Peace Operations 2007: The Year in Numbers

Global demand for peacekeepers continued to rise in 2007. By the end of the year, there were over 160,000 peacekeepers in the field.

For the second year, the United States was the largest contributor to mandated multilateral peace operations, with large contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as smaller contributions in the Middle East. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were the next three largest, contributing exclusively through the UN. Nine out of the remaining top 20 mixed their contributions between UN and non-UN operations.

Non-UN organizations – primarily the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – maintained over 78,000 military and police personnel in the field. The bulk were deployed under NATO in Afghanistan and Kosovo, constituting about 74 percent of military personnel deployed outside the UN framework.

The UN remained the centerpiece of the international peacekeeping system, providing nearly 50 percent of all peacekeepers in the field. In 2007, the UN’s deployments of uniformed personnel grew by 10 percent to 83,000 personnel. In addition, there were nearly 20,000 civilian staff serving in UN peace operations.
2007 was a difficult year for peacekeeping, and presaged serious challenges ahead. By year end, peacekeeping was becoming a victim of its earlier successes, the reflex solution to conflicts and crises even in the absence of a peace agreement or viable political process. Repeated warnings of overstretch did not forestall the authorization of ambitious new mandates by the Security Council and regional organizations. The complexity of operations began to outstrip the ability of international organizations to keep pace.

Nowhere were these challenges more evident than in Darfur. The Sudanese government continued to throw up obstacles to the deployment of the ‘hybrid’ United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur, even as the security and humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. The stalled Darfur peace talks were the subject of concentrated mediation efforts, but registered little progress. And the UN and AU – the two peacekeeping platforms with the most limited logistical capacities – were struggling to mount the most daunting peacekeeping operation of the past half century. Secretariat officials repeatedly warned of the obstacles to an effective deployment, but their warnings went unheeded by the Security Council. By early 2008, some permanent members of the Security Council were already engaged in the ‘pass the buck’ game of blaming the organization for failing to do precisely what it warned it could not. The lesson: if the UN has a ‘responsibility to protect’, it must also have a ‘capacity to protect’.

Nor were peacekeeping difficulties in the region contained to Darfur. A proposed UN force of roughly 11,000 personnel for Chad and Central African Republic was abandoned and replaced by a smaller EU military and UN police force. Efforts to deploy even this compromise force were delayed by a rebel advance on the Chadian capital, N’Djamena in early 2008. Additionally, the EU force struggled to raise adequate mission enablers, especially helicopters, and faced potential hostility from the rebel groups that questioned France’s neutrality. Meanwhile, overshadowed by negotiations over the deployment to Darfur, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, governing north-south relations in Sudan, was stalled. And the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was crippled by a lack of cooperation by the parties to the border dispute.

Also in 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia only managed to deploy about a quarter of its authorized strength of 8,000 due to a combination of logistical constraints, financial shortfalls and a growing reality of a lack of peace to keep.

Outside of Africa, NATO and UN efforts to build a secure and functioning Afghan state were stalled, a function of an increasingly active insurgency coupled with slow progress in the creation of competent national institutions. Growing divisions within NATO on the use of caveats added to the mission’s difficulties.
Operational Clusters

The planned deployment of nearly 40,000 peacekeepers in Darfur, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Somalia, combined with the existing mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, represented the emergence of a major peacekeeping concentration in the Broader Horn of Africa – part of one of three major ‘clusters’ of peacekeeping activity.

In 2007, these three clusters of peace operations were defined by the combination of source of troops, location of their deployment and authorizing institution(s). These were:

- **An Asian-African nexus** of operations in Africa, where 67,715 UN and non-UN military and police personnel were deployed, drawing primarily on troops from Africa itself and three major South Asian contributors: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The three South Asian and African contributors account for over 80 percent of all UN troops deployed in Africa.

- **A Euro-Middle Eastern nexus** of operations in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, where 58,895 troops were deployed, relying largely on European forces under UN and NATO command. European troops made up 60 percent of the UN force in Lebanon and over 50 percent of the 41,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan.

- **Regional Specializations** including the Australian-led force in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands; the Russian peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States; the European presence in the Western Balkans and the African presence in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. Most of these deployments, though led by regional actors, operated under a UN political framework.

**Military Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations in Africa: 31 October 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; South America</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; The Pacific</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations in the Broader Middle East: 31 October 2007**

- **Central & South Asia**: 6%
- **East Asia & The Pacific**: 6%
- **North America**: 29%
- **Middle East**: 1%
- **Europe**: 56%
- **Africa**: 2%

The sharpening distinction between large-scale European deployments to the broader Middle East and their minimal deployments in Africa – accounting for under three percent of UN deployments on the continent - has been the subject of continued political tension. However, in 2007, potential European deployments to Darfur were objected to by the government of Sudan, which continued to insist on maintaining the “African character” of UNAMID.

Nevertheless, the wide disparities in peacekeeping responses in these three clusters pose potential complications for peacekeeping in the years ahead.
Peacekeeping and Politics

Though peacekeeping operations across these three ‘clusters’ faced acute logistics and financial difficulties, the primary obstacles to their performance arose rather from failed, stalled or even absent political processes. The frequent result was increased insecurity, both for civilian populations and the missions themselves. The stunting effects of this challenge was on display in most peace operations throughout the year, and is likely to be a dominant and recurring theme for some years to come.

The impact of stalled political processes on peace operations was vividly displayed in Kosovo, where the political uncertainty about the future status of the territory clouded both UN and NATO missions throughout 2007. Failure to achieve an agreed outcome in 2007 raised fears of renewed violence, and the province’s declaration of independence in February 2008 ratcheted up international tensions, as the US and some major EU member states supported the province’s independence in the face of stiff opposition from Russia and Serbia. This development set a challenging context for the newly authorized EU operation.

In Lebanon, a reinvigorated UNIFIL was overshadowed by the deepening domestic political crisis between the western-backed government and a coalition of opposition forces including Hezbollah. This situation was exacerbated by continuing tensions across the Lebanon/Syria border.

NATO and UN efforts to stabilize Afghanistan faced their own political challenges. The declining confidence in the central political institutions of the Afghan government and a lagging process of building core institutions of the state, especially a credible and capable military and police force, contributed to widespread insecurity in the face of a resurgent Taliban. This situation was aggravated by the exponential growth in the production and sale of drugs, fuelling the insurgency.

Seeming progress in Timor-Leste throughout 2007 was thrown into doubt in early 2008 with the attempted assassination of the country’s President and Prime Minister. This incident exposed the fragility of Timor-Leste and reinforced the need for a sustained international engagement.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, continuing insecurity in the country’s eastern provinces reflected an incomplete political process, despite the holding of successful general elections in 2006. The growing insecurity forced the UN mission in DRC to spend most of 2007 dealing with the humanitarian crisis triggered by the upsurge in fighting, instead of focusing on long-term peace consolidation efforts.

In contrast to these cases, progress in the political process in Haiti allowed the UN mission in that country to stabilize it by cracking down on notorious gangs and drug-lords. The improved security environment paved the way for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to reorient its focus toward building state institutions such as the police, allowing for the operation’s most constructive year to date. Developments in Haiti demonstrated that in the right political context, robust peacekeeping can be a critical instrument in effective statebuilding.

The interaction between political processes and peace operations was the theme of a guest essay in this year’s Review, summarized on page 8.
Data on UN Operations

Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Troops/Military Observers</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16,381</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>4,662</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South Asia</td>
<td>31,678</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>6,376</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,287</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Troops/Military Observers</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>2,203</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South Asia</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9,375</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,687</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Troops/Military Observers</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>17,511</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South Asia</td>
<td>27,637</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,391</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data on Non-UN Operations

Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN Missions: 30 September 2007

- European Union: 3.3%
- Commonwealth of Independent States: 5.6%
- Coalitions/Ad Hoc: 7%
- African Union: 10%
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 73.5%

Deployment of Non-UN Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2007

- Africa: 13.7%
- Europe: 28.6%
- Central & South Asia: 53.6%
- East Asia & The Pacific: 1.7%

Deployment of Non-UN Troops in Africa by Organization: 30 September 2007

- African Union: 72%
- Coalition/Ad Hoc: 24%
- Central African Economic and Monetary Community: 4%

Deployment of Non-UN Troops in Europe by Organization: 30 September 2007

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 69%
- European Union: 11%
- Commonwealth of Independent States: 20%
**Complex Dynamics:**
Multidimensionality, Institutional Reform and Partnerships

2007 saw the deepening of a trend towards deploying peace operations with broad civilian mandates and under the operational aegis of two or more organizations. There were good reasons for this, but the result has been a growing complexity of peace operations that is proving difficult to manage.

**Multidimensionality**

In Haiti and elsewhere, missions had broad multidimensional mandates and worked in close collaboration with host governments, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the UN Development Program and other actors to push forward the development of key state institutions. Missions had a broad range of foci; for example:

- **Inflexibility:** the inability to reassess the “political map” to reflect changes at the local and international levels, and therefore redirect one’s approach;

- **False promises:** the failure to convey to all parties the necessity for compromise and the often slow pace of a peace process to avoid inflated expectations.

While success is difficult to achieve, mistakes come easily, and some of these mistakes can have fatal consequences for the peace process in which an operation is embedded. Although the mediator can avoid the deadly sins mentioned above, that’s not an absolute guarantee for success. Failure is inevitable, however, when peacekeepers are thrown at conflicts as a substitute for an effective political process that compels the parties to face the painful political compromises necessary to achieve a sustainable peace.

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**In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The “Seven Deadly Sins” of Mediation, Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed**

The political and security challenges that dogged several peace operations during the year reinforced the fact that fundamental political problems are seldom fully addressed prior to the arrival of peacekeepers.

Given the unprecedented number of peacekeepers now deployed globally, often in volatile areas, the role of effective mediation in peacekeeping contexts deserves more attention. Of particular concern are ‘seven deadly sins’ that recur in mediation contexts:

- **Ignorance:** the lack of an exhaustive “political map” of a country’s political and cultural landscape, or of regional and international interests;

- **Arrogance:** the tendency to rely too heavily both on advice from those with similar views and backgrounds and false comparison from one’s own experiences while ignoring more diverse views, especially those from within the community;

- **Partiality:** the failure to acknowledge and correct assumptions of partiality on the part of the mediator;

- **Impotence:** the inability to maintain legitimacy as an effective broker and advocate for all stakeholders in a way that best aligns the interests of all parties, subsequently calling into question a mediator’s bargaining authority;

- **Haste:** the tendency to expedite a peace process at the expense of inclusion undermines the long-term sustainability of the peace arrangement and future mediation efforts;
In **Liberia**, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) supported a major program of economic governance and natural resource management: *the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program*, undertaken by the Liberian government, the World Bank, and donors.

In **Timor-Leste**, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) has focused its attention on elections and security sector reform, especially as pertains to the development of police institutions.

In **Afghanistan**, in addition to counterinsurgency war, peace operations focused on economic reconstruction and its interplay with security, managed through joint security/civilian *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*.

**Civilian Police Deployed in UN Peace Operations: 2005 - 2007**

The multidimensional character of peace operations was reflected also in 2007 in the rising numbers of police deployments. Through the UN alone, police deployments rose from 6,167 in 2005 to 9,414 in 2007. An additional roughly 2,123 police were deployed outside of UN frameworks, primarily in EU and AU operations. These overall numbers are set to rise sharply in 2008 with the authorization of 3,700 police to be deployed in Darfur and an additional 300 to Chad and the Central African Republic.

In 2007 it however became increasingly clear that multidimensional peace operations will continue to be confronted with the twin issues of overreaching mandates and overstretched political/civilian personnel reserves.

The contemporary practice of authorizing broad multidimensional mandates has not been matched by efforts to increase the availability of the necessary human resources, especially qualified civilian personnel for crucial tasks in the area of the rule of law. In 2007, average civilian vacancy rates in UN missions were about 30 percent; the bulk of which were for critical areas such as judicial reform. The absence of a credible international mechanism for maintaining a ready supply of civilian personnel to such operations is a major gap, though far from the only one, in the organizational arrangements for peace operations.

**Organizational Challenges**

Meanwhile at the UN, the question of organizational arrangements for peacekeeping became a central issue in 2007. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon made a major overhaul of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) a centerpiece of his early reform efforts. The Secretary General’s reform saw three significant changes:

- DPKO’s division for field support and logistics was established as a self-standing Department of Field Support (DFS);

- A total of 287 posts were added to the total staff complement of the two departments;
The post of Military Advisor in DPKO was upgraded, and a new pillar was added to the Department comprising Rule of Law and Police Operations.

**Partnerships**

As the year drew to a close, the AU and UN began to work together to tackle what is undoubtedly one of the most complex peace operations ever undertaken, the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur. While the UN-AU arrangement in Darfur represents the first peacekeeping operation of its kind between the two institutions, it is also merely the most recent point on an ongoing continuum, as operational exigencies make cooperation between institutions in the same theater an imperative. Inter-institutional arrangements, ranging from sequential deployments to fully integrated “hybrid” operations, were a major feature of the peace operation landscape in 2007 and are likely to continue for some time to come.

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**Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements, A. Sarjoh Bah and Bruce Jones**

Defining the operational framework for the ‘hybrid’ UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was a major preoccupation for the international community in 2007. While the UN and AU negotiated the details of this arrangement, the public debate proceeded as though it was the first instance of such a cooperative venture. In fact, UNAMID should be seen as the latest iteration of a deepening trend towards peacekeeping partnerships. Various forms of these partnerships have been on display in Liberia, Haiti, and Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor Leste, the Balkans and elsewhere.

These partnerships vary by mandating authority, mandated tasks and division of labor. Despite their sui generis nature, three broad variants of partnerships have emerged:

- **Sequential Operations**: Different peace operations platforms succeeding each other. (Australia and the UN in Timor Leste, 1999; ECOWAS and UN in Liberia, 2003; and NATO, UN and the EU in the Balkans in the 1990s)

- **Parallel Operations**: Two platforms operating in the same theater but under separate command. (UN-CIS in Georgia, 1994; UN-France in Côte d’Ivoire, 2003; EU-UN in Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003, 2006; UN-NATO in Kosovo, 1999; and NATO-UN-US in Afghanistan beginning in 2002)

- **Integrated Operations**: The rarest form of this paradigm, characterized by unified or joint command. This variant is best exemplified by UNAMID in Darfur, but previous arrangements include UN-OAS in Haiti and UN-EU-UNHCR-OSCE in Kosovo.

This paradigm is likely to continue for some time to come. However, if future arrangements are to address the myriad challenges associated with this trend, four key issues, referred to here as the 4Ps, need to be addressed. These are the use of joint **planning** to address problems of strategic coordination; the re-hatting of **personnel**, especially troops from a lead nation; establishing **predictable** financing mechanisms, including the use of UN assessed contributions to support weaker institutions; and most importantly, establishing a common **political** framework for action.
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008:

The Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than fifty UN and non-UN peace operations. It aims to inform policy-makers, media outlets, academics and peacekeepers as the international community debates the prominent role of peace operations in conflict management. The report draws on data previously unavailable outside of the United Nations and other non-UN peacekeeping platforms. CIC prepared the Annual Review with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the African Union Peace and Security Department.
“The Annual Review combines the most authoritative and current data on UN and non-UN peace operations with the analytical capability and editorial independence of a major university. The result is quite a splendid anthology of facts and figures cleverly and attractively presented.”

—RAMESHTHAKUR
Distinguished Fellow, University of Waterloo Center for International Governance Innovation, and former Senior Vice Rector, United Nations University

“This is a hugely important resource not only for scholars and officials engaged with peace operations, but also for those involved in developing regional peacekeeping capacity. It sets out current operational requirements, political factors, and ongoing trends in peace operations with great clarity and impressive detail.”

—DUMISANI KUMALO
Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations

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—WILLIAM J. DURCH
Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center

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—PIERRE SCHORI
Director General, FRIDE, and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN Mission in Côte D’Ivoire

The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 was launched on 12 March 2008. It was published by Lynne Rienner and can be ordered at www.rienner.com.

This briefing paper was prepared on the basis of the Annual Review by Dr. A. Sarjoh Bah (Volume Editor and Research Scholar), Dr. Bruce D. Jones (Series Editor), Benjamin C. Tortolani (Series Coordinator) and Victoria DiDomenico (Research Officer).


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The project’s Advisory Board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith and Stephen J. Stedman.

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CIC is solely responsible for the content of the Review and this briefing paper. Any errors of fact, interpretation or judgment are those of CIC alone.

Cover photo: Ali Dia/AFP/Getty Images