The *Global Peace Operations Review* is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the Country & Regional Profile pages, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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SUSTAINING PEACE IS A CORE ACTIVITY OF THE UN

Oscar Fernandez-Taranco

On 27 April 2016, as an end result of an over a year long process aimed at reviewing the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, the member states of the United Nations agreed by consensus on two substantially identical, parallel resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. The comprehensive and far-reaching resolutions successfully capture the ambitious and innovative content of the 2015 Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture.

The AGE Report starts by acknowledging that while any effort that does not tackle the root causes of conflict and seek durable solutions will do little more than set the stage for the next round of violence, peacebuilding is still often left as an afterthought – under-recognized, under-prioritized, and under-resourced. In the meantime, the failure to successfully prevent lapse and relapse into conflict is having irreversible repercussions for the credibility of global action, and of the United Nations.

The adoption of the two resolutions indicate that the membership of the United Nations is ready to stand up to the challenge set by Dag Hammarskjold, who once said that ‘the pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned’. At a time of recurrent divisions within the Security Council and among the membership of the General Assembly, it is very encouraging that member states were able to produce such a substantial, forward looking document.

The resolutions, first and foremost, should be seen as a pledge by the international community to go beyond mere rhetorical commitments to devise innovative, concrete and lasting solutions to conflict – not as a peripheral activity, but as a core task of the UN.

One important innovation of the Report and the resolutions is the introduction of the idea ‘sustaining peace’. Reflected throughout the text, the ‘sustaining peace’ approach seeks the UN and other peace and security actors to move beyond looking at peace and conflict in a sectorial way. Instead, it advocates more flexible, content appropriate and demand-driven approaches, while acknowledging peacebuilding as a political activity that must avoid templates, formulas and one-size-fits-all solutions.

Sustaining peace also requires breaking silos and combatting fragmentation at the intergovernmental, strategic and operational levels including in the field; further exploring the interlinkages between the political and security, development and human rights pillars of the United Nations; partnering better with regional and sub-regional organizations and international financial institutions; and emphasizing the importance of inclusivity and people-centered approaches for successful peacebuilding.
The notion of peacebuilding as a thread running throughout the life cycle of conflicts resonates throughout the resolutions. Peacebuilding is no longer a set of specific tasks and interventions promoted primarily by the three New York-based entities. Rather, it is connected to conflict prevention and peacekeeping, with a view to making, building, keeping and sustaining peace in an efficient, integrated and cost-effective manner.

In this way, the resolutions should be seen as supplementary to the normative consensus forming around conflict prevention especially since the adoption of UNSCR 2171 (2014), the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the Secretary-General’s Reports on Preventing Violent Extremism and the World Humanitarian Summit. However, the resolutions go beyond rhetorical commitments and talks about actual ways to implement the prevention agenda. Improving joint action and strategic analysis capacity, coordinated and coherent action including during transitions, ensuring adequate and predictable financing, and establishing effective leadership and operational coherence on the field are presented as concrete steps.

The resolutions also underscore the importance of connecting humanitarian - development - peacebuilding action towards more effective and preventive UN responses. The resolutions not only underscore the joint role of the ECOSOC and PBC in bridging different agendas and breaking silos, but also highlight the importance of using the overarching UN development framework to further sustaining peace.

THE FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY PREVENT LAPSE AND RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT IS HAVING IRREVERSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF GLOBAL ACTION, AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

The Peacebuilding Commission particularly emerges as a key venue to implement the prevention agenda. By presenting peacebuilding as a goal that reaches beyond the pure post-conflict realm, for the first time member states are provided with a venue to bring their conflict prevention and peacebuilding priorities to the UN, without running the risk of stigmatization. The role of the PBC to provide political accompaniment and advocacy to conflict-affected states, and bridge the silos between and among the UN’s principal organs and entities is specifically highlighted in this respect. In the next year, we will be working closely with the PBC leadership, to ensure that it truly becomes a body, which fosters effective peacebuilding and prevention. In the meantime, the UN system and particularly the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Department of Political Affairs should jointly explore ways to more effectively use the PBC.

As all other major reviews and processes at the UN, the resolution recognizes that the UN cannot singlehandedly address all the global peace and security challenges, nor can it respond to the call to ‘leave no one behind’ in development processes on its own. As such, it recognizes the importance of partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly the African Union, as well as international financial institutions, civil society, and the private sector. There is very strong language on UN-World Bank cooperation, drawing a framework for them to jointly support the capacities of national institutions and local civil society, in support of inclusive national ownership and people-centered solutions.
Finally, the resolutions call for the next Secretary-General to provide options on increasing restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to UN prevention and peacebuilding activities. This is a good opportunity for the UN system to provide a comprehensive and realistic assessment on constraints to achieve adequate and predictable financing and innovative solutions, in connection with other discussions being held at the UN and beyond, on better funding arrangements. The new Secretary-General should be able to provide these options in conjunction with thinking in the humanitarian and development areas on funding and financing UN action. The resolutions also recognize the value of the Peacebuilding Fund as a flexible, rapid, effective tool, and emphasize the importance of multi-year commitments to the PBF to ensure adequate, sustained, predictable financing.

Paradoxically, while there is general consensus and political commitment to prevention, funding for prevention and peacebuilding is not forthcoming. This is, perhaps, not surprising given the growing costs associated with escalating humanitarian crises. Nonetheless, all agree that our best chance of reducing humanitarian suffering and cost is to build more durable and just political solutions. The UN will now have to live up to and deliver on the commitments set by these groundbreaking resolutions.

Oscar Fernandez-Taranco is the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.

This post reflects the views of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
A GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON SUSTAINING PEACE

Gillian Bird and Ismael A. Gaspar Martins

Benjamin Franklin once said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The United Nations membership acknowledged this, by consensus, by adopting on 27 April the most comprehensive and far-reaching peacebuilding resolutions in the Organization’s history.

To say that the world is going through difficult times is an anodyne understatement. The number of simultaneous security and humanitarian crises facing the world is enormous – affecting millions and placing unprecedented strain on the United Nations system to respond.

The extent of the situation was laid bare in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture entitled “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace”, released on 29 June 2015. This Report was commissioned by the United Nations as the first stage of a comprehensive Review of the UN’s peacebuilding efforts.

Led by former Guatemalan Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, the assessments were stark as to the global peace and security challenges faced, and the sustainability of UN peacebuilding efforts to date. The Review presented the international community with a call to action and outlined an extensive range of practicable and far-reaching recommendations to fundamentally shift how the UN works to build and sustain peace.

As co-facilitators of the second or intergovernmental stage of the Review, we were entrusted with the responsibility of transforming the ambitious recommendations of the AGE report into comprehensive and substantially identical resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In January 2016, intergovernmental consultations began. Following three months of intense negotiations, consultations concluded in late March, with the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council meeting on 27 April in a rare parallel process to adopt, by consensus, the most comprehensive UN peacebuilding resolutions to date.

The General Assembly and Security Council adopting such detailed and cross-cutting resolutions is a clear reflection of the importance that the international community places on peacebuilding to collective peace and security efforts, and its willingness to explore options to find durable solutions.

The resolutions include specific, innovative actions to bring greater coherence and effectiveness to UN peacebuilding. They affirm that effective peacebuilding is a shared responsibility of the entire United Nations system, and covers a wide-range of political, development, and human rights engagements. Of critical importance, the resolutions embed – for the first time at the United Nations – the concept of ‘sustaining peace’.
‘Sustaining peace’ looks to shift peace and security responses from linear and sequential activities to a more comprehensive and strategic approach aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. ‘Sustaining peace’ represents both a goal and a process that requires inclusive nationally-led responses, with the sustained support and attention of the international community. ‘Sustaining peace’ is fundamental to all of the UN’s peace and security, development and human rights engagements, and needs to be prioritized in the field and at UN Headquarters.

Critically, ‘sustaining peace’ requires a greater focus on efforts to prevent the lapse and relapse of conflict. Indeed, the need to better invest in conflict prevention was a central finding of all three UN peace and security reviews in 2015 - the AGA, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and the Global Study on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Through the peacebuilding resolutions, the UN membership has made clear its expectations of how the UN system should implement these efforts.

The important role of the Peacebuilding Commission is also affirmed through the resolutions. This particularly includes its work to: promote a strategic, integrated and coherent approach to peacebuilding; serve a bridging role between the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and other UN entities; and provide a platform for countries to bring their peacebuilding priorities to the international community’s attention without the risk of stigmatization. The Peacebuilding Commission is also encouraged to diversify its working methods and rules of procedure to enable it to operate more flexibly and with a greater focus on regional and cross-cutting issues.

‘SUSTAINING PEACE’ LOOKS TO SHIFT PEACE AND SECURITY RESPONSES FROM LINEAR AND SEQUENTIAL ACTIVITIES TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND STRATEGIC APPROACH

The peacebuilding resolutions additionally call for greater operational and strategic coherence across the UN system, improved joint analysis and planning, strengthened leadership, and a greater focus by the Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Council and UN development system on sustaining peace, including through the overarching framework of the UN’s operational activities for development (the upcoming Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review).

In line with the findings of the 2015 reviews, the resolutions recognize that the scale of global peace and security challenges requires partnership and cooperation between the United Nations and other key actors, including regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union, international financial institutions, civil society, and the private sector. The importance of United Nations cooperation with the World Bank in assisting conflict-affected countries receives specific attention. The resolutions also emphasize the important role of women and youth to sustaining peace.

The resolutions close by inviting the next UN Secretary-General to report back on implementation of the resolutions at the 72nd session of the General Assembly held in 2017-18. This includes a request to provide options to increase, restructure and better prioritize funding to United Nations peacebuilding, consistent with Member States’ recognition of the need for predictable and sustained financing to this work. Through this request, it is hoped that Member States will be provided with a range of comprehensive and innovative options on how to stabilize UN peacebuilding financing.
Of course, the long-term impact of these resolutions is contingent on their effective implementation. For this, we turn to the United Nations system and implore it – along with other international peacebuilders – to take the opportunity presented to build on the current global consensus, to bring a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated approach to sustaining peace, and to position the organization so that it is able to respond to the global challenges of our age.


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April 4, 2016

U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS NEED LESS JARGON AND MORE DIRECTION

Jim Della-Giacoma

Peace and the United Nations go together; at least that’s what its founders intended. But in the meeting rooms of the organization’s New York headquarters, diplomats often argue over the buzzword vocabulary of compound words and phrases for advancing the U.N.’s peace mandate. They parse whether an operation is a special political mission or a peacekeeping mission. They worry that calling something a “peace operation” is too imprecise. When they cannot agree whether something should be peace building or “sustaining the peace,” they compromise by using both terms.

Maybe it’s time for the semantic arguments to be replaced with a focus on results.

A good start on how to do so is a joint resolution of the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council finalized Thursday, which should be tabled and passed by both bodies in mid-April. The resolution, shepherded over months by Angola and Australia, follows up on a report last year by an advisory group of experts who reviewed the U.N.’s “peace-building architecture.” They aptly titled their final document “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace.”

In today’s divided U.N., some feel it is something of an achievement that member states agreed on a resolution with 31 operative paragraphs and 21 normative ones. They say it is the most comprehensive resolution on peace building agreed to by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, representing a first step in breaking down silos. It firmly connects peace building with prevention and talks about how to implement it. It sees sustaining peace as part of a continuum, rather than just a post-conflict activity. It calls for a stronger relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Security Council, conceiving of them as partners rather than rivals. It tries to build a better bridge across the Delaware River between the U.N. system based in New York and the World Bank in Washington, D.C.

But some key issues were placed in the “too hard to resolve now” basket, especially how peace building should be paid for. The advisory group of experts had proposed the Peace Building Fund receive core funding of either $100 million or a “symbolic” 1 percent share of the total U.N. budgets for peace operations, comprising both peacekeeping and Special Political Missions, but member states couldn’t agree. Instead, they asked the next secretary-general to look into this issue and report back in two years time.

This reflects how, for the U.N., funding and naming are always sensitive issues. A case in point is the new mission established by the Security Council in January for a team of international observers to monitor an imminent peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Though it looks like a traditional peacekeeping operation, it was called a special political mission.
This could be because the peacekeeping “brand” has acquired an image problem over the past few years. A quick look at the map of current operations, especially in Africa, makes it clear why member states associate peacekeeping with failed states. For this reason, Colombia is more comfortable with a political rather than a peacekeeping mission. This also means the mission will be funded from the U.N.’s regular budget, rather than by assessed contributions to its peacekeeping account.

The decision displays an obvious lack of consistency. The U.N.’s missions in Western Sahara and Cyprus wrestle with glacial political processes, but are technically peacekeeping missions. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq has more than 400 personnel, but is a special political mission. As the “Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations” recounts, the U.N.’s 1965 mission in the Dominican Republic had a task similar to the forthcoming mission in Colombia—namely, monitoring a cease-fire alongside a regional organization—but was called a peacekeeping operation.

But there is an explanation for the semantic games played over the mission in Colombia: Anything that reaches the Security Council is by definition a political problem, on which member states’ interests prevail. This means that a policy designed to save face and money for member states prevails over determining the best form or function for a future peace operation. Rather than pay a little now to prevent a conflict, we pay much more later to manage a crisis.

**ANYTHING THAT REACHES THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS BY DEFINITION A POLITICAL PROBLEM, ON WHICH MEMBER STATES’ INTERESTS PREVAIL.**

U.N. peace operations have the capacity to change; they have demonstrated this in the past 15 years since the landmark Brahimi report. They need to continue to evolve, because the environments where peace operations are deploying are fluid and resist the application of templates. Circumstances on the ground change, and missions need to constantly adapt. The U.N.’s expert advisory reports from the past year have re-emphasized the political nature of conflict and the need for the international system to think more creatively about preventing it. Last year’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), for instance, called for the U.N. to deliver “right fit” missions along a “continuum of response and smoother transitions between different phases of missions.”

Ian Johnstone believes the process should start with asking the right questions. What is the political process? Where is the conflict? Who are the targets of violence? What are the reasons for it? How legitimate is the state? Is it cooperating with or consenting to a U.N. mission? What role are the neighbors, regional actors and global powers playing?

A U.N. peace operation, Johnstone argues, performs a range of tasks including political engagement, protection, capacity-building, monitoring, service delivery and coordination. In addition to its blue helmets and uniformed police, it has at its disposal civilian instruments, such as envoys and mediators as well as human rights, political and civil affairs officers.

Thinking of a spectrum of peace operations rather than a type of mission would require profound changes in behavior at all levels, Johnstone acknowledges. To start with, locals cannot be bypassed if a mission is to work; U.N. envoys must stop legitimizing “imported peace” or “elite peace.” Mandates from the Security Council also need to be simpler. Troop-contributing countries who are reimbursed based on the size of their contingents will have to accept that an operation with lots of battalions might not always
be the best international tool to resolve a conflict. At U.N. headquarters, the secretary-general would require much better planning and analysis capabilities to understand how the organization's instruments fit with the actions of regional and subregional groups. The General Assembly’s administrative and budgetary committees must stop micromanaging mission finances to allow the Secretariat to become much more flexible in the way it deploys operations.

In short, Johnstone argues, U.N. peace operations need less bureaucracy and more “adhocracy.” This is an organizational form that lends itself to innovation in a fluid environment. It is flexible, adaptable and informal. Indeed, in its purest form, it functions without bureaucratic policies or procedures.

At the very least, thinking with greater flexibility about peace operations would quickly start a discussion about the artificial departmental split between political affairs, peacekeeping operations and field service. There is little appetite for a debate on restructuring, but it has to happen.

The expert reports released in 2015 have done a thorough job of mapping the challenges and plotting a few possible ways forward. When the declared candidates for the position of U.N. secretary-general appear before the General Assembly later this month, someone should ask them a question or three about the future of peace operations—not just the buzzwords, but the goals and processes. We will be all be listening to see in which direction they want to lead the organization.

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FOOD SECURITY, NUTRITION, AND PEACE
Sarah Cliffe

What do we know about the links between food security, nutrition and peace? What makes countries resilient to these risks? And what does this mean for global policy development in future?

There are four points worth making between the links between food security, nutrition, other natural resource issues, and peace:

First, conflict of course has a deep impact on food security and nutrition – people living in conflict-affected countries are more than twice as likely to be malnourished as those in stable environments, and countries in prolonged conflict fall on average 20 percentage points behind in poverty reduction.

Second, there is some evidence that food insecurity can play a role in increasing conflict risk. In particular, food price shocks can increase the vulnerabilities. Studies have found that rainfall shocks in 41 African countries significantly increased conflict risks: a 5 per cent decline in economic growth due to rainfall costs increased the risk of conflict the following year by half. Countries in the Sahel have been notably vulnerable to this type of risk.

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity and conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations.

Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) is indirect rather than direct.

WHAT MAKES SOME COUNTRIES MORE RESILIENT THAN OTHERS?

Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict. Essentially, the two important factors in determining their resilience are:

First, whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009 drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of course have been one factor amongst many but it would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary driver of the Syrian conflict.

Second, whether countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens, providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance. During the 2007-2008 food crisis, developing
countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent. This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL POLICY?

First, consider food security - and in particular food price volatility – as one of the structural risks that may merit inclusion in a better strategic risks analysis at the UN.

Second, help countries develop scalable social protection programs that can help citizens when food shocks occur. Good examples would be Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program, which since 2005 has helped the rural poor resist shocks and create assets, increasing their resilience to chronic food security. More recently, the UN has helped countries surrounding Syria scale up social safety net programs to assist both their own vulnerable citizens and refugees, such as the work WFP, UNHCR, UNDP and UNICEF have done in support of the Lebanese Government’s national poverty targeting and education programs.

Third, and relevant for the UN Security Council, make efforts to ensure that peace operations can complement the restoration of food security and livelihoods. This may mean ensuring that peace operations can protect civilian cultivation and principal local trade routes; it may mean helping governments assess the impact of internal and border security measures on agricultural producers and the consumers of basic foods.

Fourth, support structural measures designed to reduce the risks of exceptional price volatility in global food markets.

This is an edited version of the remarks made by CIC Director Sarah Cliffe to the Arria Formula meeting on food security, nutrition and peace in the UN Security Council on 29 March 2016.

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April 26, 2016

LOUISE OLSSON: WE NEED TO PUSH FOR A MORE GENDER-EQUAL PEACE

Louise Olsson

The women, peace, and security agenda is often treated as one coherent process when in it is a myriad of questions and challenges each demanding different responses. The Folke Bernadotte Academy’s Louise Olsson is the co-editor a book entitled Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325. The Global Peace Operations Review’s Lesley Connolly recently asked her how this agenda is moving forward after last year’s three key reports on peace operations, peacebuilding, and resolution 1325 and what the book can tell us about the way forward.

Lesley Connolly: Many books have been written about gender. What does this book contribute to the debate around gender policies in peace operations?

Louise Olsson: While there has been a lot of good policy and critical research, there is still a shortage of systematic empirical, and not least statistical, research that can test assumptions and try to find out what works – and what doesn’t – when we try to realize the resolutions on women, peace and security. The Folke Bernadotte Academy has worked since 2009 to support this form of research by organizing a network called the Research Working Group on 1325. In this book, Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325, my co-editor Ismene Gizelis and I bring together new knowledge from the network and try to move the debate forward.

The book focuses on three themes of the resolution – participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming. It tests some of our assumptions and arguments quite openly. For example, how should we better understand what it takes to increase women’s participation in a peace process? Is it so “easy” as to just focus on ensuring access – or is it about understanding what the different power platforms which underlie participation look like so we can act more strategically? Another example is Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad’s chapter on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse which finds that missions operating in areas with many vulnerable groups are more likely to have personnel commit these crimes. We need more of this form of research if we are to take implementation further and we hope that the book contributes to those efforts.

LC: What are the greatest challenges facing the implementation of Resolution 1325?

LO: As we see in the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report and the Global Study on Resolution 1325, some of basic challenges remain in how we address the underlying reasons for why the resolution was adopted in October 2000. Since then, we have come further in understanding that women and men are differently affected by conflict, how we see women as actors, and we know that peace automatically does not mean the same for men and women. But we still have far to go in terms of
understanding how to best adapt to these facts in a systematic and effective manner. To address this, the reports suggest that the Security Council should receive an improved form of conflict analysis that includes a more explicit gender perspective.

Other challenges lie in how we have approached implementation. The HIPPO report talks about the need for a stronger leadership responsibility. We need to get this firmly integrated through the chain of command. We are not there yet.

However, as Ismene and I also note in a blog on Political Violence a few months ago, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda today encompasses most issues and themes on the whole of the Security Council’s vast agenda. Still, we often treat WPS as one coherent process. This is in itself presents a challenge. WPS now consists of a myriad of questions and problems which require different forms of actions and competences in order to be effectively addressed – each in their own fashion.

LC: How do we start to overcome these challenges and start progressing the women, peace, and security agenda? Will the recommendation on senior gender advisers help?

LO: Perhaps it is time to get even more strategic in how we address the different questions and challenges on the vast WPS agenda. As an example, it is important not to mix up gender mainstreaming with women’s participation in peace operations, or to mix it up with women’s participation in peace negotiations. These are three distinct areas with their own challenges. The first is about mandate delivery – does an operation contribute to a more equal peace? The second is about recruitment and equal opportunities. The third is about a more inclusive peace process. All are very important but in order to be successful, we have to address them as separate challenges – although they all require a better understanding of gender equality dynamics. To address them, we need to make use of the increasing empirical evidence and systematic research that is now quickly growing in all areas as we can see in the book.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IS ESSENTIALLY ABOUT UNDERSTANDING HOW TO TURN THE MAIN MANDATE INTO ACTION – WHICH IS A LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY.

A more strategic approach needs assistance by a senior gender adviser as outlined in the Secretary-General’s report following up on the Global Study. This decision is not unique to the UN. In NATO, the recommendation has long been that the gender adviser should be placed directly in relation to the most senior management. Gender mainstreaming is essentially about understanding how to turn the main mandate into action – which is a leadership responsibility. In order to be able to do that in a way which benefits men and women, and which contributes positively to a country’s gender equality developments, he or she needs support from a gender adviser.

LC: How does this book resonate with the findings of the Global Study?

LO: The book was published ahead of the study so it does not address the results directly, but there are many common denominators with the recommendations from both the study and the HIPPO report.

Ismene Gizelis and Jana Krause’s chapter finds that we need to get even better at ironing out how to more effectively adapt to both men’s and women’s situations and security needs, i.e. how to get functioning gender mainstreaming in place. This requires a
solid understanding of each given context. The same is true for funding and inclusion of women's local participation which must be specific to the given setting.

The chapter by Helen Basini is a good example of this *problematique* in a DDR context. She finds that in Liberia, women were part of demobilization and demilitarization phases but that a similar inclusion did not occur in the reintegration phase. This, she argues, demonstrates the importance of also having a clear and concrete understanding of the situation for both men and women in the transition process from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, which was addressed by both HIPPO and the peacebuilding review.

**LC:** In both the HIPPO and Peacebuilding Architecture reports there are recommendations looking at leadership and the need for more gender balanced representation within peace operations. How does your book address this recommendation?

**LO:** The book provides insights into the many challenges that come with working to improve participation in peace operations. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley examine the reasons for why it is so difficult to increase the number of women in uniform and find that the incentives of the contributing countries are central. However, they also warn us from making oversimplified solutions focusing on numbers. First of all, working to increase the number of women personnel requires strong leadership that seeks to change and improve the working environment and to rid the organization of negative gender stereotypes. Second, we need to understand that having, for example, twenty per cent women employees does not mean that we automatically have a gender perspective.

**LC:** We have just seen the appointment of Elizabeth Spehar as Special Representative in Cyprus and Lisa Buttenheim as Deputy of the Department of Field Support, but women are under represented in the senior ranks of the UN Secretariat. Where is the problem and how do we overcome this gap?

**LO:** This is an additional important theme under the WPS agenda that needs to be more strongly addressed in its own right. While we have not looked at that specific issue in the book, there is quite a lot of growing research – and many lessons learned from other spheres – which shows that it can be addressed successfully if there is will. It is also a question which was much discussed already when I started doing research on WPS in 1999, so it is disturbing that we have not come further.

**LC:** It has been acknowledged that 1325 has not yet been implemented fully; now we have the Global Study that has this provided renewed focus on gender issues. How do we ensure a sustained focus on the WPS agenda?

**LO:** We need to become more specific in how we measure our progress on addressing the different problems and questions that fall under the implementation of the resolutions. We have made progress in many areas which we need to recognize and build on in our continued work. We will discuss this and how to support progress further at the Challenges Forum 20th anniversary meeting on 8-9 May here in New York.

I also think that gender mainstreaming needs to be more strategically channeled into the major processes and big questions facing the UN around prevention and the changing nature of conflict. Much depends on how the next Secretary-General, regardless of whether it is a male or female, addresses the challenges recognized in the resolutions on women, peace and security and in the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
So far, we have seen less focus on the Global Study and the gender specific recommendations of the HIPPO report. Unless we all take this seriously, there is a risk that we will not see the progress which is much needed.

LC: Who is the target audience of this book and what message do you aim to get out there with this book?

LO: The target audience is both policy makers and researchers; those interested in WPS questions but also those focusing more broadly on peace and security. The aim is twofold: bring out new and central lessons learned which can assist us in progressing the implementation of resolution 1325 in the areas of participation, protection and gender mainstreaming. The other is to demonstrate what systematic research can contribute with in terms of bringing us more and nuanced knowledge on how the UN can continue to contribute to a more equal peace.

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PSC Report: There are various crises that erupt in Africa despite early signs of tensions; is early warning effective at the level of the AU?

**Ambassador Frederic Ngoga Gateretse:** We have come a long way in the operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System [CEWS]. Today I can gladly say that it is fully operational, although challenges remain, such as human resources constraints and the necessary information and communications technology [ICT] infrastructure to enhance data collection efforts and exchange information more efficiently with our Regional Economic Communities [RECs]. We have also made considerable progress in strengthening coordination and collaboration with the early warning systems of the RECs. The issue is to more efficiently link early warning to early response. We are also making efforts in this regard through the horizon scanning that we provide to the AU Peace and Security Council [PSC], the decision-making body on peace and security matters.

**PSC:** What are the challenges in coordinating with regional mechanisms?

**FNG:** I would not call it challenges but rather the need to enhance the already existing coordination mechanism. We get most of our information from our RECs and we have been working hand in glove on many crises. As a matter of fact, our next biannual meeting with our RECs will take place in the coming month in Addis Ababa. The objective will be to look at potential crises. It is extremely important to have a common and shared understanding of what is happening in order to develop a common strategy. Our commissioner, Smail Chergui, has stressed on numerous occasions the concept of ‘**jointness**’. It is essential because the AU alone cannot address the challenges we face on the continent. So we are compelled to forge strong strategic partnerships – a priority in our conflict prevention effort.

**PSC:** Last year, a structural prevention of conflict framework was adopted. Where are we in the implementation of this document?

**FNG:** This framework was adopted by the PSC because there is an acknowledgement that **conflict prevention must tackle structural issues**. We need to act earlier rather than dealing with situations that are already in crisis form. The tools exist and now we are reaching out to member states and encouraging them to take advantage of these. The tools will help us to build the in-house capacities of our member states to have a conversation about their structural vulnerabilities and consider mitigation strategies. So this technical assistance is available for our member states.
PSC: Aren’t you concerned that member states are not ready to have such a conversation about their vulnerabilities?

FNG: The Country Structural Vulnerability Assessment is a voluntary process. I think member states are committed to preventing conflicts and they will do everything humanly possible to avoid any crises. Some 30 or so countries are already having this conversation through the APRM [African Peer Review Mechanism] and our Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework [CSPF] will complement this.

PSC: Elections continue to be a major cause of crises – what do you do to prevent it?

FNG: As an issue, elections are within the purview of the Department of Political Affairs [DPA]. Elections are an opportunity to consolidate democracy and to renew ideas. With many elections planned for 2016, we expect that the majority of the elections will remain largely peaceful, but with the possibility that some might experience turmoil and violence. From past experience, disputes over the composition and membership of election management bodies; complaints about the lack of adequate consultations on impending election timelines; debates around issues of succession and term limits; as well as prevailing security situations have been some of the issues that have led to heightened tensions and violence in some member states. But if you look at the majority of elections on the continent, they are peaceful and credible.

As far as conflict prevention is concerned, we work with our colleagues from the DPA who have the lead on elections. The Panel of the Wise, which is in our division, has on numerous occasions participated in pre-electoral political missions, etc.

But we also see it is a moment of vulnerability for our member states that have structural issues that have not been addressed. That is one of the reasons why we have developed the CSPF – to help member states identify and address their vulnerabilities.

PSC: There was a PSC open session on climate change and peace and security; do you see climate change as a cause of conflict and instability on the continent?

FNG: The continent is facing some consequences related to climate change, such as environmental degradation, desertification, floods, drought and famine. The climate change caused by El Niño in Eastern and Southern Africa poses the worst humanitarian crisis in more than two decades and could escalate into complex humanitarian emergencies in situations of armed conflict. The prevailing drought has already impacted on hydroelectric power generation and the resultant energy crisis in Southern Africa. The AU on numerous occasions has underlined that stresses induced by climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict and unrest on the continent. So the link between climate change and security is real.

PSC: How do you address it in the Early Warning division?

FNG: One of the priorities is to work with departments that deal with issues related to climate change, for example the Department of Agriculture and Rural Economy with RECs, to identify early potential trigger of conflicts. Whether it is water scarcity or the displacement of population caused by climate change.

PSC: In the efforts to launch a conflict prevention policy within the AU, what are the interdepartmental efforts?
FNG: Conflict prevention is multidimensional. Therefore, you need to work with other departments that deal with governance issues, economics issues, social issues. Because we understand that, we have created an Interdepartmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention in order to have a holistic approach to deal with the root causes of instability.

PSC: How does this interdepartmental task force work?

FNG: The task force is co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace and Security. We hold several meetings. It is working well; we have identified priorities and areas of intervention.

PSC: What are the main threats to stability for the year 2016?

FNG: The list is not exhaustive but let me touch on a few. First, disputed elections. As I said earlier, elections are an opportunity to consolidate democracy and renew ideas, but it is also a moment of vulnerability. We have many elections this year; we must work to ensure credible, transparent electoral processes. The second one is current crises, which risk an escalation especially as you approach key milestones like peace agreements or the implementation of different accords. We are also observing a trend where countries in post-conflict situations are now facing the risk of relapse.

Then we have the threat of terrorism, where you have various groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State competing in the race to the bottom by stepping up attacks in different parts of the continent. This was demonstrated by the recent attacks in Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Kenya, etc. There are also new threats known as ‘hybrid threats’, such as cyber security. Then there is also concern over bio-terrorist threats, with two dozen conventional biological agents, including anthrax, and an unknown number of genetically engineered organisms that terrorists or other criminals could acquire and unleash on an unsuspecting public.

The other issue that may affect peace and security is the bleak economic outlook. International financial institutions have issued forecasts on the impact of global volatility on Africa’s economic growth in 2016, pointing to an increasingly challenging macro-economic environment in the short term and a negative impact on investment, commodities, agricultural production, employment and economic growth.

Lastly, we have climate change, which can lead to the displacement of people and trigger tensions at the national and regional scales. All of these challenges require us to work together at the sub-regional, continental and global level.

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MINUSCA DEPLOYMENT

This map represents MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic) missions as of April 2016.

UNIFSA DEPLOYMENT

This map represents UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (Sudan) missions as of April 2016.
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