Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report
Rising Powers and Peace Operations

Dr. Cedric de Coning and Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash
Peace Capacities Network
Synthesis Report

Rising Powers and Peace Operations

Dr. Cedric de Coning and Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash

Published by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Authors and Acknowledgements

This Synthesis report was produced by the Peace Capacities Network. The respective national baseline studies were authored by the following researchers:

- Dr. Renata Giannini and Dr. Eduarda Hamann of the Igarapé Institute for the Brazil national case study
- Dr. He Yin of the China Police Peacekeeping Centre for the China national case study
- Karim Hafez and Yomna Elbakly from the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) for the Egypt national case study
- Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash (retd.) of the United Service Institution of India (USI) for the India national case study
- Dr. Lina Alexandra and Dr. Sharon Wiharta from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for the Indonesia national case study
- Dr. Alexander Lukin from the Center for World Politics and Public Diplomacy and Dr. Maxim Bratersky from the Higher School of Economics for the Russia national case study
- Dr. Cedric de Coning and Priyal Singh from the Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes for the South Africa national case study
- Auveen Woods from the Istanbul Policy Center for the Turkey national case study

The study has been overseen and edited by Dr. Cedric de Coning, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and ACCORD and Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, the United Service Institution of India (USI).

The PeaceCap Network wishes to acknowledge the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose support through the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) made this study possible.
# Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................. 5  
Introduction .............................................................................. 7  
Brazil ......................................................................................... 11  
China ......................................................................................... 20  
Egypt .......................................................................................... 29  
India ........................................................................................... 38  
Indonesia .................................................................................... 47  
Russia ......................................................................................... 55  
South Africa ............................................................................... 63  
Turkey ......................................................................................... 69  
Conclusion .................................................................................. 76
Executive Summary

In the current changing world order, UN peace operations remain one of the foremost symbols of international cooperation and collective global governance. In the context of the recommendations of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), this report analyses the positions of a group of rising powers on UN peace operations reform. The countries selected for this study are Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. The Peace Capacities (PeaceCap) Network undertook a joint research project where research institutes from each of these countries contributed their own respective country studies. The aim was to give voice to authentic national narratives on UN peace operations, rather than an external interpretation. The current report is a synthesis of the country studies and provides a comparative analysis.

This report considers the stance of these rising powers on a number of critical UN peace operations reform issues like conflict prevention; the principles of peacekeeping, including the use of force, robust peacekeeping and enforcement operations; integration and the so-called full spectrum approach; peacekeeping capabilities; as well as sovereignty and national ownership.

Seven of these eight countries are among the top 20 troop and police contributors (T/PCCs), yet traditionally they have exercised little influence on mandate, policy and doctrine formulation. As the findings in this report show, these rising powers are no longer satisfied with this limited role, and are set to play a more assertive role on the direction of UN peace operations in future.

Overall, the countries covered in this study maintain that the United Nations is the most legitimate body to deal with international peace and security issues. They regard the UN as a credible forum where states can reach agreement on shared norms and common approaches. They consider UN peace operations as one of the UN's most visible tools, and therefore it is of great symbolic value as an example of the international community's collective will. As such the stakes are high and most countries have a keen interest in how UN peace operations will develop in the future.

All the rising powers covered in this report support the HIPPO's emphasis on the primacy of politics when it comes to conflict resolution. In fact, several of these countries perceive themselves as regional peace-makers and take an active role in various mediation initiatives. These countries also exhibit a strong preference for consensual peacekeeping,
which makes them weary of the trend toward more robustness and the use of force in recent UN missions. They are concerned that the trend may suggest a growing preference for externally imposed military solutions. Their preferred approach is for locally grounded negotiated political solutions.

In the view of these rising powers, the principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence or in defence of the mandate) remain the cornerstone of UN peacekeeping, and its best guarantee for success. They are concerned about the increasingly ambitious mandates given to UN peace operations, and the blurring of lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For them, force should only be used in UN peacekeeping if it is minimal, calibrated, proportional and in conformity with international humanitarian law.

All of the countries included in this study seek to strengthen cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs. They want more influence for T/PCCs in shaping mission mandates. On the basis of their own, not always positive, experience with the mandating process and its implications for new and existing T/PCCs, they wish to be consulted at an earlier stage in the mandating process and when mandates are revised.

These countries stress sovereignty and national ownership as core norms, on which the UN Charter is based, that must be respected at all stages during peace and conflict resolution processes. They are against the imposition of external solutions, and they believe that a key role for UN peace operations should be to help with the capacity building of national institutions, specifically in the area of security, rule of law and justice.

In conclusion, while the rising powers in this study do not agree on every policy issue and do not always speak with one voice, they do share a common normative approach to global governance, and they agree on the central role of the UN, and especially UN peace operations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. In their view, UN peace operations remains an important common project, a shared experience that helps foster co-ownership of the United Nations as a collective security regime, and as the foundation for an emerging rule-based global order.
Introduction

The global order is experiencing significant turbulence as it shifts from a period of relative stability under a unipolar order to a new era of multipolar uncertainty. One of the characteristics of this new era is the emergence, or re-emergence in some cases, of a number of states that have gained sufficient economic and political power over the last decades to challenge the hegemony of the West over the main instruments of global governance. We refer to these countries loosely as rising powers because their power and influence in global politics are growing in importance. In this new multipolar era, the West and the rising powers have to accommodate and consider each other when it comes to the future direction of global governance. In this report we consider what the implications of these changes in the global order are for UN peace operations.

China has become the second largest economy in the world and, at least until recently, the main engine of global economic growth. It has also become increasingly assertive, especially in its immediate neighbourhood. In the aftermath of the intervention in Libya and subsequent chaos, Russia has taken a forceful stance in Syria and Ukraine to check what it perceives as interventions and manipulations by the West to change governments that do not subscribe to their neo-liberal ideology. India, Brazil and South Africa have similarly emerged as significant economic and political players in their regions, and in the case of India, in the global economy. These countries have come together in 2011 to form the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) grouping. In the BRICS and Coexistence, de Coning, Mandrup & Odgaard¹ argue that the BRICS articulate an alternative framework for global governance which they call coexistence. Coexistence is a type of global order that is inherently pluralist in the sense that it allows for countries and regions with different world views, religions, political systems and approaches to national development to coexist, without one ideational system dominating the others. They argue that the coexistence strategy pursued by the BRICS consists of four basic principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; interference in the internal affairs of other states only within the framework of multilaterally agreed upon norms and rules; mutual non-aggression and the legal equality of states; and the promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths. As will be discussed later in this report, these principles also influence the role these countries assign to UN peace operations as a tool to maintain the global order.

The BRICS grouping is not the only countries that have emerged in recent years to play a more prominent role on the world stage. Several others, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam have similar rising influence profiles. Not all these countries could, however, be included in this Peace Capacities Network research project. The rising powers selected for this study included the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. These countries were selected to serve as a sample of countries that reflect the rising power profile, and in an attempt to represent all the major geo-political regions of the world.

UN peacekeeping is the foremost symbol of international cooperation and collective global governance. The group of rising powers covered in this report play an increasingly important role in shaping and contributing to international peace and security. All these countries, except Russia, are among the top 20 T/PCCs. However, as this report will show, these countries are no longer content with only being T/PCCs, and they are now also starting to develop the will and capacity to influence policy and doctrine formulation.

This report analyses their contributions, motivations and policies to UN peace operations at a time when the future direction of UN peace operations are under critical review. The High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) submitted its report in mid-2015, and the Secretary-General has issued his own report on the HIPPO for the 2015 General Assembly session. Since then these reports have been considered in various UN bodies, and whilst some aspects are being implemented by the Secretariat many others are still being debated.

UN member states contribute soldiers and police officers to UN peace operations, and their costs are reimbursed according to a scale of assessment agreed upon at the UN. All member states of the UN contribute to the cost of peace operations on the basis of a formula that takes their GDP and a number of other factors into account. The scale of assessment was reviewed and updated in 2015. Over the last few decades a gap has emerged between those countries that pay the bulk of the costs and those countries that contribute the bulk of the peacekeepers. For example, the West and Japan contributes approximately 80% of the nearly 9 billion USD annual budget for peacekeeping operations. In 2016, the USA contributes 28.5%, whilst China, India and Russia contribute 10.3%, 4%

---

2 The Peace Capacities (PeaceCap) project consist of a network of research institutes in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. The have cooperated since 2012 in research on civilian capacity, security sector reform and peace operations. The network is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The research produced by the network can be found at http://www.peace-cap.org
and 0.15% respectively.\(^3\) China and France are the largest troop contributors among the permanent members of the Security Council with a and \(b\) respectively. The countries in South East Asia—Bangladesh, India and Pakistan—have consistently been among the top five troop and police contributors to UN peacekeeping. Together these countries contribute approximately 34% of UN peacekeepers. Another significant regional grouping in UN peacekeeping is Africa. Twelve of the top 20 troop contributors are from Africa. Together the African countries contribute approximately 50% of all UN peacekeepers.

The difference in perspectives and interests between those who pay for UN peacekeeping and those who contribute the troops and police can result in divergent opinions and understandings with regards to the identity and role of UN peacekeeping operations, what needs to be done to improve and strengthen peace operations, and what direction UN peace operations should take in the future. However, not all those countries that are major troop or police contributors, or those that make a financial contribution, necessarily agree on all aspects related to UN peace operations. As this report also shows, countries have taken different positions on various issues, and alternative understandings need to be acknowledged, understood and recognized. The maintenance of international peace and security is a collective effort and UN peace operations are one of its principle tools. In fact, it is the single most visual, and therefore symbolic, example of the international community’s collective will and collaborative action. As such the stakes are high and most countries have a keen interest in how UN peace operations develop. Naturally, the national interests and domestic compulsions of individual member states have an impact on their policies towards UN peace operations. At the same time, UN peace operations can only be effective and successful if there is broad agreement among member states about its purpose and role. It is therefore necessary that these national policies are known and understood, and that through dialogue at the UN and elsewhere compromises are found among nations in order to arrive at the broadest possible collective agreement on the role and scope of UN peace operations. In this spirit this report is an attempt to shed light on the national policies of a sample of rising powers, with a view to see how their views may influence the future direction of peace operations.

In light of the recommendations of the HIPPO Panel, this report will analyse the stance the rising powers have taken on a number of important issues like conflict prevention; the principles of peacekeeping, including the use of force, robust peacekeeping and enforcement operations; integration and the so-called full spectrum approach; peacekeep-

\(^3\) Effective rates of assessment for peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018, based on the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 70/245 and the composition of levels endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 70/246, United Nations, 28 December 2015.
ing capabilities; as well as sovereignty and national ownership. This report considers the policies, experiences and opinions of eight rising powers on the future of peace operations. It is based on a series of country studies undertaken by the research institutes in Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. This report is an attempt to synthesise the observations and findings of the eight country reports written by the Peace Capacities Network partners. In the following section each of the country reports will be summarised and then, in the final section, their positions will be analysed and discussed.
Brazil has regularly deployed military personnel to UN peace operations since 1948. It has provided a small but consistent number of troops to 50 missions (approx. 70%) out of the 71 ever authorised by the UN Security Council. In the majority of cases, Brazil has deployed professionals (military observers and/or staff officers) in missions. It has also deployed troops to eight missions namely UNEF I (Suez), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNAVEM III (Angola), INTERFET / UNTAET / UNMISET (Timor Leste), MINUSTAH (Haiti – ongoing) and UNIFIL (Lebanon – ongoing).

The missions with greater Brazilian engagement, in terms of numbers of troops deployed, were located within Brazil’s political area of influence, with the exception of UNEF I (the first UN mission with troops). It can be inferred that Brazil has mainly contributed troops and police officers to those peacekeeping operations that have geopolitical linkages with its foreign policy priorities, exemplified, for instance, by the missions to Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Dominican Republic (the only OAS mission with Brazilian troops). Other important factors are historical linkages, such as former Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola and Timor Leste) and places, such as the Middle East, from which a considerable amount of immigrants have settled in Brazil.

Brazil has also deployed both troops and military advisors to operations under the Organization of the American States (OAS). From 2000 onwards, Brazil has participated in 3 demining missions: MARMINAS (Ecuador and Peru), MARMINCA (Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) and it still participates in the Inter-American Monitors Group of the OAS Assistance Mission to the National Demining Plan in Colombia (“GP Mon Inter” or GMI).

Motivations to Participate in Peace Operations
Brazil’s actions on international peace and security are guided by the same principles on which the UN was founded. As such Brazil believes that the UN is the legal and the most legitimate authority to deal with international peace and security issues at the global level. At the tactical level, the motivation is related to operational needs and interests. In

---

4 The country study of Brazil was undertaken by the Igarapé Institute of Brazil.
the last 15 years, Brazil’s military and police contingents have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in operational and logistic terms.6

Evidence shows that prestige/status in the international system is another motivation for participation. There is a recurrent argument that Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping is related to its interest to obtain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Although this is not officially stated by the Brazilian government, engaging in peacekeeping would eventually support this aspiration.

It is often argued that developing countries’ active participation in peace operations is associated with UN’s financial reimbursement. However, Brazil is only partially reimbursed by the UN. For example, the country is fully responsible for the transportation of its battalions to Haiti and also for the use of some of its equipment for which it does not get reimbursed. The second Brazilian battalion deployed in Haiti (for 2 years) that was entirely financed by the Brazilian government. Not to mention the very expensive six-month training through which the troops undergo before deployment. Therefore, the money received through the UN system of reimbursement does not serve as an incentive.

Policy Related Key Issues
Brazilian foreign policy has been evolved over a strong preference towards diplomacy, international law, multilateralism and consensus building. In its international actions, the country also follows two other principles: peaceful conflict-resolution and non-intervention, explicitly mentioned in Article 4 of the Constitution. At the tactical level, Brazil’s position largely follows the Capstone Doctrine, as well as the key peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum level of force.7

Although Brazil’s participation in peace operations dates from the mid-20th century, it was only after the 1990s that major policy changes related to its participation started taking place. Main changes relate to deployment of police; evolving, albeit conservative, approach on using force; and participation of Brazilian women in peacekeeping.

In early 1990s, Brazil started to put in place a system to identify and deploy Brazilian military police officers and lower ranking police personnel to the UN peace operations. It started not by a strategic vision of a government, but as a reaction of a demand by the UN Secretary-Gen-

---

7 CCOPAB.
eral to deploy Brazilian police first to Angola (1991), then to Mozambique (1993). However, the numbers remain very low. It is also noteworthy that neither the civilian police nor the federal police participate in peacekeeping.

An important shift happened with respect to the participation of Brazil in Chapter VII missions and use of force in 1999. Until then, Brazil would often refrain from sending troops to UN missions under Chapter VII or with Chapter VII provisions. The first time in 1999, Brazil deployed a platoon to INTERFET (Timor Leste), a Chapter VII mission with an agreement with the UN that the Brazilian troops would only engage with policing tasks, such as patrolling, protecting authorities, securing convoys, etc. While at the political level Brazil agreed to participate in a Chapter VII mission, at the tactical level, Brazilian troops were not to use force. However, in 2004, there was a more dramatic change with MINUSTAH (Haiti). It was the first UN mission under Chapter VII in which Brazil actually used force, especially in the pacification phase (2005-2007). To a lesser extent, the provision of a Brazilian general as the Force Commander in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is also a signal of change of policy in this regard. But in Brazil, this is considered an exception and to be done with caution.

Brazilian women’s quantitative and qualitative participation in peace operations is low and has a direct relationship with their numbers in the national military force. In 2015, women comprise of 7% of Brazilian military of 23,787 officials. Their presence is usually in the technical, administrative and health-related areas except as the Air Force aviators. The absence of Brazilian women in combat positions (particularly in the Army which sends the vast majority of troops to peace operations) has a bearing on their participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The first Brazilian military woman to participate in a UN mission was a doctor (captain), deployed to Timor Leste in 2003. In MINUSTAH, women started to join the Brazilian troops in 2006 and until January 2014, 124 women from the Army had been deployed (dentists, nurses, translators and engineers). In April 2015, out of 1678 Brazilian troops deployed, only 18 (all in Haiti), about 1% are women. The UN Mission in Lebanon had one Brazilian woman in the Navy contingent from a total of 267 troops. And, until today, only one Brazilian military woman has participated in peace operations as a military observer.

Recently, Brazil has launched the drafting process of a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, thereby standing to its commitment of fostering the participation of women in peace missions; and providing humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation to post-

---

conflict countries concerning gender issues. This initiative supports the Brazilian emphasis on the necessity of dealing with protection and empowerment as inseparable aspects of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.\textsuperscript{11}

Brazil’s diplomatic statements heavily lean towards preventive and non-coercive actions, such as persuasion and capacity building. Brazil argues that social and economic developments are necessary tools for conflict prevention. There is a concern in finding concrete measures to translate the relation between security and development, going beyond the purely military view of conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{12}

Brazil is of the view that peacekeeping must create the conditions for effective prevention or the definitive resolution of the conflict. Peacekeeping is not the main tool/actor responsible for achieving lasting peace but the parties to the conflict are. In this sense, the most important tasks of peacekeeping operations include offering to the parties an enabling political and security environment, as well as the time they may need to establish the basis for sustainable peace. The limits are also clear: peacekeeping missions should not become a third party in the conflict or replace them. The UN’s role is to provide support for sustainable peace, not to impose a solution to the conflict. Building peace is thus a role that ought to be carried out by the conflict parties.\textsuperscript{13} Brazil has welcomed the recommendations of the UN High-Level on Peace Operations and the 10-year review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, emphasizing the centrality of conflict prevention and social development to the promotion of a sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{14}

Brazil argues that it is neither possible nor desirable to draw a watertight separation between activities of “peacekeeping” and those of “peacebuilding”. There should be no peacekeeping without peacebuilding, and peacekeepers must be seen as early peacebuilders. Peace can only be sustainable if socio and economic activities are also included in the equation. Therefore, the UN missions need not only to stop violence but also to prepare the conditions for the future leading to sustainability.

Brazil opines that to build sustainable peace, the three peacekeeping principles should be respected. Moreover, it is essential that the UN role in any activity is based on dialogue with local society, which should have the prerogative to lead the peace process. The imposition of external priorities and solutions without adapting to local conditions should be avoided at all costs otherwise it could undermine stabilization efforts

\textsuperscript{11} Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 7533 (13 Oct 2015)
\textsuperscript{12} Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 7109 (12 Feb 2014) and UNSC meeting 7374 (30 Jan 2015).
\textsuperscript{13} Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
\textsuperscript{14} Statement by Brazil at UNSC open debate on security, development and root causes of conflicts (17 Sep 2015).
and sustainability. The UN itself and peacekeeping operations in particular, are based on three pillars: peace and security, development, and human rights. To build sustainable peace, it is mandatory to work not only with the political elements but also social and economic elements.

During Brazil’s presidency at the UNSC (Feb. 2011), there was a high-level debate on the “interdependence between security and development”. The Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH (from 2004 to date) has been referred to as a “laboratory” for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in terms of the civil-military cooperation and Quick Impact Project (QIPs) activities.

Brazil has observed that there is a clear over-representation in the field and under-representation in the UNSC of developing countries. As a consequence, Brazil has reiterated the need for the UNSC to hold ample and regular consultations with the T/PCCs during the preparation and the evaluation of peacekeeping mandates. More partnership is also needed to bridge this gap. In the future, a reformed UNSC, more representative and more inclusive, would have greater legitimacy to draft peacekeeping mandates in line with the aspirations of developing countries and therefore is more likely to get support and contributions of troops and equipment from the member states.

Brazil has also supported initiatives that reinforce the political importance of the C-34 (could be seen as a type of “global partnership”). For example, Brazil has made efforts to reduce the polarization between the negotiating groups of the Committee. It is in Brazil’s interest to help building consensus on the most relevant issues of the agenda, in order to avoid deadlocks that would weaken the UNGA as a forum for dialogue and negotiation on peacekeeping; which in turn would give the UNSC the exclusive prerogative to deal with these issues.

Developing countries supply about 90% of all UN peacekeeping troops. Although it is not possible to draw a common profile, there are a few shared positions. Among the groups that seek to reflect these shared positions on PKOs, the most important is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which plays a central role in the C-34. Its weight is reflected in the fact that it “speaks” on behalf of most of the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs): among the 25 largest T/PCCs, only three (Uruguay, Brazil and China) are not NAM members. Moreover, most countries hosting peacekeeping operations are NAM members. NAM has played an important role in defending the basic principles of PKO, and Brazil has closely collaborated with them on this matter, as well as on others issues.

---

16 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17 Idem.
such as the need to increase support for T/PCCs through timely payment of reimbursements, increasing the troop cost and supporting staff training.\textsuperscript{18} In general, Brazil supports the following common positions\textsuperscript{19}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Need to observe national interests of countries emerging from conflict. UN action must be based on dialogue with local authorities, avoiding the imposition of external priorities. Similarly, it is important to get a maximum use of existing local capacities, with due appreciation and strengthening of national institutions;
  \item[b.] Need for the international community to assist conflict-emerging countries not only on issues like security and justice, but also in social and economic terms such as job creation, economic revitalisation, basic services and infrastructure.
  \item[c.] More significant role of women, emphasising its importance to restore the social fabric as to the local economy.
\end{itemize}

Brazil supports the need to promote national ownership so that the interests of countries emerging from conflict are ensured. UN’s actions, it expresses must be based on dialogue with local authorities and avoid the imposition of external priorities. The civil society should have the prerogative to lead the peace process. The imposition of external priorities and solutions without adapting to local conditions should be avoided at all costs otherwise it could undermine stabilisation efforts towards sustainability. Similarly, it is important to make maximum use of existing local capacities and strengthen the national institutions.

The above also impacts the Brazil’s position on military intervention, which is often based on the condemnation of intervention in domestic affairs including serious violations of human rights (e.g. Libya and Syria). Brazil’s preference is for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the use of force being the last resort. Brazil is in favour of democratic governments. This has been illustrated by the constant support to elections in Haiti and the agreement to the democratic clause at the Organisation of American States (OAS). Nonetheless, there are expressed concerns when democracy involves imposition and/or external intervention.

With respect to protection of civilians (POC), back in 1999, Brazil’s official position was marked by: (1) concerns about the high level of civilian deaths in armed conflicts and the need to protect these groups

\textsuperscript{18} Idem.
\textsuperscript{19} Idem.
(parallel to the need of protecting non-combatants according to international humanitarian law); (2) the need to think about humanitarian support as something that does not automatically entail the use of force; and (3) issues regarding arms trade, since they were/are eventually responsible for putting civilians in danger. In 2004, Brazil’s discourse started to include the notion that peacekeeping missions are also responsible for implementing POC strategies. In 2009, Brazil became more vocal on legality and accountability in international interventions, and has since then been advocating that Chapter VII tools should be used with a high level of specificity and monitoring. Finally, in 2011, after the controversial UN mission in Libya, Brazil launched the expression “Responsibility while protecting” (RwP), which includes the following elements:

a. Prevention is always the best tool;

b. Maximum commitment to use all peaceful means to protect civilians in armed conflicts;

c. The use of force should be authorized by the UNSC and in accordance with Chapter VII;

d. The authorization to use force should respect legal, operational and time constraints, and must be in accordance with international humanitarian law;

e. Minimum force should be used, and it should not result in more damage or instability than it meant to prevent;

f. The implementation should be fair, proportional and limited to the goals established by the UNSC;

g. There should be constant monitoring of the field mission, on the application of the above elements/principles; and

h. The UNSC should be responsible to guarantee transparency and accountability of those who use force.

In the last 25 years, Brazil’s position on international interventions (including for humanitarian and for protection of civilians) has tended to be towards non-intervention, the only exception being Rwanda. Brazil was on the UNSC when the Rwandan crisis escalated in 1993-1994 and

---

20 Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 3977 (12 Feb 1999).
21 Statements by Brazil at UNSC meeting 4990 (14 Jun 2004); at UNSC meeting 5209 (21 Jun 2005); at UNSC meeting 6066 (14 Jan 2009); and at UNSC meeting 6216 (11 Nov 2009).
22 Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 6151 (26 Jun 2009).
it explicitly supported the use of force to stop genocide. However, Brazil’s position was against intervention in 3 other key cases of gross violations of human rights: Kosovo (1998-1999), Darfur (esp. 2004-2006) and Libya (2011).

Brazil usually demonstrates more reluctance than willingness to act in humanitarian crises when the use of force is involved, including for peace operations\textsuperscript{25}. Brazil often leans heavily towards preventive and non-coercive actions, such as persuasion and capacity building. Brazil has a historical preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts, where the use of force should happen only as the very last resort.

In UN peacekeeping, the country explicitly defends the three traditional principles: consent, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate. As a consequence, Brazil has refrained from sending troops to UN missions under Chapter VII or with Chapter VII provisions, even if it is to protect civilians. The first (limited) initiative took place in 1999, when Brazil deployed a platoon to INTERFET (Timor Leste), a clear Chapter VII mission. Even here there was an understanding with the UN that the Brazilian troops would only undertake policing tasks, such as patrolling, protecting authorities and infrastructure, securing convoys, among others.\textsuperscript{26} While at the political level it was agreed to participate in a Chapter VII mission, at the tactical level, there was no use of force by Brazilian troops. However, this position changed again and more dramatically in 2004, in MINUSTAH (Haiti). This was the first UN mission under Chapter VII in which Brazil actually used force, especially in the pacification phase (2005-2007).

Brazil has also noted a growing willingness of the UNSC to formulate more and more ambitious mandates regarding the use of force. This trend faces several challenges, one of the most important being the lack of cause-effect relation between the increased use of force and better results in terms of protecting civilians or protecting forces. Brazil opines that although led by good intentions, military operations can have devastating humanitarian effects on the civilian population. In fact, the use of force always brings with itself the risk of collateral damage and of spreading violence and instability. Moreover, it is not correct to affirm that the more intensive use of force has a positive relation with a more effective political process. Rather, use of force risks compromising UN’s impartiality as it undermines the organization’s ability to mediate and to promote a political solution. It also leads to the mistaken idea that the UN would or should be able to impose a military solution to the conflict. On the one hand, the use of force may be essential to create some stability, but on the other, it cannot be inferred that it will lead to building the


\textsuperscript{26} Fontoura (2005), op.cit.
needed consensus for national reconciliation or for achieving a political solution to the conflict.\footnote{27}{Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.}

At the tactical level, Brazil’s position regarding the use of force is aligned with the Capstone Doctrine, which imposes limits but also provides a margin of manoeuvre to use force within rules of engagement that basically reflect International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Brazilian contingents have used force in self-defence and in the defines of the mandate in numerous times, within the rules of engagement and the directives for using force in the mission area. This was true in MINUSTAH, particularly in the initial years (2004-2007).\footnote{28}{CCOPAB.}

a. To conclude, the points expressed by Brazil in multiple fora provide a good insight into the policy stand. The key issues are:

b. Treat issues related to both security and development simultaneously in conflict and post-conflict situations;

c. Criticizes the securitization of the UN regular budget, at the expense of investments in development and human rights;

d. Expresses reservations about the use of force by peacekeepers; and

e. Important for the UNSC to consult T/PCCs and take their views into account, especially on decisions related to changes in the mandates and in processes of troop withdrawal.
China ranks ninth among the 124 T/PCCs (TPCC) and number one among the five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members in terms of the contribution of personnel. As of December 2015, China has 3045 peacekeepers, including 2839 troops, 37 UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) and 169 police officers, in 10 of the 16 ongoing UN PKOs, which represented about three percent out of a total of 107,088 uniformed peacekeepers in all the UN-commanded PKOs. So far China has contributed a total of about 30,000 military and police peacekeepers to the UN-commanded PKO and political missions. In December 2013, China for the first time deployed a security company to a UN PKO, the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In September 2014, China announced that it had agreed to contribute a 700-person infantry battalion to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMSS).

China’s increasingly active participation in UN peacekeeping is also reflected in its increasing financial contributions, huge investment in building training capabilities and increasingly active participation in international conflict management in and outside of the UN peacekeeping system. China’s share of the UN peacekeeping budget had increased from about 0.995 percent in 2000 to 10.5 percent in 2016.

China has also greatly enhanced its peacekeeping training capabilities. Both the Chinese military and police forces have established their own peacekeeping training centres. The Chinese government has invested heavily in setting up training facilities for these two training centres, which serve as venues not only for training of Chinese peacekeeping personnel, but also for international cooperation activities. Both

---

29 The country study of China was undertaken by Dr. He Yin of the China Peacekeeping Police Training Centre.


32 In August 2000, the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center was established, which is located in Langfang, Hebei Province and later renamed as the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center (CPPTC). In 2009, the Chinese military established the MOD Peacekeeping Training Center, which is located in Huairou, Beijing Municipal City.
these training centres hold international training courses and host international academic activities, attracting participants from around the world.\textsuperscript{33}

China is becoming increasingly active in participating in international affairs regarding peace and security. It has nominated special representatives for regions like Africa and Middle East. Beijing was believed to have played an important role in persuading Sudan to accept UN peacekeeping in 2006.\textsuperscript{34} Working together with their international colleagues including those from the U.S. and Europe, the Chinese special representatives and Minister of Foreign Affairs have made significant contribution to the peace process in many conflicts, such as South Sudan, Darfur in Sudan, the eastern part of the DRC, Mali, Afghanistan and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{35} China has given strong support to the UNSC Resolution 1816, which calls for international efforts to fight pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden. It has deployed ships to conduct escort missions in international waters of that region since 2008. On January 4, 2014, China sent the frigate “Yancheng” to join the international escort mission for the disposal of Syrian chemical weapons in response to the appeals from the UNSC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).\textsuperscript{36}

Most significantly, on September 28, 2015, in his statement at the General Debate of the 70\textsuperscript{th} Session of the UN General Assembly and remarks at the UN Peacekeeping Summit respectively, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced six important measures to support the improvement and strengthening of UN PKOs, namely:

\begin{enumerate}
\item China will join the new UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness System and set up a permanent peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops;
\item It will give favourable consideration to UN requests for more Chinese engineering soldiers and transportation and medical staff to take part in UN PKOs;
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{33} In 2014 alone, China has hosted two important international academic events on peacekeeping, one is the Strategic Guideline Framework Seminar, co-hosted by the MPS with the DPKO in June 2014 in the CPPTC, another the Challenges 2014 Annual Forum, co-hosted by the MOD Peacekeeping Affairs Office and China International Strategic Institute with the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy in October 2014 in the MOD Peacekeeping Training Center.


\textsuperscript{35} Interview with official from the MFA, June 18, 2014, Beijing.

c. In the coming five years, China will train 2,000 peacekeepers from other countries, and carry out 10 demining assistance programs which will include training and equipment provision;

a. Also, in the coming five years, China will provide free military aid of US$100 million to the African Union to support the building of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis;

b. China will send the first peacekeeping helicopter squad to UN PKOs in Africa, and

c. It will establish a 10-year, US$1 billion China-UN peace and development fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more to world peace and development. Part of the fund will be used to support UN PKOs.37

China responded enthusiastically to the recently published Report of the High-Level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and decided to take a lead in giving strong support to the UN peacekeeping at this historic time, and to help promote UN peace operations in the coming years. Some believe that China’s current policy of increasingly active participation in UN peacekeeping is driven by a long list of pragmatic needs or interests ranging from “multilateralism and image building to more traditional concerns such as isolating Taiwan and securing its investments”.38 The Chinese Government contest this. Some point to South Sudan and argue that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping is driven by its increasing needs for natural resources like oil.39 However, the Chinese Government state that this kind of argument is questionable because China has also deployed many troops to UN PKOs in places like Darfur, Mali, Lebanon and Haiti, where there are not many natural re-


sources. Others argue that Beijing’s One-China policy is a key factor affecting its peacekeeping behaviour.\footnote{International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p 17.} The Chinese Government argue that it has shown, through its support to the UN peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, which has long adopted a pro-Taiwan policy, that Beijing has a peacekeeping strategy beyond the “Taiwan Question”.

Since 1971 China’s national identity has undergone three phases of development, and so has its doctrine on UN peacekeeping. In the 1970s, China was largely revolutionist in its outlook, which meant that it kept a sceptical eye on the existing international order and institutions. As a result, it condemned and opposed the creation and continuation of all UN PKOs, refused to burden its annual budget with peacekeeping or contribute personnel to ongoing operations, and abstained from UNSC voting. In a way, in the 1970s, China isolated itself outside the UN peacekeeping regime.

In the 1980s and 1990s, China began to selectively accept UN peacekeeping. Being a veto-wielding permanent member in the UNSC, China found that its policy on UN peacekeeping, if well designed, could generate precious political capital for its integration into the international community. As a result, Beijing gradually accepted the concept of UN peacekeeping. China’s peacekeeping doctrine in 1980s and 1990s largely reflected a balance between its traditional normative position and pragmatic concerns for its national interests, in particular, those regarding its strategy of being a normal member of the international community.

China is a rising power in the 21st century and it has a peacekeeping doctrine that is increasingly aligned with other member states. China’s new identity of a rising power defines its interests in peacekeeping and shapes its peacekeeping doctrine. UN peacekeeping has three guiding principles – consent, impartiality and non-use of force, which China believes are “fundamental to winning the confidence and support of Member States for peacekeeping operations and ensuring their smooth conduct”\footnote{“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the UN Security Council’s Vote on the Draft Resolution to Refer the Situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 23 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1158923.shtml. (Accessed on 21 November 2015).}. Although, China still insists that peacekeeping should adhere to these three principles, there have been some shifts in its position.

China insists that consent of a host country is a prerequisite to establishing a UN PKO. This stance is in concord with its traditional position on Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. If a host country has consented to accept peacekeeping, Beijing will usually not only show its support to the UNSC resolution that authorizes a PKO, but also contribute peacekeepers to participate in the PKO. China is also
Cedric de Coning and Chander Prakash

aware that sometimes consent may not come voluntarily; instead, it has to be obtained through efforts. However, Beijing is against the use or threat of sanctions and force; it prefers non-coercive means like persuasion and influence. China is believed to have joined the international community to persuade Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC Congo and Syria to accept UN peacekeeping or cooperate with the UN in recent years.42

China also insists that the principle of impartiality should be abided by in peace efforts of the international community: “[T]he international community should adhere to the principle of ‘impartiality, objectiveness and neutrality’ ... refrain from interfering in local political disputes or impeding the peace process”.43 Ambassador Wang Min warned:

“Any practice that deviates from or weakens [the guiding principles of peacekeeping] will hamper the operation’s impartiality and objectivity and, worse yet, could transform the United Nations into a party to conflict, thereby undermining the conflict resolution efforts of the international community”.44

China maintains that peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. It opposes the threat or use of force in international relations.45 Nevertheless, Beijing does not rule out the necessity of using force in peacekeeping under some circumstances. It insists that the use of force should meet two basic requirements: one is the authorization of the UNSC, the other is that force should only be used for self-defence or defence of the mandate. Moreover, it advocates that the decision on whether to use force or not should be decided by the UNSC in light of the reality of conflicts on a case-by-case basis”.46 China’s contribution of a 135-person security company and a 700-person infantry battalion to MINUSM and UNMISS respectively shows that although in the 21st century the rising power still has concerns regarding the use of force, it does not mind being directly engaged in use of force in UN-commanded PKOs anymore.

China’s position on the above-mentioned three guiding principles is also well reflected in its attitude towards R2P. Although Beijing has in principle endorsed R2P by supporting the 2005 World Summit Outcome,

42 Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat, June 18, 2014, Beijing.
46 Ibid.
it has never accepted the interventionism embodied in the doctrine. According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, R2P has three pillars:

**Pillar One**: Each individual state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities.

**Pillar Two**: The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to protect its population.

**Pillar Three**: If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures. But military intervention is the last resort.47

China insists that most of the weight of R2P should fall on “Pillar One”. It is concerned that R2P may serve as a sharp tool for the West, who prefers “Pillar Two” and “Pillar Three” of R2P, to skip the consent of host countries and penetrate the wall of traditional sovereignty.48 According to one Chinese ex-diplomat, Chinese Government regards R2P as a concept or a good wish, which simply has significance of political morality. Nevertheless, China has not adopted a rigid policy on R2P which rules out international intervention under any circumstances. It does recognize that the concept of R2P can apply for international crimes of “genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity”.49

One major concern of the supporters of R2P is about protection of civilians (PoC). As is shown in China’s support to the UN guiding principle of use of force, which makes it clear that force can be used as the last resort in implementation of a PKO mandate authorized by the UNSC according to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, China basically agrees to the concept of PoC. In a statement at a UNSC open debate on PoC in armed conflict, Ambassador Wang Min said:

“[W]hen considering a protection-of-civilians mandate for a peacekeeping operation, it is crucial to respect fundamental principles, such as the consent of host countries …[peacekeeping operations] should ... respect the sovereignty of the host country, ensure objectivity and impartiality and avoid becoming a party to the conflict”50

---

47 “2005 World Summit Outcome”, UN General Assembly, A/60/L.1, p. 31.
48 He Yin, “China-EU Cooperation on UN Peacekeeping: Opportunities and Challenges”, p 52.
In recent years, the Chinese academic community has also begun to discuss R2P. In 2012 one Chinese academic Ruan Zongze coined a concept “responsible protection (RP)” to balance the interventionist elements, most notably, Pillar Three, of R2P. Some regard RP as the Chinese initiative of protection vis à vis R2P. The greatest significance of RP is not how it differs from R2P, but that it symbolizes a turn of China’s attitude towards international norms, from passive acceptance or rigid rejection in the past to increasingly active participation in debate.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA’s) increasingly active participation in non-military missions both domestically and internationally in the 21st century urged China to re-define the PLA’s missions as military operations and military operations other than war (MOATW). In January 2009, the MOD issued *The Planning on Capacity Building of PLA’s Military Operations other than War*, which defined clear guidelines, principles, objectives, force scale as well as measures and requirements on the PLA’s capacity building of MOATW. In December 2011, The Military Operations Other Than War Research Center has also been established at the Academy of Military Sciences.

In March 2013, the MOD issued white paper called *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*, which for the first time systematically explained the PLA’s missions in the 21st century. According to the white paper, the PLA has diversified missions including defending national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, supporting national economic and social development and safeguarding world peace and regional stability. Most notably, it goes in-depth to explain the PLA’s MOATW missions including participating in UN peacekeeping, promising that the PLA “conscientiously assume their due international responsibilities; and play an active role in maintaining world peace, security and stability.”

Regarding the legal issues of the PLA’s MOATW, the white paper reads:

> “On the basis of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms of international relations, they [the PLA] consistently operate within the legal framework formed by bilateral or multi-lateral treaties and agreements, so as to ensure the legitimacy of their operations involving foreign countries or militaries.”

At the operational level, the PLA’s deployment of a security company to Mali and an infantry battalion to South Sudan shows that the Chinese military forces are willing to carry on security tasks in UN peacekeeping

---


52 Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*. 
and when necessary, the PLA peacekeepers will not mind using force. On 25 September 2104, MOD spokesperson Geng Yansheng said on a press conference:

“The United Nations’ Security Council resolution authorizes the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to take the protection of civilians, UN employees and humanitarian workers as one of its main tasks. The Chinese peacekeeping troops will strictly abide by the international law and stick to their mandate. They will provide protection to the local people and other countries’ personnel engaged in such peaceful activities as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and economic development in the area to the best of their ability. And their actions will be taken as required by the situation, or upon the instruction from the headquarters of the mission, and they will also follow the rule of engagement.”

Nevertheless, the spokesperson also emphasized that it is not accurate to call the Chinese peacekeeping infantry battalion to South Sudan “combat troops”. He stated “The peacekeeping infantry battalion, called security troops by the UN, is tasked to implement security and protection, rather than to carry out traditional combat tasks...[t]he UN peacekeeping troops will not get directly involved in the armed conflicts of the mission country.”

China is a rising power in the 21st century. Backed with enhanced national strength, improved international status and accumulated knowledge about the international community, including UN peacekeeping, China is increasingly aware of its rights and responsibilities as a rising power. China is evolving a peacekeeping doctrine in concert with its strategy of peaceful rising. The peacekeeping doctrine should serve China’s strategic interests of being a responsible power and building a peaceful international environment. Therefore, it is playing an active or sometimes even proactive role in UN peacekeeping. China’s peacekeeping doctrine in the 21st century can be characterized as “active participation”. The PLA’s increasingly recent deployment of security troops to Africa in particular, shows that at the operational level, the PLA is willing to accept protection tasks in UN-commanded PKOs. When necessary, the PLA peacekeepers will not mind using force for self-defence or defence of their mandate.

UN peacekeeping is at a crossroad where the traditional principles of peacekeeping are faced with challenges of post-Westphalian norms of limited state sovereignty and interventionism. As an active participant


54 Ibid.
of UN peacekeeping as well as a rising power, China has its own distinct peacekeeping doctrine.
Egypt is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and is a regional power in both the Arab World and Africa. Egypt is currently (2016-2017) a non-permanent member of the Security Council and the AU's Peace and Security Council. Egypt views peacekeeping as the UN's most potent instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. UN peacekeeping from an Egyptian point of view is a “cost-effective means of averting conflicts” and “a genuine expression of the principle of collective security”.

Egypt has had a long history of association with UN peacekeeping. While the first UN peacekeeping mission was the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948 that monitored the Armistice Agreement with Israel, the first armed peacekeeping mission was the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF-I). UNEF-I was deployed in 1956 to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France, and Israel from Egyptian territory and to act thereafter as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces. But the country’s initial contribution was to UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the first UN multidimensional mission with a complex and large mandate. However, it was three decades later – in 1991 – that Egypt began its uninterrupted contribution to UN peacekeeping, with UNAVEM II (Angola) and MINURSO (Western Sahara) in 1991.

Over all, Egypt has contributed to 37 UN peacekeeping missions, with more than 30,000 peacekeepers deployed in 24 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. Today, Egyptian peacekeepers serve in 8 of the 16 active UN missions worldwide, namely in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), Congo (MONUSCO), Darfur (UNAMID), Liberia (UNMIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI).

During the period 2000-2005, Egyptian contribution to UN peacekeeping missions remained more or less stagnant at a low level. In the following year, the contribution, more than tripled from 301 in 2005 to

55 The country study of Egypt was undertaken by the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCPA).
916 in 2006. The upward swing in Egyptian contributions, driven primarily by the surge in UN demand for peacekeepers, continued uninterrupted throughout the rest of the decade, reaching its peak of more than 5,000 peacekeepers in 2010. From that point onwards, Egyptian contribution started to decline until this very day reaching their current levels of 2809 uniformed personnel as of 31 Dec 15.57

A review of the available data indicates a clear preference for participation under the UN helmet. With the exception of Egypt’s contribution to the International Force/Stability Force (IFOR/SFOR), its participation in non-UN missions has been both limited in numbers and predominantly in the form of staff officers and military experts.

In his statement before the Summit on Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Operations, on the margins of the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the UN, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced Egypt’s readiness to increase its contributions to UN peacekeeping. He expressed Egypt’s willingness to deploy additional infantry troops and enabling units, including capabilities for rapid response, to current and newly established missions. He also expressed Egypt’s interest in joining the UN Formed Police Units Standby Capacity, and contributing with more Formed Police Units.58

Egypt ranks as the 13th among T/PCC’s as of 31 December 2015, with a total of 2809 personnel, whereas it ranked the 17th in June 2015 (2059 personnel). The surge in the Egyptian participation in UN peacekeeping indicates Egypt’s commitment to turning those pledges into contributions.59 Egypt has pledged increasing its contribution to peacekeeping before, during and after the 2015 Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit. Some of those pledges have already materialized or are in the process of materialization. Egypt has deployed a mechanized infantry battalion in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), with a total of 750 personnel. The country is deploying a Formed Police Unit (FPU) to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in February 2016, with a total of 180 personnel, that’s in addition to the current 140 personnel. It is also deploying a Formed Police Unit (FPU) to Mali (MINUSMA) with a total of 140 personnel.

A number of rationales drive Egypt’s contribution to UN peacekeeping. Together they form a set of diverse, yet coherently linked, strategic and political interests. Strategically, Egypt sees its active participation

58 Statement by Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Summit on Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 26 September 2014.
in peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa, as a means of contributing to international peace and security. This is particularly true of Egypt’s participation in its immediate neighbourhood (Sudan, for example), where Egyptian participation is seen as a means of preventing a spill over effect. It is equally true of regions considered as priority areas from an Egyptian national security point of view, most notably the Nile Basin, Great Lakes, and most recently the Sahel and Sahara region, especially following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011.

Politically and normatively, Egypt maintains a self-image of a leader in its neighbourhood and a champion of multilateralism based on a strong UN and the purposes and principles of its Charter. In this regard, active participation in peacekeeping, together with Egypt’s consistent efforts in areas of conflict resolution, peacemaking, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding\textsuperscript{60} in Africa, the Arab world and beyond, exemplify the country’s leadership and commitment.

Accompanying that sense of responsibility, comes a legitimate claim to recognition, international prestige and most importantly authority, as demonstrated by Egypt’s keen interest in being a norm and agenda-setter, rather than a norm and agenda-taker, particularly globally. Egypt’s current membership of the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council falls within the same logic.

Egypt’s approach and contribution to the issues on peacekeeping being debated recently has been consistent over the years and in conformity with the long-held stances of its foreign policy. On the one hand, as a founding member of the UN, LAS, OAU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Egypt has been a champion of multilateralism and collective action, based on a strong UN.\textsuperscript{61} Egypt places great emphasis on the unmatched legitimacy and credibility that distinguishes the UN as an actor in the field of international peace and security. On the other hand, Egypt has also been a leading voice in defence of state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the principle of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs.

Egypt insists on the exclusive use of the term peacekeeping for such UN operations. Most recently, and as a response to the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations\textsuperscript{62}, Egypt

\textsuperscript{60} Egypt has actively supported the UN peacebuilding architecture since the adoption of the General Assembly of Resolution 60/180 and the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005. It served as a PBC member for three terms, most recently during the period 2013-14.

\textsuperscript{61} Egypt served as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for four terms: 1949-50, 1961-62, 1984-85 and 1996-97, and is currently a candidate for the term 2016-17.

has shown some flexibility regarding the use of the term “peace operations” as long as it is used exclusively in reference to peacekeeping and special political missions. Whether the term is peacekeeping missions or peace operation, the Egyptian emphasis is on the consent-based nature of UN peacekeeping built around the understanding that peacekeeping does not itself deliver peace, but that it is rather an enabler of an ongoing peace process.

Egypt questions the use of terms such as “peace support operations” and “peace enforcement”, when used in a way that may confuse these operations with peacekeeping operations. Egypt views these concepts, and their coercive nature, as a departure from the consent-based approach of peacekeeping, especially in light of the continued lack of a clear and agreed upon definition for them. Egypt has gone as far as openly expressing concerns about what it regards as a deliberate attempt to blur the lines between these concepts and peacekeeping, which it believes would eventually undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the UN as an institution, and of peacekeeping as a tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Consistent with the above are Egypt’s views on the enshrined principles of peacekeeping, namely consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. From an Egyptian point of view, lack of consent of the main parties to the conflict undermines the mission, puts the lives of its personnel at risk, and limits its political and physical freedom of action, hence jeopardising the mission’s chances of success. Egypt equally stresses the importance of impartiality for the success of peacekeeping. Taking sides – or even the appearance of it – would risk making the peacekeeping mission a party to the conflict. Egypt also views the use of force in a peacekeeping mission as a last resort, not as an enforcement mechanism.

However, Egypt’s position concerning the principles of peacekeeping is a dynamic one. On the one hand, there is a recognition that the ever-growing complexity of the modern peacekeeping environment necessitates adaptability, yet one that does not dilute the principles or undermine the efficacy of peacekeeping by blurring the lines with other concepts. On the other hand, there is also an acknowledgement that the way these fundamental principles of peacekeeping play out in practice is far from self-evident.

Egypt’s contribution to peacekeeping missions goes hand in hand with an active role in doctrinal development and policymaking. Egypt has been a vocal participant in various international peacekeeping fora. Most notably, Egypt has been the rapporteur of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) since 1966. In general, Egypt stresses

---

63 Interviews with Egyptian officials.
64 Egypt’s views on the use of force will be discussed later in detail.
that the development of concepts, policies and strategies must be done at the intergovernmental level, and that only ideas and approaches that have been adopted by member states collectively would be implemented. Egypt also insists that the C34 is the only body entitled to reviewing UN Peacekeeping Operations in all its aspects.

Egypt has consistently advocated a comprehensive approach to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.65 Within that framework, Egypt views peacekeeping as an important component of a larger strategy that equally stresses the pivotal role of conflict prevention and mediation through early warning, good offices and similar endeavours, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.66 It is no surprise therefore that Egypt has welcomed the emphasis placed by the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations on the “primacy of politics”.67

In the same token, Egypt has been a consistent advocate of the development-security nexus and of a better integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. In the pursuit of lasting peace and to prevent relapse to conflict, Egypt views both sets of activities as overlapping and mutually-reinforcing,68 not as two phases of a consequential process.

Consistent with its position on all issues of peacekeeping, Egypt emphasises the absolute necessity of respecting state sovereignty and national ownership. Egypt therefore insists that all activities aimed at building national capacities and developing the linkage between peace and development must be in accordance with the host country’s strategies and priorities.

Egypt has consistently been a promoter of realistic and achievable mandates, based upon an objective assessment of needs. Egypt also emphasises the importance of fully and carefully considering the availability of resources69 to achieve the link between policy formulation and implementation on the ground. It is of the view that the mandate design should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, especially respect of state sovereignty and host-nation owner-

65 Ibid.
ship, The UN should avoid creating mandates that lack the necessary political support. Mandates should also conform to the enshrined principles of peacekeeping.

Egypt highlighted its stance on the recommendations of HIPPO Panel during the General Assembly debate held on 12 October 2015. Egypt endorsed the Panel’s call for a renewed focus on prevention, but highlighted that early prevention shouldn’t be used as a backdoor for intervening in other states affairs. Egypt also underlined the importance of upholding peacekeeping principles and establishing concrete mechanisms between the Security Council and regional and sub-regional actors to strengthen global-regional partnerships.\(^{70}\)

Moreover, and as a top T/PCC, Egypt has been at the forefront of calls for the full participation of T/PCCs, together with the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, in doctrinal development, policy formulation and mandates design and extension. Egypt sees this triangle as the only guarantee of realistic and feasible mandates, and as a means of achieving the aspired partnership and required effectiveness for the activities of the UN peacekeeping.\(^{71}\) Changes to the mandates of peacekeeping missions should be preceded by consultations with troop-contributing countries and securing their consent for any change.

Egypt’s position with regards to protection of civilians (POC) resonates with its position on other concepts, most notably the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It views R2P as a political term in need of further deliberations and clarification to bring it to conformity with the UN Charter and relevant principles of international law. Egypt also insists that the only negotiated document that includes the concept R2P is the World Summit Outcome Document, and that any further steps on R2P, including the interpretation of the concept, should be based on the acceptance of the general membership of the UN.\(^{72}\) Egypt has also explicitly expressed concern about using R2P “as a back door for disguised military intervention”\(^{73}\).

It is no surprise therefore that Egypt’s position on the protection of civilians in armed conflict is one of placing emphasis on the role of peacekeeping in support of national efforts in this regard. The primary

---


\(^{73}\) Ibid.
responsibility for the protection of civilians rests with the state and parties to the conflict, in accordance with the purposes of the Charter and the enshrined principles of peacekeeping.

Egypt highlights that POC in peacekeeping missions, must be mandated, and must be limited to the cases of an imminent and direct threat to civilian populations. It should not be used as a pretext for military intervention by the UN in conflicts, nor as diluting the concept and practice of impartiality vis-à-vis the parties of any specific conflict. Egypt also highlights the legal difficulties related to the characterization of civilians in armed conflicts as combatants, especially in conflicts that have armed civilian parties. Finally, Egypt stresses the need for improving the process of planning, most notably improving the consultative process between the Security Council and troop contributing countries and securing the necessary resources to enable the mission to carry out its POC mandate.

In general, Egypt maintains that the use of force should be as a measure of last resort and that it must be minimal, calibrated, proportional, and in conformity with rules of engagement and international humanitarian law, used in self-defence or in the defence of the mandate. Egypt has also been among the countries – mostly emerging powers and T/PCCs – that view the growing robustness of UN peacekeeping with concern, regarding definition, scope and applicability. On the one hand, there is a worry that the growing robustness of peacekeeping missions would dilute or compromise the core principles of UN peacekeeping, turning the mission into a party to the conflict, and in the process undermining faith in the UN. On the other hand, adaptability to the changing environment and new and emerging threats, challenges and risks must be weighed against the operational implications for missions in the field from the growing resort to force.

Egypt is a supporter of a more prominent role for regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security, and of a closer cooperation with the UN in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. This covers the full spectrum of peace efforts, including peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Egypt also maintains that the UN – as the organization with the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security – has a crucial role to play in support of regional organizations, politically, financially,logistically and in the field of capacity building.

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
Egypt recognises “the pivotal role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building as outlined in the Security Council Resolution 1325.” It has joined the International Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. Egypt has reiterated its support for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the landmark resolution on “Women, Peace and Security,” and announced its backing for the United Nations Secretary General’s recent call to strengthen the role of women within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. Several high-ranking Egyptian officials have made it clear that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 remains a priority for Egypt as it is consistent with the country’s vision to enable women on all levels. This has culminated in concrete efforts, as the Egyptian National Council for Women has put forth a national plan to follow-up on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Nonetheless, Egypt sees that UNSCR 1325 lacks key components and ignores important aspects that are necessary to empowering women while taking issues such as control and confidentiality of collected information into consideration within the current global context. The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shourky, recently highlighted that the UNSCR 1325, in its current form, fails to give attention to “the suffering of women under foreign occupation” and ignores the “consequences of linking international human rights law with international humanitarian law” which has led to the politicisation of initiatives undertaken under the guise of “women, peace and security.” Shoukry has also been firm in stressing that “national sovereignty considerations” were ignored while implementing the resolution and that “informal and inaccurate” information have been utilised to evaluate the impact of projects pertaining to the “women, peace and security agenda.”

On the issue of use of new technologies, Egypt has been among a group of countries calling for a thorough examination of utilising high-technology equipment in peacekeeping operations, and the political, legal and financial ramifications of doing so.

With regards to funding and mission support, Egypt is of the view that peacekeeping missions should have predictable and sustainable resources, be it financial, human or logistical, to implement their mandates. While providing these resources is the responsibility of all Mem-

---

78 “Statement by Minister Sameh Shoukry, Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt, In the debate session held by the Spanish Presidency on the occasion of the ongoing review of Security Council Resolution 1325.” Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Published on 15 October 2015. Accessible online: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Ministry/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=c75dfb10-9c71-4115-9704-97418fa64260
79 Ibid.
ber States, developed countries should shoulder a larger burden, especially in providing funding and critical resources, such as strategic lift, technology, training and capacity building.

Egypt on its part has invested in training and capacity building. The Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) – plays an intrinsic role in training Egyptian and African peacekeepers. In addition to pre-deployment training of Egyptian peacekeepers, CCCPA offers integrated multidimensional training in issues of conflict resolution, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The Center has expanded its thematic areas of focus recently to include dealing with transnational threats, such as human trafficking and countering the illicit trade in light arms and small weapons (SALW).
India

Even before India’s independence in 1947, Ms Vijayalaksmi Pandit, leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly’s first session in New York (October-December 1946) pledged commitment to the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the UN Charter. As a founding member of the United Nations, India strongly supports the purpose and principles of the United Nations. It has been her endeavour to make significant contributions towards implementing the goals of the UN Charter and to the UN’s specialised programmes and agencies.

With the increased commitment in peacekeeping of the UN in the post-Cold War era, India has continued to provide commanders, armed military contingents, military observers, and staff officers, as also Indian Air Force attack and utility helicopters, to many of the UN missions deployed to keep the peace in various parts of the world. India’s contributions include Korea 1950-1954, Indo-China in 1954-1970, Middle East 1956-1967, Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964 with Brigade Group and Air Force, Iran and Iraq in 1988/90 after the bloody conflict in the region; on the Iraqi-Kuwait border after the Gulf War in 1991; Angola in 1989/91, and again in 1995/99; Central America in 1990/92; El Salvador in 1991; Cambodia 1992/93; Mozambique 1992/94, Liberia in 1993; Somalia (1993-94) (UNITAF & UNOSOM II) with a Brigade Group composed of 5000 personnel from the Indian Army and four battleships from the Indian navy; Rwanda in 1994/96; Sierra Leone in 1998/2001; Lebanon from 1998 to date; Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001/2009; the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1999 to date; Cote d’Ivoire from 2003 to date, Burundi in 2003/2006; Sudan/South Sudan from 2005 to date, and the Golan Heights from 2006 to date.

India has also provided police personnel to a number of United Nations missions such as in Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Congo, and in Liberia (where it has created history by providing all-women formed police units that

80 The country study of India was undertaken by the United Services Institute of India (USI-India).
India has to date (31 Dec 2015) contributed nearly 180,000 troops, in more than 44 missions and has suffered 159 Indian peacekeepers fatalities the largest number from any country, while serving in UN missions.\(^{84}\) India currently (as on 31 Dec 15) contributes 7798 troops, military observers and staff officers and police personnel in 12 of the 16 current UN peace operations. India’s major deployments are 4022 personnel with MONUSCO in the DR Congo, 2187 personnel with UNMISS in South Sudan, 898 military personnel with UNIFIL in Lebanon; and a contingent of 191 personnel with UNDOF in the Golan Heights. As the third largest contributor of troops and police personnel to the UN peacekeeping, India provides 7.6 per cent of the total contributions of all the T/PCCs.

As an emerging power, India’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions represents an ideal opportunity to project India as a responsible and conscientious nation with non-aligned credentials. India aspires to be recognised as a great power that has influence on the world stage, and has aspiration of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Compared to many other troop contributing countries from developing countries, India has a better economic status and comfortable levels of foreign exchange reserves. With vibrant and open economy, the financial remunerations in US dollars that come from participating in UN peacekeeping operations are not an attraction and motivation for participating in peacekeeping operations. To the contrary, India’s Controller Audit General has found that the Indian exchequer incurs a net loss due to the UN deployments. The report tabled in the Indian parliament in February 2014 stated that the UN owes $81.15 million as reimbursements on account of the UN deployments.\(^{85}\)

UN peacekeeping missions provide the Indian military and police personnel exposure to newer conflict situations and an opportunity to work with other armies/police personnel of the world and thus widen their perspective. While this is true, it has a limited motivational value towards the contribution to the UN peacekeeping as the Indian Defence Forces these days have other opportunities such as participation joint

---


military exercises with other countries including developed countries both at home and abroad. However, it is definitely considered a tool for military diplomacy, as the Indian troops at many places have created goodwill with the local population and therefore can be utilized for furthering economic and strategic goals.

The Indian defence forces have also been involved in two regional non-UN peacekeeping operations. The first was in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, the second in Maldives in 1988. In addition to this, India has also undertaken nation building in Afghanistan.

**Sri Lanka**

Indian government considering the pro-Tamil sentiments in its state of Tamil Nadu signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on July 29, 1987, and deployed a peacekeeping force on the island. The Indian government became the principal guarantor of a solution to the ethnic violence that had heightened dramatically since 1983.86 Nearly 60,000 Indian troops participated in this operation as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) between 1987 and 1990.

After the presidential elections in December 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa, the elected president, declared an end to the five-and-a-half-year state of emergency and the IPKF to withdraw. Accordingly, IPKF withdrew in a phased manner by March 1990. During the three-year involvement, some 1,500 Indian troops were killed and more than 4,500 were wounded during this operation. The Sri Lanka mission also resulted in the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a Tamil militant in 1991.

**India’s 1988 intervention in the Maldives**

India’s intervention in the Maldives is a model for the benign security role that India could play in the Indian Ocean. It was undertaken at the express invitation of the democratic Maldivian government. India undertook the intervention alone and demonstrated its ability to airlift troops over long distances and successfully intercept the plotters at sea. India demonstrated that it could execute a combined services operation in an efficient and timely manner. “Operation Cactus” as this intervention was known, enhanced India’s prestige enormously and showcased India’s

---

capability to mount a successful operation at short notice. There was universal acknowledgement of India’s role.\textsuperscript{87}

**Afghanistan**

India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. India realizes that stability can prevail in Afghanistan only if all the major actors and countries have a stake in its stability, growth and prosperity. India has, thus, been championing efforts to attract regional and trans-regional investment into Afghanistan that provides a viable alternative to the dominant narrative of extremism and offers job opportunities to its population, by pioneering events like the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in June 2012.

India’s extensive developmental assistance programme, which now stands at around US 2 billion, is a strong signal of its abiding commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan. India’s assistance has focused on infrastructure, engineering, training, and humanitarian needs. It has constructed the Afghan parliament building, part of the inter province Ring Road, electrical lines, and the Salma Dam, among others. India has also trained Afghan civil servants in Indian academies. The Confederation of Indian Industry has trained more than one thousand Afghans in carpentry, plumbing, and welding. The Self-Employed Women’s Association of India—a women’s trade union—has educated more than three thousand Afghan women in micro-enterprise. India has also signed an MoU for 57 projects in July 2014 and for 13 ongoing small development projects (SDPs) in October 2014 (under US$ 100 million commitment for SDP) covering Public Health, Education, and community infrastructure in various provinces of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{88}

The Indians have learned some valuable lessons in the above three operations. These include the realisation that better coordination is needed between political decision makers and the defence forces and other department of the government for such missions. It also emerged that better intelligence, training, equipment, and command and control are required to undertake interventionist peace operations. This experience is probably embedded in the psyche of policy makers while defining the guidelines for the UN peacekeeping operations.

The resurgence of India’s peace operations since the 1990s is based more on the ideals for which the country stands and not only an overall strategic conception of India’s interests. On the foreign policy side, it is seen as a useful device to promote India’s interests at the UN. On the


military side, both for the Ministry of Defence and the Indian Defence Forces, peacekeeping has never been a major priority amidst the multiple challenges of internal security and territorial defence. The political leadership, which is more focused on the diplomatic value of peacekeeping, has not sought to publicly articulate the strategic rationale for India’s international peacekeeping efforts in terms of a white paper or any published official document. India’s approach, has been mostly driven by the inherited traditions.

Nevertheless, a broad debate has begun in India about peacekeeping amidst a broader global discussion on the future of peacekeeping. A number of imperatives for change are indeed likely to modify India’s approach to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now likely to be seen as less of a lofty ideal, and future participation in UN peacekeeping operations would need to be justified in the context of the changing nature of India’s security interests. As an emerging trading nation — more than 40 per cent of India’s current GDP is linked to imports and exports – India is dependent on import of natural resources and export markets for sustaining high economic growth rates and improving the living standards of its teeming millions.89

Indians are of the view that the new trend of using peacekeepers to tackle internal political conflicts is an “unsustainable” approach for the maintenance of global peace and security. The new trend of mixing peacekeeping mandates directly affects the operational effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations and exposes traditional mandate peacekeepers to unnecessary threats from armed internal conflicts. Greater strategic support and guidance is required for the peacekeeping operations to be effective.

India expresses that the international community must not lose sight of the fact that the protection of civilians is first and foremost, a national responsibility and requires institutions and conditions in which these institutions can function. To do that, it is necessary to strengthen the capacities of the States and their national institutions to enable them to fulfil their responsibility to protect their populations. Peacekeepers, in spite of their best efforts, cannot possibly “protect everyone from everything”.90 Protecting populations is a resource intensive enterprise. It needs sufficient personnel, proper equipment and suitable capacities. Political will of the international community and its ability to provide


adequate resources is critical to the success of missions in fulfilling their protection mandates.

Further, Indians are of the opinion that the civilians are protected best in an eco-system of peace where all its elements work and contribute in tandem; the International Community represented by the Security Council’s efforts should therefore address multiple dimensions of a conflict in a comprehensive and proportionate manner. Protection of civilians does not end with a military or police response. Civilians require humanitarian wherewithal for survival. In this process, the multiple stakeholders should be involved, not just the military. An engagement between warring factions in a conflict situation in a nationally owned and inclusive political process is of paramount importance. This inclusive approach to national reconciliation, anchored in state sovereignty, is the only way to move forward to ensure the protection of civilians in an effective, pragmatic, and enduring manner.\textsuperscript{91}

Many dimensions of the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations being mandated by the Security Council, in India’s opinion fall into the basket of peace-building which constitutes a political objective and does not fall under the responsibility of peacekeepers. This leads to a heavier drain on the financial, material and human resources being allocated for peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{92}

India’s policy makers have been stressing that the views of the T/PCCs should be taken into account while formulating peacekeeping mandates. The Indians officials have stated that the T/PCCs know the situation on the ground better than most, as they are in touch daily with developments and can – on the basis of practical experience – advise on what needs to be done. They have also expressed concerns about the mixing of the original and new interventionist mandates in peacekeeping operations as these expose the peacekeepers in the same mission who have not signed up to intervention to higher risks.\textsuperscript{93}

India is of the view that the maintenance of international peace and security will become more sustainable if the international community agrees to adopt a holistic and equitable approach to relations between member-states. Capacity building should be a key focus of UN efforts as

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
affected countries emerge from armed conflict situations. If the international community wishes to see sustainable peace and stability, then state institutions, including in the area of security, rule of law and justice, need to be augmented and strengthened. States need to take ownership as they embark on the difficult process of rebuilding their societies and countries including consolidation of democratic ideals and practices, and effective improvements in socio-economic conditions. It is important to recognize that the structural changes can take place only in the mid to long term. The UN and the international community must step up and sustain their support to the affected States in these critical areas.  

It is imperative, in India’s view that the international community fully respects the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all UN member-states. The international community must respect the states’ right to control and manage their affairs, including natural resources. There must be no attempt to be prescriptive about control, management and use of natural resources by the states concerned. The role of the international community, including the relevant UN agencies, should be to enhance development partnerships with countries that experience conflict. This should include higher allocations of financial, technical and human resources by donors and UN agencies and these must be aligned with national priorities of the countries concerned.

India has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the Force Intervention Brigade. The brigade’s deployment makes the UN a party to the conflict, which India as many member states, fear taints the UN’s neutrality with future consequences for peacekeeping operations. It also underscores that the peacekeepers must not become a party to the conflict and must respect the principles of neutrality and impartiality on which peacekeeping was founded. In addition, in India’s views, taking the case of MONUSCO, such mixing of mandates directly affects the operational effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations, exposing traditional peacekeepers to unnecessary threats from armed internal conflicts which the United Nations has not itself instigated.

Regional arrangements, in India’s view, can play an appropriate role in assisting the UN in maintaining peace; however, the primacy of the

94 Statement by Mr. M. Krishnasswamy, Member of Parliament & Member of the Indian delegation, during the Open Debate on ‘Women and Peace and Security’ at The United Nations Security Council on October 18, 2013.
UN must be maintained. The UN cannot disengage with the regional alliances by contracting peacekeeping to regional arrangements. It cautions that the impartiality of the UN forces must be maintained as this is a possibility that cannot be ruled out with regionalization and sub-regionalization of peacekeeping. On the operational aspect of cooperation between UN and regional organizations, it has been India’s experience that investment in equipment, logistics and training go a long way in making the peacekeeping operations more viable and sustainable.  

Indians are of the view that the participation of women in peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction efforts is necessary to lay the foundation for durable peace. While agreeing that the UNSCR 1325 and its successor Security Council resolutions have provided a framework for effective institutional arrangement and significant progress has been achieved but much more needs to be done.  

Indians believe that the failure of preventive diplomacy gives rise to greater demand for resources to tackle threats to international peace and security. A successful special political mission can create the framework for a sustainable peace, which can be then mid-wifed through time-bound peacekeeping operations. This is illustrated by the work being done by UNAMA in Afghanistan especially due to the draw-down of international forces from that country.  

On the financial aspects of the mandates, India has been expressing that multidimensional mandates have created a situation wherein new mandates of UNPKOs given without providing for matching financial resources. The larger issue of financial imbalance must be taken into account when looking at the issue of the providing sustainable and predictable financial support to the peacekeeping operations.  

Finally, to conclude, India has strong democratic credentials and a fairly consistent foreign and security policy. India has developed a consensus-based foreign and security policy over decades. Changing domestic political alignments have not so far brought about significant changes in its foreign policy. There is a balanced consideration of domestic defence priorities and global diplomatic aspirations. The Indian

---

98 Statement by Mr. M. Krishnaswamy, Member of Parliament & Member of the Indian Delegation, during the Open Debate On ‘Women and Peace and Security’ at the United Nations Security Council On October 18, 2013.  
Government so far has not been questioned about its UN troop deployments and the related challenges. With an emerging educated and socially minded public and a very active media, the government’s decisions are being increasingly put through public scrutiny. The possibility of domestic pressures affecting the foreign policy related to peacekeeping should not be ruled out.

India is pleased that the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has recognized the issues and concerns raised by India and looks forward to their early consideration. India’s commitment to UN Peacekeeping remains strong and will grow. Indian Prime Minister while speaking at the UN Summit in September 2015 had announced new intended contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. These include additional battalions of up to 850 troops in existing or new operations; an additional 3 Police units with higher representation of female peacekeepers; commitment to provide critical enablers; deployment of technical personnel in UN missions; and, additional training for peacekeepers at the Indian facilities in India and in the field.\(^{100}\)

---

Participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been a crucial element of Indonesia's foreign policy since its independence in 1945. As of December 2015, Indonesia deployed 2854 military and police personnel to 9 UN missions, ranking it as the 12th largest contributor to UN peace operations. At the world peacekeeping summit in New York in September 2015, Indonesia pledged a further contribution of one composite battalion and a Formed Police Unit (FPU), and underscored its vision of deploying 4000 uniformed peacekeepers by 2019. The turning point in the upward trajectory of Indonesia’s contributions was 2006, when it contributed a total of 1058 personnel to 5 missions.

The nature of Indonesia’s deployment has evolved over the past five years. In the past, Indonesia used to primarily deploy in support capacities such as medical and engineering units in the less risky areas of responsibility of a mission. Now, it increasingly deploys more infantry battalions and other assets that have a ‘frontline’ function—such as maritime capabilities, mechanized infantry battalions, and FPUs. One area where it seeks to increase its ‘presence’ is the special political missions.

The modernization of its armed forces and acquisitions of more sophisticated equipment and weaponry are also contributing factors to Indonesia’s growing capability to deploy to complex and non-permissive mission environments. It has acquired transport and combat helicopters (e.g. Cougar, Apache, MI-17 and MI-24), large transport aircraft (e.g. C-130s), and armoured personnel carriers (APCs, e.g. Black Fox IFV, Bushmaster). It has also developed and produced its own APCs. Thus, in addition to military and police personnel, Indonesia has developed a capacity to become a contributor of force enablers.

Simultaneously, Indonesia has also sought to be an active voice in the global discourse on the development of policy. One such initiative was the Civilian Capacities initiative. On the policing front, POLRI (kePolisian Negara Republik Indonesia) has been quite engaged in the development of the UN Police’s Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF)
process, including hosting the thematic meeting in 2013. Indonesia often convenes the regional outreach meetings on key peacekeeping issues. Most recently, it hosted the Asia-Pacific meeting on peacekeeping in support of the US-led Peacekeeping Summit initiative.

A significant boost toward more active participation in UN peacekeeping occurred during President Yudhoyono’s government (2004-2014). His government enacted several regulations and laws to strengthen the mechanisms to facilitate Indonesia’s contribution. One of the often-cited reasons was his personal involvement in peacekeeping: Yudhoyono served in UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As President, he aspired to re-shape the country’s image as peacemaker.105

Drivers for Participation
Indonesia’s motivation for participation in peacekeeping, like other “emerging” and “middle” powers, is associated with prestige and some tangible benefits. The preamble to the Indonesian Constitution states that a national objective is to participate in preserving world orderliness based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice. Indonesia’s 1948 foreign policy doctrine of ‘independent and active’ (bebas aktif) continues to be a guiding framework of policy objectives. Indonesia’s main motivations can be classified as financial, socio-cultural and its ambition to become more influential in the region.

Indonesia’s active participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been influenced by the country’s ambition of becoming a significant regional and global power after recovering from severe economic and political crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Significantly, the Indonesian government has linked Indonesia’s participation in UN peace operations to its policy priority of seeking UN reform, notably of the Security Council. Becoming a member of the UN Security Council is viewed as one of the most effective ways for Indonesia to influence reform from inside and to increase its role in international security. According to several high-ranking officials, Indonesia’s intention to increase its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations is strongly linked to its quest for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2019–2020.106 Indonesia is also keen to have greater representation in the UN Secretariat, believing that this would increase its informal influence on the policy development process in the UN.

There is also a socio-cultural dimension to the political drivers to Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping. Indonesia at times seeks to feature its Islamic identity in its foreign policy decisions and to maintain

106 Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.
Muslim solidarity, despite its secular state ideology, to satisfy its domestic public.107 This is illustrated by the relatively large deployment to UNIFIL (Lebanon) compared to other UN missions, which to some extent corresponds with Indonesia’s support for the Palestinian cause. Indonesia’s participation in UNIFIL is believed to allay militants in Indonesia riled by the violence in the Middle East.108 Indonesia’s commitment to deploy peacekeepers to Syria (should a peacekeeping operation be established) can also be viewed through this lens.109

Participating in UN peacekeeping is seen as an effective way to manage the so-called idle security capacities, a useful force projection exercise, and a way to increase professionalism among the personnel.110 It is also a means of rehabilitating the negative image of the security forces who committed human rights violations during the authoritarian regime of Suharto.

Financially, the UN reimbursements are a significant incentive for the individual military or police personnel to apply for deployment as the US$1028 compensation is triple the domestic monthly salary. At the governmental level, the reimbursements help to offset the high costs of maintaining equipment since the national budget allocated for military spending remains low.111 An indirect economic motivation is promotion of Indonesia’s nascent military industry. The home-grown Anoa armoured personnel carrier (APC), used in Lebanon and Darfur, has attracted several countries due to its competitive price and adaptability. Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal and Oman have expressed interest in acquiring the Anoa for their peacekeeping contributions.112

Concepts and Terminology
Indonesia recognizes that the political contexts and operational environments of UN peace operations are increasingly complex and require multifaceted responses. For Indonesia, the preferred terminology is ‘peacekeeping operations’ or ‘peacekeeping tasks’ (tugas perdamaian) as articulated in the 2008 Defence White Paper. The TNI (Indonesian armed

---

108 Ibid.
111 Despite significant increase of defence budget over the past ten years, the total military spending is still around 0.8 % of total GDP and the TNI will still struggle to achieve its minimum effective force goals by 2024.
forces) loosely refers to peacekeeping operations as ‘military operations other than war’.\textsuperscript{113}

There appears to be a view amongst Indonesian officials, that UN peacekeeping is solely an activity under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and that operations under Chapter VII are, instead, peace enforcement operations because they are authorized to use force. The latter include operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, some officials contend that Indonesia does not participate in Chapter VII operations, that missions such as MINUSCA or UNAMID are ‘Chapter VI and a half’ missions.\textsuperscript{114} There is overwhelming consensus that the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in MONUSCO is a peace enforcement measure.\textsuperscript{115} Indonesia is concerned that the FIB model may be the start of a new trend in UN peacekeeping.

### Principles of Peacekeeping

Indonesia asserts that the core principles—consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate—are still intrinsic to the conduct of UN peacekeeping. They are integral to the legitimacy, credibility and, eventually, success of a UN peace operation, and should not be undermined. However, with its growing operational experience, Indonesia acknowledges that the current contexts in which peace operations deploy may give rise to situations where the principles may be challenged and cannot be strictly applied. Indonesia therefore contends that it is ever more important that there is clarity of purpose and intent when UN peacekeeping missions are authorized. This is reflected in numerous statements made to various peacekeeping-related forums in the UN.\textsuperscript{116}

Indonesia places particular importance on the *principle of consent*. As an emerging large-scale contributor, Indonesia has been cautious and selective in the choice of the missions it contributes to. It has stated that it would shy away from missions where consent was ambiguous.\textsuperscript{117} In cases where consent from one main conflict party—the host government—has become the accepted minimum level of consent, in part because of the fragmentation of non-state conflict parties, Indonesia has not raised any particular objection to the dilution of the principle.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{113} TNI Act 24/2004.
\textsuperscript{114} Authors interviews with government officials, March 2015.
\textsuperscript{115} Authors interviews with government officials, March 2015.
\textsuperscript{117} Author’s Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, May 2011, in paper presented to SWP.
\textsuperscript{118} Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.
Equally, Indonesia recognizes that consent is dynamic and fluid and is differentiated at the strategic and tactical levels. Indonesia also believes that the principle of consent also applies to operational issues such as the use of certain modern technologies in UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{119}

The principle of impartiality is important for Indonesia, as apart from other issues it helps ensure safety and security to its peacekeepers. In 2013 Indonesia was approached to provide a C-130 to MONUSCO; keen to be a more strategic contributor than just a provider of personnel, Indonesia responded positively to the request.\textsuperscript{120} During the negotiations with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), when it became apparent that the C-130 may at times be used to support the transportation of FIB troops, Indonesia quickly withdrew its offer as it did not want to be involved in a ‘grey area’ or be open to the potential legal ramifications.\textsuperscript{121}

The growing inter-linkages between the principles of impartiality and the non-use of force, particularly in the context of protection of civilians (POC) mandates, and their implications for the overall legitimacy of UN peacekeeping are of concern to Indonesia. One such example is the deployment of the FIB. Although Indonesia had some reservations that the FIB ran the risk of MONUSCO being perceived as a party to the conflict, thereby negating its impartiality; Indonesia and the other T/PCCs were assured that the FIB would not prejudice their own participation in MONUSCO. In 2014, the UN Office of Legal Affairs unambiguously said that the Security Council’s authorization of the FIB had made the mission a party to the conflict and clearly jeopardized the principle of impartiality.\textsuperscript{122} This raised a strong rebuke from the Indonesian government because the FIB deployment had squarely impinged on Indonesia’s efforts to adhere to the principle of impartiality.

The use of force in a UN peacekeeping operation is a sensitive issue for Indonesia. In earlier years, Indonesia took a conservative and principled position on the ‘non-use of force except in self-defence’ principle and objected to the interpretation of the term ‘self-defence’ to include ‘pre-emptive strike’ or ‘anticipatory self-defence’.\textsuperscript{123} With growing experience, Indonesia recognizes that a more proactive self-defence is at


\textsuperscript{120} Indonesia was already contributing an engineering contingent.

\textsuperscript{121} Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.


\textsuperscript{123} Statement by H.E. Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations on Agenda Item: 34 “Compre-
times necessary. It also accepts the notion of robust peacekeeping. Rhetorically, however, Indonesia maintains that the prevalent use of force is not in keeping with the values of UN peacekeeping. It has called for a clearer definition of the term ‘robust peacekeeping’, and for a sharper distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.\(^{124}\)

Indonesia fully supports the analysis of the high-level panel on peace operations that the UN is not suited to counterterrorism operations. Equally, Indonesia affirms that peace enforcement measures or operations should be undertaken with extreme caution. It would welcome the recommendation to draw up criteria for when UN peacekeeping missions could use force.

One practical reason for Indonesia’s opposition to the growing trend of robust peacekeeping is that it requires a concomitant increase in advanced force protection measures, which Indonesia is not yet able to provide to its troops.\(^{125}\) Indonesia has yet to delineate its own threshold for robust peacekeeping and its participation in missions such as MINUSMA and MINUSCA, which operate in hostile and volatile environments, may further shape its position on this principle.

Indonesia broadly agrees that one of the imperatives of contemporary UN peacekeeping is the protection of civilians. Although Indonesia agrees with the POC norm, it has questions on how the norm is operationalised.

POC has added a layer of complexity to the ‘use of force’ issue for Indonesia. It has led to some within the government to conflate POC with the use of force: several officials have indicated that POC mandates automatically require the use of force.\(^{126}\) In particular, the TNI thinks that POC is a task primarily for the military component.\(^{127}\) This conflation is partly explained by the growing pattern that Indonesia witnesses in the global peacekeeping landscape in which POC is seemingly the overriding justification for many recent developments (e.g. the FIB, the use of unarmed UAVs, etc.). Indonesia also perceives that carrying out POC mandates has led to an increasing softening of the core principles. To that end, Indonesia has insisted on the need to clarify the scope and role


\(^{126}\) Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.

\(^{127}\) Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.
of peacekeepers in protecting civilians. Additionally, it underlines that the UN’s role should be a supporting one to the host governments.

Indonesia has consistently advocated for UN peacekeeping to have clear and achievable mandates. Indonesia would probably welcome the recommendation of the high-level panel to enact a two-stage sequenced mandating process. Additionally, Indonesia is of the position that it should be more inclusive and draw in potential T/PCCs.

Indonesia has called for deepening the triangular cooperation between the Secretariat, Security Council and T/PCCs and articulated for a stronger role of T/PCCs in the decision-making processes. Indonesia argues that T/PCCs need to be fully aware of the situation they are getting into, and early on in the process. This is particularly the case when mandates undergo significant changes or when they are being renewed. A notable example was the lack of sufficient consultation with T/PCCs on the decision to create the FIB in MONUSCO prior to the Security Council resolution. To improve the triangular cooperation, Indonesia, among other countries, has called for more discussions and decisions on strategic policies as well as operational directives to be made in the C-34. The panel’s proposal for an institutionalized framework for the triangular consultations between the Security Council, the contributing countries and the Secretariat, would also be received positively.

At the mission level, Indonesia believes that, to avoid uneven implementation of the mandate, greater harmonization in the understanding and interpretation of the mandate is necessary among contingent commanders and the mission leadership. To address its related concerns that contingent commanders do not have sufficient influence over the performance of the mission or lack clarity over the mission mandate, Indonesia appears to be advocating for contingent commanders to be included in the mission leadership. The panel’s call for mission leadership to engage early with contingent commanders on changes to the mission mandate is a concrete step in addressing Indonesia’s concerns.

There is a general acceptance by Indonesia that peace operations serve as early peacebuilders. What is open to question however, is when the ‘early peacebuilding’ ends and when the ‘sustainable peacebuilding’ efforts begin. Indonesian officials have stated that there is an insufficient discussion of what the objectives of the early peacebuilding tasks are, what the standards should be and, more fundamentally, what the tasks themselves should be. Critically, Indonesia underlines that ‘the primary responsibility of identifying priorities and strategies, in particular

---

128 Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.
129 Authors interview with government officials, March 2015.
for post-conflict peacebuilding, should remain in the hands of host countries.\textsuperscript{130}

Indonesia’s growing involvement in UN peace operations is likely to shape its views and position on the practice of peacekeeping. Indonesia thus far has been a relatively accommodating T/PCC. It often acquiesces to DPKO’s requests and rarely places limits or restrictions by way of caveats on how its troops or police are to be deployed. Indonesia can be said to be testing the waters in peacekeeping to assess the different operational environments and to see what plays to its strengths. Indonesia’s desire to build a resolute, positive image also partly explains its keenness to perform well in missions. As Indonesia’s experience deepens, it may begin to put its self-interests ahead of its desire to maintain a good reputation.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
Russia considers peacekeeping one of the main functions of the UN. Russia consistently prioritizes peacekeeping as an important multilateral instrument, which should be applied to reduce conflict among international actors and manage crises that threaten international law and security.\(^3\) As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation inherited the Soviet Union’s political assets and responsibilities regarding peacekeeping, including its central role on the UN Security Council. At present, Russia has 92 personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping missions, including: 29 police officers, 60 military observers, and three troops.\(^3\) Current numbers of personnel are lower than average for Russia, which in 2010 was 366 personnel, which includes: 55 police officers, 77 military observers, and 239 troops.

Russian personnel have previously served in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), and East Timor (UNMIT). Russian (at the time Soviet) participation in UN peacekeeping missions dates back to the second United Nations Emergency Force mission established in 1973 to quell troop activity in the Middle East.

The largest military contingent Russia ever contributed to a UN mission served in the former Yugoslavia. On March 6, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a resolution sending 900 Russian peacekeepers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 400 of which were transferred to Kosovo in 1999. In June 1999, an additional 3,600 Russian troops were sent to Kosovo, where they stayed until July 2003. The most technically equipped mission that Russia has been engaged in took place in Sudan in 2006, consisting of 120 men and 4 helicopters.

Russia’s contribution has historically ranked somewhere between twentieth and fortieth, depending on the year in question; significantly lower than the United Kingdom, France, China, and many others. The

---

[^3]: The country study of Russia was undertaken by the Centre for World Politics and Public Diplomacy (CWPPD) in Moscow.
[^3]: According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov.

Russia is committed to deterring and preventing military conflicts as reflected in Article 19 of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which calls for Russia “to participate in international peacekeeping activities, including under the auspices of the United Nations and within the framework of interaction with international (regional) organizations.”\footnote{Text of newly-approved Russian military doctrine, 2010. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf} This document serves as the legal basis for Russia’s participation in peacekeeping operations by both the UN and other international regional organizations.

Russia only contributes about 2% of the annual UN peacekeeping budget. Leading Russian expert Alexander Nikitin notes that this “reflects the fact that while Russia pays its assessed contributions for UN peacekeeping it does not make significant additional voluntary contributions.”\footnote{Alexander Nikitin. “The Russian Federation”, in: Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds.) \textit{Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions}. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). p. 163.} Russia is also the second largest supplier of contractor services. “In 2011, Russian companies held contracts from the UN worth $382 million, [all of which comprised of aviation transportation services] and composed 14% of [total] UN peacekeeping services.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 163.}

Russian support to UN peacekeeping activities should be understood in the context of its broader policy towards the UN. In relation to world order, Moscow attributes enormous importance to the United Nations as the central institution in the global political architecture. Russia, does not consider herself a revisionist power, but a status-quo power (although some experts would also argue that Russia is a ‘descending power.’) Furthermore, Russia insists on preserving the original Yalta – Potsdam international system.\footnote{Wilson, J. (2004), quoted in David Scott, \textit{China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System} (London: Routledge, 2007). P. 99.} Assertive actions taken by Russia, for example in relation to Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, should be considered not revisionist initiatives, but a reaction to aggressive actions undertaken by the West. These actions have attempted to change the status-quo by broadening the West’s sphere of influence.
Policy Concept, which states that, “...international relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations.”

The current leadership of the Russian Federation maintains a more realist understanding of world order than its liberal counterparts, in which the world is seen as a competitive arena where nations simply attempt to promote their national interests. Russia believes that the United Nations is the key mechanism in seeking compromises between nations as well as the only institution that, despite its problems, can maintain global stability and predictability. Russia sees the world without the UN as dangerous, unpredictable, prone to conflicts, and, certainly, unfair.

The current Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of 2013 states that, “the United Nations should remain the center of international relations and coordination in world politics in the 21st century, as it has proven to have no alternative and also possesses unique legitimacy. Russia supports the efforts aimed at strengthening the UN’s central and coordinating role.”

Peacekeeping operations conducted in regions of direct strategic interest to Russia are considered both an instrument for keeping the peace and resolving humanitarian problems as well as a tool for pursuing international leverage and maintenance of national policy interests. Russia’s strategy towards peacekeeping is not unlike that of other nations. Russia takes both a pragmatic and, fundamentally, realist outlook (based on a range of issues related to peacekeeping) in order to form foreign policy. Principally, Russia views peacekeeping as a component of its foreign policy and, thus, participation is determined based on Russia’s national interests. Consistently, Russia tends to support interventions that preserve the status quo. This stance is applicable in many respects to Russia’s foreign policy structure.

The Russian government believes that the UN Security Council should customarily sanction international peacekeeping missions. Only in exceptional cases and through intergovernmental agreements should peacekeeping operations by regional organisations be authorised. However, this exception is applicable only when a regional organisation initialises a mission within their prescribed geographical boundaries. Peacekeeping missions beyond these legal premises are to be considered illegal and a violation of international law.

Generally, Russia believes that UN peacekeeping operations have not been sufficiently effective and implementation strategies require urgent

---

140 Ibid.
reform. However, Moscow does not consider institutional structural to be the root cause of such failure. Instead, actions by the US and its Western allies have been the primary drivers of ineffective initiatives. Moscow’s relationship with its Western partners has undergone a series of changes. Immediately after the fall of the USSR, Russia actively participated in international peacekeeping and shared similar goals as those of the West. Yet, it soon became apparent that peacekeeping operations were being used for political benefit (rather than for their stated purpose of conflict resolution), in particularly during the US and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. The need for reform of the UN peacekeeping system became impeccably clear following the forced breakup of Yugoslavia, the disagreeable punishment of the Milošević regime, and other such situations.

The Assistant Director of the Department of International Organizations of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Zaemskii himself asserted that,

“a new level of regulations put forth by the world community on the issue of peacekeeping activities, substantially broadened the range of goals and means for their attainment. On one hand, the established methods of peacekeeping have undergone a substantial evolution, on the other, the number of tasks that must be addressed in the course of peacekeeping operations have multiplied exponentially. The variety of forms of modern peacekeeping methods, including with the participation of regional organizations or coalitions, is a natural and necessary development, but what must remain immutable is the lead role of the UN as the only universal organization of its kind, to whose charter all members of the international community are bound to adhere.”

In Moscow’s opinion, necessary UN peacekeeping reforms consist of two principal components: the increase of the effectiveness of the crisis-reaction mechanism and the development of clear legal guidelines for the use of force in international relations. The UN Security Council should spearhead reforms. First and foremost, measures need to be taken to enhance the quality of both preparation and implementation of peacekeeping operations. To realize this goal, it is necessary to create various well-trained multinational teams. Each team would consist of 5,000 people and would need to be deployable to any crisis centre within a month. The Security Council should provide a clear and obtainable mandate to these teams, and multinational teams in turn should strictly adhere to this mandate.

Secondly, it is the opinion of the Russian Federation, that sanction regime frameworks should be seriously revised. In a best case scenario revised sanction regimes would be: approved by the UN Security Council; consist of defined time-limits; as well as include built in review periods in regards to possible humanitarian consequences, civilian suffering, and the negative effects of sanctions on ‘third’ countries.

Thirdly, Russia continues to support the reinvigoration and activation of a UN Security Council Military Staff Committee. Finally, Moscow supports the expansion of partnerships between the UN and regional organizations, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Moscow considers increasing coordination between the UN and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the area of peacekeeping as an example of successful progress in partnership. Nonetheless, Russia opposes the replacement of the UN by regional structures.142

In addition, Russia emphasises that peacekeeping activities must adhere to fundamental principles of international law, in particular the UN Charter. For example, Russian representatives have introduced a proposal to the UN to collectively clarify the limitations of the use of force in the context of globalisation. Legal principles may not be used to violate the basic principles of sovereignty and state territorial integrity. The US has consistently violated these principles based on artificial justifications such as: ‘limited sovereignty,’ ‘humanitarian intervention,’ and/or the ‘responsibility to protect.’143

In addition, Russia considers ‘precedent’ as a key principle of international law. Although Russia protested against the independence of Kosovo in 2008, it referred to the principle of ‘precedent’ when granting recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the Crimean referendum in 2014. Yet, Russia rejects the continued monopoly of a small group of chosen countries to interpret and violate international law, and will not initiate such actions itself.

With regards to the normative interpretation of international law, Russia stresses the need for strengthened early warning systems and preventative diplomacy measures. Speaking at the 54th session of the General Assembly in 1999, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov warned,
“The founding fathers of the UN envisioned the capability of responding, on a legal basis, to the violation of peace and security. The international community can resort to coercive measures, but this must be done in accordance with the UN Charter and by a decision of the Security Council. Non-legal means can only compromise legal ends. This is precisely the view that informs our understanding of doctrines such as the concept of “humanitarian intervention”. We must be exceptionally careful in our approach to any coercive measures, and even more so in not allowing them to become a tool of repression to be used against states or peoples that one or another state finds objectionable.”

Russia views peacekeeping initiatives in the context of two central trends. First, regional organizations or coalitions of powerful nations have increasingly begun engagement prior to UN authorization. These actors have either sought a mandate ex post facto or interpreted existing mandates to meet their needs. Thus, essentially eliminating the need for a UN mandate. The second trend is represented in a departure from the traditional, non-partisan nature of UN decisions in response to increased interethnic, religion and/or ideological conflicts. These developments have been understood as a threat to world order and the traditional role of peacekeeping operation as well as an opportunity to advance Russian security interests.

Russia has played a substantial role in the development of UN peacekeeping procedures. These procedures are virtually unilaterally understood as: a clear mandate; consent of the parties in conflict; impartiality of the missions; and the non-use of force by peacekeepers, except in self-defence and in defence of the mission’s mandate. Additionally, Russia regards the non-participation of the military contingents of great powers in peacekeeping missions as a customary principle of peacekeeping. Rather, ‘third’ countries should staff military personnel. This principle was established by the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria.

Russia regularly emphasises that UN decisions should be implemented by regional organisations in their respective region. Additionally, major supra regional powers, such as Russia, must undertake facilitation rather than control of implementation. Russian emphasis of this dynamic derives from scepticism of interference in regional conflicts by U.S. and its Western allies. Russia considers interference in opposition to its interests and instead a potential pathway for further Western dominance. Secondly, Russia envisions that organisation of the post-soviet space—the traditional sphere of influence of the Russian Federation—should be dominated by organisations where Moscow plays a leading
role such as the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Russia is convinced that African leaders should play a leading role in resolving their own regional conflicts. In May 2014, following a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Partnership of the Republic of South Sudan, Benjamin Barnaba, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stated “The African Union and sub-regional organisations on the continent have proven that they are ready to take the initiative and act as peacekeepers, and they deserve all necessary support from the UN and the Security Council...[As far as future conflict management is concerned, in Somalia, the Central African Republic, Mali, the DRC, and the Great Lake Region as a whole, Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council will continue to play an important part in peacekeeping on the African Continent”.

In some exceptions, Russia accepts the broad interpretation of UN mandates, emphasising the importance of objectives and political consequences rather than the scale of the mission itself. Examples include: Russia’s support of both UN Resolution 2100 on Mali as well as Resolution 1590 on Sudan as well as opposition to US-sponsored resolution on Syria in 2012.

In conclusion, Russia shares the general humanitarian concerns of other members of the international community. Moscow remains opposed to violent actions taken within internal conflicts and prioritises conflicts within Russia’s sphere of national interests. However, peacekeeping interventions should not be conducted for national interests, but rather to maintain the Yalta-Potsdam international system. The following principles reflect Russia’s logic in regards to global politics:

a. Within the context of normal international practice, the interests of state actors shall be prioritized above non-state actors;

b. Attempted regime change—including those undertaken by means of peacekeeping operations—is illegitimate;

c. The UN Security Council is the only body that can legitimately approve peacekeeping operation and international intervention. Outside this framework only intergovernmental agreements,

145 “Vystuplenie I otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannyh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v hode sovмесnoi press-konferentsii po itogam peregovorov s Ministrom inostrannyh del mezhdunarodnyh sotrudnichestva Respubliki Yuzhnyi Sudan B. Barnaboi”, (Speech and Q&A with the media with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov during the course of a joint press conference on the results of talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan, Benjamin Barnaba), Moscow, 26.05.2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Department of Information and Press, Information Bulletin. 23-26 May 2014. P. 14 (author’s translation).
which include the state whose territory the operation will take place in, can serve as a legitimate exception to this principle;

d. All other attempts at ‘peacekeeping’ that lack such mandates (e.g., ‘coalitions of the willing’) are illegitimate;

e. Peacekeeping operations should not result in geopolitical or economic achievements by the initiating countries; and

f. In determining mandate objective and priorities, neighbouring countries possess a stronger vested interest in the region. Thus, their opinions should be considered before those of international actors from outside the region.

The Russian view is that attempts to manage crises through unilateral sanction and other coercive measures outside the framework of the UN Security Council, including armed aggression, are in direct conflict with global peace and stability. Additionally, some international concepts are being utilised under the guise of civilian protection to overthrow legitimate authorities. Coercive measures and military force without the approval of the UN Security Council will not eliminate profound socio-economic, ethnic and other antagonisms that cause conflicts.\textsuperscript{146}

Russia conceives current changes in UN peacekeeping operations problematic in two ways: 1) peacekeeping operations have the potential be used unilaterally for geopolitical and economic gains; and 2) such peacekeeping operations, conceived and carried out for geopolitical objectives, may only cause increased chaos and instability. In the instance where these problems are resolved, Russia has no objections to robust peacekeeping missions; the use of force; or implementation of modern equipment, such as reconnaissance drones or other means of technical support of the UN missions.

\textsuperscript{146} Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.
South Africa’s first engagement in international peace operations came about in 1998 when it led a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Combined Task Force intervention into Lesotho to prevent a military coup. South Africa’s first UN deployment came in 1999 when it deployed unarmed military observers to MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Its first major UN contribution came in 2004 when South African troops stationed in Burundi, as part of the African Union (AU) mission to Burundi (AMIB) were re-hatted to form the basis of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Since then South Africans have served in 14 AU and UN peacekeeping missions, with annual contributions of approximately 2,500 soldiers and police officers.

South Africa’s emergence as a contributor to international peace operations has been characterised by several trends. First, its contributions are strongly informed by the country’s political engagements on the African continent, notably its efforts at conflict prevention and management. South African deployments to Burundi and the DRC were characterised by Pretoria’s leading role as a facilitator in the peace processes in both countries, whereas the South African deployment to Darfur paved the way for South Africa to play a role in the resolution of conflicts in the Sudan(s). Second, South Africa has deployed its forces in UN-led operations, through regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as through bilateral arrangements. Third, South Africa’s contributions to peace operations are linked to its growing self-image as an emerging “middle power,” and as an African power, in the international arena. Consequently, South Africa views such operations as a foreign policy tool which can support its ambition to play a leading role in regional and international multilateral forums.

The current growth potential of South Africa as a contributor to international peacekeeping appears limited because defence spending over the course of the past decade has not kept pace with the growth in international deployments. Pretoria’s deployment of approximately 2,500

---

147 The country study of South Africa was carried out by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban.
personnel on peacekeeping duties at any given point in time thus appears to have reached a ceiling for the time-being. In fact, South Africa announced that it will withdraw its battalion in UNAMID in April 2016. This decision seems to be primarily motivated by austerity measures the South African Government is taking in an attempt to reduce Government expenditure. South Africa has deployed various special capacities over the years, including medical, aviation and engineering units, as well as helicopters. South Africa’s most recent deployment as part of the Forced Intervention Brigade, in the eastern DRC as part of MONUSCO, also saw the first deployment of a squadron of South African produced attack helicopters.

South Africa's contributions to international peacekeeping were foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1994). This states that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is to act both in defence of the republic and in fulfilment of international obligations. But this envisaged role proved controversial, and both the Defence White Paper of May 1996 and the subsequent Defence Review of 1998, that argued that the primary role of the SANDF was to protect South Africa’s territorial integrity and that only limited resources should be set aside for international peace operations. However, and additional policy process produced a clear, albeit nascent; policy framework that underpinned the country’s evolving understanding and approach to international peacekeeping.

However, to effectively prepare South Africa for what was (domestically and internationally) expected to become a growing role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, particularly on the African continent, the Department of Foreign Affairs (now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation – DIRCO) developed a White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (the White Paper). This was approved by Cabinet in October 1998 and tabled in Parliament in February 1999, and, arguably, remains the most salient official document, to date, that details the country’s official policy-level understanding and approach to international peace operations. The White Paper importantly, and for the first time – in an official policy paper – broadened the country’s existing understanding of peace operations beyond the role of the SANDF, by including in its prescriptions a civilian as well as police dimension. Additionally, the 1999 White Paper posited a significant contribution to the country’s understanding and approach to international peace operations by arguing that, despite the complex admixture of humanitarian, military and security-related factors, such operations are fundamentally political initiatives – and should be primarily understood as such by all concerned stakeholders and actors. To this effect, the 1999 White Paper explicitly underscored the necessity of basing all future participation in international peace operations on the extent to which such involvement supported and advanced the country’s national interests, with particular regard to six key principles, namely (South Africa’s):
a. Commitment to the promotion of human rights;

b. Commitment to the promotion of democracy;

c. Commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;

d. Commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;

e. Commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs;

f. Commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation in an inter-dependent world.

This broadened political focus thus necessitated a greater elaboration on the operational roles, responsibilities and functions of organs of state, ministries and departments, far beyond previous allusions to the centrality of the Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs. Underpinning the relationship between national interest and the country’s participation in international peace operations, was an appraisal of the how the country’s approach to conflict resolution, in general, was informed by its own recent history – and the subsequent reputation that it had built around this approach within the international system. Subsequently, South Africa officially came to view its involvement and contribution to international peace missions as longer-term endeavours that heavily invest in directed pre- and post-conflict interventions that incorporate preventive diplomacy and peace building in equal measure. Indeed, a growing and increasingly detailed table of technical understandings concerning, inter alia, the substance or nature of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement continued to evolve during this period – which underscored the country’s early appreciation of the utility of the so-called ‘full-spectrum’ approach toward international peace and security.

In this context, the primacy of the UN Security Council, as well as the growing prominence of regional and sub-regional intergovernmental actors to sanction and authorise international peace missions – under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was acknowledged as critical to the country’s future engagements in international peace missions. The focus on regional, and sub-regional, mandates proved to be particularly significant given the institutional evolution of the OAU to the AU – and the consequent evolution of its various components dealing specifically with peace and security issues on the continent. To this effect, the country further recognised that, given certain constraints and shortcomings of the UN system, the significance of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which focuses on the provisions set aside for certain regional and sub-regional bodies to undertake peace missions in their respective regions, on the basis of their own initiative, would be crucial to the effectiveness
of its own approach and role toward the peace and security challenges confronting the continent in general, and Southern Africa in particular.

The 1999 White Paper also provided DIRCO with the lead responsibility of overseeing and coordinating South Africa’s involvement in international peacekeeping missions, and to this effect the Department established a National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM). Aside from being mandated to coordinate South African engagement in international peace operations and maintaining political oversight of such missions, the NOCPM is also tasked to lead Pretoria’s whole-of-government approach to international peace operations, thereby leading the combined planning of the Department of Defence, the Department of Safety and Security, and the National Treasury. While the NOCPM is responsible for overseeing the planning and deployment of personnel in support of international peace missions, the decision to contribute to such operations, however, is ultimately taken at the level of the executive branch of the government, in this case by the Cabinet – with the approval of Parliament. Once the Cabinet has taken a decision to contribute to a peace operation, the decision is relayed by the Minister for International Relations and Cooperation, and the NOCPM initiates a whole-of-government planning and oversight process. This process is the same whether the operation is UN-led, UN-authorized or a non-UN peace operation. In this way, the country has increasingly consolidated its understanding and approach to international peace missions, within a democratic and institutional system that emphasizes public approval, and the application of foreign policy in tandem with the recognition of domestic factors and constraints.

Foreign policy, once formulated, can be implemented by various means. The SANDF accepts its role to act as a foreign policy instrument of the South African Government. In this context, the Draft Defence Review 2014 states that “the promotion of peace and stability in the region and on the continent is a key component of South Africa’s foreign policy.” Additionally, and with particular regard to its official conception of peace missions, South Africa stresses the fact such endeavours must be understood as primarily political in nature – and that its involvement should extend far beyond considerations solely to do with SANDF, to encompass the roles that could be played – for example – by civilians, the police and the deployment of technical expertise to effect capacity-building and reconciliation.

The main rationale driving South African contributions to provide peacekeepers abroad is political. Two political considerations in particular underpin South Africa’s growing desire to contribute to international peace missions. First, South Africa views its own development and prosperity as hinging on the development and prosperity of the African continent. On this basis, the country has articulated a foreign policy which is designed to promote economic and social development
throughout the African continent, which in turn requires the strengthening of peace and security across it. Pretoria therefore views contributions to sub-regional, regional, and UN peace operations as an intrinsic part of its foreign policy aims and objectives. Second, South Africa has increasingly come to use its role as a facilitator in peace processes, which is reinforced through the deployment of peacekeeping personnel, to leverage its position in multilateral forums, especially in the UN. This has allowed South Africa to “punch above its weight,” and has strengthened its case for a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council. Both of these considerations help to explain why all South African contributions to date have been to peace operations in Africa, and why it seems unlikely that Pretoria would consider a deployment outside of the continent.

Additionally, an assessment of the country’s relatively recent interventions and related efforts in terms of regional and continental peace and security does indeed credit the fact that South Africa has not generally appeared to be reluctant to assume a decisive leadership role by, for example, initiating a range of key diplomatic processes, preventive diplomacy engagements, and contributing to multilateral peace missions – as it is understood in terms of the full-spectrum approach. Moreover, throughout these interventions and efforts, South Africa has laid a strong emphasis on the need for obtaining coherent domestic, sub-regional, regional and international mandates in order to inform its responses prior to any on-the-ground interventions, whilst dually acknowledging the utility of multidimensionality throughout all levels of its approach.

Two barriers inhibit an expansion of South African contributions to peacekeeping, namely, the financial costs incurred in peace operations, and capacity-related institutional, or structural, constraints. Contributions to AU and UN peacekeeping missions have proved costly in the past, and South Africa has not always been able to recover costs associated with its deployments. While South Africa has the ability to absorb some of these costs, this is not sustainable in the long-term, and could impact on future decisions to deploy. Capacity-related institutional, or structural, constraints are a major factor that restricts further deployments. South Africa’s ability to properly equip and support personnel deployed abroad for sustained periods of time will likely remain a major obstacle impeding further deployments in the near future. In particular, the country is in need of air lift capabilities to deploy and sustain its personnel to peacekeeping theatres across the continent.

South Africa is actively engaged with SADC, the AU and the UN policy processes to shape future peace operations policies and doctrine. In both SADC and AU contexts, South Africa has supported the development of the SADC Standby Arrangement and the African Standby Force (ASF), and in addition South Africa also played a leading role in the initiative to establish the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis
(ACIRC), as an interim measure, until the ASF is fully operational. In January 2016 the AU declared the ASF operational following the AMANI II field training exercise hosted by South Africa in 2015.

In 2015, South Africa actively engaged in the work of the UN high-level independent panel which carried out a review of UN peace operations and supported the development of an African Common Position on the UN high-level panel. The panel’s endorsement of a strong strategic partnership between the UN and the AU, and the need to secure predictable sources of funding for AU peace operations was welcomed by South Africa, who has campaigned for the same principles at the highest level. South Africa also supports strengthening the UN's ability to carry out its protection of civilians mandate, including through a more robust peacekeeping posture, where necessary, as demonstrated by South Africa’s willingness to contribute troops and helicopters to the Forced Intervention Brigade in the DRC. South Africa is also committed to the importance of developing senior leadership for AU and UN missions. Currently South Africans hold the posts of Special Representative of the UN mission in Afghanistan, Special Representative for the UN at the AU and Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, head of the AU High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan, Force Commander in MONUSCO, and Police Commissioners in UNAMID and AMISOM. South Africa is also strongly committed to the primacy of the political dimension of peace operations, as can be seen by the strong link between South Africa’s peacemaking efforts and its subsequent peace operations deployments.

Despite this progress, certain shortcomings of the SANDF – as alluded to in the country’s 2014 Draft Defence Review – presents a particularly concerning conundrum to the country’s leaders in so far as the question of whether policy should dictate current capacity, or vice versa, is concerned. What is clear, however, is that there may well be a scaling-back of South African participation in international peace operations, in the short- to medium-term, given the SANDF’s current challenges – and the efforts required to arrest this – will have a significant impact on the country’s capacity to live up to its current (and potential future) commitments vis-à-vis regional and continental peace and security. One possible way around this may entail South Africa adopting a more hands-off approach by prioritizing greater regional and continental peace and security responses via regional and continental actors and stakeholders, continuing to stress the merits of preventive action as opposed to post-conflict intervention, and supporting the efforts of other actors through the provision of technical and non-military assistance. Regardless, the final approval of the latest Defence Review will have far-reaching implications and dictate whether or not the country will stray toward continuity or change in its approach to, understanding of, and participation in international peace operations.
Turkey conducts peace operations and related activities through four organizations in the following order of priority: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Within these organizations there are a variety of peace operations that Turkey participates in. These include Chapter VII operations, observer missions, civilian and police missions, rule of law missions, and hybrid missions between the UN and regional organizations. Since 2000, Turkey has participated in a range of missions from the Caribbean, Africa, the Balkans, Caucasuses, and Middle East to Central Asia and the South Pacific. As of September 2015, Turkey has been contributing to 11 UN peace operations, three EU missions, three NATO missions, and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. In addition, Turkey also contributes to the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) in the West Bank, which is an independent mission insularly financed by six participating states.\textsuperscript{151}

Modernisation, security, and, particularly, identity construction have been some of the main motivations behind Turkey joining multilateral organisations such as the UN and participating in their peace operations. Up until the 1990s, Turkey had been largely concerned with the internal and the territorial security of the country and did not participate in peace operations. This began to shift with the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of war in the Balkans in the 1990s, which pushed Turkey to become more engaged in peace operations. Turkey approached these missions from a security and military perspective with troop contributions. This is in part due to Turkey’s prioritisation of NATO missions above others. Such an affiliation and approach has been influenced not only by the country’s challenging neighbourhood and the resulting militarised state of Turkish relations but also by the internal dynamics within the country.

Instigated by Turkey’s candidacy for the EU, a transformation in Turkey’s traditional civil-military relations has occurred over the past dec-

\textsuperscript{150} The country study of Turkey was carried out by the Istanbul Policy Centre (IPC) in Istanbul.

\textsuperscript{151} TIPH website. http://www.tiph.org/en/About_TIPH/. Accessed 20 July 2015. Since 1997 six countries chosen by the PLO and Israel exclusively contribute and finance TIPH with the goal of training and supporting stability in the area. The six countries are Norway, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
ade, with civilian governments gaining increased control over the military and, therefore, decisions regarding peace operations.\textsuperscript{152} Such transformations were also supported by decreased fighting with Kurdish separatists and stable economic growth for much of the 2000s. These internal changes were also accompanied by a realignment of Turkish foreign policy considerations that have directly impacted its engagement in peace operations.

In 2000, a Defence White Paper was produced that states the moral and strategic importance of peace operations to Turkey.\textsuperscript{153} The White Paper is critical for outlining Turkey’s position on peace operations on a number of fronts. It outlines Turkey’s support for regional and multilateral peacekeeping activities that are authorised under the UN Charter. And it highlights regions of strategic priority to Turkey, which include the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, respectively.

These positions were reinforced by the 2005 policy paper, \textit{Concept on Turkey’s Contribution to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations}. Signed by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on March 15, 2005, it is one of the key policy documents for Turkey, outlining the principles to guide Turkish decision-making on peace operations.\textsuperscript{154} The paper, which has not been made publicly available, stipulates that a peace operation must be seen as internationally legitimate and, therefore, authorised by the United Nations Security Council. The paper reinforces the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East as priority geographic areas for Turkey’s participation in peace operations. Another notable aspect of the paper is that it states that peace operations are recognised and prioritised through NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE, respectively. This illustrates Turkey’s preference to work outside UN efforts.

With the rise of the Justice and Development Party, ideational factors, particularly the image of Turkey as an emerging regional actor, have become more prevalent and replaced security concerns as the primary motivation for participating in peace operations. As such, Turkey has been more engaged in multilateral forums. For example, since 2006 Turkey’s financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have been increasing. It is the 22\textsuperscript{nd} largest contributor to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, paying 1.7 million dollars in 2015.\textsuperscript{155}


\textsuperscript{154} Satana, (2013).

\textsuperscript{155} “Ahmet Davutoğlu Speech at Leadership Summit on Peacekeeping,” 70th Session of the UN General Assembly New York, (29 September 2015). Retrieved from
for multilateralism is notable given Turkey’s historical preference for bi-
lateral engagement. Additionally, Turkish leaders and representatives
have become more active on a number of security and humanitarian is-
ues in NATO, the EU, UN, and OSCE. This has been accompanied by
high profile international mediation initiatives. And at the UN, Turkey
has been promoting preventative diplomacy and non-violent conflict
resolution methods. To this end and in partnership with Finland, it has
created the “Group of Friends of Mediation” and developed the “UN
Guidance for Effective Mediation” booklet. During NATO’s mission in
Libya, Turkey continually pressured NATO to continue to explore diplo-
matic options with Libyan parties.\textsuperscript{156} It is clear that Turkey has shifted
its engagement in these organizations as it tries to become a norm and
agenda-setter.

In this regard Turkey’s participation in peace operations is just an-
other tangible illustration reflecting the country’s growing regional and
international activism alongside increased trade relations and political
engagement. In one instance, it was suggested by some Turkish parlia-
mentarians that Turkey’s limited participation in MONUSCO (UN Orga-
nization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo had supported trade expansion
with African nations.\textsuperscript{157} These rationales are particularly important to
understand given that Parliament determines whether the country will
contribute to a peace operation and the Turkish public’s apathy for such
activities.\textsuperscript{158}

The gradual shifts in internal power dynamics in Turkey have also in-
fluenced perceptions with respect to its engagement in peace operations.
“Peace operation” is generally used by Turkish officials today as the pre-
ferred term to peacekeeping, which they associate more with the use of
military forces.\textsuperscript{159} However, “peace support” or “peace preservation” are
also used by Turkish personnel to describe their contributions reflecting
their emphasis on the peace aspect of international activities.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElRNNGa-dTM. Accessed 30 September
    2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Kardas, S. (2012). “Turkey on NATO’s Role in the MENA: Perspectives from a ‘Cen-
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Satana, N. S. (2012, September). “Contributor Profile: Turkey,” Retrieved
    http://www.academia.edu/574759/UN_Peacekeeping_and_Turkey. Accessed 13
    April 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Güngör, U. (2007). “The Analysis of Turkey’s Approach to Peace Operations” (Doc-
    cessed 20 April 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Interviews with Turkish Diplomat, Vienna, Austria, June 2015; Interviews with Turk-
    ish Officials, Ankara, June 2015.
\end{itemize}
Some general trends have emerged within Turkey’s engagement in peace operations. Turkish troops predominantly participate in UN authorised NATO peace operations as compared to any other organisation. There have only been two missions outside of NATO that Turkish troops have significantly contributed to in the last fifteen years. Those are UNIFIL in Lebanon, with Turkish troop numbers dwindling, and EUFOR in Bosnia. One reason for this pattern could be that NATO membership led Turkey to develop its security strategies and protocols in line with that of the alliance, and with the United States in particular. This had the effect of modernising the Turkish Armed Forces but in a manner that was more suitable to harmonisation with NATO approaches than to that of others. Turkish troops have also indicated their own preference for participating in NATO or even EU-led peace operations over the UN. This is in part due to the prestige associated with such missions by the Turkish Armed Forces and the standard of individual salaries in UN missions, which have not kept pace with the changes in Turkey.

Turkey has participated in UN authorised NATO peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo with IFOR, SFOR and Kosovo Force (KFOR) respectively. Turkey had been a nominal contributor to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2001. After achieving authorisation as a peace operation under Chapter VII in 2003, Turkish activities in ISAF expanded from troop contributions to financial support, training, and scholarship programs to Afghan Armed Forces.

In contrast, Turkey consistently sends police, gendarmerie, and to a lesser extent military observers to UN and EU peace operations, and on occasion to OSCE missions. With the exception of EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey is providing police and civilian personnel to EULEX (The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo); and EUPOL COPPS (EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories). Similarly, of the 149 Turkish personnel participating in UN peace operations as of September 2015, only 49 are troops. Given their low domestic wages, Turkish police have noted the comparatively higher salaries in the UN and EU as a significant incentive to participate.

---

in such missions, in addition to the opportunities to acquire new skills and language abilities.\textsuperscript{164}

Turkey’s experiences with different multinational organisations have informed and cemented a number of its positions regarding peace operations. Through these organisations Turkey supports the key peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. Sovereignty has and remains the defining concern for Turkey from the conceptualisation of missions to their operationalisation and engagement with recipient countries. For Turkey, national ownership ranges from including national leaders into the mandating and preparation process for peace operations, to recipient-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) at the national level.\textsuperscript{165} In supporting this position, Turkish officials point to their own experiences, for example, the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq from 2004 to 2011, which was initiated at the request of the Interim Government of Iraq.

Turkey has shown increasing preference for participating in peacebuilding activities in peace operations. In the last five years, a humanitarian agenda has become more prominent in both the rhetoric and framing of Turkey’s activities from aid to peace operations. This has been largely influenced by Turkey’s support for Syrian and Iraqi refugees, which they see as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Turkish officials are quick to point out that their reference to R2P in relation to peace operations is primarily through a humanitarian framework that emphasis civilian protection rather than unilateral military intervention that other countries may emphasize.\textsuperscript{166}

The challenge of balancing the sometimes opposing forces of sovereignty and human-centric operations are extensive. These are issues that Turkey has to confront given the increasing emphasis they place on human security in peacebuilding and development. In this regard Turkish officials have sometimes pointed to their experiences with Liaison Observation Teams (LOTs) in EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in ISAF\textsuperscript{167} as examples of successful development-security activities conducted within peace operations.

Reflecting this increased emphasis on preventative diplomacy and peacebuilding in the last five years, Turkish officials have stressed the need for sustained political engagement to support peace. They do not believe that military or peace operations can replace political dialogue. With particular regard to the UN, Turkey believes that there should be


\textsuperscript{165} Interview, Turkish Official, Ankara, June 2015.

\textsuperscript{166} Telephone Interview, Turkish Official, Ankara, June 2015.

\textsuperscript{167} Interview Turkish Official, Ankara, June 2015.
increased cooperation between special political missions and peace operations, especially during political transition phases. In this context, Turkey believes that special political missions are cost-effective and valuable tools in conflict prevention and resolution.

Developing achievable and realistic mandates is also seen as a priority by Turkish officials, particularly with regard to the UN, stressing that for efficiency there needs to be consistency between the mandate and use of resources. Turkey’s officials state that there must also be an inclusive process of developing and implementing the mandate that considers the needs and perspectives of the recipient country and its people. Reflecting their emphasis on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping activities with the UN, Turkish officials believe that a more efficient way to use these resources would be through peace-building initiatives that are implemented in cooperation with regional organizations and national authorities who better understand the peculiarities of individual cases. In this regard Turkish officials highlight the importance of linguistic and cultural affinity to the success of peace operations, pointing to their own experiences in the Balkans. This is something that has been reiterated by Turkish police and personnel returning from UN and EU missions.

The importance of an inclusive mandating and preparation process to Turkey is evident in its decreasing engagement with EU peace operations. As a non-EU member, Turkey has no input in the preparation, planning, or strategic decisions of the peace operations it is asked to contribute to. While officials claim that these challenges at the institutional and political level do not affect the collaboration between Turkish and EU forces on the ground, they admit that they create barriers in providing timely and relevant activities and support for missions and personnel. For example, in November 2014, the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of Turkish troops to UN-sanctioned EU missions.
in the Central African Republic and Mali. But to date no Turkish personnel have been deployed to these missions.

With regard to national caveats, the Turkish parliament has consistently refused to participate or deploy Turkish troops to combat situations. For example, in ratifying Turkey’s participation in the UNIFIL, parliament specified that Turkish forces would not participate in disarmament activities or be deployed in active combat areas. Despite contributing significant numbers of troops to ISAF, they were ordered not to engage in fighting or clashes despite pressure from the United States.

Internal challenges and capacity remain a challenge for Turkey. For example, Turkish officials admit that they do not have enough experienced people to meet the increasing demand for personnel in the area of rule of law and judicial enforcement for the UN. In public statements Turkish officials at the UN have stated their support for gender mainstreaming in peace operations. Domestically, gender issues are a political and social challenge. Women’s participation in the Turkish National Police remains low with a male/female ratio of approximately 95 to 5.

To conclude, Turkey’s traditional conceptualisation and approach to peace operations has largely been security based through multilateral institutions, particularly NATO. From 2000, however, Turkey’s participation in peace operations has begun to expand and diversify. Until 2009, much of these activities, particularly those conducted in new regions, could be attributed to ideological motivations, increasing international prestige, and supporting EU membership ambitions. Turkey is among the top 10 strongest military forces in the world. The Armed Forces are well-trained and equipped with an estimated 510,600 total active personnel and a further 378,700 reserve personnel in 2014. As such there is capacity for Turkey to participate more significantly in a range of peace operations than it is currently doing. Renewed internal and regional challenges due to the crises in Syria and Iraq, internal discord, and economic instability are increasingly consuming the Turkish state’s resources and will prevent the country from broadening its contributions to peace operations in the immediate future.

174 Telephone Interview Ankara, June 2015.
176 Army 258,700; Air 65,000; Navy 55,000; Paramilitary/Gendarmerie 50,000. The Military Balance 2014 (London: IISS/ Routledge, 2014a).
Conclusion

Without exception all the countries in this group recognise the UN as the legitimate authority to deal with international peace and security issues at the global level. They see the UN as the forum where states can reach agreement on shared norms and common approaches, and where compromises can be negotiated between competing interests. For them, the UN is the only institution that, despite its problems, can maintain global stability and predictability. A world without the UN would be dangerous and unpredictable. The rising powers thus share an interest in maintaining and further strengthening the role of the UN as the apex of global governance.

In this context UN peacekeeping is of special importance. It is the most visual and practical manifestation of the UN’s collective security regime, and the UN’s role to maintain international security. It provides its member states with a common project to steer, manage and execute. It is thus not surprising that it is an instrument that the rising powers have a special interest in. Whilst there are differences among the rising powers on some issues related to challenges facing modern day peacekeeping, they all agree that peacekeeping is an important tool to preserve and safeguard international peace and security and a stable world. In general, they desire a conservative interpretation of the principles of UN peacekeeping and would like to reform peacekeeping at a pace that the rising powers and global south are comfortable with. In particular, these rising powers wish to check any attempts by the West to use UN peacekeeping as a tool to coerce or sanction states that do not conform to the West’s neoliberal ideology.

Some of the rising powers, especially Brazil, India and South Africa are positioning themselves for place in a reformed UN Security Council. As it is unlikely that China and Russia will agree to any form of Security Council reform that will weaken their own positions, the most likely reform that the rising powers can reach agreement on would be an increase in the permanent members of the council. However, UN Security Council reform is seen as a potentially decisive issue and have not featured prominently in the discussions among rising powers. For instance, each of the seven BRICS summits that have taken place thus far have acknowledged the need for reform and the aspirations of Brazil, India and South Africa, but they have not sought to arrive at a common BRICS position on Security Council reform. This is atypical as these Summits have generated
common positions on a wide range of issues, including several other aspects related to the macro-economic aspects of global governance.\textsuperscript{177}

Security Council membership is also commonly mentioned as one of the factors that motivate rising powers to contribute to, and otherwise actively engage in peacekeeping. For instance, the recent increase in Egypt’s and Indonesia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping is seen as linked to their respective campaigns for non-permanent seats, and Brazil, India and South Africa’s positions on peacekeeping is presented, at times, as part of their long-term posturing for permanent membership of the Security Council. However, Security Council ambitions are just one of many considerations that influence the decisions that countries take when it comes to contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. From the foregoing it is clear that for most rising powers the most prominent considerations are geo-political, including the construction of their own regional and international identities and managing conflicts in their own neighbourhoods and spheres of influence.

Money, in the form of reimbursements, is not a major incentive or disincentive for these countries to participate in UN peacekeeping. Only a portion of their operational costs are reimbursed, and none of their input costs, i.e. equipping and preparing forces for deployment, can be recovered. The UN owes member states, especially large contributing countries like India tens of millions of US dollars, and are only able to pay these outstanding reimbursements when some of the large financial contributors pay their overdue assessed contributions. Contributing to UN peacekeeping thus comes at a net costs to all these countries, yet they still find it important to contribute. So the funding aspect is one consideration, but it is not of overriding importance.

**Conflict prevention**

All the rising powers covered in this study strongly agree with the HIPPO’s emphasis on conflict prevention and the primacy of politics in resolving conflicts. Several countries like Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey see themselves as regional peacemakers and are actively involved in several mediation initiatives. In the case of South Africa, there is also a strong correlation between its peacekeeping contributions and the conflicts in which it had a direct mediation role. In general, all the BRICS countries favour diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes and see military intervention as a last resort. When it comes to UN peacekeeping this preference for prevention, mediation and the peaceful settlement of disputes translated into a strong preference for consensual peacekeeping, with the use of force seen as a last resort. The trend towards more robust peacekeeping, where the use of force, or the threat of

\textsuperscript{177} de Coning, Mandrup & Osgaard, 2015.
the use of force becomes part of a routine doctrinal posture is thus questioned, and instead the emphasis is placed on the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and mediation.

These countries see the role of UN peacekeeping as providing support to national actors who have the main agency to achieve sustainable peace, not as a tool to impose a solution to the conflict from the outside. Countries like Egypt and Russia caution, in addition, that prevention shouldn’t be used as a backdoor for intervening in other states affairs. All rising powers have expressed that there should be more support for Special Political Missions (SPMs), which it sees as cost-effective and valuable tools for conflict prevention and resolution.

The principles of peacekeeping, including the use of force, robust peacekeeping and enforcement operations

All the rising powers in thus study supports the importance and continued relevance of the principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and the use of force only for self-defence or in defence of the mandate. They argue that the principles should remain the cornerstone guidance for UN peacekeeping, and that adherence to the principles is the best guarantee for successful peace operations.

In this context the most contentious issue for the rising powers are the trend towards greater use of force in UN peacekeeping operations. Brazil, for instance, notes with concern the growing willingness of the UN Security Council to formulate more and more ambitious mandates for UN peacekeeping missions regarding the use of force. In this context Brazil argues that there is little evidence of a cause-effect relation between the increased use of force and better results in terms of protecting civilians or protecting forces. Likewise, countries like Egypt, India and Indonesia are concerned that blurring the lines between peace enforcement and peacekeeping would make the UN a party to the conflict, and in the process undermine faith in the UN, and eventually in peacekeeping as a tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. China maintains that peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. It opposes the threat or use of force in international relations. Nevertheless, Beijing does not rule out the necessity of using force in peacekeeping under some circumstances. It insists that use of force should meet two basic requirements: one is the authorisation of the UNSC, the other is that it be limited to self-defence or defence of the mandate.

All of them view that the use of force in a peacekeeping mission as a last resort, and argue that it must be minimal, calibrated, proportional, and in conformity with international humanitarian law. India and Indonesia are especially concerned about the case of the Forced Intervention
Brigade (FIB) that was deployed as part of MONUSCO. India and Indonesia argue that such mixing of mandates directly affects the operational effectiveness of the overall operation, and exposes normal peacekeepers to unnecessary threats from the armed factions targeted by the FIB.

South Africa, that contributes forces and attack helicopters to the FIB, agrees with and support the principles of peacekeeping, but sees the eastern DRC as an exception where the M23 and other rebel groups have been specifically identified by the UN Security Council as aggressors that not only threatens the civilian population, but also the stability of the whole eastern DRC. South Africa is of the view that the unchecked aggression of the M23 rebel group, including twice invading and occupying Goma, undermined not only the UN but also the whole peace process in which the UN and international community has invested so heavily.

Many of the rising powers are concerned about the negative consequences of the use of force. For instance, Brazil argues that despite good intentions, military operations can have devastating humanitarian effects on the civilian population, and always brings with itself the risk of collateral damage and of spreading violence and instability. Brazil also questions whether the use of force has a positive impact on the political process, and argues instead that the use of force risks compromising the UN’s impartiality, and where it does, it undermines the UN’s ability to mediate and to promote political solutions.

All the countries studied recognise the close link between the use of force and the responsibility to protect civilians from violent conflict. India and Russia argues that the only sustainable way to achieve protection is to focus on an inclusive approach to national reconciliation, anchored in state sovereignty. They argue that UN peacekeeping operations do not have adequate resources (manpower, enablers and self-protection means) to meet the expectations that the Security Council creates when it tasks UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians. They argue that the host nation must bear the primary responsibility for protection, and that the role of the UN must be to support the host nation in executing this responsibility.

All the countries recognise the close link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but several of the countries covered in this study question what role peacekeeping missions should play in peacebuilding. Most seem comfortable with some basic recovery and outreach activities, but are concerned about the outer limits of using peacekeepers as early peace builders. They raise three concerns, namely the more political nature of peacebuilding that can impact negatively on the impartiality of peacekeeping; the importance of maintaining the principle that peacekeeping cannot itself deliver peace, and should limit itself to being an enabler of a locally owned peace process; and lastly the drain on the fi-
Financial, material and human resources being allocated for peacekeeping, when peacekeeping missions are given expansive peacebuilding mandates.

**Sovereignty and national ownership**

All the rising powers in this study stress the importance of sovereignty and national and local ownership. Brazil, China and Russia, for instance, argue that it is essential that the role of UN peacekeepers in any activity is based on dialogue with the local society, which should have the prerogative to lead the peace process. India, Russia and South Africa argue that the imposition of external priorities and solutions without adapting to local conditions undermine stabilisation efforts and sustainability. Brazil also argues that it is important to make maximum use of existing local capacities, including civil society, and strengthen the national institutions. All the rising powers emphasise the necessity of respecting state sovereignty and national ownership.

They therefore insist that all activities aimed at building national capacities and developing the linkage between peace and development must be in accordance with the host country’s strategies and priorities. India and Turkey is of the view that capacity building should be a key focus of UN efforts as affected countries emerge from armed conflict situations. If the international community wishes to see sustainable peace and stability, then state institutions, including in the area of security, rule of law and justice, need to be augmented and strengthened.

**Relations between the UN Security Council and T/PCCs**

All the countries in this study call for strengthening the triangular cooperation between T/PCCs, the Security Council and the Secretariat. Egypt sees this triangular cooperation as the only guarantee of realistic and feasible mandates, and as a means of achieving the aspired partnership and required effectiveness for the activities of the UN peacekeeping. Changes to the mandates of peacekeeping missions should be preceded by consultations with troop-contributing countries and securing their consent for any change.

India state that the T/PCCs know the situation on the ground better than most, as they are in daily touch with developments and can – on the basis of practical experience – offer advice the Security Council and the Secretariat. Indonesia argues that T/PCCs need to be fully aware of the situation they are getting into, as early as possible in the process. This is particularly the case when mandates undergo significant changes or when they are being renewed. Brazil, India and Indonesia hold that the Security Council should hold regular consultations with the T/PCCs during the preparation and the evaluation of peacekeeping mandates. Egypt also argues for involving T/PCCs in doctrinal development, policy formulation and mandates design and extension.
Brazil and Egypt has also supported initiatives that reinforce the political importance of the C-34. Brazil argues that it is in the interest of the member states to help build consensus on the most relevant issues on the agenda of the C-34, in order to avoid deadlocks that would weaken the UN General Assembly as a forum for dialogue and negotiation on peacekeeping; which in turn would give the UNSC the exclusive prerogative to deal with these issues.

Although all the so-called rising powers covered in this study do not agree on every policy issue, they generally share a common normative approach to global governance and the importance of the UN, and UN peacekeeping, for the maintenance of international peace and stability. In particular, they see UN operations as an important common project, both in terms of how it serves to bring member states together behind a common cause, and in terms of the contributions it makes to help member states recover from conflict. Many countries that have benefitted from peacekeeping missions in their own past now contribute peacekeepers to others. As such, peacekeeping is seen by these rising powers as a shared experience that help to foster co-ownership of the United Nations identity, and that contributes to a collective security regime and an emerging rule-based global order.