Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace

Alhaji M. S. Bah and Ian Johnstone
Sudan presented the most complex, combined peacekeeping challenges to the international community in 2006. It hosted two operations, one run by the United Nations to oversee the north-south peace process, and the other by the African Union to manage the Darfur crisis. Faced with a frequently hostile government in the north and a largely indifferent one in the south, the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) struggled to hold the parties to the terms of a comprehensive peace agreement they signed in early 2005. The African Union mission (AMIS) faced even greater obstacles. Despite (or perhaps because of) the peace agreement signed by the government of Sudan and one rebel faction in May 2006, security and humanitarian conditions in Darfur worsened. The long-planned exit strategy for AMIS—a handover to the UN—was blocked by the unyielding opposition of the government, whose good faith was further cast into doubt by a major military offensive in the fall. While debate and planning for such a transition occupied much of the year, it was not until the end of 2006 that key outside actors began to forge a common position. In November, the UN increased its support for the AU and agreement was reached in principle on a hybrid UN-AU mission, but it took another month of diplomatic pressure to get the Sudanese government to agree to the concept. As 2007 approached, the north-south peace process was faltering and questions remained about the will and ability of the international community to make good on its commitment to protect civilians in Darfur.

Background

Signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in January 2005, the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) has as its centerpiece a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan after six years. In the interim period, the south is granted significant autonomy, while the NCP retains its authority in the north—including the continuation of Islamic law (sharia) (at least until elections are held in 2009). The two parties are to share power and wealth, while carrying out agreed security-related measures and resolving disputes over areas in southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile States, and Abyei.

Darfur has been in crisis since February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M)—later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—took up arms against the government to protest years of political and economic marginalization. The government of Sudan reacted by mobilizing the Arab militia, known as Janjaweed. Negotiations in 2004 produced a humanitarian cease-fire agreement between the government and two rebel groups. The AU then launched peace talks in Abuja, which progressed unevenly. This was due in part to a split in the SLA between a faction led by Minni Minawi, with support from the Zaghawa ethnic group, and a faction led by Abdoul Wahid al-Nour, with significant support from the Fur, the largest ethnic group in the region. High-level engagement and intense pressure from the United States during the final round of negotiations produced the Darfur peace agreement (DPA), signed by the government of Sudan and the SLA faction led by Minni Minawi, on 6 May 2006.

Meanwhile, in January 2005, an international commission of inquiry established by the UN Security Council found that crimes
against humanity and war crimes were probably committed in Darfur and that, while the government had not pursued a policy of genocide, some individuals may have committed acts with genocidal intent.\(^1\) In March 2005 the Security Council referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The prosecutor began investigations of fifty-one individuals identified by the commission. The Security Council also adopted a sanctions regime targeted at individuals who impede the peace process or commit atrocities.

**UNMIS: Key Developments in the North-South Peace Process**

UNMIS is in most respects a typical Chapter VI multidimensional peacekeeping operation, but faces unusual difficulties in dealing with a strong central government and a nascent southern government, neither of which wants the UN to play a proactive role in managing their relations. The mission was established by the Security Council in March 2005 to support implementation of the CPA. It provides good offices, monitors the cease-fire between north and south, oversees the redeployment of armed groups, assists with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and has a mandate to restructure the police forces, monitor human rights, promote the rule of law, facilitate the return of displaced persons, and prepare for elections and referenda. UNMIS operates under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, though it does have Chapter VII authority to protect civilians.

At the start of 2006, UNMIS had only reached 40 percent of its authorized military strength, which rose to 78 percent by early March and close to full strength by the middle of the year. Police deployment followed a similar pattern, while civilian recruitment was further behind schedule, with a vacancy rate of 36.5 percent at the end of September. UNMIS operates in difficult conditions. In addition to a massive area to be covered, roads are often impassable during the rainy season, and the northern government in particular has imposed restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as other obstructions like customs delays. At times during 2006, security conditions rendered certain places off limits or only accessible with force protection. However, some of the UN’s difficulties in Sudan were self-inflicted. Procurement and recruitment faced major delays. By September 2006, resignations and contract nonrenewals had reached a rate of one person per day, outstripping the pace of hiring. Though nominally “unified,” the mission suffered from inordinately poor coordination. The expulsion of SRSG Jan Pronk in October, after being declared persona non grata (see below), did
not seem to affect day-to-day operations significantly, but it did reinforce the sense of UN vulnerability to government pressure.

Power and Wealth Sharing
The CPA is, at its core, a deal between two political-military elites. The personal connection between John Garang and Ali Osman Taha, the architects of the peace agreement, who later became vice presidents in the government of national unity (GNU), was to be the driving force of implementation. The death of Garang in mid-2005 resulted in the erosion of relations between the two parties. Taha has been weakened by hard-liners in the NCP who have felt cornered by international pressure due to the situation in Darfur. Meanwhile, no progress had been made on delineating the rest of the north-south border, which could also affect the distribution of oil reserves, as well as the outcome of the 2011 referendum. Disputes over oil revenues, half of which go to the government of southern Sudan during the interim period, add another layer of complexity to a tense relationship.

UNMIS’s ability to impact the resolution of these issues is constrained by its lack of presence in the commissions and committees set up to deal with them. This is part of a larger problem. Under the CPA, the parties agreed to deal with most matters bilaterally. The UN can cajole and offer advice, but unless the parties are receptive, there is little more it can do. The NCP in particular has been stalling on implementation of the CPA, and has little interest in turning to the UN for help in resolving its disputes with the SPLM. The heavy international focus on Darfur throughout the year only caused the NCP to harden its stance. Meanwhile, UNMIS has been urging the SPLM to become more assertive in the CPA commissions, and more generally in the GNU “partnership,” but to little avail. The SPLM, reportedly experiencing serious internal divisions, seems to lack both the capacity and inclination to reverse the NCP’s stalling and its determination to limit UNMIS’s role.

While direct engagement with the parties on the core issues was not making much headway in 2006, UNMIS sought to move forward on DDR, security sector reform, human rights, the rule of law, and preparation for elections. But again, with an assistance mandate only,
UNMIS’s effectiveness depended on the receptivity of the northern and southern governments. One small success toward the end of the year was the reconvening of the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), which serves as a vehicle for including groups (political parties and civil society) in the political process, in addition to the signatories of the peace agreement. Against a backdrop of increasing marginalization of UNMIS, this sort of progress was seen as a small step toward opening political space in the north. With elections scheduled for 2009, UNMIS was starting to think more about how it could work with all political actors, including opposition parties.

Meanwhile, the government of southern Sudan has adopted its interim constitution, passed a budget (almost half of which is devoted to building SPLA capacity), and established a minimal administrative presence throughout the south. However, the SPLM has little incentive to govern in an inclusive way, given its dominance of the southern legislative assembly. UNMIS can partly address this through its rule of law, human rights, and civil affairs activities, all of which were starting to get off the ground in the latter half of 2006, though with few tangible results, such as local reconciliation initiatives. The much-delayed release of recovery funds, administered by the World Bank, should also help in the south, in terms of both building capacity and delivering a peace dividend.

**Security**

Although UNMIS had reached its full deployment of uniformed personnel by the middle of 2006, the security situation worsened. There are four interrelated sources of insecurity in the south: other armed groups, ethnic clashes, an undisciplined SPLA, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Tension in the east of the country was also a concern throughout much of the year, but in October the government of Sudan and the Eastern Front signed a peace agreement following four months of talks facilitated by Eritrea. Widely viewed as a deal between the governments of Sudan and Eritrea that sidesteps many of the demands of the former rebels, it remains to be seen whether the peace will hold.

The term “other armed groups” (OAGs) refers to those who were meant to have joined either the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA by March 2006. Approximately 15,000 combatants were integrated into the SPLA by that date. This left out at least thirty groups aligned to the SAF during the war. Meanwhile, only 38 percent of SAF personnel had redeployed north from the Upper Nile region, leaving an explosive mix of SAF, SPLA, and other armed groups in close proximity. While direct fighting between the armies of the north and south were rare throughout 2006, a major clash occurred in Malakal on 28 November, which began as a confrontation between the SPLA and an SAF-aligned OAG. This was the worst incident between SAF and SPLA forces since the signing of the CPA, highlighting the volatile security situation caused by the continued presence of militias.

Intercommunal violence was a serious and growing problem throughout the year. Competition over land, water, and grazing rights, exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms, could easily escalate. While the spontaneous return of about 1.5 million displaced persons by October 2006 had not caused major security problems, the larger numbers scheduled to come back in 2007 could. Concerned that SAF-supported militias were exploiting these tensions, in early 2006 the SPLA decided to disarm some youth members of a local militia by force, killing many. This incident, in addition to ill-discipline in the SPLA, raised alarm bells in UNMIS. Later in the year, the SPLA shifted to a more voluntary approach to disarming civilians, facilitated by UNMIS.

The LRA—the Ugandan rebel group whose leaders were indicted by the ICC—was a major security problem at the start of 2006. Talks sponsored by the government of southern Sudan in September appeared to bring that problem under control, but the SPLA struggled to maintain security at LRA assembly points.
UNMIS has a number of tools at its disposal to address the growing security threats. The mission’s force commander chairs the Cease-Fire Joint Military Committee, reputed to be one of the few CPA-related bodies that functions well. When it reached full deployment, UNMIS began to take a more proactive role in defusing conflicts involving armed groups. It can react quite quickly to prevent escalation, although shortage of air assets limits mobility. Consistent with the “unified mission” concept, some of these interventions take a team approach, involving military personnel, police, and civilians. UNMIS is the first UN operation to have “protection” and “relief, reintegration, and recovery” units—an institutional innovation designed to ensure better integration with political and security concerns. Although the mission could respond robustly to threats to civilians under its Chapter VII mandate if necessary, its capacity to manage a major breakdown in security is doubtful.

Other security-related tasks performed by UNMIS include DDR and security sector reform. The DDR process is led by the northern and southern governments, and little progress had been made by October 2006, given that neither side has an incentive to tackle disarmament seriously until south Sudan’s status is resolved in the 2011 referendum. An interim DDR program for children, women, and disabled soldiers had made some progress by the end of the year, but was disappointingly slow. UNMIS has been constrained given the political sensitivities and the emphasis on “national ownership.” The UN’s only explicit SSR mandate is to restructure and train police forces. Its effort is concentrated in the south, where a strategy to work with local police on community policing had begun to take shape. The 665 UN civilian police officers do not have an explicit monitoring mandate, but co-location and joint patrolling began in the middle of the year as a form of on-the-job training. The Sudan police resisted the involvement of UNMIS in their activities, but the GNU police, after a year of pushing, accepted a human rights training package.

Thus, while the security situation in the south is not dire, there are disturbing signs. Communal tensions could rise alongside increased returns and new displacement caused by oil exploration. The problem of armed combatants—not integrated into a formal structure—has yet to be resolved, especially as the SAF has continued to use them to provoke instability along the border with the south. The restrictions of movement around Abyei, by the SAF since the start of the mission, and by the SPLA since September 2006, are worrying, as are command and control problems in the SPLA. As the year drew to a close, the possibility of large-scale fighting between north and south seemed remote, but its likelihood could increase in the lead-up to the scheduled 2009 elections and 2011 referendum, as the parties jockey for position and power.

AMIS: Key Developments in Darfur
Since October 2004, AMIS has had a peacekeeping mandate but little capacity to operate as anything more than an observer mission. It was established in May 2004 by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a small mission of 60 military observers, supported by a protection force of 300. Its original mandate was to monitor compliance with the N’djamena Agreement (a humanitarian cease-fire), assist with confidence-building measures, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In October 2004 it grew to a force of over 3,000, and assumed a stronger mandate, including protection of civilians under imminent threat. As the limits of its capacities quickly became apparent, AMIS continued to operate as an observer force. In March 2005 it was expanded again, to an authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police. At the end of October 2006, AMIS’s strength stood at over 7,000 uniformed personnel. While African countries provided troops, the European Union
In 2003 the African Union adopted a policy framework to establish the African Standby Force (ASF) as part of a broader continental security architecture. This was followed in March 2003 by the adoption of a roadmap for operationalization of the ASF. The ASF will comprise multidisciplinary (military, police, and civilian) regional standby brigades from central, eastern, northern, southern, and western Africa. The policy framework outlined six intervention scenarios, ranging from military advice, to a political mission, to intervention in situations involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Under the plan, advisory and complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions (Chapter VI) will deploy in thirty days, while those requiring robust military intervention will do so in fourteen days.

The ASF will be developed in two phases. The first phase, initially planned to be completed by 30 June 2005 (now extended to 2006), focused on developing strategic-level management capacity by the AU and the regional economic communities (RECs) to undertake advisory and Chapter VI peace operations, and preventive deployment. The second phase (2005–2010) is focusing on developing the strategic management capacity of the AU and RECs for complex peace operations, including robust military intervention. To date, progress on establishing the police and civilian components has lagged behind progress on the military component.

Progress in establishing the regional standby brigades has been varied. Eastern, West, Central, and Southern Africa have adopted their policy and legal frameworks, established the planning elements and provided military officers. These regions have all identified the location of logistics depots, but more in-depth studies need to be carried out to determine the feasibility of the locations. They have also received troop pledges of 3,500–4,000; 6,500; 3,655; and 4,000–6,000 respectively. North Africa has made slow progress relative to the other regions. The absence of a subregional political institution has been partially responsible for delays in this region.

The staffing of the Planning Element—the hub of the ASF—at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa has been slow; although its first chief of staff, Major-General Ishaya Isah Hassan, was appointed at the end of 2005.

In 2006, the AU Peace Support Operations Division, in collaboration with the RECs, organized workshops on doctrine, logistics, training and evaluation, command and control, standing operating procedures, and a draft policy framework on the civilian and police components of the ASF. These core policy areas were harmonized at a follow-on workshop in October 2006, and were presented to the African Chiefs of Defense Staff for approval. Much more work remained to be done on the financial, health, and legal aspects of the ASF. As the ASF development unfolded this year, the EU, Group of Eight (G8), and other bilateral partners funded the workshops and provided military and civilian experts to work with their African counterparts.

In 2004, during its summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the G8 launched an action plan to expand global capacity for peace support operations. At the same time, the US government announced a new initiative on global peace operations, which aims to train and equip a total of 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010. The plan would initially focus on Africa to bridge the gap between increasing demand and existing capacities. Under this initiative, approximately $660 million are to be provided for training, equipment, and logistical support, with 75 percent of training efforts aimed at African armed forces. In the 2006 fiscal year, 44 percent of the $100 million went to twelve Africa-only projects. While the ECOWAS secretariat was the beneficiary of the majority of assistance to regional organizations, many of the ECOWAS are being replicated for the African Union. The GPOI funds also support three peace operations training centers: The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, the École de Maintien de la Paix in Mali, and the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya. Previous G8-focused initiatives are elaborated in a joint Africa-G8 plan to enhance African capabilities for undertaking peace operations, one goal of which is to support the development of the African Standby Force. While Italy has established the Center on Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as part of the G8 plan, other initiatives remain largely uncoordinated.
provided logistics and financial support, NATO provided strategic airlift, and the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and others provided additional bilateral assistance—an indication of an emerging division of labor of sorts.

From late 2004 to mid-2005, AMIS was quite effective, due in large measure to good cooperation from the rebel groups in Darfur. The Janjaweed were less cooperative, but tended to operate at night and so there were few opportunities for direct confrontation with AMIS. As the security situation deteriorated in late 2005 and pressure for a peace agreement grew in early 2006, there was public discussion for the first time about handing over peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN. The rationale for the transition, which had been the AU exit strategy from the start, was the UN’s greater capacity for the sort of multidimensional operation that would be required to oversee a comprehensive peace agreement.

With the signing of the Darfur peace agreement, and the government of Sudan’s continued resistance to a transition to a UN operation in Darfur, AMIS adopted a new concept of operations in mid-2006. Subsequently, the AU proposed an expansion of the force by 4,000 troops, bringing the total to approximately 11,000. But it was not clear where they would come from, how quickly they could be deployed, or what funding arrangements would be in place. Partly to fill the gap, the AU and UN jointly agreed on a package of support to AMIS, consisting of 105 military, 33 police, and 48 civilian advisers, as well as 36 armored personnel carriers and other equipment. In meetings in Addis Ababa and then Abuja in November, agreement was reached on a so-called “heavy support package” of some 3,000 personnel.

The Darfur Peace Agreement and Its Implementation

The year 2006 began with a deteriorating security situation in Darfur, doubts about AMIS’s ability to sustain a robust operation, and determination to reach a peace agreement between the government and rebel groups. Under pressure from the United States to complete the AU-led Abuja talks, the Darfur peace agreement was signed in early June. Modeled on the north-south comprehensive peace agreement, it addresses the contentious issues of security, power, and wealth sharing. It calls for disarmament of Janjaweed militia. Minni Minawi was appointed special assistant to the president, the fourth highest position in the GNU, as well as chair of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. The DPA calls for a referendum, by July 2010, to decide whether Darfur should be a region with a single local government, or a collection of three states. The DPA parties have agreed to establish a reconstruction and development fund, to which the GNU is to contribute $700 million over three years.

The appointment of Minni Minawi widened the rift with the SLA-Wahid and JEM, who had rejected the DPA, as it failed to address some of their key demands, such as individual (as opposed to group) compensation, the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, a vice-presidential position reserved for Darfur, and justice for those who experienced atrocities. Efforts by the AU and others, including threats of sanctions against the leaders of the two groups, failed to bring them on board. However,
some individuals within the two nonsignatory groups signed a Declaration of Commitment (DoC) in support of the DPA.

The post-DPA period witnessed an increased splintering and realigning of the rebel groups, with conflicting and competing demands. The National Redemption Front (NRF) and G19 were the most notable groups to emerge during this period. Meanwhile, the government of Sudan and SLA-Minni used the DPA to mount attacks on the nonsignatories. Starting in August 2006, the government amassed thousands of troops and weaponry in the region, and attacked several towns and villages. While hostilities between the DPA signatories decreased, fighting between them and the nonsignatories increased. In addition, AMIS itself increasingly became the target of attacks by the latter.

Compounding these growing security problems, the humanitarian and human rights situation deteriorated significantly in the post-DPA period. With approximately 14,000 aid workers and about 85 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Darfur hosted the biggest humanitarian operation in the world. Fighting between the various rebel groups, the government of Sudan, and the Janjaweed militia created more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and forced humanitarian agencies to withdraw from affected areas. By August 2006, humanitarian access had dropped to its lowest level since 2004. Attacks against civilians and UN and NGO staff increased during the year, with violent deaths in the first half of 2006 up nearly 400 percent over the same period in 2005.2 In late November, as the government placed new obstacles in the way of humanitarian action, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs told the Security Council that the crisis in Darfur was “closer to the abyss” than at any time since 2004.

To carry out the new tasks emanating from the DPA, such as monitoring buffer zones and grazing routes, as well as the protection of civilians, AMIS developed a new concept of operations in June 2006. By then, its ability to carry out even its monitoring mandate had
Between 1997 and 2005, nearly as many humanitarian aid workers lost their lives to violence as did uniformed peacekeepers. All told, 947 civilian aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured by armed attacks during the nine-year period. These are among the findings of a joint study by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and the Humanitarian Policy Group/Overseas Development Institute (ODI): Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations (see http://www.cic.nyu.edu or http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg).

Drawing on the most comprehensive global dataset to date of reported major incidents of violence against aid workers, the study found that the absolute number of attacks on aid workers each year has nearly doubled since 1997. The proliferating numbers of violent incidents have contributed to the widespread perception that aid workers are increasingly targeted, and that the risk of violence against them is higher today than ever before. The study’s statistical analysis, however, reveals that the situation is not as dire as it appears. By calculating yearly estimates of the population of aid workers in the field (a population that increased roughly 77 percent from 1997 to 2005), the study demonstrates that the global incidence of violence against aid workers rose only slightly over 1997–2005.

The analysis also shows that, with the exception of Iraq in 2003–2004, Somalia was the most dangerous environment for aid workers, followed by Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, North Caucasus, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan in particular has had an upswing in violence recently, as aid workers increasingly fall victim to violence in Darfur. From the start of 2005 to the third quarter of 2006, Sudan led the field, with the highest number of attacks committed against aid workers (thirty-seven incidents involving ninety-four victims). In these contexts, however, local aid workers, relative to their numbers in the field, are suffering increasing casualties, while their international colleagues are becoming relatively less at-risk.

Perceptions of increased risk have led to greater reliance on local actors and national staff to deliver aid. So-called remote management programming allows operations to continue, but often results in less effective and less strategic programming. The study argues that humanitarian organizations have failed to fully consider the impact and ethics of remote management. Recommendations are offered for strengthening operational security and aid management in insecure environments, including through development of local capacity.

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**Box 2.2 Sharing the Front Lines: Aid Workers Under the Gun**

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**Table: Violent Incidents Against Aid Workers by Year**

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>Total Aid Worker Victims</th>
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<th>ICRC</th>
<th>IFRC</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Donor/Other</th>
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*The figure of 947 includes those killed in the bombing of the UN’s Baghdad headquarters in August 2003, but not the estimated 150 people injured in that incident. Records are insufficient to determine the number and affiliation of the injured.
diminished, for a variety of reasons. It had limited access to areas controlled by groups opposed to the DPA, and could not maintain a twenty-four-hour presence in some IDP camps. The politicized environment and the insecurity meant that AMIS could not execute its strategy of protection by presence, a strategy that had worked well in the past. Despite the deployment of over 90 percent of the mission’s authorized personnel, the financial and logistical challenges were acute. Financial shortfalls left mission personnel without salaries and allowances for months on end. Aiming to restructure and enhance the existing force, the AMIS force commander requested six additional battalions in September 2006. However, given the logistical and financial constraints (and hesitations on the part of donors), initial efforts centered on the possibility of two additional battalions.

A new cease-fire commission and joint commission were inaugurated in June 2006 to monitor the cease-fire under the DPA and previous agreements. This forced AMIS to experiment with two cease-fire commissions, one for the N’djamena Agreement and the other for the DPA. This experiment was dogged by controversy, as the DPA parties objected to the participation of nonparties in the two new bodies. The government of Sudan declared the NRF a terrorist group, and claimed the government could not guarantee the security of nonsignatories on the CFC. AMIS suspended representatives of the nonsignatories on 16 August in an attempt to put an end to the paralysis of the two bodies. As a result, AMIS increasingly came to be seen as biased in favor of the DPA parties. The parties referred to the decision as an act of war—an implicit threat against AMIS personnel and property. Moreover, the suspension severed the only link AMIS had with these groups, making it difficult for the mission to verify cease-fire violations and attacks on its personnel in areas controlled by the nonsignatories. However, a meeting of the DPA Joint Commission in November approved a proposal for the establishment of a two-chamber CFC: one for the DPA and DoC signatories and another for nonsignatories. A proposal for a third chamber involving all the parties was left to the discretion of the force commander.

The AU established a DPA implementation team (DPAIT) to work closely with the chair of the proposed Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), loosely modeled on Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga. The DDDC was designed as a bottom-up approach to remedy the top-down approach of the Abuja talks, and to encourage dialogue among the people of Darfur for identifying problems, proffering solutions, and choosing their leaders (with external partners acting as facilitators). One of the DPA implementation strategies is to undertake quick-impact projects to rebuild schools and clinics, sink boreholes, and expedite the establishment of a compensation committee. Nonetheless, the vast majority of people rejected the DPA, making its implementation and the convening of the DDDC problematic. The chairperson of the DDDC’s preparatory committee was finally appointed in September 2006, but little progress had been made by the end of October.

The Politics of Transition

The increased insecurity in the post-DPA period—and the need to implement the agreement—increased the motivation for transition to a UN force. While AMIS had done a laudable job since its initial deployment, the mission could not address the intractable political and security problems given its human resource, financial, and logistics constraints. On 10 January 2006, the PSC decided in principle to hand over the operation to the UN. The UN Security Council welcomed the decision and requested the Secretary-General to embark on contingency planning in consultation with the AU, the GNU, and other stakeholders. The PSC reiterated its position in March and extended the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006, while stressing that the transition would require the consent of
the government of Sudan and the continued African character of the mission.

A UN Security Council mission visited Sudan and Chad in June to boost efforts to implement the DPA, and to pave the way for the transition. The Council’s visit was followed by a joint AU-UN technical assessment team, led by UN Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno of the UN and AU Commissioner Said Djinnit. The Security Council and the assessment mission concluded that AMIS should hand over to a larger, more robust, multidimensional UN operation, and that AMIS should be strengthened in the interim. President Omar al-Bashir rejected the proposed transition, arguing that the AU had no right to hand over its mission, especially since the DPA deliberately left out such a reference.

Claiming that the government of Sudan was capable of restoring security and protecting the civilian population in Darfur, President Bashir presented the UN Secretary-General with a plan to deploy 27,550 government troops and police, along with 4,000 Sudan Liberation Movement (i.e., SLA-Minni) fighters to the region, signaling the government’s intent to pursue a military option.

The GNU was not united in its rejection of the proposed transition. While members of NCP vehemently opposed the transition, SPLM leader Salva Kiir openly voiced his support, as did Minni Minawi, the DPA nonsignatories, and the vast majority of Darfur’s population. The AU as an organization has been steadfast in its public support for a transition, but in private dealings with the government of Sudan, some North African countries have been equivocal.

Based on recommendations presented by the UN Secretary-General, on 31 August the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, expanding the mandate of UNMIS to include support for implementation of the DPA and the N’djamena Agreement, and to use all necessary means to protect civilians. UNMIS would be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel, 3,300 civilian police, including 16 formed police units (of 125 each) and 3,000 civilians. The resolution also called for the UN to support AMIS, pending the transition to a UN force. Twelve members of the Council voted in favor of the resolution, while China, Russia, and Qatar abstained.

Although the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII, the Security Council invited the GNU to consent to the UN deployment. The government of Sudan forcefully rejected the deployment, reiterated its threats to wage a jihad (holy war) on any UN troops deployed to Darfur, and demanded that the AU leave Darfur at the expiration of its mandate, on 30 September 2006, unless it accepted financial assistance from the League of Arab States and the GNU, though the government of Sudan later retracted this ultimatum. The government claimed that the UN would not be impartial, as the international community had not condemned the DPA nonsignatories for their violent acts. An unstated worry of the government of Sudan was that the “international community” was pushing for regime change, and that a UN force would arrest senior government officials indicted by the International Criminal Court. Perhaps even more worrying to the NCP was the fear of Darfur gaining independence.

In October, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jan Pronk reported on his personal blog that the SAF had lost two major battles in Darfur in September 2006, with hundreds of casualties, many prisoners taken, and some soldiers refusing to fight. The report prompted first the Sudanese military and then the government (without consulting the SPLM) to declare Mr. Pronk persona non grata on 20 October. He left three days later for “consultations with the Secretary-General” in New York. It was there decided that Mr. Pronk would continue as SRSG until the end of the year, based outside of Sudan. His deputy, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, would assume day-to-day responsibilities pending the appointment of a new SRSG.
In mid-November, a meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General in Addis Ababa led to an agreement “in principle” on a hybrid UN-AU force. This was confirmed at an AU PSC meeting in December, as part of a three-phase process: UN light support to AMIS, followed by a larger support package and eventual transition to a hybrid force. With January 1 approaching—a critical date because it marked the end of the AMIS mandate as well as the term of Kofi Annan—pressure grew for the deployment of an expanded force and a re-energized political process in Darfur. At the end of December, the government finally agreed to the hybrid force. But with continuing reservations about the size, as well as command and control arrangements, it was clear that it would take some time to get a major UN presence on the ground.

Meanwhile, violence that had been spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic for much of the year prompted the dispatch of a UN technical assessment mission to consider the possible deployment of a multidimensional presence to both countries. On 22 December, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the conditions for a UN peacekeeping operation did not exist, mainly because the rebel groups would oppose it. He went on to state that, if the Council decided to deploy a mission, it should be a robust force with a mandate to monitor the borders and protect civilians.

**Conclusion**

In late 2006, international attention was focused on Darfur, while the north-south peace process was faltering. The outline of a unified international strategy was starting to emerge for both conflicts, but it was not clear whether either would come to fruition or succeed.

The strategy on Darfur had three elements: broadening support for the DPA, enhancing the capacity of AMIS, and convincing the NCP to accept a transition to a UN mission. On the
first, it was clear the government of Sudan would not agree to renegotiate the DPA, but some aspects of it could be “revisited,” such as individual compensation, the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, and more equitable power-sharing. It was hoped that this, plus other inducements, would bring the nonsignatories on board and would win the support of the broader population.

By the end of October, progress had already been made on enhancing AMIS in the form of a new concept of operations, changes in the mission leadership, and the UN light-support package. However, there was a disconnect between the Security Council’s approval in August of a much larger, more robust UN operation, and the minimal enhancements of AMIS described above. If 20,000 uniformed personnel were seen as necessary to bring a measure of security to Darfur, then the latter hardly seemed like an alternative, even as a stop-gap measure. Moreover, with the government of Sudan having successfully resisted pressure for a speedy transition to the UN, it was better placed than ever to dictate terms on what happened in Darfur. Whatever new capacity AMIS may acquire, its political weaknesses vis-à-vis an emboldened government raised troubling questions about whether it would be able to turn the tide on its declining effectiveness.

As for the prospects of a transition, with nobody volunteering troops to intervene coercively, the consent of the government was essential. Better diplomacy, including among major outside players like the United States and China, might well have prevented matters reaching stalemate in September. The NCP’s genuine worries about losing Darfur (seeing a parallel with the south), and about ICC prosecutions, could have been addressed, at least to the extent that a UN presence in the region would not have a decisive impact one way or the other. Moreover, formal consent of the government without any intention to cooperate would not be a sound basis for deploying a UN force, of any size. The NCP needed incentives to give up the military option. In those circumstances, only so much could be achieved by “megaphone diplomacy” (as the UN Deputy Secretary-General put it). A consensus seemed to be emerging at the end of the year that a more nuanced approach was required, combining carrots and sticks, with China and Arab and African countries delivering reassuring messages to complement the tougher messages coming from the United States and United Kingdom.

In October 2006 the United States raised the level of its political engagement by appointing a senior envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios. Meanwhile, the five Security Council permanent members were working to forge a common message in their dealings with the Sudanese government. Similarly, Secretary-General Annan put together a set of “common principles” to guide the efforts of the UN, AU, and League of Arab States behind the scenes. The November meeting in Addis Ababa saw a convergence among the outside actors, with the UN and AU leading the process and the P5, EU, and LAS committing to support it. This seemed to bear fruit in the form of the government’s agreement on a hybrid mission.

Overlaying the three elements of a strategy on Darfur was how to ensure it did not detract from the north-south peace process. While there is logic in delinking the two, given that the international focus on the former seemed to be to the detriment of the latter, the government of Sudan had an incentive to keep them linked. The NCP may ultimately be able to live with losing the south if it can be assured of enough access to oil; it could not tolerate the loss of Darfur. It might therefore be tempted to give ground on north-south issues in order to gain SPLM support on Darfur.

There is an even more fundamental linkage between the two issues. Whether the north-south process leads to unity or secession (both sides seem to be working on the assumption that it will be the latter), the top priority for UNMIS and other international actors is to ensure that the end result occurs
peacefully and is sustainable. For that to happen, not only must the parties to the conflict settle the core issues that divide them, but the governments they lead (in the north and south) must also meet minimal standards of participatory governance. While all eyes are focused on the crisis in Darfur, the 2009 elections also warrant attention now because they have the potential to transform the political landscape. If converting the SPLM into an inclusive government is likely to be difficult, the challenge in the north is much greater. The NCP has little incentive to transform its style of governing, especially if it has given up on ever “making unity attractive” to the south. But peace will not be sustainable unless all groups feel they have a stake in the future of the country. The conflict in Darfur stems from a long and brutal history of marginalization. Unless that is rectified by building a more inclusive political community in the north, any peace is likely to be short-lived.

Notes