Strategic Summary
2006
The year 2006 saw profound changes in the political and strategic environment for peace operations, many of which could not have been predicted at the start of the year. There have been significant successes, such as the UN’s oversight of elections in Haiti and, most strikingly, the Democratic Republic of Congo. But these have been balanced—and frequently eclipsed—by severe challenges. The latter included the return of international troops and police to Timor-Leste after its reversion to violence; the intense opposition faced by NATO forces in Afghanistan; and the need to sustain the African Union’s troops in Darfur while the Sudanese government blocked the deployment of a UN force to the region. And there were surprises, notably the deployment of a large European-led UN force to Lebanon.

The year’s challenges resulted in a major new expansion of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping deployments. From January 2000 to September 2005, the number of UN military and police personnel on duty worldwide grew from 18,600 to 68,500, while those deployed by regional organizations fell from 108,300 to 48,000. The previous edition of this Review warned that these trends were “already straining the capacity” of the UN. But in the twelve months from 1 October 2005 to 31 October 2006, the number of UN troops, military observers, and police personnel rose to 81,000—and if all current mandates were fulfilled, and civilian staff added in, the UN would eventually have 140,000 peacekeeping personnel in the field. This would almost double the UN’s previous peak of 77,000 during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the decline in deployments by regional organizations has been reversed. In the twelve months up to 30 September 2006, the number of troops deployed by NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and other regional organizations jumped from 52,700 to 68,000—a rise of 28 percent, largely driven by increases in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

Alongside this increase in military activity, 2006 also witnessed new dilemmas for the policing and peacebuilding elements of peace operations. The importance of these had been recognized in the 2005 World Summit’s decision to establish the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Standing Police Capacity within the UN—both the Group of Eight (G8) and the EU also pursued policing initiatives. But Timor-Leste’s relapse into violence raised hard questions about failings in earlier international peacebuilding efforts there, and also led to a new mandate to deploy 1,608 police—the Security Council also envisaged sending 3,300 police officers to Darfur. While the Peacebuilding Commission took up the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, the international community struggled to identify ways to reconstruct the Lebanese state without provoking a confrontation with Hezbollah. (For trends in civilian and police deployments, see the information box on p. 9.)

Given the diversity of peace operations and the rapidity of their evolution, it is risky to generalize about the state of peacekeeping. But it is clear that the rate of growth raises a basic question: Is the present level of activity sustainable? This is a matter of global strategic concern—peace operations increasingly involve the flow of personnel between as
well as within regions, be they Bangladeshi troops in Africa, Europeans in Afghanistan, or Chinese in Lebanon. The scale of deployments challenges our preconceptions about the resources required. In 2004, US scholars Michael O’Hanlon and Peter Singer estimated the need for a “total pool of 200,000 international peacekeepers,” including at least 20,000 police. As of September 2006, there were over 140,000 UN and non-UN troops and police deployed worldwide in addition to 162,000 troops in Iraq. UN mandates called for about 35,000 more. Both the demand for and the supply of personnel is challenging previous predictions—as well as the resources of the international community.

In this context, it is necessary to analyze the trends that may affect the deployment and effectiveness of peacekeepers, including the distribution of peace operations worldwide and the sources of troops for those missions. It is also necessary to highlight the extent to which current circumstances have caused international institutions and states to approve innovative hybrid peace operations—but also to blur the line between peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, making new deployments harder.

### Diversifying Deployments

The overall growth in peace operations has been driven by the geographical diversification of the military deployments of the UN, NATO, and the EU. For the UN and NATO, this has involved increased engagement in the Greater Middle East. As of September 2005, the UN maintained 51,400 (82 percent) of its troops and military observers in Africa, and only 3,200 (5 percent) in the Middle East. The Lebanese crisis transformed its presence in the latter: by September 2006 it had 6,400 soldiers in the region, and the UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was mandated to reach 15,000.

However, the increased importance of the UN’s operations in the Middle East was offset by its continued role in Africa. In the year ending at September 2006, the UN military presence on the continent grew from 51,400 to 54,500, increasingly concentrated in its four large-scale missions in DRC, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia. Although the UN reduced its role elsewhere in Africa, withdrawing troops from Sierra Leone in December 2005 and drawing down its mission in Burundi through 2006, Africa still represented 75 percent of its global
deployments at the end of October, relative to 14 percent in the Middle East.

In August 2006, the Security Council mandated an expansion of the Sudan mission (UNMIS) for Darfur by 17,300 military personnel, 3,300 civilian police, including up to 16 formed police units, and 3,000 civilians, although it had not won Khartoum’s consent for this mission by the end of November. If UNIFIL was to reach its full authorized strength, African missions would still account for three-quarters of the UN’s military commitment in terms of personnel. Even if UN peacekeeping thus faced major political challenges in the Middle East, this has not been balanced by a reduction of its obligations across Africa—exacerbating the strain it faces.

NATO experienced a far clearer shift in its deployment patterns. In September 2005, NATO oversaw missions of 17,200 troops in Kosovo and 12,400 in Afghanistan—a year later, the former force had shrunk slightly, while the latter had grown to 20,000. In October 2006 NATO took command of 12,600 US troops in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it still faces constraints in the Greater Middle East, demonstrated by the rejection of proposals that it should deploy to Lebanon.

The EU’s diversification was smaller in scale, and focused on Africa. In the third quarter of 2005 it fielded 6,700 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but none outside Europe, although it had civilian missions in Africa and Asia and had intervened in the DRC in 2003. In September 2006 its presence in Bosnia had fallen to below 6,000, while it had committed 2,400 troops to reinforcing the UN in Kinshasa—although most of the latter were being held in reserve in Gabon and Europe.

While NATO and the EU have significantly altered their global military profiles, the third major regional organization in peacekeeping, the AU, has remained more static. In March 2006 it launched a short-term and successful combined military and police mission of 1,226 to support elections in Comoros, but it primarily remained focused on its operation in Darfur.

While the AU has supported a transfer to a UN mission in Darfur, it has aimed to go elsewhere. In 2005 the AU’s Peace and Security Council had explored options for a deployment alongside the UN in the DRC. In 2006 it authorized an East African subregional organization, the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), to deploy up to 8,000 peacekeepers to Somalia in expectation of an AU follow-on force. Although Uganda had pledged 3,000 troops to IGAD and despite the UN Security Council’s authorization of the mission in December, the deployment was blocked by financial, logistical, and political obstacles.

Elsewhere, ad hoc coalitions continued to make equally important contributions to peacekeeping, as in the deployment of an Australian-led multinational force to Timor-Leste in May 2006. And despite their rapid growth, the combined military deployments of the UN, NATO, the EU, and the AU in September 2006 still only represented 70 percent of the US-led and UN-mandated multinational force in Iraq.

Diversifying Troop Contributions
A second major shift in peace operations in 2006 concerned the supply of troops. The reinforcement of UNIFIL brought the first large-scale increase in European contributions to the UN since the Bosnian war. This should be seen in the context of further increases in European deployments through the EU and NATO, as well as significant increases in East Asian contributions to the UN. Nonetheless, the majority of UN peacekeepers continued to come from South Asia and Africa. In September 2005, 46 percent of UN military personnel were from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal—a year later, the four countries still accounted for 45 percent of forces.

Although UN deployments in Africa grew in 2006—and would grow far more in the case of a Darfur deployment—the number of African UN peacekeepers actually fell slightly, from 19,100 to 18,600, between September 2005 and September 2006. Nevertheless, Africa remained the second largest regional contributor to UN operations, providing 27 percent of forces, a 4 percent drop from 2005. In the same period, the AU force in Darfur remained level at 7,000, despite plans to expand it by an additional 4,000. This may reflect the fact that, in quantitative terms, African forces come from a relatively small number of states—and as the table below shows, fewer than ten provide the bulk of both UN and AU forces. While the importance of smaller contributors with considerable peacekeeping experience (such as Ghana, Kenya,
and Tunisia) and untapped sources should not be underestimated, the difficulties in increasing the total of AU-led deployments reflect strains on a core group of militaries needed to sustain them.

If South Asia and Africa continued to supply the bulk of UN forces worldwide, two other regions appeared important to the UN’s ongoing operational expansion. The first of these was East Asia and the Pacific. By September 2006, this region supplied 3,500 UN peacekeepers. If this contribution was still only a tenth of South Asia’s, it was nonetheless twice the figure of a year before. It was also set to grow further, as China and Indonesia had pledged up to 1,000 troops each to UNIFIL. Even before the Lebanon deployment, China had more than doubled its UN commitments, from 700 troops and military observers in September 2005 to 1,500 by June 2006.

In that China’s active army of 1,600,000 is nearly half as large again as India’s, there has been speculation as to whether it may develop a peacekeeping role comparable to that of the South Asian states. To date, China has concentrated on offering enablers, such as medical units and engineers. It remains to be seen whether China will move toward deploying a fuller range of forces. But it may prove particularly important to the UN, the only organization through which China has as yet deployed.

The reverse is true for Europe, the second region contributing to the expansion of peace-
Keeping. Here, NATO, the EU, and the UN all offer institutional frameworks for deployments. We have seen that the NATO role in Afghanistan drew a considerable number of European peacekeepers into the Greater Middle East. The expansion of UNIFIL had a similar effect. European forces were already better represented in the UN’s Middle Eastern missions (UNIFIL, UNDOF, and UNTSO) than in the UN’s African operations before the Lebanese crisis. UNIFIL’s growth meant that by the end of September 2006, Europeans made up 70 percent of the expanding force. But as in Africa, European deployments have been driven in quantitative terms by a core group of states using the variety of institutions available (as well as single-nation deployments such as France’s Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, and ad hoc multinational frameworks, such as in Iraq), as shown in the table below, which compares UNIFIL with the main deployments of the EU and NATO. Six European nations (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) supplied half or more of the forces in each case. The percentages are higher for operations outside Europe—although the addition of US forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in October 2006 affected the ratio there considerably. Therefore, the relative expansion of European peacekeeping across all institutions relies heavily on the capacities of these countries.

Just as the UN has overseen a major influx of South Asian troops into African missions since 1999, it is now an institutional channel for Europeans to deploy into the Greater Middle East; NATO offers another. This reflects significant political obstacles to expanding the region’s own peacekeeping capacities. As of September 2006, the Middle East provided 3,000 peacekeepers to the UN, an increase of 600 compared to the year before—all but 31 of these were from Jordan. While Qatar promised a contingent of 300 troops to UNIFIL, the politics of the region’s conflicts and the lack of a regional institutional framework both militate against a major increase in Middle Eastern peacekeeping capacity.

While NATO has provided a mechanism for new European deployments, the US decision to transfer 12,600 troops to ISAF in October 2006, represented a significant shift, as US practice since 2001 had been to reduce the number of troops in NATO missions. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will act as a precedent for further US deployments through NATO and other formal multilateral structures. Meanwhile, Central and Latin
American states provided 10 percent of UN forces, concentrated in the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH), the only military peace operation in the region.

**Overstretch: Symptoms and Solutions**

As military deployment patterns altered through 2006, two trends emerged across global peace operations. The first was an increasing reliance on “hybrid” operations—those that mixed and matched the capacities from different organizations into common responses—to respond to the risk of overstretch. The second was an increase in the political problems in winning consent for operations—problems associated with the increasing use of force by and against missions.

**Hybrid Operations**

Hybrid peace operations are not new. Since the 1990s, there has been a complex interaction of organizations in the Balkans and West Africa, and the UN has entered into hybrid arrangements with multinational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Striking examples of hybridity in 2006 were the DRC, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Lebanon, although in each it took a different form. In the DRC, the UN and the EU deployed troops separately, but in coordination. The EU’s force was deployed at the UN’s request, for UN purposes, and carried out joint operations with MONUC in Kinshasa. Similarly, a balance has been found between the new UN police and Australian-led forces in Timor-Leste.

In Sudan, where the UN, NATO, the AU, and the EU have joined forces to develop a complex peacekeeping framework, the UN deployed UNMIS, a multidimensional operation, to oversee the north-south peace agreement. In Darfur, the AU deployed AMIS and received strategic lift support through NATO, while the EU provided additional lift, police and military advice, and (most crucially) funding. EU personnel worked in a cell within the AU command and control structure, while the UN provided planning resources for the AU (since 2004) through its assistance cell, and expanded its support to include a package of police, military, political advisers, and hardware.

Coordinating this level of complexity proved challenging. The establishment of a partner technical support group and a liaison group in Addis Ababa improved coordination among those involved, but the focus was on operational issues instead of strategy. The African Peace Facility, an EU financial instrument, proved to be a useful financing mechanism for AMIS, but the need to replenish this brought to the fore significant challenges for
If military peace operations remained level in Africa and grew in the Middle East, police missions have followed another pattern. The number of UN police grew by 29 percent, from 6,200 to 7,900, in the year ending 30 September 2006; the Security Council resolutions for Timor-Leste and Darfur meant that there was a theoretical requirement for 12,000 personnel. The majority of those police actually deployed were in three non-African missions: Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Haiti combined accounted for 54 percent of the total. But there has been a significant growth in the use of police in African missions, for which the total rose from 2,300 to 3,800 in the period under review. These were largely concentrated with the major UN military formations in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan. Conversely, there were no UN police in the Greater Middle East, except for eleven in Afghanistan, although the EU had a police training mission in the Palestinian territories.

While the focus of UN policing is thus moving to Africa, the sources of personnel are more diverse than in the case of the military, with Africa, Europe, and Central and South Asia providing roughly a quarter each. However, when non-UN police missions are taken into account, the shift toward Africa in terms of deployments and contributions becomes clearer still. While the EU reduced its residual police presence in the Balkans to fewer than 200, the AU expanded its police presence in Darfur to 1,425 (including 234 female officers) and deployed 30 officers to the Comoros in 2006. This increase in the use of international policing has received external support—the EU and UN assisted the AU police in Darfur. The AU’s deployment of a significant number of female police officers is also an important development.

The distribution of civilian political, peacebuilding, and monitoring missions is even more complex. The UN was responsible for four such missions at the start of 2006—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. A fifth, in Burundi, is under preparation, and long-term UN peacebuilding missions are likely to become the norm as larger African operations draw down. Among other international organizations, the EU’s civilian missions are the most varied, with legal advisory teams for Georgia and Iraq, border monitors for Moldova and the Palestinian territories, and demobilization monitors in Aceh, Indonesia. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was negotiated in part at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum, and staffed by observers from ASEAN nations alongside EU personnel.

AMM, though not a formal ASEAN operation, as command and management of the mission remained with the EU, is indicative of the particular complexity of civilian missions in Asia, where the UN presence is slight relative to Africa and the Middle East. The result is a variety of small-scale institutional and ad hoc initiatives, including monitors from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on the Philippine island of Mindanao, and from the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The fragility of such arrangements was highlighted in 2006 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) demanded that all EU citizens be removed from the SLMM, in response to its being declared a terrorist organization by the EU.
than its critics generally maintain.

Coordination questions were not confined to the AU, EU, and UN. NATO was confronted with logistical challenges and slow force generation in its engagement in Afghanistan. As NATO took on more responsibilities through 2006, debate regarding command structures, policy harmonization, national caveats, and simple manpower and equipment availability dominated discussions among NATO officials. Some complained about a lack of “rapid response” capacities, a function in large part of excess demands on NATO’s limited supply of helicopters—others put these problems...
down to an inequitable distribution of the burden among contributors. In September 2006, calls from NATO’s Supreme Command for 2,000 reinforcement troops nearly went unmet, until Poland volunteered 1,000.

**The Challenge of Consent**

But in Afghanistan—as in Lebanon, the DRC, and Darfur—the biggest obstacles to operational efficiency were often political. ISAF’s capacity problems reflected troop contributors’ domestic political sensitivities over its mandate to confront the Taliban alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Similarly, when Secretary-General Annan requested rapid deployment of an EU standby force for the DRC, debates among potential contributors ran on for three months. But when large numbers of peacekeepers were required for Lebanon, they were available to deploy rapidly. Yet the likelihood that Hezbollah might oppose the deployment of peacekeepers generated a tough debate over UNIFIL’s rules of engagement. Politicians and the media weighed the risks of an international and domestic backlash from either inflicting Muslim casualties or stumbling into a confrontation with Israeli forces. Generating domestic support for long-range operations remains a challenge for troop contributors.

Thus, while ISAF fought the Taliban, UNIFIL aimed to avoid conflict with Hezbollah and Israel. But the challenge of consent was not confined to these missions. From Timor-Leste to Haiti and the DRC, peacekeepers also confronted the challenge of political, military, and other groups who were dissatisfied with the results of transitional political processes or elections. In the DRC, this meant deploying additional combat capacity to provide security during elections and their aftermath, and also mounting robust operations to protect civilians—operations that resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. In such environments, peacekeeping can seem to blur into war-fighting, affecting public opinion both where troops are deployed and in their home countries.6

The most acute challenge of consent in 2006 came not from a nonstate actor, but a state: the Sudanese government’s protracted rejection of the transfer from the AU to the UN in Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 expanded the mandate of the UN mission in Sudan to include Darfur, and was adopted under Chapter VII, but required Khartoum’s consent before any deployment. Khartoum’s refusal to acquiesce was a serious political challenge to the UN, especially in light of the 2005 World Summit’s commitment to “a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The UN’s inability to deploy to Darfur was seen as damaging both to the norm and the institution. In spite of the shift of emphasis toward deploying an AU-UN hybrid in late 2006, questions remained over whether the Sudanese government would give its consent to command structures that vested decisionmaking power in the UN—the precise structure of a mission can prove open to negotiation as well as its basic deployment.

Sudan’s stance was also a challenge to the AU, which was in the early stages of developing its security architecture to tackle conflicts involving gross violations of human rights, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by its own members. The fact that the AU’s Peace and Security Council continued to seek Sudan’s consent for the transition to the UN, highlighted the gap between the interventionist provisions of the AU’s Constitutive Act and the political complexities of implementing them. Similarly, it was not clear how the AU planned to deal with the demand for rapid deployment of a peace operation to Somalia after the transitional government, backed by Ethiopian troops and aircraft, ousted the Union of Islamic Courts from Mogadishu and other areas it controlled. As peace operations expanded through 2006, so did the level of resistance to them.

**Conclusion**

Problems over hybrid operations, reports of violence from the DRC to Afghanistan, the
breakdown in Timor-Leste, and the failure to get the UN fully into Darfur all cast long shadows over peace operations in 2006. But any analysis of the performance of peace operations in this period must take one fact into account: there was no general collapse. The previous edition of this Review noted that the UN seemed to be facing chronic problems in deploying its forces. UNMIS was far behind schedule in deploying to southern Sudan, and MONUC had been denied requests for extra troops for the DRC by the Security Council. In early 2006, it appeared possible that the EU would not accede to the UN’s request for help in the DRC, that some NATO countries would not go to Afghanistan at all, and that AMIS would withdraw from Darfur.

The reality may have been grim, but it was not as bad as it could have been. MONUC managed to run the DRC polls against huge odds, the UN found a way to deploy rapidly to Lebanon, and EU and NATO members accepted responsibilities beyond Europe. Australia mounted an effective response in Timor-Leste. The AU struggled in Darfur, but held on. By the end of the year, deployments to peace operations, including operations in Iraq, had surpassed recent predictions of need, and new troop and police contributors had emerged in Asia. If hybrid operations were developing through trials and (sometimes tragic) errors, new modes of cooperation resulted.

Peacekeeping has thus managed to adapt to high-profile crises over the past year. But if peace operations are to be sustained at their current level, crisis-response mechanisms alone will not be enough. The international community also needs to deepen its shared understanding of how to consolidate hard-won peace agreements and translate them into lasting stability. This is a precondition for balancing global demand for peace operations with resources, and the subject of Ian Johnstone’s thematic chapter in this Review.

Notes
The information provided in the graphs and tables in this section, where not cited otherwise, has been aggregated from the data presented in Chapters 5 through 9 of this volume. For scaling purposes, the tables and graphs in this section do not take into account personnel deployed in the Multinational Force–Iraq.


3. In the event, operational requirements meant that these pledges did not need to be fulfilled in their entirety. For more on this issue, see p. 82 of this volume.

4. For an earlier discussion of hybrid operations, see Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, “Evolving Models of Peacekeeping” (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, 2005).

5. Additional direct financial, logistical, and planning support was provided by Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Netherlands, and Norway.