



# General Assembly

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## Sixty-ninth session

Item 53 of the provisional agenda\*

### Comprehensive review of special political missions

## Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### *Summary*

The present report, which covers the period of August 2013 to July 2014, is submitted pursuant to resolution [68/85](#), whereby the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions, including efforts towards ensuring transparency, accountability, geographical representation, gender participation, expertise and effectiveness in respect of all special political missions.

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\* [A/69/150](#).



## I. Introduction

1. Over the past few years, the international community has seen the emergence of an ever more complex international security environment. From the spread of transnational organized crime networks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the breakdown of State apparatus and the rise of inter-communal tensions in many areas, the United Nations faces a challenging new reality. The increased human and financial costs related to crisis management and response have further confirmed the imperative of conflict prevention.

2. As a core United Nations mechanism for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, special political missions have continued to play a critical role in the peace and security architecture of the Organization. Their growing importance is reflected in the fact that these missions are deployed to some of the most demanding contexts around the world, from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia to Libya, the Great Lakes region and the Syrian Arab Republic.

3. Over the past few years, special political missions have been the subject of increased interest from Member States. This is further evidence of the increased reliance on these missions by the international community, as well as a consequence of the complexity of mandates and contexts in which they are deployed.

4. This is my second report on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions. In 2013, further to General Assembly resolution [67/123](#), I submitted a comprehensive first report on this topic, which provided a detailed account of the historical evolution of special political missions, as well as their role in conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, and discussed some important policy questions that these missions face on a day-to-day basis. The analysis contained in that report remains valid, as it addressed long-term trends that remain largely constant on a year-to-year basis. This report therefore focuses on providing updates on key developments relating to special political missions over the past year and on the policy issues covered in my 2013 report. It also covers the new issue areas highlighted by the General Assembly in its resolution [68/85](#).

## II. Key developments in the reporting period

### **New missions and expansion and conclusion of existing mandates**

5. The reporting period was a dynamic time for special political missions. Two missions concluded their operations: the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). At the same time, three new special political missions were established by the Security Council: the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

6. On 31 March 2014, UNIPSIL successfully concluded its mandate on peace and security, closing a chapter in the Organization's engagement in Sierra Leone and signalling important progress in the country's transition. The successful exit of UNIPSIL marks the end of 15 years of United Nations peacekeeping and political

presences in the wake of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Given the significant progress made by the country in its peace consolidation and transition process, the Security Council decided that the political mission should give way to a regular United Nations country team presence, which would provide a different kind of assistance to the country going forward.

7. On 10 April 2014, in view of the grave deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic, the Security Council adopted resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#), authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country — the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This marked the end of the mandate of BINUCA, which was subsumed under MINUSCA. BINUCA and its predecessor, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUSCA), had supported peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic since 2000.

8. Previously, the Security Council, in its resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#), had decided to enact a sanctions regime for the Central African Republic for an initial period of one year. The Security Council established a sanctions committee, and requested the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of 13 months, a group of up to five experts (“Panel of Experts”) under the direction of the Committee. The mandate of the Panel was further extended to 28 January 2015 by its resolution [2134 \(2014\)](#), in which the Council adopted additional targeted measures. As a result of both resolutions, the sanctions regime that the Panel will monitor consists of an arms embargo, which prevents the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Central African Republic of arms and related materiel, an assets freeze and a travel ban.

9. On 19 March 2014, the Security Council adopted resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#) increasing the size of the Panel of Experts on Libya from five to six members, in line with the expansion of the mandate of the Panel, which refers to illicit exports of crude oil from Libya, once the Government of Libya informs the Committee of such illegal export and once the Committee has designated a vessel exporting the crude.

10. The Security Council has made two requests for the Secretary-General to undertake assessments of the sanctions regimes in Somalia and Liberia. On 5 March 2014, the Security Council, in its resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#), requested the Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations on United Nations and other technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia in complying with the requirements of the Council in paragraphs 3 to 7 and its requests in paragraph 9 of that resolution, and to assist the Government in improving its capacities to manage weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and verification. In a letter dated 3 April 2014 ([S/2014/243](#)), the Secretary-General presented the results of his assessment mission.

11. Similarly, in a letter dated 16 July 2014 ([S/2014/504](#)), the President of the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to carry out an assessment on the progress that Liberia has made towards meeting the conditions set out in Security Council resolution [1521 \(2003\)](#) for the termination of sanctions, and to provide recommendations on United Nations assistance and other technical assistance to the Government of Liberia in improving its capacities to undertake the proper management of arms and ammunition, including enacting the necessary legislative frameworks; and facilitating the effective monitoring and management of the border regions.

12. In its resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) of 27 September 2013, the Security Council endorsed the decision of the Executive Council of OPCW of the same date that the Syrian Arab Republic should complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment by 30 June 2014. In the same resolution, the Council authorized an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide early assistance to OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Those recommendations were put forward by the Secretary-General in his letter to the President of the Security Council dated 7 October 2013 ([S/2013/591](#)). In his letter dated 11 October 2013 ([S/2013/603](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General about the authorization by the Council of the establishment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission.

13. In its resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), the Security Council adopted, for an initial period of one year, a sanctions regime for Yemen consisting of an assets freeze and a travel ban. The Council established a sanctions committee to monitor the implementation of those measures and requested the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of 13 months, a group of up to four experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee established in the same resolution.

14. In addition, in its resolution [2137 \(2014\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) until 31 December 2014, requesting the mission to complete the transfer of appropriate responsibilities to the United Nations country team by that date. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested me to establish a United Nations electoral observer mission immediately following the end of the mandate of BNUB. This new mission is envisaged as a special political mission.

#### **Interactive dialogue with Member States**

15. In their consideration of the item “Comprehensive review of special political missions”, Member States highlighted the importance of increased interaction between the Secretariat and Member States on policy matters pertaining to special political missions. In particular, the General Assembly, in its resolution [68/85](#), requested me “to hold regular, inclusive and interactive dialogues on the overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions in order to promote greater collaboration with Member States”. In 2014, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs held an interactive dialogue with Member States in March and initiated consultations for a second one in the second semester.

16. The first interactive dialogue took place on 26 March 2014, and focused primarily on two thematic issues: the complexity of mandates of special political missions, and transitions from special political missions to United Nations country teams. The discussion highlighted the significant evolution in the mandates of these missions, which are now routinely tasked in areas ranging from good offices and electoral or constitutional support to human rights, rule of law, gender and security sector reform. This represents a significant move away from the more narrow political facilitation functions that these missions carried out originally. The interactive dialogue also discussed the importance of planned transitions for the long-term success of peace consolidation efforts in countries and regions where special political missions are deployed. In particular, the need for exit strategies was

highlighted as a critical ingredient to strengthen national ownership, as was timely planning for special political mission withdrawals.

17. At the time of writing the present report, informal consultations were being undertaken for the organization of the second interactive dialogue on special political missions in 2014.

### **III. Key policy issues and challenges**

#### **Delivering mandates in a volatile security environment**

18. Over the reporting period, we saw a deterioration of the security situation in several countries in which special political missions operate, which created greater risks for United Nations personnel and assets, and posed significant obstacles for mandate implementation across various areas. This is in line with a longer-term trend that I described in my last report on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (A/68/223), where I pointed out that special political missions have been called upon to deliver complex mandates in situations of active conflicts, or barely post-conflict contexts. Volatile security environments hinder the ability of the Organization to interact with national stakeholders, both Government and civil society, in particular in more remote areas away from urban centres. Other areas of mandate implementation, such as humanitarian assistance, disarmament and demobilization or electoral assistance, may also be affected.

19. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, political missions are operating in areas with fragile security environments. In order to cope with these less permissible environments for United Nations operational work, the Organization has developed a menu of security options to minimize security risks while providing missions with the ability to implement their mandates. This may include cooperation with existing international or regionally led military operations in a country where special political missions are deployed, the deployment of United Nations security officers to support security for mission premises and personnel and enhanced cooperation with host Governments.

20. One of the options that the United Nations has explored in recent years is the deployment of guard units. A guard unit is a force composed of police or military personnel, or other State security forces, provided as contingents by one or more Member States and deployed with the authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly to protect United Nations personnel, premises and assets in field missions operating in non-permissive environments. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq has had a guard unit since 2004; in 2013, three new guard units were authorized: for BINUCA on 29 October 2013, followed by UNSMIL on 27 November 2013 and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) on 24 December 2013.

#### **Partnerships with regional and subregional organizations**

21. Close partnerships with regional and subregional organizations are one of the key elements of success for special political missions. Over the past years, these partnerships have taken a wide range of modalities and covered various issue areas, reflecting the growing diversity and complexity of cooperation between the United Nations and regional actors.

22. Regionally mandated envoys, for example, have, by the nature of their mandate, a close relationship with regional actors in the areas in which they operate. In particular, given their focus on addressing cross-boundary issues and challenges, their cooperation with regional actors is critical in many cases. For example, the Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region has developed a strong partnership with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and other regional actors. Similarly, the Special Envoy for the Sahel works closely with a wide range of regional and subregional actors to coordinate the different regional and international initiatives for the Sahel, including the African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

23. Regional offices have also made strong efforts to work closely with regional or subregional organizations in their area of operation. For example, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia holds regular annual or biannual consultations in the area of preventive diplomacy with regional organizations, notably the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union.

24. In some instances, cooperation with regional actors is a crucial part of their mandates. The United Nations Office to the African Union, for example, was established to further strengthen cooperation and the strategic partnership between the two institutions. The United Nations Office in West Africa (UNOWA) is mandated to enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict management, mediation and good offices, including providing support to existing subregional mechanisms, in particular the Conflict Prevention Framework of ECOWAS and the Community's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Similarly, the United Nations Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) is mandated to cooperate with ECCAS, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and other key partners in the region, providing assistance to their efforts to promote peace and stability in the broader Central African subregion. Both UNOWA and UNOCA have worked with regional partners such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to prepare a regional anti-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.

25. Country-specific missions have equally developed strong partnerships with key regional actors. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) works closely with the League of Arab States on issues of common interest, such as the Middle East peace process, Palestinian State building and unity, and the situation in Gaza. To improve and strengthen such cooperation, UNSCO opened a liaison office in Cairo in 2014. In Somalia, the United Nations has worked side-by-side with its regional partners, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the European Union, in addition to the logistical support provided by the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The United Nations Integrated

Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau enhanced its partnership with ECOWAS, which led regional support towards the restoration of constitutional order in the country, as well as the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the European Union. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has been closely involved in the development of the Istanbul Process for Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, which includes as one of its key elements drawing together the regional organizations operating in the 14-country “Heart of Asia” region to develop synergy and coherence among their activities, specifically in the areas of security, economic development, trade, disaster management and counter-narcotics. UNAMA also maintains close ties with the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia to coordinate efforts as required.

### **Support mechanisms in mediation and good offices**

26. Given their relatively lean structure and light footprint, special political missions often have to rely on support from Headquarters in specific thematic areas, ranging from rule of law and constitution-making to electoral assistance. One of the key areas in which special political missions have required particular support over the past few years are mediation and good offices.

27. From the outset of my tenure as Secretary-General, and in line with calls from Member States and the international community more broadly, I have promoted the reinvigorated use of mediation and preventive diplomacy as critical instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security. In my recent reports on enhancing mediation and its support strategies (S/2009/189), preventive diplomacy (S/2011/552) and strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution (A/66/811), I have presented my vision for an Organization with stronger mediation and preventive diplomacy capacity, and described some of the steps we have taken to make this objective a reality.

28. As part of these efforts, the United Nations has enhanced its operational readiness to implement and support mediation efforts. The strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs, including through the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit, is a key development in this regard. The Unit, which complements expertise available elsewhere in the United Nations system, now serves as the central hub for mediation support within the United Nations system, capable of assisting the peace efforts of the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and others.

29. In operational terms, a number of steps have contributed to strengthening the United Nations mediation capacity. An important asset in the rapid response capability of the Organization is the standby team of mediation experts. These experts, deployable within 72 hours, are specialists in mediation process design, constitution-making, gender and inclusion issues, sharing of natural resources, power-sharing and security arrangements. The Department of Political Affairs has also maintained rosters of pre-vetted thematic, operational and senior mediation experts, with geographical and gender representativeness, who can be deployed for longer-term engagements to support mediation processes. Knowledge products, such as induction guidance, good practices and technical papers, have also been systematically prepared and shared with mediators. Finally, mediation training for both senior mediators and working level staff, with special focus on women

mediators, and a high-level seminar series on gender and inclusive mediation, have been important areas of work.

30. Given their role in conflict prevention and peacemaking, special political missions are one of the main beneficiaries of these structures. Special envoys supporting complex mediation processes have frequently relied on expertise from the Department of Political Affairs on a wide range of mediation activities. In Yemen, standby team experts assisted through the Office of the Special Adviser in the design and conduct of the National Dialogue Conference that concluded successfully in January 2014. In other cases, special political missions facilitating constitutional processes have also benefitted from such expertise. Several standby team experts have been advising UNSMIL, and through it the Libyan Constitutional Drafting Assembly, on international best practices in constitution-making. In Somalia, a standby expert has been working closely with UNSOM to provide advice to the Speaker of Parliament and officials within the Federal Government of Somalia on how to move the country's constitutional review process forward. In Yemen, in addition to the support to the national dialogue process noted above, a standby team and other United Nations experts are supporting the Office of the Special Adviser in advising the constitution-drafting committee and its secretariat.

31. Given that the Organization, including through its missions in the field, is often called upon to provide electoral assistance in fragile or unstable environments, such as political transitions and post-conflict settings, we have placed greater focus on preventing election-related instability and violence, urging more consultative approaches that will enhance confidence in the electoral process and mitigate the risk of conflict.

### **Managing knowledge and learning lessons**

32. As an increasing number of missions conclude their mandates, or new missions are deployed, the ability of the Organization to take stock of existing experiences, create inventories of successful policies and best practices, and disseminate them across the range of special political missions becomes even more important. Over the past few years, the United Nations has been undertaking concerted efforts to strengthen its knowledge management and lessons learned capacity and apply this to the work of its special political missions. In this process, the Organization seeks to learn from its failures and its successes. While the experience of each special political mission is highly context-specific, awareness of existing practice, policies and successful strategies can greatly contribute to the effectiveness of a mission in implementing its mandate.

33. In this regard, the Organization has created more opportunities for the exchange of experiences and good practices among mission leadership and specialized areas. For example, in March 2014, my Special Representatives — heads of both special political missions and peacekeeping operations — met for an annual retreat, where they shared views on some key challenges they face on the ground, from security and resourcing to mediation and conflict prevention. In the same month, the heads of political affairs components in field-based special political missions met in an annual retreat to exchange experiences on key substantive and operational issues faced in the discharge of the mandate of the mission. The Joint Mission Analysis Centre workshop, held in May 2014, afforded information analyst officers and Centre Chiefs from both special political missions and peacekeeping

missions the opportunity to share good practices and lessons learned. A dedicated workshop for special political missions Chiefs of Staff is also being planned.

34. The Organization has also focused on the preparation of guidance material in key thematic areas such as crisis management, integrated assessment and planning, and on mission concepts. These system-wide and interdepartmental products have been accompanied by implementation strategies to ensure that guidance is implemented and promoted at both Headquarters and in the field. In addition, the Organization is undertaking several studies, such as on Security Council-mandated benchmarks in the context of mission transitions and an independent review of the United Nations programme criticality framework — a systematic approach to determining the criticality of all activities carried out by United Nations personnel and establishing maximum acceptable risk for staff working on different activities.

35. Mission-specific lessons learned activities and other analytical studies have been an important component of the ability of the Organization to capture successful experiences. For example, in 2014, the Department of Political Affairs undertook a lessons learned study on the UNIPSIL transition to the United Nations country team at the end of its mandate on 31 March 2014. In May 2013, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support produced a joint evaluation of the start-up of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya in order to identify the challenges faced by the mission during its first months of operations, and to explore opportunities to better support the start-up of special political missions. In 2013, the Department of Political Affairs undertook a lessons learned exercise on the strategic review and budget cuts of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, to inform similar strategic reviews and budget processes in field-based special political missions in the future. A study jointly commissioned in 2013 by the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme on integrated electoral assistance in United Nations mission settings provided recommendations on how to improve United Nations assistance and national electoral processes in countries on the agenda of the Security Council.

#### **Geographical representation, gender participation and expertise**

36. The United Nations seeks to have a pool of staff that is representative of its global membership, both at Headquarters and in the field. Geographical diversity greatly enriches the work of the Organization. Field-based special political missions, in particular, have benefitted from such diversity. These missions generally employ significant numbers of national staff, including national professional officers, whose knowledge of local dynamics, politics, language and culture is invaluable to the overall work of the mission. As part of its broader policies for the Secretariat as a whole, the Organization will continue to work to improve the representation of staff from across the globe in all its special political missions.

37. As a standard setting organization, the United Nations has a strong responsibility to achieve gender parity and gender equality within its own system. It strives to lead by example, although several challenges remain to be addressed and overcome. I have repeatedly emphasized the high priority I attach to achieving this important goal. In my report on improvement in the status of women in the United Nations system (A/67/347), I outlined the present status of women in the United

Nations system and the measures and policies put in place to ensure that the Organization continues to make progress towards gender equality.

38. In addition, important efforts are being undertaken to increase the number of women serving as senior mediators for the United Nations. In 2013, I appointed Mary Robinson as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. Similarly, in 2014, my appointment of Hiroute Guebre Sellassie as Special Envoy for the Sahel further reinforced our ranks of women mediators. In order to increase the pool of women qualified to take up similar key positions, the Organization has developed dedicated mediation training courses specifically tailored for women in senior level positions. In order to strengthen gender perspective among the existing pool of mediators, a high-level seminar on gender and inclusive mediation processes was also developed and offered to 101 envoys, senior mediators and mediation experts in 2013-2014, with three more seminars to be organized in 2014 and 2015.

39. In addition to striving for gender equality within their own ranks, special political missions have an equally important role to play in promoting women's participation and representation in ongoing conflict prevention and resolution efforts. During the last reporting period, women were represented on all United Nations mediation support teams, and gender expertise was provided in a majority of our mediation engagements. Women's representation on delegations of negotiating parties has also increased steadily throughout the past years.

40. As I noted in my 2013 report, the mandates of special political missions have expanded considerably over the past decade. In particular, these missions now routinely carry out multidimensional mandates that go beyond their traditional political functions to cover activities in areas such as rule of law, constitutional and electoral assistance, human rights, security sector reform, gender and conflict-related sexual violence. Special political missions with electoral mandates regularly work closely with the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs. Similarly, when specific expertise in the area of rule of law and security sector reform is needed, special political missions receive support from the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

41. The increasing breadth of the mandates of special political missions has as a result created a demand for specific expertise. Special political missions that do not have dedicated capacity in all areas that relate to their mandate may also call upon expertise based at Headquarters to meet specific needs. For example, all special political missions can receive gender expertise from the Department of Political Affairs headquarters on issues related to gender mainstreaming and women, peace and security, including how to prevent and address conflict-related sexual violence.

#### **IV. Observations**

42. Special political missions continue to play a critical role in the United Nations overall efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to build a sustainable peace. The developments in the reporting period further reaffirm their place at the centre of the Organization's peace and security architecture.

43. The closure of UNIPSIL after it successfully completed its mandate on 31 March 2014 and the decision of the Security Council to end the mandate of

BNUB by 31 December 2014 underline the fact that most of these missions are not permanent fixtures, but, rather, are mechanisms that are deployed only for as long as their support is needed. Once mandates are successfully completed these missions will give way to other United Nations structures, in particular the development presences of country teams. On the other hand, the closure of BINUCA in the Central African Republic also highlights the value of different tools at the disposal of the Security Council to deal with its mandate of maintenance of international peace and security.

44. National ownership remains a core component of the work carried out by special political missions. Their mandates and activities are designed with a central premise: only national actors can address the needs and goals of their societies in a sustainable manner. In this regard, the role of special political missions is ultimately a supporting role, aimed at assisting national counterparts and regional partners in resolving conflict and consolidating peace.

45. Continued support from Member States to special political missions is a key element in their ability to implement their mandate successfully. A very important dimension of this support is political unity behind the efforts of my Special Representatives and Special Envoys, for whom the backing of the international community is the most important currency and source of legitimacy. Support from Member States is also required insofar as the funding of special political missions is concerned. I would like to recall that special political missions still face important challenges related to administrative and budgetary matters; those issues lie within the remit of the Fifth Committee and are the subject of my report on the review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions ([A/66/340](#)).

46. In closing, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representatives and Special Envoys and to the dedicated and courageous United Nations staff serving in these missions, who often work under difficult conditions in support of peace, security and development.

## Annex

### United Nations special political missions (as at 31 July 2014)

#### Special Envoys

1. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus
2. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region<sup>a</sup>
3. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar
4. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
5. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel
6. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan
7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria
8. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara
9. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen
10. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)
11. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

#### Sanctions panels and monitoring groups

1. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
2. Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire
3. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
4. Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
5. Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran
6. Panel of Experts on Liberia
7. Panel of Experts on Libya
8. Panel of Experts on the Sudan
9. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities
10. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
11. Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) [concerning the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction]
12. Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

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<sup>a</sup> Funded from the "unforeseen" account until 31 December 2013.

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13. Panel of Experts on Yemen

**Field-based missions**

1. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
2. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process<sup>b</sup>
3. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
4. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
5. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
6. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
7. United Nations Office in Burundi
8. United Nations Office for Central Africa
9. United Nations Office for West Africa
10. United Nations Office to the African Union<sup>b</sup>
11. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
12. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission
13. United Nations Support Mission in Libya
14. Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

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<sup>b</sup> Funded from the regular budget but technically not part of the special political mission budgetary category.