Strategic Summary
2009
That peacekeeping remains a vital international tool was reinforced during 2009. The nadir of 2008 saw military and political breakdowns in the most high-profile theaters and the growing impact of the global financial crisis. Fears of a large-scale withdrawal from peacekeeping abounded. But global peacekeeping levels did not contract in 2009. In fact, deployments of military personnel again surpassed record highs—rising by about 9 percent over the year—with over 200,000 military, police, and civilians in the field.

Overall growth, however, does not mean that the situation facing the global peacekeeping enterprise improved. Rather, the operational and political challenges that pushed UN, NATO, AU, and EU peacekeeping operations close to their limits in 2008, became even more acute in 2009. Global peace operations proved flexible enough to avoid breaking under the pressures related to growing demand, but it became ever more clear that—as currently conceived, mandated, deployed, and supported—they are ill suited to address the dynamics of modern conflict adequately.

The Contours of Strain: Slow Deployments, Bad Politics, and Shifting Conflicts

Two peacekeeping platforms, the UN and NATO, accounted for 93 percent of all peacekeepers deployed during 2009. Whereas deployment levels as recently as 2005 showed a division of labor, with regional organizations and ad hoc arrangements accounting for about 20
percent of deployments, since then there has been a steady shift back to the UN and NATO as primary international actors. Between 2008 and 2009, deployments by regional and ad hoc arrangements dropped by 20 percent, while UN and NATO deployments grew by 9 percent and 30 percent respectively.

The main driver of growth in 2009 was the spiraling situation in Afghanistan, where a discredited central government, a strengthened Taliban, and turmoil in Pakistan elicited the response of increased military deployments under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Uneven development of the Afghan National Army and Police also contributed significantly to the demand for more troops. ISAF grew about 30 percent, largely a function of the 40 percent US enhancement in its engagement. This was despite persistent, if initially halfhearted US calls for more contributions from other NATO alliance partners, several of whose militaries are stretched to their operational limits and all of which face increasing domestic scrutiny regarding the mission’s goals eight years into its operations. ISAF now dwarfs even the largest UN peace operations.

As a result, for the third consecutive year, the United States remains the largest deployer of UN-mandated forces, and will continue to hold this rank in 2010 given the 30,000 additional troops pledged by the Barack Obama administration in late 2009. This is even if troops deployed in Iraq are excluded, as they have been in this volume. Following the United States, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the second and third largest deployers of UN-mandated peacekeepers. In total, the number of peacekeepers in NATO deployments during 2009 was roughly equal to the total number of peacekeepers deployed in the nineteen field missions overseen by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The UN’s 9 percent deployment growth over the year, however, belies a significant slowing of its deployments exactly when and where they were needed the most. The operational, logistical, and political challenges of getting troops and police to the field in a timely manner continued to draw serious questions about the efficacy of the UN’s support structures and the overall available resources for UN peace operations.

The violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo that overwhelmed the UN’s mission there (MONUC) during 2008 did not improve much in 2009 and served to further expose the political and operational vulnerabilities of the mission in relation to its mandates to protect the civilian population and extend the authority of the Congolese government. The Security Council did approve additional troops

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Top Ten Military Contributors to UN-Mandated Operations: 2009
for the mission and reoriented MONUC’s mandate after 2008. But by year end only two-thirds of those 3,000 additional forces had arrived in theater, and additional helicopters crucial for rapid reaction were yet to be seen, as civilians continued to bear the brunt of the conflict.

Meanwhile, MONUC’s main operational and political partners on the ground—the Congolese government and its armed forces (FARDC)—proved to be problematic collaborators. MONUC’s enhanced mandate provided little clarity on how and when to protect civilians, a limitation that was compounded as the MONUC-supported FARDC played a brutal role in the deterioration of human security. After ten years in the country, MONUC’s relationship with the Kinshasa government became more tense as President Joseph Kabila pressed the UN to wind down the mission by mid-2010, notwithstanding the still chaotic situation in the east. Tensions between troop contributors and the Security Council sharpened over the implementation of the mandate and the end of the year saw a five-month renewal of the mission’s mandate, rather than the usual practice of annual renewals for MONUC.

MONUC wasn’t the only UN operation to struggle in the face of fluid conflicts, persistent lack of resources, and stalled political processes. In contrast to the sharp deterioration of security that preceded the augmentation of MONUC, the UN and its member states had a year’s notice that the EU would hand over in March 2009 its military operation on Chad and the Central
African Republic’s borders with Sudan. Nevertheless, the UN mission (MINURCAT), with no means to impact the political situation on the ground and thus little strategic direction, remained only halfway deployed at the end of 2009. Of those troops in the field at the end of 2009, half were already in-theater, rehatted from the EU operation. Security on the Chad-Sudan border remained poor at the end of the year, with nongovernmental organizations halting their critical operations on account of rampant insecurity and conflict between the N’Djamena government and rebel groups.

The joint AU-UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID) struggled to implement its mandate in the face of ongoing conflict and a continued lack of consent on the part of the Khartoum government. Some two years since being authorized, UNAMID’s military component only stood at three-quarters deployed, and the impact of those contingents in Darfur was limited by operational restrictions on conducting land and air patrols imposed by Khartoum. Banditry and kidnapings spiked, sharply impacting the delivery of humanitarian aid and overall civilian security, and also resulting in fatal consequences for UNAMID peacekeepers themselves. The situation underlined the fact that only about 65 percent of UNAMID’s mandated police were in the field at the end of the year.

The stalled implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the decades-long civil war between north and south Sudan in 2005, was an area of renewed concern, as tensions between the signatories mounted in advance of national elections. In this deteriorating context, the UN mission (UNMIS) struggled to implement its protection of civilians mandate. Intercommunal violence in the south flared throughout the year, with civilian casualties and displacements outpacing those in Darfur.

The six missions covered above account for over 62 percent of global deployments. As they demonstrated in 2009, conducting the business of peacekeeping as usual will no longer suffice. Peacekeepers have increasingly been sent to address complex and ongoing intrastate conflicts where peace agreements are weak or nonexistent, consent does not come easily, and peacekeepers are mandated to use force to protect civilians and extend the authority of fledgling or contested governments. Such operational contexts demand substantial resources, both human and logistical, and even more importantly, firm political foundations from which to operate—all things that appeared difficult to harness in 2009.

It was not only the large-scale operations that faced difficulties. Division among the Security Council shut down the UN’s observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in July. Stalled reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire saw elections in that country delayed yet again, further extending the stay of the nearly 7,000 troops in the UN’s UNOCI operation. As Nepal entered a new period of political crisis, the mismatch between

“peace versus justice” and stymied political progress. Khartoum responded by expelling thirteen aid groups working in Darfur, for which the UN and the Khartoum government had to compensate to avoid humanitarian disaster.

And in Somalia, the conflict deemed inappropriate for UN peacekeepers by the Security Council continued to rage. By year end, only 60 percent of the 8,000 authorized for AU’s AMISOM force—logistically supported by the UN—were in place. However, it is questionable if any military force in the country could have an impact on the situation. In the absence of a credible peace process, the internationally backed Transitional Federal Government and the AU, along with the civilian population, continued to be the object of insurgent attacks. A constellation of naval deployments had a measurable impact on piracy off Somalia’s coast, but it was increasingly clear that the solution to insecurity on the high sea could not be comprehensively addressed there.

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the limited mandate of the UN mission (UNMIN) and the reality on the ground became increasingly clear. Meanwhile, the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) saw political constriction of its ability to maneuver as Kosovo further embraced independence.

The Need for Reform

Realizing the consequences that further peacekeeping failures would hold for millions of people in those hostile environments and for broader global security, the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and individual member states once again took up reform of peacekeeping during 2009 (see table on page 7). Each initiative—in its own way—sought to address the factors that have led to peacekeeping overstretch, with an eye toward making UN peacekeeping operations both more effective and more efficient in confronting the contours of modern conflict. This, among other things, included efforts to improve planning, management, and oversight mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, to expand the base of troop, police, and civilian peacekeepers, and to bring up to standard the capacity of those willing to contribute.

These sentiments were bolstered by the Obama administration’s recognition of the role of peacekeeping as a critical international tool. Be it through the president’s convening of major UN peacekeeping troop contributors or through the activities of the US mission in New York, this intention to improve peacekeeping operations to ensure that they continue to deliver stability and security was reaffirmed.

Despite their differences in approach, the initiatives by the UN Secretariat, Security Council, and member states rightly recognized that the problems affecting peacekeeping were, at their center, political in nature and that the political consensus among troop and police providers, financial contributors, the UN Secretariat, and the Security Council necessary to sustain complex and ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping operations was in disrepair. The result has been increasingly complex mandates that are disassociated both from realities on the ground and from the pool of available and willing resources necessary for implementation. The need to refresh and renew this partnership was evident.

It would be unrealistic to expect reform efforts to improve peacekeeping within a year, but there was some progress in terms of the crucial relationship between the Security Council, Secretariat, and troop and police providers. In the second half of the year, consultation between troops and police providers prior to the renewal of the mandates for the UN operations in Haiti and Lebanon (MINUSTAH and UNIFIL) represent marked improvement. Nevertheless, the debate on the renewal of the MONUC mandate in December saw little in the form of consultation, demonstrating that much still needed to be done in regard to peacekeeping operations of more sensitive, operational, and political contexts.

The reform initiatives, in particular the “New Horizons” process of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, also recognize that overstretch in peacekeeping is partially a function of missions being unable to withdraw despite having achieved interim stability. One contributing factor is the absence of an effective system to support the development of the rule of law in postconflict settings. While establishing the rule of law through the reform of the judiciary and security sectors is often associated with longer-term peacebuilding activities, over the course of the past decade it has emerged as a core peacekeeping task, closely tied to the eventual withdrawal of a mission. This is as true in Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo as it is in the DRC and will be in Somalia and south Sudan. NATO’s members look set to concentrate on similar challenges in Afghanistan during the year ahead.

As argued in this volume’s thematic chapter, however, it is not clear that the international peacekeeping architecture is well placed to build the rule of law or that it has a complete understanding of what it takes to do so in practice. The increasing and necessary focus on establishing the rule of law through peace operations is also beginning to encounter real challenges. As building the rule of law has become more widespread, demand for specialized police and
civillian mission personnel—experts in short supply—has grown significantly. Quantities have largely been met, but the quality of these deployed personnel has become diluted as demand has grown. This has become a particular concern with police deployments, especially formed police units in UN operations, which continued to grow throughout the year.

### Peacekeeping Reform Initiatives Launched in 2009

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<tr>
<th>Initiative (Date Started)</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<td>New Horizon Initiative (January 2009)</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support</td>
<td>Improve the UN’s approach to peacekeeping in light of current and future challenges. Specific topics covered by the initiative's non-paper published in July 2009 include enhancing the partnership necessary to meet current challenges, design, and management of missions; delivery in the field including enhanced deployment; and establishing a global support strategy on logistics to meet future needs (for more information, see <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml</a>).</td>
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<td>United Kingdom and France Initiative (January 2009)</td>
<td>Governments of France and the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Develop greater flexibility in the Security Council and UN for better response to dynamic or complex peacekeeping situations with respect to the mission renewal process; as well as improved communication, especially in regard to reporting in times of crisis between the Secretary-General and the Security Council.</td>
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<td>Thematic Series on Building More Effective UN Peace Operations (May 2009)</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
<td>Provide an informal forum for all UN member states to address the current challenges in peacekeeping, including overstretch, the political dimensions of peacekeeping, and creating more realistic peacekeeping mandates. Seeks to increase dialogue between the Secretariat, Security Council member states, troop-contributing countries, academics, and nongovernmental organizations (for more information, see <a href="http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/thematicseries.html">http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/thematicseries.html</a>).</td>
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Achieving a better understanding of building the rule of law in peacekeeping settings is urgent and will become a larger issue as the military deployments of the early 2000s consolidate and pressure for drawdown mounts.

Conclusion

Balancing heavy military deployments in difficult political and operational contexts while managing the transitions from heavy peacekeeping presences to longer-term peacebuilding operations will remain a central task of the year ahead. Meanwhile, the reform initiatives taken up in 2009 will take yet on more saliency as the impacts of the global financial crisis continue to demand that the global peacekeeping architecture does its job more efficiently and with fewer resources at its disposal. Achieving the ambitious goals that they set will only be possible with shared understandings of both the purposes of peacekeeping and the necessary means to meet those ends.
Source of Deployed Police: 31 October 2009

- United Nations: 12,646 (85%)
- European Union: 1,750 (13%)
- Other: 385 (3%)

Where Police Go: 31 October 2009

- Africa: 71%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 12%
- Central and South America: 16%
- Europe: 1%