

*Global* \_\_\_\_\_  
**Peace Operations**  
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*Review*



August 2015

A monthly newsletter from the Center on International Cooperation

# GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

The **Global Peace Operations Review** is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military **peacekeeping operations** and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the [New York University Center on International Cooperation \(CIC\)](#) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to **peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding**, the *Review* aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the **Country & Regional Profile pages**, the *Review* provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the **Data & Trends** section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute \(SIPRI\)](#). For more details, please see our [Data guide](#). The **Strategic Summary** provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the **statistics** used to compile these reports.

## Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review

The *Review* covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a **broad definition of peace operations** that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the *Review*, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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## THEMATIC ESSAYS

August 6, 2015

### A BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON PEACE OPERATIONS

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Jean Arnault

A year ago, when the Secretary-General put forward the idea of a new review of peacekeeping operations, he naturally referred to the **Brahimi report**. He argued that as the 15-year anniversary of that report approached, it was necessary “to take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared view of the way forward.”

Because the terms of reference of the new panel included (besides peacekeeping operations) field missions focused on prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) decided early on to take as its frame of reference the **1992 Agenda for Peace**, which defined the panoply of tools that the UN could bring to bear on the resolution of conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold War.

However, clearly the more relevant comparator for the exercise carried out in 2015 is the 2000 effort by the Brahimi panel to find answers to the challenges resulting from setbacks suffered by UN peacekeeping in the 90s. Indeed, both in content and tone, the 2000 and 2015 reports stand in rather stark contrast to the seminal 1992 Agenda. The latter still contemplated the case of inter-state conflicts, while the former two were focused exclusively on intra-state situations. In 1992 the novelty in peacekeeping was the fielding of UN operations “to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers”, whereas the 2000 and 2015 reports largely focused on the challenge to peacekeeping “where there is no peace to keep”.

Broadly speaking, the Agenda for Peace aimed to take advantage of new opportunities offered by dramatic improvements in international relations – the new World Order – whereas subsequent reports were an effort to enable the UN to cope with new and severe constraints. The **1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace** described these as “unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties”, namely a succession of new wars, often within newly independent states, with a marked religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty, particularly against civilians.

In that sense, against the background of high expectations raised in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the **HIPPO** faced in 2015 the same sobering realities as the Brahimi panel in 2000, and to a large extent the Secretariat as early as 1995:

- Because UN involvement continues to represent the highest possible level of internationalization of a conflict – or any other domestic issue – it continues to face reluctance on the part of individual governments and, increasingly, regional groupings to entrust the Organization with sensitive issues such as preventive diplomacy and the negotiation of internal conflicts.

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- Because UN peacekeeping forces continue to be a “pickup team” whose constituent parts often do not share the same language, doctrines, training and equipment, or national interests, the UN continues to struggle to move beyond the mostly symbolic role it played in support of pre-existing agreements and become a relevant actor in situations of active hostilities.
  - Because the UN continues to be a relatively minor player in the field of international cooperation, and continues to be fragmented among a multiplicity of autonomous agencies, it continues to face great challenges in the consolidation of peace in countries that painfully emerge from conflict.

As a result, whether in the areas of mediation, peacekeeping or peace consolidation, the ground covered in the Brahimi and the HIPPO reports is strikingly similar, as are many recommendations offered by the two panels. And it comes as no surprise that the HIPPO refers explicitly to the Brahimi report on key issues such as the protection of civilians or the use of force.

At the same time, while the UN has faced similar challenges in its effort to remain relevant over the past 20 years, each panel has been working in a different set of circumstances. Each has developed different perspectives on the same issues, and has produced recommendations with significant nuances. Let us look at three key areas: the use of force and the principles of peacekeeping; peacebuilding; and the challenge of having no peace to keep.

## **THE USE OF FORCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING**

Following the frustrating experience of the use of force by UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia, the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace drew very clear-cut conclusions:

*“Nothing is more dangerous than to ask [a peacekeeping operation] to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter is incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. International problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. Conflicts the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others. It is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum”.*

Five years later, with the experience of the genocide in Rwanda etched deeply in the UN consciousness, the Brahimi panel would take the exact opposite stance: “As the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force”. In other words, not only is the use of force “other than in self-defence” not incompatible with peacemaking, it is a pre-requisite for its success – and the imperative of saving lives trumps allowing for the slow ripening of peace negotiations. Robust rules of engagement should enable a peacekeeping mission to defeat “those who reneged on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence”. And the Brahimi panel proceeds to revisit the traditional principles of impartiality, consent and use of force in self-defence with a view to accommodating the centrality of the use of force in peacekeeping affairs.



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In truth, the 1995 and 2000 positions are not as incompatible as it may seem: the 1995 report argued that the UN is in no position to impose a peace settlement by military means, which the Brahimi panel would not disagree with (“force alone cannot create peace”). And the Brahimi report argued that once a peace agreement has been achieved, it is essential that UN peacekeeping forces should be capable of defending it against violent challengers. The authors of the 1995 report would also not disavow this. At the same time, the central message to emerge from the Brahimi report was that the UN suffered from a critical deficit in military credibility, and its continued relevance to international peace and security depended on acquiring the “robustness” that was so tragically lacking in Rwanda.

Fifteen years later, the course of international affairs was bound to have an impact on the HIPPO’s perspective on the use of force. And in this regard change had been fast and momentous. Indeed, barely one year after the completion of the Brahimi report, a major shift took place in the international community’s approach to conflict with the start of the Global War on Terror in the wake of 9/11.

Together with the prodigal branding of rebel groups as “terrorists” with whom dialogue and political negotiations were deemed unacceptable, the 2000s witnessed the ascendancy of the “primacy of the military” in the settlement of conflicts. Significantly, with perhaps the particularly bloody exception of Sri Lanka, application of military force led nowhere to a termination of conflict. In Iraq and Libya, it arguably made the conflicts worse. Moreover, as some Western powers, reeling from setbacks in [Afghanistan](#) and Iraq, seemed to distance themselves from population-centered counter-insurgency campaigns, they switched to an even less political approach: counter-terrorism.

In the field of peacekeeping, politics also appeared to take a backseat to military deployment. In Darfur and the DRC, the two largest-ever peacekeeping missions ended up almost entirely disconnected from any political process. The Security Council was increasingly embracing forceful “protection of civilians” as central to the mandate of peacekeeping missions. But it did so without a corresponding effort to find long-term political solutions that could make the protection of civilians effective and sustainable.

Looking at the current state of affairs in relation to ongoing conflicts and emerging trends in peacekeeping, the HIPPO considered that the first fundamental shift for the UN to maintain and increase its relevance in peace and security had to be the restoration of the “primacy of politics” and the imperative of reconnecting the use of force with political strategies. To quote the [HIPPO’s report](#), this meant recognition of the fact that, without denying the importance of credible deterrence in peacekeeping, “politics is the true force multiplier”.

The report further elaborated on what was intended by “politics” when UN forces deployed in situations of ongoing conflicts, namely the search for negotiated solutions. This is essentially in contraposition to what has often been a flaw of counter-insurgency campaigns from Vietnam in the 60s to Afghanistan in the 2000s: the vigorous extension of state institutions, particularly the armed forces, as a substitute for negotiations and accommodation. It also contrasts with the general proposition that political settlements are not achievable with “terrorists”. While the report accepts that negotiation with “violent extremism” is a very difficult proposition, it draws lessons from NATO’s late recognition that there was no military or state-building solution to the Afghan insurgency. It reasserts the “hallmark” of the UN’s approach to conflict resolution: to explore peaceful options with all combatants regardless of military affiliation on the basis of “legitimate interests and grievances”.

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Again there is no contradiction as such between the Brahimi report and the HIPPO: the former does list “political support” as the first key condition for the success of complex operations. And the latter emphasizes the critical need for every stakeholder at the UN – Security Council, TCCs, and Secretariat – to provide missions with the capacity to act as a credible deterrent to threats against civilians. But the nuance in emphasis is not unimportant: the HIPPO’s first concern is to reconnect the use of force with the politics of peaceful settlements as a pre-condition for deployment, and to impress upon the Security Council the need to bring its political leverage to bear as a pre-condition for success.

And just like the Brahimi report tinkered with the “principles of peacekeeping” to make way for the centrality of the use of credible force, the HIPPO revisited them to accommodate the centrality of negotiated political solutions to internal conflict. It follows the Brahimi report in distinguishing impartiality from the “equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time”, but it also stresses the UN mission’s equidistance from belligerents in key areas: the protection of civilians “irrespective of the origin of the threat”; the promotion of human rights of all actors “including the belligerents regardless of affiliation”; and the search for political solutions based on “the legitimate interests and grievances of all parties”.

The HIPPO’s report acknowledges that consent from parties other than the government may be difficult to secure, but emphasizes that consent from all actors must be relentlessly sought:

*“Obtaining and maintaining the consent of the other parties remains an important objective of any mission and should be pursued to the extent possible. This strengthens the view of the Panel that any peacekeeping mission must be a part of a robust political process in which the UN is deeply involved, and must continuously seek to build consent to the UN role and presence through an impartial posture”.*

Finally, the HIPPO proposed that between the overly restrictive “use of force in self-defence” in the 1995 report and the overly militaristic and unrealistic “use of force in defence of the mandate” in the Brahimi report - indeed, many if not most tasks contained in UN missions’ mandates are not apt to be implemented by military means - the use of force should be clearly specified in each mandate.

## **PEACEBUILDING**

Peacebuilding is another area where the HIPPO report adds updated perspective to the concerns contained in the Brahimi report. In the Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was defined as activities undertaken by the international community to supplement the efforts of national actors with a view to consolidating peace. However, as noted in the 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, while the situation is clear when a mission is deployed on the back of a previously negotiated peace agreement, in other circumstances the question of the ownership of peacebuilding becomes blurred. The Brahimi report gave peacebuilding activities a much more critical role than previous reports:

*“When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation’s peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peace-building, and the peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining.”*

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But it did not dispel the ambiguities surrounding ownership, quite the contrary. Traditional ceasefire monitoring missions were explicitly meant to create conditions in which negotiations for a settlement could take place. In that sense, international peacekeepers were to enable national actors to deliver peace. In the Brahimi report – as in the practice of peace operations in many late 90s missions – peace was assumed to be “built” rather than “negotiated”; and international peacebuilders, rather than local actors, tended to be in the lead. A number of areas were singled out – elections needed the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building, the police and the justice system should be reformed, and DDR should be undertaken – but the responsibility for designing those activities appeared to rest primarily with international actors based on their theory of change, rather than national actors. While it was stated that “effective peacebuilding requires active engagement with the local parties”, it was unclear whether the degree of ownership of these local parties went beyond that of implementing agents of international designs.

In this regard, the Brahimi report reflected the international paradigm that emerged from the 90s, which assumed that during a “peacebuilding window” of a decade or so the international community could apply a series of generic reforms to “build back better” countries emerging from conflict. That approach encompassed reforms around a set of acronyms (e.g., SSR, DDR, RoL) that were assumed to be so universal and so powerful that the Security Council ended up including them automatically in its mandates without considering whether they were actually relevant to the settlement of the specific conflicts in the country concerned, or whether they had domestic constituencies.

While this ambitious approach seemed reasonable and realistic at the end of the 90s and the early 2000s, the picture was quite different by the time the HIPPO met in 2015. Over the past 15 years numerous attempts were made at full-spectrum transformation of countries at war, or emerging from war à la Afghanistan or Iraq, and even at remaking small countries not at war (Haiti comes to mind). More often than not these attempts proved disappointing and sometimes counter-productive. Many missions with ambitious mandates and a staff of international experts on police, judicial reform or DDR have been engaged year after year in attempting to implement their templates with very little impact on their target institutions and no tangible impact on the restoration of peace. Still, institution development was thought to be the winning strategy, and it tended to displace from the missions’ agenda a political approach to contending local forces and interests.

Warnings were voiced both from academia and from international organizations that institution building was a much more uncertain and protracted affair than initially assumed, that formal institutions were not as relevant as initially believed, and that their functioning was so deeply contextual that it was risky for foreigners to play sorcerer’s apprentice in cultures they did not have the time or the inclination to understand. To some extent, the lessons learned from the 2000s invited a return to the much more modest and cautious philosophy of the 1995 Supplement:

*“The United Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new state institutions. It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again. All too often it turns out that they do not yet want to be helped or to resolve their problems quickly”.*

The HIPPO did not conclude that efforts to strengthen institutions were irrelevant. It shared the view expressed by the World Bank, the G7+ and others that improvement in the field of justice, security, inclusive politics and jobs are generally positively correlated with peace consolidation. It actually stressed that alongside inclusive politics jobs and livelihood should be a much more prominent



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part of the international approach. However, it also argued – and this is a significant development in peacekeeping affairs – that particularly in contexts where there is no comprehensive peace agreement, which is the general rule these days, the Security Council should refrain from providing any substantive peacebuilding mandate until it has given the Secretariat and peace missions on the ground the opportunity to carry out the fullest possible in-field consultations with local actors on what peace building could mean to them in the particular country and at the particular time when the mission is deployed. No element of the traditional international template should be mandated without prior understanding of its relevance to the grievances and interests that drive the conflict, and the prospect of a political settlement among national actors.

Incidentally, the approach advocated by the HIPPO fully dovetails with the peacekeeping philosophy so well articulated by Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed in their 2008 essay [“In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: the Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation”](#):

*“The people of the country concerned – the educated and the illiterate, the governors and the governed, the suspected perpetrators of the violence and the victims, the men and the women, alike – understand their own country far better than the foreign mediators who have just arrived on the scene. They will have to live with the consequences of the political process long after the mediator has departed. They also can help the mediator to identify where a potential course of action could lead to a dead-end, fail to command domestic support, or worse, exacerbate political divisions in the country and potentially provoke violence. It is therefore not only a question of shrewd diplomacy, but good sense and basic respect to listen to a diverse range of views in the host country.”*

Among others, this approach provides the fullest answer to the problem of supply-driven “Christmas tree” templates, whether pushed by vested interests at UNHQ, the donor community or the Security Council. The implications are profound: it means a restoration of national agency in peacekeeping, after more than a decade of template approaches where “national ownership” was more often than not an afterthought. For missions, it means a renewed emphasis on political approaches to peace consolidation, since for a protracted period in the life of a mission this consolidation will have to be achieved not so much through the building of formal institutions, but rather in their absence, or while they remain largely dysfunctional. It means a transformation of the mandating process, better adjusted to the reality of continuously evolving political and military situations. It also means a transformation of the budget process at the UN, which currently favors front-loading mission tasks and resources rather than allowing for ongoing re-adjustment of mission mandates depending on context.

## **“NO PEACE TO KEEP”**

It is a testament to the relevance of peacekeeping to international peace and security that it has been able to expand from strictly military missions dealing with inter-state conflicts in the 60s, 70s and 80s to the multidimensional missions assisting the resolution of internal wars in the 90s and 2000s. But it is also a testimony to its relative immaturity that it is still struggling after 70 years to define the limits of its “territory” relative to other fields of endeavor in the midst of continuing controversy among the UN membership.

After disastrous attempts at peace enforcement in the protection of humanitarian activities in Somalia and the protection of the notorious UN safe areas in Bosnia, the conclusion was drawn in the mid-90s that UN peacekeepers did not have what it took to deploy in situations where no agreement existed among belligerents, at least on a ceasefire. A few years later, the Brahimi report concluded from the Rwanda tragedy that the UN simply did not have a choice but to acquire the military robustness that would

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enable it to face its responsibilities when a political settlement it was deployed to assist collapsed, violence resumed and the lives of thousands were threatened or lost as a result.

Given these sharp swings, the HIPPO has taken a position that reflects both concerns: it accepts fully that the protection of civilians in armed conflict is a core principle of international humanitarian law and a moral responsibility for the United Nations. In addition to the moral and legal dimensions, it is a political and military imperative: indeed, as a foreign force confronted to local challenges, no UN mission can expect to remain politically or militarily relevant unless it enjoys support from the population where it has deployed. The HIPPO therefore agrees that missions have the obligation, and must be given the means, to protect civilians from armed attack.

Moreover, beyond the type of situations that the Brahimi report had in mind – missions sent to uphold peace but confronted with “lingering forces of war and violence” – it accepts as legitimate the deployment of UN missions even “in situations of violent conflict and in the absence of a viable peace process”. It does so convinced that, in some cases, combined with the deployment of UN forces, the leverage available to influential members of the Security Council and the region can help create a political process where none existed, make a difference in the protection of civilians and bring the conflict under control.

But it does so very cautiously. It takes into account that the pursuit of robustness after the Brahimi report met great difficulties: key recommendations for stand-by forces, rapid deployment, adequate enablers, intelligence-gathering and other elements required for the “projection of credible force” by peacekeepers were not implemented. Denoting deep differences among member states, the practice of hidden caveats continued to undermine command and control as it did 25 years earlier. In the end, throughout the 2000s, in spite of the Brahimi report the use of force against spoilers in the context of UN peace processes was more often than not carried out by national and regional forces – in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Haiti, Somalia, Mali and the DRC – rather than the UN.

The HIPPO insists that further progress can be made in the political and military capacity of peacekeeping forces, particularly if a consensus on peacekeeping is restored among member states. But it also believes that the composition and character of multinational, fundamentally heterogeneous, and to some extent disparate peacekeeping forces carries inherent limitations both in terms of deployment speed and military capability. It argues therefore that while UN multilateral peacekeeping can play a part in the management of today's violent environments, it will always critically depend on others – national or regional contributors – as “first responders”, as “parallel forces” or as the primary protagonists in the control of conflict.

Peacekeeping proved to be a valid proposition in its original domain, the consolidation of inter-state ceasefires. It proved to be, with some tragic exceptions, a valid proposition in a very different context: the termination of civil wars. Confronted with a vastly more ambitious task, i.e. the global management of emerging conflicts and crises, it can again play a role. It could even be argued that it should play a much larger part – bearing in mind, in the wake of the controversy over NATO's intervention in Libya, the risks inherent in the intervention of non-UN actors authorized by the Council. Already in 1995 the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace pointed out “the danger that the States concerned may claim international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that were not in fact envisaged by the Security Council when it gave its Authorization to them”.

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But the UN must not be taken as a substitute for the creation of the “global-regional peace and security framework” that the HIPPO calls for, and which it hopes the Secretary General will agree to lead. In 2007 the founding father of UN peacekeeping, Brian Urquhart, stressed:

*“A new approach needs to be found, something between peace enforcement action by large and battle-ready national contingents made available under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the improvised, more or less symbolic, peacekeeping that served so well during the Cold War but has often proved inadequate since”.*

This approach is not to be found by focusing on UN peacekeeping forces alone. It requires a new, multi-actor response. The global-regional framework will have to bring clarity to the relationship between national, regional and UN operations, an area where improvisation and ad hoc arrangements have prevailed to this day. In particular, it will have to review the political costs and benefits of several factors critical to the effectiveness and reputation of UN operations: the separation of regional initiatives or their integration under the blue flag (the case of the Force Intervention Brigade comes to mind); the re-hatting of first responders, and in particular re-hatting of troops from neighbouring countries; and the arrangements guiding the relationship between UN missions and parallel forces. There is very real urgency to this undertaking: the pressure on peacekeeping to do more than it can will not relent until this new architecture is in place.

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August 19, 2015

## LES OPÉRATIONS DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : LE RÉALISME CONFRONTÉ AUX AMBITIONS

Alexandra Novosseloff

### LES CASQUES BLEUS FACE À UNE NOUVELLE CRISE DE CROISSANCE ?

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Contrairement aux pronostics faits à la fin des années 90, le maintien de la paix n'a cessé de s'accroître depuis, au point d'atteindre un nouveau pic de déploiement, avec la mise en place de deux nouvelles opérations (MINUSMA-Mali et MINUSCA-Centrafricaine) et l'augmentation des effectifs de la MINUSS-Sud-Soudan. L'ONU déploie aujourd'hui plus de **125 000** personnes (civils, policiers et militaires) sur le terrain. Ces opérations évoluant dans des contextes particulièrement compliqués ont engendrés ce que l'on pourrait appeler une nouvelle "crise de croissance". Entre le déploiement de Casques bleus dans **un contexte de menace terroriste** (Mali), la création d'une brigade d'intervention ayant pour objectif « **de neutraliser les groupes armés** » de l'Est du Congo (RDCongo), l'envoi de troupes supplémentaires dans un contexte de résurgence de guerre civile (Sud-Soudan) et la création d'une énième opération (le 9e dispositif international depuis 1997) dans un pays sans Etat (RCA), beaucoup au sein du Secrétariat ont eu peur que les Casques bleus perdent leur âme dans des tâches qui ne manqueraient pas de les dépasser et avec des moyens toujours planifiés à l'économie. De ce fait, le fossé entre les décideurs du Conseil de sécurité et les contributeurs de troupes a continué de se creuser, et le malaise de certains contributeurs de troupes semblait de plus en plus grand face aux décisions prises par le Conseil. A la crise de croissance risquait de s'ajouter une crise d'identité voire une crise de légitimité dont l'Organisation ne pouvait se permettre (après les échecs dont elle s'est vue affublée depuis des années, de manière d'ailleurs souvent injustifiée).

Dans ce contexte, le Secrétaire général a pris l'initiative de créer, à l'approche du quinzième anniversaire de l'adoption du **rapport Brahimi** (août 2000), un nouveau panel qui puisse « procéder à un examen approfondi des opérations de paix des Nations Unies » et contribuer au débat « sur la façon dont [elles] devraient s'adapter aux nouvelles exigences et sur les capacités et les ressources dont elles ont besoin pour s'adapter » (**réunion du Conseil de sécurité du 11 juin 2014**). Le Secrétaire général a senti soudain le besoin de donner des gages d'intérêt dans un domaine qu'il a largement délaissé pendant les près de dix années de son mandat (**voir l'analyse de Richard Gowan**). Un panel de haut niveau de 15 personnes a ainsi été **créé le 31 octobre 2014** ; il a rendu son **rapport** de 117 pages (surnommé HIPPO – *High Level Panel on Peace Operations*) le 16 juin dernier.

Ce nouveau rapport pour réformer les opérations de paix a-t-il été à la hauteur des attentes placées en lui et a-t-il relevé les défis posés (être stratégique et opérationnel à la fois, traiter de l'ensemble du spectre de la gestion de crises, faire des propositions concrètes pour améliorer les outils à disposition de l'ONU) ? Va-t-il créer ce nouveau *momentum* tant attendu pour faire entrer la pratique du maintien de la paix dans le XXIe siècle ?

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## QUELLES PRIORITÉS POUR LES MOIS À VENIR ?

Au-delà des recommandations spécifiques du rapport qui doivent chacune faire l'objet d'un examen précis, il s'agit de voir quelles doivent être les grandes priorités des prochains mois pour l'ensemble des acteurs du maintien de la paix afin de redonner du souffle et de la cohérence à cette activité ?

- Poser la spécificité et les limites du maintien de la paix sans se désengager des opérations existantes.

Le rapport rappelle avec force qu'il faut « consolider les fondements » sur lesquels se basent les opérations de maintien de la paix et faire prévaloir la primauté du politique face à des solutions de toute autre nature. Il considère toutefois, dans le même temps, que ses principes (impartialité, consentement de l'Etat-hôte, usage de la force en cas de légitime défense) « doivent être interprétés progressivement et avec souplesse », et que les Casques bleus peuvent mener de manière exceptionnelle des actions d'imposition (Ce que la version française du rapport traduit de manière très approximative par « tâches de renforcement »...). Le HIPPO n'aurait-il pas du poser plus clairement, de manière plus autoritaire, les limites du maintien de la paix de l'ONU qui constituent en réalité sa spécificité (par rapport aux actions des autres organisations internationales) ?

Il faut rappeler avec force que les Casques bleus (peu interopérables, comme le rappelle le rapport) ne peuvent être efficaces dans des contextes de guerre civile ouverte, de contre-insurrection ou de contre-terrorisme ; ils n'ont pas les moyens d'employer la force armée de manière stratégique (c'est-à-dire être partial, combattre un ennemi identifié comme tel et le mettre sous sa coupe). Non seulement ceci est à l'opposé de l'esprit du maintien de la paix (tel que posé par l'Article premier de la Charte), mais les Etats membres ne donneront jamais au Secrétariat les moyens de s'engager dans une telle action dont seules des coalitions d'Etats puissamment armés ou des alliances militaires comme l'OTAN disposent. Jamais les Casques bleus ne disposent des capacités pour soutenir sur la durée l'usage de la force, qui ne peut alors être que tactique, limité et accompagné par une stratégie politique. Ce constat, ce rappel, doit ramener les Etats membres à la raison, à savoir les objectifs des opérations de paix doivent être fonction de leurs moyens, ce que le rapport rappelle largement : « les mandats doivent être mis en cohérence avec les capacités ».

Ceci ne signifie pas, bien au contraire, que les Casques bleus ne peuvent utiliser la force armée, qu'ils seraient condamnés de manière intrinsèque à n'avoir qu'une action passive. Loin de là : ils doivent avoir et garder en toute circonstance une approche déterminée, robuste qui leur permet de se faire respecter par les parties au conflit. Ceci est une question d'attitude ; c'est aussi :

- *une question de moyens* : on revient toujours à l'adaptation des moyens au mandat et à la disposition de moyens mobiles qui font partie des capacités critiques de toute opération et qui lui évitent d'être statique ; c'est précisément toujours ce qui fait le plus défaut aux opérations de maintien de la paix, et en particulier l'absence **d'hélicoptères**.
- *une question de volonté* ; on pourrait dire de leadership et d'autorité, et
- *une question d'intérêt*, notamment des principaux contributeurs : on ne mène pas une action militaire d'envergure sans intérêt national ou stratégique qui la soutienne (au fond, **Pour qui meurt-on?**).

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Quoiqu'il en soit, en toutes circonstances, leur action doit être guidée par une protection de la force adaptée à leur environnement et une posture robuste. Les deux doivent, comme le rappelle le HIPPO, être soutenus par une stratégie politique robuste qui doit être le fait non seulement des contributeurs de troupes et du Secrétariat, mais également et surtout des Etats membres du Conseil de sécurité et notamment des plus puissants d'entre eux. La force et l'autorité d'une opération de maintien de la paix face aux fauteurs de troubles de tous bords proviennent aussi voire avant tout de la pression exercée sur eux par un Etat extérieur puissant. C'est en jouant collectif que l'ONU dans son ensemble gagnera.

*- Rétablir la relation entre les différents acteurs du maintien de la paix à travers le renforcement de la coopération triangulaire.*

C'est en ce sens qu'une plus grande efficacité des opérations de paix passe aussi par un meilleur dialogue entre ses différents acteurs. Le HIPPO propose à cet égard que « *le Conseil de sécurité [adopte] un cadre systématique pour qu'un dialogue avec les pays fournissant des contingents ou du personnel de police et le Secrétariat soit engagé dès le début du processus d'élaboration du mandat* ». En dépit de l'adoption de la **Résolution 1353** en 2001 et de **l'initiative franco-britannique** en 2009, le Conseil de sécurité n'a toujours pas créé une enceinte adéquate pour consulter les contributeurs de troupes, sans que ses prérogatives décisionnelles ne soient bien entendu amoindries. Les « réunions de contributeurs de troupes » organisées par le Secrétariat sont des lieux trop formels et non adéquats ; le **groupe de travail** du Conseil sur les opérations de maintien de la paix n'a jamais pris la mesure de cet enjeu. Une autre enceinte, plus informelle, restreinte, doit être mise en place.

Pour que les représentants des contributeurs de troupes, du Conseil de sécurité et du Secrétariat puissent échanger plus facilement sur les problèmes rencontrés, ils doivent se réunir dans des groupes restreints et en format politico-militaire (pour que l'expertise militaire puisse être également prise en compte). Pourquoi ne pas prévoir, par exemple, des réunions avec les dix plus importants contributeurs d'une mission, puis avec les dix suivants, l'essentiel étant que les contributeurs ayant la charge des principales opérations militaires de la mission puissent être réellement consultés. Il pourrait aussi y avoir un format purement militaire et un autre purement civil. Une chose est sûre, les grandes messes où tout le monde attend que son voisin prenne la parole en premier ne peuvent donner de grands résultats.

En parallèle, à l'occasion de l'examen de chaque mission, le Conseil de sécurité pourrait également se réunir de manière informelle avec les représentants des Etats-hôtes pour faire passer les messages nécessaires de coopération avec les Nations Unies. En effet, les fauteurs de trouble ne sont pas uniquement les représentants de groupes armés ou les opposants politiques à un Etat ; ils peuvent aussi être les autorités élues de cet Etat. Le Conseil de sécurité doit pouvoir leur rappeler de manière ferme et discrète qu'ils doivent respecter ses décisions, prises au nom de l'ensemble des Etats membres de l'Organisation, à moins de risquer d'être l'objet de certaines mesures (sanctions, **menaces de retrait**, voire conditionnement de l'aide au développement).

*- Mieux calibrer les objectifs des opérations de maintien de la paix et mieux partager le fardeau*

Le panel y fait allusion tout au long de son rapport sans vraiment l'affirmer nettement. Les opérations multidimensionnelles ne sont-elles pas allées trop loin, n'ont-elles pas suscité trop d'attentes par rapport aux capacités réelles de l'Organisation ? « Qui trop embrasse mal étreint », dit le proverbe. Le concept même de protection des civils n'a-t-il pas conduit l'ONU à élargir tant et plus le périmètre de son action ? Ce qui doit rester un objectif incontournable de tout déploiement, de toute action des Nations Unies, peut-il réellement, et de manière réaliste, se décliner en tâches à accomplir quand on connaît la superficie immense des territoires



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à couvrir ? Là encore, le rapport rappelle qu'« il faut aligner les besoins sur les moyens », mais on sait aussi que les moyens sont limités.

Non seulement les Casques bleus ne peuvent tout faire, mais on ne peut les envoyer n'importe comment (voir les tribunes de deux éminents praticiens du maintien de la paix : [Satish Nambiar](#) et [Jean-Marie Guéhenno](#)). On en revient à la question de la spécificité de l'action des Casques bleus. La poser permet aussi de mieux identifier sa valeur ajoutée dans la division des tâches qui se joue dans la réponse internationale aux crises et de mieux travailler avec les uns avec les autres. Ici, il est nécessaire de réfléchir à un meilleur soutien mutuel entre forces des Nations Unies, forces parallèles et forces régionales. En effet, le HIPPO le dit et le répète, l'ONU ne peut faire tout toute seule et considère que des priorités doivent pouvoir être établies de manière plus précise. Nous devons entrer dans une « ère de partenariats », comme l'a répété à plusieurs reprises le Secrétaire général. Ceci nécessite également que chacun prenne sa part du fardeau, pas seulement du gâteau.

On en revient aussi à la question des moyens et des responsabilités de chacun. De fait, beaucoup de missions ayant un mandat de protection des civils sont sous-équipées en termes de capacités mobiles et critiques : est-ce tolérable dans des contextes de menaces asymétriques ? Est-il encore concevable que des Etats membres déploient dans les opérations de l'ONU des personnels sous-équipés, sous-entraînés et sous-formés, comme l'ont montré les récentes allégations d'abus sexuels envers les populations locales ? Ici, le blâme est sans doute plutôt à porter sur les Etats membres que sur le Secrétariat, pris dans la nécessité de trouver toujours plus de troupes et dont les pouvoirs disciplinaires sont très **limités**.

On touche ici aussi à la question du commandement et du contrôle des opérations menées par l'ONU (voir les recommandations du [rapport du Challenges Forum](#) à ce sujet). Les Etats ne donnent jamais, quelles que soient les circonstances (et ceci n'est pas propre à l'ONU) l'entier contrôle de leurs soldats à l'Organisation. Ainsi, si les objectifs d'une mission pour laquelle ils ont commis des troupes changent, ils peuvent être amenés à demander à leurs troupes, en passant outre les instructions du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix ou du Représentant spécial sur place ou encore de son Commandant de force, de ne pas appliquer les ordres donnés. C'est là que la coopération triangulaire prend toute son importance et est un instrument indispensable à l'absence de restrictions d'emplois (caveats) cachées. L'autorité du seul Secrétariat ne pourra les empêcher d'apparaître en temps de crise.

## **UNE NOUVELLE OPPORTUNITÉ À SAISIR POUR RÉFORMER LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ?**

Activité centrale des Nations Unies, le maintien de la paix s'est construit depuis toujours de manière *ad hoc*, sur le terrain, au fil de multiples crises, en s'adaptant continuellement aux nouveaux défis. Mais, comme l'analysait récemment [Jean-Marie Guéhenno](#), les demandes en Casques bleus ont toujours dépassé leurs capacités opérationnelles réelles. De ce point de vue, le HIPPO rappelle avec force les défis actuels en s'insérant dans la lignée, pas si longue que ça, des rapports clés du maintien de la paix ([Agenda pour la paix](#), rapports sur [Srebrenica](#) et le [Rwanda](#), [rapport Brahimi](#), [Capstone Doctrine](#), [New Horizon](#)) produits depuis le développement de cette pratique (1956 pour les puristes, 1948 pour les autres).

Ce nouveau rapport, le premier de cette envergure depuis 15 ans, doit constituer une opportunité de réexaminer comment améliorer non seulement la mise en œuvre des opérations de paix mais aussi et surtout trouver les moyens de forger un nouveau consensus entre ses acteurs (Conseil de sécurité, contributeurs de troupes, Secrétariat) sur leur conduite. Aucune excuse ne doit pouvoir empêcher le Conseil de sécurité et l'Assemblée générale (et ensuite leurs organes subsidiaires, comme le Comité

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spécial des opérations de maintien de la paix ou le groupe de travail du Conseil de sécurité sur les opérations de maintien de la paix), chacun à leur niveau et selon leurs compétences, d'appuyer ses recommandations (et celles qui seront proposées par les rapports de mise en œuvre du Secrétaire général) comme ils l'avaient fait à la suite de la sortie du rapport Brahimi ([Résolution 1327](#)). Même si ce rapport intervient au moment où le Secrétaire général pense plus au bilan qu'il va laisser – sa réforme de 2007 séparant le soutien logistique des opérations au sein du Secrétariat est loin de faire l'unanimité et le HIPPO considère d'ailleurs qu'il faudrait revenir dessus – qu'à de nouveaux chantiers à entreprendre, il faudrait que ce rapport puisse créer un nouveau momentum pour forcer les Etats à s'impliquer davantage en termes de réflexion, en termes financiers et en termes de moyens humains, à ce que le fardeau du maintien de la paix soit mieux partagé. Ceci doit être l'objectif des Etats membres à l'occasion du 70e anniversaire des Nations Unies et des mois à venir.

En juin 2010, l'Assemblée générale a organisé un [débat](#) sur le maintien de la paix à l'occasion du dixième anniversaire de la publication du rapport Brahimi. A cette occasion, son auteur a rappelé combien la plupart des recommandations contenues dans son rapport restaient valables : les mandats devaient être clairs ; les opérations de maintien de la paix devaient bénéficier des moyens suffisants pour exécuter les tâches qui leur étaient confiées ; ces opérations ne pouvaient pas tout faire et être déployées n'importe où ; elles ne pouvaient en aucun cas se substituer aux processus politiques ; les capacités d'analyse politique du Secrétariat devaient être améliorées ; il fallait faire effort sur la qualité plutôt que la quantité des troupes déployées ; le dialogue avec les principaux contributeurs de troupes devait être amélioré, de même que la collaboration avec les acteurs en dehors des Nations Unies. Cinq ans après, le HIPPO est là pour rappeler que ces recommandations restent d'actualité (il en reprend d'ailleurs un très grand nombre) si l'on souhaite que le maintien de la paix soit toujours aussi ambitieux.

Mais voilà, le veut-on encore ? Le peut-on encore ? Ceci est peut-être aujourd'hui la seule question pertinente sur laquelle se pencher. Le maintien de la paix du XXIe siècle doit-il être obligatoirement ambitieux, exporter des modèles idylliques de sociétés rêvées ? Tout au long du rapport, le panel souligne à quel point les opérations de maintien de la paix manquent de moyens. Son erreur n'a-t-il pas été de penser que les Etats membres des Nations Unies veulent encore investir tant et plus dans des solutions de longue haleine dont leurs dirigeants ne verront sans doute pas l'issue ? Au fond, n'est-il pas trop ambitieux ? Aujourd'hui, à la croisée des chemins, deux solutions s'offrent donc à l'ensemble des Etats : soit être plus modestes dans les ambitions assignées aux opérations de paix (donc mieux cibler des objectifs bien particuliers et atteignables), soit donner les moyens réellement adaptés aux mandats qui dépasseront de fait les neuf milliards de dollars de [budget](#) annuel de ces opérations, même si ce coût n'équivaut, il faut le rappeler, qu'à 0,5% des dépenses militaires mondiales.

Les tensions budgétaires actuelles ne peuvent que plaider pour la première d'entre elles. Le réalisme commanderait la modestie dans l'approche. La question est de savoir si les Etats membres des Nations Unies arriveront à s'y astreindre.

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## COMMENTARY

August 27, 2015

### CAN THE UN REDUCE GLOBAL CONFLICT?

Sarah Cliffe

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There has never been a better time to renew the UN's commitment to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Recent headlines have been dominated by crises old and new: from ISIS in Iraq and Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria; from war in Yemen, Libya and South Sudan to fighting in the east of Ukraine. Global conflict levels have risen in the last three years after two decades of decline. So the UN's two independent panel reports ([Uniting for Peace, the Challenge of Sustaining Peace](#)) are timely. How do their recommendations stack up to the challenge?

If “don't do stupid stuff” is your mantra, as President Obama once said in rather more robust terms, these are thoughtful, well-judged instruction manuals. In an era of much criticism of the UN, they also underline the international organisation's achievements: keeping the peace (most of the time) in over **11 million square kilometres** of territory with just **106,000 uniformed peacekeepers**. That's like policing an area the size of Europe with fewer officers than England and Wales. What is notable in the reports? They concur that political solutions are needed for political problems. While robust security plays a part, force alone is not the solution. They agree on the importance of giving a political voice, jobs and social opportunities to those excluded, engaging communities. They stress the need for a wider partnership on the political, security, justice, social and economic levers needed to avoid escalating crises, and emphasise global-regional partnerships, in particular with the African Union. They underline the long timelines needed to build peaceful institutions, a timely reminder when the failure of institutions in Iraq ten years on has spurred such a brutal blowback in the form of ISIS.

Reflecting the panel members' deep international experience, both panels have produced detailed, largely well-crafted recommendations for changes in the UN bureaucracy to make it more agile, more focused on prevention and more able to protect civilians in the face of changing threats. Yet in the end the reader comes away with a sense that the response is not quite up to the challenge: not fiddling while Rome burns, but more handing out safety matches rather than putting out the fire.

Two points are missing. First, both reports are largely silent on the violent extremist movements, like ISIS, that have dominated popular and political concerns this year. Some of the obvious failures to prevent conflict – Libya, Yemen, and Mali – have occurred in these contexts. Uniting for Peace rightly notes that the UN does not have the capability to be used as a military response to these threats. But neither report lays out what a more comprehensive approach might look like strategically, with effective security that still builds respect for justice (“just security” as called for by the recent commission on global security, justice and governance); nor operationally, with smart ways to counter these movements politically and economically, demonstrating that citizens are better

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governed outside the “Caliphate” than inside. The UN has another chance to grapple with this challenge in a forthcoming action plan to prevent violent extremism in November. It cannot afford to appear to be ignoring the threat.

Second, the reports have some good ideas that are not fully developed, giving the sense that the panel members could have come up with more definitive solutions given a bit more time. These cover a broad spectrum of international action, with more focus on upstream prevention; drawing on national agency and local solutions; compacts between the international community, represented by the Security Council, and conflict-affected countries who need help; using over-the-horizon guarantees of security to protect against new and recurring risks; and bringing together an international coalition for prevention.

The current UN Secretary-General is nearing the end of his term. Most of the ideas above, as well as some recommended greater structural changes, will need to wait for his successor. While the temptation will be toward a very cautious UN response for now, there is nevertheless a chance to make international peace-building efforts stronger before the incumbent SG leaves, including at the upcoming peacekeeping summit in September. A strong SG’s response to these thoughtful reports will have twofold benefits. First, it can achieve consensus on some practical building blocks at the UN. Second and most importantly, it is more likely to put the SG on the right side of history: ensuring as part of his legacy that he has rung the warning bell on the urgency of action needed to avoid escalating conflict, and he has rung it loud and clear.

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