Strategic Summary
2007
The year 2007 was a troubled one for global peace operations. Following a successful 2005 and a surprisingly resilient 2006, in 2007 prominent peace operations in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East all encountered challenges that impeded their performance. These challenges arose primarily from failed or stalled political processes, though they were often manifested in insecurity or direct attacks on peacekeepers. In Africa, these issues were compounded by serious logistical challenges combined with weak commitments from troop contributors that slowed the pace of peacekeeping growth—indeed, despite authorization of new missions, the number of UN forces in Africa actually declined, by just over 2,000, in the period between October 2006 and October 2007. Political, security, and logistical challenges were all featured in one of the year’s most contested operations, in Darfur, as the UN and the AU negotiated to define the arrangements for a “hybrid” mission.

Meanwhile, largely beyond the headlines, Latin America’s sole large-scale peace operation, in Haiti, saw its most positive year to date, and was becoming a proving ground for a broader approach by the UN to issues of statebuilding and the rule of law. In several other mission contexts, also, the multidimensional, political, and civilian character of peacekeeping was on display as missions strove to help restore state capacity and foster broader peacebuilding processes, including with respect to economic development. By contrast, NATO in Afghanistan struggled with its lack of an integrated or comprehensive operational structure.

The UN tackled organizational issues of a different type, launching an extensive reform of its peacekeeping machinery at headquarters.

The Year 2007 in Numbers

These themes of the year in review were set against a backdrop of still-rising global numbers of peacekeepers. As it has for the past six years, the UN experienced substantial growth in the total number of peacekeepers deployed, though 2007 saw the rate of that growth slow to 10 percent, from 20 percent in each of the past six years. On 31 October, the UN had 82,701 uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, and police) in the field, plus approximately 20,000 civilian staff (international and local). The UN remained the largest peacekeeping provider in the world, deploying more personnel than all other peacekeeping organizations combined. NATO was second, with just under 57,000 troops deployed in the field. Simultaneously, non-UN operations involved over 78,000 personnel. While over half of these were NATO troops in Afghanistan and Kosovo, both the European Union and the African Union initiated new missions in 2007.

Rising overall numbers in 2007 masked a different reality, however, namely a number of missions in Africa that failed to materialize or for which deployments were agonizingly slow. Detailed plans to send over 10,000 UN personnel to Chad and the Central African Republic were scrapped in the face of Chadian opposition. A smaller contingent of EU troops and UN police were authorized to cover the same territory. During that period, tentative
proposals for a UN force in Somalia remained on the drawing board. While the AU approved an interim deployment of 8,000 troops to Somalia, it could only muster little more than a quarter of this force in almost a year. And most visible, the Security Council’s August 2006 resolution that authorized deployment of over 20,000 UN troops to Darfur went virtually entirely unfulfilled. In July 2007, the UN Security Council (acting jointly with the AU Peace and Security Council) approved a joint UN-AU operation in the region instead, but admitted that this would take at least a year to deploy in its entirety. Still, once these mandated UN, EU, and AU missions reach full deployment strengths, during 2008, the broader Horn of Africa region will become one of the most concentrated peacekeeping theaters in the

![Diagram showing military personnel deployed in UN and Non-UN missions: 31 October 2007]

- UN: 48%
- NATO: 38%
- Other Organizations: 14%

![Diagram showing military deployments (troops and military observers) in global peace operations: 1997–2007]

- UN
- NATO
- CEMAC
- AU
- CIS
- ECOWAS
- EU
- Other (MNFs and ad hoc)
world. However, African troop contributors faced their own version of overstretch, with merely twelve countries providing 86 percent of the total African contribution to UN and AU peacekeeping operations on the continent. On the other hand, 2007 saw an increase in capacity-building efforts for African peacekeeping, with the G8-supported Global Peace Operations Initiative undertaking programs, and the EU’s African Peace Facility providing critical financing to AU operations.

The failures to mount large-scale responses to African conflicts in 2007 were in contrast to more decisive UN deployments elsewhere, most obviously its rapid intervention in Lebanon in late 2006. There it proved possible to put nearly 10,000 troops on the ground in four months. Indeed, the 10 percent growth in the UN’s global presence in the year ending September 2007 largely reflects the expansion of the Lebanese operation.

Patterns of Deployment

The resulting patterns of deployment suggested the emergence of three clusters of global peace operations, defined by the combination of sources of troops, the location of their deployment, and the authorizing institutions:

• **Asian-African nexus.** Operations in Africa, where 62,000 military personnel were deployed, drew heavily on troops from the continent itself and from three primary external contributors: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. This nexus comprises three subregional clusters of operations: in West Africa (including Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire), Central Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (centering on the latter), and the broader Horn (including Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Somalia, and Ethiopia–Eritrea). In this cluster of missions, the UN and the AU cooperated to respond through a range of inter-institutional deployments, with periodic EU support. The authorized EU deployment of 3,000 troops in Chad and the Central African Republic will constitute the only major Western peacekeeping presence on the continent other than France’s Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire.

• **Euro–Middle Eastern nexus.** Operations in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, where 57,661 troops were deployed, relied on European forces under UN command (mainly in Lebanon), EU deployments (Gaza, West Bank), or NATO (Afghanistan). European troops composed the bulk of UNIFIL’s expansion during 2006, maintained more than 60 percent of the troops under UN helmets there, and composed over 50 percent of the more than 41,000 NATO troops under ISAF in Afghanistan. In most of these contexts, the UN provided the overall political framework for diverse institutional operations.

• **Regional specializations.** A variety of regionally specialized forces were deployed, including the largely Latin American–composed UN force in Haiti; the mainly Australian and New Zealand military presence in Timor-Leste and the Australian-led presence in the Solomon Islands; the largely Russian peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States; the ongoing European presence—nearly 20,000 peacekeepers (under the EU, NATO, and the OSCE)—across the Western Balkans; and the more than 7,000 African personnel operating in Darfur and Somalia under AU command. In each instance, regional organizations or regional actors led the deployment, though again usually within a UN-provided political framework.

These patterns were reflected in the composition of troops in various regions. For instance, 60 percent of UN troops in the Middle East in 2007 were European. By contrast, European contributors comprised 2 percent of UN forces in Africa. The rest of the UN’s troops in Africa were from South Asia (53 percent), from Africa itself (33 percent), and other regions (14 percent). This divergence in composition in the various regions was an issue that continued to generate political tensions at the UN.
The Interplay of Political and Security Issues

Across this enormous deployment of personnel, and for all its complexities, the issues that attracted the greatest attention in 2007 were neither military nor logistical, but political. Nowhere was this more evident than in Kosovo, where deep political uncertainty about the future status of the territory clouded both UN and NATO missions. Failure to achieve an agreed outcome during summer 2007 raised fears of renewed violence, and contributed to ratcheting up broader international tensions.

In Lebanon, too, the successful deployment in 2006 of a reinvigorated UNIFIL, with
a larger, more robust troop complement and a broader mandate, was by the end of 2007 overshadowed by a deepening domestic political crisis. As highlighted in this volume’s review of missions in the Middle East, that political crisis combined with continuing cross-border tensions significantly impeded the implementation of the two resolutions (1559 and 1701) that framed mission mandates as well as the broader UN political engagement in Lebanon.

The interwoven relationship between political process and peace operations was highlighted also in Sudan, on two fronts. In Darfur, two dimensions of political negotiations, with Khartoum over its efforts to stymie the deployment of a broader peacekeeping mission, and in revitalizing the Darfur peace talks, complicated efforts to deploy a larger and more robust operation throughout 2007. Meanwhile, overshadowed by negotiations over the deployment of UNAMID to Darfur, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, governing north-south relations in Sudan, was stalled.

Another focus of concern in 2007 was the darkening prospects in Afghanistan. There, the main challenge to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force was manifested in deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan’s southeastern provinces, and in a rise in direct attacks against the mission and against civilians in Kabul and elsewhere, all from a resurgent Taliban and associated forces. However, underlying this was a declining confidence in the central political institutions of the Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai, and a lagging process of building core institutions of the state, especially a credible and capable police force. Corruption and rampant drug production and trafficking also impeded the already delayed processes of institution building and economic development in the country.

In none of these missions was the relationship between politics and security either straightforward or unidirectional. Much was determined by the political ambitions and agenda of forces arrayed against the mission in question and the peace agreement that framed it. Where those forces had no national political ambitions or base, robust peacekeeping was able to hold sway. In Haiti, for example, a large-scale security crackdown by MINUSTAH against criminal gangs and drug lords in the slums of Cité Soleil breathed new momentum into the mission and into Haiti’s previously stalled recovery. Still, there is little doubt that the election of René Préval in 2006, bringing to power a prime minister with the support of the population and the confidence of the international community, was a necessary condition for MINUSTAH to undertake its security crackdown.
International Monetary Fund, and the UN Development Programme to push forward the development of key state institutions, especially judicial institutions. The joined-up actions by the UN and the international financial institutions illustrated how far peace operations have come since Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo in 1994 likened the efforts of the UN and the IMF in El Salvador to two surgeons operating on the same patient with a curtain dividing them.

Subsequently, the UN has paid ever-greater attention to what it refers to as “multi-dimensional” operations—a term that attests to the political, legal/judicial, institutional, and economic roles played by peace operations. Particularly UN operations and increasingly those of the EU have become a major vehicle for the allocation of civilian and economic support to states recovering from conflict. The numerous forms this takes are evident in this volume’s mission reviews and mission notes. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL supported a major program of economic governance and natural resources management, undertaken by the Liberian government, the World Bank, and donors. In Afghanistan, in addition to counterinsurgency battles, efforts focused on economic reconstruction and its interplay with security, including through the use of joint security/civilian provincial reconstruction teams. In Timor-Leste, UNMIT has focused its attention on elections and on security sector reform, especially as pertains to the development of police institutions. In other contexts such as Lebanon and Nepal, the issue of elections, and the broader political process that surrounds (or should surround) them, dominated mission activity.

This multidimensional facet of peace operations was reflected also in 2007 in rising numbers of police deployments. Through the UN alone, police deployments rose from 6,167 in 2005 to 9,414 in 2007. Additional police, roughly 2,123, were deployed through other organizations, primarily the EU and AU. These overall numbers were set to rise sharply with the authorization of 3,700 police to be deployed in Darfur and an additional 300 to Chad and the Central African Republic.

Meanwhile, the political/civilian aspects of peacekeeping face at least two core challenges. The first is highlighted by Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed in Chapter 1, which raises important questions about the ambitiousness of UN operations and highlights the potential for mediators to commit a range of “sins” in relation to domestic political processes. Second, and more prosaic, the UN and other peacekeeping organizations faced serious challenges in providing an adequate supply of appropriate civilian staff to their multiple nonmilitary functions. At the UN, for example, average civilian vacancy rates during 2007 were about 30 percent, a number that actually underestimates the problem, since the bulk of those civilian vacancies were in critical functional areas such as the rule of law and judicial reform. The absence of a credible international mechanism for maintaining a ready supply of civilian personnel to such operations is a major gap, though far from the only one, in the organizational arrangements for peace operations.

Organizational Challenges
As noted in previous editions of our Annual Review, the slim scale and excess burden on the headquarter mechanisms for managing peace operations continued to pose serious challenges to the viability of peace operations in 2007. The AU struggled to maintain adequate support for its operations; its institutional limitations were among the factors that led to calls for a UN force to replace AMIS in Darfur. It should be noted, however, that the two mission environments the AU struggled to manage, in Sudan and Somalia, were among the most complex imaginable.

At the UN, the question of organizational arrangements for peacekeeping became a central issue in 2007. Specifically, incoming Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon made a major
overhaul of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations a centerpiece of his early reform efforts (several other elements of which were blocked early by member states). Although the Secretary-General’s reform proposals for the DPKO initially met with considerable resistance from troop contributors and major donors alike, a modified version of his proposal was endorsed by the UN’s Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) in March 2007. The associated budget, stripped of a few proposed new senior posts, was approved by the UN General Assembly’s budget committee in June 2007.

That reform saw three significant changes. First, the DPKO’s division for field support and logistics was established as the self-standing Department of Field Support, headed at the level of Under-Secretary-General. Second, a total of 287 posts were added to the total staff complement of the two departments. Third, the post of military advisor in DPKO was upgraded, and a new pillar was added to the department, comprising rule of law and police operations.

The split of DPKO raised concerns among both field commanders and member states about unity of command, one of the UN’s core strengths. Two mechanisms were put in place to assuage these concerns. First, it was agreed that the head of the Department of Field Support, while normally reporting to the Deputy Secretary-General, would report to the head of the DPKO on all operational matters. Second, and perhaps more promising, new arrangements were put in place for staff from the various pillars of the DPKO and from the Department of Field Support to work together in unified teams (called “integrated” mission teams—confusingly so, given the use of that term also to refer to integration processes among peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development, and other departments of the UN). The effect of these arrangements, on paper, was to give the DPKO’s Office of Operations, which oversees and directs field missions, a structured system for drawing together the resources of all parts of both departments, thus strengthening unity of command over operations, while simultaneously, at least in theory, reducing the management burden on the DPKO by giving oversight of logistics, financial management, and personnel systems to the newly formed Department of Field Support.

**Conclusion**

It is striking that as the year 2007 drew to a close, the two organizations that were experiencing the greatest management strain in terms of headquarter/field ratios, and had the slimmest intrinsic logistics capacity—the AU and the UN—were set to begin working together to tackle what is undoubtedly one of the most complex logistical operations ever undertaken, in Darfur. In addition to logistical challenges, the two organizations were working together—not always entirely smoothly—to tackle the intertwined processes of peacekeeping and political negotiations.

Beyond Darfur, the challenge of managing the security, political, and broader civilian dimensions of peacekeeping was in some cases exacerbated, in others facilitated, by the increasingly common phenomenon of peace operations being undertaken in partnership between two or more peacekeeping organizations. Indeed, inter-institutional arrangements, ranging from sequential deployments to fully integrated “hybrid” operations, were a major feature of the peace operation landscape in 2007—an issue explored further in Chapter 2 by A. Sarjoh Bah and Bruce D. Jones. Most critically, though, stalled political processes and linked security challenges presented an even more testing situation for the year ahead.

**Note**

The information provided in the graphs and tables in this chapter, where not cited otherwise, has been aggregated from the data presented in Chapters 5 through 8 of this volume. For scaling purposes, the tables and graphs in this chapter do not take into account personnel deployed in the Multinational Force-Iraq.