The *Global Peace Operations Review* is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the Country & Regional Profile pages, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM - A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

John Karlsrud

During the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Barack Obama chaired two summits - the first on peace operations on September 28, and one the following day on counter-terrorism. His participation in both demonstrated the level of commitment of the U.S., and the American belief that the UN is still relevant to tackling these challenges. The summits have also drawn some attention to the possible convergence between these two policy fields. What are the implications of this convergence? And, are UN peace operations really able to take on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) tasks?

In this article, I argue that the UN neither will be principally, nor operationally ready to fight terrorist groups, and that coalitions of the willing and regional organizations may be best positioned to take on these tasks. Furthermore, I argue that the increasing focus on CVE, with the attendant resources that are brought to the table, limits the space for more politically oriented approaches. It also risks marginalizing, politicizing and securitizing the peacebuilding, local governance and development agendas.

Counter-terrorism has been high on the international agenda since the 9/11-attacks. In recent years it has been subsumed under the wider and less ominous sounding concept of countering violent extremism (CVE). For many people the two terms amount to the same thing, but the latter is considered more polite in certain circles. At the UN, the CVE agenda is also moving from the margins to center stage.

During 2015, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon participated in a U.S.-arranged CVE summit. He warned against a securitized approach to CVE, and outlined a future prevention agenda where the main goals must be to better understand the motivations for joining groups such as the Islamic State (IS); avoid using ‘terrorism’ as a label to eliminate political opposition; and deal with root causes through strengthening governance, the respect for human rights, more accountable institutions, service delivery and political participation.

At the recent Leader’s Summit on peacekeeping held during the General Assembly and chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama, UK Prime Minister David Cameron was not the only one citing terrorism as a motivating factor for contributing more troops and resources to UN peace operations. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda scolded the UN for peaceful coexistence with terrorist groups, while the U.S. Mission to the UN cited the “jihadist insurgency” in Mali as an example of a challenge that the UN needed to be better equipped to deal with. U.S. officials have emphasized that America is not outsourcing the so-called “War on Terror” to the UN; rather it is taking a burden-sharing approach. On the other hand, the recently released US presidential memorandum stressed that the UN will not be able take on “more forceful military interventions that need to be carried out in non-permissive

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environments”. However, Richard Gowan, Non-Resident Fellow at CIC, has argued that using UN peace operations to deal with situations of counter-terrorism is one area where the veto powers of the Security Council may be able to agree.

A CHANGING CONTEXT?

A record 59.5 million people were forcibly displaced in 2014. The UNHCR global trends report for 2014, tellingly titled World at War, paints a bleak picture with a four-fold increase of people forced to leave their homes due to conflict during the previous four years. While the number of conflicts had been steadily declining for more than a decade, the last few years has witnessed a wave of new conflicts in Libya, Syria, Mali, Yemen and the Central African Republic (CAR). Old conflicts have rekindled, leading to a tripling of civil conflicts between 2007 and 2014. The UN is struggling with more ‘traditional’ protection threats of formidable scale: the deteriorating situation in CAR, and in South Sudan, where hundreds of thousands of civilians in danger outside of UN camps are trapped in a civil war that has only increased in brutality and abuse during the last few months.

However, it is the arguably new threats of violent extremism and organized crime, combined with these traditional challenges, that are propelling discussions of change at the UN – particularly to its peace operations. Boko Haram, IS, the Al Shabaab and other extremist groups in Libya, Mali, Syria and Yemen have challenged policy-makers and the multilateral system, which is poorly equipped to respond to these violent, but also multifaceted challenges. These groups add to the political complexity and increase the intractable nature of conflict in these countries. Some groups can be talked to, while others have no interest in negotiating with the UN.

In recent years, the UN Security Council has been giving increasingly expansive and robust mandates to UN peace operations. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2013, it authorized a peace enforcement mission that pitted blue helmets against identified rebel groups, tasking the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to ‘neutralize’ these armed groups. This was in clear contradiction of principles guiding UN peacekeeping operations including impartiality, obtaining consent of the main parties, and only using force in self-defence or in defence of the mandate. The UN missions authorized in 2013 and 2014 in Mali and CAR were given mandates to ‘stabilise’ and ‘extend state authority’, effectively asking them to confront rebel and extremist groups in Mali as well as sectarian groups in CAR. In the next few years, multidimensional missions to Libya, Yemen and Syria are also possible. At UN Headquarters, staff only half-jokingly say that the organization has moved from being in the crossfire into the crosshairs, attacked no longer for where they are, but for who they are. The increasing attacks on blue helmets in Darfur, DRC and Mali testify to this impression.

In Mali, the UN mission is equipped with a mandate to extend state authority to the northern parts of the country. Local communities in that region see this as taking sides against them. The mission has thus far suffered a high price: 40 military peacekeepers have been killed in “malicious acts” since deployment in April 2013. It is difficult to draw a line where pursuit of armed groups behind these attacks turns into a counter-terrorism operation. This is particularly true when such pursuit is backed by a mandate “to support the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, as well as the progressive redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces especially in the North of Mali.” The UN is not seen as impartial when it supports the extension of the state’s authority – perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of the local community in the north – rather than seeking to heal fractured state-society relations.

In Somalia, the African Union mission AMISOM has been fighting the Al Shabaab since 2007, at great human, political and economic
costs. The mission has made important steps forward, but together with the Federal Government of Somalia it is struggling to provide the ‘liberated’ areas with security, service delivery and a real feeling of a peace dividend. The AU Peace and Security Council has also given a mandate to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and Chad. It has reportedly had some initial progress but is not yet fully deployed and operational.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM MOVES TO CENTER STAGE AT THE UN

Inside the UN Secretariat, a growing number of bodies deal with counter-terrorism and CVE. More are joining the field. The UN Security-Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, established by Security Council resolution 1373 in 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, provides guidelines, suggestions for codes and standards and facilitates technical assistance to member states.

In 2005, the Secretary-General established a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), endorsed by member states of the UN General Assembly through the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006. Within CTITF, the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was established. The Centre received a donation from Saudi-Arabia of $100 million in 2014 to strengthen its “tools, technologies and methods to confront and eliminate the threat of terrorism”. It is also partially funded by Germany, the UK and the U.S. According to one UN official, the CTITF/UNCCT now accounts for roughly half of the DPA budget and has reached out to the UN mission in Mali, UN agencies and others to develop projects, in total 31 so far.

The convergence of the peace operations and counter-terrorism agendas is not only at the rhetorical level. CTITF has been visiting Mali and MINUSMA offering funding for activities that align with its narrow objectives. As there has so far been limited scope for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Mali to deal with the political dimension, mission creep is a tempting proposition. The generous but very specific funding accumulated by DPA’s counter-terrorism/CVE programs could potentially skew priorities. This risks creating supply-driven niche programming at headquarters and in the field, rather than trying to address the larger political problems driving the conflict by an objective analysis of the problems and needs.

The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has shown keen interest in expanding its activities to help countries prevent and counter violent extremism, even those not hosting an active peace operation. A recent report published by the UN University (UNU) Centre for Policy Research, with the support of the UN DDR section, asks the rhetorical question: UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? In the preface of the report, OROLSI’s head Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov agrees with the problem statement. He asks how “we can move forward together in exploring DDR and CVE programming”, and he agrees with the editors that a new policy merged area of “Demobilization and Disengagement of Violent Extremists” (DDVE) could be the way forward.

The report suggests the UN may need to adapt its guidelines for DDR in order to deal with foreign terrorist fighters, terrorist rehabilitation and involuntary detention. It states that UN peace operations are already moving in such a direction, and acknowledges that this is in contradiction to the aforementioned peacekeeping principles. The report also raises a red flag by noting that such contradiction presents “a host of safety, legal, ethical, operational, and reputational risks to the UN, its staff, Member States, and donors”. Despite this, the authors press for a stronger engagement of the UN in these areas. Overall, the unclear division of labor between the UN Secretariat and other departments and agencies, combined with the potential of supply-driven programming, should be of great concern to the UN.
A DIVIDED HOUSE

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report emphasized the primacy of political solutions. It stated, “there is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of [UN] peace operations today and what they are able to deliver”. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former head of UN peacekeeping, argued that robust peacekeeping has to be supported by a robust political strategy. However, institutional dynamics can also play a role. Some among the senior officials at the UN argued for the mission in Mali to maintain the ‘market share’ over and above regional organizations or bilateral deployments. These officials believe the UN has the most competence, has been in the peacekeeping business the longest, and should not be frightened by the challenges and uncertainties on the ground but rather adapt to changing circumstances and not be hindered by outdated principles.

The HIPPO panel drew a red line against counter-terrorism. It argued that UN peace operations were veering from peacekeeping toward conflict management, and stated that they “lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required” to deal with violent extremists. The report emphasized that when deployed in parallel with a counter-terrorism operation, “[t]he UN must in these situations maintain a strict adherence to its impartial commitment to the respect for human rights. When such non-UN forces depart, the UN should not be called upon to assume residual tasks beyond its capability”. Aside from the HIPPO panel, others have also questioned whether UN peace operations is the right tool for counter-terrorism situations, particularly when not supported by a strong political mandate.

The UN DPKO is today a divided house between those that want UN peace operations to ‘evolve’ and be ‘relevant’ to the threats on the ground, and those that stand by the traditional principles of peacekeeping. A UN official told me that those diverging opinions have created a “massive rift in DPKO”. On the one hand, some see the core principles of the UN threatened – and by extension, the viability of UN peacekeeping as a tool in the future. On the other hand, others see new areas where the UN can engage and maintain market share, continuing to be relevant to challenges on the ground and to member states that advocate for more robust peace operations. But the question remains whether the UN in places like Mali is mandated to deal with conflicts that go against the principles of the organization, and whether these conflicts can undermine the long-term support and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping as a tool to help countries emerging from conflict.

A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

In his leaked 2007 End of Mission report, Alvaro de Soto, long time senior UN official and former Special Envoy to the Middle East, condemned the UN and the Secretary-General for limiting the space that the UN established over past decades for engaging with all actors in conflict, including those considered “beyond the pale.” De Soto resigned from his post because of the restrictions he was given on engaging with Hamas and Syria. In his report, he warned against establishing a new precedent for UN officials, that of talking only with those actors seen to be in the clear: “Since the late 1980s the UN has become rather adept dealing with groups that most governments can’t or won’t touch. If this ability is removed we would seriously weaken our hand as a peacemaking tool”.

The branding of rebel groups as terrorists can limit the ability of UN Special Envoys and peace operations to engage with these groups. This is part of a general tendency, starting with the “War on Terror”, wherein the maneuvering space of the UN has increasingly been limited. This has hampered the ability of the UN to broker peace and prevent conflict. The limits placed on
dialogue have been paralleled by an increasing belief in the use of force to solve conflict – with limited results, considering the fallout of Western engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Arguably, security thinking and terms such as “counter-insurgency” and “counter-terrorism” have replaced more political approaches to solving conflict, or seeking to understand and deal with root causes.

The central tenet of the HIPPO report is its emphasis of the primacy of politics. It argues for scaling down the engagement in substantive areas in countries where there is no peace to keep, rather than increasing them. It seems the HIPPO red line drawn against counter-terrorism is already fast receding in the rear view mirror under the pressure of increased engagement in DDR and CVE.

The UN and its lead operations departments such as DPKO should be careful not to rush into providing technical solutions for problems that are deeply political and often rooted in longstanding development challenges. Going forward, the UN and member states need to carefully consider the grave implications of merging peace operations with the agendas of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism. The increasing focus on CVE, with the attendant resources that are brought to the table, can limit the space for more politically-oriented approaches and risks marginalizing, politicizing and securitizing the humanitarian, peacebuilding, local governance and development agendas.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will soon be presenting a Plan of Action on preventing violent extremism, likely before the end of this year. His emphasis on the preventative pillar is a positive sign. However, there is still the danger that existing development and peacebuilding work on facilitating consultation, addressing root causes, strengthening service delivery, rule of law and justice may be rebranded as countering and preventing violent extremism, in order to access new funding streams. E.g. UNDP has years of experience in working in this area under banner of ‘community violence reduction’.

Some commentators argue that the UN may well be asked, sooner rather than later, to deploy multidimensional missions with enforcement mandates where it will face terrorism in countries like Libya, Yemen and even Syria. The argument that UN peace operations are deployed to face situations where there is no peace to keep, and where violent extremist and terrorists are part of the picture, is well taken. So are the many calls for more sophisticated capabilities to enable the UN to protect itself against these threats on the ground. However, this should not stop the UN from warning the UN Security Council against prematurely deploying UN peace operations to these situations.

On the ground, missions should carefully consider activities countering violent extremism, bearing in mind the core principles of peacekeeping. While there is a strong need to further strengthen the capability and will of the UN to robustly protect civilians, these tools should not be used to make the UN participate in longer term counter-terrorism operations. Both field and headquarters staff should continue to stand by the values of the organization, and not try to defend its ‘market share’ of global peace operations.

**UN STABILIZATION MISSIONS AND BURDEN-SHARING**

There are no easy answers to the challenges that some of today’s and most of tomorrow’s peace operation theatres will bring. Part of the solution must be to clearly delineate what UN peace operations can and cannot do. The HIPPO report and the follow-up report from the Secretary-General both drew the line against counter-terrorism operations. The recent US presidential memorandum on peace operations argues that although UN peace operations in “select and exceptional cases” can be tasked
to “conduct offensive military operations against armed groups that act as spoilers outside of a peace process”, it adds that UN “peace operations cannot substitute for diplomatic solutions to end a war, nor for more forceful military interventions that need to be carried out in non-permissive environments by individual states or coalitions that possess the will and capacity to do so.” The memorandum suggests that UN peace operations can “replace national or coalition military forces in operations once an area has transitioned from an immediate crisis to a more permissive environment.” It does not seem to support the kind of co-deployment of a counter-terrorism force and a UN peace operation that we see in Mali.

The HIPPO report declared opposition of UN involvement in counter-terrorism, but it also asked for more clarification on the use of the concept of ‘stabilization’ in UN peace operations. There are divergent understandings of this term among member states and the UN, ranging from peace enforcement to peacebuilding efforts. But what future role should we expect the UN to have in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen? If the UN Security Council is not able or willing to outsource peace enforcement missions in these countries to other organizations, new options and modus operandi could be considered. In my article The UN at War, I commented that the UN quite literally was going green in Mali: troop contributing countries have resisted painting their vehicles and helicopters white, or simply did not care to do so. In my view, the blue helmets and white vehicles should be preserved as a tool that signifies impartiality, consent and limited use of force.

Following these developments to their logical conclusion, one could argue that on its spectrum of operations the UN may need a new tool of stabilization missions. In our forthcoming book, UN Peacekeeping Doctrine Towards the Post-Brahimi Era? Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats, co-authors Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and I argue the UN to consider developing a doctrine for a new category of UN stabilization missions.

A UN stabilization mission would be clearly delineated from other UN peace operations, able to engage in offensive operations for limited durations, but the focus would be more on long-term stability. As such a mission would be seen as partial to the government of the day, it would not necessarily be mandated to mediate between the parties. When developing the doctrine, one would need to also carefully consider the implications of an offensive posture for the routinely substantive tasks of UN peace operations, and limit these accordingly. The HIPPO report similarly recommended such an approach. A stabilization force would not be using blue helmets and white vehicles, clearly demarcating itself from traditional UN peacekeeping missions. These stabilization missions would allow the UN to take on counter-terrorism tasks for limited durations.

However, while UN stabilization missions may provide a level of legitimacy and funding, a number of disincentives should also be taken into account. In order to sustain fatalities and casualties, participants in these missions are likely to be coalitions of the willing, but under a UN banner. That means adding several new layers of UN accountability and human rights reporting mechanisms. Two current missions, the French Barkhane mission in Mali and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, are currently less burdened by these forms of accountability, or by having to develop and relate to complicated UN rules for contracting and management, or slowing down deployment, construction of new bases and logistics in the field, among a host of other issues. If disregarding the principal issues and focusing on pragmatic challenges, for member states, the question will be whether sufficient incentives exist to undertake these tasks under a UN heading, or whether they should participate in a coalition of the willing outside the UN framework.

Taking into consideration that similar ongoing operations are shouldered by the African Union and sub-regional organizations on the African continent, and that likely future operations of this kind will be in Libya, Yemen and Syria, it may make more sense to
undertake such operations in coalitions of the willing. This would give the lead regional organization/group of states the space to decide on a range of issues that might be more constrained in a UN setting. Such missions should be sequenced to not further undermine traditional UN peace operations. Coalitions of the willing, and in some instances regional organizations, will remain the only options with the requisite political will, capabilities, doctrines and staying power to conduct counter-terrorism operations, furnished with a UN mandate. However, with military solutions enjoying dim prospects, they need to be paralleled with a long-term political strategy to enjoy any chance of success.

The HIPPO panel recommended that the UN should use the full spectrum of its operations more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground. Special political missions, combined with strong mediation, intercommunity dialogue, rule of law and governance components addressing state-society relations from the bottom up, could in many instances more effectively address challenges in fragile states before they erupt. However, the way SPMs are financed, combined with sensitivities about sovereignty and the wish to be seen as doing something, will keep larger-scale state-centric peacekeeping operations as the preferred choice of the Security Council.

To achieve a balance and burden-sharing between the UN and other actors is more important than ever. Here, I have argued that there are principled as well as operational reasons why the UN should not conduct counter-terrorism, and that the UN should carefully consider the implications of bringing significant parts of its core business under a CVE umbrella. In broad terms, the limits of the UN also converge with the disincentives for member states and regional actors for conducting counter-terrorism operations under a UN banner.

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THE HAZARDS OF THE PECULIAR UN-NATO RELATIONSHIP

Yo Reykers

More than two decades ago, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* highlighted the necessity of regional support “to lighten the burden of the Council”. He called it “a matter of delegation”. One organization that has occasionally acted upon authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council (NATO NAC). While both the UN and NATO share a “commitment to maintaining international peace and security”, reiterated during a meeting between Ban Ki-Moon and Jens Stoltenberg in this year’s UN General Assembly, the relationship between the two organisations has always been peculiar.

The many reports and debates where the UN addresses its relationship with regional organizations rarely mention NATO. This is somewhat surprising for two reasons. First, the UN-NATO relationship is a lopsided one that mainly benefits NATO. If regional action is indeed “a matter of delegation”, one wonders who in this relationship is actually delegating to whom. The Security Council, in its authorizations of NATO-led interventions, rarely explicitly delegates to NATO. For instance, in UNSC Resolution 1244, which is the legal framework for NATO’s KFOR operation in Kosovo, it authorized “Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo”.

The second reason touches upon a problem that reaches far beyond this single relationship. While UNSC delegation to regional organizations has long been uncontested, the current divisions within the Security Council have led to increased criticisms on the lack of control. Accusations of mandate violations, such as those in the aftermath of NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, have clearly highlighted the UNSC’s limited oversight of the operations it authorizes.

**UN-NATO: WHO’S DELEGATING TO WHOM?**

Since 1992, the UN-NATO relationship has been stretched both geographically and thematically. While originally established for collective defence purposes, the gradual expansion of NATO’s “shared commitment” with the UN in a broad range of tasks was illustrative of the organization’s search for a new raison d’être following the end of bipolarity. In doing so, NATO has also moved beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

In the field of peace enforcement, the UN provided authorization for NATO-led operations in the Balkans (IFOR, SFOR and KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), and ultimately in Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Likewise, NATO also provided training missions in Iraq (NTM-I). NATO’s thematic expansion became most obvious in its deployment of a relief mission following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, its support to the African Union’s AMIS mission in the Darfur region, and its escorts of vessels in the Gulf of Aden.

In the UN-NATO Joint Declaration of 2008, following the 2007 signature of the UN-EU Joint Declaration and the UN-EU Joint Statement, both sides have showed commitment to further cooperation and to formalizing their relationship in several interesting
areas including information-sharing, capacity-building, lessons learned, planning, and operational coordination and support. But it took years to sign a document that in the end remained vague in content and strategy, and which has received little to no follow-up. Since its signature, information exchange is the only area that has been formalized by the creation of civilian liaison offices and regular meetings of both Secretary-Generals.

In their meeting in the margins of this year's UN General Assembly, the two Secretary-Generals once again stressed the need for closer cooperation between both organizations, but one might wonder what would be the next crisis in which they will actually cooperate. Moreover, with the exception of NATO's support for UN disaster relief in Pakistan and its support for the African Union in Darfur, it is doubtful whether this is in fact a truly cooperative relationship.

It can be argued that NATO still benefits most from the relationship. For instance, in operations involving the use of force, UNSC resolutions provide the required legal coverage and political legitimacy (at least in the early stages of its actions) to NATO's operations. In addition, it has been argued that NATO's peace support activities in Afghanistan would hardly have been possible without the support of the UN's specialised agencies.

**Mandate Compliance**

Commentators have frequently indicated a problem with NATO “hopping in, and hopping out” of the UN Charter. NATO has always resisted being seen as one of many regional organizations falling under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, a position primarily inspired by its reluctance to abide by the information requirement in Article 54:

“The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

NATO's resistance to Article 54 makes its actions difficult to control for those UNSC members that are not part of the North-Atlantic Alliance. As a result, the history of the UN-NATO relationship has strongly been characterised by discussions on NATO's degree of mandate compliance. Such discussions are particularly pressing in instances where NATO implements mandates that deal with its key expertise: the use of force.

The most recent example is NATO’s 2011 Operation Unified Protector in Libya. UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized the use of all necessary means “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (Operative Paragraph 4) and “to enforce compliance with the ban on flights” (Operative Paragraph 8). However, accusations of mission creep quickly followed NATO's deployment. Interestingly, these were voiced far beyond Russia, even among NATO's own members such as Italy. Such accusations are not surprising given that NATO retains full political and operational control over operations decided by the NAC. Once having received UNSC authorization, NATO is de jure sanctioned by a UNSC Resolution while de facto autonomous in its operation. As one high-level NATO diplomat told me on the matter of getting a NATO operation authorized by the UNSC, the UN should be aware that “once you fire a shot, you cannot get it back into the gun”.

Operations such as the one in Libya are useful tools in blaming and shaming strategies. Jim Della-Giacoma has argued on the Global Peace Operations Review that “with the U.S. and Russia once again using the organization [UNSC] as a proxy battlefield, the ‘challenges to implementation’ are numerous.” In order to minimize the leeway for such diplomatic battles, these operations
require careful decision-making. Even more crucial is a mechanism that would allow the UNSC to better monitor the operations it authorizes. Discussion of the capacities to control non-UN led operations raises another problem, however, as this requires consensus within the UNSC.

**FLAWED MONITORING CAPABILITIES**

The Libya experience seems to have sparked awareness among several UN member states on the importance of keeping the UNSC fully informed at all times. This was recently reiterated by the Brazilian Permanent Representative Antonio Patriota during the UN General Assembly’s Informal Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect. Patriota stated that “we have a right to expect full accountability from those to whom authority is granted to resort to force”.

But the UNSC’s capacity to effectively control the operations it authorizes is in fact rather limited. In theory, when delegating interventions to non UN-led coalitions or other organizations such as NATO, the Council’s control capacities are limited to the reporting procedures included in the authorizing resolutions. In cases of a regional organization’s involvement, this implies a referral to Article 54 of the UN Charter. But often this is merely treated as a procedural detail, indicating a huge gap still exists between theory and practice.

NATO’s Libya intervention illustrated this in the strongest terms, and should be a thought-provoking case in that regard. When authorizing the creation of a no-fly zone, UNSC Resolution 1973 stated that “the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General” and requested the Secretary-General “to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this Resolution”. Although Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in December 2011 voiced the recurring argument that “This military operation done by the NATO forces was strictly within [Resolution] 1973”, the accusations that followed illustrate the monitoring problem the UNSC is facing. While the reporting provisions included in Resolution 1973 may have been the result of diplomatic efforts to gain the broadest support possible, it seems that the drafters were unaware of the consequences of these provisions.

Coming back to the UN General Assembly’s Informal Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, Antonio Patriota urged an introduction of a briefing system similar to that in peacekeeping operations, as well as the establishment of expert panels to monitor these interventions. How this might actually look in practice remains unclear. But what is certain is that, although numerous UNSC Resolutions oblige the executing coalition or organization to report to the UN Secretary-General, the SG does not have the means and structures to deal with this information in a constructive/operational fashion. So even if the information obligation in NATO’s Libya intervention had been met, it is highly doubtful whether the Secretary-General had the structure, the staff and the expertise to thoroughly assess such military information. Regrettably, the Libya legacy has not (yet) led the UN – either at the level of member states or within the Secretariat – to deeper reflection in that regard.

**WAYS FORWARD: REVITALIZING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE?**

Is there any way forward for the UN on these issues? An overarching solution would be to craft more specific guidelines that are applicable to a broad range of organizations, including NATO. That should start with an inward-looking approach, addressing the UN’s own capacity to monitor the operations it authorizes. This issue was raised in the recently published HIPPO-report: “When the Security Council authorizes non-UN forces, it should establish requirements for reporting and accountability to the Council.”
A problem however arises when dealing with operations that primarily focus on the use of force. Military officials shudder at the idea of being subjected to UNSC decision-making, as more political oversight might obstruct operational effectiveness. Yet those concerns should not stand in the way of an increased accountability for such operations.

Such accountability could be achieved by revitalizing the largely dormant Military Staff Committee. Although established as a subsidiary body of the UNSC, the Military Staff Committee is at present not doing what was envisioned through Article 47 of the UN Charter, i.e. to provide advice and assistance to the UNSC on all questions dealing with military requirements and the employment and command of forces put at its disposal.

The greatest advantage of a revitalized Military Staff Committee would be that it could guarantee follow-up of the reporting requirement and oversee operational accountability of non-UN-led operations. This could also have benefits beyond the subdomain of military interventions. It could provide the P5 with a means for more coordinated exchange of ideas among their military advisors, in order to bring about more realistic and achievable mandates for UN-led peace operations.

However, reinvigorating the Military Staff Committee is a decision that has to be taken by the UNSC itself, which is currently divided. Adding to the uncertainty of reaching such a decision, the P3 members will always keep their NATO membership in mind. And this brings us back to the peculiar UN-NATO relationship. Taken together, all of these considerations lead to the conclusion that installing an independent expert panel for guaranteeing monitoring, as recently proposed by Brazil, might not be a bad idea after all.

**A CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL?**

What is clear is that the peculiar UN-NATO relationship reveals much wider challenges – not only to the relationship itself, but also to the UNSC's position. It goes without saying that these challenges will probably not be solved in the coming year. But the next UN Secretary-General could take a step in the right direction by deducing an agenda from the 2008 UN-NATO Joint Declaration for implementing aspects that may benefit the work of the Council or the Secretariat.

Doing this will require a strong figure, one who is able to shift some of the position's weight from merely being the chief executive officer. It will be a challenging endeavour, not only because the UN-NATO relationship highlights problems that are at the heart of the UNSC's functioning. NATO's manoeuvring room has largely been a deliberate choice by its key allies, those with a strong hand in the selection of the new Secretary-General. It remains to be seen what the effect will be on the UN-NATO relationship if that new UN Secretary-General comes from Eastern Europe.

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AUSTRALIA’S FALSE START ON PEACEKEEPING: A POST-SUMMIT REVIEW

Peter Nadin

Much of the mainstream coverage of this year’s UN General Assembly leaders’ week focused on Putin and Obama’s tete-a-tete on Syria, as well as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals.

On the sidelines of the GA, President Obama convened a leaders’ summit on peacekeeping. The summit was born of a US recognition that peacekeeping is under extreme stress – weighted down in the quagmires of CAR, Mali, and South Sudan. Western countries have vanished without a trace and left the global south to do the dirty work. The division of labour between those providing the ‘treasure’ and those providing the ‘blood’ is not only unacceptable, it is untenable.

The summit was designed to act as a pressure valve. On paper, it delivered. Some 50 countries pledged a total of approximately 40,000 personnel, an impressive surge in the numbers of peacekeepers. The peacekeeping stalwarts of the global south still came through with the most substantial pledges: Rwanda, Pakistan, Uruguay, Bangladesh and Ethiopia all pledged infantry battalions. New and emerging players such as Indonesia and Colombia also pledged to do more.

The biggest story of the summit was almost certainly China’s pledge of an 8000-strong standby force. China is currently the largest P5 contributor, with just over 3,000 personnel deployed. If ever fully deployed, this added boost would likely place China among the top contributors overall.

Indeed, the problem with pledges is that they are less solemn promises and more aspirational goalposts. An informal system for holding countries to their pledges, some of which are quite vague, will be necessary. Here, US leadership will be again required to corral and cajole.

SO WHAT DID AUSTRALIA OFFER?

The core of the Australian pledge was spelt out by Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop: “We will use our C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft to provide strategic airlift support to UN peacekeeping operations in crisis situations, wherever and whenever we can.” In January of this year, a Royal Australian Air Force C-17 was offered to carry “critical equipment and supplies” to the UN’s beleaguered mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). It is likely that this one-off commitment was used as the model for Australia’s pledge.

Australia also committed itself to helping prepare its neighbours for the rigours of modern peacekeeping. A particular emphasis was placed on defeating “the scourge of improvised explosive devices.” No mention was made of a potential police contribution,
despite the fact that Australian Federal Police boasts a highly capable International Deployment Group. Sweden, by contrast, has pledged to deploy 1% of its entire national police force to UN operations.

If Australia is a “reliable contributor,” as Julie Bishop has proclaimed, then it is reliably poor one. Only 48 Australian personnel are deployed to UN peacekeeping missions. When all is said and done, Australia’s pledged contribution is unlikely to see a spike in the numbers of Australians actually deployed to UN missions. The number is likely to remain fixed below 50.

This lack of commitment underlines Australia’s preference for checkbook peacekeeping: Australia is the 13th largest financial contributor to peacekeeping initiatives, but only the 81st ranked police and military contributor. In fact, Australia ranks below Liberia, a country recovering from civil war and also the host of a UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Much has been made of Australia’s history in peacekeeping. Australia has been particularly strong in the Asia Pacific region, supporting UN missions in Indonesia (1947), Cambodia (1991), and East Timor (1999), as well as non-UN missions in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville. The ‘only in our region’ argument is weak. Surely Australia has a role beyond its own region? If the answer is no, then Australia is a profoundly limited middle power. History suggests otherwise. Throughout the 1990s, Australia sent peacekeepers to Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Namibia and the Former Yugoslavia. The largest contributions included 900 engineers to the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and an entire Battalion Group to Somalia as part of United Taskforce (UNITAF).

If Australia wants to sit on the Security Council in 2029-30, making decisions about peacekeeping mandates, then it must genuinely recommit to the Council’s core business: peacekeeping. The status quo paints Australia as arrogant and indifferent to the demands of modern peace operations.

**SO WHAT SHOULD AUSTRALIA BE DOING ON PEACEKEEPING? THE SHORT ANSWER IS MORE.**

Finland, Australia’s potential challenger for a spot on the Security Council in 2029-30, is one of the strongest European contributors with a total of 337 personnel deployed. At the 28 September summit, the Finns pledged extra support: an amphibious task unit, Special Forces, military observers, police, and a Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear lab and training capacity. Finland’s commitment follows Jim Della-Giacoma’s recent suggestion that the UN needs “small units of high quality.” Australia could have followed suit by providing a few select niche capabilities. The airlift commitment is a good start. But it falls short of a genuine recommitment.

The continual invocation of Australia’s proud peacekeeping history is beginning to ring hollow. The government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Australian Defence Force must now ask the obvious question: what is Australia’s peacekeeping future?

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FOG OF PEACE: UN PEACEKEEPING NEEDS TO FOCUS MORE ON POLITICAL STRATEGY AND LESS ON TROOPS

Jean-Marie Guéhenno

"WHEN IT COMES TO HELPING A COUNTRY IN CRISIS THERE ARE SEVERAL TOOLS, THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE BEING THE MOST IMMATERIAL: THE POLITICAL ONE."

Distinguished former Under Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno shares his insight on the current state of UN peacekeeping in an interview with CIC Senior Visiting Fellow Alexandra Novosseloff. Referring to analysis in his recent book The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century, Guéhenno talks about the role of the P5 in peacekeeping, the challenge of adequate mandates, and necessary reforms in UN Peace Operations efforts that the next Secretary-General needs to address. The following is an edited transcript of the interview.

Alexandra Novosseloff: The Fog of Peace looks in particular at lessons learnt in peacekeeping. From your perspective of vast in-depth knowledge, first-hand involvement and experience with peacekeeping, is it fair to say that the real problem of peacekeeping is that it too often lacks “a focused political strategy” and “clarity on the degree of the support of the international community”, as you state in the book?

Jean-Marie Guéhenno: Yes. A key lesson for me in my years of running peacekeeping operations is that the Security Council and the member states focus on the hardware of troops, because that’s easily visible. However, they don’t focus enough on the politics underpinning the whole effort, because that’s much more controversial and politically sensitive. The members of the Security Council have a hard time agreeing in substance on a political strategy. I think that this can be overcome if the UN Secretariat, if the UN officials themselves, think through a political strategy. Provided that political strategy does not contradict the direct interests of one of the key members of the Security Council, the UN actually has quite a bit of leeway if it is creative and imaginative. But it is not always creative and imaginative, and so it does not always use the space it has. When you are creative, you take risks. If you take a risk and are successful, the Security Council will be happy with it and will take credit for it. But if it does not work, you will be very lonely. The resulting safe bureaucratic attitude is not to take too much initiative or risk, and therefore not to have a genuinely ambitious political strategy. Hence this focus on troops, on the hardware, on the military means to an end, and not much thinking on all the other tools or about the real political end that should be achieved.

AN: Another aspect is the fact that the mandates are maybe too ambitious. How do you balance these ambitions with the reality of UN capacities as a whole?
**JMG:** The mandates are not just too ambitious, they are also too broad and lacking in focus. In the Security Council negotiations leading up to writing the resolution that will define the mandate, everybody has his or her own 'nice' idea. So, very often, the mandate looks like a kind of Christmas tree with lots of laudable goals but no sense of priority. Since priority would again require asking some hard questions, and then answering them, that is where it gets difficult.

Another element is that the process of writing a mandate and then deploying a mission is flawed. In the Brahimi Report a two-step approach was suggested. And the latest High-level Panel on Peacekeeping [HIPPO] report advocates a staged approach to mandates. Both reports identify a key issue: producing a mandate should be a much more iterative process, because the Secretariat has to be the bridge between the Security Council – which has political authority – and the troop contributing countries [TCCs] that will provide the muscle. The various interests have to be reconciled. Currently it does not happen that way. The result is that the Security Council defines a very broad, unfocused, overambitious goal and then it says to the Secretariat, 'over to you'. The real process should be for the Secretariat to discuss with all the stakeholders and agree on a mandate that is backed not just by the Security Council but also by those who will have the difficult task of implementation.

**AN:** How would a strengthened and more constructive triangular cooperation between the Secretariat, the Security Council and those troop contributing countries look? We've seen for example TCC meetings convened by the Secretariat that are not an appropriate venue for TCCs in particular to convey their concerns.

**JMG:** Well, to be invited to such a meeting you only have to contribute one officer to be considered a TCC. So you then have one country contributing maybe several battalions or a key component of the mission sitting next to a country that is just there to be informed about what's going on. Hence there is no sense of shared responsibility. I do think that there needs to be meetings where you really sit around the table with the key actors or potential actors of a mission to discuss the operation. But a meeting in itself is just a meeting. The crucial question is whether that meeting will have consequences.

There are several issues with how you shape the military leg, so to speak, of an overall strategy. Yet again, the strategy cannot be just the military leg. The military strategy is only one component of an overall political strategy wherein military force can provide some leverage. The military strategy is important, and I would be the last one to underestimate that. But it’s only part of something broader – it is just one of the levers you have. Now there are several factors alluded to in your question. First, what capacity will be available? And capacity here means a combination of forces made available to the UN along with the willingness to use those forces in a certain way. There are many shortcomings with respect to this. You see for instance the Security Council authorizing a mission with 10,000 troops and one year later there are little more than half of those troops deployed on the ground. That is not right. When the Secretariat sees that it is not going to be able to recruit within a certain period of time at least half of what the Security Council has authorized, there should be a process to engage the Security Council and review those goals. You cannot achieve the mandate with 60% of the force that was planned. It is not credible.

You need to have a working equation between the numbers and the required tasks. It is a question of how many troops the Secretariat can recruit. What operations are the recruited troops willing and able to conduct? There must be a sufficiently detailed and frank discussion for the Secretariat to have a very clear idea of this. Writing a mandate should be an evolving process, an interaction between the Secretariat and the Security Council, and the final operational mandate should integrate all of it. The Secretariat needs to be in a position to say concerning a particular mandate, "we would have loved to do this and that, but frankly
we don't have the numbers, we don't have the capacities, we don't have the willingness among our troop contributors, so this is what we can do.” The ball is squarely also in the camp of the Security Council. It is too easy for the Security Council to turn to the Secretariat and assume there is some miraculous army that can be put together with no responsibility on their part.

Numbers are not the whole story though. Behind the numbers there has to be willingness, tied to an effective capacity. And that's where we need discussion on the concept of the operation of a peacekeeping mission. Are the troops that are going to be deployed prepared to do x, or not? And not in generic terms - but concerning concrete scenarios. Are we for example prepared to deploy mobile operating bases? Are we going to complain if after six months they are not in fixed accommodations? There has to be a clear understanding of the expectations of the troops. And here I think in terms of the planning phase of the mission. I don't think that the NATO model is necessarily the ideal, where the mission is entirely the property so to speak of the troops and the countries that are contributing them. Concerning the UN model, there is some merit to benefiting from lessons learnt, and from the experience of other missions. There is also an advantage in not making the mission the sole hostage of the troop contributing countries. A more integrated, broader perspective is what the UN is all about as a universal organization. However, I think that in the planning phase and then in the execution, officers of the main contributing countries should be involved so that they feel comfortable with the way the mission is planned and then executed. That is not a bad thing. It is all a question of balance.

The United Nations has immense institutional knowledge. It does not always do a superb job because it lacks resources. But it certainly knows a lot about stabilizing operations, and it knows more about peacekeeping than most countries individually, including countries that think of themselves as vastly superior militarily and that have much greater military capacity. That does not mean that they understand everything about peacekeeping. Sometimes there is a little bit of arrogance here.

AN: Do you think the Obama Summit will impact those current challenges concerning the lack of a sufficient number of deployable troops? And will it provide the Secretariat more options in selecting the TCCs needed in a peacekeeping operation?

JMG: The United States contributes officers and police, but it is not contributing troops to the United Nations. If it did, that might actually create problems because of the geopolitical weight of the country. At the same time, the U.S. is the UN's number one financial contributor. That situation puts the U.S. in a delicate position with regard to peacekeeping. If it calls on other countries to contribute more troops, it can be accused of asking others to do what it does not do. But the fact that President Obama at the UN and in a memo to his administration has detailed all the things that the U.S. is willing to do for the UN sends a very good political signal. And in the end, the political support the United States gives to the United Nations is even more important than the material support.

This excellent U.S. initiative is not going to end the debate on the risks that peacekeepers should take. Troop contributors would like the countries – among them the U.S. – that ask them to take more risks, to also carry part of that burden. This is a legitimate political request, and the fact that the U.S. may provide more indirect support in terms of training, logistics, etc. is a partial answer, as would be more direct operational support in difficult environments. The Obama Peacekeeping Summit will ideally begin to address more directly and more transparently this issue of the triangular interaction between the Security Council, the troop contributing countries and the Secretariat. It will remain a problem if the P5 are not prepared to provide the backbone of peacekeeping in terms of military capacities.
This was actually the idea of the UN charter in 1945, and it was completely turned around during the Suez crisis because France and the UK were parties to the conflict. And so the great invention of Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson was to bring in troops that would be anything but the P5. For a very long time afterward, peacekeeping was anything but the P5. But some of the P5 came back during the Yugoslav war: Britain and France. Russia is involved in peacekeeping now, as is China. So now you do have the P5 in limited numbers but not totally insignificant. We are therefore presently in a situation that is neither the vision of the charter of 1945 nor the vision of the founders of peacekeeping in 1956. We have now a sort of mixed situation, in a context where it is also much riskier to be a peacekeeper today than it was 30 years ago. Because of this, we need to find intelligent ways to involve troop contributing countries more. And the P5 must open up to the troop contributing countries.

AN: In your book you talk about the relationship between the host countries and the various parties to the conflict. What are your conclusions?

JMG: Peacekeeping missions are generally deployed on the basis of the host country's consent. But that consent needs to be managed, and sometimes it is essentially not really there. In these cases, the UN is effectively begging the host country to accept to be helped. That was the case in Sudan, in Darfur. This is not a good position to be in because the UN should never be in a position of “demandeur” when it comes to actually putting its people, its troops, at risk. I strongly believe that when you deploy troops in a country, that country is not doing you a favor – you are doing a favor for that country. You are spending blood and treasure to help. If the leadership of that country does not want you to help – and peacekeeping in itself is difficult enough – then it is going to become an almost impossible situation. So I think in many situations we see that the golden hour for the peacekeeping operation is at the beginning, when the state structures have collapsed. Then the UN – even if it does not have a mandate to run the country, as was the case when Timor became independent – is in a strong position to shape things and can help if it does so intelligently and with a clear political strategy.

AN: If you had to pick one or two major reforms that the next Secretary-General [SG] should undertake, what would those be?

JMG: I think the existing structures of the UN, with a Department of Political Affairs and a Department of Peacekeeping, are not completely adequate. Yet I do not think there is an ideal organigram. Each has its downside. So, I will not suggest that there is ‘the’ organigram that will fix the problems of the UN. But I think that the next SG certainly will have to think about how to better manage the crucial connections that exist between politics, peacekeeping and development.

When it comes to helping a country in crisis there are several tools, the most important one being the most immaterial: the political one. How are you going to enlist the support of a particular region or at least make sure that the divisions within that region are not going to make things worse? Political strategy really has to be the umbrella, the compass, of a mission. It is the key element.

Then you have different tools - but they are only tools. You have the possibility of deploying troops; you have what may be done in terms of support to governance and humanitarian challenges, because there can be a major humanitarian crisis that will also have political implications that require development tools. All of this needs to be orchestrated much better in a much greater continuum. The notion of distinct categories of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is just theory. It is not reality. When and to what extent to deploy troops has to be decided on the merits of the case, and each situation has its unique characteristics. The UN is not really configured to have this kind of broad approach in terms of how it plans its actions, or to really
think of all the tools it has in its toolbox and use them in a seamless manner. I think this is a reform to which much thought should be given. The traditional categories of peacekeeping and political missions do not make sense any more. The separation between the peacekeeping budget and the fact that political missions cannot be funded through peacekeeping is not useful. One should be much more flexible on that. If the international community invests in engagement in countries, it has to have the means to do it. So that is one structural issue where greater flexibility and fluidity should be built into the UN systems.

Another key issue is that the Secretary-General of the United Nations needs to have much more flexibility with an available team of highly experienced political operators that he can consult and deploy quickly. The UN needs more seasoned leaders like UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, whom we lost in Bagdad, or like Lakhdar Brahimi, who can be deployed rapidly in times of crisis. I think the way the UN currently scrambles to find the right envoy or SRSG in acute crisis situations leads to uneven results. There has to be much greater thought given to how you assemble a flexible pool of people that can help the Secretary-General deal with a world that is increasingly complicated.

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On 28 September 2015, over 50 countries from all regions of the globe met during the start of UN General Assembly to support UN Peacekeeping. Co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General, US President Barack Obama, and nine Member States (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uruguay and the United States), the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping brought world leaders together to pledge concrete contributions to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity and capabilities.

Today’s UN Peacekeeping missions are unprecedented in both the scale and scope of their mandates - of the 125,000 peacekeepers deployed to four continents, 98% are mandated to protect civilians. “The situations into which peacekeepers are deployed have never been more challenging, as tasks multiply and we face extremists, criminal groups and others who show no regard for international humanitarian or human rights law,” said UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

“So we are here today, together, to strengthen and reform UN peacekeeping because our common security demands it. This is not something that we do for others; this is something that we do collectively because our collective security depends on it,” said US President Barack Obama at the summit.

The summit generated a new wave of contributions and commitments to address critical gaps. “An unprecedented number of countries made substantial pledges to strengthen peacekeeping operations at a time when the need is greater than ever,” said the UN Head of Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. “Together, we can meet the challenges ahead to protect the most vulnerable and support peace and security worldwide.”

To see a breakdown by country of what was pledged, click HERE
TEN TRENDS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

The UN remains the leading force in peacekeeping

- UN forces: 130,125 troops
- US forces: 13,000 troops
- NATO forces: 8,200 troops
- African Union forces: 23,000 troops
- Other forces: 12,413 troops

Each chart represents one mission and the troop numbers by region:
- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America
- Middle East
- Other

Robust deployments save lives...

As the number of UN troops increases, civilian casualties decrease

There are more peace operations than ever, which is pushing the limits of the UN system.

Average mission length is now over 14 years

UN deployment is slow, taking several months to reach strength and often not reaching their targets

Changes and innovations in peace operations

Europe is playing a diminishing role...

...while African contributions are on the rise

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However, African governments are increasingly setting the agenda for peace ops in Africa through UN and non-UN missions

Conflict-affected countries with political missions

...but more civilian missions are operating in active conflicts.

Read the full essay Ten Trends in Peace Operations by Richard Gowan
The creation of the Global Peace Operations Review was generously supported by the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the German Foreign Office, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs.