UN to establish a commission of inquiry. As the inquiry’s report neared release in December, Dadis Camara was shot in the head by a lieutenant he had implicated in the atrocities. The injured de facto leader was flown out of the country, and Defense Minister Sékouba Konaté assumed power on an interim basis.

The next month, in January 2010, Konaté, Dadis Camara and the Forces Vives reached an agreement brokered by Burkina Faso’s President Compaoré, who had assumed the lead mediator role on behalf of ECOWAS after the September violence. Under the Ouagadougou Accord, the first round of presidential elections took place in June, followed by a second round in November — the latter amid some incidents of violence. The UN deployed a Peace and Development Adviser and a Senior Mediation Adviser with support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The UN’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), which had a technical team on the ground from before the coup through November 2009, proved vital in assisting the electoral commission and ensuring that the second round of voting transpired. Opposition leader Alpha Condé was declared the winner, a result accepted by the defeated candidate and recognized by the International Contact Group. Condé assumed power and has ruled without a parliament pending legislative elections scheduled for late 2011.

Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 Putsch
In February 2010, demonstrators in the north of Kyrgyzstan launched protests against price hikes...
Representative for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, arrived within two days of Bakiyev’s flight to the south, seeking a political solution that would prevent national and regional mass violence and restore some form of constitutional order. In contrast to the AU and sub-regional organizations’ reactions to unconstitutional ousters in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, neither the European Union, the OSCE nor the UN condemned the coup or sought Bakiyev’s return to power.5

On 8 April a new interim government was announced under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Roza Otunbaeva, with pledges of new elections and a new constitution later in 2010. The three envoys of the OSCE, UN, and the EU worked in close collaboration, issuing a joint statement on 10 April, facilitating talks between Bakiyev and his supporters and the leaders of the provisional government, who held disparate opinions on issues such as whether Bakiyev should be held for trial or due to privatization of utilities. These spread in the subsequent weeks, with protestors raising their demands to include the resignation of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, whom they accused of engaging in authoritarian practices and corruption. On 6 April, protestors briefly took over the governor’s offices in Talas and declared a “people’s government.” The next day, protests swelled and spread to other cities, and President Bakiyev fled to his southern stronghold of Jalalabad. Unlike the 2005 ouster of President Akaev, state forces used violence against protestors, resulting in the deaths of 85 people and hundreds injured over several weeks.

Founded in 1998, the OSCE Center in Bishkek had been in regular contact with the political opposition, and on 8 April, the OSCE appointed a Special Envoy for Kyrgyzstan, Zhanybek Karibzhanov. On the same day the UN Secretary-General appointed Jan Kubíš as Special Envoy for Kyrgyzstan, and he, Karibzhanov, and the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, all arrived within two days of Bakiyev’s flight to the south, seeking a political solution that would prevent national and regional mass violence and restore some form of constitutional order. In contrast to the AU and sub-regional organizations’ reactions to unconstitutional ousters in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, neither the European Union, the OSCE nor the UN condemned the coup or sought Bakiyev’s return to power.5

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Review of UN Special Political Mission Funding and Backstopping (Continued)

The different budgetary systems for peacekeeping operations and special political missions complicates resource sharing and service provision from one side to the other, as well as transitions to and from peacekeeping operations and SPMs. For example:

- The Department of Field Support (DFS) covers the logistical needs of both peacekeeping operations and SPMs. However, under current rules it should not use resources paid through the peacekeeping support account to support SPMs, and SPMs should not have access to the strategic deployment stocks of equipment and supplies housed in the UN’s Brindisi Logistics Base.

- While the General Assembly has passed a resolution endorsing a new Global Field Support Strategy designed by DFS, it only provides specific improvements for peacekeeping operations but not to SPMs.

- There are similar problems associated with SPMs drawing on experts based within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) such as the staff in its Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). Paradoxically, OROLSI cannot budget for providing support to SPMs, even in cases of SPMs with mandates that include police reform or security sector reform.

- Conversely, under the current arrangement the Department of Political Affairs’ Electoral Assistance Division has difficulties budgeting for expert backstopping to leaders of peacekeeping operations involved in organizing elections, although EAD staff have long been supporting elections where there are peacekeeping operations.

- Where countries hosting peacekeeping operations face decreasing imminent threats of armed conflict or crisis (e.g., Liberia, Timor Leste), transition to smaller political missions is complicated by the lack of interoperability across the two budgetary systems.

If the UN is to run political missions more rationally, and ensure that they receive the best available support from New York, Brindisi or a neighboring mission, new arrangements need to be found to remove these artificial boundaries. In a multi-year legislative reform, the Secretary-General’s review is likely to propose changes to the funding rules that will have a direct impact on operational effectiveness.

1 A/RES/65/259 (2011)
2 A/64/349 (2009)
3 A/RES/64/269 (2010)