Peace Operations in 2011

The United Nations Security Council authorized two new peacekeeping missions during 2011—the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—the first missions since the joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in 2007.

The Council also authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, clearing the way for a NATO air campaign that divided members of the Security Council. Following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the civilian UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a political mission, to help reestablish state authority.

These authorizations exhibit the range of options at the disposal of the Security Council in supporting countries in crisis and those emerging from conflict. For the past decade, the default mode of UN peacekeeping has been deployment of large, multidimensional operations. Recent missions, driven by the global financial crisis and by realities on the ground, offer alternatives to this model. UNISFA, a border-monitoring operation, was able to rapidly deploy by drawing its entire force requirement from a single, regional troop contributor. In Libya, none of the options tabled for a UN (or indeed non-UN) mission involving military troops were acceptable to the National Transitional Council. Agreement on a light civilian support mission is in line with the patterns of deployment elsewhere in the Middle East, which have favored monitoring missions and political missions.

Rapidly changing environments also tested the ability of existing missions to effectively respond to conflict. Electoral crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti, and the deep flaws in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s election, exposed limits in the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to support political processes and reestablish legitimate state authority.

The advanced military capabilities of France’s Operation Licorne were decisive in supporting the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Globally, these capabilities are predominantly—though not exclusively—possessed by Western countries largely absent from peacekeeping. Due to the dearth of advanced military participation in peacekeeping, several of the UN’s largest missions—including UNMIS, UNAMID, and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)—have also struggled to uphold their mandates and protect civilians this past year. At the same time, NATO’s experience in Afghanistan cautioned against placing too much stock in capabilities in the absence of a viable political framework. If the UN is to sustain confidence in peacekeeping as an effective means of crisis management, it requires member states to support it not just militarily, but politically as well.
Global peacekeeping continued to grow in 2011, though at a reduced pace compared with previous years; there were 263,118 peacekeepers deployed in 2011, compared with 256,170 in 2010, an increase of just 2.7 percent.

In 2011 UN peacekeeping deployments experienced their first contraction since 2003. This year, 98,972 uniformed personnel were deployed, compared with 99,172 in 2010—a change of less than 0.5 percent.

The decrease in UN peacekeeping was offset by increases in NATO and African Union deployments. NATO deployments increased this year, though troop numbers in its mission in Afghanistan remained stable. Additional contributions to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from Burundi and Uganda strengthened the peacekeeping force by 35 percent this year.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were once again the top three troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping this year. However, Uruguay, Jordan, and Fiji supplied the most troops and military observers on a per capita basis.

Within the UN, in the past five years military deployments have grown by nearly 13 percent, while police deployments have increased by 80 percent. Over the same period, civilian staff in UN peacekeeping missions, including international staff, national staff, and UN volunteers, increased nearly 27 percent.

Yet peacekeeping has faced increasing strain at UN headquarters and in capitals, as member states struggle with the ongoing fallout from the global financial crisis. Budgetary constraints, particularly among Western governments, have further frayed the relationship between financial contributors and troop/police contributors, and resulted in calls to quicken the pace of mission drawdown—both where missions have achieved stability and where they have not—without appropriate, practical, and cost-effective alternatives to prevent reversals and mitigate further violence.

The deepening financial crisis is certain to dominate discussions on mandates and resources—including troop reimbursement rates and the scale of assessed contributions—for peacekeeping in the year ahead. Nonetheless, these negotiations also present an opportunity to galvanize support for peacekeeping as an essential tool of crisis management, and to define its future strategic direction—including strengthening partnership arrangements, mobilizing civilian expertise and military assets, and developing flexible, alternative models of deployment.

*Year to year comparisons are made between September 2010-September 2011 for non UN-commanded missions and October 2010-October 2011 for UN-commanded missions.

**Note: Per capita calculations were completed using 2010 population data from the United Nations Population Division.**
Data on UN-Commanded Operations

Origin of Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2011

- Europe: 9.0%
- Central and South America: 8.7%
- North America: >1%
- Middle East: 2.5%
- Africa: 37.1%
- Central and South Asia: 33.9%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 8.7%

Deployment of Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2011

- Europe: 1.0%
- Central and South America: 10.5%
- North America: 0%
- Middle East: 16.1%
- Africa: 72.2%
- Central and South Asia: >1%
- East Asia and the Pacific: >1%

Origin of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2011

- Europe: 4.7%
- Central and South America: 1.1%
- North America: 1.9%
- Middle East: 15.2%
- Africa: 36.5%
- Central and South Asia: 34.1%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 6.6%

Deployment of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2011

- Europe: 0.5%
- Central and South America: 25.5%
- North America: 0%
- Middle East: 0%
- Africa: 65.5%
- Central and South Asia: 0%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 8.4%
Data on Non-UN-Commanded Operations

Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN-Commanded Missions by Organization: 30 September 2011

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 89.4%
- African Union: 6.0%
- European Union: 1.7%
- Economic Community of the Central African States: >1%
- Coalitions/Ad hoc: 2.5%

Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2011

- Europe: 5.4%
- Middle East: 1.1%
- East Asia and the Pacific: >1%
- Africa: 12.6%
- Central and South Asia: 80.6%

Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police by Organization: 30 September 2011

- African Union: 2.6%
- Coalitions/Ad hoc: 14.4%
- Economic Community of Central African States: 7.2%

Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police to Regions: 30 September 2011

- Europe: 63.8%
- Middle East: 2.6%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 13.0%
- Africa: 10.9%
- Central and South Asia: 9.7%
Director's Comment

Bruce D. Jones

Peace operations demonstrated an unexpected degree of resilience throughout 2011. The UN reasserted itself in Côte d’Ivoire and helped ensure that the Haitian and Liberian elections were relatively smooth, if far from flawless. In Somalia, the AU scored a series of tactical victories and the Islamists pulled back from Mogadishu. While these peace operations may have performed relatively well on the ground, the year brought unexpected challenges in the Middle East.

Yet all these events and challenges have had surprisingly little impact on policy debates about the future of peacekeeping at the UN and in other organizations in 2011. Rather than talking about the effects of operations, diplomats and officials have developed one overriding obsession: what operations cost.

In New York, 2011 saw a fierce debate over the rate of reimbursements to troop contributors and quieter but serious arguments among Western countries about the costs of the UN missions in South Sudan, Haiti, and Liberia. US, British, and French officials traded barbs privately and even in the media, betraying unusual tensions among the Western powers that traditionally dominate the Security Council. Cost issues are not solely confined to the UN. The European Union, which mandated an increasing number of missions prior to the financial crisis, has now become very negative toward new operations. Analysts are still trying to interpret how North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense cuts will restrain future operations.

There is a strong case for using the current combination of strategic and financial pressures as the basis for launching a much more serious debate about how international peace operations are run.

A real debate about peacekeeping would start from two basic presumptions. First, the financial pressures are real, and denying them is foolish. Secondly, the demand for effective peace operations is equally real, whether in Côte d’Ivoire or Syria. Trying to cut peacekeeping costs just to save money is, therefore, a mistake. Refusing to accept the need to use money more effectively is just as mistaken.

In this context, this seventh edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is intended, like its predecessors, to provide the hard data and analysis of peacekeeping necessary for a real debate.
Peacekeeping and Support to State Sovereignty

Jake Sherman

The majority of contemporary peace operations occur in countries with weak state institutions, and where insecurity and violence continue after the signing of a peace accord. Typically, these states have had limited formal administrative, judicial, and security presence, in addition to limited capacity and resources to deliver even the most basic services beyond the capital and major urban centers.

Since 2000 the Security Council has authorized a range of peacekeeping missions explicitly tasked with supporting the restoration and extension of state authority. Yet there is no single model for this kind of work.

The international community’s experience on supporting the extension and restoration of state authority highlights seven lessons:

1. Extension of State Authority Often Depends on Peacekeepers’ Tactical Use of Force
2. Extension of State Authority Often Depends on Development of National Security Forces
3. Establishing State Presence Is Not the Same as Legitimate State Authority
4. Supporting States is Distinct from Supporting Governments
5. Extending State Authority Can Undermine Perceptions of Peacekeepers’ Impartiality
6. Peacekeepers Need to Adjust Their Posture Over Time
7. Peacekeepers Need to Be Realistic

These experiences also demonstrate three continuing operational challenges:

1. Coherent Support Requires Stronger Internal and External Integration
2. Rapidly Deployable and Appropriate Civilian Expertise is in Short Supply
3. Financial Resources are Inflexible and Programming Capacity is Inadequate

Demand by states emerging from crisis and conflict for assistance in extending and consolidating their authority is unlikely to diminish, as demonstrated by requests from South Sudan and Libya in 2011 for UN missions. At the same time, greater pragmatism and less hubris about what can realistically be achieved by external actors is required.

Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012

The Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is the most comprehensive publication of its kind, covering both UN-commanded and non-UN-commanded peace operations during 2011. Released prior to the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Annual Review serves as an indispensable resource informing policy-makers, academics, practitioners, the media, and peacekeeping stakeholders as the international community considers the role of peace operations in managing conflicts. CIC prepares the Annual Review with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Department of Field Support, and the African Union Peace and Security Department.

Global Peace Operations Program

CIC’s Global Peace Operations Program has been a leading source of reliable data and policy analysis of the major trends affecting UN and regional organizations’ response to conflict and crisis. Its independent analysis on the role and effect of peacekeeping and political operations has had a significant impact on both policy and political support for those missions at a time of growing uncertainty.

CIC’s Global Peace Operations Program also publishes the Review of Political Missions, which tracks strategic trends, mission deployments, and deployment data for more than sixty political missions authorized by the UN and regional organizations. The 2011 volume also provides analysis on the extent and potential role of political missions in responding to transnational threats and unconstitutional changes of government. The volume is available online at: www.cic.nyu.edu.
“The Annual Review continues to be an indispensable yearbook for all those involved in peacekeeping. It analyzes and comments ably on the rich and varied operations deployed around the world. It also helps to place United Nations peacekeeping operations within a broader array of peace and security instruments.”

— HERVÉ LADSOUS

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations