern and western provinces clashed. The police force split along similar lines. Twenty people died and many houses were destroyed. Among the brutal incidents that occurred were the killing of nine unarmed police officers by soldiers, and a mob burning-to-death of six women and children in their home. Among the ransacked buildings was the office of the prosecutor-general, in which the original records of the investigations of serious crimes in East Timor in 1997 were kept. One hundred fifty thousand Timorese—15 percent of the entire population—sought refuge in makeshift camps.

Within the space of a few months, many of the institutions established by the UN, and then handed over to the government of Timor, appeared to have unraveled. The tensions laid bare cracks in the leadership, the police, and the security forces. The government seemed paralyzed, with rumors of a split between the unpopular prime minister Mari Alkatiri and President Xanana Gusmão. It soon became clear that it could not control the spiraling insecurity. The PNTL and F-FDTL were at best incapable, and at worst complicit in crime and lawlessness. The small UNOTIL mission could do little in such circumstances, and Operation Astute was called in.

Further to securing key areas in Dili, including the air- and seaport, UN headquarters, and government buildings, ADF and NZDF forces helped evacuate nearly 500 foreign nationals. Some weapons were confiscated from gangs, and a semblance of order was restored. However, clashes spread from Dili to other towns and cities as government

wrangles continued, with Prime Minister Alkatiri refusing to resign. By mid-June, greater stability returned, with the departure of Alkatiri and the ministers of interior and defense. Weapons began to be handed to peacekeepers, including the symbolically important rifle of the mutineers' leader, Major Alfredo Reinondo, chief of the military police, who deserted the military in early May.

Troops were followed by the deployment of international police from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal. As the PNTL lacked legitimacy and capacity, the international police took on daily police functions. The mandate of UNOTIL was extended by three months, while a team led by Ian Martin, former head of the UN Assistance Mission to East Timor, was dispatched to assess the situation and use the Secretary-General's good offices to facilitate dialogue between the various factions. Annan opined that perhaps the UN had withdrawn too soon: "Would it have made a difference if the U.N. had stayed longer, if we had not drawn down our forces too quickly? This is something that I must assess."²

The need for foreign troops a year after the departure of the last international peacekeepers raised doubts about the long-term prospects of one of the world's youngest nations. Beyond insecurity, Timor-Leste must cope with deep-seated social, economic, and governance problems: high unemployment, rapid population growth, inadequate infrastructure, a weak public sector with limited service capacity, poor governance, and fragile state institutions. Unemployment is running at about 40 percent and is higher among the youth, per capita gross domestic product is \$350 a year, few industries exist apart from coffee, and the birthrate is 7.8 per woman, among the world's highest. Half the population still has no access to safe drinking water. Revenue from oil and gas in the Timor Sea has yet to fill government coffers.

Encouraged to do so by the Timorese government, the UN made plans for a long-term

operation to rebuild what had been regarded as a peacekeeping success. This will be a second test of the ability of UN peace operations to effectively build state institutions. The UN arrived better prepared this time, as the UN system was less integrated to handle complex peacekeeping in 1999. With UNMIT, there has been a greater lead-in time and rigorous planning. Many senior personnel have experience in Timor, including the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General (DRSG), Finn Reske-Nielsen. UNMIT also deals with a supportive Timorese administration, led by a new prime minister, former foreign minister and Nobel laureate José Ramos-Horta.

With state building as the foremost challenge, the overriding objective of UNTAET and UNMISSET was to recruit, train, and deploy a large number of PNTL officers (approximately 2,800) in a very short time frame. However, the haste to mobilize new officers left critical shortcomings in the selection of PNTL cadets, and in basic and field training. The constant rotation of personnel—most officers were seconded for just six months—meant that information hemorrhaged quickly. As the UN assessment team discovered, the PNTL was without legal frameworks, mechanisms for control, and well-functioning managerial systems. The force was politicized: a large number of former Indonesian police officers were recruited into the PNTL and placed in leadership positions. This contributed to growing mistrust of the PNTL among some sectors of Timorese society.

Police reform is a complex and difficult task in many peace operations. It requires overcoming profound political, cultural, and logistical obstacles. It also demands the condensing of skills into short periods. Much turns on the manner in which policing is organized. It remains difficult for peace operations to find officers of sufficient quality, in sufficient quantity, and in a timely manner. A common doctrine that would unite practice for officers from entirely different policing backgrounds is still at an early stage of development. Police

Box 3.7.1 The Failings of Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste*Shepard Forman**

Whether through a simple failure of policy imagination or a misreading of the political, cultural, and economic realities of Timor-Leste, four successive UN missions have gradually handed off authority to the fledgling state without ensuring its capacity to exercise the sine qua non of national sovereignty: the ability to protect its borders and provide basic security to its citizens. The failure is all the more conspicuous since its starting point, Falintil (East Timor's defense force), was a disciplined and courageous national liberation force that managed, with full support of the East Timorese population, to maintain its resistance to the Indonesian occupation for nearly a quarter century. Fighting as army to army, Falintil never engaged in an act of terrorism, and actually submitted to self-imposed cantonment while an Australian-led international force drove marauding militias across the border in the aftermath of the independence referendum in 1999.

What went wrong? First, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) chose not to recognize the important place Falintil held in the imagination and hearts of the East

Timorese people, sidelining it as an institution while placing defense responsibility fully in the hands of international forces. Large numbers of Falintil fighters were decommissioned with little more than a parade to honor them and no provisions for any sort of productive livelihoods. With cross-border defense issues largely resolved by the international force, the newly established Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) had virtually no institutional role to play in building the new nation, was given little training or actual resources beyond uniforms and rudimentary material (despite a five-year, \$37 million defense cooperation program with the Australians), and quickly became subject to national political infighting among rogue members of the government of Timor-Leste.

UNTAET and its successor missions did little more to help establish a credible national police force. This was needed to manage increasing tensions among political rivals and diverse regional groups who were crowding into and vying for property and resources within the capital, including gangs of unemployed and disaffected youth.

Police officers, recruited from the general population and having little formal training, were often placed under the command of officers who had previously served as police under Indonesian occupation. A \$40 million, multiyear, joint UK-Australian police training and development program, begun in 2004, hardly had time to professionalize the police force before dissension in the police ranks and the sacking of nearly half the armed forces led to a complete breakdown of the security forces and escalating violence.

The task before the new mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), is clear. It needs to vest leadership in the hands of the Timorese, who must assume the responsibility for defense and security in their country. It is up to the Timorese government to sort out the proper roles of the national police and defense forces, to align these with a credible national system of criminal and civil justice, and to seek advice, training, and technical assistance from governments that are willing to make a firm commitment to Timorese sovereignty and success.

*Shepard Forman is director of the Center on International Cooperation.

reform requires more than just patrol officers, and must include personnel skilled in anthropology, change management, capacity building, and organizational practice. Whether UNMIT can recruit sufficient numbers of such candidates remains to be seen.

UNMIT will also have to deal with an institution that was neglected during the transitional administration: the F-FDTL. The force is administratively and organizationally weak, and lacks a strong role. Relations between the police and the army caused problems in Timor,

as neither appeared to have been educated about the concept of their respective roles as envisaged by their constitution.³

Encouragingly, the mandate is constructed so that police and military development will be approached comprehensively. The appointment of an DSRSG for security sector reform is a sign of this commitment, and a comprehensive review of future functions and needs is planned. The extensive role that nonstate or subnational actors play in providing policing and justice services in



(Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

An Australian peacekeeper patrols the scene of gang violence in Dili, 7 June 2006.

Timor requires urgent attention. Four years after independence, the majority of everyday disputes in the country are still dealt with largely by informal means rather than through an underresourced formal justice system. For the 80 percent of the population who live in rural areas, accessing the nearest police post, magistrate, or even telephone might involve a lengthy and difficult journey. In any case, reliance on a formal police force may not be financially feasible, especially when funding ends and foreign personnel are withdrawn. With population growth outstripping economic growth, careful attention needs to be paid to financial sustainability.

In contrast to the security sector, UNMIT will make extensive use of nonstate mechanisms for justice and reconciliation in dealing with the events of 1999. Building on the recommendations of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, UNMIT will coordinate “restoration” programs to provide psychological and practical remedy at individual, familial, and community levels.

Although prosecutions of those involved in the events have taken place in both Timor-Leste and Indonesia, many alleged perpetrators continue to benefit from immunity. Warm relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia may paradoxically slow efforts to bring those involved to justice. The Committee for Truth and Friendship has been established between the two governments, with the goal of establishing “conclusive truth” about the events of 1999. However, neither government has wanted to create difficulty with the other. An important part of UNMIT’s remit will be to keep the issue of justice and accountability paramount, as well as to improve the capacity of Timorese government institutions in that regard.

Justice, accountability, and security sector reform are not the only important tasks for UNMIT. Equal attention will have to be paid to underlying socioeconomic and governance issues. Challenging issues for UNMIT will be restoring basic services, many of which are not available beyond the capital,

revitalizing the economy, and dealing with lack of accountability, transparency, and capability within the central government. A large part of Timor-Leste's future is linked with how revenues from oil and gas, expected to generate \$35 billion over the next decade, will be used. Helping translate mineral wealth into effective development for all will depend on a comprehensive approach to economic governance. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a new Timorese compact between the government and the international community to ensure that the new mission's activities and resources complement the government's own budget resources and bilateral and

multilateral coordination programs. It will also be a stern test of the integrated mission concept.

Conclusion

José Ramos-Horta insists that despite its difficulties, Timor-Leste is not a "failed state." It is up to the country's elected leaders, with sustained commitment of the international community, to ensure that it does not become one. For the UN, the successful performance of UNMIT will demonstrate that past failings have been identified and have been addressed.

Notes

1. Edward Rees, "Under Pressure: Falentil F-DTL—Three Decades of Defense Force Development in Timor-Leste," Working Paper no. 139 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, April 2004).
2. Richard C. Paddock, "Bloodied East Timorese Hope U.N. Will Return," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 June 2006.
3. International Policy Institute, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (London: Kings College, 2003).

4

Mission Notes

Abkhazia-Georgia

Despite promising signs at the end of 2005, the past year brought little progress in determining the status of the breakaway Abkhaz republic. In fact, the prospects for a mutually agreeable solution appear less likely. A general decline in Russo-Georgian relations, along with efforts to link the dispute to the outcome of the Kosovo status negotiations, exacerbated an already tense situation. Violence erupted in late summer when Georgian forces entered the Kodori Gorge en masse, ostensibly in pursuit of a local warlord.

The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established in August 1993 to monitor a July cease-fire between Georgia and Abkhazia, which declared its independence from Georgia in July 1992. Before the UNOMIG team was fully deployed, the cease-fire broke and hostilities resumed. In spring 1994, negotiations culminated in the “Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces,” also known as the Moscow Agreement. The Moscow Agreement created the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia-Georgia (CISPKF), drawing on the over 1,000 Russian troops already present in the conflict zone. The CISPKF responsibilities include maintaining the cease-fire, promoting the safe return of refugees, supervising the implementation of the Moscow Agreement, and maintaining a “security zone” free of armed forces and heavy military equipment.

Human rights and security issues were the primary source of tension in the early part of 2006, with January bringing a surge of robberies and kidnappings to the Gali region, a part of Abkhazia with a significant Georgian

population. The Georgian government continued to request UNOMIG for an expansion of its monitoring of human rights violations against ethnic Georgians, and for an international police force for Gali. Presently, eleven UNOMIG police personnel operate on the Georgian side of the administrative border in the region of Zugdidi, but none are deployed within the Abkhaz part of the conflict zone. The outgoing UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Georgia, Heidi Tagliavini, argued on 22 June that the presence of peacekeepers and UN observers in the conflict zone is the only factor preventing the situation from spiraling out of control.

On 28 March 2006, Security Council Resolution 1666 extended UNOMIG’s mandate by six months, and reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia. While the United Nations has always supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, the Russian Federation moved closer to acknowledging the independence of Abkhazia during the year under review. Throughout the spring, President Vladimir Putin and foreign minister Sergei Lavrov continued to promote the concept of referenda on independence in contested areas of the CIS, hinting at the possibility of official recognition of the separatist republics within the former Soviet Union. Despite concerns about the safety of ethnic Georgians, the CISPKF is generally seen by international observers as a stabilizing force in the region.

In early May 2006 the Abkhaz administration released a peace plan that envisioned “fundamentally new, neighborly relations” between Abkhazia and Georgia as independent states, and also demanded an apology from the

Georgian government for its policy of “war and intimidation.” A Georgian peace initiative released on 9 June offered Abkhazia “broad internal sovereignty” based on the principles of federalism. Both plans were rejected and the governments pledged further negotiations. As 2006 drew to a close, negotiations had been suspended as a result of a breakdown in relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi following Georgia’s July incursion into the Kodori Gorge.

The Kodori Gorge is located in the north of Abkhazia, on the Russian border, and has been under nominal Georgian jurisdiction since 1994. It has long been controlled by local leader Emzar Kvitsiani, who on 23 July 2006 announced that he no longer recognized Tbilisi’s authority over the region. Georgia’s subsequent deployment of over a thousand police and special forces into the Kodori Gorge neutralized Kvitsiani’s militia with a minimum of casualties, but Kvitsiani himself escaped.

The significant Georgian military presence in Kodori prompted unease in Moscow and Sukhumi. Russia accused Georgia of violating the terms of the 1994 cease-fire, which called for the demilitarization of the Kodori Gorge. This position was accepted at the UN, where a Security Council resolution unusually critical of Georgia was passed on 13 October. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili’s statement, on 27 July 2006, that he planned to install the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the upper Kodori region increased tensions. The situation worsened significantly when Georgia announced that it would not allow the CISP KF to patrol the Kodori Gorge, preferring instead that the valley be patrolled by Georgian forces and UNOMIG.

The debate over monitoring of the upper Kodori Gorge brought to the fore the question of whether Georgia has the right to withdraw its consent to the CIS peacekeeping mission. Throughout the year, the Georgian parliament and legal advisers debated this question with-

out coming to a definitive conclusion. Meanwhile, Russia has stated that it does not intend to withdraw its peacekeepers from the conflict zone, particularly as the majority of Abkhaz have received Russian passports.

In early October 2006, after Russo-Georgian relations hit a new low following the arrest of four Russian officers accused of espionage, Georgia acceded to Russia’s demand to allow Russian CISP KF troops to inspect the upper Kodori Gorge. Despite this compromise solution, Russia’s relationship with Georgia remained extremely strained, and the situation in Abkhazia remained tense.

UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

• Authorization and start date	24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858)
• SRSG	Jean Arnault (France)
• Chief military observer	Major-General Niaz Mohammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan)
• Senior police adviser	Alexey Telichkin (Ukraine)
• Budget	\$33.4 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 121 Civilian police: 13 International civilian staff: 100 Local civilian staff: 180 UN volunteer: 1

For detailed mission information see p. 356.

CIS Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia-Georgia (CISP KF)

• Authorization date	21 October 1994 (CIS Council of Collective Security) and 21 July 1994 (UNSC Res. 937)
• Start date	June 1994
• Head of mission	Major-General Sergei Chaban (Russia)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 1,600

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The year 2006 began optimistically for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with the incoming High Representative announcing that the state had made such progress toward normality that it would be possible to close his office in 2007. But the year ended with new concerns over continued divisions between the Serb and Croatian-Bosniak halves of the country, demonstrated by highly polarizing elections in October. The early optimism was also overshadowed by slow progress on defense sector and police reform, as well as the continued failure to apprehend the two highest-profile Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects of the early 1990s, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

Bosnia remains host to a complex peace-keeping architecture that evolved out of the 1995 Dayton Accords, originally intended to act as the basis for a relatively short-lived international presence. But the late 1990s saw the entrenchment of the roles of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative (OHR) in maintaining postconflict stability. The European Union has recently taken on security responsibilities, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replacing the IPTF in January 2003, and the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) taking over from SFOR in December 2004. These transitions took place during the tenure of Lord Paddy Ashdown as High Representative. Appointed in 2002, he was also "double-hatted" as the EU's Special Representative (EUSR). He took a highly assertive

approach, using the powers of his office to intervene in domestic politics and dismiss a number of elected politicians.

If Ashdown's time in office was defined by the Europeanization of the international presence in Bosnia, 2006 appeared to offer the opportunity for a further transition. On 31 January, Christian Schwarz-Schilling succeeded Ashdown as High Representative, promising to maintain an emphasis on EU membership but to adopt a less interventionist approach than his predecessor. There was also a reorientation of the EUPM. The police mission was originally mandated to monitor and mentor the domestic police, partitioned into Serb and Bosnian-Croat forces. In November 2005 the European Council agreed to extend the mission by another two years, giving it additional coordination responsibilities for tackling organized crime. However, the force was reduced from over 350 officers to 173 in September 2006.

This reorientation reflected the fact that late 2005 had seen progress on a central issue in police reform, the unification of the divided Serb and Croat-Bosniak police forces under a single national authority. Politicians from both sides now accept this in principle, as well as the unification of their military forces, which had also remained separate since Dayton. Both decisions were preconditions for Bosnia entering into talks on a stabilization and association agreement with the EU, begun in November 2005, as well as progressing toward NATO membership. But there was little political will among Bosnian Serb leaders to hasten the implementation of police reform, and a 30 September deadline for the Bosnian Police Directorate to present a unification plan was missed.

This lack of progress reflected broader political tensions. In April 2006, Schwarz-Schilling urged the UN Security Council to treat Bosnia as a “normal” state, and let the domestic authorities take their own decisions. However, the Bosnian Serb leadership in particular has continued to resist a full integration of state structures, even calling for secession on the basis of a referendum similar to that held in Montenegro in May 2006. On 1 October, the first general elections since Dayton were convened to elect a three-person presidency and national parliament, as well as separate legislatures for the Serb and Bosnian-Croat regions. Campaigning overshadowed reform priorities, and while Bosnian-ethnicity voters backed candidates in favor of a unified state, the Serb-ethnicity electorate opted for nationalists. The polls were the first carried out entirely by the domestic authorities. While voting was smooth, international observers raised questions over the conduct of the count in some locations.

Uncertainty over Bosnia’s political future has led policymakers to address the evolution of the international presence there. In August, Schwarz-Schilling announced that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would begin preparations to close on 30 June 2007. In October, the European Council and European Commission won the agreement of EU foreign ministers to develop a “reinforced EUSR office” to inherit some of the roles of the OHR, including residual responsibilities under the Dayton Accords, facilitating local political processes, and promoting the rule of law and police reform. The Council and Commission underlined that the new office should be smaller than OHR. It is widely assumed that the OSCE’s role will continue in Bosnia, including assistance in economic and educational affairs as well as justice and defense reform.

The future of EUFOR is also under consideration. While the force originally consisted of 7,000 troops, this figure was understood to be higher than Bosnia’s conditions demanded, although it had a secondary role as a potential reserve for Kosovo Force (KFOR).

NATO Headquarters Sarajevo

- Authorization date 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit)
- Start date 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)
- Senior military representative December 2004
Major-General Richard O. Wightman Jr. (United States)

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

- Authorization date 8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council)
- Start date December 1995
- Head of mission Douglas Alexander Davidsson (United States)
- Budget \$22.1 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 International civilian staff: 109
Local civilian staff: 575

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

- Authorization date 11 March 2002
(Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP)
- Start date January 2003
- Head of mission Brigadier-General Vincenzo Coppola (Italy)
- Budget \$17 million
(October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Civilian police: 173
International civilian staff: 28
Local civilian staff: 215

EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

- Authorization date 12 July 2004 (Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP)
- Start date 9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551)
- Head of mission December 2004
Major-General Gian Marco Chiarini (Italy)
- Budget \$56.5 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 5,935
Civilian staff: 85



By the third quarter of 2006, EUPOR included slightly fewer than 6,000 soldiers, and EU governments have reportedly considered reducing it to 1,500. In the meantime, EU troops have cooperated with US forces, commanded by a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, in raids to capture war crimes suspects. EUPOR was embarrassed in early January when soldiers killed the wife of one suspect during a firefight. While a number of targets were apprehended, former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic remain free—they are believed to spend more time in Serbia than Bosnia.

While the international presence in Bosnia is thus attempting to give the state greater autonomy, political divisions have obstructed real progress in many areas. With the politics of the Western Balkans unsettled by tensions over Kosovo's future, Bosnia's transition to "normal" statehood may yet founder on issues left unresolved since Dayton. While the EU may continue to draw down its military and police presence, it will need to intensify its political efforts to persuade the Serb community that its future lies within a unified Bosnia.

Burundi

At the request of the newly elected government of Burundi and following negotiations with the United Nations on the timetable, the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) commenced a phased drawdown in 2006. The Security Council renewed the mandate until 31 December 2006, while discussions were conducted on the size and functions of a successor mission, the UN Office in Burundi (BINUB). Based on an agreement reached in May, and with a mandate to support the consolidation of peace, BINUB would smooth the somewhat rushed transition and avert a full-scale rift between the UN and the elected government. Meanwhile, the peace agreement of 7 September, signed by the government and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL)—the only rebel group that remained out of the peace process—offered significant hope for a return to stability. The fault lines of the fragile peace process were exposed by the government's arrest of opposition politicians in August 2006, and the resignation of the country's second vice president, who cited graft and obstruction in executing her duties.

Civil war broke out in Burundi in 1993, triggered by the assassination of the country's first democratically elected president. The Tutsi-dominated military was pitted against Hutu rebel movements, including the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération (Palipehutu-FNL). The Arusha Accords, of August 2000, created a power-sharing transitional government. However, it was not until November 2003 that the CNDD-FDD declared a cease-fire and joined the transitional administration. Meanwhile, the

FNL remained a source of insecurity in Burundi's western provinces.

On 1 June 2004, ONUB took over from the AU Mission in Burundi, absorbing many of the deployed troops. Granted a broad Chapter VII mandate, ONUB was tasked with overseeing disarmament and demobilization of militias and rebel groups; monitoring borders, with particular attention to the illegal arms trade; coordinating with the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC); creating a safe environment for refugees; and assisting with elections.

After a decisive election victory for the CNDD-FDD in August 2005, the new government, under President Pierre Nkurunziza, considered ONUB's mission discharged, and firmly requested the peacekeepers' withdrawal. Initially, the nature of the follow-on presence to ONUB proved contentious. In February the government announced its opposition to a "partner forum" that was to include ONUB, UN agencies, and other donors, arguing it would duplicate government functions. International misgivings about the withdrawal were based on the fragility of postconflict institutions, as well as on continued fighting between government forces and the FNL prior to the signing of the peace deal in September 2006.

While security was less precarious in the rest of Burundi, the transition remained at an early stage. Following its phased drawdown plan, ONUB's military strength was about 2,400 by the end of October. The fourteen remaining police officers continued to provide training assistance to their local counterparts and commenced the development of specialized

programs in areas such as investigations, airport security, and prison management.

In April, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1669 (2006), authorizing the temporary redeployment of a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital, and fifty military observers from ONUB to bolster MONUC ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Reflecting a growing pattern of intermission collaboration, ONUB and MONUC worked jointly on the return of alleged Burundian rebels from the DRC. The forced repatriation of fifty-one alleged FNL rebels, who had been captured by the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in South Kivu, raised some human rights concerns, as their status had not been established.

Refugee return was not as high as anticipated, due largely to the continued insecurity caused by the activities of the FNL and armed bandits. The signing of the peace agreement between the government and the FNL set the stage for the return of as many as 50,000 returnees by the end of 2006.

The arrest of the country's former president, Domitien Ndayizeye, and several other

key political figures in an alleged plot to overthrow the newly elected government, heightened concerns about the government's increasing tendency to target members of the opposition, as well as concerns about its poor human rights record. The resignation of the country's second vice president, Alice Nzomukunda, in September—who protested interference with her functions by the chairman of the ruling party—exposed the tensions within the government. It also brought to the fore allegations of corruption and mismanagement of public resources, and further cast doubt on whether there was a coup plot.

Plans for a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and a special chamber for war crimes were boosted by the visit to Burundi of a mission led by the UN Legal Counsel, who consulted with the government, political parties, civic organizations, and religious and traditional leaders. In reaffirming its support for the establishment of a TRC and tribunal, the UN emphasized its principle of no immunity or amnesty for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The peace deal between the government and FNL in September marked the end of open hostilities. However, land disputes, lack of economic opportunities, and delays in disbursing benefits to ex-combatants raised concerns about the peace process, as did the increase in human rights violations, the government's intimidation of opposition figures, and allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Improved relations with its neighbors, including the possibility of admission to the East African Community, and the designation of Burundi as one of the first clients of the Peacebuilding Commission, were promising developments. At its second-ever country-specific meeting on 16 October, the commission recommended assistance for Burundi out of the new peacebuilding fund. Consolidation of the gains from peace will require sustained international support for the foreseeable future.

UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

• Authorization date	21 May 2004 (UNSC Res. 1545)
• Start date	1 June 2004
• Acting SRSG	Nureldin Satti (Sudan)
• Force commander	Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi (South Africa)
• Police commissioner	Ibrahima Diallo (Mali)
• Budget	\$79 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of	Troops: 2,353
30 September 2006	Military observers: 87
	Police: 14
	International civilian staff: 262
	Local civilian staff: 327

For detailed mission information see p. 233.

Box 4.3.1 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations

The September 2005 World Summit outcome document urged the UN General Assembly to adopt recommendations made earlier in the year by Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein of Jordan on combating sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers. The year 2006 saw the development of a detailed UN strategy toward the problem, alongside an ongoing series of investigations into specific complaints. Between 1 January 2004 and 18 October 2006, investigations were conducted against at least 316 peacekeeping personnel, and these resulted in the summary dismissal of eighteen civilian staff, the repatriation of seventeen members of former police units, and the repatriation or rotation of 144 military personnel (including seven commanders) on disciplinary grounds.

Evidence of the damage SEA can do to the reputation of peacekeeping forces has continued to mount. Surveys of public opinion toward UN operations in Liberia and Burundi carried out by Jean Krasno in early 2006 found that SEA was the biggest single source of resentment toward both missions. In Liberia, 22 percent of those surveyed referred to peacekeepers committing rape or encouraging prostitution. Of 900 Burundian interviewees, 536 referred to SEA, of whom 136 made specific complaints about rapes.

In 2005, the UN General Assembly transferred responsibility for investigating SEA claims to the Office of Internal

Oversight Services (OIOS), outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). But Kofi Annan admitted in May 2006 that OIOS lacked the resources to address all cases as they were received, "resulting in a backlog of serious misconduct cases to be investigated." There were 340 allegations of SEA reported in DPKO missions in 2005, and 127 more in the first three-quarters of 2006. Prince Zeid also raised concerns about progress on implementing a strategy for assistance to victims of SEA. Annan presented such a strategy to an expert working group in June 2006, and elements of it were already being implemented by the end of the year.

The strategy proposes that the UN should fine staff members found guilty of SEA, and use the funds to assist victims. Proposed forms of assistance include medical and psychological care, and even basic shelter, clothing, and food. Where necessary, the UN will assist victims in bringing complaints to national authorities, and may finance their legal costs. It will also offer economic reintegration and job training for victims of SEA. The UN will also offer support for paternity suits against UN staff, and aim to ensure that children born as a result of SEA receive support for any diseases transmitted at conception, and for the potential social and economic ramifications of their status. The strategy emphasizes working with community groups and nongovernmental organizations in providing assistance.

DPKO has also worked with the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping on combating SEA by military and police personnel, over whom DPKO has no direct disciplinary authority. In November 2006, it was reported that DPKO's conduct and discipline team had recorded the repatriation of a variety of uniformed personnel in the previous twelve months, including "12 peacekeepers from Nepal, seven from Uruguay, four from Nigeria, four from Senegal, two from Benin, two from Ethiopia, two from Togo and one each from France, Ghana, India, Niger and South Africa." The Special Committee and DPKO are working on a model memorandum of understanding with personnel contributors, by which states would send national investigations officers to the field to handle accusations of SEA against members of their contingents.

While the General Assembly is still considering these proposals, other organizations are searching for new approaches to SEA. In December 2005 the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a resolution calling on states to take action against peacekeeping personnel who commit SEA. And in April 2006 the AU launched its first investigation into SEA, following accusations that peacekeepers in Sudan had been involved in sexual abuse.

Sources: UN docs. A/Res/59/287, A/60/861, A/60/862, and A/60/877; OSCE doc. MC.DEC/16/05; Jean Krasno, *Public Opinion Survey of UNMIL's Work in Liberia* (United Nations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006); Jean Krasno, *Public Opinion Survey of ONUB's Work in Burundi* (United Nations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, June 2006); Jonah Fisher, "AU Darfur Troops in Abuse Probe," *BBC News Online*, 4 April 2006; Edith M. Lederer, "180 UN Peacekeepers Face Disciplinary Actions for Sexual Abuse," *Associated Press*, 30 November 2006.

Central African Republic (CAR)

After landmark elections in 2005, the UN Secretary-General observed that for the first time in years, “the conditions for peacebuilding are in place” in the Central African Republic (CAR). But these hopes receded in 2006, as post-election violence escalated into a full-scale rebellion in the north, gruesomely entangled with the tensions between Chad and Sudan. Neither the CAR military nor the Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC) was in a position to restore order. A fragmented country once again risked being a victim of the regional dynamics involving its immediate neighbors.

Decades of political instability in CAR reached a peak in 1996, when protests over unpaid salaries triggered multiple mutinies by the armed forces against the elected government of President Ange-Félix Patassé. Fighting was fueled by regional and ethnic tensions, as Patassé’s supporters, mainly from the north and west of CAR, were pitted against the mainly southern elites dominant under the former president, General André Kolingba. The conflict in the former French colony has also been driven by the struggle to control the lucrative timber and diamond industries.

Regional mediators brokered the Bangui peace agreement in January 1997, which was monitored first by an 800-strong African regional force, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), and subsequently by the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). The peacekeepers provided security in and around Bangui, enabling the conduct of elections that saw Patassé returned as president in September 1999. But as MINURCA drew down, security in CAR remained fragile. A successor political mission, the Office of the

UN in Central Africa (BONUCA), was established in February 2000 to help consolidate peace and promote security sector reform. However, President Patassé remained beleaguered by opposition inside and outside the army, becoming reliant on military aid from Libya and Congolese mercenaries for his own survival. FOMUC was created in 2002 to stabilize the government as it battled a growing insurgency led by the former army chief of staff, General François Bozizé.

FOMUC was established by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), with endorsement from the UN Security Council. It is composed of troops from Gabon, Congo, and Chad, and is financed by France, the European Union, and CEMAC member states. Initially conceived as a 200-strong “observer” mission—later expanded to 380 troops—the force has a broad mandate to monitor security in Bangui and along the Chadian border, and to contribute to the transitional process. Until recently, its main operational focus was Bangui, particularly to secure the president’s residence and the national airport. This assistance was not enough to prevent the 2003 coup in which General Bozizé ousted Patassé; however, the force remained in place under the new regime. Bozizé established the broad-based National Transition Council, restored constitutional rule, and was formally elected president in May 2005.

Following the elections, it was hoped that 2006 would mark a period of consolidation. FOMUC reduced its presence in Bangui in order to help extend government authority across the troubled northern provinces. On 30 November 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced his intention to extend BONUCA and to promote its head to “Special

Representative.” While it seemed that conditions conducive to peacebuilding had been in place, with some progress made in building state institutions, there has been a sharp deterioration in the security situation. Escalating violence in the northwest is attributed to at least four armed groups, all dedicated to overthrowing the Bozizé government: the Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR), the Armée pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD), the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Restauration de la République Centrafricaine (MPRC), and the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricaine (FPDC). On 29 January 2006, government and FOMUC clashes with armed rebels in the northern town of Paoua resulted in over twenty civilian deaths. Fighting intensified in February and March, accompanied by accusations of human rights violations by government forces. A lull in March saw the launch of a “national dialogue on peace and security,” but by June, according to UN estimates, 50,000 people had been internally displaced, with a further 20,000 seeking refuge in Chad.

Internal conflict in the CAR has been fueled by rising tensions between Chad and Sudan. In April, armed men and military equipment were reportedly delivered by air to northeastern CAR. In response, the CAR government closed its border with Sudan. The same month, forces hostile to the regime in N’djamenā allegedly used the CAR as a base for attacks into Chad. On 26 June, rebels attacked a government camp at Gordil, near the Chad border, clashing with the Chadian contingent of FOMUC. President Bozizé, concerned about links between the CAR and Chad rebel groups, called for international assistance against “armed groups in the pay of foreign powers.” Separately, Annan warned Security Council members that the CAR’s armed forces and FOMUC were not in a position to secure the territory. France then stepped up military support to the CAR’s armed forces, including aerial patrols of the northern areas. The European Commission’s recommendation to the EU for the continued funding of FOMUC until 30 June 2007, was a positive development, pre-

Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC)

- Authorization date 2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit)
21 March 2003 (Libreville Summit, Amended)
- Start date December 2002
- Head of mission Brigadier-General Auguste Roger Bibaye Itandas (Gabon)
- Budget \$9.7 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of Troops: 380
30 September 2006 Local civilian staff: 54

Office of the UN in Central Africa (BONUCA)

- Authorization date 10 February 2000
- Start date 15 February 2000
- SRSg and General Lamine Cissé (Senegal)
head of office
- Budget \$6.5 million (2006)
- Strength as of Military advisers: 5
30 June 2006 Police advisers: 6
International civilian staff: 25
Local civilian staff: 44
UN volunteers: 3

empting an untimely withdrawal of the mission.

As 2006 drew to a close, fighting in the north displaced an estimated quarter of a million civilians, including refugees to neighboring Chad and Cameroon, despite the unstable security situation in the former. This prompted the UN to call for international action to respond to what was quickly becoming a regional humanitarian crisis. Consequently, in November, the UN dispatched an assessment mission to the country (and Chad) with a view to considering deployment of a multidimensional UN mission to both countries for the purpose of monitoring the border and possibly protecting civilians. While FOMUC and BONUCA might have helped to prevent Central Africa from degenerating into total chaos, the escalation of fighting in the north exposed the limits of both missions, and the need for greater international involvement.



Comoros

The 2006 elections in the Union of the Comoros marked an important milestone in the peace process on the troubled archipelago. New union president Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi won 58 percent of the vote in elections, described by the African Union as free and fair, and took over on 27 May 2006, in the islands' first peaceful leadership transition since 1975. The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC), a short-term mission devoted to the peaceful conduct of the elections, withdrew from Comoros at the end of May, having been declared a success by the AU and the Comorian government.

The Comoros comprises three islands: Grande Comore (including the capital, Moroni), Anjouan, and Moheli. Following independence from France in 1975, the country experienced some twenty coups in its first twenty-five years; meanwhile, Comoros slid ever deeper into poverty, and efforts at administrative centralization met with hostility, fueling calls for secession and/or a return to French rule in Anjouan and Moheli. When both islands declared independence from Comoros in 1997, state security forces sent to restore order clashed with separatists, leaving forty dead and causing consternation among the archipelago's regional neighbors.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) became involved in resolving the conflict on the islands in the mid-1990s. As part of its engagement, the Central Organ of the OAU authorized the deployment of a small military mission, the Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC), in 1998 to monitor the situation and to build confidence. The OAU also facilitated multiple rounds of negotiations, while emphasizing its

support for a solution that preserves the country's unity. After Anjouan separatists rejected an initial deal in 1999, the OAU, under South African leadership, threatened sanctions and military action if the island continued to pursue secession. All parties eventually acceded to the 2001 Fomboni Accords, which provided for a referendum on a new constitution in advance of national elections.

The core of the current deal is a federated structure, giving each island substantial autonomy and a turn at the presidency of the union, which rotates every four years. Presidential



An African Union peacekeeper checks voter identification cards at a polling center in Mutsamudu, Comoros, 14 May 2006.

AP Photo/Xinhua, Wang Hongda

AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)

• Authorization and start date	21 March 2006 (Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council)
• Head of mission	Francisco Madeira (Mozambique)
• Force commander	Colonel G. K. Sibanyoni (South Africa)
• Police commissioner	E. Razafindrazaka (Madagascar)
• Budget	\$19 million (estimate, excluding the boost to numbers around election time)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 401 (boosted by 700 troops) Military observers: 31 (boosted to 63) Civilian police: 30

elections in 2002 returned the incumbent president, Colonel Azali Assoumani; however, there were widespread allegations of fraud. Many feared the 2006 elections would be more contentious, with the departure of Assoumani and the transfer of the presidency from Grand Comore to Anjouan. The relationship between the three islands' individual security forces and the national military also remained contentious.

In an effort to keep peace implementation on track, the AU's Peace and Security Council authorized the deployment of AMISEC on 21 March 2006, at the request of the president of Comoros. South Africa, which had acted as the coordinator of regional efforts in the past, was chosen as the lead nation. The mission had a mandate to monitor the elections, create a stable environment, and verify that the Comorian security forces were not involved in the electoral process. AMISEC was also authorized to "take all measures necessary to protect its personnel, as well as civilians within the proximity of the polling stations."

Troops were deployed almost immediately, with South Africa initially providing 361,

Rwanda 30, Nigeria 11, Mozambique 10, Congo-Brazzaville 5, and Egypt 5. Madagascar and Mauritius provided 15 police officers each. The primaries in Anjouan on 16 April 2006 ran smoothly, although with long delays in some areas. However, more support was needed to ensure security for the nationwide poll on 14 May. A last-minute request by the African Union, supported by all the Comorian parties, resulted in the deployment of an additional 700 South African troops for the presidential election. A total of 63 observers monitored the polls, which were declared free and fair.

Voting on 14 May generally went smoothly, with polls open at 624 sites. Comorian security forces reportedly remained in their barracks. AMISEC troops arrested several people for fraud, including a prominent member of the National Electoral Commission who was later handed over to the Comorian authorities. Counting proceeded without incident, with a decisive victory declared for moderate Islamist, "Ayatollah" Sambi, who was inaugurated in a cordial ceremony in Moroni on 27 May. AMISEC, whose mandate concluded on 9 June, demonstrated the AU's ability to undertake effective short-term peace operations, especially with a strong lead nation, as was the case with South Africa.

The chairman of the Commission of the African Union expressed his satisfaction with the smooth conduct of the polls. President Sambi has many challenges ahead, including delivering on his election promises of a fresh start for Comoros, persuading international donors to deliver on their pledges of aid, and reconciling his Anjouan supporters with mistrustful compatriots in Grand Comore. But for now, AMISEC's timely intervention seems to have given this small nation a decent chance at peace.

Côte d'Ivoire

Despite international efforts to end the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the country remained divided in 2006 between the government-controlled south and the rebel-held north. Lack of progress in disarmament and demobilization, continued delays in the national identification process, and the development of an electoral register meant that the presidential and parliamentary elections were not held as scheduled in October 2006. The expiration of President Laurent Gbagbo's term of office, coupled with the resignation of Prime Minister Charles Banny's government of national unity triggered by a poison scandal that followed the dumping of toxic waste in the commercial capital Abidjan, left the country dangerously divided and presented the international community with a dilemma. The opposition insisted they would not accept Gbagbo as president after the October deadline, while Gbagbo claimed that under the constitution he had the mandate of the populace to stay in power until elections are held. The matter was resolved in October when the Security Council, acting on a recommendation from ECOWAS and the AU, adopted Resolution 1721 (2006) extending the president's and prime minister's terms for one year, during which time key aspects of the peace process including elections should have been completed. The prime minister was given expanded powers, including control of the country's security forces—a potential source of friction with the president.

Côte d'Ivoire, the once prosperous and world-leading cocoa producer, which gained independence from France in 1960, was plunged into conflict in September 2002 following a mutiny and a failed coup attempt by soldiers of the armed forces. Since then, the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU, former colonial power France, and the UN have all been engaged in efforts to resolve the crisis. The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established in April 2004, with a mandate to assist in the implementation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accords. It took over from the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), which was deployed immediately after Linas-Marcoussis. Meanwhile, French Operation Licorne forces were mandated by the Security Council to operate alongside ECOMICI and then the UN mission.

Tensions that emerged toward the end of 2005 boiled over in early January 2006, starting with an attack on a military barracks in Abidjan. This was soon followed by a more organized and orchestrated violent demonstration under the banner of the Young Patriots. These riots, which lasted from 15 to 20 January 2006, were ostensibly triggered by an erroneous interpretation of a communiqué issued by the International Working Group regarding the expiration of the National Assembly. The Young Patriots interpreted the communiqué as an attack on the country's sovereignty, because it purportedly did not recommend the extension of the National Assembly.

The demonstrations, which left five people dead, were targeted at UN personnel, Licorne forces, international organizations, and ethnic minorities. They were concentrated in the government-controlled south and west of the country, especially in the towns of Guiglo, Toulépleu, Duékoué, and Bloléquin, forcing UNOCI and UN agencies to relocate their staff from these areas. The cities of Abidjan,

Yamoussoukro, San Pedro, and Daloa also witnessed increased lawlessness. The UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, and the French embassy, came under repeated attacks. In the western part of the country, rioters destroyed UN property and that of international humanitarian agencies, forcing them to withdraw and leaving thousands without any humanitarian assistance. Radio Télévision Ivoirienne, which was taken over by the Young Patriots, incited the rioters by broadcasting hate messages against the UN, the international community, and ethnic minorities, while the government watched in silence.

Meanwhile, Licorne forces were obstructed in their operations by the Force Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI), especially

in the western part of the country. Following the French retaliatory attack on the Ivorian air force and its forceful occupation of the international airports in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro in November 2004, in reaction to the deaths of some of its soldiers, pro-Gbagbo forces came to view Licorne forces as occupiers.

The January riots, threatening to jeopardize the faltering peace process, ended with the timely intervention of then chairman of the AU, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who arrived in Abidjan on 18 January 2006. President Obasanjo's visit resulted in a joint communiqué released by the two heads of state, calling for an immediate end of the demonstrations and for the president and the prime minister to explore options to resolve the status of the National Assembly. However, on 27 January 2006, President Gbagbo signed a decree extending the life of the National Assembly, which was immediately rejected by the opposition parties and the Forces Nouvelles, who described the move as a flagrant violation of the country's constitution and UN Security Council Resolution 1633 (2005).

In February 2006, Prime Minister Banny and Guillaume Soro, the secretary-general of the Force Nouvelles (who had withdrawn from the previous government), discussed a roadmap for peace. They agreed to establish mechanisms for the implementation of key aspects of the peace process.

On 2 June 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1682, which increased UNOCI by 1,025 military personnel and 475 civilian police, in response to an earlier request by the Secretary-General. As the year drew to a close, UNOCI's strength stood at 6,896 military out of an authorized strength of 8,115, and 728 personnel out of the mandated 1,200. Despite shortfalls in troops and police and a wave of anti-UN propaganda mounted by the Young Patriots and other pro-Gbagbo forces during the year, UNOCI police continued their joint patrols with defense and security forces in Abidjan, and conducted joint training exercises with Licorne forces. UNOCI and UNMIL initiated a two-month joint border

UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

- Authorization date 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528)
- Start date 4 April 2004
- SRSG Pierre Schori (Sweden)
- Force commander Brigadier-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin)
- Police commissioner Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina)
- Budget \$420.2 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006
 - Troops: 7,843
 - Military observers: 194
 - Police: 949
 - International civilian staff: 366
 - Local civilian staff: 508
 - UN volunteers: 228

For detailed mission information see p. 347.

Operation Licorne

- Authorization date 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1464)
- Start date February 2003
- Head of mission General Antoine Lecerf (France)
- Budget \$253.4 million
- Strength as of 30 September 2006
 - Troops: 3,400

patrol initiative to increase security and the visibility of peacekeepers along the Côte d'Ivoire–Liberia border.

In collaboration with the UN High Representative for Elections, Côte d'Ivoire's electoral commission embarked on a number of preelection preparation programs, including the contested identification process. The identification and disarmament processes, which were supposed to be coordinated simultaneously, were hampered by deliberate obstructions from the parties. However, some progress was made on both during 2006: 12,547 FANCI troops and 12,885 Forces Nouvelles elements were reportedly cantoned in designated sites, while 3,907 applicants received their birth certificates and 3,137 received certificates of nationality as part of the identification process. Despite logistical problems and conflicting demands from the parties, these phases of the DDRR and identification programs were carried out simultaneously.

An ECOWAS meeting on the issue of elections recommended to the AU's Peace and Security Council and to the UN the renewal of the president's mandate for a period of twelve months, and called for a significant strengthening of Prime Minister Banny's powers, something that President Gbagbo had resisted for a long time. Initially the Forces Nouvelles rebels and civilian opposition rejected the proposed extension of President Gbagbo's mandate, but eventually softened their stance on condition that the prime minister be given enough room to exercise his strengthened mandate, which they argued had been obstructed by the president. As the year drew to a close, the stalemate in the peace process exposed the complexities and limitations of the various stakeholders involved in resolving the Ivorian conflict, and it remained to be seen whether this time around the outstanding issues including elections would be implemented in good faith.

Cyprus

In its forty-second year of operation, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continued to monitor the cease-fire between Greek Cypriots (in the south) and Turkish Cypriots (in the north), to encourage the resumption of normal civilian routines in the buffer zone between them, and to engage in humanitarian activities. The island experienced another year of stability, partly attributable to the presence of UNFICYP. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot officials agreed to resume contacts after a two-year hiatus, and the leaders of both sides called on UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to resume his mission of good offices to the island, suspended after Greek Cypriot voters rejected proposals to reunify the island in a 2004 referendum. But Annan stated in May 2006 that the political circumstances were “not yet ripe” for this move, and in the second half of the year the UN’s mediation in Cyprus was increasingly shaped by talks between the European Union (EU) and Turkey over the latter’s refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot government.

Established in March 1964, UNFICYP was initially mandated to prevent violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and to restore law and order. Following the resurgence of hostilities and intervention by Turkish military forces, a de facto cease-fire was established in 1974 and UNFICYP’s duties were broadened to include cease-fire monitoring, buffer zone administration, and humanitarian activities. Despite efforts by the Secretary-General—based on the request of the Security Council—no formula for reunification of the island was acceptable to both the Greek and Turkish parties. In March 2003 the Secretary-General’s envoy, Alvaro de Soto, submitted a comprehensive peace plan to the parties, which led to a resumption of talks in April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the



SRS Michael Møller (right) and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fog Rasmussen leave UNFICYP headquarters to tour the UN-administered buffer zone, Nicosia, Cyprus, 5 September 2006.

plan in a referendum, but the Greek Cypriot electorate rejected it. In the absence of a political settlement of the underlying conflict, the Security Council continued to extend UNFICYP’s mandate at six-month intervals, most recently in June 2006.

UNFICYP fulfills its mandated tasks by investigating reported cease-fire violations and buffer zone infringements, ranging from minor enhancements to military positions, to stone-throwing, to the more serious incidents of weapon-pointing. Between November 2005 and May 2006, UNFICYP reported 486 violations in the buffer zone, up from 397 during the

same period in the previous year. This increase in reporting is attributable to the adoption of UNFICYP's mobile concept of operations in February 2005, which put the mission in more direct contact with the National Guard and the Turkish Forces/Turkish Cypriot Security Forces, with an emphasis on liaison. This new operational concept increased UNFICYP's civilian police component from 45 to 69, and reduced its overall troop strength from 1,224 to 860. The result has been improved coordination among civilian, military, and police elements, with the overall security situation remaining stable.

UNFICYP's presence has helped to preserve the status quo along the cease-fire lines and to promote the resumption of normal civilian activity in the buffer zone. Presently, some 8,000 Cypriots live and work in the UN-administered zone, and there is now a steady flow of both people and trade. UNFICYP's humanitarian work facilitates farming, ensures the supply of electricity and water, provides emergency medical services, and encourages bicomunal contacts in the buffer zone. UNFICYP also helps Greek Cypriots, the small Maronite community in the north, and Turkish Cypriots in the south, to maintain contact with their relatives.

In July 2006, the mission's priorities were affected by events in Lebanon. During the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, UNFICYP chartered a cruise ship to evacuate 150 nonessential UNIFIL staff and 750 other third-country nationals. UNFICYP sent military personnel to coordinate the civilians' embarkation at Tyre, and UNFICYP also assisted resupply vessels for UNIFIL during the crisis. While the Greek Cypriot government agreed to host UNIFIL's command center and provide bases for its maritime component, these decisions did not involve UNFICYP directly.

July 2006 also saw face-to-face negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities on technical matters such as water, and both sides agreed to the resumption of talks under UN auspices on more substantive political issues. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Michael Møller predicted

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

• Authorization and start date	4 March 1964 (UNSC Res. 186)
• SRSG	Michael Møller (Denmark)
• Force commander	Major-General Rafael José Barni (Argentina)
• Senior police adviser	Carla Van Maris (Netherlands)
• Budget	\$46.3 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 851 Police: 65 International civilian staff: 38 Local civilian staff: 108

For detailed mission information see p. 266.

that such confidence-building measures would bring the parties back to the table for full-scale settlement negotiations in 2007.

But this progress was overshadowed by increasingly acrimonious negotiations between the EU and Turkey over Ankara's refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot government or permit Greek Cypriot planes and ships to land or dock in Turkey. Since joining the EU in 2004, Cyprus has consistently threatened to block negotiations on Turkish entry into the Union over these issues. The EU has maintained a trade embargo on Turkish Cyprus.

In November, UN and EU officials advocated a plan by which Turkey would open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. In return, the EU would trade freely with Turkish Cyprus through the eastern port of Famagusta. Additionally, UNFICYP would take over administration of Varosha, a deserted southern district of Famagusta technically within the buffer zone but occupied by Turkish troops since 1974. But the Greek Cypriot government remained opposed to opening direct trade links, and the EU rejected a Turkish offer to open limited trade links. In mid December, the European Council suspended parts of Turkey's accession talks. While UNFICYP saw positive developments within Cyprus, therefore, it continues to face challenges arising from the broader political context of its mission.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

The year 2006 saw Eritrea and Ethiopia roll back from a return to war over their disputed border. With no progress on the border's demarcation and the disregard of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) throughout the year, the Security Council reduced the mission's size and scope, limiting its ability to observe a possible military buildup in the temporary security zone (TSZ). Meanwhile, fears of greater instability throughout the Horn of Africa grew, as it became clear that conflict in Somalia could directly involve Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war in 1998 over disputed border territory around the town of Badme. In the course of the conflict, Ethiopian troops retook Badme and penetrated deep into Eritrean territory. The Algiers peace agreement of 2000 provided for their withdrawal, and for the separation of forces by a TSZ along the Eritrean side of the border. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission was created to rule on the disputed territory.

UNMEE was mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to monitor the force withdrawal from the TSZ, chair a joint military commission, and coordinate mine clearance. The 6,000-strong mission has carried out these tasks largely successfully. However, the wider peace process has since stalled over border demarcation. In 2003 the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission clarified that its 2002 ruling would cede Badme to Eritrea—a decision that Ethiopia regards as illegal and has refused to implement. Because Eritrea sees the ruling as final, the government has opposed attempts at further dialogue and the appointment of a UN Special Envoy. Meanwhile, Eritrea increasingly regards UNMEE as an

imposition on Eritrean sovereignty.

At the end of 2005, the stalemate looked set to escalate into crisis. In October, Eritrea abruptly announced a ban on UNMEE helicopter flights that left UNMEE unable to monitor some 60 percent of its area of responsibility. There followed reports of illegal military activity in the TSZ, which Eritrea claimed were the movements of militia and nonregular Ethiopian military elements. Ethiopian troops massed along the border in November and made several incursions into the TSZ. On 23 November, Security Council Resolution 1640 called on both sides to de-escalate the situation through an immediate return to 2004 levels of deployment, a reversal of Eritrea's restrictions on UNMEE, and immediate steps by Ethiopia to demarcate the border in line with the Boundary Commission decision.

Although Ethiopian troops did pull back, reducing the immediate threat of military clashes, the other provisions of Resolution 1640 were not implemented. In December 2005, Eritrea demanded the withdrawal of US, Canadian, European, and Russian staff from UNMEE. The Secretary-General condemned the request, but "in the interests of the safety and security of UNMEE staff," redeployed about 140 mission personnel from Asmara to Addis Ababa. In January 2006, he advised that the position of UNMEE was becoming "increasingly untenable" and outlined options for downsizing or withdrawal if progress were not made.

On 10 March 2006, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission met with the parties in London to discuss arrangements for the resumption of demarcation negotiations that had been halted since 2003. UNMEE's mandate

was extended for one month on 14 March, and then for a further thirty days until 15 May. On that latter day, the Council gave Ethiopia and Eritrea a final two weeks to comply with Resolution 1640. On 31 May, in the absence of substantive progress on border demarcation or UNMEE's status, the Council authorized the reconfiguration of UNMEE's military component and reduced its authorized strength by about a thousand troops, to 2,300. In September 2006, the existing mandate was extended until 31 January 2007, despite the failure of

both parties to attend scheduled meetings of the boundary commission in June and August of 2006.

Of the menu of options for the future of UNMEE, the 31 May decision represented a cautious choice, allowing the mission to continue to monitor the TSZ as far as is possible within the restrictions laid down by Eritrea. UNMEE conducts land patrols, humanitarian activities, and demining over the accessible 40 percent of the TSZ. Regular reports throughout June and July described the TSZ as "stable but

Box 4.8.1 Somalia

Soon after his election in October 2004 as president of Somalia's new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed appealed to the international community for a multinational peacekeeping force of up to 20,000 troops to help restore security in Somalia and enable his government's return from exile. The request initially met a lukewarm reception, but in January 2005 the African Union accepted the idea of a mission "in principle." The Security Council expressed its support, and regional states, notably Ethiopia, offered to contribute. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), sponsor of the peace talks, agreed to take the lead in establishing a peace support mission, which was approved by the AU on 7 February 2005.

In Somalia, however, there was widespread opposition to the notion of a force comprising peacekeepers from neighboring countries. An initial AU assessment mission in February 2005 was met with violent protests. The Security Council cautioned that any peace support mission "would require the support of the Somali people," while IGAD promised not to include troops from Ethiopia, Kenya, or Djibouti in the proposed mission.

IGAD formally established its Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM)

in April 2005, with a robust "peace enforcement" mandate. The concept of operations was approved by the transitional parliament on 11 May and authorized by the AU on 12 May 2005. However, deployment of IGASOM was suspended, pending Security Council approval of an exemption to its arms embargo on Somalia imposed under Resolution 733 (1992). The Security Council agreed to consider an exemption, but only on the basis of an IGASOM plan that had the support of the TFI and was consistent with an agreed national security plan.

Though the Somali parliament finally adopted its national security plan on 14 June 2006, concerns emerged that unless the TFI could reach agreement with the increasingly powerful Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)—which controls Mogadishu and large sections of Somali territory—there would be no peace for IGASOM to keep. In early July the UIC made clear to a joint EU, AU, and Arab League delegation that it opposed the deployment of foreign troops.

Nevertheless, on 13 September 2006, the (African Union's) Peace and Security Council (PSC) approved the deployment plan of IGASOM. Among other things, it authorized the mission to provide security for the TFI and create an environment

conducive for dialogue and reconciliation. The PSC renewed its request to the Security Council for an exemption to the arms embargo. The IGASOM plan calls for the deployment of 8,000 troops. The UIC rejected the AU decision. The League of Arab States continued to meditate between the UIC and TFI, but tensions between the two sides persisted. The UIC accused Ethiopia of deploying troops in support of the TFI—an allegation that Ethiopia initially denied but later admitted to sending hundreds of military trainers.

On 6 December, the UN Security Council amended the arms embargo and authorized IGAD and AU states to establish a "protection and training mission" in Somalia. Neighboring states, including Ethiopia, would be prohibited from contributing troops to the mission. Matters took a dramatic turn in late December when war between the UIC and transitional government broke out. Backed by Ethiopian troops and aircraft, the TFI regained territory that had been under UIC control. With pressure on Ethiopia to withdraw, momentum to get an African peacekeeping force on the ground grew, although it was unclear which countries would provide troops.

UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)

- Authorization and start date 31 July 2000 (UNSC Res. 1312)
- Acting SRSG Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia)
- Force commander Major-General Mohammad Taisir Masadeh (Jordan)
- Budget \$174.7 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006
 - Troops: 2,064
 - Military observers: 205
 - International civilian staff: 135
 - Local civilian staff: 187
 - UN volunteers: 61

For detailed mission information see p. 296.

tense.” Nevertheless, what Secretary-General Annan called a “pattern of hostility” toward the mission came to a head in September 2006, when the Eritrean government arrested one and ordered the expulsion of five UNMEE staff on allegations of espionage.

While the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute ebbs toward cold war, fears have mounted of a hotter,

proxy war for influence in Somalia. Ethiopia has long been a staunch ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf, whose transitional government is sequestered in Baidoa, near the Ethiopian border. Conversely, Eritrea is sympathetic to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which took over administration of Mogadishu during Somalia’s civil war and emerged as a political and military force in 2006, extending its administrative control throughout the country’s south (see Box 4.8.1). The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was met with threats of jihad by the UIC. Although Ethiopia continued to insist it had only military trainers in Somalia, a UN report in November accused several countries including Ethiopia and Eritrea of violating a UN arms embargo by providing support to the various belligerent groups. The end of 2006 saw the eruption of war between the UIC and the transitional government, backed by Ethiopian troops and aircraft. Despite concerns, the Somalia conflict did not lead to direct clashes between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

India and Pakistan

The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continued to oversee a frequently tense situation between Indian and Pakistani forces in the Jammu and Kashmir region. While violence was common in the disputed region during the year (though not usually along the line of control that divides the forces), the 11 July 2006 terrorist attacks on India's mass transit system that killed 180 in the financial capital, Mumbai, temporarily dashed hopes that the two parties would move closer to resolution of their prolonged territorial dispute. Responsibility for the attacks was not claimed, but suspecting Pakistan's involvement, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh postponed continuation of the bilateral talks aimed at normalizing relations, which had begun in 2004.

UNMOGIP continues to observe the cease-fire established by the Karachi Agreement, of 27 July 1949, despite India's official position that UNMOGIP has had no operational role to play since the signing of the 1972 Simla Agreement, which established a line of control (LOC) separating the two armies and specified that the parties should resolve their differences bilaterally. The mission monitors the 1972 LOC, which has only been slightly revised since the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Over the years, India has restricted somewhat the activities and movement of UNMOGIP observers on its side of the LOC by requiring them to travel in Indian army convoys, and has rejected proposals for the UN to play a mediating role in the conflict. Despite this resistance, both governments have continued to provide UNMOGIP with accommodation, transportation, and security.

Following tensions in 2003 that raised the prospect of nuclear confrontation, Pakistan

declared a unilateral cease-fire, later reciprocated by India. Political relations improved further in January 2004, when an agreement was reached to commence a bilateral "composite dialogue" on an agreed range of issues, including those related to Jammu-Kashmir. Numerous confidence-building measures were initiated, and a minisummit was held in April 2005 to discuss the fate of Jammu-Kashmir. Following an overall decline in violent attacks through 2005, India reduced its troop levels in Jammu and Kashmir by about 3,000.

In a demonstration of solidarity and a desire to resolve their long-standing dispute, during the September 2006 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Indian prime minister Singh agreed to resume their bilateral talks at an undisclosed date in the future. UNMOGIP continues to provide on-the-ground observation, but its ability to contribute to a further easing of tension in the Kashmir region remains limited. The mission's status is likely to remain unchanged for the foreseeable future.

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

• Authorization date	21 April 1948 (UNSC Res. 47)
• Start date	1 January 1949
• Chief military observer	Major General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia)
• Budget	\$7.9 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 44 International civilian staff: 22 Local civilian staff: 47

For detailed mission information see p. 342.

Box 4.9.1 Nepal

The handover of authority from Nepal's King Gyanendra to parliament during 2006 marked the end of both the Hindu monarchy's grip on Nepal's governing structures, and ten years of conflict between the Royal Armed Forces of Nepal and the country's Maoist rebel movement. To help sort out continuing differences over disarmament and reintegration, in August 2006 the new interim government and the rebels jointly requested the United Nations to provide a wide-ranging assistance package.

In February 2005, King Gyanendra dissolved Nepal's parliament in an effort to stifle political opposition and crush the Maoist insurgency. This move was followed by a wave of guerrilla attacks and political protests, which were met with an upsurge in arrests by the king's emergency-rule government as well as widespread human rights violations. The king lifted emergency rule on 30 April 2005, but the gesture did little to calm the situation, as Nepal's parliament was not reinstated and questions regarding the constitutional power of the monarchy went unanswered.

In response to the increased violence and restrictions placed on personal freedoms, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), with the consent of the Nepalese government, established a monitoring office in Nepal in April 2005. Ian Martin was appointed Personal Representative of the High Commissioner in Nepal.

After further violence and protests, seven political opposition parties formed an alliance that brought about the reinstatement of parliament on 24 April 2006. The opposition alliance then called off protests and established an interim government, headed by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. On 16 June 2006, the Maoist rebels agreed to a three-month cease-fire and joined the interim government in peace talks aimed at completely ending the decade-long conflict.

In August 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan dispatched a week-long assessment mission to Nepal, led by Staffan de Mistura. Following the mission's return, Annan received identical letters from the interim government and Maoist rebels, inviting the UN to dispatch

a mission to oversee the rebel cantonment, management of arms, and the overall peace process. The letter also requested that the UN continue its human rights monitoring, as well as oversee the twenty-five-point code of conduct agreed to by the two sides in anticipation of June 2007 elections.

Ian Martin was subsequently appointed Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, supported by a small team of administrators. His first task was to determine how the UN could contribute most effectively to Nepal's postconflict evolution. On 21 November 2006, the Maoists and the government agreed to a peace deal in which the Maoists would join the parliament and their weapons would be locked up and monitored by the UN.

With the first group of mission personnel starting to arrive in late December, a second assessment team was sent to plan for a full-fledged UN mission to support the peace process.

Iraq

After enormous efforts in 2005 to deliver three elections and restore constitutional government, 2006 should have been a year when security and political stability were consolidated in Iraq. Instead, with the active insurgency conducting nearly 800 attacks each week, the country looked closer to territorial breakup than to sustainable peace. The new government of national unity, under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, initially provided hope of building some consensus around an agenda for national reconciliation, but the prevailing security situation cast doubt on any substantial progress.

From May 2003 to June 2004, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by the United States under its obligations as an occupying force. Iraqi sovereignty was restored with the creation of an interim government, established on 28 June 2004. The Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), which succeeded the coalition forces, is deployed at the request of the Iraqi government under arrangements set out in a pair of letters from the interim prime minister Ayad Allawi and then US secretary of state Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5 June 2004. Its mission is to contribute to security in Iraq, including through combat operations against forces hostile to the transition and by training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.

MNF-I was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), and later was extended until 31 December 2006. Apart from the United States, which supplies 87 percent of its troops, leading contributors as of October 2006 included the UK, South Korea, Italy, Poland, Australia, Georgia, Romania,

and Denmark. By then, Japan and Italy had begun the incremental drawdown of their participating troops. The force's mandate is subject to ongoing Iraqi consent, most recently expressed by Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in a letter to the Security Council on 9 June 2006.

The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was established in 2003. After the 19 August 2003 bomb attack on its headquarters, which killed Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one staff members, many staff were relocated to Jordan and Kuwait. But UNAMI continued to function, receiving a new mandate in Security Council Resolution 1546, and played a role in facilitating the constitutional process and in the conduct of the 2005 elections. At Iraq's request, UNAMI's mandate has been extended each year, most recently in August 2006 for a further twelve months.

In 2006, MNF-I and UNAMI faced spiraling sectarian violence that accompanied months of negotiations over Iraq's new government. Final election results were declared on 10 February. A 22 February suicide bomb attack on a Shi'a shrine at Samarra killed over eighty people, triggering reprisals that derailed the negotiations and made March 2006 one of Iraq's most violent months since 2003. This was surpassed in October when the UN estimated that more than 3,700 were killed, most in sectarian attacks. In the period 1 May to 30 June 2006, UNAMI's human rights unit estimated 100 civilians were killed each day, and that between February and June a further 100,000 were displaced from their homes. Some 600

US troops were killed in the year to October, as were over 1,700 members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Against this backdrop, UNAMI conducted human rights monitoring, and provided good

offices and constitutional expertise in support of the political process. The mission also continued to work on donor coordination and efforts to develop medium-term funding mechanisms for Iraq's reconstruction. UNAMI aimed to expand its activities in other areas, including development of public services and the judiciary. However, its operations remain severely restricted by security concerns. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General's repeated appeal for dedicated air assets to support the mission finally bore fruit, with Denmark offering an aircraft in June. Additionally, in September, Japan began a dedicated airlift support mission solely for UNAMI-related passengers and cargo.

MNF-I claimed further progress in training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which it undertakes in conjunction with the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). By September 2006, about 307,800 military and police had reportedly been trained, approaching the overall target of 325,000. In the same month, the Iraqi Security Forces assumed autonomous responsibility over the southern Dhi Qar province from 1,800 Italian troops. NTM-I, which leads officer training, made progress on a major objective with the opening of Iraq's Training and Doctrine Command in July.

There remain serious concerns about ISF development. Even the more capable army units are heavily reliant on MNF logistics, communications, and intelligence, desertion rates are high, and units in Sunni areas are especially understrength. Sectarian divisions are most worrying in the police, where poor vetting and politicized appointments have allowed Shi'a militias to infiltrate and control the powerful National Police counterinsurgency units. The year 2006 has been declared "Year of the Police," with MNF-I stepping up efforts to reform the force. An additional 41,000 police were trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center, bringing the total active Iraqi police up to 188,000.

MNF-I and ISF ran a series of operations against insurgent and militia activity, one of which resulted in the 9 June 2006 killing of

Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)

- Authorization date 16 October 2003 (UNSC Res. 1511)
8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546 modified)
- Start date November 2003
- Head of mission General George W. Casey Jr. (United States)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 162,000

NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

- Authorization date 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546)
30 July 2004 (NAC establishment of Training Implementation Mission)
16 December 2004 (modification into full-fledged training mission)
- Start date August 2004
- Head of mission Martin E. Dempsey (United States)
- Budget \$16 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 200

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

- Authorization and start date 14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500)
- Budget \$179.6 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
- SRSG Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)
- Senior military adviser Colonel Peter Jeffrey (Australia)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 223
Military advisers/liaison: 11
International staff: 228
Local staff: 352

For detailed mission information see p. 250.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of Al-Qaida in Iraq. In an effort to crack down on Shi'a militias in Baghdad, 50,000 Iraqi and 12,000 US troops deployed under a new security plan that seemed initially to provoke a sharp rise in violence.

The summer saw promising developments on the political front. On 20 May, Iraq's Council of Representatives successfully approved a government of national unity under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Appointing a broad-based cabinet including Sunni and other opposition figures, al-Maliki announced a national reconciliation plan on 25 June, establishing the Iraqi Reconciliation and National Dialogue Committee, a new mechanism for the disarmament of militias, and a review of policy toward former members of the Ba'ath Party. In late August, a conference of 700 tribal leaders endorsed the program and called for an end to sectarian killing and human rights violations—including by ISF and MNF-I forces.

October 2006 saw the adoption of a regional autonomy law by the Iraqi parliament. The legislation moved Iraq closer to a federalist model of statehood, allowing provinces to merge into regions where they would be afforded substantial governing autonomy. The law was adopted by only 138 of the parliament's 275 members, as Sunni and Shi'a elements abstained from the

vote, citing the divisive impact the law would have on Iraq. A 22 percent spike in sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shi'a ensued. The single deadliest attack since the March 2003 intervention occurred on 23 November, killing about 200 and injuring 250 in Sadr City, a Shi'a area of Baghdad. In subsequent reprisals, thirty were killed in a Sunni-Arab area of the Iraqi capital. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein was convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death on 5 November.

As civil violence and terrorist attacks continue, contributors are under increasing pressure to identify a timetable for withdrawal (including in the US Congress, control of which passed to the Democratic Party in the November 2006 mid-term elections), which would require handing over to the Iraqi Security Forces, whose capacity and neutrality are patchy at best. The December report of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group chaired by James Baker III and Lee Hamilton fueled further debate in the United States about the need for a fundamental change in course. With more and more commentators describing the conflict as civil war, risks of a further deterioration remain, bringing the prospect of a territorially divided Iraq, regional conflict, and foreign forces, international terrorists among them, ungoverned in a country awash with sophisticated weaponry.

Kosovo

The year 2006 was one of uneasy stasis for Kosovo. In February, Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders met in Vienna to launch talks overseen by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari on the future status of the province, still technically under Serbian sovereignty.¹ With both sides under pressure to reach agreement by the end of the year, the international organizations that have held executive authority in Kosovo since 1999 undertook detailed planning for their future roles there. While it was assumed that an external presence would be required for some time, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) emphasized the transfer of responsibilities to local police and administrative structures. But a lack of progress in the status negotiations meant that the basic peacekeeping framework had not undergone major alterations as 2007 approached.

This framework is a complex arrangement, by which KFOR maintains military security, while executive policing and civilian duties lie with UNMIK. The latter includes not only UN staff, but also personnel of the EU (overseeing economic matters) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (responsible for developing both political structures and the country's police academy). After three days of rioting severely tested the international presence in March 2004, KFOR maintained its force level at 17,000 until early 2006, and then it shrunk by nearly 1,000 during the year. Conversely, UNMIK gradually entrusted day-to-day security to the 7,000-strong Kosovo Police Service (KPS), reducing its own police element from 3,500 to 2,146 during 2005. In December 2005

it launched domestic interior and justice ministries, despite concerns raised by evidence of criminality in the government of President Ibrahim Rugova. The ministries had limited initial duties, but Belgrade argued that their formation represented a de facto step toward Kosovar statehood.

Kosovo's political landscape was altered significantly by Rugova's death from cancer on 21 January 2006. This followed a period of political drift caused by his illness and the resignation of his popular prime minister Ramush Haradinaj in March 2005 to face war crimes charges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The president's death allowed a new leadership to emerge: Fatmir Sejdiu, a longtime Rugova ally, became president and appointed a new prime minister, Agim Çeku. The latter is also rumored to have committed war crimes, but had worked closely with the international community as a reforming commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civil defense force with ties to criminality and Albanian radicalism. Soon after taking office, Çeku insisted that the status talks should lead to Kosovo's independence.

The initiation of the status talks had both positive and negative effects inside Kosovo. After a brief increase in low-level violence in late 2005, the province remained relatively calm through much of 2006, as Albanian radicals refrained from upsetting the negotiations. The government also made some progress toward achieving international standards on minority rights and a decentralization plan intended to give Serb-ethnicity enclaves greater self-governance. Nonetheless, the Serb

community (approximately 5 percent of the total population), always wary of dialogue, reduced its cooperation with the government still further as the status talks failed to progress. Talks between Kosovar and Serb authorities on issues other than status also lost impetus.

Although faced with limited immediate security challenges, KFOR was shaken in January 2006 when a plane crash killed forty-six Slovak troops flying home from the mission. Through the rest of the year, KFOR ran a series of military exercises aimed at demonstrating its ability to bring NATO reserves into the province on short notice should the situation deteriorate, and to sustain high-intensity operations in two parts of the province simultaneously. These were intended to dispel the poor impression the force made in the March 2004 riots, after which its structure was reformed to emphasize flexibility.

Meanwhile, the UN, EU, and OSCE prepared for a transition from UNMIK should the

status talks conclude successfully. An informal steering group, including representatives of the three organizations, and Martti Ahtisaari's negotiating team held a series of meetings through the year under the chairmanship of UNMIK's Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). While the OSCE indicated its interest in maintaining a long-term role on governance issues, it was accepted that the EU should take over justice and policing responsibilities from the UN under any future settlement. In April 2006 the European Council mandated a planning team to be based in Kosovo. Deployed in June, this consisted of twenty-four staff, including five police and four justice experts, authorized to operate until the end of the year. By September 2006, EU member states were contributing 608 of UNMIK's 1,907 police, and it was assumed that any post-status international police presence would be below current levels.

The strategic direction for the international

Box 4.11.1 Macedonia

While planning to reorient its roles in Kosovo and Bosnia, the European Union also reshaped its presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2006. December 2005 saw the replacement of a two-year police mission, the EU Police Mission Proxima (EUPOL Proxima), with a smaller mission, the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT), having a six-month mandate. Police reform was a significant element of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, which averted civil war between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians. The agreement envisaged decentralization of authority to the local level on issues including policing. EUPOL Proxima was required to balance this political priority with helping the domestic police develop a professional culture and tackle cross-border crime. EUPAT was mandated to support

these reforms, emphasizing police relations with the judiciary, and internal control mechanisms.

EUPAT was scheduled to be replaced by a European Commission monitoring team in June 2006. Its operations coincided with the run-up to national elections on 5 July, which were accompanied by low-level but frequent violence in the second quarter of the year. Nonetheless, EUPAT judged that the domestic police were advancing in initiating investigations, working with public prosecutors on organized crime, and coordinating border control. Less progress was made on the decentralization issue, due to both delays in necessary legislation and the resistance of some senior police officers. On concluding its operations in June, EUPAT drafted a series of recommendations for further improvements. While the European

Commission duly took over monitoring duties, the July elections failed to produce a majority government, and political attention was temporarily focused on coalition building. In September, the parliament finally passed a police reform law, which had been drafted by the previous government and supported by the EU.

EUPAT thus contributed to real, if slow, progress on implementing the Ohrid Agreement, but events in FYROM may be affected by disputes over Kosovo's status. The current government excludes former Albanian guerrillas who were backed by Kosovar radicals during the 2001 conflict. While FYROM's leaders remain committed to moving toward EU and NATO membership, renewed violence in Kosovo could unsettle their plans.

community in Kosovo also required further definition. A 2005 policy statement agreed by the European Council and Commission declared that the key mechanism for such direction “could take the form of an international office with an important EU component but cannot be EUMIK.” In September 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported to the Security Council that the nucleus of such an international office had already been established in Kosovo.

But if there was progress on planning for the post-status environment, progress on sta-

tus itself was minimal. While Kosovar leaders insisted on independence, it was clear that Belgrade would not yield it up easily. Belgrade’s line hardened throughout the year, and after Montenegro voted for independence in a referendum in May 2006, a new Serbian constitution was drawn up reasserting sovereignty over Kosovo. When this was made public in September, Kosovo’s calm gave way to a spate of attacks on Serbs and a warning of potential “revolts” by the speaker of the province’s parliament. In early October, Martti Ahtisaari admitted that he could not see either side backing down. On 10 November, he responded to a decision by Serbia to hold national elections in January by announcing that he would make recommendations on Kosovo’s future immediately after these polls.

Ahtisaari’s decision prompted widespread speculation that he would urge the UN Security Council to recognize Kosovo’s independence in spite of Serbia’s opposition. But the fragility of Kosovo’s security situation was demonstrated on 28 November when Albanian protesters attacked the UN headquarters in Pristina. One possible compromise, previously rejected by the international community but occasionally raised by Belgrade, would be a partition of Kosovo by which its ethnically Serb north would revert to Serbia. This option gained attention during 2006, as the Serb authorities in the north increasingly cut off contact with the provincial government. Opinion polls conducted for the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) saw support for partition among Kosovo Serbs jump from 8 percent to 47 percent—an important shift, given that the minority had previously been overwhelmingly opposed to any outcome other than Kosovo remaining part of Serbia in its entirety. But partition might well endanger the many Serbs living in enclaves in Albanian-majority Kosovo, and the precedent would encourage secessionism among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UN officials predict that, whatever arrangement is reached over northern Kosovo, it may

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

- Authorization and start date 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter until the Security Council decides otherwise)
- SRSG Joachim Rücker (Germany)
- Police commissioner Stephen J. Curtis (United Kingdom)
- Chief military liaison officer Brigadier-General Raul Cunha (Portugal)
- Budget \$217.9 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Military observers: 37
Police: 1,870
International civilian staff: 509
Local civilian staff: 2,044
UN volunteers: 148

For detailed mission information see p. 305.

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

- Authorization date 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244)
- Start date June 1999
- Head of mission Lieutenant-General Roland Kather (Germany)
- Budget \$31.4 million (October 2005–September 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 16,160
Civilian staff: 30 (approximate)

require the maintenance of a heavier international presence compared to the rest of the province. But with negotiations adrift, KFOR and UNMIK may find themselves responding to threats from both Serb and Albanian radicals throughout the province in the near future.

Note

1. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint President Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the Kosovo status talks on 31 October 2005, and indicated that Albert Rohan of Austria would be Deputy Special Envoy. The Security Council welcomed this decision in a letter of 10 November 2005. The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) was established in Vienna, employing eighteen international staff as of 30 June 2006.

Mindanao, Philippines

Negotiations between the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government of the Republic of the Philippines continued throughout the first half of 2006. However, progress toward a comprehensive peace agreement for Mindanao was stymied by the resumption of large-scale fighting between the two parties. The Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) struggled to fulfill its cease-fire monitoring mission in the context of limited movement toward a political settlement.

The 1996 peace agreement, signed by the secular-nationalist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government, established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but did not address the demands of the more radical MILF branch of the MNLF, which sought the establishment of an independent Muslim state. After several failed attempts at negotiations, the parties resumed peace talks, brokered by Malaysia on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in 2004. In mid-2004 the MILF agreed to cooperate with the government armed forces against the Al-Qaida-connected Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network and other terrorist elements, while the government dropped its criminal charges against MILF personnel over alleged bombings in 2003. By September 2004, the parties agreed to the creation of the IMT. In November, fifty Malaysians and ten Bruneians were deployed to monitor the cease-fire and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. In December 2004, four Libyan personnel joined the IMT in its headquarters and satellite offices throughout Mindanao.

IMT contingents wear official military uniforms, carry no weapons and are escorted

by security from the government or the MILF. Peacekeepers are paid by their respective governments, while the government of the Philippines covers their operational costs. Since its initial deployment, the IMT's mandate has been extended annually at the request of the MILF and government. In 2006, both factions lauded the IMT's work, and requested it be expanded to include other nations. Japanese and Swedish monitors were added to the IMT in July and September. In October Philippine president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo requested an extension of the IMT, citing its centrality to the peace process.

Between the deployment of the IMT in late 2004 and mid-2006, cease-fire violations in the contested territory decreased by 90 percent, and the mission played an instrumental role in maintaining a relatively calm environment. In January 2006 intra-MILF clan fighting in the province of Maguindanao elicited a military response from government forces, resulting in several skirmishes and the death of two civilians. The IMT's head, Major-General Soheimi Abbas, immediately visited the site and initiated steps to put an end to the confrontation. Similarly, in February, the IMT neutralized a potentially violent standoff between 200 heavily armed government marines and MILF forces.

By the start of 2006, negotiations between government and the MILF had made progress in defining the concept of territory and governance relating to Moro peoples' ancestral homelands, but the parties failed to reach agreement on issues like the delineation of territory and resource management. The breakdown of negotiations in May 2006 precipitated

a deterioration in the security situation. The IMT presence did little to limit the violence, and the increasing cease-fire violations by both sides resulted in the displacement of 20,000.

Despite this continued tension, in mid-November the government put forward a settlement offer in the hope of bringing MILF back to negotiations. Also, both parties requested that the United States take an active role. The peace process is scheduled to resume in early 2007, but the political stalemate and deteriorating security suggest that a solution will not be easy to find.

International Monitoring Team (IMT)

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| • Authorization date | 22 June 2001 (Tripoli Peace Agreement) |
| • Start date | November 2004 |
| • Head of mission | Major-General Ismael bin Ahmad Khan (Malaysia) |
| • Strength as of
30 September 2006 | Military observers: 54
Civilian staff: 2 |

Moldova-Transdnistria

The year 2006 opened with several positive developments in Transdnistria, and little overt conflict. However, a customs dispute between Transdnistria and the neighboring Ukraine, combined with Western criticism of both Russian peacekeepers and the policies of the separatist region, created significant tensions as the year progressed. While Russian leaders have linked Transdnistria's situation to precedents being set in other separatist conflicts in the wider region, including Kosovo, the involvement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and European Union (EU) in managing this frozen conflict indicates its complexity.

Geographically isolated from Moldova by the Dnestr River, and historically and linguistically tied to Ukraine and Russia, Transdnistria declared its independence from Moldova in September 1990. Transdnistrian independence was annulled by Gorbachev later in the year. But the collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by full-scale conflict between Dniestrian militias (acting with some support from the Russian Army) and the Moldovan government. Fighting raged throughout early 1992. By July, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement that mandated a complete ceasefire, Russian recognition of Moldova's territorial integrity and a provision for Dniestrian independence should Moldova join Romania. The agreement also established a 225-km-long security zone along the Dnepr River, which was to be patrolled by a joint CIS peacekeeping force made up of Russian, Transdnistrian, and Moldovan units.

Operations of the joint peacekeeping force have been overseen by the Joint Control Commission (JCC), composed of Russian, Moldovan, Transdnistrian, Ukrainian, and OSCE representatives. Since September 2005, the JCC has also included US and EU representatives as observers. In addition to monitoring the activities of the peacekeeping force, the JCC is responsible for overseeing the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and for brokering confidence-building measures. January 2006 brought the first meeting of the new "5+2" JCC arrangement, with US and EU participation. Moldovan officials were positive about the new arrangement, but JCC-sponsored negotiations broke down in March, ostensibly as a result of a new Ukrainian customs regime requiring that goods passing into Transdnistria be cleared by Moldovan officials. Ukraine implemented the new rules as a response to alleged black-market trade in Transdnistria and to comply with European standards. Since December 2005, a 120-strong EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine has assisted in the implementation of these standards.¹ As the new customs regulations dramatically cut the number of goods entering Transdnistria from Ukraine, the Dniestrian leadership claimed that Ukraine was mounting an economic blockade against the region.

When the Ukrainian customs regime came into effect, Transdnistria suspended its participation in negotiations and publicly requested that Russia send more troops to the region. At present, Russia has approximately 400 peacekeepers in the mission. While Russia did not contribute additional troops, Moscow did send

200 tons of humanitarian assistance to Transdnistria in late March 2006.

Western political pressure on the Russian peacekeeping force increased significantly during 2006. In January, the new chairman-in-office of the OSCE, Belgian foreign minister Karel De Gucht, stated that his priority would be the resolution of the so-called frozen conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. In a break with the neutral stance of the OSCE, De Gucht called for the replacement of Russian peacekeepers with international forces. Simultaneously, the United States and NATO used the occasion of a June OSCE conference on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to voice their displeasure with the continued presence of Russian troops in Transdnistria.

While Russia has maintained its presence in the region, in March it instituted a severe ban on Moldovan goods, including wine, which had been Moldova's primary export to Russia.² Additionally, both President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly supported a Transdnistrian referendum on independence, which was held on September 18 and received 97 percent support within the breakaway republic.

Joint Control Commission (JCC) Peacekeeping Force

• Authorization date	21 July 1992
• Start date	July 1992
• Head of mission	Major-General Boris Sergeyev (Russia)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 1,199

At the close of 2006, the Russian government had not officially granted recognition to Transdnistria as independent from Moldova, despite a statement from the Russian parliament's lower house supporting September's referendum. A joint Russian-Moldovan communiqué of mid-November referred to the need for a "special, well-guaranteed status" for Transdnistria that respected Moldova's territorial integrity. The year ended with an easing of tensions, as Russia ended its trade ban with Moldova. But in December, the Transdnistrian leader was re-elected for a five-year-term, repeating his commitment to independence.

Note

1. This mission, involving 69 EU and around 50 local staff, was originally requested by the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments in a letter of July 2005. It has a two-year mandate that may be extended, and is primarily involved in training Ukrainian and Moldovan officials.

2. The ban was not linked to Transdnistria, but to health and quality issues.

Sierra Leone

In 2001, Sierra Leone was the site of the UN's largest peacekeeping mission. The post-conflict stabilization—resulting in the withdrawal of the last peacekeepers in December 2005—constituted, in the words of the UN Secretary-General, a “remarkable turnaround.” The establishment of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2006 was intended as a channel for continued international support for peacebuilding. Despite the end of the civil war, consolidating peace in Sierra Leone continues to face difficult challenges: crime and corruption are on the rise, governing institutions remain weak, and the border dispute with Guinea remains a source of concern. UNIOSIL is a new breed of peace operation that combines the features of a political support mission and a country office with the aim of strengthening state institutions. The mission also represents a means of monitoring Sierra Leone's fragile stability in the run-up to the 2007 elections.

Civil war broke out in Sierra Leone in 1991. Three decades of rule by weak and authoritarian regimes caused an erosion of state authority, during which the diamond-rich territory had the lowest ranking on the human development index. Clashes between the government and Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by former Liberian warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor, spiraled into a ten-year conflict marked by gruesome human rights atrocities. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (1999–2005) played a major role in supporting elections in 2002, and the restoration of security and state authority across the country, including a disarmament and demobilization program for 76,000 former fighters. UNAMSIL's

withdrawal by December 2005 was linked to progress on five benchmarks: capacity building for the army and police, reintegration of ex-combatants, restoration of government control over diamond-mining, extension of state authority throughout the country, and progress toward peace in Liberia.

The Security Council's decision to establish UNIOSIL reflects recognition that Sierra Leone's peace remains fragile. The “integrated office” has three functions. First, it is intended to help the government achieve a wide range of governance and development objectives related to peace consolidation. Second, UNIOSIL has a security, monitoring, and liaison function, advising the local security forces “and other partners” on internal and external threats. Third, it has a coordination and liaison role with international bodies whose activities have security implications for Sierra Leone, including the Special Court and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNIOSIL's executive representative is concurrently resident coordinator of the UN country team, and UN Development Programme (UNDP) resident representative.

The security situation has remained generally calm. However, violent protests became more frequent in 2006, reflecting the worsening economic situation and hostility to perceived government corruption. The UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) will remain operational until 2010. UNIOSIL is working with the government to develop a youth employment strategy to address the security concerns associated with disaffected and unemployed youth. The mission also supported the organization of

Sierra Leone's first international investment conference in March. The police force has reached 9,000 officers (500 less than its target level), but there are concerns about discipline and financial sustainability. UNIOSIL's police section provides training and mentoring, with officers embedded in regional headquarters and in divisions dealing with human resources. Reform of the armed forces is proceeding, despite existing resentment of plans to downsize that would lay off a significant number of senior officers and soldiers.

A critical milestone in the year ahead will be the elections scheduled for 28 July 2007. Rising tensions have accompanied increased activities by political parties. A national electoral commission was established, and a security plan for the election period was being prepared as 2006 drew to a close. Meanwhile, the government's ability to deal with any unrest that may result from the trial of Sam Hinga Norman, former leader of the Civil Defense militia, will be a test.

Sierra Leone is widely regarded as a peacekeeping success story. At the request of the government of Burundi, the UN plans to replicate the UNIOSIL model for peace consolidation in Burundi, and both countries have been chosen as the first "clients" of the newly established Peacebuilding Commission. At its first-ever country-specific meeting on 13 October 2006, the government of Sierra Leone presented its proposals to the commission, where it was decided to recommend support to the country from the newly established peacebuilding fund. Meanwhile, UNIOSIL has improved integration of security and development activities, and has kept Sierra Leone on the Security Council agenda. However, the country faces challenges ahead. The ability to deal with corruption and an increasingly disenfranchised and swelling number of unemployed youths, as well as the elections, will affect the success of Sierra Leone's continuing effort to consolidate peace through 2007 and beyond.

UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)

• Authorization date	31 August 2005 (UNSC Res. 1620)
• Start date	1 January 2006
• Executive Representative of the Secretary-General	Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)
• Chief military liaison officer	Colonel Sven-Olof Broman (Sweden)
• Senior police adviser	Rudolfo Landeros (United States)
• Budget	\$23.3 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers/liaison officers: 9 Police: 19 International civilian staff: 66 Local civilian staff: 184 UN volunteers: 22

For detailed mission information see p. 286.



UNAMSIL peacekeepers depart from Freetown, Sierra Leone, in December 2005 at the end of the mission's mandate.

Solomon Islands

Presidential elections in 2006, the first since the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed in 2003, sparked the worst violence the archipelago has experienced since the mission's arrival. Rioting in response to the election of the unpopular Snyder Rini in April 2006 was quelled by 400 RAMSI troops. However, this emergency deployment came after the razing of the capital city's Chinatown district, the displacement of thousands, and the resignation of Rini. The mission's failure to anticipate the postelection violence, combined with the subsequent election of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare in May 2006, left RAMSI facing a government that was less accommodating than its predecessor.

In 1998, disputes over land rights on the main island of Guadalcanal led to violence between indigenous residents and settlers hailing from the island of Malaitia—leaving hundreds dead and 20,000 Malaitians displaced. Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) militants, under the direction of Harold Keke, and the opposing Malaitia Eagle Force (MEF), terrorized the government and citizenry in the capital, Honiara. Many of these militants then enlisted in the government's special constables units, using government uniforms for militia activities.

In response, Prime Minister Sir Alan Kemakeza requested support from Australia, and then took the matter to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). After notifying the UN Security Council, the initial RAMSI force of 2,000 Australian-led troops and police was deployed on 24 July 2003. Invited by the Solomon Island parliament, RAMSI's primary objective was to restore stability and assist in the continued

development of governing, rule-of-law, and economic structures.

The RAMSI presence yielded immediate security benefits: GLF and MEF commanders surrendered by August 2003. Furthermore, over 400 officers of the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP) (about one-third of the active police service) were fired or pushed to retire, with some being placed on trial. The Participating Police Force (PPF) of RAMSI worked in tandem with the remaining RSIP to strengthen its capabilities and to reestablish the force as a vital national institution. Since 2003, the 258 PPF personnel, alongside the RSIP, have established seventeen police posts in all provinces and have begun training new police recruits at the RSIP police academy in Rove.

Following the quick restoration of peace in its first year of deployment, RAMSI reduced its military troop presence and switched its focus to economic and governance reform. It placed eighteen advisers among the Ministry of Finance to assist the government in addressing corruption and regaining control of revenues and expenditures. RAMSI is mostly an Australian enterprise in personnel and financial resources, and Australians hold several top posts within Solomon Island government, civil service, and financial bodies. This overt presence and influence in state institutions has created friction. Following the instability in April 2006, Prime Minister Sogavare expressed his gratitude for RAMSI's accomplishments, while also promising to review and limit the mission's actions. The tensions between RAMSI and its host reached new heights at the end of the year when Sogavare expelled Australia's



REUTERS/Tim Wimborne

A New Zealand peacekeeper protects a convoy of trucks transporting civilians fleeing the riots of 23 April 2006.

top diplomat for alleged interference in the controversial investigation of the April riots. The prime minister also recommended a restructuring of the mission and threatened to expel it altogether.

The continued rebuilding of the Solomon Islands in the face of a resistant Sogavare government eager to achieve autonomy will pose great challenges for RAMSI in the coming year. The majority of the emergency RAMSI forces that deployed in April have been withdrawn, but Australians maintain a high profile in Solomon Island affairs. The instability in April is indicative of the work still to be done if the country is to fully overcome its history of conflict and poor governance.

Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

• Authorization date	23–30 October 2000 (Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué)
• Start date	July 2003
• Head of mission	Timothy George (Australia)
• Budget	\$159.4 million (October 2005–September 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 200 Civilian police: 320 Civilian staff: 180

South Ossetia-Georgia

Despite the lack of progress in negotiations on the status of the breakaway region, there was a noticeable decline in the number of armed incidents between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2006. Working in collaboration with observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) maintained stability in the conflict zone and increased border security. On the political front, a breakdown in relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation contributed to the stalemate. Statements by Russian leaders linking South Ossetia's future to the outcome of the Kosovo status talks caused deep unease in Tblisi, while the Georgian parliament's resolution in early spring to expel Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia and Abkhazia was met with opposition from both Moscow and the international community.

The conflict in South Ossetia broke out in 1989. After the Georgian government denied the request of Ossete officials to receive autonomous status within Georgia, the first clashes between ethnic Georgians and Ossete civilians followed. In September 1990, the South Ossetian region declared its full independence from Georgia and its status as a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. War raged from January 1991 until June 1992, destroying the South Ossetian administrative center of Tskhinvali and displacing over 70,000 civilians from both sides. A cease-fire was reached in 1992, when Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the Sochi Accords, ending the hostilities and establishing the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and the JPKF.

Peacekeeping operations of the Commonwealth of Independent States are unique in involving significant numbers of troops from parties to the conflicts involved. The JPKF is commanded by the Russians, and composed of 1,320 troops from the Russian Federation (500), Georgia (320), and North/South Ossetia (500). It is responsible for the restoration of peace and the support of law and order. Although it is a "joint" mission, the Georgian peacekeepers frequently do not patrol with their Russian or Ossete counterparts. Since 1994, observers from the OSCE have monitored the JPKF, accompanying patrols, patrolling independently, and liaising with local civilian and military authorities.

Neither the Sochi Accords nor other signed protocols mandate the return of South Ossetia to the control of the Georgian government. Since 1992 the region has established state institutions, including a presidency, a parliament, and armed forces. For over a decade, the separatist region and Georgia existed side-by-side, with only occasional flare-ups between the two. In early summer 2004, newly elected Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili closed a famous smugglers' market in Georgian-controlled territory near Tskhinvali—moving a significant number of Georgian troops into the vicinity of the conflict zone. Georgian and Ossete troops were at a standoff all summer, and the ensuing hostilities killed over twenty people, necessitating a renewal of the peace agreement.

The JPKF has struggled through a year of political wrangling over its status and fate. In mid-February 2006 the Georgian parliament

passed a nonbinding resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zone. Both Moscow and Tskhinvali decried the Georgian resolution as a violation of international law, and the United States urged the government of Georgia to act with caution. While no move has been made to enact the legislation, it is still a possibility. On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have both expressed their support for South Ossetia's right to self-determination based on the Kosovo and Macedonian cases.

In November 2006, a referendum on independence was held in South Ossetia, and the region's Central Electoral Commission declared that 99.88 percent of votes cast had been in favor. However, the poll was open only to those holding newly acquired South Ossetian passports and was condemned by the OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, and US. While Moscow did not endorse the vote's outcome, it described it as an "expression of free will" by the Ossetes. A second poll, held in ethnic Georgian villages in the region, favored negotiations toward South Ossetia remaining part of a federal Georgia. These referenda narrowly preceded two sets of elections for the region's president—again, one involved ethnic Ossetes and the other ethnic Georgians.

By the end of the year, tensions were high in the conflict area. On 3 September 2006, a Georgian helicopter carrying Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili was fired upon while flying over the peacekeeping zone. Days later,

CIS–South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF)

- Authorization date 24 June 1992
- Start date July 1992
- Head of mission Marat Kuakhmetov (Russia)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Troops: 1,320

OSCE Mission to Georgia

- Authorization date 6 November 1992
- Start date December 1992
- Head of mission Roy Stephen Reeve (United Kingdom)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Military observers: 68
Civilian staff: 71

four South Ossetian militia members and one Georgian police officer were killed in a clash in the conflict zone. Although not directly related to the conflict in South Ossetia, the diplomatic crisis surrounding Georgia's arrest and detention of four Russian citizens in late September deepened political tensions and brought international attention to the region. While diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts succeeded in preventing a further expansion of conflict in autumn, the year 2006 ended without significant improvement in relations between the two sides, and with Georgia still debating the status of the peacekeeping force.

Sri Lanka

Widespread violence between the Tamil Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka during 2006 cast into doubt the continued viability of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which had been established to oversee the 2002 cease-fire between the two parties. Following the election of hard-line anti-Tamil president Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) ramped up guerrilla attacks on government military elements. The government responded with aerial and artillery shelling for the first time since the original cease-fire. The conflict became more

violent as the year progressed, and brought the Norwegian-mediated peace talks to a halt by June. In the same month, the LTTE demanded that all SLMM monitors from European Union countries withdraw, which they did by the end of August. With limited capacity, the SLMM was relegated to observing what began to look like renewed and all-out war.

Following decades of civil war between the government and the LTTE—a struggle over Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic identity and autonomy in the north—a tentative cease-fire between the two sides was formalized in a



REUTERS/Anuruddha Lokuhanarachchi

A soldier patrols past a Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) jeep near the village of Salampan-Kalmadu, Vavuniya, northern Sri Lanka, 11 May 2006.

memorandum of understanding in February 2002. The SLMM, composed of monitors from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, was established to oversee the cessation of military operations, separation of forces, and the free movement of personnel and nonmilitary goods. The mission, headquartered in Colombo, maintains six district offices and a liaison office in Killinochchi, and points of contact in the north and east. District offices operate mobile units and patrol in their areas of responsibility. The SLMM has the authority to respond to complaints throughout Sri Lanka, but must rely on the parties to provide access and information, as well as security.

The dramatic escalation of conflict in 2006 overwhelmed the SLMM's limited investigative capacity. In June, the SLMM reported that only a small portion of the cease-fire violations were being investigated and ruled on. As the security situation deteriorated even further, an atmosphere of lawlessness became pervasive, as exemplified by the August murder of seventeen staff members of the French nongovernmental organization Action Contre la Faim.

In May, the EU placed the LTTE on its list of international terrorist organizations, prompting the Tigers to demand the withdrawal of EU country monitors—citing lack of impartiality. By the end of August 2006, the Swedish, Finnish, and Danish contingents had departed; in replacement were ten Norwegian and Icelandic monitors, which brought the mission's

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)

• Authorization date	22 February 2002
• Start date	February 2002
• Head of mission	Major-General Lars Johan Sjølvberg (Norway)
• Budget	\$2.4 million (October 2005–September 2006)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Military observers: 30

strength back to thirty, still less than the original strength of sixty.

Despite repeated assertions by both LTTE and the government that the cease-fire was still in effect, hundreds of combatants and civilians were killed from July to November 2006. Amid the fighting, the LTTE agreed to attend Norwegian-mediated talks in Geneva on 28–29 October. The October talks devolved into little more than an opportunity for the parties to trade accusations. What followed was a steady escalation of violence by both sides including aerial assaults on LTTE installations, the assassination of pro-Tamil members of the Sri Lankan government, a suicide attack on the brother of the president, and increasingly brazen guerrilla attacks by the LTTE in the last months of 2006. The prospects of the SLMM having a significant impact in this bleak environment is discouraging.

Tajikistan

Stability and minimal security disruptions in Tajikistan since the end of its 1992–1997 civil war belie a more sobering reality, where long-standing political tensions and broader regional instability threaten to disrupt peace in this impoverished state. The UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Centre in Dushanbe continue to play a valuable peacebuilding role. In the wake of devastating earthquakes that left over 9,000 homeless in July and August 2006, humanitarian activities by the United Nations have also had a stabilizing effect.

After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan was gripped by civil war between groups that supported the Moscow-backed Tajik government and factions that had unified under the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) label. A Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force of 25,000 troops, provided mostly by the Russian Federation, arrived in September 1993. By September 1994, the Tajik government and the UTO had approved a UN-brokered cease-fire, making way for the establishment of the UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) to work with the existing OSCE observer mission to Tajikistan in implementing both the cease-fire and the subsequent peace agreement of 1997.

Parliamentary elections in February 2000 coincided with the withdrawal of both UNMOT and CIS peacekeepers. At the Secretary-General's suggestion, in June 2000 the Security Council established UNTOP to provide political leadership for peacebuilding activities in Tajikistan. The OSCE Centre in Dushanbe is helping to strengthen democratic political

institutions and processes, while serving an early warning and conflict prevention role.

In its six years of existence, UNTOP has brought together diverse elements of the citizenry and leadership in discussion forums, and trained over 900 Tajik officials in human rights and conflict management procedures. In 2005, 1,000 Ministry of Interior staff were trained in policing standards and 3,000 local election commission members took part in seminars on election standards in advance of the 2006 presidential elections. To defuse regional antagonisms, UNTOP sponsored a national dialogue on political pluralism, which brought together over 500 government officials, political party activists, and representatives of civil society. Meanwhile, the OSCE gathered some 1,600 state representatives in seminars on the functioning of political parties, and convened meetings of disparate political groups to help build consensus on pressing social issues.

Despite the work of both UNTOP and the OSCE, developing an inclusive governance system has been a challenge. No elections since the signing of the peace agreement in 1997 have been deemed acceptable by international standards. Political opposition has been marginalized, press freedom diminished, and corruption allowed to thrive. Dissatisfaction and outrage among political opposition parties and Islamic groups are growing. In November 2006, President Imomali Rakhmonov won his third seven-year term. Establishing inclusive governing structures has proved difficult, as Rakhmonov received nearly 80 percent of votes cast in an election that international observers declared not to have met international standards.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan's ongoing tumult, Kyrgyzstan's 2005 war, the continued disquiet in Uzbekistan, and the threat of transborder resource conflicts due to water scarcity all present serious obstacles to Tajikistan's future stability. The 2004 withdrawal of Russian troop protection along Tajikistan's borders raised questions about the capacity of the Tajik government to protect itself from instability beyond its borders. Given Tajikistan's poverty, geographic situation, and troubled history, the continued support of the OSCE and the UN will be needed for some time to come.

UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP)

- Start date 1 June 2000
- Executive Representative of the Secretary-General Ambassador Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria)
- Budget \$1.8 million (1 January–31 December 2006)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 International civilian staff: 11
Local civilian staff: 21

OSCE Centre in Dushanbe

- Authorization date December 1993 (Rome Ministerial)
- Start date February 1994
- Head of mission Ambassador Alain Couanon (France)
- Strength as of 30 September 2006 Civilian staff: 17

Western Sahara

Fifteen years after the creation of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the parties are no closer to a resolution of the dispute over self-determination in Western Sahara. With the mission's mandate due to expire in October 2006, the Secretary-General hinted at the possibility of the UN assuming a different role in the peace process. But on 31 October the Security Council (2006) renewed MINURSO's mandate—unchanged—until 30 April 2007.

After twenty-five years of war, MINURSO was established in 1991 on the basis of an agreement between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario) that called for a referendum on Western Sahara's future. After years of stalled progress, in 2003 the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, former

US secretary of state James Baker, presented the "Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara," a scheme for governance sharing that also allowed for the possibility of a referendum on independence. Frente Polisario accepted the plan in July 2003. However, the government of Morocco later stated it would not agree to any arrangement that could lead to an independent Western Sahara. Baker's "peace plan" has not been mentioned in any Security Council resolutions since, nor has the government of Morocco come under much pressure to alter its approach.

The security situation throughout 2006 remained relatively calm. In November 2005 the mission established a joint operations center and a joint mission analysis cell. These innovations improved data collection and information management capabilities, and enabled expanded cease-fire monitoring activities with an increased ground presence—while not increasing the number of troops. The restructuring, coupled with Frente Polisario's adoption of more permissive policies toward the mission's observation work, resulted in 4,852 ground patrols and 266 air patrols between March and October 2006. During that period, there were 50 percent fewer cease-fire violations. Despite the lack of overt violence, reports of human rights abuses have increased.

MINURSO continued to work with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on refugee repatriation throughout 2006. Following an eleven-month hiatus, the Moroccan government reinstated a program of family visits between the disputed territory and the refugee camps in the Tindouf area in November 2005. With logistical and security

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

• Authorization and start date	29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690)
• SRSG	To be appointed
• Force commander	Major-General Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark)
• Budget	\$45.9 million (1 July 2006–30 June 2007)
• Strength as of 30 September 2006	Troops: 28 Military observers: 190 Police: 4 International civilian staff: 103 Local civilian staff: 122 UN volunteers: 14

For detailed mission information see p. 206.

assistance from MINURSO, the UNHCR has facilitated visits with 610 persons since November 2005, and intends to expand operations to provide this program to more of the 17,000 candidates.

There were signs that some international actors were losing patience with the prolonged political stalemate over Western Sahara. Moreover, the current situation is fueling unrest among younger generations of Saharawis, who

are eager to gain independence. In January 2006, Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum stated that the only recourse would be direct negotiations between the parties, with the UN facilitating the talks. The Secretary-General recommended this in his October report, but the Security Council did not act on it, instead extending MINURSO's mandate through April 2007.


5

Global Statistics on UN Missions

The data in this chapter covers all UN missions in the period running from 1 July 2005 to the third quarter of 2006. While a number of exceptions are noted, the coverage reflects the UN's 2005/2006 peacekeeping budgetary year (which concluded on 30 June 2006) in addition

to information available in later months. In almost all cases, the data presented here is aggregated from the mission-by-mission material in Chapter 7. Where other sources have been used, they are indicated in the footnotes.


5.1 Total Troops in UN Missions: July 2005–October 2006



Source: DPKO FGS.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL). UNAMI included as of January 2006.


5.2 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2006




Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and UNAMI.


5.3 Troops Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2006



Source: DPKO FGS.




5.4 Total UN Military Observers: July 2005–October 2006



Source: DPKO FGS.


Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL). UNAMI included as of January 2006.

5.5 Top Twenty Military Observer Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2006




Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and UNAMI.




5.6 Military Observers Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2006



Source: DPKO FGS.


5.7 Total UN Police: July 2005–October 2006



Source: DPKO PD.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL). Formed police units included.


5.8 Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2006



Source: DPKO PD.

Notes: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL). Formed police units included.


5.9 Police Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2006



Source: DPKO PD.

Note: Formed police units included.

Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Map No. 4290 UNITED NATIONS
October 2006

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

5.10 Formed Police by UN Mission: October 2005 and October 2006



Source: DPKO PD.

Notes: MINUSTAH 2006 figures include a 40 person SWAT team. UNMIK 2006 figures include a 40 person canine unit.


5.11 Formed Police Contributions by UN Mission: 31 October 2006

	UNMIK	UNMIL	UNOCI	MONUC	MINUSTAH	UNMIT	Total
Jordan	—	120	375	—	329	—	824
Bangladesh	—	—	250	250	—	143	643
Nepal	—	240	—	—	124	—	364
Pakistan	115	—	—	—	249	—	364
Senegal	—	—	—	250	84	—	334
India	—	—	—	250	—	—	250
Nigeria	—	119	—	—	125	—	244
Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	140	140
Malaysia	—	—	—	—	—	140	140
China	—	—	—	—	125	—	125
Ukraine	155	—	—	—	—	—	155
Poland	115	—	—	—	—	—	115
Romania	115	—	—	—	—	—	115
Total	500	479	675	750	1,036	423	3,813

Source: DPKO PD.

Notes: Figures include a 40 person SWAT team in MINUSTAH. UNMIK 2006 figures include a 40 person canine unit.

5.12 Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006




Region	Troops/Military Observers	Percentage of Total
Africa	18,594	25.7%
East Asia and the Pacific	3,083	4.3%
Central and South Asia	31,128	42.9%
Middle East	2,962	4.1%
Europe	10,355	14.3%
Central and South America	6,285	8.7%
North America	81	0.1%
Total	72,488	

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: The regions used here and in the charts below are defined as follows: **Africa:** all members of the African Union and Morocco (but see Middle East below.) **Central and South Asia:** all members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (including Afghanistan) and all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the east of the Caspian Sea, other than Russia. **East Asia and the Pacific:** all states in or bordering on the Pacific, the states of South-East Asia and Mongolia. **Central and South America:** all members of the Organization of American States other than Canada, the United States and Mexico. **Europe:** all states to the north of the Mediterranean, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta, Russia and Turkey. **Middle East:** all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. (While Egypt is included under Africa as a member of the AU, the contingent of UNTSO stations on the Suez Canal is counted under the Middle East deployment section to reflect its line of command.) **North America:** Canada, the United States, and Mexico.


5.13 Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006



Region	Troops/Military Observers	Percentage of Total
Africa	54,587	75.3%
East Asia and the Pacific	31	0.0%
Central and South Asia	54	0.1%
Middle East	10,147	14.0%
Europe	1,017	1.4%
Central and South America	6,652	9.2%
North America	—	—
Total	72,488	

Source: DPKO FGS.

5.14. Origin of UN Police by Region: 31 October 2006




Region	Police	Percentage of Total
Africa	2,121	25.0%
East Asia and the Pacific	976	11.5%
Central and South Asia	2,142	25.2%
Middle East	904	10.7%
Europe	1,883	22.2%
Central and South America	116	1.4%
North America	346	4.1%
Total	8,488	

Source: DPKO PD.

Note: Formed police units included.

5.15 Deployment of UN Police by Region: 31 October 2006




Region	Police	Percentage of Total
Africa	3,874	45.6%
East Asia and the Pacific	959	11.3%
Central and South Asia	3	0.0%
Middle East	—	—
Europe	1,970	23.2%
Central and South America	1,682	19.8%
North America	—	—
Total	8,488	

Source: DPKO PD.

Note: Formed police units included.


5.16 Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006



Region	Troops/Military Observers	Percentage of Total
Africa	17,943	32.9%
East Asia and the Pacific	2,414	4.4%
Central and South Asia	28,468	52.2%
Middle East	2,197	4.0%
Europe	1,551	2.8%
Central and South America	1,957	3.6%
North America	57	0.1%
Total	54,587	

Source: DPKO FGS.

5.17 Origin of UN Police in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006




Region	Police	Percentage of Total
Africa	1,473	38.0%
East Asia and the Pacific	233	6.0%
Central and South Asia	1,245	32.1%
Middle East	550	14.2%
Europe	291	7.5%
Central and South America	62	1.6%
North America	20	0.5%
Total	3,874	

Source: DPKO PD.

Note: Formed police units included.


5.18 Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2006



Region	Troops/Military Observers	Percentage of Total
Africa	640	6.3%
East Asia and the Pacific	468	4.6%
Central and South Asia	914	9.0%
Middle East	—	—
Europe	8,104	79.9%
Central and South America	8	0.1%
North America	13	0.1%
Total	10,147	

Source: DPKO FGS.

5.19 Total UN Civilian Personnel (International, Local and UNV): July 2005–September 2006



Sources: DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL) and UNAMI. Figures do not include staff from UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes.


5.20 UN International Civilian Staff and DPKO Headquarters Personnel Occupational Groups

Occupation	International Civilian Staff 30 September 2006	Percentage International Staff	DPKO HQ Staff 31 October 2006	Percentage of DPKO HQ Staff
Administration	754	15.2%	156	28.1%
Aviation	131	2.6%	11	2.0%
Civil Affairs	192	3.9%	—	—
Economic Affairs	2	0.0%	—	—
Engineering	259	5.2%	12	2.2%
Financial Mgmt	213	4.3%	48	8.6%
Human Resources	184	3.7%	77	13.9%
Human Rights	169	3.4%	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	63	1.3%	13	2.3%
Info Mgmt	13	0.3%	9	1.6%
Info Systems and Tech	411	8.3%	27	4.9%
Legal Affairs	84	1.7%	—	—
Logistics	641	12.9%	54	9.7%
Medical Services	47	0.9%	4	0.7%
Military	—	—	44	7.9%
Police	—	—	16	2.9%
Political Affairs	402	8.1%	50	9.0%
Procurement	116	2.3%	—	—
Program Mgmt	90	1.8%	11	2.0%
Public Admin	4	0.1%	—	—
Public Info	151	3.0%	2	0.4%
Rule of Law	112	2.3%	3	0.5%
Security	665	13.4%	—	—
Social Affairs	43	0.9%	1	0.2%
Training	—	—	17	3.1%
Transport	230	4.6%	—	—
Total	4,976		555	

Sources: DPKO PMSS; DPKO EO.

Notes: Mission occupations includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and UNAMI. Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. DPKO HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.


5.21 UN Mission International Staff Occupations: 30 September 2006



Sources: DPKO PMSS; DPKO EO.

Notes: Mission Occupations includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and UNAMI. Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not represented.

5.22 UN Headquarters Personnel Occupations: 31 October 2006



Source: DPKO EO.

Notes: DPKO HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

5.23 Highest National Representation in UN Missions: 30 September 2006

UN Missions – International Professional and General Service Staff Total International Staff in missions = 4,976				DPKO Missions – Local Professional and General Service Staff Total Local Staff in missions = 10,893			
Rank	Country	Number of Intl'l Staff	Percentage of Total International Staff	Rank	Mission	Number of Local Staff	Percentage of Total Local Staff
1	United States	312	6.3%	1	MONUC	2,063	18.9%
2	Kenya	204	4.1%	2	UNMIK	2,044	18.8%
3	Canada	197	4.0%	3	UNMIS	1,874	17.2%
4	United Kingdom	173	3.5%	4	UNMIL	839	7.7%
5	Philippines	170	3.4%	5	UNAMA	769	7.1%
6	France	162	3.3%	6	MINUSTAH	529	4.9%
7	India	152	3.1%	7	UNOCI	508	4.7%
8	Ghana	116	2.3%	8	UNAMI	352	3.2%
9	Ethiopia	109	2.2%	9	ONUB	327	3.0%
10	Sierra Leone	92	1.8%	10	UNIFIL	305	2.8%
11	Nigeria	84	1.7%	11	UNMIT	227	2.1%
12	Australia	81	1.6%	12	UNMEE	187	1.7%
13	Italy	80	1.6%	13	UNIOSIL	184	1.7%
14	Pakistan	73	1.5%	14	UNOMIG	180	1.7%
15	Germany	72	1.4%	15	MINURSO	122	1.1%
16	Croatia	71	1.4%	16	UNTSO	121	1.1%
17	Fiji	70	1.4%	17	UNFICYP	108	1.0%
18	Tanzania	70	1.4%	18	UNDOF	107	1.0%
19	Lebanon	67	1.3%	19	UNMOGIP	47	0.4%
20	Bosnia and Herzegovina	63	1.3%				

Source: DPKO PMSS.

Note: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and UNAMI. Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

5.24 Highest National Representation in UN DPKO Headquarters: 31 October 2006

Total DPKO HQ Staff: 555

Rank	Country	Number of Staff	Percentage of Total HQ Staff
1	United States	121	21.8%
2	Philippines	38	6.8%
3	India	20	3.6%
4	France	18	3.2%
4	United Kingdom	18	3.2%
6	Canada	15	2.7%
7	Myanmar	13	2.3%
8	Australia	12	2.2%
8	Kenya	12	2.2%
10	Germany	10	1.8%
10	Japan	10	1.8%
10	New Zealand	10	1.8%
10	Trinidad and Tobago	10	1.8%
10	Uruguay	10	1.8%
15	Pakistan	9	1.6%
15	Russia	9	1.6%
17	Ghana	8	1.4%
18	Nigeria	8	1.4%
19	Argentina	8	1.4%
19	Peru	8	1.4%

Source: DPKO EO.

Note: Includes professional and general service staff, but excludes professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

5.25 Total Personnel in UN Missions: 30 September 2006

Mission	Troops	Military Observers	Police	International Staff	Local Staff	UNVs	Total
MONUC	16,627	763	1,107	959	2,063	656	22,175
UNMIL	14,570	200	1,076	516	839	251	17,452
UNMIS	8,914	705	665	742	1,874	159	13,059
UNOCI	7,843	194	949	366	508	228	10,088
MINUSTAH	6,642	—	1,700	417	529	169	9,457
UNIFIL	5,147	—	—	100	305	—	5,552
UNMIK	—	37	1,870	509	2,044	148	4,608
ONUB	2,353	87	14	262	327	105	3,148
UNMEE	2,064	205	—	135	187	61	2,652
UNDOF	1,047	—	—	36	107	—	1,190
UNFICYP	851	—	65	38	108	—	1,062
UNAMA	—	11	3	191	769	30	1,004
UNMIT	—	18	463	80	227	34	822
UNAMI	223	11	—	228	352	—	814
MINURSO	28	190	4	103	122	14	461
UNOMIG	—	121	12	100	180	1	414
UNTSO	—	151	—	106	121	—	378
UNIOSIL	—	9	19	66	184	22	300
UNMOGIP	—	44	—	22	47	—	113
Total	66,309	2,746	7,947	4,976	10,893	1,878	94,749

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Note: Police figures include formed police units.


5.26 UN Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	63,046	1,173	98.2%	1.8%
Military Observers	2,509	62	97.6%	2.4%
Police	7,543	403	94.9%	5.1%
International Civilian Staff	3,513	1,463	70.6%	29.4%
Local Civilian Staff	8,690	2,203	79.8%	20.2%
DPKO HQ Professional (Oct-06)	196	105	65.1%	34.9%
DPKO HQ General Service (Oct-06)	73	181	28.7%	71.3%
UN Logistics Base Brindisi (Jun-06)	129	62	67.5%	32.5%
Total	85,699	5,652	93.8%	6.2%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; DPKO EO.

Notes: International and local civilian staff figures include all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and UNAMI. DPKO Headquarters staff figures include all general service staff and all professional staff with contracts of one year or more.

5.27 Total Monthly Fatalities in UN Missions: October 2005–September 2006



Source: DPKO Situation Center.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL) and UNAMI. UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Malicious acts include what were referred to as hostile acts and crime in the previous edition of the Review.


5.28 Fatalities by UN Missions: October 2005–September 2006

	Number of Fatalities	Percentage of Fatalities
MONUC	26	22.2%
UNMIL	26	22.2%
UNOCI	17	14.5%
UNMIS	12	12.3%
MINUSTAH	10	8.5%
ONUB	8	6.8%
UNTSO	4	3.4%
UNAMI	3	2.6%
UNMEE	3	2.6%
UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL	2	1.7%
UNDOF	2	1.7%
UNFICYP	1	0.9%
UNIFIL	1	0.9%
UNMOGIP	1	0.9%
UNOMIG	1	0.9%
MINURSO	—	—
UNAMA	—	—
UNMIK	—	—
UNOTIL/UNMIT	—	—
Total	117	

Source: DPKO Situation Center.

Note: Includes fatalities in all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL) and UNAMI.


5.29 Fatalities in UN Missions by Incident Type: October 2005–September 2006



Source: DPKO Situation Center.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL) and UNAMI. UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Malicious acts include what were referred to as hostile acts and crime in the previous edition of the Review.


5.30 Fatalities in UN Missions by Personnel Type: October 2005–September 2006



Source: DPKO Situation Center.

Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNOTIL) and UNAMI. UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

5.31 UN Peacekeeping Budgets: 2005–06 and 2006–07



Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/60/27 and A/C.5/60/30; DPKO FMSS.

Notes: Figures above only include peacekeeping operations funded out of the peacekeeping budget; see table below for missions funded from the regular UN budget. UNMIT budget is commitment authority granted for the start-up of the mission; only additional funds had yet to be approved as of November 2006. The July 2006–June 2007 budget for UNIFIL includes approved resources as well as an additional \$50 million in commitment authority for the expansion of the mission.


5.32 Other Peace Operations Budgets: January–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

	Estimated Requirements January–December 2006
UNAMA	68,361.1
UNAMI	179,633.3
UNIOSIL	23,276.0
UNMOGIP	7,867.2
UNOTIL	17,731.8
UNTSO	29,961.2
Peacekeeping Operations	888.7
Total	327,719.3

Source: UN Document A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FMSS.


Note: Peacekeeping Operations budget line item is for peacekeeping operations executive direction and management costs, programme of work and programme support. The budget is an estimate based on one-half of the proposed budget in A/60/6 (Sect. 5). UNTSO and UNMOGIP budget are allotted funds for 2006 only.

5.33 2006 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget



Source: DM OPPBA.

5.34 2006 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Regular Budget



Source: DM OPPBA.


**5.35 Top Twenty Assessed Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations:
30 September 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)**

Member State	2006 Effective Assessment Rate	Outstanding Contributions as at 31 December 2005	Assessments Issued in 2006	Collections Received in 2006	Credits Utilized in 2006	Outstanding Contributions as at 30 September 2006
United States	26.7%	843,134.3	698,003.6	691,237.7	(114,397.3)	735,502.8
Japan	19.5%	844,756.3	494,909.3	876,105.2	(57,427.2)	406,133.2
Germany	8.7%	102,086.8	220,202.6	196,377.6	(25,551.4)	100,360.4
United Kingdom	7.4%	88,072.9	188,986.0	255,289.3	(21,769.5)	—
France	7.3%	99,781.1	185,994.0	149,080.4	(21,424.9)	115,269.8
Italy	4.9%	107,242.5	124,184.9	157,754.5	(14,409.9)	59,263.0
Canada	2.8%	33,152.9	71,511.2	96,366.2	(8,297.9)	—
Spain	2.5%	90,480.4	64,062.6	95,145.4	(7,433.6)	51,964.0
China	2.5%	76,223.0	63,324.3	36,703.4	(7,699.1)	95,144.8
Netherlands	1.7%	19,536.6	42,962.6	30,992.6	(4,985.2)	26,521.5
Australia	1.6%	18,762.7	40,471.3	54,537.8	(4,696.1)	—
Republic of Korea	1.4%	106,744.3	36,529.4	58,845.8	(5,296.9)	79,130.9
Russia	1.3%	15,686.6	33,929.3	43,988.4	(3,908.4)	1,719.1
Switzerland	1.2%	14,107.4	30,429.7	38,312.4	(3,530.9)	2,693.8
Belgium	1.1%	31,943.8	27,175.8	31,065.0	(3,153.4)	24,901.2
Sweden	1.0%	11,762.0	25,370.8	34,188.9	(2,943.9)	—
Austria	0.9%	13,207.3	21,837.2	22,558.0	(2,533.9)	9,952.6
Denmark	0.7%	8,624.1	18,252.8	24,754.9	(2,118.0)	4.0
Norway	0.7%	0.2	17,261.3	15,258.5	(2,002.9)	0.0
Finland	0.5%	6,281.6	13,549.8	18,259.1	(1,572.3)	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

Note: Credits utilized are derived from unencumbered balance of appropriations and other income for peacekeeping operations utilized at the time that assessments for the same operations were issued.


5.36 UN Mandate Renewals: 1 July 2005–30 November 2006



Sources: UN Security Council resolutions.

Notes: Mandate duration noted is mission length authorization as per initial Security Council resolution. In some cases, mission authorization was renewed prior to the end of the previous mandate; in such cases the mandate duration may not match the timeline.

5.37 UN Operations Timeline: 1945–2006



Sources: UN Security Council resolutions.

6

Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions

This chapter presents data on peace operations conducted under the authority of regional organizations and nonstanding coalitions of states; these data are compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

sipri

* * *

Listed here are thirty-one non-UN multilateral peace operations that started, were ongoing, or terminated in 2006. The chapter lists only operations conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states with the stated intention to: (1) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (2) support a peace process, or (3) assist in conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding efforts.

SIPRI uses the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. This may include monitoring and observing cease-fire agreements; undertaking confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions); policing and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. The chapter thus covers a broad range of peace missions to reflect the growing complexity of mandates of peace operations and the potential for operations to change over the course

of their mandate. The chapter does not include good offices, fact-finding, or electoral assistance missions.

The operations are divided into two loosely defined categories: those with military and observer functions (Table 6.10), and those with primarily policing and other civilian functions (Table 6.11). Legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations—are cited in the third column. The start dates for the operations refer to dates of first deployments. The list of countries presented in this volume is incomplete and refer only to the main contributors to a mission. For a complete list of countries participating in each mission, consult the *SIPRI Yearbook*.

Mission fatalities are recorded as a total from the beginning of the mission until the last reported date for 2006 and as a total for 2006. Fatality figures are broken down by cause of death: hostilities, accidents and illness. Subtotals owing to hostilities, accidents and illness may not add up to the total number of deaths in 2006 because some deaths have not yet been classified or were the result of other causes.

Data on multilateral peace operations are obtained from the following categories of open source: (1) official information provided by the secretariat of the authorizing organization, (2) information from the mission on the ground, either in official publications or in responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires, and (3) information from national governments contributing to the mission in question. These primary sources are supplemented with

a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals; research reports; news agencies; and international, regional, and local newspapers.


Table 6.12 lists the estimated declared costs of the peace operations underway in 2006. Budget figures are for the period 1 October 2005–30 September 2006. Budget figures are given in millions of US dollars, and conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on the aggregated market exchange rates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the reporting year and are expressed in current dollar terms. The issue of financing of peace operations is a complicated one and warrants a brief explanation on the different ways in which peacekeeping budgets are calculated and the manner in which they are financed.

Unlike UN budgets, figures for operations conducted by regional organizations such as the EU and NATO refer only to common costs. This includes mainly the running costs of EU and NATO headquarters (the costs of civilian personnel and operations and maintenance) and investments in the infrastructure necessary

to support the operation. The costs of deploying personnel are borne by individual sending states and do not appear in the budget figures given here. Most EU missions are financed in one of two ways, depending on whether they are civilian or military missions. Civilian missions are funded through the Community Budget, while military missions or missions with military components are funded through the ATHENA mechanism to which only the participating member states contribute. In missions by other organizations, such as the OAS Mission in Haiti and in general the ad hoc missions, budget figures for missions may include program implementation.


For these reasons, budget figures presented in this table are best viewed as estimates, and the budgets for different missions should not be compared. There are certain limitations to the data. The main problems of reliability are due to varying definitions of what constitutes the total cost of an operation. The coverage of official data varies significantly between operations; sometimes a budget is an estimate while in other cases it is actual expenditure.

6.1 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN Missions: 30 September 2006




Note: These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units, and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small-scale units. For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

6.2 Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN Missions: 30 September 2006



Note: As the figures for largest contributors represent personnel deployed in large scale units, there may be a small variation with actual field strength.


Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN Missions




Country/Region	Number of Troops									
1. United States	14,440	6. Russian Federation		2,485	11. Spain		1,480	16. Romania		560
2. France	8,067	7. Netherlands	2,346	12. Australia			1,065	17. Greece		550
3. Germany	7,241	8. Nigeria	2,040	13. Austria			849	18. Senegal		538
4. United Kingdom	5,573	9. Canada	2,000	14. Turkey			794	19. South Ossetia		500
5. Italy	4,738	10. Rwanda		1,786	15. South Africa		721	20. Hungary		480
Total										58,253

The numbers in this listing correspond to the numbered circles in the above map.
Source: SIPRI, September 2006. These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small-scale units.

Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN Missions




6.3 Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN Missions by Organization: 30 September 2006



Organization	Troops/Military Observers	Percentage of Total
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	48,960	66%
European Union	8,533	11%
Coalitions/Ad hoc	6,465	9%
African Union	6,013	8%
Commonwealth of Independent States	3,919	5%
Central African Economic and Monetary Community	380	0.5%
Total	74,270	

Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.


6.4 Deployment of Non-UN Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2006



Region	Non UN Military Personnel	Percentage of Total
Africa	12,163	16%
East Asia and the Pacific	1,459	2%
Central and South Asia	32,600	44%
Middle East	1,896	3%
Europe	26,152	35%
Central and South America	—	—
North America	—	—
Total	74,270	


Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

**6.5 Deployment of Non-UN Police by Organization:
30 September 2006**



Organization	Police	Percentage of Total
African Union	1,376	56%
Coalitions/Ad hoc	774	31%
European Union	328	13%
Total	2,478	


6.6 Deployment of Non-UN Police to Regions:
30 September 2006



Region	Civilian Police	Percentage of Total
Africa	1,430	57%
East Asia and the Pacific	765	31%
Central and South Asia	—	—
Middle East	88	4%
Europe	193	8%
Central and South America	2	0.0%
North America	—	—
Total	2,478	


Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

**6.7 Deployment of Non-UN Troops in Africa by Organization:
30 September 2006**



Organization	Troops Contributed	Percentage of Total
African Union	5,381	47%
Coalition/Ad hoc	3,400	29%
European Union	2,370	21%
Central African Economic and Monetary Community	380	3%
Total	11,531	


6.8 Deployment of Non-UN Troops in Europe by Organization:
30 September 2006



Organization	Troops	Percentage of Total
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	16,160	62%
European Union	5,953	23%
Commonwealth of Independent States	3,919	15%
Total	26,032	

Source: SIPRI.

**6.9 Deployment of Non-UN Police in Africa by Organization:
30 September 2006**



Organization	Police	Percentage of Total
Africa Union	1,346	96%
European Union	54	4%
Total	1,400	

Source: SIPRI.

6.10 2006 Non-UN Military and Observer Missions

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop Contributors	Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Police Contributors	Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur, Sudan	28 May 2004 (Agreement with Sudanese Parties) ¹ 30 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1556)	June 2004	Chad (40), Gambia (196), Kenya (60), Nigeria (2,040), Rwanda (1,756), Senegal (538), South Africa (350)	Cameroon (31), Chad (34), Egypt (34), Kenya (46), Malawi (25), Nigeria (65), Rwanda (35), Senegal (38), South Africa (40), Zambia (46)	Cameroon (49), Egypt (50), Gambia (94), Ghana (480), Nigeria (148), Rwanda (49), Senegal (49), South Africa (126), Uganda (64), Zambia (65) ²	—	Troops: 4,980 Military observers: 601 Civilian police: 1,346	13/8 (2, 1, 2)
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) ³	Union of the Comoros	21 March 2006 (Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council)	March 2006	Rwanda (30), South Africa (371)	Congo (Republic of) (5), Egypt (5), Mozambique (10), Nigeria (11)	Madagascar, Mauritius ⁴	—	Troops: 401 ⁵ Military observers: 31 Civilian police: 30	—
CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)	Central African Republic	2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit) 21 March 2003 (Libreville Summit Amended) ⁶	December 2002	Chad (121), Congo (Republic of) (120), Gabon (139)	—	—	—	Troops: 380 ⁷	8/2 (2, -, -)
Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force	Moldova, Trans-Dniester	21 July 1992 (Moldova and Russia) ⁸	July 1992	Moldova (403), Russia (385), (Trans-Dniestra) (411) ⁹	—	—	—	Troops: 1,199	./..
South Ossetia Joint Force	South Ossetia, Georgia	24 June 1992 (Georgia – Russia) ¹⁰	July 1992	Georgia (320), Russia (500), (South Ossetia) (500) ¹¹	—	—	—	Troops: 1,320	./..
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia	Abkhazia, Georgia	21 October 1994 (CIS Council of Collective Security) 21 July 1994 (UNSC Res. 937) ¹²	June 1994	Russia ¹³	—	—	—	Troops: 1,600	./..

EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)	Western Balkans ¹⁴	7 July 1991 (Brioni Agreement) ¹⁵	July 1991	—	Austria (4), Finland (6), France (11), Germany (6), Greece (5), Ireland (5), Netherlands (5), Norway (8), Spain (4), Sweden (7)	—	Military observers: 65 ¹⁶	11/—
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	12 July 2004 (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP) 9 July 2005 (UNSC Res. 1551)	December 2004	—	Austria (285), Finland (177), France (477), Germany (861), Italy (888), Netherlands (301), Poland (195), Portugal (193), Turkey (344), UK (573) ¹⁷	—	Troops: 5,935 ¹⁸	5/3 (—, 1, —)

1. AMIS was initially established by the Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur on 28 May 2004 as an observer mission and was endorsed by UNSC Res. 1556 with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mandate was expanded pursuant to a decision adopted at the 17th Meeting of the Africa Union's Peace and Security Council.
2. Additional contributors of military observers are non-specified states listed as EU/US (23), the Government of Sudan (GOS) (34), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (34), and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) (34).
3. On request of the President of the Union of the Comoros, Azali Asoumani, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted the decision PSC/PR/COMM.1(XLVI) to support the authorities of the Comoros in the presidential elections in May 2006.
4. The mission is further supported by France, the UK, and Norway. France assisted in logistics tasks, Norway contributed acquisition of police equipment, the UK provided logistical support as well as equipment.
5. From 11 May 2006 until 19 May 2006, South Africa deployed an additional 675 troops to assist in stabilizing the region during the presidential elections.
6. The CEMAC Multinational Force was established on 2 Oct. 2002 by decision of the Libreville Summit to secure the border between Chad and the CAR and to guarantee the safety of former President Patassé. CEMAC decided at the 21 Mar. 2003 Libreville Summit to amend the mission's mandate to contribute to the overall security environment, to assist in the restructuring of CAR's armed forces and to support the transition process. 'Communiqué Final du Sommet des Chefs d'État et de Délégation de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale', Libreville, 2 Oct. 2002; and 3rd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, African Union, 4–8 July 2003. The current mandate of FOMUC is authorized until 30 Jun. 2007.
7. FOMUC is supported by and co-located with a detachment of 224 French soldiers. In addition, 54 locally employed staff provide administrative support.
8. Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Trans-Dniester region, signed in Moscow on 21 Jul 1992 by the presidents of Moldova and Russia. A Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Moldova and Trans-Dniester was established to coordinate the activities of the joint peacekeeping contingent.
9. The participation of parties to a conflict in peace operations is typically not included in the table; however, the substantial involvement of the parties to the conflict in this operation is a distinctive feature of CIS operations and of the peace agreement which is the basis for the establishment of the operation.
10. Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in South Ossetia, signed in Dagomys, on 24 Jun. 1992, by Georgia and Russia. A joint Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement.
11. See note 9 above.
12. The Georgia-Abkhazian Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994. The operation's mandate was approved by heads of states members of the CIS Council of Collective Security, 21 Oct 1994, and endorsed by UNSC Res. 937. The period of the mission's mandate was extended indefinitely from Jan. 2004.
13. Other CIS states may participate in the mission.
14. The EUMM operates in Albania, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Presovo.
15. The mission was established Croatia, by representatives of the European Community (EC) and the 6 republics of the former Yugoslavia. MOUs were signed with the governments of Albania in 1997 and Croatia in 1998. The EUMM became the EUMM upon becoming an instrument of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and was mandated to monitor political and security developments, borders, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns; to contribute to the early warning mechanism of the European Council; and to contribute to confidence building and stabilization in the region. Council Joint Action of 22 Dec. 2000, on the European Union Monitoring Mission, EU document 2000/811/CFSP, 23 Dec. 2000, Introduction, para. 6 and Article 1, para. 2. Council Joint Action 2005/807/CFSP of 21 Nov. 2005 amended the mission's geographical mandate to focus on Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro. The mission mandate has been prolonged until 31 Dec. 2006.
16. These are civilian observers. The mission is supported by 69 locally contracted staff.
17. The contingents are grouped into 3 task forces—MNTF North (Tuzla), MNTF Southeast (Mostar) and MNTF Northwest (Banja Luka)—for which Austria, France, and the UK are the framework nations.
18. In addition, approximately 85 civilian personnel are deployed.

continues

6.10 Continued

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop Contributors	Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Police Contributors	Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)	Aceh, Indonesia ¹⁹	9 September 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP) ²⁰	September 2005 ²¹	—	Brunei Darussalam (6), Finland (10), Germany (7), Malaysia (8), Netherlands (5), Philippines (6), Singapore (6), Sweden (10), Thailand (6), UK (9)	—	—	Military observers: 90 ²²	1/1 (–, 1, –)
EU Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)	Democratic Republic of the Congo	27 April 2006 (Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP) 24 April 2006 (UNSC Res. 1671) ²³	July 2006	Belgium (60), Finland (10), France (1090), Germany (730) Italy (50), Netherlands (40), Poland (130), Portugal (50), Spain (130), Sweden (55)	—	—	—	Troops: 2,370 ²⁴	—
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) ²⁵	June 1999	Austria (560), Czech Republic (450), France (2100), Germany (2900), Greece (550), Hungary (480), Italy (2200), Spain (750), Sweden (425), USA (1800) ²⁶	—	—	—	Troops: 16,160 ²⁷	94/4

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	Afghanistan ²⁸	20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386)	December 2001	Canada (2,000), France (1,000), Germany (2,750), Italy (1,600), Netherlands (2,000), Romania (560), Spain (600), Turkey (450), UK (5,000), USA (12,600) ²⁹	—	—	Troops: 32,600 ³⁰	143/33 (26, -, -)
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)	Iraq	8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546) ³¹	August 2004	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA	—	—	Troops: 200	—

19. In line with the mission's drawdown plans, the mission's 11 geographically distributed District Offices, as well as the 2 sub-District Offices were closed on 7 Sep. 2006.

20. The AMM was established to monitor implementation of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 Aug. 2005. The mission closed on 15 Dec. 2006.

21. At the request of both parties to have a small presence immediately after the signing of the MOU, an initial interim monitoring presence (IMP) was deployed by 15 August 2005. The IMP consisted of 80 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries, as well as Norway and Switzerland. The AMM was launched and fully deployed on 15 Sep. 2005.

22. These are civilian observers.

23. The mission closed on 30 Nov. 2006.

24. Of this number, approximately 1100 troops are based in Kinshasa while, the remaining 1200 strong reserve force, so called the "on-call" force, was located in Liberville, Gabon, to deploy if necessary.

25. KFOR's mandate includes deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders.

26. In addition to KFOR Headquarters in Pristina, KFOR contingents are grouped into 5 task forces: MNTE Centre, located in Lipljan is led by Sweden; MNTE North, located in Novo Selo is led by France; MNB Southwest, located in Prizren is led by Germany; MNB East, located in Urosevac is led by USA; and, finally MN Specialized Unit (MSU), a police force with military status, located in Pristina is led by Italy.

27. Of which NATO member states contributed a total of 13,495 personnel and partner countries contributed 2,665. In addition, approximately 30 civilians are deployed.

28. The territory of Afghanistan is currently divided in five areas of responsibility: the Regional Command Center in Kabul, led by UK; RC North at Mazar-e Sharif, led by Germany; RC West at Herat led by Italy; RC South at Kandahar led by Netherlands; and RC East at Bagram led by the US.

29. The following countries have contributed military and/or civilian personnel to the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.

30. ISAF assumed command of approximately 12,600 US troops (formerly under OEF command) on 5 Oct. 2006. These figures include military personnel serving in the PRTs.

31. NSC Res. 1546, requests member states and other international organizations to assist the Iraqi Government's efforts in building the capacity of Iraq's security forces. The North Atlantic Council agreed on 30 Jul 2004 to the establishment of NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM-I). On 16 Dec. 2004, the NAC decided to transform the training implementation mission into a full-fledged training mission to support the build-up of the Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq. The NTM-I operates within Baghdad's secure "Green Zone" and in undisclosed locations outside of Iraq.

continues

6.10 Continued

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop Contributors	Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Sinai, Egypt	3 August 1981 (Egypt and Israel) ³²	April, 1982	—	Australia (25), Canada (28), Colombia (358), Fiji (338), France (15), Hungary (41), Italy (79) New Zealand (26), Uruguay (87), USA (687)	USA (15)	Military observers: 1687 Civilian staff: 15	49/1 (—, —, 1)
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH 2)	Hebron	15 January 1997 (Hebron Protocol) ³³	January 1997	—	Italy (6), Turkey (3)	Denmark (2), Italy, Norway 13, Sweden (3), Switzerland (5), Turkey	Military observers: 9 Civilian staff: 2334	2/— Civilian police: 7
International Monitoring Team (IMT)	Philippines ³⁵	November 2004 (Trilateral decision between Malaysia, Philippines and the MILF) 22 June 2001 (Tripoli Agreement on Peace)	November 2004	—	Brunei Darussalam (10), Libya (5), Malaysia (39)	Malaysia (2)	Military observers: 54 Civilian staff: 2	—
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)	Sri Lanka	22 February 2002 (Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam) ³⁶	February 2002	—	Denmark, Finland, Iceland (10), Norway (20), Sweden	—	Military observers: 3037	—

Operation Licorne	Côte d'Ivoire	24 January 2006 (UNSC Res. 1652, 4 February 2003 (UNSC Res. 1652) ³⁸	February 2003	France (3,400)	—	—	Troops: 3,400 ³⁹	20/—
Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	Solomon Islands	23 October 2000 (Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué) ⁴⁰	July 2003	Australia (140), Fiji, New Zealand (42), Papua New Guinea, Tonga ⁴¹	—	Australia, Cook Islands (2), Fiji (8), Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (2), Nauru, New Zealand (38), Palau (2), Papua New Guinea (7), Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (3)	Troops: 200 Civilian police: 320 Civilian staff: 180	2/—

32. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was established according to the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed on 26 Mar. 1979.

33. The mission receives its authority from the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 15 Jan. 1997, and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, 21 Jan. 1997. The mandate is renewed every 3 months pending approval from both the Palestinian and Israeli Parties.

34. Following attacks on the Mission's HQ on 8 Feb. 2006, TIPH was temporarily withdrawn from Hebron. Since May 2006, TIPH returned to conduct daytime patrols on a regular basis, but has not returned to full strength.

35. IMT operates on the island of Mindanao.

36. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was instated to monitor the implementation of the Agreement on a ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (CFA). The governments of Norway and Sri Lanka, endorsed by the LTTE leadership, composed a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) where the position of the SLMM is delineated. SLMM HQ are located in Colombo and the Liaison Office is in Kilinochchi. In addition, there are four District Offices (DO) manned each with 4 monitors supported by locals.

37. These are civilian and unarmed observers. Until the end of August, Danish (11), Finnish (11), and Swedish (15) monitors were deployed. After the withdrawal of the EU Nordic countries, as demanded by the LTTE, Norway (16) and Iceland (4) increased the numbers of their personnel to 20 and 10, respectively.

38. The UNSC initially authorized under Chapter VII and in accordance with Chapter VIII the deployment of French troops alongside ECOMIC to contribute to a secure environment and allow for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, UNSC Res. 1464.

39. The troops deployed in Côte d'Ivoire are supported by additional troops based in Togo (100 personnel/air unit) and in the Gulf of Guinea (250 personnel/naval unit).

40. The Regional Assistance Mission was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration in which members of the Pacific Islands Forum agree to a collective response to crises usually on the request of the host government.

41. Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga contribute a platoon each.

continues

6.10 Continued

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop Contributors	Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Police Contributors	Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)	Iraq ⁴²	16 October 2003 (UNSC Res. 1511) 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546, modified) ⁴³	November 2003	Australia (900), Denmark (470), Denmark (470), El Salvador (380), Georgia (900), Italy (1,600), South Korea (2,800), Poland (900), Romania (890), UK (7,200), USA (14,4000)	—	—	—	Troops: 162,000	2,555 ⁴⁴ / 564(476,57,7)
Joint Task Force – Operation ASTUTE	Timor-Leste	25 May 2006 ⁴⁵	May 2006	Australia (925), New Zealand (160)	—	Australia (150), Malaysia (250), New Zealand (25), Portugal (120) ⁴⁶	—	Troops: 1,085 Civilian police: 445	—

42. The territory of Iraq is divided into 5 major areas of responsibility and is covered by the following units—MND Baghdad, MND North, MNF West—for which the USA is the lead nation; MND Central South and MND Southeast are maintained by Poland, and the UK and Australia respectively.

43. The Multinational Force in Iraq was authorized by UNSC Res. 1511 to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of UNAMI's mandated tasks. The mandate of MNF was reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 1546 following the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq.

44. Only fatalities that occurred after the UNSC authorization are included.

45. Following a formal request for military assistance from the authorities of Timor-Leste on 24 May 2006, the Australian government, in cooperation with Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal, launched operation ASTUTE. It received a formal mandate under UNSC Res. 1690 (20 Jun. 2006)

46. At the end of Sep. 2006, the civilian police units were subsumed to the UN mission UNMIT (UNSC Res. 1704).

6.11 2006 Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian Missions

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop		Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Police Contributors		Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
				Contributors	Contributors		Contributors	Contributors			
EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	11 March 2002 (Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP) ⁴⁷	January 2003	—	—	—	Austria (5), Czech Republic (5), Finland (5), France (26), Germany (12), Italy (12), Netherlands (10), Poland (7), Portugal (5), Romania (6), Spain (6), Turkey (5), Ukraine (5) UK (13)	Belgium (1), Bulgaria (1), Germany (3), Ireland (5), Italy (4), Netherlands (1), Norway (1), Portugal (1), Spain (3), Turkey (2), Ukraine (1), UK (13)	Civilian police: 173 Civilian staff: 2848	3/—	
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) the Congo	Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of	9 December 2004 (Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP) ⁴⁹	April 2005	—	—	—	Angola (13), Belgium (1), Canada (1), Denmark (1), France (22), Italy (4), Mali (2), Netherlands (2), Portugal (5), Romania (1), Turkey (1), UK (1)	Belgium (1), France (1), Portugal (1)	Civilian police: 5450 Civilian staff: 3	—	
EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC DR CONGO)	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2 May 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP)	June 2005	—	—	—	—	Belgium (9), France (10), Germany (1), Hungary (2), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (3), Portugal (2), Sweden (2), UK (3)	Civilian Staff: 3351	—	

47. On the request of the BiH authorities, the EU modified the mandate (including the size) of the mission and extended it to the end of 2007 (Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP, 24 Nov. 2005).

48. The mission is supported by 215 local staff.

49. EUPOL Kinshasa was established as a follow on mission to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and is mandated to monitor, mentor and advise the Congolese police force.

50. During the election process (30 Jun.-30 Nov. 2006) 29 additional civilian police officers were deployed to strengthen the mission (UK 1/ France 11/ DK 1/Romania 1/Angola 13/ Mali 2—included in the national figures).

51. The majority of the deployed personnel consists of military advisors (24): 15 are based in Kinshasa while 9 are located in the eastern parts of the DR Congo. In addition, the mission is supported by 10 local staff.

continues

6.11 Continued

Name	Location	Authorization Date	Start Date	Principal Troop Contributors	Principal Military Observer Contributors	Principal Civilian Police Contributors	Principal Civilian Staff Contributors	Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)	Total Fatalities to Date/In 2006 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)
EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)	Rafah Crossing Point	12 December 2005 (Council Joint Action) 2005/889/CFSP) ⁵²	October 2005	—	—	Belgium (4), Denmark (3), Finland (4), France (9), Germany (8), Greece (3), Italy (18), Netherlands (3), Spain (8), Sweden (7)	Italy (1), Lithuania, Portugal (1), Romania, Slovenia, Spain (2), UK (2)	Civilian police: 72 Civilian staff: 653	—
EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	24 November 2005 (Council Joint Action) 2005/826/CFSP) ⁵⁴	December 2005	—	—	Austria, Belgium (1), Cyprus (1), Denmark (1), Finland (1), France (2), Germany (3), Greece (1), Hungary (1), Italy (2), Latvia (1), Netherlands (1), Slovakia (1), Slovenia (1), Spain (1), Sweden (1), UK (1)	Belgium (1), Denmark (1), France (1), Germany (1), Ireland (1), Italy (3), Portugal (1), Sweden (1), UK (2)	Civilian police: 20 Civilian staff: 1255	—
EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	Palestinian Territory	14 November 2005 (Council Joint Action) 2005/797/CFSP) ⁵⁶	January 2006	—	—	Belgium (1), Denmark (1), Finland (1), France (1), Germany (1), Ireland (1), Spain (1), Sweden (1), UK (1)	Austria (1), Sweden (1), UK (1)	Civilian police: 9 Civilian staff: 357	—
OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	18 September 1992 (16th Committee of Senior Officials)	September 1992	—	—	—	Austria (3), Belarus (3), Croatia (2), France (4), Georgia (2), Germany (7), Ireland (2), Italy (3), Poland (2), Portugal (2), Romania (2), Slovenia (2), Spain (3), Sweden (2), Turkey (9), UK (3), Ukraine (2), USA (8)	Civilian staff: 69	—

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina	8 December 1995 (5th Meeting of the Ministerial Council) ⁵⁸	December 1995	—	—	—	Austria (6), Bulgaria (4), France (11), Germany (9), Ireland (3), Italy (9), Netherlands (4), Russia (5), UK (4), USA (16)	Civilian staff: 109 ⁵⁹	—
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305) ⁶⁰	July 1999	—	—	—	Austria (13), Bulgaria (10), Canada (9), France (14), Germany (32), Italy (16), Romania (9), Spain (9), Turkey (9), UK (20), USA (38)	Civilian staff: 255 ⁶¹	6 (-, -, 2)
OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti June 2004	Port-au-Prince, Haiti	16 January 2002 (Permanent Council Decision CP/RES. 806) ⁶²	June 2004	—	—	Benin (1), France (1)	Argentina (1), Barbados (1), Benin (1), Bolivia (1), Canada (2), Dominica (1), Ecuador (2), France (1), Grenada (2), Mexico (1), Peru (5)	Civilian police: 2 Civilian staff: 18 ⁶³	1

52. EU BAM Rafah was established on the basis of the "Agreement on Movement and Access" reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on 15 Nov. 2005.

53. The mission is supported by 8 local staff.

54. EUPAT was established as a follow-up mission to EUPOL PROXIMA. The mission closed on 14 Jun. 2006.

55. In addition, 20 local staff were assigned to the mission.

56. EUPOL COPPS currently has a 3 year mandate, expiring on 31 Dec. 2008. The mission's HQ is located in Ramallah with 2 field offices in the West Bank and in Gaza.

57. The mission is supported by 4 local staff.

58. The decision to establish the mission taken in accordance with Annex 6 of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. PC.DEC/694, 17 Nov. 2005, extended the mission until 31 Dec. 2006. The mission is headquartered in Sarajevo with five regional centers located in Banja Luka, Bihac, Mostar, Tuzla and Sokolac, 20-30 field offices, as well as a centre in Brcko.

59. The mission is supported by 575 local staff.

60. The mission replaced the transitional OSCE Kosovo Task Force, which had been established on 8 Jun. 1999 (PC.DEC/296). The mission is a component (Pillar III) of UNMIK. 580th PC Meeting, PC.DEC/693 of 17 Nov. 2005 extended the mission mandate until 31 Dec. 2006. The mission headquarters are located in Pristina with nine field centers situated elsewhere in Kosovo.

61. 183 of the 255 international personnel are seconded staff, while 72 are directly contracted by the OSCE Mission. In addition, there are 749 local staff.

62. In June 2004, the OAS General Assembly, through A/RES. 2058 (XXXIV-O/04) amended the mandate. In Jun. 2006 the General Assembly of the OAS extended the mandate through resolution AG/RES. 2215 (XXXVI-O/06).

63. The mission is supported by 103 locally recruited staff.

6.12 Cost of Non-UN Military, Observer, Civilian Police, and Civilian Missions: October 2005–September 2006

Name	Location	Cost (\$US millions)
Non-UN Military and Observer Missions		
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur, Sudan	417.8
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	19
Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force	Moldova – Transdniestria	—*
South Ossetia Joint Force	South Ossetia – Georgia	—
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia	Abkhazia – Georgia	—
CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)	Central African Republic	9.7
EUFOR RD Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	21.2
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	56.5
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	Afghanistan	102.4
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	31.4
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)	Iraq	89,033
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Sinai, Egypt	59.0
International Monitoring Team (IMT)	Philippines	—
Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)	Iraq	—
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)	Sri Lanka	2.4
Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	Solomon Islands	159.4
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH-2)	Hebron	2.5
Operation Licorne	Cote d'Ivoire	253.4
Operation Astute -Joint Task Force Timor Leste	Timor Leste	—
EU Aceh Monitoring Mission	Aceh, Indonesia	19.7
Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian Missions		
EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC – R.D. CONGO)	Democratic Republic of Congo	4.8
EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)	Macedonia	1.9
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EU BAM Rafah)	Rafah	13.2
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)	Western Balkans	3
EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	17
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	Ramallah	5.8
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa)	Democratic Republic of Congo	5.4
OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	13.3
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	43.1
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina	22.1
OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti	Haiti	13

Source: SIPRI

Note: *While complete contribution figures for CIS operations is not available, Russian expenditure for CIS missions is 1 883 226 (\$US), including the upkeep of coordinating structures in CIS and spending in regard to the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The Russian general contribution to CIS collective security and peacekeeping is 3 794 705 (\$US).

6.13 Heads of Non-UN Military, Observer, Civilian Police, and Civilian Missions: September 2006

Name	Location	Head of Mission
Heads of Non-UN Military and Observer Missions		
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur, Sudan	Collins Remy Umunake Ihekire (Nigeria)
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	Col. George Sibanyoni (South Africa)
Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force	Moldova – Transdniestria	Maj. Gen. Boris Sergeyev (Russian)
South Ossetia Joint Force	South Ossetia – Georgia	Maj Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov (Russian)
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia	Abkhazia – Georgia	Maj. Gen. Sergey Chaban (Russian)
CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)	Central African Republic	Gén. de Brigade Auguste Roger Bibaye Itandas (Gabon)
EUFOR DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck (Germany)
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Maj. Gen. Gian Marco Chiarini (Italy)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	Afghanistan	Lt. Gen. David J. Richards (United Kingdom)
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	Lt. Gen. Roland Kather (Germany)
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)	Iraq	Martin E. Dempsey (United States)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Sinai, Egypt	James A. Larocco (United States)
International Monitoring Team (IMT)	Philippines	Maj. Gen. Ismael bin Ahmad Khan (Malaysia)
Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)	Iraq	Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (United States)
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)	Sri Lanka	Maj. Gen. Lars Johan Sølberg (Norway)
Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	Solomon Islands	Timothy George (Australia)
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH-2)	Hebron	Arne Huuse (Norway)
Operation Licorne	Côte d'Ivoire	Gen. Antoine Lecerf (France)
Operation Astute -Joint Task Force Timor Leste	Timor Leste	Brig. Mal Rorden (Australia)
EU Aceh Monitoring Mission	Aceh, Indonesia	Pieter Feith (Netherlands)
Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian Missions		
EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC – R.D. CONGO)	Democratic Republic of Congo	Gen. Pierre-Michel Joana (France)
EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)	Macedonia	Jürgen Scholz (Germany)
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EU BAM Rafah)	Rafah	Maj. Gen. Pietro Pistolese (Italy)
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)	Western Balkans	Maryse Daviet (France)

continues

6.13 Continued

Name	Location	Head of Mission
EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Brigadier Gen. Vincenzo Coppola (Italy)
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	Ramallah	Jonathan Mclvor (United Kingdom)
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa)	Democratic Republic of Congo	Adílio Ruivo Custódio (Portugal)
OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Carlos Pais (Portugal)
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro	Werner Wnendt (Germany)
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Douglas Alexander Davidsson (United States)
OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti	Haiti	Denneth Modeste (Grenada)

Source: SIPRI.

7

UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

This chapter contains data on all current missions and missions immediately preceding current missions of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as well as some Department of Political Affairs (DPA) missions supported by DPKO. It is based on public UN documents and sources, combined with data provided by DPKO and in some cases by the UN Department of Management (DM). Some data for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was provided by the mission through DPA.

Variations in types of data sources and reporting dates between missions are often a result of differences in the structure, reporting and funding mechanisms for different types of UN peace operations:

- Peacekeeping missions funded by the General Assembly on the basis of a financial period running from 1 July to 30 June of the following year.
- New or newly expanded peacekeeping missions funded through short-term commitment authority (UNMIT, UNIFIL).
- Peacekeeping missions funded by the biennial UN budget, which runs from January in even years to December of odd years (UNMOGIP and UNTSO).
- Integrated missions and DPA political missions and special political missions with a peacekeeping component supported by DPKO and funded through extrabudgetary resources, running on a single calendar year basis (UNAMA, UNOTIL, UNIOSIL, UNAMI).

The features of our dataset are outlined below.

Key Facts

Notes on mandates and key personnel.

Personnel:

July 2005–September 2006

These graphs cover personnel trends through the last UN peacekeeping financial year and through the first quarter of the 2006-2007 financial year on a month-by-month basis. Authorized military and police personnel strengths are based on *authorized* strengths in Security Council resolutions, relevant budgetary documentation, or were provided directly by the DPKO Force Generation Service (FGS) and the DPKO Police Division (PD). Actual military and personnel strengths were provided by the FGS and PD. Actual and authorized strengths for international staff and local staff were provided by the DPKO Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS). UNV actual and authorized strengths (based on exchange of letters and mission-specific agreements between the United Nations Volunteer Programme and DPKO) were provided by the UNV Programme in Bonn. Figures for UNAMI are only shown as of January 2006 as DPKO did not begin reporting military personnel figures on a regular monthly basis until that date. Personnel graphs for UNMIT, UNIFIL and UNMIS end in July 2006, as separate mission deployment/expansion sections are included for these missions. There may be slight discrepancies in the July–September 2005 data shown here and the data shown for the same period in last year’s edition of the *Review* due to changes in data sources.

Personnel: Since 2000

These graphs show average annual number of personnel and average annual number of authorized personnel for the last five years (up to June 2005 for missions funded by the peacekeeping budget and through September 2006 for other missions). For the July 2005–September 2006 period, actual military and police personnel figures were calculated based on information provided by the FGS or PD. Authorized military and police personnel figures were derived from Security Council Resolutions or obtained from FGS and PD in cases where Security Council resolutions did not specify authorized strengths. International and local civilian staff actual and authorized strengths were calculated based on information provided by PMSS. UNV actual and authorized figures were provided by the UNV Programme.

Average actual and authorized figures for the January–June 2005 period were obtained from official budgetary and financial performance reports covering that year, or from data collected directly from the relevant UN Departments for last year's edition of the *Review*. Exceptions include UNMOGIP and UNTSO, for which historical and actual personnel figures were derived from the UN's Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium. Historical figures for UNAMA were obtained from the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or Security Council. No historical graph is shown for UNAMI as DPKO did not begin reporting military personnel figures on a regular monthly basis until January 2006.

***Military and Police Contributors:
30 September 2006***

These data show all contributors to the mission on 30 September 2006, and were provided by the FGS and PD. The extent to which the UNIFIL and UNMIT missions grew between 30 September and 31 October 2006

led us to include a special table on their state at that date.

Military Units: 30 September 2006

These data show units in the field on the day in question by their type and country of origin, based on information provided by FGS. Military staff are not formed into traditional units in observer missions, political missions, and in the observer elements of larger missions; therefore these personnel are not recorded in this section. Special tables for UNIFIL and UNMIT as of the 31 October 2006 are also provided here.

***International Civilian Personnel
Occupations: 30 September 2006***

These data, provided by PMSS, break down international civilian staff into 23 occupational groups, as provided by PMSS.

Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

These data show the total number of male and female troops, military observers, police, international staff, and local staff as of that date. Military data were provided by FGS, police data were provided PD, and international and local staff data were provided by PMSS. Data for UNVs were not available.

Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

These data were provided by the DPKO Situation Center. Differences may exist between the historical data shown here and fatality data shown in last year's edition of the *Review* due to investigations and reviews of fatality reports undertaken by the Situation Center over the course of the year. Fatality incident types previously categorized as “hostile act” and “criminal act” have henceforth been combined into a single category—“malicious act.”

Vehicles: 30 September 2006

These data cover both UN-owned vehicles and those vehicles owned by national contingents serving in the field under a Memorandum of Agreement and for which usage is

reimbursed by the UN. Data for UN-owned vehicles were provided by the DPKO Surface Transport Division; data on Contingent-owned vehicles obtained from a database managed by the DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Management Section.

Aircraft: 30 September 2006

These data have been provided by the DPKO Air Transport Section and identify aircraft by their type (transport fixed-wing, transport helicopter, or attack helicopter) and supplier (contractor or government).

Budgets and Expenditure Data

Budget and Expenditures: 2005–2007

All 2005–2007 data were provided by the DPKO Finance Management and Support Service (FMSS).

Peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget show budget and expenditures for the 2005–06 financial year as well as the budget for the 2006–07 financial year. The 2006–07 budget for UNMIT and UNIFIL include additional funds allotted through commitment authority as of mid-November 2006.

Peacekeeping missions funded from the regular biennial budget (UNTSO and UNMOGIP): These data show both the estimated requirements for the January 2006–December 2007 period, as well as allotted resources for the 2006 calendar year.

Political/Special Political/Integrated Missions: These data show the financial requirements and allotments for the 2006 calendar year, as well as expenditures for the 2005 calendar year. 2007 budgets are not included for these missions.

Mission Expenditures: 2000–2005

Covering the five financial years prior to the most recent, this overview of expenditures has been derived from mission financing reports, financial performance reports, and reports on mission budgets. Information on UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNAMA, and UNOTIL

has been provided by FMSS. Some discrepancies may appear between the 2004–2005 data provided here, which is derived from official performance reports on the budget, and those data provided in last year's edition of the *Review*, which were provided by the FMSS prior to the publication of official performance reports. The mission expenditure tables for peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget are broken down into the three following categories (although there was some variation in subcategories in 2000–2001¹):

1. *Military and police personnel.* Includes missions subsistence allowance, travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation, death and disability compensation, rations and clothing allowances for military observers and police. This section also includes expenditures on major contingent-owned equipment, and freight and deployment of contingent-owned equipment.

2. *Civilian personnel.* Covers salaries, staff assessment, common staff costs, hazardous duty stations allowances, and overtime for international and local staff. Also covers costs associated with United Nations Volunteers.

3. *Operational requirements.* Costs associated with general temporary assistance (salaries, common staff costs, staff assessment), government-provided personnel and civilian electoral observers (allowances and travel), consultants, official travel of civilian personnel, facilities and infrastructure, as well as self-sustainment costs of contingent-owned equipment. Also included are costs associated with ground, air, and navel transportation in mission, communications, IT, medical, special equipment, other supplies, services and equipment, and quick impact projects.

Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006

These data, supplied by FMSS, cover contingents' expenditures on major equipment (for

which they can be reimbursed by the UN) as well as self-sustainment (rations, etc.) for those missions financed by the peacekeeping budget.

Voluntary Contributions:

July 2005–June 2006

These data cover those countries and organizations providing financial support to missions other than through assessed contributions. They are provided by the UN Department of Management's Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA).

Mission Deployment/Expansion Timeline

These graphs—shown for UNMIT and UNIFIL, missions which undertook significant expansion and new deployment over the course of the year—show the key developments leading up to the authorization of the mission as well as key events in the first phase of the mission. These graphs show the actual and authorized number of troops and police through October or November 2006 as well as actual and authorized civilian personnel through September 2006. Markers show major events during the deployment phase, including:

- The date of the outbreak of hostilities.
- Mandate extensions (technical roll-overs) for existing mission authorization.
- Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council preceding resolutions and making recommendations on mission establishment, structure, and concepts of operation.
- Date of UN Security Council resolutions on the mission establishment, mandate renewal, and expansion.
- Planning and multi-disciplinary assessment missions prior to or following key Security Council resolutions.
- In the case of UNIFIL, the dates of the first report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and the first official meeting of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), following a decision to expand the mission.
- In the case of Timor-Leste, the launch of Operation Astute, which preceded the Security Council's decision to establish UNMIT.
- Key local government decisions and other significant events related to the mission.

Note


1. Prior to the July 2001–June 2002 financial year, "Staff Assessment" was reported as an additional line item in "Gross Expenditures" for each mission. Since then, staff assessment has been included as part of the "Civilian Personnel" line item. For the sake of consistency, figures for the 2000–2001 financial years are shown using the current financial reporting method and include staff assessment expenditures as part of the civilian personnel expenditures. For those years, civilian personnel expenditures will thus appear to be higher than in the official UN financial reports.

7.1 MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)

MINURSO Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	31 October 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1720 (six month duration) 28 April 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1675 (six month duration) 28 October 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1634 (six month duration)
First mandate	29 April 1991 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 690 (no determined duration)
SRSB	To be appointed
First SRSB	Johannes Manz (Switzerland)
Force commander	Major-General Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark) SG letter of appointment 6 September 2005 Entry on duty 16 September 2005
First force commander	Major-General Armand Roy (Canada)



MINURSO Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS, DPKO PD, DPKO PMSS, UNV Programme.

Notes: Above figures do not include government provided personnel. Police deployment has been suspended.

MINURSO Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/58/642, A/59/619, and A/60/634; DPKO FGS, DPKO PD, DPKO PMSS.
 Note: Above figures do not include government provided personnel.

MINURSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Malaysia	20	14	—	34	Croatia	—	5	—	5
Egypt	—	21	2	23	Republic of Guinea	—	4	—	4
Russia	—	21	—	21	Hungary	—	4	—	4
Honduras	—	18	—	18	Italy	—	4	—	4
France	—	17	—	17	Austria	—	3	—	3
China	—	15	—	15	Ireland	—	3	—	3
Ghana	7	8	—	15	Mongolia	—	3	—	3
Bangladesh	—	8	—	8	Denmark	1	1	—	2
Kenya	—	8	—	8	Sri Lanka	—	2	—	2
Nigeria	—	8	—	8	Argentina	—	1	—	1
Uruguay	—	8	—	8	Greece	—	1	—	1
El Salvador	—	5	2	7	Poland	—	1	—	1
Pakistan	—	7	—	7	Total	28	190	4	222

Sources: DPKO FGS, DPKO PD.

MINURSO Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Country
1	Advanced Level I Medical Unit	Malaysia

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff, staff officers and military observers not included.

MINURSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	16	15.5%
Aviation	—	—
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	14	13.6%
Finance	6	5.8%
Human Resources	2	1.9%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	17	16.5%
Legal Affairs	1	1.0%
Logistics	11	10.7%
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	7	6.8%
Procurement	4	3.9%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	3	2.9%
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	6	5.8%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	16	15.5%
Total	103	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

MINURSO Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	21	7	75.0%	25.0%
Military Observers	189	1	99.5%	0.5%
Police	2	2	50.0%	50.0%
International Civilian Staff	85	18	82.5%	17.5%
Local Civilian Staff	95	27	77.9%	22.1%
Total	392	55	87.7%	12.3%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

MINURSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
1992–1999	5	1	1	2	2	—	11
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2005	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	5	1	1	2	5	—	14

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
1992–1999	—	3	8	—	—	11
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	1	—	1
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	1	—	—	1
2005	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	1	—	—	1
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	—	3	10	1	—	14

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

MINURSO Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	309
Airfield Support Equipment	7
Ambulances	4
Automobiles	8
Buses	16
Engineering Vehicles	3
Material Handling Equipment	18
Trucks	34
Total	399

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.

MINURSO Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	3	3	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	3	3	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

MINURSO Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	5,525.6	5,360.3	5,598.2
Military contingents	705.8	730.1	715.4
Civilian police	201.4	127.2	165.1
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	15,370.4	14,080.8	13,404.4
Local staff	2,174.6	1,726.5	2,960.9
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	782.1
General temporary assistance	—	46.1	169.8
Government-provided personnel	108.8	35.1	45.8
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	32.0	3.7	3.0
Official travel	419.1	428.9	336.2
Facilities and infrastructure	2,681.9	4,111.4	2,843.7
Ground transportation	2,590.8	2,471.5	1,555.0
Air transportation	12,432.4	9,982.1	11,313.8
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	2,251.8	2,193.7	1,839.6
Supplies, services, and equipment	1,045.6	1,115.6	886.4
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	45,540.4	42,413.0	42,619.4
Staff assessment income	2,508.0	2,191.5	2,206.4
Net requirements	43,032.4	40,221.5	40,413.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	3,118.1	3,761.3	3,315.6
Total requirements	48,658.5	46,174.3	45,935.0

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–July 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

MINURSO Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	68.2
Self-sustainment	88.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

MINURSO Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
Morocco	3,131	—	—	3,131
Algeria	420	—	—	420
Frente Polisario	210	—	—	210
Total	3,761	—	—	3,761

Source: DM OPPBA.


MINURSO Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005
(in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	7,144.0	6,344.7	6,214.8	6,495.3	6,373.5
Civilian personnel	22,523.2	19,720.8	18,191.5	17,472.9	16,162.6
Operational requirements	10,239.6	13,025.0	14,002.7	14,882.6	18,861.9
Other	2,309.1	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	42,215.9	39,090.5	38,409.0	38,850.8	41,398.0
Staff assessment income	3,773.4	2,751.3	2,636.2	2,442.8	2,311.9
Net requirements	38,442.5	36,339.2	35,772.8	36,408.0	39,086.1
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	3,670.7	1,806.1	2,567.4	3,084.0	3,885.2
Total requirements	45,886.6	40,896.6	40,976.4	41,934.8	45,283.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/58/642, A/59/619, and A/60/634; DPKO FMSS.



MINUSTAH Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	15 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1702 (six month duration)
	14 February 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1658 (six month duration)
First mandate	30 April 2004 (date of issue), 1 June 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1542 (six month duration)
SRSG	Edmond Mulet (Guatemala) SG letter of appointment 15 May 2006, effective 1 June 2006
First SRSG	Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)
Force commander	Lieutenant-General José Elito Siqueira Carvalho (Brazil) SG letter of appointment 18 January 2006 Entry on duty 20 January 2006
First force commander	Lieutenant-General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil)
Police commissioner	To be appointed



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, and S/RES/1702, DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

MINUSTAH Personnel: Since 2004



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, and A/60/646; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

MINUSTAH Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Brazil	1,212	—	4	1,216	Niger	—	—	29	29
Uruguay	1,141	—	7	1,148	Mali	—	—	25	25
Jordan	759	—	292	1,051	Chad	—	—	20	20
Sri Lanka	961	—	—	961	Turkey	—	—	10	10
Nepal	757	—	130	887	Zambia	—	—	9	9
Argentina	559	—	4	563	Russia	—	—	8	8
Chile	502	—	12	514	Benin	—	—	7	7
Pakistan	1	—	248	249	Egypt	—	—	7	7
Bolivia	218	—	—	218	Togo	—	—	5	5
Peru	210	—	—	210	Romania	—	—	4	4
Philippines	157	—	42	199	El Salvador	—	—	4	4
Nigeria	—	—	133	133	Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	3	3
Senegal	—	—	133	133	Paraguay	3	—	—	3
China	—	—	130	130	Vanuatu	—	—	3	3
Burkina Faso	—	—	87	87	Yemen	—	—	3	3
Guatemala	84	—	—	84	Mauritius	—	—	2	2
France	2	—	76	78	Sierra Leone	—	—	2	2
Canada	4	—	65	69	Colombia	—	—	2	2
Ecuador	67	—	—	67	Croatia	1	—	—	1
Guinea	—	—	65	65	Grenada	—	—	1	1
United States	3	—	48	51	Madagascar	—	—	1	1
Spain	—	—	42	42	Morocco	1	—	—	1
Cameroon	—	—	37	37	Total	6,642	—	1,700	8,342

Sources: DPKO FGS, DPKO PD.

Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Jordan (289), Nepal (124), Nigeria (125), Pakistan (249), and Senegal (84).

MINUSTAH Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
2	Aviation Units	Argentina, Chile
2	Engineering Companies	Brazil, Chile-Ecuador Composite
1	Headquarters Company	Philippines
8	Infantry Battalions	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jordan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uruguay (2)
2	Infantry Companies	Bolivia, Peru
1	Level II Medical Unit	Argentina
1	Military Police Unit	Guatemala

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and staff officers not included.

**MINUSTAH International Civilian Personnel Occupations:
30 September 2006**

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	64	15.3%
Aviation	11	2.6%
Civil Affairs	34	8.2%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	20	4.8%
Finance	19	4.6%
Human Resources	19	4.6%
Human Rights	16	3.8%
Humanitarian Affairs	6	1.4%
Information Management	1	0.2%
Information Systems and Technology	24	5.8%
Legal Affairs	4	1.0%
Logistics	64	15.3%
Medical Services	2	0.5%
Political Affairs	22	5.3%
Procurement	9	2.2%
Program Management	2	0.5%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	13	3.1%
Rule of Law	7	1.7%
Security	58	13.9%
Social Affairs	4	1.0%
Transport	18	4.3%
Total	417	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

MINUSTAH Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	6,550	92	98.6%	1.4%
Military Observers	—	—	—	—
Police	1,540	62	96.1%	3.9%
International Civilian Staff	284	133	68.1%	31.9%
Local Civilian Staff	410	119	77.5%	22.5%
Total	8,784	406	95.6%	4.4%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

MINUSTAH Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type							
Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	9	—	3	1	—	—	13
January–March	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
April–June	2	—	1	—	—	—	3
July–September	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
October–December	3	—	2	—	—	—	5
2006 (Jan–Sep)	3	—	—	1	1	—	5
January–March	3	—	—	1	—	—	4
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Total Fatalities	12	—	3	2	1	—	18

Incident Type						
Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	6	3	3	1	—	13
January–March	2	1	1	—	—	4
April–June	1	—	2	—	—	3
July–September	—	1	—	—	—	1
October–December	3	1	—	1	—	5
2006 (Jan–Sep)	3	—	1	1	—	5
January–March	2	—	1	1	—	4
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	9	3	4	2	—	18

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

MINUSTAH Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	12	4x4 Vehicles	721
Combat Vehicles	211	Airfield Support Equipment	1
Engineering Vehicles	91	Ambulances	4
Material Handling Equipment	25	Buses	55
Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern)	470	Engineering Vehicle	1
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	495	Material Handling Equipment	20
Trailers	333	Trucks	66
Total	1,637	Total	868

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

MINUSTAH Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	1	2	—
Contingent owned		6 (2 Argentina, 4 Chile)	
Total	1	8	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

MINUSTAH Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	—	—	—
Military contingents	198,790.0	172,391.3	191,211.9
Civilian police	46,231.6	39,490.4	47,836.6
Formed police units	29,776.3	26,525.5	26,967.7
International staff	69,694.2	69,756.4	77,031.1
Local staff	11,924.3	11,017.7	15,500.2
United Nations Volunteers	7,420.8	8,045.7	7,457.3
General temporary assistance	2,434.6	1,042.6	2,493.6
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	283.2	384.6	84.5
Official travel	1,290.0	1,807.9	969.5
Facilities and infrastructure	74,652.1	77,537.3	43,087.4
Ground transportation	8,817.1	9,664.4	8,563.2
Air transportation	20,853.9	18,611.9	25,378.4
Naval transportation	205.2	231.7	192.0
Communications and IT	24,377.9	24,796.4	25,108.9
Supplies, services, and equipment	18,279.7	15,385.7	15,294.8
Quick-impact projects	1,457.6	1,455.9	2,030.0
Gross requirements	516,488.5	478,145.4	489,207.1
Staff assessment income	10,235.2	8,620.3	9,398.7
Net requirements	506,253.3	469,525.1	479,808.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	516,488.5	478,145.4	489,207.1

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

MINUSTAH Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	30,153.5
Self-sustainment	31,277.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

MINUSTAH Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

MINUSTAH Mission Expenditures: May 2004–June 2005
(in thousands of US dollars)

Category	May 04–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	7,159.3	192,850.1
Civilian personnel	1,246.5	56,050.5
Operational requirements	26,150.3	128,334.7
Gross requirements	34,556.1	377,235.3
Staff assessment income	60.7	5,347.3
Net requirements	34,495.4	371,888.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—
Total requirements	34,556.1	377,235.3



Source: UN Documents A/59/745 and A/60/646.

7.3 MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

MONUC Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	<p>29 September 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1711 (four-and-one-half month duration)</p> <p>30 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1693 (three month extension of temporary strength increase)</p> <p>30 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1692 (three month extension of partial ONUB redeployment to MONUC)</p> <p>25 April 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1671 (authorization for Eufor R.D Congo support for MONUC)</p> <p>10 April 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1669 (3 month authorization to partially redeploy ONUB to MONUC)</p> <p>21 December 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1650 (authorization for temporary redeployment of personnel among ONUB and MONUC staff)</p> <p>28 October 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1635 (eleven month duration)</p> <p>30 September 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1628 (one month duration)</p> <p>6 September 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1621 (ten month authorization to increase strength)</p>
First mandate	<p>30 November 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1279 (three month duration)</p>
SRSG	<p>William Lacy Swing (United States) SG letter of appointment 16 May 2003, effective 1 July 2003</p>
First SRSG	Kamel Morjane (Tunisia)
Force commander	<p>Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) SG letter of appointment 4 March 2005 Entry on duty 23 March 2005</p>
First force commander	Major-General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal)
Police commissioner	<p>Commissioner Daniel Cure (France) Date of appointment 1 January 2005</p>



MONUC Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1258, S/RES/1279, S/RES/1291, S/RES/1355, S/RES/1445, S/RES/1493, S/RES/1565, S/RES/1621, S/RES/1635, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Actual troop and military observer figures include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC. The authorized strength for these personnel remains unaffected, as ONUB military personnel in MONUC remain under the authorized strength for ONUB. For Security Council authorization to redeploy a one infantry battalion, a military hospital and 50 military observers from ONUB to MONUC, see S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

MONUC Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, A/60/669, S/RES/1258, S/RES/1279, S/RES/1291, S/RES/1355, S/RES/1445, S/RES/1493, S/RES/1565, S/RES/1621, S/RES/1635, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Actual troop and military observer figures include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC. The authorized strength for these personnel remains unaffected, as ONUB military personnel in MONUC remain under the authorized strength for ONUB.

MONUC Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
India	3,517	49	250	3,816	Malaysia	—	16	—	16
Pakistan	3,563	47	—	3,610	Ukraine	—	13	3	16
Bangladesh	1,333	24	250	1,607	France	—	6	9	15
Uruguay	1,323	44	—	1,367	Turkey	—	—	12	12
South Africa	1,186	26	—	1,212	Belgium	—	9	—	9
Nepal	1,032	20	—	1,052	Canada	—	9	—	9
Morocco	807	4	—	811	Sweden	—	5	3	8
Benin	751	18	8	777	Central African Republic	—	—	7	7
Senegal	459	25	290	774	Madagascar	—	—	7	7
Tunisia	464	25	—	489	Serbia and Montenegro	6	—	—	6
Ghana	462	22	—	484	United Kingdom	—	6	—	6
China	218	12	—	230	Algeria	—	5	—	5
Bolivia	200	4	—	204	Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	5	—	5
Indonesia	175	14	—	189	Netherlands	—	5	—	5
Malawi	110	25	—	135	Peru	—	4	—	4
Guatemala	105	6	—	111	Sri Lanka	—	4	—	4
Burkina Faso	—	12	76	88	Ireland	—	3	—	3
Niger	—	19	41	60	Poland	—	3	—	3
Guinea	—	—	52	52	Mozambique	—	2	—	2
Cameroon	—	3	48	51	Argentina	—	—	2	2
Mali	—	26	19	45	Chad	—	—	2	2
Egypt	—	24	13	37	Denmark	—	2	—	2
Kenya	—	32	4	36	Mongolia	—	2	—	2
Jordan	—	26	3	29	Spain	—	2	—	2
Russia	—	23	3	26	Switzerland	—	2	—	2
Zambia	—	25	—	25	Vanuatu	—	—	2	2
Romania	—	22	1	23	Côte d'Ivoire	—	—	1	1
Nigeria	—	22	—	22	Czech Republic	—	1	—	1
Paraguay	—	18	—	18	Yemen	—	—	1	1
Total						15,711	721	1,107	17,539

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Notes: Police figures include formed police provided by Bangladesh (250), India (250) and Senegal (249). See table below for ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

ONUB Military and Police Contributors Deployed to MONUC: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
India	850	—	—	850	Mozambique	—	2	—	2
Jordan	66	2	—	68	Paraguay	—	2	—	2
Mali	—	5	—	5	Romania	—	2	—	2
Bolivia	—	3	—	3	South Africa	—	2	—	2
Guatemala	—	3	—	3	Uruguay	—	2	—	2
Peru	—	3	—	3	Burkina Faso	—	1	—	1
Tunisia	—	3	—	3	Kenya	—	1	—	1
Bangladesh	—	2	—	2	Niger	—	1	—	1
Benin	—	2	—	2	Togo	—	1	—	1
China	—	2	—	2	Zambia	—	1	—	1
Guinea	—	2	—	2	Total	916	42	—	958

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

MONUC Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Air Cargo Handling Team	South Africa
4	Air Medical Evacuation Teams	Morocco, Pakistan, Serbia, South Africa,
1	Airfield Crash Rescue Team	South Africa
3	Airfield Service Units	Bangladesh, India, Uruguay
5	Engineering Companies	China, Indonesia, Nepal, South Africa, Uruguay
3	Headquarters Support and Signal Company	Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
7	Helicopter Units	Bangladesh, India (5), South Africa
16	Infantry Battalions	Bangladesh, Benin, Ghana, India (3), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan (4), Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay
2	Infantry Guard Companies	Bolivia, Malawi
2	Level II Medical Units	China, Morocco
1 partial	Level III Medical Unit	India
2	Military Police Companies	Bangladesh, South Africa
2	Riverine Units	Uruguay (2)
1	Special Forces Company	Guatemala
1	Water Treatment Plant	Uruguay

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff, staff officers, military observers, and Level I Medical Units not included.

ONUB Military Units Deployed in MONUC: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Infantry Battalion	India
1	Level II Medical Unit	Jordan

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

MONUC International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	126	13.1%
Aviation	57	5.9%
Civil Affairs	19	2.0%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	49	5.1%
Finance	34	3.5%
Human Resources	35	3.6%
Human Rights	30	3.1%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	79	8.2%
Legal Affairs	8	0.8%
Logistics	166	17.3%
Medical Services	13	1.4%
Political Affairs	123	12.8%
Procurement	20	2.1%
Program Management	17	1.8%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	44	4.6%
Rule of Law	9	0.9%
Security	90	9.4%
Social Affairs	14	1.5%
Transport	26	2.7%
Total	959	

Source: DPKO PM55.

MONUC Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	16,308	319	98.1%	1.9%
Military Observers	745	18	97.6%	2.4%
Police	1,042	79	93.0%	7.0%
International Civilian Staff	668	291	69.7%	30.3%
Local Civilian Staff	1,765	298	85.6%	14.4%
Total	20,528	1,005	95.3%	4.7%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

Note: Troop and military observer figures include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

MONUC Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
1999	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	4	1	—	1	2	—	8
2002	3	2	—	2	1	—	8
2003	8	3	—	3	—	—	14
2004	18	2	—	—	2	—	22
2005	20	—	1	2	2	—	25
January-March	10	—	—	—	—	—	10
April-June	6	—	—	—	—	—	6
July-September	3	—	—	1	—	—	4
October-December	1	—	1	1	2	—	5
2006 (Jan-Sep)	15	2	1	1	2	—	21
January-March	8	—	—	—	—	—	8
April-June	5	1	—	—	1	—	7
July-September	2	1	1	1	1	—	6
Total Fatalities	68	10	2	9	9	—	98

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
1999	—	—	—	—	—	—
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	1	4	1	1	1	8
2002	—	5	3	—	—	8
2003	3	7	4	—	—	14
2004	3	8	11	—	—	22
2005	13	8	4	—	—	25
January-March	9	1	—	—	—	10
April-June	3	1	2	—	—	6
July-September	—	2	2	—	—	4
October-December	1	4	—	—	1	6
2006 (Jan-Sep)	9	10	1	—	1	21
January-March	8	—	—	—	—	8
April-June	1	4	1	—	1	7
July-September	—	6	—	—	—	6
Total Fatalities	29	42	24	1	2	98

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

MONUC Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	77	4x4 Vehicles	1,348
Combat Vehicles	333	Airfield Support Equipment	183
Communications Vehicles	6	Ambulances	24
Engineering Vehicles	178	Automobiles	3
Material Handling Equipment	50	Buses	414
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	305	Engineering Vehicles	16
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	1,505	Material Handling Equipment	105
Trailers	501	Trucks	263
Naval Vessels	22		
Total	2,977	Total	2,356

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

MONUC Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	27	40	—
Contingent owned	—	22 (5 Bangladesh, 15 India, 2 South Africa)	8 (India)
Total	27	62	8

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

MONUC Budget and Expenditures: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	40,695.2	42,456.7	43,874.0
Military contingents	371,785.5	369,763.9	382,578.9
Civilian police	17,625.6	16,638.8	21,173.8
Formed police units	14,715.0	19,683.7	18,199.0
International staff	132,703.1	121,605.4	140,784.5
Local staff	19,351.0	18,368.7	29,440.1
United Nations Volunteers	24,832.8	23,080.4	19,691.7
General temporary assistance	10,623.5	7,174.3	2,102.0
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	196.1	219.6	317.2
Official travel	5,884.4	7,144.0	4,056.9
Facilities and infrastructure	103,558.0	105,738.5	93,058.8
Ground transportation	26,835.4	24,152.5	17,165.1
Air transportation	285,256.7	224,411.4	244,775.9
Naval transportation	2,570.4	2,359.8	2,729.0
Communications and IT	42,247.6	37,761.6	36,310.1
Supplies, services, and equipment	33,791.9	33,304.5	33,985.8
Quick-impact projects	1,000.0	999.0	1,000.0
Gross requirements	1,133,672.2	1,054,862.7	1,091,242.8
Staff assessment income	21,251.4	17,031.7	18,760.0
Net requirements	1,112,420.8	1,037,831.0	1,072,482.8
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	3,203.0	3,237.5	3,005.1
Total requirements	1,136,875.2	1,058,100.2	1,094,247.9

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

**MONUC Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)**

Major equipment	71,497.6
Self-sustainment	65,742.3

Source: DPKO FMSS.

MONUC Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
Fondation Hironnelle	3,237	—	—	3,237
Total	3,237	—	—	3,237

Source: DM OPPBA.

MONUC Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005
(in thousands of US dollars)


Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	29,656.1	97,177.0	156,973.6	262,734.7	379,763.4
Civilian personnel	28,080.0	68,491.0	93,521.5	112,562.7	140,862.5
Operational requirements	185,247.6	223,159.0	229,456.9	261,188.0	380,258.6
Other	474.6	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	243,458.3	388,827.0	479,952.0	636,485.4	900,884.5
Staff assessment income	3,013.7	6,777.6	10,037.6	12,114.2	14,882.7
Net requirements	240,444.6	382,049.4	469,914.4	624,371.2	886,001.8
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	1,780.2	2,345.8	3,112.6
Total requirements	243,458.3	388,827.0	481,732.2	638,831.2	903,997.1

Source: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, and A/60/669.

ONUB Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	<p>25 October 2006 (date of issue), 1 January 2007 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1719 (on the establishment of BINUB following the withdrawal of ONUB)</p> <p>30 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1692 (six month duration and three month extension of partial ONUB redeployment to MONUC)</p> <p>10 April 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1669 (three month authorization to partially redeploy ONUB to MONUC)</p> <p>21 December 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1650 (six month, ten day duration and authorization for temporary redeployment of ONUB personnel to MONUC)</p> <p>30 November 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1641 (one and one half month duration)</p>
First mandate	<p>21 May 2004 (date of issue), 1 June 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1545 (six month duration)</p>
Acting SRSG	<p>Nureldin Satti (Sudan) Date of appointment 1 April 2006</p>
First SRSG	Carolyn McAskie (Canada)
Force commander	<p>Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi (first force commander, South Africa) Entry on duty 1 June 2004</p>
Police commissioner	<p>Commissioner Ibrahima Diallo (Mali) Date of appointment 26 June 2004</p>



ONUB Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents: S/RES/1545, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Actual troop and military observer figures do not include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC. The authorized strength for these personnel remains unaffected, as ONUB military personnel in MONUC remain under the authorized strength for ONUB. For Security Council authorization to redeploy a one infantry battalion, a military hospital and 50 military observers from ONUB to MONUC, see S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711

ONUB Personnel: Since 2004



Sources: UN Documents: S/RES/1545, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, S/RES/1711, A/59/748, and A/60/612; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Actual troop and military observer figures do not include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC. The authorized strength for these personnel remains unaffected, as ONUB military personnel in MONUC remain under the authorized strength for ONUB. For Security Council authorization to redeploy a one infantry battalion, a military hospital and 50 military observers from ONUB to MONUC, see S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711

ONUB Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Nepal	932	2	—	934	India	—	3	—	3
South Africa	867	3	—	870	Yemen	—	3	—	3
Kenya	192	1	—	193	Cameroon	—	—	2	2
Thailand	177	3	—	180	Egypt	—	2	—	2
Pakistan	166	4	—	170	Ghana	—	2	—	2
Ethiopia	9	2	—	11	Malawi	—	2	—	2
Mali	—	7	4	11	Philippines	—	2	—	2
Tunisia	1	8	—	9	Republic of Korea	—	2	—	2
Burkina Faso	—	6	2	8	Algeria	—	1	—	1
Chad	—	8	—	8	Belgium	1	—	—	1
Senegal	4	3	—	7	Benin	—	—	1	1
Togo	1	6	—	7	Gambia	—	1	—	1
Nigeria	1	5	—	6	Guatemala	1	—	—	1
Niger	—	1	4	5	Madagascar	—	—	1	1
Russia	—	5	—	5	Namibia	—	1	—	1
Jordan	1	3	—	4	Portugal	—	1	—	1
				Total		2,353	87	14	2,454

Sources: DPKO FGS, DPKO PD.

Note: Troop and military observer figures do not include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

ONUB Military and Police Contributors Deployed to MONUC: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
India	850	—	—	850	Mozambique	—	2	—	2
Jordan	66	2	—	68	Paraguay	—	2	—	2
Mali	—	5	—	5	Romania	—	2	—	2
Bolivia	—	3	—	3	South Africa	—	2	—	2
Guatemala	—	3	—	3	Uruguay	—	2	—	2
Peru	—	3	—	3	Burkina Faso	—	1	—	1
Tunisia	—	3	—	3	Kenya	—	1	—	1
Bangladesh	—	2	—	2	Niger	—	1	—	1
Benin	—	2	—	2	Togo	—	1	—	1
China	—	2	—	2	Zambia	—	1	—	1
Guinea	—	2	—	2	Total	916	42	—	958

Sources: DPKO FGS.

Note: ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711.

ONUB Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Aviation Unit	Pakistan
1	Engineering Company	Thailand
1	Headquarters Company	Kenya
2	Infantry Battalions	Nepal, South Africa
1	Level II Medical Unit	Pakistan
1	Maritime Unit	South Africa
1	Military Police Unit	Kenya
1	Special Forces Company	Nepal

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

ONUB Military Units Deployed to MONUC: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Infantry Battalion	India
1	Level II Medical Unit	Jordan

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

ONUB International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	43	16.4%
Aviation	3	1.1%
Civil Affairs	3	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	16	6.1%
Finance	12	4.6%
Human Resources	10	3.8%
Human Rights	16	6.1%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	17	6.5%
Legal Affairs	1	0.4%
Logistics	42	16.0%
Medical Services	3	1.1%
Political Affairs	13	5.0%
Procurement	5	1.9%
Program Management	5	1.9%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	7	2.7%
Rule of Law	2	0.8%
Security	42	16.0%
Social Affairs	4	1.5%
Transport	18	6.9%
Total	262	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

ONUB Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	2,213	140	94.1%	5.9%
Military Observers	85	2	97.7%	2.3%
Police	10	4	71.4%	28.6%
International Civilian Staff	175	87	66.8%	33.2%
Local Civilian Staff	237	90	72.5%	27.5%
Total	2,720	323	89.4%	10.6%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

Note: Troop and military observer figures do not include ONUB personnel temporarily redeployed to MONUC as per S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, and S/RES/1711

ONUB Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
2004	5	—	—	1	—	—	6
2005	14	—	1	—	1	—	16
January-March	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
April-June	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
July-September	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
October-December	5	—	1	—	1	—	7
2006 (Jan-Sep)	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	20	—	1	1	1	—	23

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
2004	—	4	2	—	—	6
2005	2	4	8	—	2	16
January-March	—	1	2	—	—	3
April-June	2	1	1	—	—	4
July-September	—	1	—	—	1	2
October-December	—	1	5	—	1	7
2006 (Jan-Sep)	1	—	—	—	—	1
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	3	8	10	—	2	23

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

ONUB Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	2	4x4 Vehicles	429
Combat Vehicles	66	Ambulances	4
Communications Vehicles	5	Automobiles	5
Engineering Vehicles	24	Buses	53
Material Handling Equipment	5	Engineering Vehicles	2
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	109	Material Handling Equipment	16
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	260	Trucks	53
Trailers	116		
Naval Vessels	4		
Total	591	Total	562

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

ONUB Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	4 (Pakistan)	—
Total	—	4	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

ONUB Budget and Expenditures: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	9,969.8	8,640.4	1,316.3
Military contingents	127,007.8	108,637.4	38,833.0
Civilian police	5,981.9	3,248.4	265.3
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	57,811.6	47,553.5	17,740.1
Local staff	8,084.5	6,170.4	2,394.4
United Nations Volunteers	5,005.1	5,913.4	1,789.9
General temporary assistance	1,361.9	952.2	268.3
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	167.2	107.3	112.0
Official travel	1,333.0	1,794.4	365.0
Facilities and infrastructure	33,402.9	27,764.0	7,598.1
Ground transportation	4,683.5	4,096.9	1,102.7
Air transportation	15,370.2	5,317.6	1,704.5
Naval transportation	824.1	126.4	36.6
Communications and IT	11,539.9	8,252.4	2,649.7
Supplies, services, and equipment	8,729.0	9,395.1	2,783.3
Quick-impact projects	1,000.0	977.0	—
Gross requirements	292,272.4	238,946.7	78,959.2
Staff assessment income	8,297.1	5,929.3	2,092.5
Net requirements	283,975.3	233,017.4	76,866.7
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	292,272.4	238,946.7	78,959.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

**ONUB Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)**

Major equipment	14,093.2
Self-sustainment	19,513.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

ONUB Voluntary Contributions: July 2006–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

ONUB Mission Expenditures: April 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Apr 04–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	11,696.8	129,209.2
Civilian personnel	1,316.6	49,129.3
Operational requirements	27,232.7	125,455.8
Gross requirements	40,246.1	303,794.3
Staff assessment income	115.5	4,850.1
Net requirements	40,130.6	298,944.2
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—
Total requirements	40,246.1	303,794.3

Source: UN Documents A/59/748 and A/60/612.



7.5

UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)

UNAMA Key Facts



Latest key resolutions	23 March 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1662 (twelve month duration)
First mandate	28 March 2002 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1401 (twelve month duration)
SRSB	Tom Koenigs (Germany) SG letter of appointment 16 December 2006 effective 16 February 2006
First SRSB	Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)
Senior Military Advisor	Brigadier Philip Jones (United Kingdom) Entry on duty 6 July 2006
Senior Police Advisor	Roberto Bernal (Philippines) Appointment 20 December 2005

UNAMA Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNAMA Personnel: Since 2002



Sources: UN Documents: A/C.5/56/25/Add.4, A/C.5/57/23, A/C.5/58/20, and A/59/534/Add. 1; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNAMA Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Bangladesh	—	2	—	2
Australia	—	1	—	1
Austria	—	1	—	1
Denmark	—	1	—	1
Germany	—	1	—	1
Nepal	—	—	1	1
New Zealand	—	1	—	1
Nigeria	—	—	1	1
Philippines	—	—	1	1
Poland	—	1	—	1
Republic of Korea	—	1	—	1
Romania	—	1	—	1
Uruguay	—	1	—	1
Total	—	11	3	14

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNAMA International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	30	15.7%
Aviation	2	1.0%
Civil Affairs	4	2.1%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	2	1.0%
Finance	9	4.7%
Human Resources	6	3.1%
Human Rights	16	8.4%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	11	5.8%
Legal Affairs	3	1.6%
Logistics	7	3.7%
Medical Services	1	0.5%
Political Affairs	31	16.2%
Procurement	3	1.6%
Program Management	16	8.4%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	5	2.6%
Rule of Law	3	1.6%
Security	37	19.4%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	5	2.6%
Total	191	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNAMA Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Advisors/Liaison Officers	11	—	100.0%	—
Police	3	—	100.0%	—
International Civilian Staff	137	54	71.7%	28.3%
Local Civilian Staff	722	47	93.9%	6.1%
Total	873	101	89.6%	10.4%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNAMA Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
2002	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2003	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2004	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
2005	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	—	—	—	—	4	—	4

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
2002	—	—	1	—	—	1
2003	—	1	—	—	—	1
2004	—	2	—	—	—	2
2005	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	—	3	1	—	—	4

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNAMA Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	196
Ambulances	26
Automobiles	11
Buses	74
Material Handling Equipment	8
Oversnows	4
Trucks	17
Total	336

UNAMA Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	3	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	3	—	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNAMA Budget: January–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Appropriations 2006
Military observers	567.2
Military contingents	—
Civilian police	201.4
Formed police units	—
International staff	27,375.3
Local staff	11,947.6
United Nations Volunteers	1,327.7
General temporary assistance	—
Government-provided personnel	—
Civilian electoral observers	—
Consultants	60.5
Official travel	679.1
Facilities and infrastructure	6,983.8
Ground transportation	4,059.6
Air transportation	8,235.0
Naval transportation	—
Communications and IT	4,547.5
Supplies, services, and equipment	1,568.4
Information and training programs	808.0
Gross requirements	68,361.1
Staff assessment income	6,232.7
Net requirements	62,128.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—
Total requirements	68,361.1

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNAMA Mission Expenditures: April 2002–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Apr 2002–Dec 2003	Jan 2004–Dec 2005
Military observers	298.8	742.6
Police	206.0	78.2
Posts	39,022.2	62,875.4
United Nations Volunteers	1,474.7	2,976.4
Consultants	893.0	372.5
Official travel	1,561.6	1,136.8
Facilities and infrastructure	9,606.4	9,607.0
Ground transportation	4,143.0	8,112.9
Air transportation	9,340.4	12,379.1
Communications	4,549.3	3,365.4
Information technology	3,546.6	1,853.6
Medical	160.4	256.2
Other supplies, services and equipment	5,047.6	2,468.2
Public information program	210.4	198.5
Training	—	981.5
Total	80,060.5	107,404.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.


7.6

UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq)

UNAMI Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	10 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1700 (twelve month duration) 11 August 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1619 (twelve month duration)
First mandate	14 August 2003 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1500 (twelve month duration)
SRSB	Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) SG letter of appointment 2 July 2004
First SRSB	Sergio Vieira de Mello
Senior Military Advisor	Colonel Peter Jeffrey (Australia) Date of appointment 7 July 2006

UNAMI Personnel: January–September 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNAMI.

UNAMI Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2005

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Fiji	223	—	—	223
Denmark	—	7	—	7
Australia	—	1	—	1
Canada	—	1	—	1
New Zealand	—	1	—	1
United Kingdom	—	1	—	1
Total	223	11	—	234

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNAMI Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Country
3	Guard Units	Fiji

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

UNAMI International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	26	11.4%
Aviation	1	0.4%
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	10	4.4%
Finance	11	4.8%
Human Resources	12	5.3%
Human Rights	6	2.6%
Humanitarian Affairs	6	2.6%
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	14	6.1%
Legal Affairs	7	3.1%
Logistics	20	8.8%
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	21	9.2%
Procurement	6	2.6%
Program Management	3	1.3%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	3	1.3%
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	79	34.6%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	3	1.3%
Total	228	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNAMI Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	209	14	93.7%	6.3%
Military Observers	11	—	100.0%	—
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	189	39	82.9%	17.1%
Local Civilian Staff	259	93	73.6%	26.4%
Total	668	146	82.1%	17.9%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNAMI.

UNAMI/UNOHCI Fatalities: January 2003–September 2006

Personnel Type							
Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
2003	—	—	—	11	8	5	24
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
January–March	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
2006 (Jan–Sep)	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
January–March	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Total Fatalities	1	—	—	13	9	5	28

Incident Type						
Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
2003	23	1	—	—	—	24
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	1	—	1	—	2
January–March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	1	—	1
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	2	—	—	—	2
January–March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	1	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	23	4	—	1	—	28

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: UNAMI was incepted in August 2003. Prior to this, the UNOHCI (United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq) was the lead UN presence in Iraq.

a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNAMI Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Support Vehicle (Commercial Pattern)	1	4x4 Vehicles	165
		Airfield Support Equipment	1
		Ambulances	3
		Automobiles	3
		Buses	12
		Material Handling Equipment	4
		Trucks	8
Total	1	Total	196

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNAMI Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNAMI Budget: January–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted 2006
Military staff	29,682.4
Police staff	—
International staff	68,953.5
Local staff	11,432.9
United Nations Volunteers	—
Operational costs	69,273.0
Information and training programs	291.5
Net requirements	173,376.3
Staff assessment	6,257.0
Gross requirements	179,633.3
Total requirements	179,633.3

Source: UNAMI.

UNAMI Mission Expenditures: August 2003–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)


Category	Aug-Dec 2003	Jan-Dec 2004	Jan-Dec 2005
Military observers	—	75.3	320.3
Police	—	—	—
Posts	—	551.0	816.0
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	170.8	804.3
Official travel	146.6	931.2	1,332.7
Facilities and infrastructure	1,416.4	6,670.2	44,582.3
Ground transportation	1,190.7	2,343.4	7,983.1
Air transportation	216.0	1,129.4	262.7
Communications	310.5	2,297.1	9,317.6
Information technology	399.3	258.9	3,465.1
Medical	—	—	198.8
Other supplies, services, and equipment	1,539.2	1,557.7	2,435.7
Public information program	—	5.0	240.6
Training	—	—	298.9
Total	5,218.7	15,990.0	72,058.1

Source: UNAMI.

UNDOF Key Facts


Latest key resolutions	15 December 2006 (date of issue); 1 July 2006 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1729 (six month duration) 13 June 2006 (date of issue); 1 July 2006 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1685 (six month duration) 21 December 2005 (date of issue); 1 January 2006 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1648 (six month duration)
First mandate	31 May 1974 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 350 (six month duration)
Force commander and head of mission	Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal) SG letter of appointment 9 January 2004 Entry on duty 17 January 2004
First force commander	Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos (Peru)

UNDOF Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNDOF Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625, and A/60/628; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNDOF Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Austria	377	—	—	377
Poland	343	—	—	343
India	194	—	—	194
Slovakia	96	—	—	96
Japan	31	—	—	31
Canada	3	—	—	3
Nepal	3	—	—	3
Total	1,047	—	—	1,047

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNDOF Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
2	Infantry Battalions	Australia-Slovakia Composite, Poland
1	Logistics Battalion	India-Japan Composite

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff not included.

UNDOF International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	7	19.4%
Aviation	—	—
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	3	8.3%
Finance	3	8.3%
Human Resources	2	5.6%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	2.8%
Information Systems and Technology	11	30.6%
Legal Affairs	—	—
Logistics	1	2.8%
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	1	2.8%
Procurement	3	8.3%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	—	—
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	1	2.8%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	3	8.3%
Total	36	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNDOF Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	1,030	17	98.4%	1.6%
Military Observers	—	—	—	—
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	28	8	77.8%	22.2%
Local Civilian Staff	82	25	76.6%	23.4%
Total	1,140	50	95.8%	4.2%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNDOF Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
1974–1999	38	—	—	1	—	—	39
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
October–December	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
2006	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
January–March	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	41	—	—	1	—	—	42

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
1974–1999	7	6	19	7	—	39
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	—	—	2	—	2
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	1	—	1
October–December	—	—	—	1	—	1
2006	—	—	—	1	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	1	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	7	6	19	10	—	42

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNDOF Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Engineering Vehicle	1	4x4 Vehicles	232
Excavator	1	Ambulances	9
Material Handling Equipment	1	Armored Personnel Carriers	18
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	5	Automobile	1
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	5	Buses	53
Trailer	1	Engineering Vehicles	9
		Material Handling Equipment	10
		Oversnows	3
		Trucks	67
Total	14	Total	402

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNDOF Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNDOF Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	—	—	—
Military contingents	20,137.7	20,223.8	19,941.6
Civilian police	—	—	—
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	6,169.1	5,696.7	6,377.7
Local staff	2,207.9	2,170.8	2,119.0
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—
General temporary assistance	40.0	361.7	40.0
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	75.4	14.0
Official travel	229.6	282.2	227.0
Facilities and infrastructure	5,684.2	5,599.4	4,094.7
Ground transportation	3,380.5	2,440.3	3,954.2
Air transportation	—	—	—
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	2,374.7	2,092.7	2,054.3
Supplies, services, and equipment	1,297.7	1,173.8	1,042.7
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	41,521.4	40,116.8	39,865.2
Staff assessment income	1,142.4	1,093.1	1,066.6
Net requirements	40,379.0	39,023.7	38,798.6
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	41,521.4	40,116.8	39,865.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–July 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNDOF Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	289.2
Self-sustainment	490.6

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNDOF Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNDOF Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	19,335.2	16,959.4	19,309.3	18,745.6	19,397.8
Civilian personnel	5,088.0	6,348.7	6,892.7	7,597.2	7,166.1
Operational requirements	9,046.8	11,114.8	12,773.7	13,401.0	14,256.0
Other	1,798.7	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	35,268.7	34,422.9	38,975.7	39,743.8	40,819.9
Staff assessment income	1,131.6	958.2	1,006.4	1,087.2	1,073.9
Net requirements	34,137.1	33,464.7	37,969.3	38,656.6	39,746.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	35,268.7	34,422.9	38,975.7	39,743.8	40,819.9

Sources: UN Documents: A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625, A/60/628.


7.8 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)

UNFICYP Key Facts	
Latest key resolutions	15 December 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 1728 (six month duration) 15 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 1687 (six month duration) 14 December 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 1642 (six month duration)
First mandate	4 March 1964 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 186 (three month duration)
SRSg	Michael Møller (Denmark) SG letter of appointment 12 September 2005, effective 1 December 2006
First SRSg	Carlos Alfredo Bernardes (Brazil)
Force commander	Major General Rafael José Barni (Argentina) SG letter of appointment 6 February 2006 Entry on duty 5 March 2006
First force commander	Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani (India)
Senior police advisor	Carla Van Maris (Netherlands) Date of appointment 18 September 2004

UNFICYP Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1486, S/RES/1586, and S/2004/756; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.



Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, A/60/584, S/RES/1486, S/RES/1586, and S/2004/756; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNFICYP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Argentina	299	—	3	302
United Kingdom	264	—	—	264
Slovakia	196	—	—	196
Hungary	84	—	—	84
Ireland	—	—	18	18
Australia	—	—	15	15
El Salvador	—	—	8	8
Netherlands	—	—	8	8
Croatia	4	—	2	6
India	—	—	5	5
Austria	4	—	—	4
Italy	—	—	4	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	2	2
Total	851	—	65	916

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNFICYP Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Aviation Unit	Argentina
1	Force Engineering Unit	Slovakia
1	Force Military Police Unit	Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-United Kingdom Composite
3	Infantry Units	Argentina, Hungary-Slovakia Composite, United Kingdom
1	Mobile Force Reserve Unit	Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-United Kingdom Composite

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and staff officers not included.

UNFICYP International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	7	18.4%
Aviation	—	—
Civil Affairs	3	7.9%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	2	5.3%
Finance	2	5.3%
Human Resources	2	5.3%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	2.6%
Information Systems and Technology	5	13.2%
Legal Affairs	—	—
Logistics	3	7.9%
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	6	15.8%
Procurement	1	2.6%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	2	5.3%
Rule of Law	1	2.6%
Security	2	5.3%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	1	2.6%
Total	38	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNFICYP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	798	53	93.8%	6.2%
Military Observers	—	—	—	—
Police	62	4	93.9%	6.1%
International Civilian Staff	27	11	71.1%	28.9%
Local Civilian Staff	63	45	58.3%	41.7%
Total	950	113	89.4%	10.6%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNFICYP Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
1963–1998	163	—	3	3	—	—	169
2000	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
2004	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
2005	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	167	—	3	4	2	—	176

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
1963–1998	15	41	91	20	2	169
2000	—	—	—	—	1	1
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	2	—	—	2
2004	—	—	2	—	—	2
2005	—	1	—	—	—	1
January–March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	1	—	—	—	1
January–March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	15	43	95	20	3	176

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNFICYP Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Combat Vehicles	9	4x4 Vehicles	9
Engineering Vehicles	4	Airfield Support Equipment	1
Material Handling Equipment	1	Ambulances	2
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	4	Bus	1
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	22	Engineering Vehicles	13
Trailers	6	Material Handling Equipment	8
		Trucks	27
Total	46	Total	61

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNFICYP Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	3 (Argentina)	—
Total	—	3	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNFICYP Budget and Expenditures: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	—	—	—
Military contingents	17,082.3	17,223.4	17,198.6
Civilian police	967.8	907.9	963.0
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	6,499.8	5,984.0	5,856.2
Local staff	6,078.9	6,244.3	5,844.3
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—
General temporary assistance	75.0	159.7	332.9
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	—	—
Official travel	154.6	161.0	145.1
Facilities and infrastructure	6,293.0	6,047.7	7,263.4
Ground transportation	3,313.1	3,259.5	3,240.9
Air transportation	1,587.1	1,597.5	1,567.2
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	1,460.3	1,472.1	1,496.2
Supplies, services, and equipment	672.4	769.5	923.6
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	44,184.3	43,826.6	44,831.4
Staff assessment income	2,112.1	2,001.0	1,818.5
Net requirements	42,072.2	41,825.6	43,012.9
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	1,431.2	1,278.4	1,439.0
Total requirements	45,615.5	45,105.0	46,270.4

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

**UNFICYP Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)**

Major equipment	1,349.2
Self-sustainment	164.1

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNFICYP Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
Cyprus	1,278	—	14,699	15,977
Greece	—	—	6,500	6,500
Total	1,278	—	21,199	22,477

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNFICYP Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	22,150.2	20,169.2	22,583.1	22,980.3	21,685.5
Civilian personnel	8,318.4	8,678.4	10,016.0	11,410.4	12,162.6
Operational requirements	7,887.2	11,440.8	11,045.0	11,073.5	14,777.0
Other	2,090.0	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	40,445.8	40,288.4	43,644.1	45,464.2	48,625.1
Staff assessment income	1,914.7	1,489.0	1,721.7	1,865.3	1,984.7
Net requirements	38,531.1	38,799.4	41,922.4	43,598.9	46,640.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	1,356.1	1,271.2	1,707.1	1,355.8
Total requirements	40,445.8	41,644.5	44,915.3	47,171.3	49,980.9

Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, and A/60/584.


7.9

UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)

UNIFIL Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	<p>11 August 2006 (date of issue and effect, and increase in number military personnel) UNSC Res. 1701 (one year and three weeks duration)</p> <p>31 July 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1697 (one month duration)</p> <p>31 January 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1655 (six month duration)</p> <p>29 July 2005 (date of issue), 1 August 2005 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1614 (six month duration)</p>
First mandate	<p>19 March 1978 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 425/426 (six month duration)</p>
Force commander and head of mission	<p>Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France) Entry on duty 18 February 2004</p>
First force commander	Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)



UNIFIL Mission Expansion Timeline




Sources: UN Document S/RES/1701; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

Notes: Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East published on 11 December 2006. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council published 1 December 2006 (factual update on the implementation of UNSC Res. 1701).

UNIFIL Personnel: July 2005–July 2006



Sources: UN Document S/RES/1701; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.



Sources: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, and A/60/629; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNIFIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
France	1,531	—	—	1,531
Italy	1,074	—	—	1,074
India	673	—	—	673
Ghana	652	—	—	652
Spain	614	—	—	614
Poland	247	—	—	247
China	187	—	—	187
Belgium	162	—	—	162
Ireland	5	—	—	5
Finland	1	—	—	1
Norway	1	—	—	1
Total	5,147	—	—	5,147

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNIFIL Military and Police Contributors: 31 October 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
France	1,653	—	—	1,653
Italy	1,512	—	—	1,512
Spain	1,393	—	—	1,393
Germany	933	—	—	933
India	671	—	—	671
Ghana	640	—	—	640
Turkey	495	—	—	495
Belgium	365	—	—	365
Poland	260	—	—	260
Greece	235	—	—	235
China	190	—	—	190
Bulgaria	130	—	—	130
Finland	73	—	—	73
Denmark	58	—	—	58
Nepal	45	—	—	45
Sweden	42	—	—	42
Ireland	41	—	—	41
Luxembourg	2	—	—	2
Portugal	2	—	—	2
Norway	1	—	—	1
Total	8,741	—	—	8,741

Source: DPKO FGS.

Notes: Total troops increased to 10,884 by 30 November 2006. Italy's contribution increased to 2,206 and Indonesia was a new troop contributor with 850 personnel.

UNIFIL Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
3	Engineering Companies	Belgium, China, France
1	Force Mobile Reserve	France
1	Headquarter Company	Italy
1	Helicopter Unit	Italy
6	Infantry Battalions	France, Ghana, India, Italy (2), Spain
1	Logistics Unit	Poland
1	Maintenance Company	Poland

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and staff officers not included. Two Luxembourg troops are part of the Belgian contingent. The United Kingdom provides one destroyer that is not part of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL Military Units: 31 October 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Aviation Unit	Italy
1	Communications Unit	Spain, Italy
5 + 1 (partial)	Engineering Companies	Belgium, China, Finland, France, Portugal (partial), Turkey
1	Engineering Unit	Italy
2	Headquarters Companies	Italy, Spain
2	Infantry Battalions	Ghana, India
1	Level II Hospital	Belgium
1	Logistics Unit	Poland
2 + 1 (partial)	Mechanized Battalions	France (2), Nepal (partial), Italy (2), Spain
3	Mechanized Companies	Ireland,
1	Military Police Unit	Italy
1	Signals Unit	Italy
1	Corvette Component	Sweden
9	Fast Patrol Boat Components	Denmark (2), Germany (4), Norway (3)
3	Frigate Components	Turkey, Germany, Greece
2	Supply Ship Components	Germany

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarter staff and staff officers not included.

UNIFIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	18	18.0%
Aviation	1	1.0%
Civil Affairs	1	1.0%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	11	11.0%
Finance	7	7.0%
Human Resources	7	7.0%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	14	14.0%
Legal Affairs	1	1.0%
Logistics	14	14.0%
Medical Services	1	1.0%
Political Affairs	2	2.0%
Procurement	8	8.0%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	1	1.0%
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	2	2.0%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	12	12.0%
Total	100	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNIFIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	5,083	64	98.8%	1.2%
Military Observers	—	—	—	—
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	78	22	78.0%	22.0%
Local Civilian Staff	253	52	83.0%	17.0%
Total	5,414	138	97.5%	2.5%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNIFIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
1978–1998	233	1	—	2	1	—	237
2000	6	—	—	—	—	—	6
2001	3	1	—	—	—	—	4
2002	3	—	—	—	3	—	6
2003	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
2004	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
2005	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	249	2	—	3	4	—	258

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
1978–1998	84	45	95	10	3	237
2000	1	—	5	—	—	6
2001	—	2	2	—	—	4
2002	—	3	3	—	—	6
2003	—	1	—	—	—	1
2004	—	—	3	—	—	3
2005	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	1	—	—	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	86	51	108	10	3	258

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNIFIL Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	7	4x4 Vehicles	369
Combat Vehicles	5	Airfield Support Equipment	1
Engineering Vehicles	10	Ambulances	19
Material Handling Equipment	1	Armoured Personnel Carriers	45
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	16	Automobiles	7
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	16	Buses	60
Trailers	4	Engineering Vehicles	17
		Material Handling Equipment	36
		Oversnows	2
		Truck	142
Total	59	Total	698

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section. 16 October 2006 UN press release.

Note: UNIFIL is also supported by a maritime task force of 19 ships.

UNIFIL Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	3	—
Contingent owned	—	4 (Italy)	—
Total	—	7	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNIFIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	—	—	—
Military contingents	39,143.2	40,777.8	57,390.6
Civilian police	—	—	—
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	18,143.0	16,244.1	15,531.9
Local staff	15,794.7	14,096.7	16,062.0
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—
General temporary assistance	48.0	20.6	7,207.7
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	—	—
Official travel	335.1	370.4	558.1
Facilities and infrastructure	9,178.7	8,811.3	17,616.1
Ground transportation	4,445.6	3,584.4	8,099.6
Air transportation	1,648.7	1,757.6	5,159.1
Naval transportation	—	—	1,600.0
Communications and IT	2,522.1	2,512.8	7,488.1
Supplies, services, and equipment	2,993.9	3,088.5	6,563.0
Quick-impact projects	—	—	250.0
Gross requirements	94,252.9	91,264.2	143,526.2
Staff assessment income	4,715.7	4,078.6	N/A
Net requirements	89,537.2	87,185.6	143,526.2
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	94,252.9	91,264.2	143,526.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: The July 2006–June 2007 budget includes the approved budget and the \$50 million in Commitment Authority for that period as of 31 October 2006. July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNIFIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	2,036.4
Self-sustainment	1,576.6

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNIFIL Voluntary Contributions: July 2006–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNIFIL Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	112,944.0	69,170.0	51,098.7	40,465.1	40,509.1
Civilian personnel	25,321.1	29,674.0	34,835.0	30,673.5	30,441.7
Operational requirements	33,855.3	32,067.0	21,663.0	18,757.4	18,293.3
Other	6,938.5	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	179,058.9	130,911.0	107,596.7	89,896.0	89,244.1
Staff assessment income	4,752.1	4,231.8	4,520.2	4,340.3	4,164.1
Net requirements	174,306.8	126,679.2	103,076.5	85,555.7	85,080.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	180.0	201.2	—	—	—
Total requirements	179,238.9	131,112.2	107,596.7	89,896.0	89,244.1

Source: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, and A/60/629.


UNIOSIL Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	31 August 2005 (date of issue), 1 January 2006 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1620 (twelve-month duration, first mandate)
ERSG	Victor da Silva Angelo (first ERSG, Portugal) SG letter of appointment 12 December 2005, effective 1 January 2006
Chief military liaison officer	Colonel Sven-Olof Broman (Sweden) Entry on duty 12 December 2005
Senior police advisor	Rudolfo Landeros (United States) Date of appointment 30 March 2006

UNIOSIL Personnel: January–September 2006





Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1620, S/2005/273/Add.2; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.




Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1270, S/RES/1289, S/RES/1299, and S/RES/1346; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL Personnel: Since 2000



continues

UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL Personnel: Since 2000 continued



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1270, S/RES/1289, S/RES/1299, S/RES/1346, A/56/833, A/57/680, A/58/660, A/59/635, and A/60/631; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Note: UNAMSIL personnel from July 2000–December 2005; UNOSIL personnel from January–July 2006.

UNIOSIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Nigeria	—	1	3	4
Sweden	—	1	3	4
Ghana	—	1	2	3
United Kingdom	—	1	2	3
Kenya	—	1	1	2
Nepal	—	1	1	2
Portugal	—	—	2	2
Bangladesh	—	1	—	1
Gambia	—	—	1	1
India	—	—	1	1
Malaysia	—	—	1	1
Norway	—	—	1	1
Pakistan	—	1	—	1
Russia	—	1	—	1
Turkey	—	—	1	1
Total	—	9	19	28

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNIOSIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	11	16.7%
Aviation	2	3.0%
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	1	1.5%
Engineering	2	3.0%
Finance	7	10.6%
Human Resources	3	4.5%
Human Rights	3	4.5%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	3	4.5%
Legal Affairs	1	1.5%
Logistics	8	12.1%
Medical Services	1	1.5%
Political Affairs	10	15.2%
Procurement	—	—
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	2	3.0%
Rule of Law	1	1.5%
Security	9	13.6%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	2	3.0%
Total	66	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNIOSIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	9	—	100.0%	—
Police	16	2	88.9%	11.1%
International Civilian Staff	45	21	68.2%	31.8%
Local Civilian Staff	142	42	77.2%	22.8%
Total	212	65	76.5%	23.5%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
1999	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2000	27	—	—	—	—	—	27
2001	36	2	—	—	—	2	40
2002	43	—	—	1	4	—	48
2003	31	—	—	1	6	—	38
2004	28	—	1	—	4	—	33
2005	4	—	—	—	2	—	6
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	3	—	—	—	2	—	5
July-September	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	1	—	—	1	—	2
January-March	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	169	3	1	2	17	2	194

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
1999	—	—	—	—	—	—
2000	13	9	2	1	2	27
2001	1	17	20	2	—	40
2002	3	22	21	1	1	48
2003	—	21	15	1	1	38
2004	—	11	20	1	1	33
2005	—	5	1	—	—	6
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	4	1	—	—	5
July-September	—	1	—	—	—	1
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	2	—	—	—	2
January-March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	1	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	17	87	79	6	5	194

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNIOSIL Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	81
Airfield Support	2
Ambulances	2
Automobiles	2
Buses	18
Material Handling Equipment	7
Trucks	27
Total	34

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNIOSIL Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	2	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	2	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNIOSIL Budget: January–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Authorized Requirements
Military observers	469.5
Military contingents	—
Civilian police	946.6
Formed police units	—
International Staff	8,618.0
Local Staff	1,048.8
United Nations Volunteers	1,230.0
General temporary assistance	—
Government-provided personnel	—
Civilian electoral observers	—
Consultants	61.7
Official Travel	366.4
Facilities and infrastructure	2,836.3
Ground transportation	758.4
Air transportation	3,892.5
Naval transportation	—
Communications and IT	2,094.8
Supplies, services, and equipment	953.0
Public information program	—
Total estimated requirements	23,276.0

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNAMSIL Budget and Financial Performance: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006
Military observers	3,250.6	2,190.6
Military contingents	31,832.3	30,854.6
Civilian police	1,562.9	1,153.7
Formed police units	—	—
International staff	24,290.3	22,681.4
Local staff	2,186.0	1,751.2
United Nations Volunteers	1,689.0	2,146.5
General temporary assistance	379.6	14.3
Government-provided personnel	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—
Consultants	77.3	74.5
Official travel	411.1	426.7
Facilities and infrastructure	9,488.9	5,711.0
Ground transportation	2,748.6	1,756.1
Air transportation	21,721.7	11,693.0
Naval transportation	—	—
Communications and IT	4,614.8	3,282.4
Supplies, services, and equipment	3,286.3	2,601.5
Quick-impact projects	—	—
Gross requirements	107,539.3	86,337.4
Staff assessment income	3,307.8	2,930.1
Net requirements	104,231.5	83,407.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—
Total requirements	107,539.3	86,337.4

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

**UNAMSIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)**

Major equipment	3,386.3
Self-sustainment	3,823.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNAMSIL Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNAMSIL Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	329,817.6	352,927.3	371,634.2	266,566.3	140,710.5
Civilian personnel	35,625.2	47,264.0	49,426.3	54,102.1	44,331.1
Operational requirements	124,031.8	217,455.1	182,025.0	128,066.0	79,484.2
Other	23,724.3	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	513,198.9	617,646.4	603,085.5	448,734.4	264,525.8
Staff assessment income	7,535.4	4,720.5	5,579.3	6,039.2	5,037.3
Net requirements	505,663.5	612,925.9	597,506.2	442,695.2	259,488.5
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	1,350.1	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	514,549.0	617,646.4	603,085.5	448,734.4	264,525.8

Source: UN Documents A/56/833, A/57/680, A/58/660, A/59/635, and A/60/631.


UNMEE Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	29 September 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1710 (four month duration) 31 May 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1681 (four month duration) 15 May 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1678 (two week duration) 13 April 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1670 (one month duration) 14 March 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1661 (one month duration) 13 September 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1622 (six month duration)
First mandate	31 July 2000 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1312 (six week duration)
Acting SRSG	Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia) Appointed Acting SRSG 1 May 2006
First SRSG	Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana)
Force commander	Major-General Mohammad Taisir Masadeh (Jordan) SG letter of appointment 7 April 2006, effective 9 April 2006
First force commander	Major-General Patrick Cammaert (Netherlands)

UNMEE Personnel: July 2005–June 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1320, S/RES/1622, and S/RES/1681; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1320, S/RES/1622, S/RES/1681, A/56/840, A/57/672, A/58/633, A/59/616, and A/60/615; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMEE Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
India	985	8	—	993	Poland	—	5	—	5
Jordan	841	8	—	849	South Africa	—	5	—	5
Kenya	179	11	—	190	Croatia	—	4	—	4
Uruguay	36	5	—	41	Denmark	—	4	—	4
Ghana	4	10	—	14	Norway	—	4	—	4
Zambia	3	10	—	13	Paraguay	—	4	—	4
Bangladesh	5	7	—	12	Peru	—	4	—	4
Malaysia	3	7	—	10	Spain	—	4	—	4
Tanzania	2	8	—	10	Greece	—	3	—	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	9	—	9	Guatemala	—	3	—	3
Algeria	—	8	—	8	Iran	—	3	—	3
Romania	—	8	—	8	Russia	—	3	—	3
Tunisia	3	5	—	8	Sweden	—	3	—	3
China	—	7	—	7	Switzerland	—	3	—	3
Nigeria	1	6	—	7	Austria	—	2	—	2
Ukraine	—	7	—	7	Czech Republic	—	2	—	2
United States of America	—	7	—	7	Germany	—	2	—	2
Bulgaria	—	5	—	5	Nepal	—	2	—	2
Finland	—	5	—	5	France	—	1	—	1
Namibia	2	3	—	5	Total	2,064	205	—	2,269

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNMEE Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Administrative and Guard Company	Kenya
1	Aviation Unit	Uruguay
1	Engineering De-mining Company	Kenya
2	Infantry Battalions	India, Jordan
1	Level II Medical Unit	Jordan
1	Military Police Unit	Jordan

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included. Level I Medical Units not shown.

UNMEE International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	26	19.3%
Aviation	3	2.2%
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	12	8.9%
Finance	5	3.7%
Human Resources	4	3.0%
Human Rights	4	3.0%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	21	15.6%
Legal Affairs	2	1.5%
Logistics	17	12.6%
Medical Services	1	0.7%
Political Affairs	15	11.1%
Procurement	3	2.2%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	5	3.7%
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	14	10.4%
Social Affairs	1	0.7%
Transport	2	1.5%
Total	135	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMEE Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	2,050	14	99.3%	0.7%
Military Observers	202	3	98.5%	1.5%
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	102	33	75.6%	24.4%
Local Civilian Staff	125	62	66.8%	33.2%
Total	2,479	112	95.7%	4.3%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMEE Fatalities: Inception–30 September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
2001	2	—	—	—	1	—	3
2002	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
2003	2	—	—	1	1	—	4
2004	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
2005	1	—	—	1	—	—	2
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
July-September	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
January-March	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
Total Fatalities	11	—	—	2	3	—	16

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
2001	—	2	1	—	—	3
2002	—	1	1	—	—	2
2003	—	4	—	—	—	4
2004	—	2	—	—	—	2
2005	—	1	1	—	—	2
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	1	—	—	—	1
July-September	—	—	1	—	—	1
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	—	2	1	—	—	3
January-March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	1	1	—	—	2
Total Fatalities	—	12	4	—	—	16

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMEE Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	3	4x4 Vehicles	413
Combat Vehicles	50	Ambulances	2
Communications Vehicle	1	Automobiles	7
Engineering Vehicles	30	Buses	59
Material Handling Equipment	2	Material Handling Equipment	13
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	92	Trucks	77
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	224		
Trailers	26		
Total	428	Total	571

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNMEE Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	2	1	—
Contingent owned	—	2 (Uruguay)	—
Total	2	3	

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNMEE Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	7,308.8	7,120.8	7,822.8
Military contingents	72,288.9	70,936.6	70,262.5
Civilian police	—	—	—
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	29,113.2	24,107.7	29,178.8
Local staff	1,065.0	1,150.7	1,198.4
United Nations Volunteers	2,540.1	2,519.9	2,564.7
General temporary assistance	—	—	622.3
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	6.5	—
Official travel	700.0	726.9	520.7
Facilities and infrastructure	16,538.3	14,515.0	16,481.3
Ground transportation	5,873.7	4,550.1	6,094.5
Air transportation	21,869.7	12,849.7	22,471.8
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	7,418.1	5,596.8	6,849.3
Supplies, services, and equipment	11,948.6	11,842.1	10,612.1
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	176,664.4	155,922.9	174,679.2
Staff assessment income	4,477.5	3,511.0	3,563.7
Net requirements	172,186.9	152,411.9	171,115.5
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	176,664.4	155,922.9	174,679.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMEE Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	12,751.4
Self-sustainment	11,362.5

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNMEE Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	58,852.8	83,695.9	102,877.7	94,115.2	85,550.3
Civilian personnel	12,429.1	27,756.2	31,042.2	34,311.3	31,112.2
Operational requirements	80,993.8	73,555.6	75,699.2	55,173.7	63,667.8
Other	9,928.3	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	162,204.0	185,007.7	209,619.1	183,600.2	180,330.3
Staff assessment income	1,902.0	3,507.9	4,010.3	4,577.3	4,000.9
Net requirements	160,302.0	181,499.8	205,608.8	179,022.9	176,329.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	162,204.0	185,007.7	209,619.1	183,600.2	180,330.3

Source: UN Documents A/56/840, A/57/672, A/58/633, A/59/616, and A/60/615.

UNMIK Key Facts


Latest key resolution	10 June 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1244 (note: paragraph 19 of the Resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.)
SRSB and head of mission	Joachim Rücker (Germany) SG letter of appointment 14 August 2006, effective 1 September 2006
First SRSB	Bernard Kouchner (France)
Chief military liaison officer	Brigadier-General Raul Cunha (Portugal) Entry on duty 24 November 2005
Police commissioner	Stephen J. Curtis (United Kingdom) Date of appointment 11 September 2006

UNMIK Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Document S/RES/1244, A/60/684, and A/60/809 ; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMIK Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1244, A/55/724, A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/58/638, A/59/623, A/60/637, A/60/684, and A/60/809; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMIK Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
United States	—	—	239	239	Spain	—	2	13	15
Germany	—	—	184	184	Slovenia	—	—	14	14
Ukraine	—	2	182	184	Argentina	—	1	11	12
Romania	—	2	170	172	Czech Republic	—	1	10	11
Pakistan	—	1	155	156	Greece	—	—	10	10
Turkey	—	—	125	125	Timor-Leste	—	—	10	10
Poland	—	1	123	124	Zambia	—	1	9	10
United Kingdom	—	1	60	61	Croatia	—	—	9	9
Jordan	—	2	58	60	Portugal	—	2	7	9
France	—	—	53	53	Hungary	—	1	7	8
Bulgaria	—	1	45	46	Lithuania	—	—	8	8
India	—	—	43	43	Finland	—	2	4	6
Russia	—	2	39	41	Kyrgyzstan	—	—	5	5
Sweden	—	—	39	39	Ireland	—	4	—	4
Bangladesh	—	1	32	33	Malaysia	—	1	2	3
Philippines	—	—	32	32	Switzerland	—	—	3	3
Italy	—	1	27	28	Brazil	—	—	2	2
Nigeria	—	—	26	26	Bolivia	—	1	—	1
Austria	—	—	22	22	China	—	1	—	1
Denmark	—	1	21	22	Egypt	—	—	1	1
Nepal	—	1	19	20	Malawi	—	1	—	1
Norway	—	1	19	20	Netherlands	—	—	1	1
Kenya	—	1	16	17	New Zealand	—	1	—	1
Ghana	—	—	15	15	Total	—	37	1,870	1,907

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Pakistan (115), Poland (118), Romania (115), and Ukraine (156).

UNMIK International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	94	18.5%
Aviation	5	1.0%
Civil Affairs	56	11.0%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	13	2.6%
Finance	20	3.9%
Human Resources	9	1.8%
Human Rights	2	0.4%
Humanitarian Affairs	2	0.4%
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	33	6.5%
Legal Affairs	43	8.4%
Logistics	29	5.7%
Medical Services	7	1.4%
Political Affairs	34	6.7%
Procurement	12	2.4%
Program Management	6	1.2%
Public Administration	4	0.8%
Public Information	14	2.8%
Rule of Law	56	11.0%
Security	50	9.8%
Social Affairs	2	0.4%
Transport	18	3.5%
Total	509	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMIK Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	37	—	100.0%	—
Police	1,919	102	95.0%	5.0%
International Civilian Staff	347	162	68.2%	31.8%
Local Civilian Staff	1,479	565	72.4%	27.6%
Total	3,782	829	82.0%	18.0%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMIK Fatalities: Inception–30 September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
1999	—	—	5	2	—	1	8
2000	—	—	2	1	3	1	7
2001	—	—	1	1	—	—	2
2002	—	—	3	—	4	—	7
2003	—	—	4	1	2	—	7
2004	—	—	5	1	2	—	8
2005	—	—	4	—	2	—	6
January-March	—	—	3	—	—	—	3
April-June	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
July-September	—	—	1	—	1	—	2
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	—	—	24	6	13	2	45

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
1999	1	—	7	—	—	8
2000	1	4	1	1	—	7
2001	—	2	—	—	—	2
2002	1	3	—	2	1	7
2003	3	3	—	1	—	7
2004	4	2	1	1	—	8
2005	1	3	1	—	1	6
January-March	1	2	—	—	—	3
April-June	—	1	—	—	—	1
July-September	—	—	1	—	1	2
October-December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan-Sep)	—	—	—	—	—	—
January-March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April-June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	11	17	10	5	2	45

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMIK Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Combat Vehicles	10	4x4 Vehicles	1,703
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	31	Airfield Support Equipment	2
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	57	Ambulances	9
		Automobiles	8
		Buses	202
		Engineering Vehicles	15
		Material Handling Equipment	25
		Oversnows	6
		Trucks	70
Total	98	Total	2,040

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNMIK Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	1	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	1	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNMIK Budgets and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	1,398.9	1,610.4	1,364.7
Military contingents	—	—	—
Civilian police	54,685.8	57,873.2	55,823.0
Formed police units	10,540.5	10,746.7	7,609.5
International staff	84,928.1	80,799.5	74,712.0
Local staff	43,327.4	46,538.7	45,269.6
United Nations Volunteers	9,979.4	8,733.0	6,344.8
General temporary assistance	93.9	165.7	718.9
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	109.5	—
Official travel	1,031.3	1,262.9	877.7
Facilities and infrastructure	14,252.1	10,991.1	11,293.6
Ground transportation	5,425.8	4,497.6	3,091.1
Air transportation	2,376.7	770.6	821.0
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	9,176.3	7,052.9	8,075.7
Supplies, services, and equipment	2,673.6	3,018.6	1,960.4
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	239,889.8	234,170.3	217,962.0
Staff assessment income	20,054.1	19,320.9	16,536.6
Net requirements	219,835.7	214,849.4	201,425.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	239,889.8	234,170.3	217,962.0

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIK Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	1,908.4
Self-sustainment	711.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIK Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNMIK Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)


Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	5,918.4	125,532.0	115,208.7	106,598.1	106,253.3
Civilian personnel	280,113.5	184,775.0	170,595.0	163,458.9	156,162.2
Operational requirements	73,816.0	49,941.0	44,164.1	45,452.2	32,081.5
Other	839.1	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	360,687.0	360,248.0	329,967.8	315,509.2	294,497.0
Staff assessment income	22,775.0	25,989.0	25,082.5	23,467.6	22,720.5
Net requirements	337,912.0	334,259.0	304,885.3	292,041.6	271,776.5
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	360,687.0	360,248.0	329,967.8	315,509.2	294,497.0

Source: UN Documents A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, and A/60/637.


UNMIL Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	29 September 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1712 (six month duration) 13 July 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1694 (change in authorized strength) 31 March 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1667 (six month duration) 6 February 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1657 (authorization for redeployment of infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI until 31 March 2006) 19 September 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 1626 (six month, twelve day duration)
First mandate	19 September 2003 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1509 (twelve month duration)
SRSg	Alan Doss (United Kingdom) SG letter of appointment 13 July 2005, effective 15 August 2005
First SRSg	Jacques Klein (United States)
Force commander	Lieutenant-General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor (Nigeria) SG letter of appointment 21 November 2005 Entry on duty 1 January 2006
First force commander	Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya)
Police commissioner	Mohammed Ahmed Alhassan (Ghana) Entry on duty 15 March 2005

UNMIL Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, S/RES/1626, S/RES/1667, and S/RES/1694; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, S/RES/1626, S/RES/1667, S/RES/1694, A/59/624, and A/60/645; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Bangladesh	3,197	17	29	3,243	Malaysia	—	10	—	10
Pakistan	2,751	16	29	2,796	Norway	—	—	10	10
Ethiopia	2,542	16	—	2,558	Argentina	—	—	8	8
Nigeria	1,964	21	142	2,127	Czech Republic	—	3	5	8
Ghana	858	11	40	909	Egypt	—	8	—	8
Namibia	612	3	6	621	Jamaica	—	—	8	8
Senegal	601	3	—	604	Kyrgyzstan	—	4	3	7
China	565	5	23	593	El Salvador	—	3	2	5
Ireland	323	—	—	323	Mali	1	4	—	5
Ukraine	299	3	13	315	Peru	2	3	—	5
Nepal	42	3	256	301	Poland	—	2	3	5
Jordan	123	7	140	270	Benin	1	3	—	4
Mongolia	250	—	—	250	Bolivia	1	3	—	4
Sweden	232	—	12	244	Ecuador	1	3	—	4
Philippines	170	3	34	207	Moldova	1	3	—	4
Gambia	—	4	32	36	Paraguay	1	3	—	4
Kenya	4	3	27	34	Yemen	—	—	4	4
Turkey	—	—	33	33	Croatia	3	—	—	3
Zimbabwe	—	—	31	31	Indonesia	—	3	—	3
Fiji	—	—	30	30	Niger	—	3	—	3
Zambia	—	3	26	29	Romania	—	3	—	3
United States	6	6	10	22	United Kingdom	3	—	—	3
Uganda	—	—	21	21	Uruguay	—	—	3	3
Malawi	2	—	18	20	Bulgaria	—	2	—	2
Russia	—	4	13	17	Denmark	—	2	—	2
Samoa	—	—	16	16	Finland	2	—	—	2
Rwanda	—	—	15	15	Republic of Korea	1	1	—	2
Germany	9	—	5	14	Brazil	1	—	—	1
Serbia	—	6	7	13	France	1	—	—	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	11	11	Togo	1	—	—	1
Sri Lanka	—	—	11	11	Total	14,570	200	1,076	15,846

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Jordan (120), Nepal (240), and Nigeria (120).

UNMIL Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Aviation Unit	Ukraine
5	Engineering Units	Bangladesh (2), China, Pakistan (2)
1	Force Reserve Quick Reaction Force	Ireland-Sweden Composite
12	Infantry Battalions	Bangladesh (3), Ethiopia (3), Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria (2), Pakistan (2)
3	Level II Medical Units	Bangladesh, China, Pakistan
1	Level III Medical Unit	Jordan
1	Transport and Maintenance Company	China

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

UNMIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	74	14.3%
Aviation	12	2.3%
Civil Affairs	41	7.9%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	32	6.2%
Finance	17	3.3%
Human Resources	11	2.1%
Human Rights	19	3.7%
Humanitarian Affairs	5	1.0%
Information Management	—	—
Information Systems and Technology	26	5.0%
Legal Affairs	6	1.2%
Logistics	87	16.9%
Medical Services	3	0.6%
Political Affairs	28	5.4%
Procurement	16	3.1%
Program Management	11	2.1%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	14	2.7%
Rule of Law	12	2.3%
Security	75	14.5%
Social Affairs	5	1.0%
Transport	22	4.3%
Total	516	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	14,230	340	97.7%	2.3%
Military Observers	196	4	98.0%	2.0%
Police	1,051	74	93.4%	6.6%
International Civilian Staff	353	163	68.4%	31.6%
Local Civilian Staff	664	175	79.1%	20.9%
Total	16,494	756	95.6%	4.4%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMIL Fatalities: Inception-September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
2003	5	—	—	—	—	—	5
2004	23	1	3	1	1	—	29
2005	26	—	3	3	4	—	36
January-March	5	—	2	2	—	—	9
April-June	8	—	—	—	1	—	9
July-September	4	—	—	—	1	—	5
October-December	9	—	1	1	2	—	13
2006	10	—	1	—	2	—	13
January-March	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
April-June	5	—	1	—	2	—	8
July-September	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	64	1	7	4	7	—	83

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
2003	—	1	4	—	—	5
2004	—	22	6	1	—	29
2005	—	28	7	—	1	36
January-March	—	6	2	—	1	9
April-June	—	9	—	—	—	9
July-September	—	4	1	—	—	5
October-December	—	9	4	—	—	13
2006	—	13	—	—	—	13
January-March	—	4	—	—	—	4
April-June	—	8	—	—	—	8
July-September	—	1	—	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	—	64	17	1	1	83

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMIL Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	4	4x4 Vehicles	1,160
Combat Vehicles	318	Airfield Support Equipment	17
Communications Vehicles	2	Ambulances	13
Engineering Vehicles	138	Automobiles	7
Material Handling Equipment	27	Buses	118
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	450	Engineering Vehicle	1
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	1,197	Material Handling Equipment	40
Trailers	496	Trucks	168
Total	2,632	Total	1,524

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNMIL Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	2	8	—
Contingent owned	—	8 (Ukraine)	6 (Ukraine)
Total	2	16	6

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNMIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	11,711.5	10,647.8	10,899.4
Military contingents	312,042.2	325,248.0	321,370.4
Civilian police	37,539.6	30,074.9	39,743.1
Formed police units	10,766.0	11,448.8	6,899.0
International staff	83,292.0	83,533.6	80,511.0
Local staff	9,867.7	11,491.6	15,978.6
United Nations Volunteers	13,350.9	14,594.8	10,755.9
General temporary assistance	2,516.0	2,634.3	792.8
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	676.2	414.5	675.6
Official travel	1,869.2	2,342.0	1,614.1
Facilities and infrastructure	89,841.9	78,709.7	80,871.7
Ground transportation	29,374.0	17,167.7	20,512.4
Air transportation	61,791.7	62,419.8	66,140.0
Naval transportation	3,003.4	2,479.3	2,590.5
Communications and IT	27,680.2	24,997.5	28,880.3
Supplies, services, and equipment	26,099.6	28,617.3	25,378.6
Quick-impact projects	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0
Gross requirements	722,422.1	707,821.5	714,613.3
Staff assessment income	11,215.7	10,877.1	10,291.9
Net requirements	711,206.4	696,944.3	704,321.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	120.0	264.0	264.0
Total requirements	722,542.1	708,085.5	714,877.3

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	55,420.6
Self-sustainment	63,030.8

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIL Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
Germany	264	—	—	264
Total	264	—	—	264

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNMIL Mission Expenditures: August 2003–July 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Aug 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	269,436.1	393,267.7
Civilian personnel	33,596.3	98,618.9
Operational requirements	245,146.3	249,078.2
Gross requirements	548,178.7	740,964.8
Staff assessment income	3,113.1	9,768.1
Net requirements	545,065.6	731,196.7
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	100.0	120.0
Total requirements	548,278.7	741,084.8



Source: UN Documents A/59/62 and A/60/645.

UNMIS Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	6 October 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1714 (seven month duration) 22 September 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1709 (two week duration) 31 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1706 (expansion of mandate) 24 March 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1663 (six month duration) 23 September 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1627 (six month duration)
First mandate	24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1590 (six month duration)
SRSB	Jan Pronk (first SRSB, Netherlands) SG letter of appointment 17 June 2004, effective 1 August 2004
Officer in charge	DSRSB Taye-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia)
Force commander	Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh Lidder (India) SG letter of appointment 4 January 2006 Entry on duty 9 January 2006
First force commander	Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar (Bangladesh)
Police commissioner	Commissioner Kai Vittrup (Denmark) Date of appointment 10 September 2006



Note: On 27 October 2006, the UN Secretary-General confirmed that responsibilities of SRSB Jan Pronk would be handed over to his Officer in Charge, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, until the end of 2006, when the SRSB would be completing his mission.

UNMIS Personnel: July 2006–October 2006




Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1590 and S/RES/1706; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.
Note: UNV figures include national UNVs.

UNMIS Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1590 and S/RES/1706; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Note: UNV figures include national UNVs.



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1590 and S/RES/1706; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMIS Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
India	2,604	26	30	2,660	Guinea	—	16	—	16
Pakistan	1,564	22	46	1,632	Bolivia	—	15	—	15
Bangladesh	1,528	23	29	1,580	Mali	—	15	—	15
Kenya	823	11	21	855	Thailand	—	15	—	15
Egypt	813	21	—	834	Sweden	2	3	9	14
China	443	15	15	473	Fiji	—	8	5	13
Zambia	334	19	18	371	Indonesia	—	13	—	13
Rwanda	256	18	20	294	Romania	—	12	—	12
Nepal	227	10	55	292	Argentina	—	—	11	11
Cambodia	136	15	—	151	El Salvador	—	5	6	11
Russia	122	15	13	150	Kyrgyzstan	—	10	1	11
Philippines	—	20	55	75	Namibia	—	10	1	11
Nigeria	—	10	50	60	Gabon	—	10	—	10
Zimbabwe	—	21	31	52	Paraguay	—	10	—	10
Germany	3	33	5	41	Guatemala	—	8	—	8
Ghana	—	—	41	41	Malawi	1	7	—	8
Jordan	8	15	16	39	Benin	—	7	—	7
Ukraine	—	13	24	37	Burkina Faso	—	7	—	7
Canada	6	25	2	33	Jamaica	—	—	7	7
Turkey	4	—	28	32	Republic of Korea	—	7	—	7
Norway	7	20	4	31	United States	—	—	7	7
Uganda	—	10	19	29	Greece	2	4	—	6
Netherlands	2	14	11	27	Vanuatu	—	—	6	6
Australia	9	6	10	25	Botswana	—	5	—	5
Brazil	—	24	1	25	Finland	2	—	2	4
Malaysia	3	10	10	23	Croatia	3	—	—	3
Tanzania	—	20	3	23	Mozambique	—	3	—	3
Yemen	—	19	3	22	New Zealand	1	2	—	3
Ecuador	—	20	—	20	United Kingdom	3	—	—	3
Denmark	8	10	—	18	Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	2	2
Gambia	—	—	18	18	Mongolia	—	2	—	2
Peru	—	17	—	17	Poland	—	2	—	2
Samoa	—	—	17	17	Uruguay	—	—	2	2
Sri Lanka	—	6	11	17	Moldova	—	1	—	1
Total						8,914	705	665	10,284

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNMIS Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
5	De-mining Units	Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan
1	Engineering Platoon	Zambia
5	Engineering Companies	Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan
1	Headquarters/Infantry Guard Company	Rwanda
4	Helicopter Units	India, Pakistan (2), Russia
5	Infantry Battalions	Bangladesh, Kenya, India (2), Pakistan
3	Infantry Companies	Egypt, Nepal, Zambia
4	Level II Medical Units	Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan
1	Level III Medical Unit	Egypt
1	Military Police Company	Bangladesh
1	Riverine Unit	Bangladesh
1	Signals Company	India
5	Transport Companies	Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan
1	Transport Platoon	Zambia

Source: DPKO FGS.

Notes: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included. Level I Medical Units are not shown as they are integrated in the units above.

UNMIS International Civilian Personnel: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	102	13.7%
Aviation	18	2.4%
Civil Affairs	25	3.4%
Economic Affairs	1	0.1%
Engineering	49	6.6%
Finance	28	3.8%
Human Resources	40	5.4%
Human Rights	38	5.1%
Humanitarian Affairs	44	5.9%
Information Management	3	0.4%
Information Systems and Technology	59	8.0%
Legal Affairs	2	0.3%
Logistics	96	12.9%
Medical Services	8	1.1%
Political Affairs	31	4.2%
Procurement	8	1.1%
Program Management	21	2.8%
Public Administration	-	-
Public Information	18	2.4%
Rule of Law	11	1.5%
Security	88	11.9%
Social Affairs	9	1.2%
Transport	43	5.8%
Total	742	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMIS Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	8,836	78	99.1%	0.9%
Military Observers	689	16	97.7%	2.3%
Police	666	42	94.1%	5.9%
International Civilian Staff	501	241	67.5%	32.5%
Local Civilian Staff	1,551	323	82.8%	17.2%
Total	12,243	700	94.6%	5.4%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMIS Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type							
Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
2005	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
March-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July-September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
October-December	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
2006	3	1	—	4	3	—	11
January-March	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
April-June	1	—	—	1	1	—	3
July-September	2	1	—	3	—	—	6
Total Fatalities	4	1	—	4	4	—	13

Incident Type							
Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total	
2005	—	—	1	—	1	2	
March-June	—	—	—	—	—	—	
July-September	—	—	—	—	1	1	
October-December	—	—	1	—	—	1	
2006	1	6	2	—	2	11	
January-March	—	—	—	—	2	2	
April-June	1	2	—	—	—	3	
July-September	—	4	2	—	—	6	
Total Fatalities	1	6	3	—	3	13	

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMIS Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	20	4x4 Vehicles	1,543
Combat Vehicles	94	Airfield Support	45
Engineering Vehicles	195	Ambulances	18
Material Handling Equipment	33	Automobiles	4
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	144	Buses	144
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	844	Engineering Vehicles	38
Trailers	364	Material Handling Equipment	91
		Trucks	243
Total	1,694	Total	2,126

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNMIS Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	14	11	—
Contingent owned	—	16 (6 India, 6 Pakistan, 4 Russia)	—
Total	14	27	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNMIS Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	9,836.0	19,188.3	36,224.3
Military contingents	225,767.2	196,381.4	246,752.7
Civilian police	8,880.1	16,095.3	34,512.3
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	73,256.0	75,143.8	149,206.1
Local staff	13,167.3	11,940.7	34,773.0
United Nations Volunteers	5,240.0	4,002.3	6,262.7
General temporary assistance	2,208.5	2,797.3	2,994.4
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	611.9	173.9	638.5
Official travel	4,342.9	6,108.2	2,542.1
Facilities and infrastructure	229,918.8	182,869.9	156,047.7
Ground transportation	77,031.0	56,121.2	44,562.2
Air transportation	198,170.3	145,361.5	177,023.8
Naval transportation	198.0	16.8	7,424.2
Communications and IT	58,966.3	43,424.1	54,412.4
Supplies, services, and equipment	59,874.5	42,684.6	124,158.0
Quick-impact projects	2,000.0	1,571.6	2,000.0
Gross requirements	969,468.8	803,880.9	1,079,534.4
Staff assessment income	12,661.6	10,968.4	20,255.7
Net requirements	956,807.2	792,912.5	1,059,278.7
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	969,468.8	803,880.9	1,079,534.4

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIS Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	26,795.7
Self-sustainment	23,156.4

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIS Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
Japan	—	642.0	—	642.0
Total	—	642.0	—	642.0

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNMIS Mission Expenditures: March 2005–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)


Category	Mar 05–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	15,168.6
Civilian personnel	17,353.4
Operational requirements	186,343.7
Gross requirements	218,865.7
Staff assessment income	2,090.2
Net requirements	216,775.5
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—
Total requirements	218,865.7

Source: UN Document A/60/626.

UNMIT Key Facts



Latest key resolutions	25 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1704 (six month duration) 18 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1703 (one week duration) 20 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1690 (two month duration) 12 May 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1677 (six week duration)
SRSB	Atul Khare (India) SG letter of appointment 30 October 2006
Chief military liaison officer	Colonel Graeme Roger Williams (New Zealand) Entry on duty 16 October 2006
Police commissioner	Commissioner Rodolfo Aser Tor (Philippines) Entry on duty 3 December 2006

UNMIT Mission Deployment Timeline




Sources: UN Documents: S/RES/1599 and S/RES/1704; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNOTIL Personnel: July 2005–July 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1599 and S/RES/1704; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.



Sources: UN Documents A/56/922, A/57/666, A/58/636, A/59/655, and A/60/614; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMIT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Malaysia	—	2	167	169
Portugal	—	1	135	136
Australia	—	3	98	101
Philippines	—	2	49	51
Pakistan	—	2	4	6
United States	—	—	4	4
Bangladesh	—	2	—	2
Brazil	—	1	1	2
Fiji	—	2	—	2
Samoa	—	—	2	2
Singapore	—	2	—	2
Jordan	—	—	1	1
New Zealand	—	1	—	1
Russia	—	—	1	1
Turkey	—	—	1	1
Total	—	18	463	481

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Malaysia (113) and Portugal (130).

UNMIT Military and Police Contributors: 31 October 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Bangladesh	—	4	193	197
Portugal	—	4	185	189
Malaysia	—	2	164	166
Philippines	—	3	149	152
Australia	—	4	74	78
Pakistan	—	2	35	37
Thailand	—	—	31	31
New Zealand	—	2	25	27
Singapore	—	2	21	23
Nepal	—	—	22	22
Samoa	—	—	17	17
Vanuatu	—	—	11	11
Spain	—	—	10	10
Turkey	—	—	9	9
Zimbabwe	—	—	6	6
Brazil	—	4	1	5
United States	—	—	4	4
China	—	2	—	2
Fiji	—	2	—	2
Jordan	—	—	1	1
Russia	—	—	1	1
Total	—	31	959	990

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Bangladesh (143), Malaysia (140) and Portugal (140).

UNMIT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	19	23.8%
Aviation	2	2.5%
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	2	2.5%
Finance	6	7.5%
Human Resources	4	5.0%
Human Rights	5	6.3%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	—
Information Systems and Technology	5	6.3%
Legal Affairs	1	1.3%
Logistics	5	6.3%
Medical Services	3	3.8%
Political Affairs	8	10.0%
Procurement	2	2.5%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	3	3.8%
Rule of Law	2	2.5%
Security	9	11.3%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	3	3.8%
Total	80	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMIT Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	17	1	94.4%	5.6%
Police	589	1	99.8%	0.2%
International Civilian Staff	53	27	66.3%	33.8%
Local Civilian Staff	189	38	83.3%	16.7%
Total	848	67	92.7%	7.3%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMIT Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
UNTAET (1999–2002)	16	1	2	1	6	—	26
UNMISSET (2002–2005)	11	2	—	2	4	2	21
UNOTIL (2005–2006)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNMIT (2006)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
August–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	27	3	2	3	10	2	47

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
UNTAET (1999–2002)	2	10	14	—	—	26
UNMISSET (2002–2005)	2	11	6	1	1	21
UNOTIL (2005–2006)	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNMIT (2006)	—	—	—	—	—	—
August–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	4	21	20	1	1	47

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMIT Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	179
Airfield Equipment (Boat)	1
Ambulances	2
Armored Civilian Vehicle	1
Automobiles	5
Buses	11
Engineering Vehicle	1
Material Handling Equipment	9
Trucks	21
Total	230

UNMIT Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	1	2	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	1	2	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNOTIL Budget: July 2006–June 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Alloted Resources
Military observers	418.2
Military contingents	—
Civilian police	3,690.0
Formed police units	3,861.9
International staff	1,715.1
Local staff	208.8
United Nations Volunteers	161.5
General temporary assistance	—
Government-provided personnel	—
Civilian electoral observers	—
Consultants	—
Official travel	475.0
Facilities and infrastructure	10,024.9
Ground transportation	17,337.4
Air transportation	1,491.4
Naval transportation	—
Communications and IT	4,475.0
Supplies, services, and equipment	6,102.3
Quick-impact projects	—
Gross requirements	49,961.5
Staff assessment income	260.5
Net requirements	49,701.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—
Total requirements	49,961.5

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Notes: Allotment advice as of 8 October 2006. Additional funds/commitment authority have been requested.

UNOTIL Budget: May 2005–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Expenditures May–Dec 2005	Alloted Resources Jan–Dec 2006
Hospitality	4.4	9.1
Other expenditures	4,972.4	5,479.5
Other staff costs	12,434.6	12,243.2
Total estimated requirements	17,411.4	17,731.8

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMISSET/UNTAET Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	231,072.3	190,461.0	131,110.2	81,434.6	19,499.7
Civilian personnel	170,435.5	122,647.0	64,806.2	51,785.4	33,876.3
Operational requirements	109,079.6	140,950.0	92,024.7	62,787.6	28,173.2
Other	2,556.5	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	513,143.9	454,058.0	287,941.1	196,007.6	81,549.2
Staff assessment income	14,444.0	13,109.4	8,232.9	6,946.4	5,353.2
Net requirements	498,699.9	440,948.6	279,708.2	189,061.2	76,196.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
Total requirements	513,203.9	454,118.0	288,001.1	196,067.6	81,609.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/922, A/57/666, A/58/636, A/59/655, and A/60/614.

Note: UNTAET expenditures July 2000–June 2002; UNMISSET expenditures July 2002–June 2005.


7.16

UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)

UNMOGIP Key Facts


Latest key resolution	21 December 1971 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 307
First mandate	21 April 1948, effective 1 January 1949
Chief military observer	Major-General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia) SG letter of appointment 2 December 2005 Entry on duty 28 December 2005
First chief military observer	Brigadier H.H. Angle (Canada)

UNMOGIP Personnel: July 2005–June 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNMOGIP Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5), and A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNMOGIP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Republic of Korea	—	10	—	10
Croatia	—	7	—	7
Denmark	—	7	—	7
Italy	—	6	—	6
Sweden	—	6	—	6
Finland	—	5	—	5
Chile	—	2	—	2
Uruguay	—	1	—	1
Total	—	44	—	44

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNMOGIP International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	4	18.2%
Aviation	—	—
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	2	9.1%
Finance	2	9.1%
Human Resources	2	9.1%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	4.5%
Information Systems and Technology	7	31.8%
Legal Affairs	—	—
Logistics	—	—
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	1	4.5%
Procurement	1	4.5%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	—	—
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	1	4.5%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	1	4.5%
Total	22	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNMOGIP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	44	—	100.0%	—
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	17	5	77.3%	22.7%
Local Civilian Staff	44	3	93.6%	6.4%
Total	105	8	92.9%	7.1%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNMOGIP Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
1949–1999	5	1	—	1	2	—	9
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
2006	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	5	1	—	2	3	—	11

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
1949–1999	—	1	8	—	—	9
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	1	—	—	—	1
2003	—	—	—	—	—	—
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	1	—	—	1
2006	—	—	—	—	—	—
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	—	2	9	—	—	11

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNMOGIP Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	46
Ambulance	1
Automobiles	3
Buses	16
Trucks	3
Total	69

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.

UNMOGIP Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNMOGIP Budget: January 2006–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	2006–2007 Estimated Requirements	Category	2006 Allotment
Posts	8,184.8	Posts	3,949.6
Other staff costs	2,822.9	Other staff costs	1,254.3
Travel of staff	913.7	Hospitality	1.3
Contractual services	—	Other expenditures	2,662.0
General operating expenses	2,188.9		
Hospitality	2.5		
Supplies and materials	1,198.1		
Furniture and equipment	1,064.7		
Total	16,375.6	Total	7,867.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.


UNMOGIP Mission Expenditures: January 2000 to December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jan 00–Dec 01	Jan 02–Dec 03	Jan 04–Dec 05
Posts	5,574.1	6,370.9	6,482.6
Other staff costs	1,593.5	1,983.8	2,038.7
Travel of staff	865.9	1,247.5	1,309.6
Contractual services	—	38.9	21.5
General operating expenses	1,772.6	1,174.3	1,995.9
Hospitality	2.3	2.5	2.3
Supplies and materials	1,022.4	800.1	355.7
Furniture and equipment	1,332.0	1,107.6	2,527.5
Total requirements	12,162.8	12,725.6	14,733.8

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOCI Key Facts



Latest key resolutions	<p>15 December 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1726 (three week duration)</p> <p>2 June 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1682 (six month, two week duration, and increase in authorized strength)</p> <p>6 February 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1657 (fifty-four day duration, authorization for redeployment of infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI)</p> <p>24 January 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1652 (ten month and three week duration)</p>
First mandate	<p>27 February 2004 (date of issue), 4 April 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1528 (twelve month duration)</p>
SRSO	<p>Pierre Schori (Sweden) SG letter of appointment 25 February 2005, effective 1 April 2005</p>
First SRSO	Albert Tevoedjre (Benin)
Force commander	<p>Brigadier-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin) SG letter of appointment 30 August 2006 Entry on duty 24 August 2005</p>
First force commander	Major-General Abdoulaye Fall (Senegal)
Police commissioner	<p>Commissioner Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina) Date of appointment 4 April 2006</p>



Source: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1609, and S/RES/1682; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Note: Figures do not include government provided personnel.

UNOCI Personnel: Since 2004



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1609, S/RES/1682, A/59/750, and A/60/630; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNOCI Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Bangladesh	2,747	11	250	3,008	Romania	—	7	—	7
Jordan	1,061	7	379	1,447	Tunisia	2	5	—	7
Pakistan	1,119	10	2	1,131	Madagascar	—	—	6	6
Morocco	735	1	—	736	Uganda	2	4	—	6
Ghana	537	6	1	544	Guatemala	—	5	—	5
Benin	428	7	27	462	Argentina	—	—	4	4
Niger	375	6	71	452	Dominican Republic	—	4	—	4
Senegal	319	7	18	344	El Salvador	—	3	1	4
Togo	318	6	1	325	Moldova	—	4	—	4
France	185	3	10	198	Vanuatu	—	—	4	4
Cameroon	—	—	61	61	Bolivia	—	3	—	3
Djibouti	—	—	39	39	Croatia	—	3	—	3
Turkey	—	—	19	19	Gambia	—	3	—	3
Nigeria	—	7	11	18	Guinea	—	3	—	3
Rwanda	—	—	15	15	Namibia	—	3	—	3
Philippines	3	4	6	13	Nepal	—	3	—	3
Paraguay	2	9	—	11	Peru	—	3	—	3
Russia	—	11	—	11	Serbia	—	3	—	3
Kenya	5	4	—	9	Canada	—	—	2	2
Chad	—	3	5	8	Ecuador	—	2	—	2
India	—	8	—	8	Ethiopia	—	2	—	2
Uruguay	1	1	6	8	Ireland	—	2	—	2
Yemen	—	6	2	8	Poland	—	2	—	2
Brazil	3	4	—	7	Switzerland	—	—	2	2
Central African Republic	—	—	7	7	Zambia	—	2	—	2
China	—	7	—	7	Tanzania	1	—	—	1
Total						7,843	194	949	8,986

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Bangladesh (250) and Jordan (375).

UNOCI Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Aviation Unit	Ghana
3	Engineering Companies	Bangladesh, France, Pakistan
1	Gendarme Security Company	Ghana-Niger-Senegal-Togo Composite
1	Headquarters Company	Bangladesh
11	Infantry Battalions	Bangladesh (3), Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo
2	Level II Hospitals	Bangladesh, Ghana
1	Signal Company	Bangladesh
1	Special Forces Company	Jordan
1	Transport Company	Pakistan

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

UNOCI International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	45	12.3%
Aviation	11	3.0%
Civil Affairs	3	0.8%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	14	3.8%
Finance	14	3.8%
Human Resources	10	2.7%
Human Rights	11	3.0%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	0.3%
Information Systems and Technology	43	11.7%
Legal Affairs	2	0.5%
Logistics	61	16.7%
Medical Services	2	0.5%
Political Affairs	39	10.7%
Procurement	9	2.5%
Program Management	9	2.5%
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	16	4.4%
Rule of Law	7	1.9%
Security	48	13.1%
Social Affairs	4	1.1%
Transport	17	4.6%
Total	366	

Source: DPKO PM55.

UNOCI Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	7,799	44	99.4%	0.6%
Military Observers	183	11	94.3%	5.7%
Police	856	30	96.6%	3.4%
International Civilian Staff	252	114	68.9%	31.1%
Local Civilian Staff	383	125	75.4%	24.6%
Total	9,473	324	96.7%	3.3%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNOCI Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	10	1	1	1	2	—	15
January–March	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
April–June	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
July–September	2	—	—	—	1	—	3
October–December	4	1	1	1	—	—	7
2006 (Jan–Sep)	9	—	1	—	—	—	10
January–March	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
July–September	6	—	—	—	—	—	6
Total Fatalities	19	1	2	1	2	—	25

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	1	8	3	—	3	15
January–March	—	2	—	—	1	3
April–June	—	1	1	—	—	2
July–September	1	2	—	—	—	3
October–December	—	3	2	—	2	7
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	3	7	—	—	10
January–March	—	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	—	2	1	—	—	3
July–September	—	—	6	—	—	6
Total Fatalities	1	11	10	—	3	25

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNOCI Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment	4	4x4 Vehicles	733
Combat Vehicles	185	Airfield Support	25
Communications Vehicles	4	Ambulances	8
Engineering Vehicles	85	Automobiles	7
Material Handling Equipment	16	Buses	74
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	373	Engineering Vehicles	7
Support Vehicles (Military Pattern)	945	Material Handling Equipment	18
Trailers	371	Trucks	103
Naval Vessels	2		
Total	1,985	Total	975

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNOCI Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	3	6	—
Contingent owned	—	3 (Ghana)	—
Total	3	9	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNOCI Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	9,783.3	9,892.7	9,777.3
Military contingents	160,183.6	150,131.1	157,672.1
Civilian police	14,544.8	14,740.1	15,786.1
Formed police units	11,101.4	10,920.1	9,903.0
International staff	50,419.7	49,954.2	62,499.7
Local staff	9,844.7	8,851.6	11,881.8
United Nations Volunteers	7,325.5	8,179.4	8,307.8
General temporary assistance	192.1	196.6	686.7
Government-provided personnel	412.5	326.5	424.6
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	179.7	149.8	189.9
Official travel	1,246.4	2,329.7	1,616.9
Facilities and infrastructure	53,774.8	50,215.5	50,352.2
Ground transportation	12,709.7	10,904.8	16,194.5
Air transportation	46,035.3	32,295.4	37,388.4
Naval transportation	24.1	—	79.2
Communications and IT	23,457.5	18,854.4	20,452.2
Supplies, services, and equipment	16,541.9	13,345.7	15,962.8
Quick-impact projects	1,000.0	778.1	1,000.0
Gross requirements	418,777.0	382,065.7	420,175.2
Staff assessment income	7,616.4	6,878.8	7,880.4
Net requirements	411,160.6	375,186.9	412,294.8
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	418,777.0	382,065.7	420,175.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNOCI Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	24,186.7
Self-sustainment	27,901.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOCI Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNOCI Mission Expenditures: April 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Apr 04–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	29,354.7	152,773.2
Civilian personnel	5,000.1	45,790.7
Operational requirements	48,708.4	138,326.6
Gross requirements	83,063.2	336,890.5
Staff assessment income	547.3	4,906.3
Net requirements	82,515.9	331,984.2
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—
Total requirements	83,063.2	336,890.5

Source: UN Documents A/59/750 and A/60/643.


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UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)

UNOCI Key Facts


Latest key resolutions	13 October 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1716 (six month duration) 31 March 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1666 (six month, two week duration) 31 January 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1656 (two month duration) 29 July 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1615 (six month duration)
First mandate	24 August 1993 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 858 (six month duration)
SRSO	Jean Arnault (France) SG letter of appointment 14 July 2006
First special envoy	Edouard Brunner (Switzerland)
Chief military observer	Major-General Niaz Mohammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan) Entry on duty 8 August 2005
First chief military observer	Brigadier-General John Hvierdgaard (Denmark)
Senior police adviser	Alexey Telichkin (Ukraine) Date of appointment 23 October 2006

UNOMIG Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1494 and S/RES/937; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNOMIG Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents A/56/721, A/57/676, A/58/639, A/59/622, A/60/643, S/RES/1494, and S/RES/937; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNOMIG Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Germany	—	11	4	15	Turkey	—	5	—	5
Pakistan	—	11	—	11	Ukraine	—	5	—	5
Republic of Korea	—	8	—	8	Greece	—	4	—	4
Bangladesh	—	7	—	7	Indonesia	—	4	—	4
Egypt	—	7	—	7	Albania	—	3	—	3
Hungary	—	7	—	7	France	—	3	—	3
Switzerland	—	4	3	7	Sweden	—	3	—	3
Jordan	—	6	—	6	Uruguay	—	3	—	3
Poland	—	4	2	6	Austria	—	2	—	2
United Kingdom	—	6	—	6	Romania	—	2	—	2
Czech Republic	—	5	—	5	United States	—	2	—	2
Denmark	—	5	—	5	Croatia	—	1	—	1
Russia	—	3	2	5	Ghana	—	—	1	1
Total						—	121	12	133

Source: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNOMIG Military Units: 30 September 2006

Number	Unit Type	Country
1	Level 1 Medical Unit	Germany

Source: DPKO FGS.

Note: Military observers not included.

UNOMIG International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2006

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	12	12.0%
Aviation	3	3.0%
Civil Affairs	3	3.0%
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	3	3.0%
Finance	5	5.0%
Human Resources	2	2.0%
Human Rights	3	3.0%
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	1	1.0%
Information Systems and Technology	9	9.0%
Legal Affairs	1	1.0%
Logistics	5	5.0%
Medical Services	—	—
Political Affairs	8	8.0%
Procurement	4	4.0%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	1	1.0%
Rule of Law	1	1.0%
Security	30	30.0%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	9	9.0%
Total	100	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNOMIG Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	115	6	95.0%	5.0%
Police	11	1	91.7%	8.3%
International Civilian Staff	82	18	82.0%	18.0%
Local Civilian Staff	122	58	67.8%	32.2%
Total	330	83	79.9%	20.1%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNOMIG Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Personnel Type

Time Period	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	Total
1995–1999	1	2	—	1	—	—	4
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Total Fatalities	6	2	—	1	2	—	11

Incident Type

Time Period	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	Total
1995–1999	3	—	1	—	—	4
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	4	—	—	—	—	4
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	1	—	—	—	1
2004	—	—	—	—	—	—
2005	1	—	—	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	1	—	—	—	—	1
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006 (Jan–Sep)	—	—	1	—	—	1
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	1	—	—	1
Total Fatalities	8	1	2	—	—	11

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNOMIG Vehicles: 30 September 2006

Contingent Owned Vehicles		UN Owned Vehicles	
Vehicle Type	Quantity	Vehicle Type	Quantity
Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern)	2	4x4 Vehicles	147
		Ambulances	3
		Automobiles	4
		Buses	15
		Engineering Vehicle	1
		Material Handling Equipment	6
		Trucks	16
Total	2	Total	192

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.

UNOMIG Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	1	1	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	1	1	—

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section.

UNOMIG Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Budgeted Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Expenditures Jul 2005–Jun 2006	Budgeted Jul 2006–Jun 2007
Military observers	3,619.0	3,583.9	3,647.4
Military contingents	64.3	64.3	64.7
Civilian police	485.1	305.4	498.6
Formed police units	—	—	—
International staff	14,499.2	14,633.5	15,080.7
Local staff	2,610.4	2,914.5	3,173.5
United Nations Volunteers	79.8	53.1	33.2
General temporary assistance	34.2	22.3	214.5
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	—	—	—
Official travel	649.4	519.8	525.0
Facilities and infrastructure	3,185.9	2,405.7	2,575.4
Ground transportation	1,807.6	1,039.5	1,434.3
Air transportation	3,160.1	2,367.7	2,903.1
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications and IT	3,592.0	2,610.5	2,616.1
Supplies, services, and equipment	775.1	612.6	611.4
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—
Gross requirements	34,562.1	31,132.7	33,377.9
Staff assessment income	2,254.0	2,191.3	2,226.6
Net requirements	32,308.1	28,941.4	31,151.3
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	34,562.1	31,132.7	33,377.9

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Note: July 2005–June 2006 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNOMIG Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2005–June 2006
(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment	64.3
Self-sustainment	27.5

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOMIG Voluntary Contributions: July 2005–June 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor	Contributions in kind (budgeted)	Contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	Contributions in cash (budgeted)	Total
None	—	—	—	—

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNOMIG Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jul 00–Jun 01	Jul 01–Jun 02	Jul 02–Jun 03	Jul 03–Jun 04	Jul 04–Jun 05
Military and police personnel	3,701.8	3,466.6	3,345.0	3,670.6	3,887.7
Civilian personnel	10,770.0	13,581.4	14,595.1	15,941.0	16,653.1
Operational requirements	8,285.7	8,236.6	10,881.6	10,866.3	10,529.8
Other	1,491.5	—	—	—	—
Gross requirements	24,249.0	25,284.6	28,821.7	30,477.9	31,070.6
Staff assessment income	1,752.0	1,749.1	1,920.3	2,139.8	2,161.6
Net requirements	22,497.0	23,535.5	26,901.4	28,338.1	28,909.0
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	24,249.0	25,284.6	28,821.7	30,477.9	31,070.6

Source: UN Documents A/56/721, A/57/676, A/58/639, A/59/622, and A/60/643.


7.19

UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

UNTSO Key Facts


Latest key resolution	23 October 1973 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 339 (to continue thereafter, until the Security Council decides otherwise)
First mandate	29 May 1948 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 50 (no duration determined)
Chief of staff and head of mission	Major-General Ian Campbell Gordon (Australia) SG letter of appointment 15 November 2006
First chief of staff	Colonel Count Thord Bonde (Sweden)

UNTSO Personnel: July 2005–September 2006



Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNTSO Personnel: Since 2000



Sources: UN Documents: A/54/6 (Sect.5), A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5), A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

UNTSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total	Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Netherlands	—	14	—	14	Argentina	—	5	—	5
Finland	—	13	—	13	Russia	—	5	—	5
Ireland	—	13	—	13	Chile	—	3	—	3
Australia	—	12	—	12	China	—	3	—	3
Norway	—	12	—	12	France	—	3	—	3
Denmark	—	11	—	11	United States	—	3	—	3
Switzerland	—	10	—	10	Belgium	—	2	—	2
Austria	—	7	—	7	Estonia	—	2	—	2
Canada	—	7	—	7	Nepal	—	2	—	2
Italy	—	7	—	7	Slovakia	—	2	—	2
Sweden	—	7	—	7	Slovenia	—	2	—	2
New Zealand	—	6	—	6	Total	—	151	—	151

Source: DPKO FGS.

**UNTSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations:
30 September 2006**

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	30	28.8%
Aviation	—	—
Civil Affairs	—	—
Economic Affairs	—	—
Engineering	3	2.9%
Finance	6	5.8%
Human Resources	4	3.8%
Human Rights	—	—
Humanitarian Affairs	—	—
Information Management	3	2.9%
Information Systems and Technology	13	12.5%
Legal Affairs	1	1.0%
Logistics	5	4.8%
Medical Services	2	1.9%
Political Affairs	2	1.9%
Procurement	2	1.9%
Program Management	—	—
Public Administration	—	—
Public Information	—	—
Rule of Law	—	—
Security	24	23.1%
Social Affairs	—	—
Transport	11	10.6%
Total	104	

Source: DPKO PMSS.

**UNTSO Personnel Gender Statistics:
30 September 2006**

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Troops	—	—	—	—
Military Observers	146	5	96.7%	3.3%
Police	—	—	—	—
International Civilian Staff	88	16	84.6%	15.4%
Local Civilian Staff	102	15	87.2%	12.8%
Total	336	36	90.3%	9.7%

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO PMSS.

UNTSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2006

Time Period	Personnel Type						Total
	Troop	Mil Ob	Police	Intl Staff	Local Staff	Other ^a	
1948–1999	18	12	—	6	3	—	39
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
2004	—	1	—	1	—	—	2
2005	—	1	—	1	—	—	2
January–March	—	1	—	1	—	—	2
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
Total Fatalities	18	18	—	8	4	—	48

Time Period	Incident Type					Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Self-Inflicted	Other ^b	
1948–1999	25	5	8	1	—	39
2000	—	—	—	—	—	—
2001	—	—	—	—	—	—
2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
2003	—	1	—	—	—	1
2004	—	1	1	—	—	2
2005	1	1	—	—	—	2
January–March	1	1	—	—	—	2
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	—	—	—	—	—
October–December	—	—	—	—	—	—
2006	4	—	—	—	—	4
January–March	—	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	4	—	—	—	—	4
Total Fatalities	30	8	9	1	—	48

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Notes: a. "Other" refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

UNTSO Vehicles: 30 September 2006

UN Owned Vehicles Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles	182
Automobiles	27
Buses	27
Material Handling Equipment	4
Trucks	17
Total	257

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.

UNTSO Aircraft: 30 September 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

UNTSO Budget: January 2006–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	2006–07 Estimated Requirement	Category	Appropriations 2006
Posts	43,179.4	Posts	20,460.9
Other staff costs	10,230.1	Other staff costs	5,061.9
Travel of staff	2,221.4	Hospitality	4.7
Contractual services	—	Other expenditures	4,433.4
General operating expenses	3,428.6		
Hospitality	10.1		
Supplies and materials	1,078.9		
Furniture and equipment	2,397.4		
Grants and contributions	—		
Total	62,545.9	Total	29,960.9

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNTSO Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category	Jan 00–Dec 01	Jan 02–Dec 03	Jan 04–Dec 05
Posts	30,532.2	31,679.1	33,215.7
Other staff costs	8,547.1	9,588.0	10,443.2
Hospitality	—	7.8	7.6
Travel of staff	1,793.3	2,658.2	2,763.5
Contractual services	—	49.5	39.7
General operating expenses	2,538.2	3,422.8	5,010.0
Supplies and materials	1,117.1	982.0	1,035.3
Furniture and equipment	1,614.5	1,498.4	3,214.7
Total requirements	46,142.4	49,885.8	55,729.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

8

Statistics on The African Union Mission in Sudan

This chapter contains data on the African Union Mission in Sudan. Military, police, and civilian personnel data was provided by the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa, and the AMIS Mission and Force headquarters in Khartoum and El-Fasher, Sudan. Information on the military including military observers and civilian police covers the period from May 2004 to August 2006.

Additional data on the status of the mission in September are provided in Chapter 6. Financial data was provided by the Finance Unit of the AU's Peace and Security Department and shows the budget for the period from April–December 2006, but does not include budgets and expenditure for earlier periods. Notes are included to explain any discrepancies and/or omissions.

AMIS Key Facts

Latest key decisions



27 December 2006: UN Security Council press statement welcoming letter of 23 December from President Al-Bashir on deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur.
 30 November 2006: Communiqué of the 66th meeting of the PSC (six month mandate renewal and endorsement of the three-phased UN support to AMIS).
 20 September 2006: Peace and Security Council of the African Union Communiqué of the 63rd meeting of the PSC (three month mandate renewal, takes notes of UNSCR 1706 and continued objection by the GoS to the deployment of UN troops in Darfur).
 27 June 2006: Communiqué of the 58th meeting of the PSC (welcomes the establishment of the CFC, JC and signing of the Declaration of Commitment).
 15 May 2006: Communiqué of the 51st meeting of the PSC (welcomes signing of the DPA, demands all groups to sign, and calls for the mandate to be reviewed).
 10 March 2006: Communiqué of the 46th meeting of the PSC (six month and three week mandate renewal, and reaffirms decision to transition to a UN force).
 12 January 2006: Communiqué of the 45th meeting of the PSC (decision to support in principle a transition to a UN force).
 10 October 2005: Communiqué of the 41st meeting of the PSC (decision to bring to the attention of the UN the situation in Darfur).

First decision	25 May 2004 (establishment of AMIS)
Acting head of mission	Monique Mukaruliza (Rwanda)
First head of mission	Ambassador Babagana Kingibe (Nigeria)
Force commander	Major-General Luke Aprezi (Nigeria)
First force commander	General Festus Okonkwo (Nigeria)
Civilian police commissioner	Daniel Moenyana (South Africa)
First civilian police commissioner	Anand Pillay (South Africa)

AMIS Personnel: May 2004–August 2006

Date	Troops		AU Military Observers		Police		Support Staff	
	Actual	Authorized	Actual	Authorized	Actual	Authorized	Actual	Authorized
May '04	—	300	—	60	—	—	—	—
June '04	—	300	—	60	—	—	—	—
July '04	—	300	22	80	—	—	N/A	N/A
Oct. '04	310	300	66	450	—	815	N/A	N/A
Jan. '05	790	1,703	285	450	7	815	12	132
Apr. '05	1,647	5,398	376	773	245	1,560	26	132
May '05	1,735	5,398	458	773	413	1,560	26	132
Nov. '05	4,878	5,398	559	773	1,175	1,560	27	173
Apr. '06	4,863	5,398	567	773	1,400	1,560	32	173
Aug. '06	5,228	5,398	646	773	1,456	1,560	45	173

AMIS Personnel: May 2004–August 2006



Source: AU DTF.

AMIS Military and Police Contributors: 31 August 2006

Contributing Country	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Total
Nigeria	2,040	51	149	2,240
Rwanda	1,756	35	49	1,840
South Africa	598	46	125	769
Senegal	538	36	50	624
Ghana	—	25	538	563
Gambia	196	20	94	310
Mali	—	65	75	140
Kenya	60	36	25	121
Zambia	—	45	65	110
Egypt	—	34	52	86
Cameroon	—	30	47	77
Chad	40	32	—	72
Uganda	—	9	55	64
Niger	—	—	43	43
Mauritania	—	10	30	40
Burkina Faso	—	4	35	39
Malawi	—	25	—	25
Gabon	—	24	—	24
Namibia	—	24	—	24
Madagascar	—	9	10	19
Lesotho	—	5	12	17
Congo	—	15	—	15
Mozambique	—	15	—	15
Algeria	—	13	—	13
Botswana	—	10	2	12
Burundi	—	10	—	10
Libya	—	9	—	9
Togo	—	8	—	8
Benin	—	1	—	—
Total	5,228	646	1,456	7,329

Source: AU DITE.

Notes: Parties' representatives not included. Refer to the Chapter 6 section on AMIS for top 10 contributors as of 30 September 2006.

AMIS Military Units: 31 August 2006

Number	Unit Type	Countries
1	Engineering Company	South Africa
1	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section	South Africa
1	Headquarters Company	Gambia
8	Infantry Battalions	Nigeria (3), Rwanda (3), Senegal (1), South Africa (1)
1	Infantry Platoon	Chad
1	Military Police Platoon	Kenya
1	Platoon	Chad
1	Reserve Company	South Africa

Source: AU DITF.

Note: Military observers not included.

AMIS International Civilian Personnel Nationality: 31 August 2006

Nationality	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Nigeria	6	13.3%
Rwanda	4	8.9%
Benin	3	6.7%
Malawi	3	6.7%
Uganda	3	6.7%
Zimbabwe	3	6.7%
Cameroon	2	4.4%
Ethiopia	2	4.4%
Tanzania	2	4.4%
Algeria	1	2.2%
Botswana	1	2.2%
Burundi	1	2.2%
Chad	1	2.2%
Congo-Brazzaville	1	2.2%
Côte d'Ivoire	1	2.2%
Djibouti	1	2.2%
Gambia	1	2.2%
Ghana	1	2.2%
Kenya	1	2.2%
Mali	1	2.2%
Mauritania	1	2.2%
Niger	1	2.2%
Senegal	1	2.2%
Sierra Leone	1	2.2%
South Africa	1	2.2%
Tunisia	1	2.2%
Total	45	

Source: AMIS HQ.


Notes: Includes military staff officers.

**AMIS International Civilian Personnel Occupations:
31 August 2006**

Occupation	International Staff	Percentage International Staff
Administration	8	17.8%
Communications and IT	1	2.2%
Economic Affairs	1	2.2%
Financial Management	4	8.9%
Gender Advisory	1	2.2%
Human Resources	2	4.4%
Human Rights	3	6.7%
Humanitarian Affairs	3	6.7%
Information	1	2.2%
Legal Affairs	1	2.2%
Logistics	2	4.4%
Military Advisory	1	2.2%
Mission Management	3	6.7%
Political Affairs	9	20.0%
Procurement	3	6.7%
Public Information/Affairs	2	4.4%
Total	45	

Source: AMIS HQ.

**AMIS International Civilian Personnel Occupations:
31 August 2006**



Source: AMIS HQ.

AMIS Police and International Staff Gender Statistics: 31 August 2006

Personnel Type	Male	Female	Percentage Male	Percentage Female
Police	1,200	256	82.4%	17.6%
International Civilian Staff	34	11	75.6%	24.4%
Total	1,234	267	82.2%	17.8%

Source: AMIS HQ.

AMIS Fatalities: Inception–August 2006

Time Period	Appointment Type			
	Military	Police	Civilian	Total
2004	—	—	—	—
2005	7	1	2	10
January–March	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—
July–September	3	1	—	4
October–December	4	—	2	6
2006 (January–August)	6	1	1	8
January–March	1	—	—	1
April–June	3	1	1	5
July–August	2	—	—	—
Total Fatalities	13	2	3	18

Time Period	Incident Type				Total
	Malicious Act	Illness	Accident	Other/Unknown	
2004	—	—	—	—	—
2005	4	4	2	—	10
January–March	—	—	—	—	—
April–June	—	—	—	—	—
July–September	—	3	1	—	4
October–December	4	1	1	—	6
2006 (January–June)	5	1	1	1	8
January–March	1	—	—	—	1
April–June	2	1	1	1	5
July–August	2	—	—	—	2
Total Fatalities	9	5	3	1	18

Source: AU DITF.

AMIS Vehicles: 31 May 2006

Vehicle Type	Quantity
4x4 Vehicles (Land Cruisers)	449
Pick-up Trucks	554
Ambulance	1
Armored Personnel Carriers	105
Total	1,109

Source: AU DITF.

AMIS Aircraft: 31 May 2006

	Transport Fixed Wing	Transport Helicopter	Attack Helicopter
Commercial	—	—	—
Contingent owned	—	—	—
Other	—	27 (25 Canada, 2 Netherlands)	—
Total	—	27	—

Source: AU DITF.

**AMIS Budget Estimate:
April–December 2006 (in thousands of US dollars)**

Category	Budget
Military observers	21,528.1
Military contingents	66,530.4
Civilian police	42,396.0
International staff	5,673.8
National staff	2,802.2
Official travel	160.0
Facilities and infrastructure	6,946.7
Ground transportation	12,801.8
Air transportation	32,566.9
Communications and IT	2,119.0
Supplies, services and equipment	4,093.2
Provision for Inter-Sudanese Abuja Peace Talks	7,000.0
Provision for DITF activities	3,300.0
Humanitarian activities	450.0
Total requirements	208,368.0

Source: AU PSD Finance Unit.

9

Statistics on Selected Non-UN Missions

This chapter contains additional data on three non-UN peace operations: the EU force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and the Australian-led Multinational Force in Timor-Leste (Operation Astute). These data are not intended to be as comprehensive as those of the UN and AMIS missions in the preceding chapters, but to offer statistical insights into operations that have received significant attention in 2006.

Information on EUFOR RD Congo and ISAF was gathered for this chapter by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), while that on Operation Astute is derived from public information published by the Government of Australia (available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/opastute/>). This data has been cross-referenced with those on non-UN missions provided by SIPRI for Chapter 6 and information available in previous editions of this *Review*, the *SIPRI Yearbook*, and the *Military Balance*, published by IISS.

9.1

EUFOR RD Congo (EU Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo)

EUFOR RD Congo Key Facts

Authorization Date	27 April 2006 EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP 25 April 2006 UNSC Res. 1671
Start Date	30 July 2006
Operation commander	Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany)
Force commander	Major-General Christian Damay (France)
Budget	21.2 (\$US million)
July-September 2006	

EUFOR RD Congo Military Personnel Contribution by Country: September 2006

Country	Personnel Contribution
France	1,090
Germany	730
Poland	130
Spain	130
Belgium	60
Sweden	55
Italy	50
Portugal	50
Netherlands	40
Finland	10

Source: SIPRI.

Notes: These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large scale units any may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small scale contributions. Additional personnel were provided by Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

EUFOR RD Congo Military Units Contributed by Country: August 2006

Quantity	Unit Type	Countries
3	Infantry Companies (Kinshasa)	France, Spain
1	Military Police Company	Poland
1	UAV detachment	Belgium
1	Infantry Platoon	Netherlands
1	Special Forces Unit	Sweden
1	Medic Team	Greece
1	Operational Command	Germany
2	Tactical reserve task groups (Gabon)	France, Germany
1	Strategic reserve (Europe)	France

EUFOR RD CONGO Aircraft: August 2006

Quantity	Type	Contributor
1 squadron	Mirage jets	France
7	Rotary wing	Germany, France
1 unit	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	Belgium
8	Transport	Germany, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey


9.2

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)

ISAF Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	<p>12 September 2006: UNSC Res. 1707 (extends mandate for a twelve month period)</p> <p>15 February 2006: UNSC Res. 1659 (welcomes ISAF's revised Operational Plan for expansion of NATO forces throughout Afghanistan)</p> <p>13 September 2005: UNSC Res. 1623 (extends mandate for a twelve month period)</p>
First mandate	20 December 2001, UNSC Res. 1386
Head of mission	Lieutenant Gen. David J. Richards (United Kingdom)
Budget October 2005-September 2006	102.4 (\$US million)

ISAF Personnel: 2002–2006



ISAF Troop Contributors		
Country	Troop Contribution 10 November 2006	Troop Contribution 2 January 2007
United States	11,800	11,800
United Kingdom	6,000	5,200
Germany	2,700	3,000
Canada	2,500	2,700
Netherlands	2,000	2,200
Italy	1,800	1,950
France	975	1,000
Romania	750	750
Spain	650	550
Turkey	460	800
Belgium	340	300
Norway	320	350
Denmark	300	400
Sweden	200	180
Hungary	200	180
Australia	200	500
Greece	170	170
Poland	160	160
Portugal	150	150
Bulgaria	150	100
Lithuania	140	130
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	120	120
New Zealand	100	100
Czech Republic	100	150
Croatia	100	130
Finland	90	70
Estonia	90	90
Slovakia	60	60
Slovenia	50	50
Latvia	30	35
Albania	30	30
Azerbaijan	20	20
Iceland	15	5
Luxembourg	10	10
Ireland	10	10
Switzerland	5	5
Austria	5	5
Total	32,800	33,460

Source: ISAF factsheets, 10 November 2006 and 2 January 2007; troop numbers are rounded and do not reflect the precise numbers on the ground on the dates of publication.

ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams Deployed: 10 November 2006

PRT Location	Lead Country
Asadabad	United States
Bagram	United States
Bamyan	New Zealand
Chaghcharan	Lithuania
Farah	United States
Feyzabad	Germany
Gardez	United States
Ghazni	United States
Herat	Italy
Jalalabad	United States
Kandahar	Canada
Khost	United States
Konduz	Germany
Lashkar-Gah	United Kingdom
Mazar-e-Sharif	Sweden
Mether Lam	United States
Meymana	Norway
Nuristan	United States
Panjshir	United States
Pul e Khomri	Hungary
Qal e Naw	Spain
Qalat	United States
Sharana	United States
Tarin-Kowt	Netherlands
Wardak	Turkey
Total PRT	25

Source: NATO, 10 November 2006.

9.3 Operation Astute

Operation Astute: Key Facts

Latest key resolutions	20 June 2006 UNSC Res. 1690 (expressing appreciation and full support of the Deployment of Operation Astute)
Start date	25 May 2006
Head of mission	Brigadier Mal Rerden (Australia)

Operation Astute Military Personnel Contributions: 30 November 2006

Country	Personnel Contribution	Unit Type
Australia	800	Battalion group, logistics, communication, engineering and mobility support elements
New Zealand	120	Infantry unit
Total	920	

Source: Australian Department of Defense, 30 November 2006.


Deployment of Australian Defense Forces to Timor-Leste: May–November 2006

Date	Number of Soldiers Deployed	Type of Unit Deployed
26 May	450	Ground Company, Rifle Company, two Royal Regiments
28 May	1,300	Infantry Battalion Group, Commando Company Group
3 Aug	700	Approximately 700 ADF troops to remain, this marks the start of a gradual troop drawdown
7 Sep	925	In response to new gang violence, 120 more ADF troops deployed to Timor-Leste
9 Nov	925	ADF force level maintained as uncertainty remains. Forces include infantry, logistical, policing and construction elements
30 Nov	800	Drawdown of ADF resumes: Battalion group, logistics, communication, engineering, and mobility support elements remain

Source: Australian Department of Defense, 30 November 2006.

Notes: This table shows Australian Defense Force (ADF) levels and significant decisions concerning deployments since Operation Astute was launched. The ADF personnel deployed in Timor-Leste were further supplemented by significant naval deployments, including two amphibious landing ships, three heavy landing ships and a guided missile frigate. For information on the UN presence in Timor-Leste, see p. 90 and 333.

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Unique in its breadth and depth of coverage, the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* presents the most detailed collection of data on peace operations—those launched by the UN, by regional organizations, by coalitions, and by individual nations—that is available. Features of the 2007 volume include:

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The editorially independent *Review* is a project of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in cooperation with the International Peace Academy

