European Military Contributions to UN Peace Operations in Africa
Maximizing Strategic Impact

A report by the Center on International Cooperation

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The *Global Peace Operations Review* is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the *Country & Regional Profile pages*, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the *Data & Trends* section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our *Data guide*. The *Strategic Summary* provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the *In Focus* section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the *statistics* used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU’s Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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1. INTRODUCTION

European forces have played a very limited military role in United Nations (UN) peace operations in Africa over the last two decades. In some periods, European personnel have accounted for less than 2% of the blue helmets on the continent. Yet there is now new momentum among NATO and European Union (EU) members to play a more significant part in UN operations – although still on a selective basis and through focused, light deployments – largely resulting from concerns over the spread of violent extremism and unregulated migration. This paper considers how these strategic dilemmas affect current UN operations, European contributions to those missions and cooperation with African governments. It then addresses three related sets of policy questions:

1. Can the UN define a strategic/operational concept for containing or mitigating (as opposed to fighting) extremist violence in Africa?

2. What specific roles can European forces play in implementing such a concept?

3. How can European governments and militaries most effectively partner with increasingly assertive African counterparts within the UN framework?

The paper draws on recent research by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and other organizations on current and recent European experiences of UN missions in Africa. It argues that, by offering both advanced military assets and expertise on tackling asymmetric threats, European militaries can help the UN tackle violent extremism. This will, however, mean addressing sensitive issues – such as the linkages between peacekeeping, stabilization operations and peace enforcement – that remain problematic despite the recent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and follow-up work by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

This paper refers to both the HIPPO report and Ban’s response, and makes concrete policy proposals about how European states can build on these papers in military terms. However, it is not a comprehensive review of either document, and does not address many of the important non-military issues (such as conflict prevention and institutional reforms at UN headquarters) that they raise. Its goal is to identify concepts and opportunities that European armed forces can use to engage more effectively in UN peace operations in Africa, in light of Europe’s security concerns.
2. EUROPE, AFRICAN SECURITY AND THE UN

Large areas of Africa, notably the Sahel and Horn of Africa, are regions of growing strategic concern for European policy-makers. The primary reason for this is the presence of Islamist extremist groups such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in African conflict zones. There is also a growing focus on the fact that refugees and migrants are transiting through countries including Mali, Niger and Sudan on their way to the Mediterranean coast and Europe. The problems of transnational extremism and unregulated migration are tied to weak governance and organized criminal networks. Many observers fear that these challenges will worsen in the coming years. A recent review of data on extremism by The Economist warned of a potential “continental metastasis”: “The cancer of jihadism in sub-Saharan Africa will probably spread outward from conflicts now underway involving groups in Libya and Nigeria; their members are likely to flee into the sandy expanse that covers much of Africa above the equator, as happened after French forces tried to wipe out extremists in northern Mali in 2013.”

These developments on Europe’s southern flank are still lower priorities in most NATO capitals than events in the Middle East and Ukraine. Nonetheless, European governments and the U.S. have begun to invest in containing regional threats across North and East Africa. In the wake of the Mali conflict, France launched Operation Barkhane, a regional counter-terrorism mission involving 3,000 troops based in Chad but with orders to pursue extremists in Niger and Mali. The EU has pumped money into the African Union Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), while also training the Somali army and maintaining an anti-piracy force offshore. EU missions are also involved in training the Malian army and attempting to build up the rule of law and anti-extremist efforts across the Sahel more generally.

U.S. and French covert operations are also increasingly common across the region. In 2013, the head of U.S. Africa Command (only launched in 2008) described it as “extremely active”, with over 500 distinct “activities” in one year ranging from training exercises to kinetic operations. The U.S. has also deployed drones to Chad and Niger to track Islamist movements, and NATO members have provided advisers and equipment to help Nigeria battle Boko Haram.

These operations are fundamentally changing the terms of security cooperation between European countries, the U.S. and their African counterparts. New alliances are forming between African governments threatened by violent extremism and European and U.S. officials who want to limit the spillover effects of this violence. “France is thinking of its security, because what happens in Africa has consequences in Europe,” President François Hollande argued on a visit to Benin this July. “So by ensuring the fight against terrorism with our African friends, we are protecting ourselves.” Although France has always placed a greater emphasis on African security issues than other NATO members, it is notable that even some European countries that are more skeptical, such as Germany, are taking a greater interest. Berlin has, for example, sent a field hospital to assist the EU training mission in Mali and is also planning to send personnel to the UN mission there.
2.i UN peace operations in a new African Security Context

This paper asks what this new focus on African security issues means for UN peace operations in general, and European contributions in particular to blue helmet missions. The vast majority of UN peacekeepers continue to be based in Africa. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been entangled in the broader battle with Islamist extremists, losing over forty personnel to ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A UN logistics mission sustains AMISOM in Somalia. Other large-scale UN forces in Africa, including those in Darfur, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR) do not have the same frontline roles in conflicts with transnational Islamist extremism. But if pessimistic predictions about the further spread of extremist groups are correct, these forces may face the destabilizing consequences. The mission in CAR (MINUSCA) is tasked with supporting reconciliation and reconstruction after bloody clashes between Christians and Muslims, a potential source of future radicalization.

Figure 1. Current UN missions in Africa (all uniformed personnel), 30/8/15

There are severe doubts inside the UN about the organization’s ability to operate in such threatening contexts. The recent HIPPO report concluded that blue helmet operations “lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military equipment required” to operate effectively against violent extremists. Major General Michael Lollesgaard, the Danish general currently in charge of the military component of MINUSMA, recently told the Security Council that his mission was “not really” geared to handle asymmetric threats. “I have some good assets,” he stated, “but overall there are some major shortfalls that make us extremely vulnerable.” Ban Ki-moon has also warned member states that he shares the HIPPO’s wariness of counter-terrorism missions.

Yet there is also a frank recognition that, at least in Africa and potentially in the Middle East, UN forces will probably be called upon to operate in more theaters plagued by violent extremism, not fewer. “I am not in doubt that in future there will certainly be continuous need for peacekeeping operations in asymmetric environments,” Major General Lollesgaard told the Council. “I do not doubt that the United Nations will be called upon to establish those kinds of missions, because who else would?" Even the
highly skeptical High-Level Panel admitted that the UN should develop the necessary capabilities, training and doctrine to function effectively in the face of asymmetric challengers “including through a preventive and preemptive posture and willingness to use force tactically to protect civilians and UN personnel.” The UN may not undertake overt counter-terrorism missions in the near future, but it will almost certainly have to contain and mitigate threats from extremist groups to the communities it defends, as well as its own forces.

This is also centrally important to European governments’ involvement in peace operations. NATO and EU members have been unusually interested in deploying troops to MINUSMA given Mali’s links to extremism and migration. As of August 2015, the UN had a total of 11,511 soldiers and police officers in Mali. Of these, 534 were from the Netherlands, 227 from Sweden and 91 from other NATO/EU states – 852 personnel in total. This is still less than 8 per cent of the total force, but the figures do not tell the full story: with the Netherlands in the lead, European countries have provided essential intelligence officers, special forces, advanced helicopters and tactical airlift to the mission. By contrast, there were just 20 European personnel based in and serving with the UN in CAR – not immediately associated with an extremist threat – representing 0.002 per cent of the overall UN uniformed presence. European governments are not only motivated to deploy peacekeepers as a result of fears of terrorism and its possible migration, but it is easier to “sell” a deployment to somewhere like Mali domestically when it appears directly connected to challenges to Europe.

Reinforcing this, the Obama administration has urged its NATO partners to take UN peace operations more seriously as part of the broader task of transatlantic burden-sharing on security. In a speech in Brussels this March, U.S. ambassador to the UN Samantha Power outlined the challenges on Europe’s southern flank and argued “UN peacekeeping needs European militaries more than ever.” Power praised the Netherlands’ engagement in Mali in particular, describing it as targeted, effective and “momentum-shifting”.

In reality, the presence of a significant number of European personnel in MINUSMA has not, as Major General Lollesgaard’s comments made clear, been sufficient to overcome the major asymmetric threats the operation faces. Nonetheless, it seems probable that if the UN does take on more missions aimed at containing extremist threats, European governments will at least have to consider deploying more troops within these missions, and the U.S. may put them under more pressure to do so.

Numerous European leaders attended a summit on peacekeeping commitments hosted by President Obama in New York in September 2015. They offered troops and assets that, U.S. officials estimate, double the number of Europeans under UN command – although many of these will be in the Middle East rather than African missions. British Prime Minister David Cameron underlined that, in pledging British engineers to the UN mission in South Sudan, he aimed to achieve “less terrorism and less migration.”

As this paper emphasizes, it is necessary to think further about what types of European deployments in such risky missions are feasible and useful. It is worth noting that the Mali experience is providing useful insights into how European forces can operate most effectively inside UN forces in Africa, building on previous experiences of European contingents in relatively recent cases including Liberia and Chad. But while these previous examples are helpful, it is also necessary to recognize that the political and strategic context for deploying peacekeepers in Africa is rapidly changing.
2.ii Recognizing African Leadership

This is not only because of the rise of violent extremism: African governments are also shaking up many of the assumptions underlying UN and non-UN peace operations on the continent. The number of African troops in UN and non-UN missions has grown markedly over the last five years: as of 2014, 70,000 African personnel were deployed in UN, AU and other missions.\textsuperscript{15} Their governments are increasingly insisting on setting the agenda for these operations, often by taking direct action on the ground. African officials are advocating increasingly robust responses to conflicts, opposing the notion (still popular in the UN) that peacekeepers should not go “where there is no peace to keep.”

In 2013, West African nations hurried to send troops to support the French intervention in Mali. In the same year, a group of southern African nations successfully lobbied the Security Council to launch the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) with a mandate to “neutralize” militias in the east of the country.\textsuperscript{16} In the last two years, African forces have also played a major role in reducing violence in CAR and rolling back Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and its neighbors.

**Figure 2: Growth in African deployments in UN and non-UN missions, 2010-2014.**

![Graph showing growth in African deployments in UN and non-UN missions, 2010-2014.](image)

Given the willingness of African governments to take robust action, some observers ask whether it is necessary to deploy UN operations at all in volatile environments when the AU and sub-regional organizations seem better suited to taking serious risks. However, recent experiences suggest that there is still a gap between what African governments are willing to commit politically and what they can achieve operationally. ECOWAS was, for example, willing to deploy forces to Mali in 2012, but it struggled with planning and delayed its deployment until France intervened in January 2013. The AU’s logistical and administrative weaknesses, in addition to financial factors, hampered its operations in Somalia (leading to the deployment of a UN support mission) and CAR (where the UN replaced the AU force in late 2014).
In addition to these planning and managerial gaps, training and discipline problems are also a recurring problem. Nigeria and Chad, for example, both cut back their presence in Mali after discovering that they lacked the equipment and training necessary to operate effectively alongside the French. Both the AU-led operation in CAR and its UN successor have been plagued by reports of sexual abuse, human rights violations, indiscipline and random violence by their personnel. Although the UN’s systems are very far from perfect, the organization provides a more reliable framework for operations.

Even so, it is still a clear political fact that the continent’s leaders are growing more willing and able to set the agenda for operations in their regions, and outsiders have to adapt to their wishes. India, Pakistan and a number of other traditional UN troop contributors objected to the formation of the FIB in 2013, for example, but had to back down when it became clear that South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi were not merely willing to lobby for the force but were ready to send the necessary troops.17

Many African governments are also increasing their defense spending, meaning that they should be able to deploy more capable units in future, further strengthening their diplomatic hands. Defense expenditure on the continent grew by over 8% in 2013 alone.18 Not all of this money has necessarily been used wisely: South Sudan, for example, placed an order for 100 Ukrainian tanks before its descent into civil war.

In the meantime, the AU continues to rely almost entirely on European donors to cover the costs of operation such as AMISOM. But as African governments increase their military capacities, both the UN and European governments will have to give them an enhanced voice in planning and managing operations as a matter of both principle and pragmatism. Ban Ki-moon has recently underlined the importance of the UN’s strategic partnership with the AU.19

In light of this context, this paper now proceeds to ask (i) whether the UN can devise effective concepts for containing/mitigating violent extremism in Africa; (ii) what role European forces can play in implementing these concepts; and (iii) how to cooperate with African militaries in this context, especially in cases where African leaders may actually argue for a more robust approach than the UN can implement.
3. CONTAINING/MITIGATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

If UN peace operations are not designed to fight terrorists, what can they achieve in the face of violent extremism? Addressing the Security Council, Major General Lollesgaard defined his goals as “trying, mainly defensively, to protect the population as well as we can” on the basis of (i) good political analysis and situational awareness; (ii) reassuring the population and offering “the possibility of a future without the armed groups”; and (iii) solid force protection. Others have argued that Mali shows that the UN should develop a clear “stabilization doctrine” of its own. As Cedric de Coning has noted, a number of UN missions have “stabilization” in their title, including those in the DRC and CAR as well as Mali. Yet their mandates vary widely and the Security Council, UN secretariat and troop contributors often have divergent perceptions of what their strategic goal involves.

Equally, despite Lollesgaard’s emphasis on protection, the UN still struggles with what it means by the “protection of civilians”, even though the Secretariat and outside scholars have done copious work on this issue. A recent internal report found that peacekeepers had responded to just one in five of some 500 reported threats to civilians in recent years. Many peacekeeping units have lacked either the capability to deter violence or have refused to obey commands. Statistical analyses suggest that UN forces have very mixed results in terms of stemming violence against civilians. In Darfur, for example, the presence of an unwieldy blue helmet operation has not stopped increases in violence, whereas the deployment of the FIB succeeded (at least temporarily) in reducing violence in the eastern DRC.

Even if UN forces aim to adopt a largely “defensive” approach to extremist groups or other perpetrators of violence (such as the armed forces and militias in South Sudan), they are likely to face major strategic and operational difficulties. In cases such as Mali, the UN also has to calibrate its operations with two factors: those of parallel French forces still conducting aggressive counter-terrorism missions; and the national armed forces, which have failed to deal with secessionist groups by force, making lasting peace harder to achieve. The UN’s tension with armed forces is indicative of broader rifts that often open between the UN and host governments. These governments often feel that the blue helmets are too cautious in dealing with opponents, or that they have been deployed only to support them.

Nonetheless, analyses of the Mali case and other regions where the UN faces serious asymmetric threats do point to the principles of potentially effective strategies for containing/mitigating extremist threats and building stability. At the strategic level, these include:

1) developing a clear political strategy to bring as many parties as possible into a peace process, and reject extremist groups;

2) boosting these efforts with economic initiatives, especially aimed at employment for former and potential combatants; and

3) clearly framing these UN and non-UN-led initiatives to prevent violent extremism with efforts to improve the rule of law, good governance and development.
It is essential to see that violent extremism can rarely if ever be tackled in isolation. Surveys in Mali, for example, have shown that the public attribute the recent political crisis to “the weakness of the state”, “a lack of patriotism among leaders” and corruption, not the threat from Islamist groups.\(^{27}\)

The military element of a peace operation cannot compensate for a lack of political strategy. But it can contribute to the implementation of an effective strategy by providing a credible security presence to deter and respond to violent challengers.

To support its political strategy, it is essential that the mission leadership has sufficient information to address both political developments and security threats, backed by analysts to process this information and trace political and conflict dynamics. It is also crucial to have civilian and military planners and staff officers capable of processing this information and turning it into credible plans at a high rate. While European intelligence officers deployed to assist MINUSMA in 2013, the mission leadership initially lacked the capacity to turn the material it received into effective planning, and the operation continues to be hampered by a lack of in-depth political analysis.\(^{28}\)

Potential sources of information are expanding rapidly and growing more complex. As John Karlsrud has noted, missions are increasingly able to access social media and other open-source information that, if processed properly, can give insights into unfolding security threats.\(^{29}\) Equally, missions can use these resources to share their own messages with vulnerable populations. At a very simple level, the 2012 UN Supervision Mission in Syria both followed social media to identify security incidents and broadcast videos of its activities.\(^{30}\) This will become more common in peace operations, but will only be effective if mission leaders understand the tools.

In operational terms, maintaining a credible security presence involves ensuring:

- UN bases, patrols and logistics convoys are well protected against attack;
- a mission has sufficient air assets (including helicopters and transport planes) to remain mobile and respond quickly even during periods of intense violence;
- a mission has reliable evacuation and medical facilities capable of handling significant casualties when necessary; and
- a reliable military communications system.

In Mali, European and non-European units have struggled to cooperate in some cases due to a lack of compatible communications equipment, and in other cases UN forces have been unable to respond to atrocities because of communications issues.
The most sensitive aspect of strengthening peace operations is, of course, the question of offensive capabilities. Following the deployment of the FIB in DRC, there has been an ongoing debate about whether other missions should also have the support of similar stand-alone intervention brigades. The Malian government has proposed the deployment of such a force within MINUSMA. However, there are reasons for caution. First, while the FIB in the DRC scored initial successes, it did so against relatively weak opponents and in coordination with effective Congolese army units. Second, some other UN forces based in the FIB’s operational area reportedly became passive in the face of violence, arguing that the special brigade should handle these problems. The overall performance of MONUSCO has thus been lowered. Finally, the troop contributors to the FIB have set explicit limits on what armed groups their personnel will and will not target, meaning that the brigade has become much less effective over the last year.

There is, however, a clear need for any force facing threats from extremists or other attackers to have a rapid reaction force that can move quickly to quell violence. A positive model is arguably the Irish-Swedish Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that deployed as part of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003-2004. This unit of around 600 troops was based near the capital, Monrovia, but undertook “robust patrolling” and operations on the country’s borders. It did not engage in offensives, but signaled to potential spoilers that the mission could react firmly to attacks. An Irish unit has recently played a similar role on the Golan Heights, deploying in one crisis to relieve a Fijian base that had come under siege by an Islamist militia. A large-scale mission covering a large area may need a number of such response forces based at strategic hubs to provide wider reassurance. It may also need to deploy advanced assets, as with the Apache helicopters from the Netherlands in Mali.

**Figure 4: Top 10 Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Budget**

**STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE:** While Europeans dominate the top 10 countries who pay for peacekeeping, none of them are among the top ten contributors of troops, police, and military experts.
The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has also suggested that the UN could supplement such tactical-level rapid reaction forces with strategic-level “vanguard” forces: rapid reaction forces based in regional hubs ready to reinforce one of a number of missions in a crisis, or facilitate new deployments.\textsuperscript{34} The HIPPO report also noted that where UN missions draw down, “security arrangements or over-the-horizon guarantees may be needed from regional, international or other partners.”\textsuperscript{35}

There is thus a need for strategic reserve forces to assist UN missions in getting going, keeping going under pressure and eventually making a safe exit. The UN is increasingly experimenting in this area, for example by setting up a single quick reaction force to cover both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. It is possible to envisage a vanguard force based in West Africa tasked with assisting MINUSMA and additionally providing an “over-the-horizon” guarantee for other countries where the UN is drawing down. A similar unit based in the Great Lakes region could cover South Sudan, CAR and the eastern DRC. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has described this as an “intriguing” concept, but it raises a number of difficult questions that need study.\textsuperscript{36} Who would contribute forces to such a unit and at what level of readiness? How much would it cost? What would happen if the country providing basing facilities to the force objected to its deployment due to regional political concerns?

Finally, it is also important that where UN forces are operating alongside other missions with more aggressive counter-terrorist mandates, there should be detailed and consistent inter-mission coordination to avoid friction. The HIPPO has noted the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between UN missions and counter-terrorism forces in public, but consultations and joint planning are also essential.\textsuperscript{37} Experience has shown that where parallel missions do not coordinate closely, the risks of security incidents rise, potentially damaging both operations.\textsuperscript{38}

Overall, therefore, the outlines of a UN approach to containing/mitigating the challenges of violent extremists are taking shape, influenced by experiences in Mali and elsewhere. While operations should aim to build trust and disenfranchise extremist forces through political and economic tools, a mobile and robust military presence should also provide solid security guarantees to a vulnerable population.

In reality, as NATO’s experience in Afghanistan has shown, even an advanced and sizeable international force will struggle to protect civilians from extremist groups and insurgents bent on violence. A UN operation without a mandate for offensives is likely to have an even lower deterrent effect. As Jason Stearns has observed of the DRC, an excessive focus on military operations may distract from political priorities: While the FIB did score successes in 2013-2014, it took attention from President Kabila’s maneuvers in Kinshasa to hold onto power at the end of his term in 2016.\textsuperscript{39}

Planners and mission leaders should not overestimate the capacity of even advanced military formations. They must also consider the effects of their operations and security on humanitarian agencies around them. Nonetheless, it is clear that European forces could contribute in many of the areas outlined above.
4. EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO FUTURE UN MISSIONS

The array of military tasks outlined above places a premium on operational areas where the UN is traditionally weak, including intelligence-gathering and mobility. It also offers a menu of potential contributions for European militaries to fill, whether through deploying full units or specific experts, or providing training, equipment and mentoring to other militaries to prepare them for threats from extremists. An obvious case for training concerns improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which have been responsible for at least half of peacekeeper fatalities in Africa. This is partially because many African soldiers ride in open trucks and soft-skinned vehicles, but it also reflects the fact that troop contributing countries have different training standards for dealing with IEDs. Even the UN’s own guidance is inconsistent. It is clear that European militaries – having learned to deal with IEDs through trial and error in Afghanistan and Iraq – are well-placed to help other peacekeepers improve.

European militaries have also used Mali as a laboratory for other experiments with supporting the UN. As noted, one such experiment was setting up an intelligence cell, the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). This has encountered some obstacles, including internal confusion over how to locate this innovation in the UN command structure, but it has gradually become more effective. In addition to the Apache squadron from the Netherlands, a number of European countries (Denmark, Portugal and Germany) have also provided C-130 and C-160 transport aircraft to give the operation additional in-country mobility. Again, there have been some setbacks over the specifications of the aircraft and how to use them, but the mission and European contributors have slowly grown accustomed to working with one another.

Although these are notably substantial deployments by the standards of European commitments to the UN in Africa, they follow a pre-existing pattern by which NATO and/or EU members have tended to focus on offering “niche” capabilities and enablers rather than infantry battalions or other large-scale units. While a number of European countries including the United Kingdom and Germany are considering contributions to the UN, they are also thinking about focused capacities.

Reviewing the outline of UN options for containing/mitigating violent extremists, we can identify various areas where Europeans could make niche contributions. One is simply to expand the number of expert officers in missions with knowledge of extremist strategies and potential responses. Such expertise could comprise advising the civilian and military leadership of a mission, or embedding with individual units from countries with less experience in this field to act as mentors to contingents officers. Additionally, staff officers and planners with expertise in devising and directing intelligence-based operations will increasingly be in demand in UN missions if the ASIFU model is repeated elsewhere and it becomes possible to improve planning.

Larger-scale potential contributions include (i) more ASIFU-type units to support mission leaders; and (ii) field hospitals and other medical units. Ban Ki-moon has already launched a review of medical units and facilities in missions. This is also a major source of concern for European militaries considering deploying with the UN. A recent survey of Irish experiences in peace operations found that officers felt that one key to UNMIL’s success was a Netherlands hospital ship off Monrovia. In contrast, doubts over the provision of medical care in the Chad mission (MINURCAT) almost led Dublin to withdraw from the mission. Many European planners continue to argue that they cannot send more troops on UN missions without better medical support.
European militaries can address this problem directly by deploying more medical units of their own under UN command. Another area where European forces may be able to play a significant enabling role is logistics. General Lollesgaard told the Security Council in June that he desperately needed robust military logistics, whereas the UN continued to use civilian contractors. “To be more specific, north of the Niger River,” he added, “hostilities are so imminent and the road conditions are so poor that it is irresponsible to keep going there with old, fragile civilian trucks that are unprotected and are driven by people who are not soldiers.” European analysts repeat this point. Edward Burke notes that the UN also relies heavily on civilian air crew, and that “civilian contractors often do not allow their personnel to deploy to hostile areas.” A byproduct of this, Burke adds, is that “peacekeeping commanders spend much of their time talking to civilian officials in New York, trying to unblock political and logistical problems, instead of focusing on day-to-day military matters.”

Ban Ki-moon has declared that he will “invite regional partners and Member States that have capabilities in key enabling areas to propose and provide specialist support packages to address specific substantive and support needs, particularly for short duration tasks to address urgent field requirements or temporary gaps.” In light of this commitment, European militaries – potentially partnering with non-European counterparts on a region-by-region basis – could offer to provide the UN with short-term military logistical support during periods of intense conflict in cases such as Mali. (There is at least one good precedent, as European nations made their own logistical arrangements for rapid deployment to Lebanon after the 2006 war.) While there is a large conservative element within the UN secretariat that opposes such innovations, a case such as Mali demands a response from capable countries.

There are other niche capability areas that have been referenced in previous reports (such as engineering units, another need flagged by Ban) or that will only occasionally be relevant (such as WMD specialists, and these are most likely to deploy outside Africa). However, the most sensitive question will be under what circumstances European governments are willing to deploy combat forces in Africa. As mentioned, there are recent examples of these deployments, including (i) the Irish-Swedish rapid reaction force in UNMIL; (ii) a significant number of units in MINURCAT (Chad) in 2009-2011; and (iii) the reconnaissance and attack helicopter elements of the Netherlands presence in Mali. Nonetheless European governments remain wary of sending medium- and large-scale combat forces to Africa. This is true not only of UN operations but also EU-flagged missions, as the poor response to the EU’s mission to CAR in 2014 demonstrated. EU governments are possibly additionally cautious in cases where combat troops could end up in firefights with extremists. They are also likely to be wary about signing up for any FIB-style missions, in which the UN is formally a party to the conflict as it sets out to neutralize specific opponents.

More broadly, European officers remain suspicious of the UN’s command and control arrangements and how they work in periods of significant violence. In many cases these attitudes reflect prejudices dating back to the 1990s. Yet even European soldiers with more recent experience of UN operations have their doubts. As Burke notes, Ireland is loyal to blue helmet missions but even so, “experiences of NATO and/or EU operations have raised expectations. Concepts of force protection – the ability to respond to attacks and to retrieve casualties – have changed forever.” In Mali, the Netherlands has insisted on maintaining military control over its Chinook transport helicopters so that they can be used in response to a crisis at short notice.

The recent UN reform process has not culminated in any fundamental reforms to command and control arrangements. As a result, it is likely that Europeans will be, at a minimum, highly selective in their approach to combat roles in the UN’s African missions. Nonetheless, there are some models for European engagements in robust operations under the UN’s aegis. These include (i) deploying special forces independently alongside UN-led troops, with a mandate to support them in periods of crisis in
consultation with the UN force commander; or (ii) inserting troops directly into a UN mission as rapid response forces with special command arrangements to allow them to undertake kinetic actions to protect the operation.

European governments can also contribute to the development of the High-Level Panel’s “vanguard forces” in Africa. As noted, this is still at the conceptual stage, and European militaries could help push the concept through consultations with African partners. In the longer term, it is improbable that European governments will dedicate troops to vanguard contingents on the African continent. But it is possible that European militaries could help launch the concept by prepositioning some assets and training specialized personnel (such as planning, liaison and logistics officers) to help with the rapid deployment of largely African forces into future crises. They could also help plan and, if necessary, support regional over-the-horizon forces on the continent. This brings us to the broader question of how European and African governments can work together to prepare for future UN operations.

5. TRIANGULAR COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN PARTNERS AND THE UN

European and African militaries cooperate closely on training and other security issues. Yet when they deploy alongside one another in a case such as Mali, the differences in their capabilities, skills and expectations are all too obvious. As Lisa Sharland notes, the Netherlands responded to the IED threat in Mali by deploying a specialist anti-IED unit, but African contingents in the north of the country remained poorly protected, fuelling a perception of unfairness within the operation.

Nevertheless, current and future UN operations are liable to rely increasingly strongly on African contingents, even if they are of mixed quality. In the early 2000s, troops from Asia and Latin America often made up the backbone of UN forces in Africa. In numerical terms at least, this remains the case in DRC, South Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire, where non-African troops still make up the bulk of UN forces. These statistics may be misleading: As we have noted, the FIB in DRC consists of African troops, while other peacekeepers have been relatively passive. Even more strikingly, most recent UN missions on the continent do have a majority of African troops. Over three-quarters of UN troops and police officers in CAR are from other African countries. 7,876 of the 11,511 uniformed personnel in Mali (68 per cent) are also from Africa. More specifically, African countries are tending to deploy troops to conflicts in their immediate strategic neighborhoods. 6,520 (57 per cent) of MINUSMA uniformed personnel are from members of ECOWAS (which, as we have seen, was planning to intervene in Mali as early as 2012) and a further 1,114 are from Chad, which sees challenges across the Sahel as threats to its own security. A similar pattern holds in CAR, where central African states such as Burundi, Gabon, Rwanda and (remarkably) the DRC are prominent contributors to MINUSCA’s ranks.

In the past, UN officials often worked on the basis that “neighbors make bad peacekeepers”, and would have tried hard to avoid such sub-regional clusters of troop contributors in Africa. Now, however, it is becoming increasingly necessary for the UN to co-opt neighbors into its peacemaking and peacekeeping strategies across Africa. Algeria has led mediation efforts for northern Mali, relegating MINUSMA officials to a supporting role. Similarly, the east African organization IGAD has led uneven peacemaking efforts in South Sudan, while Uganda has deployed its own troops to support President Salva Kiir. The most obvious case of regional actors impinging on the independence of UN operations is, however, probably still the FIB. As we have seen, southern African countries (South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi) advocated for the special brigade and provided the troops. Their open goal was to curb Rwanda’s proxy militia forces in the eastern DRC: although deployed under a UN banner, the FIB was always part of a regional power play too.
This was arguably a source of strength. “In the past, militia commanders backed by Rwanda were able to maneuver around UN units, most of which came from far-off places like South Asia and Latin America,” this author noted at the time of the FIB’s launch, “but the new brigade is a tripwire force that cannot be treated so lightly.” This assessment proved somewhat unfair: The FIB did engage in some hard fighting, and followed tactical orders from a Brazilian general with no stake in local power battles. Yet, as we have also noted, the contributors to the brigade have also reined in their operations in recent months, refusing to attack specific anti-Rwandan militias.

This holds important lessons for UN and European officials elsewhere, including those considering how to employ peacekeeping forces to contain/mitigate threats from violent extremism in Africa. In future, it will be necessary to engage regional powers in planning, mandating and implementing such missions. It will also be necessary to assess the risks associated with their participation. Are there cases where a neighbor’s presence and influence in a peace operation will do more harm than good? Is there a risk that building regional buy-in for a force will compromise its operational competence? The UN has already had to dodge around problems of this type in Mali, where Chad has been accused of deploying underage soldiers. Ban Ki-moon has promised to crack down on such aberrations, and the UN Secretariat has mechanisms to penalize underperforming contingents financially.

Yet there are limits to how tough the UN can be with such regional partners. Sometimes they are the only ones willing to deploy peacekeepers at all. More generally, their political and practical support is necessary to let UN missions work. As Arthur Boutellis observes, “a major obstacle for a UN mission to contribute to stabilization is the fact that it is geographically limited … while terrorism and organized crime and groups operate across borders in the Sahel region.” MINUSMA is relatively fortunate in that the UN has a well-established office in West Africa dealing with conflict prevention (UNOWA). A similar office in central Africa (UNOCA) has acted as an adjunct to MINUSCA. Yet the real key to any regional strategy in either case, or elsewhere, has to be dealing with the neighbors.

This holds true for those European countries that want to deploy in UN operations in Africa. Planning for such deployments cannot simply involve coordination with the UN Secretariat and the Security Council. Instead, it needs to involve multi-level engagement with regional powers on how to handle both instability and extremism.

This form of engagement could take a number of forms. At a basic tactical level, it could involve agreements to (i) embed pre-prepared European advisers on issues such as IEDs and community engagement strategies with African units in future deployments; or (ii) conducting joint trainings and table-top exercises handling extremist violence under UN rules with potential regional contributors.

At an elite military level, it could also involve training on such specific aspects of containing/mitigating violent extremism. These might include intelligence-based planning, using open source information to track political events, and (most crucially) mechanisms for maintaining discipline and human rights standards in the face of extremism. European forces have already experimented with a range of “embedding” options to bolster African units in Mali, providing models that can be repeated in other cases.

At a broader level, European countries could aim to combine funding with operational cooperation to assist African countries in developing rapidly deployable medical facilities, along with robust military logistics capacities that can potentially be deployed in tandem with European assets. European and African officials should liaise jointly with the UN secretariat on these procedures to report on standards.
Finally, as noted above, the HIPPO's proposal for “vanguard” units to back up missions under pressure could also be an area for Euro-African cooperation. Both the EU and the AU have made unsuccessful experiments with formal rapid reaction mechanisms. The EU's Battle Groups (although still commended by the High-Level Panel) have become notorious for their inability to deploy. The AU is constantly slipping behind schedule in setting up its much-vaunted African Standby Force (in reality a system of regional brigades), and leading African powers are already working up alternative deployment mechanisms. Although this is unfortunate, most rapid reaction remains *ad hoc*. While thinking on UN “vanguard forces” remains embryonic, there is always a risk that it could go in the wrong direction, focus instead on unworkable models like the Battle Groups and ASF.

Yet it may still be possible to create a better model. While the idea of vanguard forces is still at the “intriguing” stage, interested European countries have the potential to shape debate by promoting public and inter-governmental discussions of lessons from cases such as Mali, South Sudan and CAR for future rapid deployments in Africa. EU countries can also consult with African partners and the UN on how European enablers and specialized units could assist African units to deploy rapidly in a “vanguard” function in future. It is possible that medium-sized but well-prepared African forces (comparable to the individual units making up the FIB) could deploy alongside European specialist forces in future to reinforce the UN.

Similarly, European planners can work with African partners in preparing over-the-horizon options to assist countries that return to violence after a UN presence exits – or preferably act as a deterrent against such relapses. European militaries have considerable experience with over-the-horizon models. Past examples have included keeping EU troops on standby for deployment to the DRC in case of serious electoral violence in 2006; and maintaining reserves to deploy to Bosnia and Kosovo in the event of an emergency. Working in tandem with UN officials, European militaries could assist African partners in devising similar models to provide long-term security guarantees in countries such as Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and potentially the DRC following a UN exit.

In a crisis, European militaries could offer transport and specialized assets for an emergency deployment. In some cases it may be possible to develop “dual use” vanguard/over-the-horizon forces, able to both reinforce UN missions and provide security guarantees in “post-peacekeeping” countries in the same region.
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has made four main points.

• **First:** European governments are obliged to take a new interest in African security due to the spread of violent extremist movements.

• **Second:** despite many limitations, it is possible for UN forces to contain and mitigate threats from violent extremists, if they have robust political, economic and security strategies.

• **Third:** European militaries can contribute directly to making UN missions more robust, learning from cases such as Mali.

• **Fourth:** it is essential that European countries align their efforts with those of African governments. Ultimately, the evolution of African policies and deployments will be of far greater significance to the continent than marginal contributions from Europe.

In this context, the paper has tried to trace a line from (i) the strategic challenges of countering/mitigating violent extremism for UN peace operations to (ii) the capacities that European countries can deploy to address these challenges, and finally to (iii) ways in which European governments and militaries can collaborate on these issues. It has focused on the military dimensions of the problem rather than the political and economic aspects. In doing so it has identified a number of priorities for European triangular engagement with the UN and African partners:

1. Providing expert assistance on strategies for dealing with violent extremists at all levels of UN operations, from mission HQ to the field.

2. Parallel assistance on intelligence-led planning and operations, and developing strategic tools such as open source information analysis.

3. Strengthening medical support and evacuation systems.

4. Developing robust military logistics systems to respond to periods of intense violence threatening peace operations.

5. Contributing to tactical-level deterrence and rapid-response mechanisms in UN operations by deploying additional quick reaction forces.

6. Building strategic-level deterrence and response by working with African partners to realize the High-Level Panel’s vision of “vanguard” and over-the-horizon forces.

Some of these tasks are urgent. Others will take time. Europe’s ability to focus on African security may be reduced by further crises in the Middle East or Eastern Europe. NATO and EU countries will ultimately prioritize those regions over Africa.
But there is both political opportunity and strategic logic in engaging with African crises, and rebooting African capabilities, to stem the spread of violent extremism on the continent. This must be part of a far broader European – and common Euro-African – strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa that should include political, developmental and capacity-building dimensions. The rule of law, good governance and the broader battle of ideas with Islamist groups are all essential factors for long-term success. Yet, in the short and medium term, European military support to UN peace operations also has an important part to play in limiting the worsening chaos on Europe’s southern flank.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ENDNOTES

1 CIC colleagues Sarah Cliffe, Jim Della-Giacoma, John Karlsrud and Alexandra Novosseloff commented on this report. The graphics are by Alison Burt. The final conclusions are the author’s alone.

2 Richard Gowan, “The EU should do more to support UN peacekeeping in Africa,” Centre for European Reform Bulletin, June/July 2009.


5 Bryant Jordan, “The Ebola outbreak isn’t the only reason the US Army’s footprint in Africa is growing,” Business Insider, 8 October 2014.


7 High-Level Panel, Uniting our Strengths for Peace, p.31.


10 Lollesgaard, Remarks to the Security Council, p.5.

11 High-Level Panel, Uniting our Strengths for Peace, p.31.


13 Samantha Power, Remarks on peacekeeping in Brussels, 9 March 2015.


17 Richard Gowan, “How Africa outflanked India at the UN,” Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, 21 June 2013. India and Pakistan have also been skeptical about deploying to CAR and Mali.


20 Lollesgaard, Remarks to the Security Council, p.4.


22 Cedric de Coning, “Do we need a UN stabilization doctrine?”, Complexity 4 Peacekeeping, 27 November 2014.

23 In the DRC, the UN essentially equates “stabilization” as “peacebuilding”. In other cases, in the words of a European diplomat, “you can put everything into this word so it is good for negotiating the resolution” (private conversation, September 2015).

24 UN releases report on sex abuse by peacekeepers,” Al Jazeera, 16 June 2015.


28 CIC staff member’s private conversation, September 2015.


Ireland initially deployed alone, and Sweden added its forces later.


See High-Level Panel, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace*, p.51. The Panel explains that “to allow the UN to insert a quick responding UN military capability into a new mission area or to reinforce an existing mission. The Organization should be able to rely on small dedicated regional vanguard contingents capable of deploying from a regional hub and self-sustaining for up to 180 days.”

High-Level Panel, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace*, p.43.


During the crisis sparked by Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, for example, the Serb minority seized a courthouse in the city of Mitrovica. UN officials sent police to storm the courthouse, but did not inform the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) of their plans. In the ensuing uncoordinated operation, one UN police officer was killed and up to 80 French KFOR troops were wounded.


Ibid, p.3.


Burke and Marley, *Walking Point for Peace*, p.21.

Lollesgaard, Remarks to the Security Council, p.5.


Edward Burke, “Rebooting Ireland’s commitment to UN peacekeeping.”

Sharland, *Counter-IED Technology*, p.11.


Lydia Lim, “Doubts linger over UN troops’ preparedness to enter Mali,” *Inter Press Service*, 5 July 2013.

Boutellis, “Can the UN stabilize Mali?”.

As Karlsrud and Smith note: “The French Operation Barkhane has embedded liaison teams with the African TCCs during AFISMA that stayed on through the re-hatting; the Dutch have provided training to other TCCs on intelligence gathering and analysis; and the UN Mine Action Service provides counter-IED mentoring to TCCs. Possible future partnerships could include such things as jointly deploying European engineering or medical assets with African TCC engineers or medics.” (*Europe’s Return*, p.15).

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