The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is often cited as the first example of the “integrated mission concept,” by which a variety of organizations and agencies respond to a single Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Yet the concept remains problematic. A May 2005 report on integrated missions, commissioned by the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, found a “very general assumption that integration is the way of the future,” but “little specific agreement about what comprises an integrated mission in practice.”

The report concentrated on how UN agencies should cooperate in helping countries and territories through political transitions, and underlined the dilemmas inherent in maintaining interagency cooperation through these processes. These include the tensions between successfully engaging in political affairs while maintaining the impartiality of humanitarian and human rights activities. It also noted that, where UN agencies have been in the field before the arrival of an SRSG or peace mission, there are risks of friction, “parallel structures and in rare cases even system dysfunction.”

Noting that the Secretary-General has emphasized the primacy of the SRSG in such situations, the report made proposals for enhancing integration within missions, including:

- The Security Council and UN Secretariat should define a “center of gravity” for a mission—“the decisive parameters that must be influenced to make all the other activities possible”—and draw up a “mission-specific profile” for the SRSG on the basis of this strategic perspective.
- While existing UN Country Teams should recognize the leadership of the SRSG, they must be closely involved in predeployment needs assessments and planning.
- Once in the field, the SRSG should form a “cabinet structure,” bringing together representatives of all agencies to promote greater coherence in the mission.
- The SRSG should be supported by a strategic planning capacity and a cell reporting on mission funding, as well as a senior humanitarian coordinator and human rights adviser.
- All UN agencies—and other actors as appropriate—should have access to a joint operations center, and the mission should sustain outreach to local actors.

While these proposals echo structures put in place by UNMIK and other UN missions, they have often proved fragile. The integrated missions report emphasized the importance of a peacebuilding commission and support office, as approved by the World Summit, in developing new practices among member states and the UN Secretariat. It also held that a doctrine must be developed to regulate the interaction of UN military and civilian staff.

Smooth transition of duties, but shared responsibility for public order. In 2002, NATO proposed that its force should be restructured to emphasize better cooperation with civilian police.

While structurally distinct, KFOR and UNMIK were therefore driven together by their security environment. But as that environment improved after 2000, both high-level and field coordination declined—communication within UNMIK also worsened, as the SRSG’s executive committee effectively ceased to function. The international presence allowed ad hoc cooperation to deteriorate, very far from the process envisaged in Resolution 1244. This deterioration was exacerbated by a decline in KFOR’s capabilities and slow progress by UNMIK in shifting responsibility to the KPS. Combined, these left the international presence with insufficient security resources.

KFOR: From Defense to Deterrence?

KFOR’s security role was overshadowed by the problem of the Serb enclaves, the protection of which was neither a straightforward military task nor a civil order issue. Its troubled deployment complete, KFOR aimed to secure Kosovo through establishing fixed positions across the province, and especially around Serb areas and Orthodox religious sites. This strategy of direct defense was coupled with protection of Serb convoys from the enclaves, coordinated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If this posture was an obstacle to transferring secu-