Global Peace Operations Review

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A monthly newsletter from the Center on International Cooperation

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the **Country & Regional Profile pages**, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)](https://www.sipri.org/). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2006-2012) and the Review of Political Missions (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU’s Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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Short-sighted policies, failed leadership, heavy-handed approaches, a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights have often made things worse.

The eagerly-awaited United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) is an ambitious and much-needed shift toward tackling the root causes that lead to radicalization. It is a bold strategy that combines a UN system-wide response with an “all of government approach” to violent extremism. Put simply, the Plan emphasizes the importance of prevention, the centrality of respecting human rights and the necessity of a coordinated multidisciplinary UN response.

But if it is to succeed, it will require more than a sea change in attitudes and improved coordination – though both will be essential. It will need to address the definitional issues that have long hampered an effective global response, invest in empirical research and comparative analysis to understand what works, and move beyond rhetoric to ensure that human rights are no longer trampled upon at the first sign of crisis.

The Plan contains more than 70 recommendations, including that each Member State develop a National PVE Plan of Action with UN assistance. It also makes a startling but frank admission: over the past decade, counter-terrorism efforts have mostly “overlooked” two of the four pillars of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, namely tackling root causes and ensuring respect for human rights and rule of law. Instead, the emphasis has been on preventing and combatting terrorism, and building countries’ capacity to combat it.

This admission is a conscious effort to retool and refocus on preventive measures for addressing violent extremism. It is also a confirmation of the need for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive steps to address underlying conditions driving individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups.
It is a welcome reaffirmation of the centrality of human rights in any policies, strategies or actions by Member States, and indeed by the UN itself. Speaking before the UN General Assembly, the Secretary-General recognized that this is a tall order given past record. He warned that “short-sighted policies, failed leadership, heavy-handed approaches, a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights have often made things worse.”

**THE PLAN IN A NUTSHELL**

There are four key components to the Plan.

1. **National PVE Plans of Action**: each Member State should create their own plan that addresses the local drivers of violent extremism and in a way that complements any existing national counter-terrorism strategies. These should be developed in a multidisciplinary manner with input from governmental and non-governmental actors to:
   - fortify the social compact against violent extremism;
   - address the Foreign Terrorist Fighter threat;
   - prevent the financing of violent extremist and terrorist groups;
   - align national development policies with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); and
   - include effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

2. **Regional PVE Plans of Action**: regional cooperation needs to be enhanced by adopting comprehensive strategies and strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations.

3. **Seven Priority Areas for Action**: the Plan identifies as priorities dialogue and conflict prevention; strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; gender equality and empowering women; education, skill development and employment facilitation; and strategic communications, the Internet and social media.

4. **Supporting Member States, Regional Bodies and Communities through the United Nations**: while recognizing that the primary responsibility to prevent violent extremism rests with Member States, the Plan of Action notes that the Secretary-General will instruct UN entities to prioritize, sensitize and adapt existing programs to target the drivers of violent extremism more precisely. The UN will need to adopt an “All-of-UN” approach through peace operations, country teams and strengthening early and effective action through the Human Rights up Front initiative.

**IF WE BECOME LIKE THEM ... THEN THEY HAVE WON**

The Plan has received quick support from advocates who have bemoaned the continued sacrificing of fundamental rights at the altar of “state security” or “national interest”. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies said the Plan “constitutes an indirect call for some Arab governments and their international backers to revise their counter-terrorism and violent extremism strategies, which have demonstrated their failure over the past decade in respecting human rights as well as in preventing the proliferation of terrorism.”
Rami Khouri, director of AUB’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, added: “When governments stifle peaceful dissent, muzzle the media, and prevent the legitimate activities of non-violent civil society organizations, they are not countering extremism; they are fomenting it.”

Respecting human rights is key to effective prevention. But how does the Plan help make this happen? The Secretary-General highlighted that national counter-terrorism strategies have often lacked basic elements of due process and respect for the rule of law. “Sweeping definitions of terrorism or violent extremism are often used to criminalize the legitimate actions of opposition groups, civil society organizations and human rights defenders,” he commented. This has led to drastically narrowed space for freedoms of expression, association and assembly. But how will the Plan change this? The problems go much deeper, including how the international community itself has violated rights in addressing violence and acts of terror.

By declaring a “war on terror,” states have blurred the distinctions between armed conflict and terrorism, between criminal law enforcement and war-related military action, and ultimately between the legal regimes of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL). Such declarations have had adverse consequences for legal safeguards and rights protections. This includes prioritizing targeted killings or assassinations over pursuing arrest; the muddying of legal status of individuals in detention; and the targeting of individuals beyond the territory of the parties to a conflict.

**BY DECLARING A “WAR ON TERROR,” STATES HAVE BLURRED THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ARMED CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND WAR-RELATED MILITARY ACTION, AND ULTIMATELY BETWEEN THE LEGAL REGIMES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW.**

Tactics of war in pursuing criminal suspects abroad have produced a number of undesirable outcomes:

- the legally questionable use of unmanned drones;
- targeted killings of a state’s own citizens (if they have gone abroad to join a terrorist group);
- unilateral decisions to send fighter planes to bomb targets in another sovereign state;
- the creation of “black sites” abroad to detain and interrogate suspects; and
- the creation off-shore detention sites such as at Guantanamo Bay.

Using similar logic, the Syrian regime has declared its own “war on terror”. It has barrel bombed its own citizens, bypassed judicial authorities to detain people in prolonged detention without charge, and conducted extrajudicial killings rather than arresting suspects. It has also systematically employed torture. Similar justifications are now used by every government dealing with internal violence.
Respect for rule of law and human rights are essential in any counter-terrorism strategy. The link between the violation of such rights, the grievances this creates, and radicalization that may lead to violence is a central thesis in prevention strategies. According to the Secretary-General, “Violent extremism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity of unlawful behavior engaged in by the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive state policies and practices which violate human rights and rule of law, the potency of the lure of violent extremisms tends to be heightened.” But when crisis hits – such as the recent attacks in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Egypt, France, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia or Tunisia – security responses trump rights imperatives. The resort to language of “war” is quickly adopted and basic safeguards, which are the essence of the UN Charter, are left far behind. Are leaders who quickly adopt such rhetoric being reckless and causing more harm?

Arguing, as the Plan does, that there is a connection between successfully countering or preventing violent extremism and respecting basic human rights has not worked so far. Do politicians, policymakers and practitioners fear that respecting rights may weaken or undermine their strategies? Have advocates failed to prove irrefutably that respecting rights can be part of an effective holistic strategy? Does the problem lie in the lack of strong evidence-based data that shows respect for human rights can help decrease the risk of violent extremism? If so, where is that data being compiled and analyzed, and when will it be presented?

Framing the argument in such terms risks undermining States’ commitments that constitute the basis of what we call universal values and principles. What if research does not show a clear link between respect for rights and effective prevention? What if it actually shows the opposite? Does that make it acceptable to continue to violate rights? One would think not, but it presents a potential slippery slope. Respecting fundamental rights should not be based on arguments of effectiveness. This should come as added value, not the main reason. The Plan is silent on the challenge of marshaling empirical evidence to support the effectiveness argument. The strongest message might be moral, rather than rational: “If we become like them in order to defeat them, then they have won.”

Counter-terrorism has been a priority for the UN for decades. Eighteen legal instruments (fourteen conventions and four amendments) have come into force. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373. There is also the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) established in 2005 to enhance coordination that now includes some 34 entities. In 2006, the General Assembly approved a “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, and now there is the Plan of Action. Despite all this work, there is still no agreement. The Secretary-General told the GA in January that definitions of “terrorism” and “violent extremism” are the prerogative of Member States.

Since the 1970s, the failure to define terrorism has hindered effective global cooperation. We now have a Plan of Action that does the same with “violent extremism.” It does attempt to explain that addressing violent extremism by adopting security-based counter-terrorism measures has not worked, and tries to put distance between the two terms: “Violent extremism encompasses a wider category of manifestations,” it states, adding that relying on counter-terrorism measures may justify actions against “conduct that should not qualify as terrorist acts.” Ultimately, then, the Plan aims to pursue a “practical approach” without venturing to address questions of definition.
PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Why is it important to have a definition? Because in seeking a solution to a problem, it helps to understand it. Otherwise one risks prescribing the wrong remedies or wasting scarce resources on a hit-or-miss approach. Delving into the term “violent extremism,” we quickly run into a discussion about radicalization and what causes an individual to turn to violence.

The Plan ably describes some of the key drivers or “push and pull” factors that a growing consensus of analysts see as being conducive to an environment for violent extremism to take root. While we can point to a set of grievances or identity or belief issues as factors, we still do not know why only certain individuals within that society or community turn to violence or join extremist violent groups.

The reasons for radicalization are complex and local. Research has found they often converge around a combination of ideology (including religion), grievance, identity, economic factors, and the propaganda that feeds on them. But these studies are limited. We do know with some certainty that there is no straightforward link between poverty and violent extremism, unlike in civil conflict. Alexander Lee, in his 2011 study on *Who becomes a Terrorist*, found violent extremists tend to be “lower-status individuals from the educated and politicized section of the population.” This suggests the opportunity costs for rich individuals to join a terrorist/violent extremist organization will in most (although not all) cases be too high. The absolute poor are too disconnected from politicized social networks.

Available research also indicates that a lack of opportunities to create change through normal politics increases the chance that opposition groups will turn to terrorism. Mostly, this occurs during or shortly before and after civil wars. Only a small group will mobilize in response to an opposition group’s violent appeals. In such cases, asymmetric (terrorist) tactics are more likely to be adopted, as symmetrical conflict tactics rely on larger mobilization of supporters. Violent extremist groups mostly operate in fragile and failed states, parts of the world with the highest concentration of development and governance failures, political injustice and proxy wars.

As with civil war, financial opportunity plays a role. Successful extremist movements have been able to mobilize recruits and expand activities where resources, particularly those linked to trafficking, are easy to capture.

Good qualitative research is also available on the role of ideology and grievance, but this tends to be case- or country-specific rather than systematic in nature. We do know violent extremist movements use grievances over both global and local factors to mobilize recruits, extending from the occupation of Iraq and Palestine and the use of drone attacks to mistreatment of Muslim populations who are forcibly displaced – not only in Syria but as far afield as Myanmar.

In failing to agree on, or avoiding having, a clear definition, does the Plan risk reaching the wrong diagnosis to the problem? Could it be then prescribing the wrong medicine? It would seem that those who have worked to develop the Plan have sought to cast the diagnostic net widely to cover all eventualities. It runs the risk of hugely investing in many attractive remedies, some of which may work and others that may not.
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES ARE THE ANSWER—BUT WHICH ONES

Most country-level approaches are still evolving. On the developmental and human rights side, these include efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants through community and family oversight, and more generalized approaches aimed at bringing jobs and services into communities deemed vulnerable. Civic education and social media are also used to combat extremist messages. Important as they are, the link between such approaches and improvements in the area of PVE is not well researched (or even documented). It is not yet known under what circumstances (and in combination with what other policies) they can be effective.

It is imperative to fill gaps in the limited available empirical data and analysis. Data on terrorist attacks has not yet been analyzed in cross-country regressions using developmental variables, and public source data on recruitment is partial. Even less information is available on what works (or doesn't) when it comes to development and access to justice policies and interventions in dealing with violent extremism. Many developmental actions that have been suggested (e.g., adopting political and economic reforms that address the frustrations of citizens) are highly compatible with long term commitments, as laid out in Agenda 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals. But evidence on how to design these efforts, as well as their prioritization, is lacking.

The struggle to prevent violent extremism is universal, given both the location of attacks and the origin of recruits and financing. Information should be more readily available for exchange on experiences and evaluation of lessons learned at the country level. Analysis drawing upon comparative experiences to develop good practices and guidelines remains a rare commodity. Unless this is given greater recognition and resource investment, the Plan risks repeating past failures in tackling root causes.

There is a need to share good practices. As States develop their National PVE plans they will need to assess the prevailing domestic conditions conducive to violent extremism while avoiding stigmatizing a particular belief, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race. Each context will be unique, but there will also be commonalities and similarities. Comparative research that analyzes what works, what does not, and why will be vital in helping develop effective plans.

WE MUST BREAK DOWN THE SILOS

The hit-or-miss approach of casting the net widely is a hugely expensive endeavor that also risks shifting resources from other worthy programs. It will likely antagonize and alienate those who do not wish to have their efforts labeled “preventing violent extremism.” The Secretary-General identified this challenge in his address to the General Assembly: “We must break down the silos between the peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian actors at the national, regional and global levels – including at the United Nations.” But how will this be done, and under what coordination mechanism?

For some this is an extension of the old Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine revived this century in Afghanistan and Iraq. This “may be defined as ‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes’”. This approach is intended to increase effectiveness by combining and coordinating security, development, humanitarian and political interventions, while ensuring that these remain within the remit of international human rights and humanitarian law. Sound familiar? The problem is that COIN approaches have also been greeted with some suspicion because of their origin from within the security forces: many development and humanitarian actors have viewed them as an attempt to co-opt development activities for short-term security goals. Such wariness, at times well-founded, has hindered partnerships from forming, preventing well-coordinated approaches, or agreed platforms or strategies, and at times led to actions that have undermined rather than reinforced separate efforts.
Until now, the debate about “silied” approaches has also focused on the need for a new coordinating architecture. Discussions have been bogged down in institutional, budgetary and resource questions, each of course carrying political implications. The Secretary-General, in introducing the Plan of Action, has referred to his aim to create a High-Level PVE Action Group to spearhead coordinated implementation. More information will be needed to see how this Action Group can overcome historical suspicions and ensure the integrity of all its parts. It would benefit greatly if the SG ensured its leadership came from the very top of the UN, rather than from one of the competing departments, and if it placed greater value on evidence-based research and analysis.

So where do we go from here? In April the Swiss government will co-host an international conference on implementing the Plan of Action. It would be useful to reaffirm the premise that tackling violent extremism is not simply a security issue and that this approach has failed. In addition, there should be a focus on three areas:

1. **Increasing knowledge** by investing in empirical research to overcome key information sharing gaps on drivers that lead to radicalization, and also on what works or does not work in PVE programming. The latter requires combining expertise from a multiplicity of fields, a variety of actors, including civil society, and a range of policy and operational responses.

2. **Enhancing coordination** by creating informal multilateral platforms to develop ideas between development, human rights, political and security actors, while remaining respectful of each community’s integrity and autonomy of action.

3. **Recommitting to rights protections** by ending the blurring of legal distinctions (e. war on terror) that have undermined individual safeguards, and ensuring that accountability for violations is part of the monitoring and evaluation mechanism promised by this Secretary-General and his successor.

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When the decision [around Burundi] reached the level of the Assembly of Heads of States, it showed that in absence of consent there is no political willingness of African leaders to act against their own.

Burundi has been moving toward greater instability since President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to stand for a third term in May 2015. Nkurunziza claimed he was entitled to a third term because his first was a post-transition mandate and he was not actually elected by the people. He argued that this made him eligible to stand again. The move, defying years of international efforts to build peace and stability, reignited what has turned into a deadly conflict. It has also created a situation that now vexes the African Union (AU) and its efforts to reach a resolution.

Nkurunziza’s political opponents and civil society immediately contested the third term, seeing it as a direct violation of the 2000 Arusha Agreement and the Burundian constitution. Their protests went unheard in the presidential palace. Elections where held in July 2015 and Nkurunziza received close to 70 per cent of the vote. Since then, the crisis has only grown more acute.

Hundreds of opposition politicians, civil society activists and journalists have left for exile in Rwanda, Kenya or Belgium. Another 240,000 Burundians now live as refugees in neighboring countries. An internal political dispute has become a regional crisis.

The AU did not send any observers to Burundi for the July 2015 elections. Only after the polls closed did it deploy around twenty military and human rights observers. The number was supposed to increase to a total of 50 human rights and 50 military observers, but by late 2015 that had not happened.

As the crisis deepened, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) tried to stop its escalation. On 17 December 2015, the PSC authorized the deployment of a force of 5,000 troops. The Mission africaine de Prévention et de Protection au Burundi (MAPROBU) was mandated for six months with the option to renew. It was tasked ‘to prevent any deterioration of the security situation, to monitor its evolution and report developments on the ground [and] to contribute, within its capacity and in its areas of deployment, to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat’. This was a groundbreaking move for the AU, as it was the first time the organization authorized the deployment of a force against the wishes of a host country. The hesitant UN Security Council, unsure of what it should do, welcomed the action by AU in Security Council Resolution (S/Res/2248 (2015).

Receiving permission of the host country is one of the holy trinity of UN peacekeeping principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence. Having host state cooperation keeps peacekeepers safe. Without it, the legitimacy of the
intervention can be challenged and the intervention might feel more than an invasion than a rescue mission. After making its move to intervene, the AU has now found itself with a new dilemma following President Nkurunziza’s refusal to accept the deployment of MAPROBU.

FAILURE TO ACT

What is stopping the AU? Burundi signed and ratified the protocol creating the PSC and thus is legally bound to accept and implement any decision of this body, and the intervention in this time of crisis should not need Burundi’s approval. This, though, is a contentious issue within the AU, and other international organizations, who are dependent on their member states for troops contributions. International law relating to state sovereignty adds further complications.

After giving the Burundian government 96 hours to approve the deployment, the PSC expressed its determination to invoke Article 4(h) of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act. This stipulates “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. The PSC recommended such an intervention to the Assembly, which ultimately decides on the deployment.

There is, however, widespread debate on this move. One reason stems from the question of under what authority the AU could launch MAPROBU, and whether it would conform to existing international law. Because the mission’s mandate envisions the potential use of force beyond self-defense and in defense of the mission’s mandate, there would be a need for a Security Council Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, even if the Burundian government did consent. This, however, is the lesser issue. The AU’s use of article 4(h) would only be permitted if cases of crimes against humanity could be proven. Given the contention over the status of the situation on the ground, this is more challenging to show. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ fact-finding mission visited Burundi in December 2015, and the AU’s own human rights observers have also deployed in Bujumbura. It remains to be determined if there is sufficient evidence of these crimes to convince the AU Heads of State to deploy.

The AU has only once deployed under Article 4(h). This was in support of the trial of the former President of Chad, Hissene Habre, on charges of political killings and torture of thousands of civilians between 1982 and 1990. The AU has thus set itself a very high threshold: Article 4(h) was not even used in the situation in Darfur. The likelihood of a deployment in Burundi was always very low. But when the Assembly could not agree, the issue was passed to the AU Heads of State Summit on 27-28 January 2016.

The United Nations Security Council visited Burundi a week before the African leaders met. They left the country stressing the urgency of addressing the situation in Burundi before it deteriorated further and possibly took on ethnic dimensions. The government in Bujumbura countered that their concern was misplaced. The Council members were worried by President Nkurinziza’s lack of willingness to compromise on either the deployment of any AU troops or on the inclusiveness of the dialogue with the opposition. Some had high hopes that the AU Summit might break this impasse.
WORDS WITHOUT ACTION

Ahead of the meeting, the news from Burundi became increasingly dire. There were reports of mass graves, widespread displacement, growing militias and fears that the country was plunging itself back into a state of civil war. Despite this growing alarm, the deployment of MAPROBU was not approved. Instead, in the face of an escalating crisis, the PSC reversed its December action by not even raising its plan to deploy a peacekeeping force with the AU's General Assembly.

The summit did not end without any action. Instead of a peacekeeping force, the AU voted to send a high-level panel to Bujumbura to promote “inclusive dialogue”. The panel is still to be appointed and its time frame determined. The AU also revisited its commitment to increase the number of human rights and military observers from under twenty to 100. The first of these observers were deployed after the July 2015 elections, and the force is now being increased to the promised 100. But even this modest move is contingent on approval from Bujumbura. In addition, the East Africa Community (EAC) mediation process will continue, though there is limited hope for this process.

The EAC is the official regional block working with Burundi, acting as mediator in the crisis in line with the AU’s principles of subsidiarity. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is leading this mediation, but he has been criticized for not doing enough to get the talks going. The first round of talks took place in July 2015 but did not render any success. The second round of talks were supposed to happen in December 2015 but were postponed to a later date. It has been speculated that Museveni’s involvement in the mediation does not have the support of the actors involved in the conflict, considering Museveni himself amended the Ugandan constitution to remove term limits and is now serving a third term in Uganda.

OBSTACLES TO DEPLOYMENT

It was no surprise that MAPROBU never deployed. Burundi was always very unlikely to accept the deployment of troops and, if they did, there would be very strict conditions on the deployment and with limited leverage of the mission as a whole. The AU took a similar path when troops were deployed to Darfur in Sudan: the government in Khartoum reluctantly accepted a joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to save face internationally, although it has not made things easy for it. But the Darfur mission showed that being flexible on the terms of a deployment aimed at protecting civilians ultimately hampers the effectiveness of the mission.

In addition, it was always going to be a challenge to find the troops to deploy. There has been some confusion over whether this is a task for the African Standby Force (ASF), which is nearing readiness, or whether it should be based on member state contributions. The PSC communiqué of 17 December indicates that MAPROBU will be placed under the command of the special representative of the AU Commission Chairperson, but the PSC also urges consultations with countries in the region within the framework of the East African component of the ASF. It is unknown, however, if the East African Standby Force (EASF) would have troops available for this mission.

If not deployed under the ASF, options for troops are limited. Tanzania is against the deployment in Burundi and is pushing for peace talks to end the conflict. The next option would be South Africa, especially considering their involvement in negotiations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But South Africa does not have the spare capacity, as its forces are already
overstretched with deployments to Darfur and the Congo. Rwanda, the biggest troop contributor to the AU, would be unlikely to contribute to MAPROBU due to the political tensions between the two countries. Uganda is similarly constrained because of its current involvement in South Sudan.

Assuming the troops could be found, there are still key issues regarding agreement over what level of force might be employed by MAPROBU. This is a challenge for all such missions. The latest debate facing the UN is the question of how much force should be used in an intervention, and whether we should be looking toward the model of the EU Battlegroups as a guide, as Ys Reykers recently argued.

HOW MUCH FORCE—AND WHEN

If the mission was ultimately to be sent in against the wishes of the Burundi government, the environment would be hostile. It would not be a classic peacekeeping mission, but rather more of a peace enforcement operation. A balance would need to be struck between using force in self-defence, or using force to carry out the mandate. Every peace operation needs robust leadership and political strategy. But when could force be used, and against whom? While 5,000 troops sounds like a large number, it is in actuality very small—especially if the mission had a mandate under Article 4 (h) to protect civilians, which, Ralph Mamiya argues, is a central tenet of peacekeeping missions after the Rwanda and Balkans disasters. It is unclear how long it would take for troop contributors to come to a common understanding about this.

Even if the troops could be found and deployed, questions arise over how the force would be paid for. The AU’s expeditionary deployments, such as in Darfur or Somalia, rely on external support. With one of the major donors the European Union found to be in budgetary crisis as it deals with mass immigration and an influx of refugees, there would be little cash to spare for a mission such as this, which is far removed from the EU’s national interests.

The creation of MAPROBU was a large step forward for the PSC. It demonstrated a politically proactive approach to a crisis, it was focused on protecting civilians, and it was a genuine attempt to prevent further deterioration of an already bad situation. However, the PSC’s inability to carry through on its resolution is a set back. When the decision reached the level of the Assembly of Heads of States, it showed that in the absence of consent and that there is no political willingness of African leaders to act against their own. Moreover, even if there was, the logistical and financial support does not exist to support such interventions. Ultimately, the action on Burundi gives the strong sentiment that the key institution of peace and security on the continent is more words than action.

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RWANDA SHOULD HAVE BEEN A WAKE-UP CALL. WHY DO THE CRISSES CONTINUE?

Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally

Twenty-two years ago this spring, more than a million men, women and children in Rwanda waited in vain for international protection to save them from death at the hands of government security forces and government-inspired militia.

Years later, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine — known widely as R2P — was approved by the United Nations in the spirit that “never again” should the world stand by and watch such carnage reoccur. Yet in the past 10 years, deaths from worldwide conflict have tripled.

An estimated 470,000 Syrians have been killed during nearly five years of that country’s civil war, and the cities of Aleppo and Madaya are in danger of becoming this century’s Guernica, the Spanish civil war massacre commemorated by Pablo Picasso and universally known as a symbol of civilian suffering in war (parallels to the 1930s abound these days — the Munich agreement last week may yet deliver the promised cease-fire, but the historical references are not promising). Even in Rwanda’s tiny neighbor Burundi, far from the center of geopolitical struggles, the international community has failed to protect more than 200,000 people who have been forcibly displaced from their homes in the past year.

R2P as a concept was groundbreaking. It brought about a now widely accepted shift in the understanding of state sovereignty; emphasized the role of the international community in helping states to fulfill this responsibility; and sought to build a more consistent and coordinated response to crises.

SO WHY HAVE CRISSES PROLIFERATED? WHY IS IT STILL POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT MASS ATROCITIES WITH IMPUNITY?

R2P is a legacy of post-Cold War idealism on peace dividends, an idea introduced at exactly the time that new great power tensions were rising: Major powers (both on and off the security council) have not been prepared to abandon their allies on human rights grounds, and fast-growing developing countries have never bought into the potential infringement on sovereignty that R2P implies.

NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya under the R2P banner has widely been interpreted as cover for Western-driven aspirations of regime change, successfully executed. The fact that Libya has subsequently descended into an ever greater spiral of civil war has not helped make the case.

And at a practical level, the “last resort” military intervention allowed under the principle is not always simple. It is doubtful that any military in the world would be able to restore order and protection of human rights in Syria in the absence of a political solution,
even before the Russian intervention on the side of the Assad government. U.N. peacekeeping forces certainly do not have the capabilities, even if they were authorized to do so.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES?

First, we should be “uncompromising” in the pursuit of the protection of civilians, as the U.N. secretary general states in a recent report. This means focusing efforts in peace talks, such as those in Geneva on Syria, on both short term efforts to stop the bombing and get humanitarian access and longer-term justice for victims and protection from retribution after the fighting stops. For international organizations, it means improving early warning capabilities and speaking out whenever civilians are threatened despite pressure from governments not to do so, a role Alex Bellamy notes that the U.N. has not always fulfilled.

Second, we should take an institution-building approach to protection. R2P emphasizes that a state bears the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Greater attention needs to be given to strengthening the institutions that can help guarantee these protections: a social compact between state and citizens that includes minority groups; a strong and independent judiciary; professional and accountable army, security forces and police; a free press and vibrant civil society organizations. Of official development aid, for example, only 2 percent is invested in access to justice and strengthening justice institutions.

Third, greater pressure is needed on the Security Council to act where the risks to civilians are high. A “cost of inaction” analysis could have increased the pressure on the council to act on Syria three years ago — the cost of their inaction now counts hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars. The council should also refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities, and it should make greater use of the non-military tools covered under R2P, in particular those to stem the financing of conflict.

Fourth, it would be wise to give serious consideration to adopting the concept of “Responsibility While Protecting,” raised in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council by Brazil in 2011. This would emphasize that military action is a last resort to be used only following agreed guidelines and ensure that force used is proportionate to the gravity of the situation. It would also establish extra monitoring, review and accountability mechanisms for delegated Security Council mandates.

Finally, we should build a bottom-up campaign for peace and justice. Advocating for the responsibility to protect is not just the business of international lawyers and diplomats — it is the business of citizens who want to see their governments do the right thing at home and abroad. Launching a global campaign “to prevent the erosion of international humanitarian and human rights law” is crucial to create pressure on states, whether to protect civilians during warfare or to ensure safe passage and asylum for refugees.

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CEDRIC DE CONING: A UNIQUE MODEL OF AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

Cedric de Coning

WE HOPE THE BOOK WILL “ENCOURAGE THE RECOGNITION THAT AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS ARE UNIQUE, AND NOT JUST DEFICIENT UN PEACE OPERATIONS. AFRICA DOES NOT NEED SAVIORS, BUT PARTNERS...THOSE THAT STILL BASE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AU AROUND CAPACITY-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT NEED TO ADAPT TO THE FACT THAT ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AU TODAY SHOULD BE ABOUT STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.”

In recent years, the world has witnessed increasing commitment by African nations to contributing to peace and security on the continent. Dr. Cedric de Coning, a South African scholar based at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and also associated with ACCORD, is an expert in the field of peace operations in Africa. Together with Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud, he has edited a new book entitled The Future of African Peace Operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram. On a recent visit to New York City, de Coning spoke with the Global Peace Operations Review’s Lesley Connolly.

Lesley Connolly: This book has been years in the making. How was it conceived, and how do you think it now fits into the current debates around peace operations?

Cedric de Coning: When the African Standby Force (ASF) was conceived, United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations was the only frame of reference. The Gambari Independent Panel of Experts, which assessed the progress of the ASF in 2013, found that a decade later, the African Union (AU) had enough mission experiences of its own to assess and develop its own concept of peace operations. The Panel felt that the challenges the AU faced in 2013 were very different from the period in 2003/2004 when the ASF was conceptualized. We convened a seminar in December 2013 on Strategic Options for the Future of African Peace Operations. The practitioners are so focussed on day-to-day crisis management that they seldom have the opportunity to consider their strategic options. The aim was to take a strategic look at where we were in the process of an emerging African peace operations capacity. We asked several seminar attendees who presented papers to contribute chapters to this book. The subtitle, from Janjaweed to Boko Haram, gives a sense of the trajectory for the future of African peace operations.

LC: The book talks about the emergence of an African model of peace operations. What do you mean by this, and how would you characterize an African model?
CdC: AU operations differ from the UN in several important aspects. First, they are not guided by the three principles of peacekeeping (*consent, impartiality and minimum use of force*), nor by the charter’s differentiation between Chapters VI and VII. Second, there is less of a sense of intervention from the outside to ensure compliance with international standards and more a sense of solidarity or good neighbors coming to each others’ aid. There is also a strong feeling of shared identity and common African identity. Third, African peace operations have a history of coming to the aid of people at risk when the UN was not able or ready to deploy UN peacekeepers, starting in Darfur, then in *Burundi*, Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR). African regional organisations and the AU were the first responders in each of these cases, and deployed into situations which the UN deemed not yet fit for UN peacekeeping. Fourth, in each of these missions the UN provided support to the AU in some form, and in each of these cases, accept Somalia, the UN subsequently took over the AU missions. The AU lacks the resource base and peacebuilding tools to consolidate the peace, so the UN takes over from the AU to help ensure sustained international support for the peace process. In this context the AU has essentially become a specialist in stabilization operations.

LC: What do you mean by “stabilization operations”?

CdC: These are typically operations where the intervening organization has to employ force to deny one or more parties the option of using violence to achieve their political aims. One implication of such operations is the need for troop contributing countries (TCCs) who have the will and means to use force. Often, the only countries that will be willing to do that are those whose national security interests are affected by the conflict. This is very different from UN PKOs, where TCCs should ideally have no interest. Another implication is that you need a command and control system geared for combat. In this context, civilian leadership and military command can range on a spectrum from a lead nation approach, such as in the early days of AMISOM, to a more networked approach, as in the case of the LRA and Boko Haram operations. In networked approaches, the AU provides overall political direction and coordination, but the members of the coalition act independently and coordinate at the operational and tactical level. AU operations are not proxies for UN operations; they have their own unique characteristics. We now have enough AU peace operation experiences (Darfur, Burundi, Comoros, Somalia, LRA, Mali, CAR, Boko Haram) to start to see a unique African model of peace operations emerging.

LC: The book looks at the notion of Hybrid-Peace Operations as well as challenges with the “UN Take-Over”. What can be done to improve joint peace operations and general coordination between the UN, AU and RECs?

CdC: The relationship with the UN has changed significantly. Ten years ago, it was more of a donor relationship – the UN was helping the AU to build capacity. The AU has fought hard to change the narrative to a relationship of partnership. It seems that the UN now recognize some of the comparative advantages of the AU. There are now regular interactions between the UN and the AU. There are usually two formal meetings at the highest level between the Security Council and the members of the PSC; regular meetings between the Under Secretary-Generals of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the AU. There are also many desk-to-desk interactions as well as specific initiatives and projects they cooperate on, such as the joint transitions exercise looking at the lessons the AU and UN can learn from the transitions in Mali and CAR. The UN and AU are looking at how these interactions can be further improved. I feel the relationship has improved a lot and this bodes well for the future of both AU and UN peace operations.

LC: What impact has the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) had?
CdC: The HIPPO helped a lot too. During the consultation process, the AU developed a specific document called the **Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations**. The HIPPO panel said it was the most detailed, comprehensive contribution they received. Their final report reflected many of the issues raised by the AU. It described the relationship in positive and constructive terms, and argued for the need for a strong strategic partnership with the AU. The SG has picked up many of the HIPPO's recommendations in his own report, and most of these are already underway. For instance, the AU and UN is undertaking a joint study that will look into options for improving the predictability and sustainability of financing and supporting African peace operations.

**LC: Did the HIPPO report shift the way we look at African peace operations?**

CdC: There was a narrative, in some quarters, before the report that the AU was unable to manage its own operations and the UN needed to come in and help it. The AU's common position and the HIPPO has been able to change this perception. Post-HIPPO, it the narrative is about a complementary and strategic relationship between the AU and the UN.

**LC: What are the strengths and weaknesses of African peace operations?**

CdC: The AU is a willing first responder, but they don't have the same resources and the know-how that the UN has on how to consolidate the post-conflict peace process. This is an division of work that has emerged organically, and that will continue to evolve over time. In Mali, the AU was unhappy about how the transition was managed, but both the AU and the UN has learned from the experience, and the subsequent experience in CAR has already been much improved. The AU and UN are now developing a joint lessons learned document and a set of transition guidelines that will help to manage such transitions in the future.

**LC: One of the criticisms of the HIPPO report was that the mandates of UN peace operations are too ambitious. Do you feel this is a challenge facing African peace operations?**

CdC: The AU has the opposite problem. It does not suffer from Christmas tree mandates, but from an overly military or securitized approach to stabilization. It lacks the civilian expertise necessary to ensure that its military operations are directed towards enabling and supporting political and governance objectives. In Somalia, the AU was able to help to liberate cities and towns from Al Shabaab, but it then lacked the ability to follow-up with the civilian expertise necessary to help the federal government and local authorities to re-establish basic governance structures and services. This is not necessarily the task of the AU. It should be the government itself and there are other actors involved such as UNDP and the UN mission in Somalia and other partners who have also been unable to meaningfully assist, partly because of the security situation. The reality is that those areas are still very unsafe so you won't have UN and other people staying there and therefore, it becomes the AU's responsibility to provide the bridge between international actors and the Somali Government. The question that needs to be addressed in this context is what kind of civilian expertise does the AU need to support this kind of stabilization operations. The AU does not have the resources or capacity to deploy the kind of civilian component you find in a UN peace operation.

The AU needs a small but specialized civilian capacity that can help the mission to assess, plan and manage the political and governance dimensions of stabilization missions, as well as to serve as a liaison for the AU mission with the government, UN and other partners. This expertise should emphasize that force should directed towards political and government role. You are not going to defeat Al Shabaab militarily; you will defeat them if the Government of Somalia can provide better security, governance and opportunities than what Al Shabaab can offer.
LC: What are some of the main accomplishments and challenges of African peace operations?

CdC: Looking at the bigger picture, we have seen Africa, with the help of its international partners, develop a significant capacity of its own over the last twenty years. If you look at the Middle East, for instance, and the crises facing that region, you notice that they do not have a comparable regional peace operations capacity, despite the fact that many individual countries in the region having large armed forces. Africa has embarked on a significant political project when it decided to invest in setting up the African Standby Force (ASF). As a result we can see a considerable increase in troop contributions by Africa to the UN. Ten years ago there were 10,000 troops from African nations in UN peacekeeping. Today African TCCs provide approximately 48,000 troops to the UN, and in addition there are a further 22,000 in AMISOM in Somalia. And then Iwe have not taken into account the soldiers engaged in anti-LRA and anti-Boko Haram operations.

Over the same period, the AU has developed the political and bureaucratic capacities to manage conflicts, and today the AU is in the lead or deeply engaged in preventing or managing all the crises and conflicts in Africa. The UN, the EU and others are also involved, but this situation is very different from ten years ago when it was expected that the USA or France or the UN would intervene or lead international mediation efforts in Africa. The French interventions in Mali and CAR stand out as exceptions, rather than what was the norm a decade ago. The AU is more assertive and willing to assume its responsibility for managing African crises, as the current situation in Burundi shows.

The challenges ahead relate to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of AU operations. It has established its willingness and ability to take responsibility for a first responder and stabilization role, and now it needs to improve its ability to assess, plan, deploy, manage and evaluate its own operations. The AU’s most serious challenge is the capacity to support its own operations. Funding is a major issue, but more importantly the AU lacks a mission support concept and the people and systems necessary to implement such a concept. The good news is that the AU, with the support of the UN, has embarked on a process to develop a mission support policy this year. So this challenge has been identified and is being duly addressed. The AU has also appointed Donald Kaberuka, the past-president of the African Development Bank, as its High Representative for the AU Peace Fund. This is a very positive development as Kaberuka has the credibility and networks to help the AU address the funding aspects of these challenges.

LC: AU peace operations remain dependent on funding and support from international organizations and partners. How can this be changed to increase the effectiveness of African peace operations?

CdC: Several options are being looked into. The AU has decided to significantly increase its own contributions and a new scale of assessment is under negotiation. This will see the AU take up at least 25 per cent of the cost of AU-led peace operations in the future. In addition, the AU is considering alternative and voluntary sources. The UN Secretary-General has also tasked the UN to look into options and a joint AU-UN team will report on this later this year.

There is of course no silver bullet. The AU, UN and partners will have to develop a range of funding options, and they will have to make use of these depending on the needs and context of each operation. I think it will not be possible to find a predictable source of funding for AU operations, but we can develop a more predictable coordination mechanism and process for finding the necessary funding for each operation.
This funding situation is the main structural driver for the aforementioned division of work that has emerged between the AU and the UN, where the AU acts as first responder to stabilize the situation, with the UN taking over the AU mission (because it has the assessed contribution funding) as soon as is feasible.

**LC: Is there too much of a focus on the financing?**

**CdC:** It is important to recall the larger strategic context within which any funding discussion should take place. The UN is responsible for international peace and security. When the AU undertakes a peace operation, it does so under Chapter VIII (and Chapter VII if authorized to use force) of the UN Charter. There are very few, if any, crises and conflicts in Africa where external factors are not a major contributing factor, and the consequences of these conflicts do not remain in Africa. When the AU deploys a peace operation, it is in service of international peace and security and it is a global public good. The rhetoric that Africa should fund its ‘own’ peace operations is not helpful. We need to distinguish between the reasons why a mission is deemed necessary by the UNSC, and who is in the best position to undertake such a mission. That is why the concept of strategic partnership is so important. The HIPPO and the Secretary-General’s implementation report capture this spirit of partnership and the new ‘networked’ peacekeeping reality very well.

**LC: What role will the African Standby Force (ASF) play in the future of African Peace Operations?**

**CdC:** The January 2016 AU Summit has declared that the ASF is now operational. The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), which was a temporary measure until the ASF became operational, may be dissolved and its capacities integrated into the ASF’s rapid response mechanisms. The ASF will be the main vehicle for cooperation, standardization, joint training and joint exercises. It is the foundation for force generation for future AU peace operations.

However, I think the ASF concept needs to be updated to take into account that in all the AU operations to date, the selection of TCCs emerged from the political realities unique to that context, to form a just-in-time coalition of the willing. Off-the-shelf regional standby forces will rarely, if ever, be used as designed. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and EU Battlegroups experiences reflect the same pattern. The ASF is a very useful coordination and capacity building tool, but it is unlikely to be used to deploy a regional brigade. If so, the ASF structures need to adapt to that new role. The UN should study the ASF experience closely when it considers its own standby or vanguard force options.

**LC: Who should be reading this book and why? What impact do you hope this book will have on the international peace and security community?**

**CdC:** I hope the book is useful for both practitioners and scholars engaged in working on or researching peace operations in general, and African peace operations in particular. The primary readership would be African countries and those in the political and military sphere who are working in or with Africa. And, of course, the African Union and the RECs themselves who are involved in peace operations. Additionally, there are the partners who work with the AU, such as those in the United Nations and European Union that deal with the AU, as well as those in Brazil, Britain, China, India, France and the United States who support the AU.
The secondary readership would be the scholarly community who work on trying to promote and make sense of African peace operations in general. Within that larger group, there is a smaller group with a particular interest in Africa.

We have two main hopes for the book. First, that it will encourage the recognition that African peace operations are unique, and not just deficient UN peace operations. Africa does not need saviors, but partners. The situation today is very different from ten years ago when the AU deployed its first operation in Darfur. The AU has now proved that it has the political will and the ability to deploy and undertake stability operations under very difficult situations. Africa has significant peace operations capacity, contributing almost 50 per cent of all UN peacekeepers in addition to undertaking its own operations. Those that still base their relationship with the AU around capacity-building and development need to adapt to the fact that any relationship with the AU today should be about strategic partnership.

Second, a unique African model of peace operations is emerging. African operations are not just regional copies of UN peacekeeping. They have their own normative and historical context, regional dynamics and drivers. If partners want to contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of African peace operations, they have to understand them on their own terms and not as proxies for UN peace operations.

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HAITI

This map represents all UN Peace Operations based in Haiti as of February 2016

UNOCI DEPLOYMENT

This map represents UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) missions as of February 2016

UNMIL DEPLOYMENT

This map represents UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) Deployments as of February 2016
MINUSTAH DEPLOYMENT

This map represents MINUSTAH (The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) Deployments in Haiti as of February 2016.
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