GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

The Global Peace Operations Review is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and the Review of Political Missions.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the Country & Regional Profile pages, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2006-2012) and the Review of Political Missions (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU’s Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Thematic Essays

**Fixing UN Peacekeeping Operations: The World’s Most Complicated Army**
Barbara Crosette  
5

**What Does New Momentum for UN Peace and Security Really Mean?**
Gustavo de Carvalho and Jonathan Rozen  
11

**Key Messages from Civil Society on the UN’s role in Peace and Security**
Ashraf Swelam, Adriana Erthal Abdennur, Cedric de Coning and Karim Hafez  
14

## Commentary

**Making UN peacekeeping Fit for Purpose: A Shared Responsibility**
Bert Koenders  
19

**Here’s how to End UN Peacekeeping’s History of Sexual Violence**
Jeni Whalan  
21

## Interviews

**Cedric de Coning: The Evolution of UN Peacebuilding from Technical Challenges to Political Solutions**
Cedric de Coning and Gizem Sucouglu  
24

**Syed Akbaruddin: UN Peacekeeping is about Politics, not Troop Numbers**
Syed Akbaruddin  
28
It has been almost a year since a sweeping assessment of United Nations peacekeeping operations by experts recommended significant changes from top to bottom: a reformed hierarchy in New York and greater coordination and discipline among military contingents in ever-more dangerous missions around the world. Few of their substantive ideas have been adopted.

As outrage mounts over reports of the exploitation and sexual abuse of children by soldiers over the last two years in the Central African Republic and its neighborhood, it is clear that there are still many loose ends needing attention. All indications suggest that the problem is getting worse globally or it is occurring at an undiminished level annually.

“We can stop admiring the problem, and begin to pursue vigorously solutions to this problem,” said Jane Holl Lute, the plain-speaking American whom Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed as his special coordinator on improving UN responses to abuse, at a briefing for the UN General Assembly on May 13. “No one has been standing still.”

Yet Lute acknowledged that the job required significant mind-set changes in the field, where she found “pockets of resistance.”

In December 2015, a subsequent, separate independent reports harshly focused on the abuses in the Central African Republic revealed that a stunning lack of communication and cooperation within the organization ranked high among the failure to deliver justice and protect the human rights of the people the UN was sent to save.

That report described the UN’s response to sexual abuses of children as bungled and bureaucratic, amounting to a “gross institutional failure.” Though the soldiers initially involved in the abuses were French troops, not formally UN peacekeepers, their presence in the crisis-wracked country had been authorized by the UN, and the organization’s mission there was responsible for reporting and acting on allegations of misconduct by anyone connected with the UN.

Instead, UN officials all the way to the top squabbled over who leaked the bad news regarding the abuse, and the welfare of victims was never a priority.

In February 2016, Secretary-General Ban, who fired the Senegalese general leading the mission in the Central African Republic in August 2015 and produced several preliminary statements and reports over the past year, provided disturbing new data on the global situation in a report to the General Assembly. The report found that scores of allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation across the UN system had been registered in 2015 alone, up nearly 25 percent over the previous year.
Thirty of the allegations were outside peacekeeping, occurring in UN agencies and other civilian programs, and 69 were directly related to peacekeeping missions. (Some of the allegations were later found not to be true and some were still being investigated at the time of the report.)

By contrast, in 2003, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations reported that it had investigated allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against only 19 military personnel and five UN staff members, although this was widely assumed to be a gross undercount. After new complaint procedures were hastily introduced, the number of allegations in 2004 jumped to 72, of which 68 were filed against soldiers and four against civilian UN staff. Ban has only about seven months left in office, and no one watching this issue closely would predict that the situation will or can change dramatically in that time.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, led by Hervé Ladsous, a French diplomat and security expert, presides over 123,053 people in 16 peacekeeping operations, as of March 31, 2016. Of the personnel, 89,546 are soldiers from 123 countries, 13,434 are police officers and 1,793 are military observers. They are backed by thousands of civilian personnel, international and local, and more than 1,800 UN volunteers.

**LUTE’S TRIP TO THE FIELD**

In her briefing to the General Assembly in May 13, Lute, the new coordinator appointed in February as head of efforts to stop sexual exploitation and abuse — and who had been UN assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping from 2003 to 2007, responsible for ground support for missions worldwide — reported on her recent trip to the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo to meet UN mission leaders and others involved in peacekeeping work in the region to test commitment on the ground.

Her impressions and findings were mixed.

“We found in the first instance very clear commitment by the leadership in both of these missions from the very top to eradicate any instance of sexual exploitation and abuse, and to vigorously respond when allegations arise,” she said. “But I can tell you that there are still pockets of resistance and pockets of reluctance to take this on personally by each and every member who serves under the UN in the field.

“Some of the resistance stems from still-held views that the problem of discipline, the problem of comportment, is not everyone’s problem.” The message that UN leadership wants to enforce, she said, is that “every single individual must personally associate themselves with this agenda, both in terms of their personal comportment and in terms of their attitude in the field when they become aware that transgressions have occurred.”

Some of the reluctance, she added, “stems from the fact that people don’t know in all cases what to do or where to go or to whom to report. We are taking steps, both in the field and at headquarters, to put together toolkits and mechanisms that clarify the appropriate response when individuals become aware of this.” Lute, she said, is working with a 90-day plan.

At the center of the behavior issue, as it applies to peacekeeping troops directly under UN command, are formal agreements between the UN and troop-contributing countries. These govern numerous aspects of deployment, from the health of soldiers, the risks to which they may be exposed, the value of the equipment they may bring with them (or what they may have stolen or damaged) and what level of reimbursement the governments who send them will receive.
Under a current agreement, reimbursement for each soldier is more than $1,300 a month, but troops in the field have long claimed they get a small fraction of that in pay, with their governments taking the bulk of the money. Peacekeeping is a source of considerable income to some developing countries, such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Rwanda.

What has caused the most trouble in these agreements with governments is the legal protection from prosecution for soldiers, national police and indeed the commanders of national contingents grouped under a UN force commander. Infringement of rules of behavior, including allegations of rape or other sexual abuses or exploitation, require that troops be sent back to their home countries for trial and, if convicted, for punishment. This happens only in a minority of cases, prompting critics to suggest that such blanket “hands off our troops” limitations on the UN peacekeeping department agreements should be reconsidered, and a new status of forces model be drawn up.

Some diplomats and nongovernment specialists who study UN peacekeeping strongly recommend revision of the rules to give the UN more power to act in cases alleging abuse, especially if it rises to the level of criminal activity. Paul Williams, a professor with the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., who has written extensively on UN peacekeeping, asked in an email that although the agreement with troop-contributing countries is fundamentally flawed in allowing them full legal power in dealing with their soldiers outside the reach of the UN Secretariat, “Is there any alternative?”

Referring to sexual exploitation and abuse, he added: “The best solution would be for UN member states to simply carry out proper discipline and punishment of their personnel if they are found guilty of SEA” — sex-abuse allegations.

The panel of experts on UN peacekeeping operations that published its global report in June 2015 said that there needed to be more consultation with troop and police commanders who face daily dangers themselves and sometime resist orders or fail to discipline soldiers under their commands. But it concluded: “In the face of imminent threats to civilians, there must be no tolerance for national constraints and the failure to follow orders.”

A succession of UN secretaries-general has said over the years, however, that leaning too hard on troop contributing nations, which governments would consider an intrusion into national sovereignty, might cause them to withdraw from UN missions. Troops can be hard to find as the number of missions grows.

**TRAUMATIZED SOCIETIES, VULNERABLE PEOPLE**

In a 2005 report that many in the UN system and diplomats who have worked with it say could have headed off many later problems, the author, Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein, went so far as to recommend courts martial.

“An on-site court martial for serious offences that are criminal in nature would afford immediate access to witnesses and evidence in the mission area,” Zeid wrote in his report for Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general then. “An on-site court martial would demonstrate to the local community that there is no impunity for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse by members of military contingents.”

Zeid, a widely respected Jordanian diplomat who holds an undergraduate degree from Johns Hopkins University and a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, was the first president of the governing body of the International Criminal Court and is now the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Ironically, Zeid was caught up in the Central African Republic scandal in 2014-2015 when the UN human-rights office in Bangui, the country’s capital, deliberately withheld information on sexual abuse allegations from the high commissioner’s headquarters in Geneva, according to the December 2015 report. A Western diplomat, speaking on background, said recently that the whole affair had left Zeid deeply frustrated, since he, of all people, knew how bad conditions and behavior could be in the field.

In preparing his 2005 report, Zeid found that it was the “inability on the part of many peacekeepers to discern the extent to which the society is traumatized and vulnerable that is at the root of many of the problems.”

He recalled earlier reports from West Africa that indicated “the difficulty of identifying perpetrators because victims are often frightened, poorly educated young women and children who have difficulty in identifying their foreign assailants.”

Lute, in her recent briefing to the General Assembly related the explanations, or excuses, for bad behavior that she heard in the field. She also described the leadership of some battalion commanders who set very high standards for their troops.

“In the field, I saw a number of examples of what I considered to be the very best practice that I have seen anywhere,” she said. “For example: One of the commanders, from Malawi, walked us through the rigorous process that they go through to select the commander to lead a contingent in peacekeeping. He was asked as part of his selection process to develop a philosophy in combating SEA [sex-abuse allegations] and to develop a training plan to pursue over the course of his unit’s deployment. I asked to see both [his essay and plan] and they were immediately available and presented to me. This was not just an academic exercise, this was not just a rhetorical exercise. It was a tangible exercise, and a tangible demonstration of follow-up on the kind of best practice that we would like to see promulgated widely in the field.
"We have a number of contingents that don't send commanders into the field unless those commanders have prior peacekeeping experience. In our view, that is a very good, indeed, best practice. We have a number of contingents that have daily accountability checks on their units. The Indian contingent, for example, has daily announced and unannounced checks of the location of their contingent members. There are restrictions on the ability of contingent members to travel in civilian clothes, restrictions on their ability to wander around local marketplaces or local villages and clear accountability throughout the chain of command."

On the other hand, Lute found that excuses were still being made for violations of the rules, which are set out clearly in guidelines monitored by the peacekeeping department's conduct and discipline unit, formed in 2005 and working with conduct teams or designated individuals in missions.

"Some voices have raised problems or issues that we have had to take into account," Lute said. "Some said, We don't have enough training. Some have said, Training is not the answer. Others have said, We have a focus too often on the military and not civilians; that's unfair. We've had some who have said, The length of tour is the problem. We've had some who have said that the lack of welfare and recreation [for troops] is a problem. We've had some who have said, We don't know what widespread [abuse] means. And we have some who have said that it is too difficult to overcome a culture of impunity, and we will never fix this problem."

Her answers at the General Assembly were direct. "Military voices know that with good command and control, good leadership engagement, proper attentiveness to the conditions under which you are asking troops to operate requires constant, steady engagement irrespective of how long you are deployed. We all know that some of the most serious allegations have been committed by contingents that have a rotating period of four months. And we also know that there is no correlation between length of time in the field and the propensity for these acts to occur. The danger of sexual exploitation and abuse is ever present from those who are determined to commit these acts.

"Widespread [abuse] can be one soldier in five, or one soldier in 10, because a soldier's failing almost never in a military context belongs to his or herself. Military operates deeply on a joint approach to mission achievement. You have a role to play, but we will all help you play your role, and you will help me play mine."

**WILL THINGS CHANGE?**

Célhia de Lavarène, a French journalist who reported for Jeune Afrique and Radio France International before she became enraged by abusive behavior of UN peacekeepers she saw in her work in countries from Cambodia to Bosnia to Liberia, among many other places. It was a period in the 1990s during which a UN mission chief famously said, “Boys will be boys,” when nongovernment organizations complained about the behavior of peacekeepers.

De Lavarène set aside her journalism career and joined the UN in Cambodia from 1991-1993, working for an information section writing a bulletin. She went back to work as a journalist for a period and then back to the UN. Over the years, she worked in seven missions with the UN but started to fight human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Bosnia in 2001 and in Liberia in 2004.

What she saw was not only individual cases of exploitation of vulnerable women and sometimes men, but also the broader picture of large-scale trafficking that often springs up around large peacekeeping forces as well as national armies. In one case, she encountered a UN force commander who had acquired two young girls and installed them in his living quarters.
De Lavarène's efforts were encouraged and supported by Jacques Paul Klein, an American commander in Bosnia and later in Liberia, and she was credited with rescuing hundreds of girls and women from bars and clubs where they were effectively held prisoners by traffickers. Returning to full-time journalism, she became a freelance correspondent based at the UN for the French investigative publication Mediapart and the news magazine L’Obs (formerly Le Nouvel Observateur) and also co-founded a nongovernment organization, STOP, an acronym for Stop Trafficking of People. De Lavarène is the author of a 2006 book on her experiences, “Un Visa pour l’Enfer” (“A Visa to Hell”).

Asked whether all the recent international attention to ending sexual abuse and exploitation involving peacekeepers would finally make progress in diminishing such tragedy and criminality, de Lavarène was skeptical. Too many people are involved in turning a blind eye to the corrupt system, which has to be tackled by governments from both developed and developing countries — soldiers and police officers have been sent home for misconduct by both rich and poor nations — as well as by local law enforcement in countries where peacekeepers are stationed and, above all, by UN officials, she said.

“The DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] has been talking about this since 2003-2004," she said. “Why are they talking about it again now? Are things going to change? Never.”

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A famous maxim of uncertain origin defines insanity as doing the same thing repeatedly, but expecting different results. In her opening statement at the United Nations (UN) High-Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security, Nobel Peace laureate Leymah Gbowee used this definition to describe challenges faced by UN engagements in peace operations and peacebuilding.

The 10-11 May meeting, called by the president of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and themed In a world in risks: a new commitment for peace, provided a platform to reflect on current challenges to international peace and security. These focused, in particular, on responses to the 2015 reviews on peace operations, peacebuilding, and women, peace and security.

The reviews were a response to the realisation that the important role of the UN in supporting many countries emerging from conflict is often challenged by the re-emergence of such conflict. Following a period of increased peace in the early 2000s, global conflict has again risen in the past five years. Additionally, with the growing presence of violent extremism, the need for different approaches from the UN and others, including the African Union (AU), is becoming ever more urgent.

The UN is currently scrutinising candidates for the position of secretary-general, and this person will have a critical role in implementing the outcomes of the different reviews. The election of a new secretary-general must therefore be kept in mind when considering the process of reviewing UN peace and security tools.

THE NEW UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL NEED TO BE CAPABLE OF MAKING CONTENTIOUS DECISIONS

Whoever succeeds Ban Ki-moon will have the difficult task of coordinating and pushing for real changes within the UN system. Many of the most salient recommendations provided at the different reviews require much institutional change and political buy-in. For these to be used effectively, the incumbent will need to be capable of making contentious decisions; and not only those that solely depend on the UN Secretariat to be addressed.

The next secretary-general will have to push for difficult political conversations among member states on how the agenda could be made more effective. Along these lines, the Ethiopian foreign minister, Tedros Adhanom, stated that implementation is absolutely critical in the aim of a paradigm shift and for credibility to be restored.

Ahead of the high-level event, many governments and global think tanks shared their concerns and hopes surrounding the UN peace and security reviews. This included the risk of failing to focus on effective implementation, and the need for strong buy-in from countries to ensure that changes actually occur.
The new UN secretary-general will not be able to respond to all of these issues alone – nor should they be expected to. Member states must support the UN peace and security architecture through continued funding and political will, beyond providing positive responses in an open thematic debate.

Promisingly, member states largely supported the findings of the review reports. Member states, civil society, and academics all emphasised the findings of the reports in relation to prevention, the primacy of politics, the role of regional organisations (particularly the AU) and the need for more sustained financing for UN engagements in peace operations and peacebuilding processes.

**THE CORE UN GOAL OF SUSTAINING PEACE INCREASINGLY RISKS BECOMING LOST WITHIN ITS BUREAUCRACY**

South Africa’s statement summarised this. It presented that the UN and regional organisations should adopt a more holistic, long-term preventive approach in addressing conflicts and its root causes, thereby moving beyond managing conflicts as they arise.

That there seemed to be consensus among such a diverse group of countries is a promising indication of increased unity on some of the evolving principles surrounding peace and security responses.

Many actors, for example, mentioned the importance of creating an enabling environment where implementation, leadership and political will become the core aspects of UN peace and security structures and responses. There were also, however, words of caution. Brazil and Egypt stressed that for the three reviews to be successful, broader and more systemic reform of the UN system is needed. Another key challenge was how coordinated approaches among different UN organs could be enhanced.

Countries like Mali and Sweden also emphasised that peacebuilding efforts are likely to fail without honest acceptance of national and local ownership over processes. Margot Wallström, Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that peacebuilding takes place at a national level, undertaken by national actors – and that while international actors can provide support, facilitation and accompaniment, they can never lead.

The UNGA meeting also indicated that a difficult road lay ahead in convincing member states of the need to change their methods of interaction. This is significant from an African perspective. Many agree on the importance of respectful cooperation among international, regional and sub-regional partners. However, stronger mutual understanding of comparative advantages for addressing conflicts, notably between the UN and AU, must also be fostered.

This was well presented by Macharia Kamau, Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN and Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Kamau stated that we cannot have peace in the world when we don’t respect each other as regions and treat our institutions as equals.

The key idea of bringing conflict prevention to the forefront of the UN responses seems, in principle, to be well accepted. But there are still many questions on what it really means for specific roles and responsibilities within the UNGA, the Security Council, and the Peacebuilding Architecture.
Some countries presented concerns around the risk of equating prevention to interventions. However, Ramos Horta, former president of Timor Leste and chair of the peace operations review panel, highlighted an important interpretation of the concept.

He stated that prevention is not just an action, it is the space to provide assistance in addressing root causes, including those related to development. Similarly, while many agree that sustaining peace is a core goal of the UN, there is also a risk that this concept is increasingly becoming lost within its complicated and complex bureaucracy.

Currently there are diverse views on how stronger coherence can be created between different organs of the UN; notably the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the role of UN Agencies, Programmes and Funds. Many called for stronger coordination between these organs, and it was also mentioned that trust has to be rebuilt between member states and the Secretariat.

**THE UN MUST BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY WHERE ITS ACTIONS WENT WRONG, AND ACT ON ITS OWN RECOMMENDATIONS**

The P5 members remained notably reserved during the discussions at the debate. Given that the P5 hold disproportionate influence over the potential success of the reviews’ objectives, a more significant contribution could have bolstered political momentum on the three reviews.

In her opening speech, Gbowee emphasised that if we want peace, we must invest in peace. Therefore, the role of the P5 in providing resources for peacebuilding initiatives is critical.

If the UN wants different peace and security results, it must be serious in its ‘new commitment for peace.’ A new focus on preventative action is important, but risks becoming a vague concept that is neither fully understood, nor effectively implemented. Rather, to be holistic, pragmatic and nimble, the UN must ensure that the necessary requirements – notably funding, political will and member-state leadership – are provided.

And thus, the UN must not only be able to identify when and where its actions went wrong, but also boldly act on its own recommendations.

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KEY MESSAGES FROM CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE UN’S ROLE IN PEACE AND SECURITY

Ashraf Swelam, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Cedric de Coning and Karim Hafez

On its 70th anniversary, the United Nations finds itself at a crossroads. Old and new threats, challenges and risks to international peace and security are increasingly testing the ability of the organization and the efficacy of the instruments available to it as it attempts to fulfill its primary promise: to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

Against this backdrop, timely and potentially groundbreaking reviews of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 were carried out in 2015 to take stock of UN involvement in peace and security and to recommend reforms for the future of the global peace and security architecture. Although the reviews were initiated independently of each other, they produced notable synergies and shared recommendations on a host of vital reforms. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the UN, working in partnership with member states and regional organizations to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, as well as to build and sustain peace.

To draw conclusions from the larger picture in which the outcomes of the reviews connect, the President of the General Assembly (PGA), Mogens Lykketoft, took the initiative of organizing a “High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on UN, Peace and Security”. Held on 10-11 May, it aimed, in the words of the PGA, to move beyond “vaguely defined need for change” to focus on practical and concrete steps to effect that change. It provided a platform for member states to reflect on the recommendations of the reviews, with the aim of identifying synergies, bridging gaps, and easing potential tensions. The ultimate objective of this initiative is to identify priority areas and to present recommendations for systemic and realistic reforms at the UN that enjoy the support of the majority of its members.

Leading up to the HLTD, a series of regional and international expert meetings, consultations, workshops and retreats were organized in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America, with the objective of informing the HLTD. While varying in formats, the events were closely coordinated with the office of the PGA, and addressed a jointly developed set of themes and questions. They brought together hundreds of officials from national governments, regional and international organizations, with experts, academics, and representatives of civil society and the private sector. Viewed together, the recommendations that they collectively produced build upon bottom-up perspectives on the UN's future involvement in peace and security.

The outcomes of those regional meetings were comprehensive and are difficult to summarize, but a few key messages and recommendations emerged during these regional meetings. They were informed in great part by the recommendations put forward by the UN reviews, but not limited to them.
THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS; PREVENTION, RESOLVING CONFLICT & SUSTAINING PEACE

Without exception, all regional discussions reiterated the call of the UN reviews for a paradigm shift that emphasizes the "primacy of politics" in leading the wide spectrum of UN peace and security interventions, ranging from conflict prevention, management and resolution, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In this regard, "sustaining peace" - another term introduced by the reviews - was highlighted over and again as an appropriate overarching framework to guide all UN interventions, with an emphasis on "prevention", rather than "reaction", and an equal emphasis on a "continuum" of interventions, rather than the current sequential approach. As defined by the recent UNSC and the UNGA's resolutions 2282 and 70/262 passed on 27 April 2016, "sustaining peace" emphasizes the importance of prevention, especially by addressing the root causes of conflict. It also frees peacebuilding from its erroneous characterization as a "post-conflict" endeavor. In addition to setting the stage for post-conflict reconstruction and development, peacebuilding must be equally regarded as a means of preventing and resolving conflict, as well as catalyzing efforts for addressing its root causes. In addition, the "sustaining peace" approach was also viewed as a positive driver for integration that can overcome fragmentation and address the silos hindering coherence amongst the three pillars of UN work: peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as their respective governance structures.

The regional consultations emphasized the need for the UN and its member states to recommit to the peaceful settlement of disputes as per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The use of force should be an option of last resort, and when employed it should be in the service of a political strategy that seeks a viable and sustainable political settlement.

Participants in the regional discussions were of the opinion that the current emphasis on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts has led to protracted crises, with damaging consequences for the countries and regions involved in the conflicts, as well as the credibility of the UN. In deploying tools available to it in the pursuit of political settlements, the UNSC and the Secretariat must shift from a mentality of "conflict management" to an emphasis on "conflict resolution."

DEMOCRACY AT THE UN: SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM & REVITALIZING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

All regional consultations, without exception, highlighted that the unrepresentative nature of the UNSC is a major obstacle to the reform of the UN peace and security architecture. Deep frustration has been echoed for the lack of political will to address the issue, including membership of the Council and the veto power. The Arab African and Latin meetings, in particular, highlighted the unsustainable lack of permanent Arab, African and Latin American representation on the UNSC.

Preparatory meetings reluctantly recognized that as reform of the Security Council, including expanding its membership, is unlikely to be achieved in the short-term, other steps need to be taken to compensate for this lack of participatory decision-making in the UNSC. In this context, the regional consultations yielded suggestions, such as enhancing cooperation between the UNSC and regional organizations, and consulting troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) in the decision-making process.

The issue of revitalizing the UN General Assembly as the main body of the Organization—one that gives legitimacy to the UN's actions and decisions - has been echoed in all regional consultations, without exception. Participants in the Arab, African and Latin American consultations all expressed acute frustration at the lack of the UN Security Council reform, and all highlighted the need to empower the UN General Assembly to be able to effectively act in the realm of peace and security.
The African, Arab, European and Latin American consultations affirmed that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is best placed to steer the organization away from military responses towards a “culture of prevention,” and they highlighted that the UNGA’s role in reconciling the interests of the P5 is key for a more balanced and representative UN peace and security architecture.

Preparatory meetings also underlined the importance of reviving and implementing UNGA resolution 337 A (Uniting for Peace) and UNGA resolution A/691007 (Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly). If implemented, these resolutions would empower the UNGA to respond to conflict where the UNSC has failed to act.

**COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIPS**

All regional consultations highlighted the importance of strengthening UN and regional cooperation, as an integral part of reforming the global peace and security architecture. The discussions highlighted that, while the international peace and security field is crowded with state and non-state actors, the UN is uniquely positioned to pursue and incentivize strategic partnerships that lead to timely, coherent and effective international response.

**PARTICIPANTS IN THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON MANAGING, RATHER THAN RESOLVING, CONFLICTS HAS LED TO PROTRACTED CRISES, WITH DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICTS, AS WELL AS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN.**

Partnerships with regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, most notably with the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), received considerable attention. The recommendation by the UN reviews for the UNSC to cooperate more closely with regional organizations in a new peacekeeping partnership was welcomed. The African and Arab, as well as the European and Latin American, consultations demonstrated considerable political willingness by these regions and their respective organizations to engage in meaningful partnerships with the UN. A common call that emerged, however, was for moving beyond capacity-building, information sharing and exchanges of views, towards a more strategic partnership between the UN and regional organizations.

Other important partnerships were highlighted during the regional consultations. On one hand, trilateral cooperation between the UNSC, the Secretariat and major troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) was underlined as one of the most important partnerships in peacekeeping. TCCs/PCCs must play an important role not only in mandate design, review and extension, but also in doctrinal and policy development. This is crucial for the effectiveness of the UN response. On the other hand, partnerships with international/regional financial institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations are all crucial elements for sustaining peace.
PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH: ENHANCING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

National ownership must be seen as a benchmark for the work of the United Nations in peace and security. It requires inclusive engagement with a wide variety of local actors, not only governments. This inclusiveness would allow UN missions and country teams to better analyze each conflict and its root causes, to tap into local resources for peace, and to monitor and evaluate the impact of UN interventions. For national ownership to be meaningful, it should not be treated as a box-ticking exercise.

The Arab and African consultations underlined that elections tend to be seen by the UN and the international community as the main indicator of national ownership of peace processes. Instead of a narrow focus on elections, the consultations called for an approach that emphasizes participatory democracy throughout the governance cycle. The consultations also pointed out that in situations where societies lack the institutional capacity to manage local and national disputes, rushing into elections prematurely can sometimes be a “driver of conflict.”

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

A common key message, reiterated across the regional discussions, was the importance of regarding women as a “driver of sustainable peace.” Women’s participation in peace processes and agreements result in a more durable peace. It is also a precondition for achieving national ownership, inclusivity and the people-centered approach, suggested by the UN reviews.

The regional discussions cautioned, however, against reducing the women, peace and security agenda to appointing women to high-level positions in the UN Secretariat and missions or to insist on the participation of women for purposes of checking the box of representation. The discussions called instead for using the cross-cutting nature of the women, peace and security agenda in New York and in the field to integrate the organization’s work and achieving synergies across the silos of the UN system. The Women, Peace and Security agenda must be mainstreamed into national institutions through concrete and effective mechanisms like National Action Plans. The Latin American consultation in particular stressed the need for more action to end impunity with all sexual and gender-based crime.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

To achieve all the above, one of the strongest messages voiced in all regional meetings was the call to transform the way the UN works so that it can escape from the silos in which it appears to be trapped.

On the strategic and policy level, this translated into a clear call for both UN member states and the Secretariat to build on the momentum created by their recent successes, most notably the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, to work together across silos in the face of mounting threats to peace and security. As mentioned previously, the concept of “sustaining peace” was repeatedly referred to as a potential new organizing principle.

On the operational level, an integrated response was highlighted as a must. All regional meetings identified the “fragmentation” of UN system, both at the headquarters and in the field, as the biggest risk to the organization’s future relevance, coherence and effectiveness. It was also singled out as the most daunting and pressing task to be carried out by the new UN Secretary-General (UNSG). The next UNSG must champion a set of concrete, ambitious, yet practical, reform proposals that would: a) garner the
support of the majority of member states; and b) incentivize the various parts of the UN system to work together in more a coherent way.

**SUSTAINABLE AND PREDICTABLE FINANCING**

Regional consultations addressed the issue of predictable and sustainable financing. Funding for the continuum of peace interventions must be predictable, including from the UN’s assessed contributions and voluntary contributions.

Regional discussions also addressed financial arrangements as one of the major impediments to achieving UN system-wide integration and coherence. Structural disincentives and prohibitions on pooling of funding streams must be overcome. At the same time that financing streams must be increased, the UN must be more effective in identifying and promoting innovative approaches to peace and security, for instance by providing greater support to South-South and triangular cooperation and helping stakeholders better integrate these modalities into broader efforts to prevent conflict and promote peace.

*This essay was originally prepared as a policy brief for the UNGA’s High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security to reflect on key messages from a series of regional preparatory meetings held by civil society groups.*

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MAKING UN PEACEKEEPING FIT FOR PURPOSE: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Bert Koenders

The blue helmet is perhaps the most powerful symbol of hope for a better world. In the 70 years since the UN was founded, its peacekeepers have saved lives and restored peace all over the world. From the Far East to Europe and on to Africa and Central America, soldiers, police officers and civilian experts have worked for peace and security at the behest of the international community, often putting their own lives at risk.

There are currently 123,000 blue helmets operating in 16 UN peace missions. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is proud to be contributing military personnel, police officers and civilian experts. But that pride does not alter the fact that there is plenty of scope for improvement in UN peace operations.

This week, the UN General Assembly will discuss how to improve the UN's efforts in peace missions. This is badly needed. Despite all the good work being done, UN missions have attracted criticism: it takes too long for missions to arrive and be operational, mandates are often too broad, bureaucracy gets in the way and UN troops are not sufficiently equipped. They lack the flexibility to deal with the fast-changing security landscape.

At the same time, it is often only the UN that has the legitimacy and the ability to intervene. So standing on the sidelines and complaining is simply not an option. Taking part in missions and proposing how to improve peace operations is the only way to take UN missions to the next level.

Indeed, the lack of proper support for missions is the main reason for much of the criticism. After all, the UN is dependent on the troops provided by its member states, and often they are insufficiently trained and badly equipped. Critical enablers such as helicopters, medevac capabilities, medical care and good logistic support are hard to come by. Troops need armoured vehicles if they are to operate in areas where they may be the target of attacks.

I want to encourage Western countries in particular to step up to the plate. It is high time they took part more in UN missions. Last year President Obama urged the heads of government of UN member states to do what they could to enhance both the quality and quantity of the troops and equipment available, but still not enough is being done.

Western countries’ share in UN missions has fallen sharply in the past twenty years. Yet they are precisely the countries that are able to make high-tech, robust equipment available. For example, European countries are currently developing the concept of intelligence as a key component of UN missions.
The Netherlands was the first Western country to make a substantial contribution to MINUSMA in Mali, and this has helped bring other European countries on board. MINUSMA was the first UN mission to have a substantial intelligence capability. Such steps help boost the quality and strength of UN missions. Without the involvement of Western countries, many peacekeeping missions will lack the resources to sustain their operations and fulfil their mandates – and people’s lives will be at risk.

In order to make all this work, the missions’ mandates should also be improved. They have become too broad, resulting in a lack of focus. They must take more account of the specific circumstances on the ground. Putting the people in need first – the local population – must be the primary motive and therefore the instinctive reflex of all personnel involved in a mission. The UN and its staff must give absolute priority to the protection of civilians. In some missions, the UN already provides direct protection to civilians in need, for instance by admitting refugees to UN bases.

But the UN needs to do more to protect civilians – not just from the external threat posed by terrorists, militias or the military, but also from abuses committed by UN personnel. There must also be protection for those who report such abuses. Victims and whistle-blowers must be kept safe, and this extends to being safe within the walls of the UN.

If the blue helmet is to remain a symbol of hope and protection, we need to do more to improve peacekeeping missions. So I call on the UN Security Council, our other fellow UN member states and the UN organisation to join forces. Because ultimately, the responsibility for the success of UN missions lies with us all.

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HERE’S HOW TO END UN PEACEKEEPING’S HISTORY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Jeni Whalan

After years of moral outrage and stern official rhetoric, the odious scandal of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers of the vulnerable people they are sent to protect may finally attract tangible penalties for the organisation. US senators this month threatened to withdraw funding from the UN over its leaders’ failure to prevent sexual violence by peacekeepers and to hold perpetrators to account when it occurs. Given that the US funds 28% of the US$8.3 billion annual peacekeeping budget, it’s a threat with teeth.

This latest legitimacy crisis for UN peacekeeping has been brewing a long time. Since the first widely publicised abuses by peacekeepers in Cambodia in 1992, allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation have followed the UN’s deployments to crises around the world: Bosnia, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan and Mali.

But it is stories of widespread sexual violence against women and children in the Central African Republic (CAR) that have captured global media attention and which may finally prompt meaningful reform.

Reports of children being sexually assaulted and raped in CAR emerged in May 2014. UN investigators recorded numerous reports from young boys, aged 8–13 years, of their abuse by French troops serving under the (UN-authorised but French-commanded) Operation Sangaris. Gross mishandling by UN and French officials saw nearly a year pass before the reports surfaced publicly, thanks to the scrutiny of the NGO AIDS-Free World; only then did French officials begin criminal investigations. A month later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed a panel to investigate the UN’s response. Their damning report concluded that the UN’s mishandling amounted to ‘gross institutional failure’ and ‘an abdication of responsibility’ on the part of senior officials. In the meantime, Mr Ban sacked the head of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the CAR.

But as the UN focused inward on the inadequacies of its own bureaucratic procedures, new reports of abuse continued to emerge. In February 2016, 120 peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo were sent home over new accusations of sexual abuse brought to light by Human Rights Watch. Other allegations involved troops from Georgia, France, Burundi, Morocco and Tanzania.

And then in late March 2016 came the revelation that the UN had investigated 108 further cases of abuse by French and Gabonese forces. The vast majority of victims were children and the allegations included grotesque violence and bestiality by a French commander. Just a few weeks later, AIDS-Free World uncovered another 41 cases of sexual violence.

Why have peacekeeping missions so frequently been guilty of abusing those they were sent to protect? And given that only a tiny fraction of peacekeepers are responsible for the abuses, why has the UN proved so incapable of holding them to account?
Some blame the UN’s reliance on unprofessional, inadequately trained troops from countries with poor human rights records. To be sure, the demand for peacekeepers is at an all-time high and they are deployed overwhelmingly from developing countries. But that can’t explain the involvement of French troops in the CAR scandal — including in its most depraved incidents — nor the fact that most peacekeepers do not sexually abuse or exploit local people.

At the same time, while the vast majority of peacekeepers serve honourably and professionally, this is not simply a case of a few bad apples: the peacekeeping system is woefully deficient when it comes to the local accountability of peacekeepers.

The primary obstacle is the legal basis on which peacekeepers are deployed, according them immunity from prosecution by the host state. Intended to allow peacekeepers to operate without host state interference, in practice immunity has enabled impunity. The rules of UN deployments protect peacekeepers, not their victims. Countries contributing peacekeepers remain fully, and solely, responsible for investigating, prosecuting and punishing their own personnel. If their home countries turn a blind eye to abuse allegations, there is little the UN — or survivors of abuse — can do about it. Recent recommendations for ‘naming-and-shaming’ recalcitrant UN member states and withholding payment for their troop contributions reflect welcome progress, but these are weak mechanisms for preventing or remedying these crimes.

A range of other factors is at play. Field missions answer to UN headquarters in New York, not to communities on the ground. Sexual abuse and exploitation has been treated as misconduct, requiring disciplinary action, rather than as criminal acts requiring a legal response. A lack of transparency, systematic monitoring and public reporting means that local populations rarely have a voice, and it has required ad hoc efforts by civil society organisations to bring abuses to light. Finally, peacekeeping is fundamentally a foreign activity, involving the deployment of international troops within societies they usually know little about. In her book Peaceland, ethnographer and former UN peacebuilder Séverine Autesserre finds that derogatory views of local populations are alarmingly common, recounting ‘blatantly racist and shockingly offensive’ attitudes and behaviours described variously as degrading, belittling, humiliating, dehumanising and denigrating of local people.

Together, these features of peacekeeping create a permissive, even enabling environment for sexual violence and exploitation. A slew of organisational reforms over the past decade has not, it seems, made the UN any more effective in curtailing these abuses.

SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Withholding funding from the UN, as US senators have threatened, is a powerful form of leverage. The 1964-65 session of the UN General Assembly, for example, essentially ground to a halt after several countries — including the USSR and France — refused to pay their share of the peacekeeping budget in protest over what they saw as the illegitimate authorisation of peacekeeping operations.

Today, the top five financial contributors to UN peacekeeping provide 60% of the entire budget: US (28%), Japan (11%), and France, Germany and the UK (each around 7%). These big contributors can wield substantial influence. While reforming the system of legal immunities is impractical, their leverage could exact reforms from UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to improve the process for dealing with abuse allegations. More importantly, their concerted attention could help to move attention from the politics of New York to the survivors of abuse in host countries, in the form of assistance and compensation.
They could also lend their political and financial weight to two more ambitious accountability reforms.

First, UN peacekeeping needs an ombudsperson, with budgetary and reporting independence from peacekeeping operations in the field and from peacekeeping bureaucracy in New York. The experiment with an ombudsperson in Kosovo provides both a precedent and a demonstration of the limits of an accountability mechanism that depends for its authority and funding on the very actors it is trying to hold to account.

Second, the extent of sexual violence in the CAR — and the UN's mishandling of it — only came to light through the determined but ad hoc reporting of international NGOs, including AIDS-Free World, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Friends of UN peacekeeping, like Australia, should promote and fund systematic civil society monitoring of peacekeeping, ideally through a mix of host country and international NGOs, to monitor operations and give voice to those made most vulnerable by violent conflict.

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CEDRIC DE CONING: THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEBUILDING FROM TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL SOLUTIONS

May 31, 2016

Cedric de Coning and Gizem Sucouglu

The recently adopted landmark General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the United Nations peacebuilding architecture tasks the entire UN system to work together to prioritize efforts to sustain peace in all its engagements. As the UN moves forward to the implementation phase of the resolutions, Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes’ new book, entitled “UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years”, provides timely analysis of the challenges, missed opportunities, and potential for improvement. During a recent visit to New York City, de Coning spoke with the Global Peace Operations Review’s Gizem Sucouglu.

Gizem Sucouglu: Your book comes at a time when the United Nations is in the process of improving its peacebuilding architecture to prioritize efforts to sustain peace. How does it fit in with the current developments and debates?

Cedric de Coning: The primary motivation of the book was to reflect on the impact of the UN's peacebuilding architecture since its establishment. Our goal was to look beyond the more limited scope of the New York-based architecture, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to assess the impact and effectiveness of the establishment of the architecture had on the UN system and the international peacebuilding community, both at the policy and practitioner levels. We shared earlier working paper versions of the chapters in the book with the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), that were responsible for the analysis behind the recently adopted General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the review of the UN's peacebuilding architecture. In fact, the AGE had a similar approach, they looked at ways to improve the UN’s peacebuilding efforts across the system, and the potential of the architecture to help bring forward a longer-term vision of peace, including in the field. As such, the analysis and recommendations of our book fit nicely with the results of the peacebuilding review, and we hope it can be helpful to the UN system and wider peacebuilding community, as they move forward with the implementation of the resolutions on the peacebuilding review.

GS: From your perspective, what are the most significant achievements and failures of the peacebuilding architecture?

Cedric de Coning: Our overall finding is that the UN’s peacebuilding architecture has contributed to peacebuilding being adopted as an overarching framework for peace consolidation; that is has contributed to improved coordination across the UN system, especially at country level; and that it has helped the UN system to realise that too much focus on resource mobilization generates unintended consequences, including reducing peacebuilding to a programmatic and technical undertaking, thus undermining attention to the political dimension. I think the bigger lesson here is that you cannot avoid the internal and regional political dynamics when you do...
peacebuilding in contexts like Burundi or South Sudan. In the last few years, it has become clearer to the broader peacebuilding community that peacebuilding is essentially a political project. This was not the case when the peacebuilding architecture was established a decade ago. Then peacebuilding was seen as something essentially technical, e.g. building institutions according to international best practice without being influenced by local politics. I am glad to see that the UN’s member states now unequivocally acknowledge the imperative of political solutions in the recent peacebuilding resolutions. One of our key recommendations is that the UN peacebuilding architecture should focus on its original intended role of addressing the root causes of conflict. For peacebuilding to be sustainable, the UN system must go beyond preventing imminent relapse, and engage with structural problems through a longer-term and system-wide perspective. This is the vision for sustaining peace.

For peacebuilding to be sustainable, the UN system must go beyond preventing imminent relapse, and engage with structural problems through a longer-term and system-wide perspective.

**GS: So peacebuilding is political, and its primary focus should be in the field. What is the potential of the Peacebuilding Commission in this case? Is there a role for a New-York based architecture?**

**CdC:** The PBC has great potential for connecting political and policy level headquarters discussions with the national and local needs and priorities of specific countries and regions. It can bring realistic perspectives from the ground to New York, to nourish discussions and decisions at the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC both on country situations and thematic issues. It can be a bridge between these principal organs, helping them to move forward jointly around a shared longer-term vision of sustaining peace. It can bring a medium and long-term perspective to ongoing peace efforts, and in so doing help to lift the discussion beyond immediate crisis management. It can host discussions that can help link humanitarian, development, security and peacebuilding action, especially in certain scenarios such as protracted displacements. It can ensure that the follow-up of processes such as the World Humanitarian Summit, the 2030 Agenda and the COP21 include a vision to contribute to sustaining peace.

One way the PBC could be more visually engaged in such efforts is if it had specific products of its own. For instance, the PBC can consider commissioning independent rapporteurs to produce country or thematic reports. Such objective reports on field-level progress towards sustaining peace in specific contexts will inform and focus PBC deliberations. These reports could also help the PBC to provide concise and focused advice to the Security Council during the formulation or renewal of peace operation mandates, particularly those with a prominent peacebuilding dimension. Finally, in the drawdowns of mission mandates, in scenarios such as the current one in Liberia, such reports can help the PBC to advise the Security Council on how best the peace can be sustained during the transition process, especially from a longer-term peacebuilding perspective.

**GS: The book also highlights why the peacebuilding architecture’s potential has not been fully realized until now. Can you elaborate on this?**

**CdC:** Yes. In fact, we have two chapters devoted to the founding and establishment of the peacebuilding architecture, and we have contributions by the first and last (when the research was undertaken) Assistant Secretary-Generals for peacebuilding that speak to this question. Our overall assessment is that the space for the peacebuilding architecture, and thus also for its further development and evolution, was and remains constrained by internal UN structural boundaries as well as the current turbulence in the state of global governance. As a result the Security Council and General Assembly are unlikely to entertain radical changes
in the role and structure of the peacebuilding architecture. However, I must say that the recent resolutions passed by these two organs have gone further than our assessment anticipated. Although no major structural changes were considered, the degree to which the recent resolutions embraced the notion of sustaining peace and with it a broadened interpretation of peacebuilding that now includes prevention, goes beyond what our analysis suggested would be possible.

GS: As frequently underscored in the book, strengthening coordination across the UN system is a prerequisite for sustaining peace. What are the concrete steps that could be taken in this direction?

CdC: If we want to make the UN system better able to work together towards sustaining peace in specific country and regional contexts, then we need to focus more on pursuing coherence among different parts of the system. The first step is to have a shared understanding of the situation, informed by the rich variety of perspectives and disciplines represented by the different parts of the UN system engaged in a specific country or region. The next step is to have a predictable and regular process for generating a shared strategic objective, as well as a process for tracking and reporting the effects the system is having on the situation. The PBC can play a key role in bringing such information to the attention of Member States and the principle organs of the UN in New York, and generating political attention and direction to these processes. The recent peacebuilding resolutions also sent a strong message from Member States on the need to move towards better system-wide coherence. This has also been a recurrent theme during the informal dialogues for a new Secretary-General as well as for the new Security Council members.

GS: Based on the book’s findings, what recommendations would you offer to those currently working on peacebuilding in the UN system?

CdC: I have mentioned two important recommendations already, firstly the need to have a medium- to long-term approach to sustaining peace, so that we can escape from being trapped in an iterative short-term crisis management approach focused on preventing imminent relapse. Secondly the critical importance of having a shared and coherent strategic objective, as well as a process of regularly adapting it, informed by a system for tracking the effects the effort is having on the situation we are trying to sustain. I would like to add three key recommendations from our book. That the PBC use its broad representative base to foster agreement among its members on ways to address external factors that undermine sustaining peace, such as soliciting and facilitating corruption and illicit financial flows, transnational organized crime and extractive industries, both globally and specifically in the countries on the PBC agenda. That the PBC give serious attention to incorporating regional approaches into its work, including developing a strategic partnership with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, sub-regional organisations in Africa and African civil-society. And lastly, that the PBC help to empower national and local ownership by giving a greater role to the governments and civil society of the countries on the PBC agenda to undertake self-assessments, to brief the PBC on its visions, plans and progress, as well as its own perceptions of risks and challenges, including those posed by its regional and international partners, and by playing a leading role in monitoring its own progress towards sustaining peace.

GS: Who should be reading this book and why? What impact do you hope this book will have on the peacebuilding community?

CdC: There are only a few books that focus on the role of the UN in peacebuilding, and even fewer that have the UN peacebuilding architecture as its main subject of enquiry. In this context we hope that our book contributes to the institutional memory of the Member States and the entities that make up the UN system. Only a few of the people that currently make decisions that affect
how the UN does peacebuilding have been involved when the UN peacebuilding architecture was founded and established. Even fewer will be around 5 and 10 years from now when the peacebuilding architecture is reviewed again. It is important for our shared knowledge to understand how the peacebuilding architecture has evolved over its first decade. In this context we hope that our book will be of value for fellow researchers, peacebuilding practitioners and policy makers in the UN system and in Member States, both those that are currently working to implement the review of the peacebuilding architecture as well as those that will become engaged in this work over the next decade.

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SYED AKBARUDDIN: UN PEACEKEEPING IS ABOUT POLITICS, NOT TROOP NUMBERS

Syed Akbaruddin

India has a long history of UN peacekeeping and in recent months it has been the second largest contributor of troops. After last year's reports and the recent round of debates on the future of peace operations and peacebuilding, the Global Peace Operations Review asked India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin for his perspective on the HIPPO report, protection of civilians (PoC), and peace operations in high-threat environments. Below is an edited transcript of the interview conducted by GPOR's Jim Della-Giacoma and Alexandra Novosseloff.

Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): India’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has always been significant. With such a large stake in UN peace operations, what is your perspective on last year’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, the Secretary-General’s follow-up, and the debates it has spurred?

Syed Akbaruddin (SA): India has traditionally been a large contributor to peacekeeping operations. In fact, if you take the total number of troops that have been contributed by all countries, we, cumulatively have the largest numbers. In addition, in 1962, India almost lost 100 peacekeepers in a mission, which is the largest number of peacekeepers killed in one mission from one country ever.

When you look at the common themes in regards to peacekeeping operations these days, there are many that resonate with India. For example, PoC, there was no such concept 50 years ago, but there was an Indian Captain in the Congo who was awarded Indian’s highest award for paying the ultimate sacrifice in defense of civilians at that time. As far as we are concerned, we have a tradition of support for the UN and concepts inherent in peacekeeping operations, whether they are articulated or not.

We see peacekeeping operations essentially as a ‘band aid’ while other solutions are being worked on. We have seen over the years that peacekeeping has been looked at as an instrument that serves multiple purposes. We have witnessed over time that it has become a blunt instrument because it tries to do too many things. Instead of being focused and targeted, it is an all-purpose approach. We need to reassess if we are doing things the right way and if there are better ways to improve this to meet the challenges of peacekeeping.

JDG: One of the candidates for the next Secretary-General said recently that he would support the “next generation” of peacekeeping missions, which he defined as including robust peacekeeping and stabilization missions. You seem to suggest that peace operations have over-reached. In your opinion, is taking peacekeeping in direction going too far?
When I arrived (in New York in early 2016) and went to the C34 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), the first thing that struck me was that the room was full of military personnel in uniform. If peacekeeping is, at its heart, a political tool, then something had changed in how it is operated (since my last posting in the 1990s). I do not have an issue with seeking advise from experts, but if we agree that peacekeeping is a political activity then we should look at those options and not look only at its “robust” nature or technology to help it meet its goal. Not that this is bad for peacekeeping, but we should not forget what the ultimate goal is. I feel that the change in the approach and focus of peacekeeping has resulted in the inherent goal being lost. Therefore, if you hold the premise of the primacy of politics as important, then we need to look at how we address this. The armed forces are one aspect, but we need to look at the other aspects too and give those the same amount of attention.

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): In a way, I agree with you that in many of those operations, the political goal has been lost. However, the newest emphasis on the military aspect comes also from the fact that in order to be politically robust and stable, you need to have an operation that is militarily strong and this has been a weakness of the UN for a long time. With the changing environment that peacekeeping operations are found in, don’t we need to give them more resources so they can operate in these new environments?
SA: It is certainly no one’s case that we should not use available means and technology. But look at the balance of these: if you have robust mandates regarding force then you need to have robust political mandates too. We do not see this but rather an over-stretch in the military aspects and a lack of follow up in the political aspects. We have now the Security Council virtually all throughout the year approving and extending mandates of peacekeeping operations, but look at what happens on the ground? We do not see as much action in terms of the political aspects of peacekeeping operations. There is a gap between the theory and the practice. The military dimensions are easy to cater for – you need more troops, more technology etc. But the political aspects require more diligence, require more effort and skill. We do not see this being as much the focus. We need to ensure that attention is given to both the political and military aspects.

EVERY TIME, THE FOCUS IS ON HOW MANY TROOPS SHOULD BE THERE. PERHAPS WE NEED TO REFOCUS ON WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE AND THE TROOPS NUMBERS ARE ONLY LINKED TO THAT.

JDG: Did the Peacekeeping Summit last year exacerbate this problem by focusing on the Western “return” to peacekeeping operations and the use of technology?

SA: No, not at all. It was good because the summit encouraged more countries to provide troops to missions but more Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are not the full solution. When we look at TCCs, we do not see many of them being perceived as stakeholders regarding contributing inputs to mandate development. The TCCs are not given a serious stake in peacekeeping operations. No one takes their input seriously or asks them about mandates. Of course, some many not respond but there should be a platform to allow stakeholders to have the opportunity to provide inputs. This new system may still be coming and the Peacekeeping Summit did encourage a broader base of contributors, which will start a trend towards change. We just need to adjust the approach to have more input given to these TCCs.

AN: What you are talking about is to increase triangular cooperation, which involves improved cooperation between TCCs, the Secretariat and the Security Council. What would you regard as the best formula to encourage all these stakeholders to sit down in one room and really talk about how to implement a peace operation and discuss the daily challenges and difficulties that peacekeepers are facing on the ground?

SA: There have been some individual initiatives to look at this idea, but these do not address the problem. We have the challenge that rotating members of the Security Council want to leave their mark during their presidency and this does not result in an institutionalization of processes. We have had these discussions going back to the 1990s, where there were meetings between the TCCs, Secretariat and Security Council one day before a mandate was to be extended to discuss the development. This was not a serious effort to be inclusive and encourage change. In the past, there may be some instances where there may not have been adequate inputs given by those involved. But lack of adequate inputs in the beginning is no justification for not utilizing adequate communication channels. I do not have a set idea but I think before the mandate is expanded or changed, it would be useful to have all inputs before the report of the Secretary-General or the resolution is drafted. There must be adequate time indicated for this. There is no obligation for all the contributions to be accepted, but a process of providing input should be permitted. This would serve the UN well. If you are looking at a longer-term architecture, then these changes should be initiated. At the start, there may be little input, but over time a habit will develop of giving input and the UN should encourage this now to start a longer term trend.
JDG: The HIPPO report made the case for a "spectrum of peace operations". In the coming years, we will see a number of peacekeeping operations transitions to other kinds of missions. How do you see operationalizing such transitions?

SA: In theory, everyone agrees that peace is a spectrum and recently the General Assembly and Security Council passed the Peacebuilding resolution agreeing it is not only in post-conflict that peacebuilding should be a focus but that it can be used prior to the conflict, during, and after. But when we compare the budgetary requests for peacebuilding, even 1 per cent of what is being given to peacekeeping was not accepted. How do we expect to do all of this with not even 1 per cent of the budget, perhaps $80 million? Several countries feel that such requests should go through extra-budgetary channels. Other member states see peacebuilding as a good way to protect or restore institutions before you even need peacekeeping. If peacebuilding is so important, then why not commit at least 1 per cent to such initiatives? There is a disconnect between what is being said and what is being done. If you claim the whole spectrum is important, then you need to put equal resources behind this.

JDG: What is your sense on how we should be assessing the effectiveness of peace operations and their mandates?

SA: First of all, we can't have this mandate renewal with numbers as the basic notion. I do not see any effort of working down the continuum of peace and security. There are peacekeeping operations that have been going on for 20 years plus and with no effort being made to look at how they are addressing the needs they were set up for or working in different ways. We need to seriously look at the politics of these missions. There is a huge amount that needs to be done after the mandate is developed and I am not sure how much effort member states put in this. Many feel their job is done but if solutions needs to be arrived at there needs to be more interest for member states to push these changes to address issues on the ground.
JDG: India is active in a “robust mission” in the DRC and involved in implementing a complicated mandated in South Sudan. Do you think India will continue to be involved and contribute troops to high-risk environments?

SA: If we ran away from high-risk operations then we would not be in any operation from 1962 because we lost about 100 soldiers in that year in Congo. Our general orientation is that we see our contribution as a tangible one to peace and security globally. The more complex operations are, the more political support you need. We would be more comfortable if operations would be measured in terms on how they have progressed on the mandates. If you have a high-risk operation, for example, you could measure if have you brought this down. Risk is intrinsic to a peacekeeping operations and that is what armed forces are trained to handle. Whether they should be peacekeeping operations with anti-terrorist aspects are calls that we will need to decide case by case. In general, support for peacekeeping should not be based on how high the risk is and this will not deter us. What is important to us is whether our contribution will bring down the threat to international peace and security.

JDG: One of the next SG candidates stated his priorities would be “prevention, prevention, prevention”. We have heard similar rhetoric since the Agenda for Peace. How do we move things forward to start see some change? How do we encourage the member states to be more open to allowing some high level of intervention from the organization?

SA: That idea that prevention is better than cure is something we all accept and have been accepting for some time now. But if you accept this, then you need to put some resources behind it. I think development is a key aspect to prevention. If you say that an issue such as development is important but you only focus on it when it comes to prevention of a conflict, then people are bound to question this ideology. You are not in a post-state era. Many see the state as an effective tool in development activities, but in many places the state structures are still coming of age. There is a concern that they will be undermined. There are various models we talk about to deal with this. For example, can prevention be separated from conflict? Can we build institutions and state structures in a pre-conflict mode without focusing on conflict aspects, maybe calling this nation building or development? If you are willing to move it in this manner, there will be less resistance because people will not see it as a political tool.

AN: But prevention is also about having good analysis of information and when you have this, you are able to tell beforehand what the risks are, the drivers of conflict and how to address these. Do you think the UN as a whole is ready to act in this way rather than wait for conflict to erupt?

SA: Most of the present day conflicts, the lack of a resolution or solution is not because of a lack of information. Look at the most serious crisis we are facing today. Nobody can say we did not know this was going to happen; it is just that there are rivalries of a sort that are not enabling you to prevent it. On the risk assessment, all the tools you need are not going to help you when you have a situation on the globe that is more disturbing than before. We are increasingly moving in a direction where the UN’s role was most effective in the Post-Cold war era, when all the major powers allowed a space for the UN to do its work. Today that coordination and collaboration is giving way to more competition and we need to address what the bigger issue is.

AN: But the role of the UN is also to force governments to deal with conflicts because it can raise awareness. I think a large role of the UN is to raise awareness on issues such as emerging conflicts or crisis such as the refugee crisis. The role of the UN is not to go against member states but do push them to do what is needed and to do what they may be reluctant to do. What do you think about this?
SA: I have no problem with that thinking and ultimately in issues such as global public goods or climate change that is the role of the UN—to push everybody to realize there is action needed. However, issues of war and peace are more circumscribed, because you have an architecture of international peace and security that was determined by the outcome of the last world war. You have a Security Council based on a certain mode of functioning based on the results of WWII; the problems of today and the challenges the UN is facing in peace and security are different to then. If you do not evolve, you will have stakeholders who want to take control and resolve these issues themselves outside the institution. Ultimately, if there is an issue that people and states want to get involved in, there must be a means of communication to allow them to share this. If you do not have this, then states look for other means to get involved. This is the reality of many developing countries in regards to peace and security – they are not given the opportunity to give input.

JDG: Will the next office holder be able to facilitate this better relationship?

SA: It is not only the Secretary-General. The SG has a role and a pulpit that he or she can use, but there needs to be a restructuring of the world order. The Secretary-General is one aspect of that but the world order is changing so rapidly and the institution needs to match that. If the UN and its decision-making mechanisms remain frozen in the status quo, it will not be perceived as a nimble organization that can meet the challenges we are facing. There needs to be more than a change in the Secretary-General for the UN to become ‘fit for purpose in the 21st century’. Fit for purpose doesn't only mean the Secretary-General and the Secretariat; it means reflecting the new global order.

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UNDERSTANDING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AS A CORE OBLIGATION

Haidi Willmot, Ralph Mamiya and Scott Sheeran

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in calling for new approaches concluded that the Protection of Civilians (PoC) was a core obligation of the United Nations, but also noted that expectations and capabilities needed to converge. While significant progress has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the Protection of Civilians, also the name of a new book on the subject, the editors and contributors to the volume on this sometimes controversial subject have analyzed and laid out suggestions for the next steps. The Global Peace Operations Review’s Alexandra Novosseloff and Jim Della-Giacoma recently spoke with three of them - Haidi Willmot, Ralph Mamiya, and Scott Sheeran – about the past, present, and future of PoC.

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): There have been many books looking at PoC. What is the added value of this book and what is the message you are trying to convey that is not present in other works?

Ralph Mamiya (RM): Our book takes a comprehensive approach to PoC. It is a multifaceted topic, and while other works acknowledge this, they then tend to guide the reader into one area or another, such as peacekeeping, international humanitarian law or the responsibility to protect (R2P). Our book aims to look holistically at PoC.

Haidi Willmot (HW): It harnesses perspectives from international law and international relations, traversing academia and practice. The book brings together a wide array of eminent academics and respected practitioners, incorporating contributions from legal scholars and ethicists, political commentators, diplomats, UN officials, military commanders, development experts and humanitarian aid workers.

The UN Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, wrote the foreword, which I think reflects the importance of the issue to the UN. And we have a brilliant collection of authors who have written with insight and passion, including Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who heads the International Crisis Group; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, a former Foreign Minister of Costa-Rica and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York; and Major-General (rtd) Patrick Cammaert, who was the DPKO military advisor as well as the deputy Force commander in MONUC.

Scott Sheeran (SS): As well as having expansive breadth, the book goes into real depth on a range of sub-topics, shining a spotlight on key issues and challenges and providing cross-cutting analysis. This allows the reader to understand the development of PoC, how the concept has changed over time, and its significance for the UN. Bringing together in-depth academic analysis with practical experience is the key value add. Other books on PoC have not taken this approach.
Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): What are some examples from the book of these authors bringing a new approach to understanding PoC?

HW: The book is divided into three parts: 1) Conceptual and Historical Foundations; 2) Legal Framework; and 3) Policy and Practice. Usually PoC commentary focuses on just policy or practice. As we cover all of those spheres the chapters speak to each other in a number of ways. For example, the use of force to protect civilians is considered from a number of perspectives. The chapter by Hugo Slim looks at the ethics of the use of force; Scott Sheeran and Catherine Kent analyse the conceptual and political interaction between PoC, R2P and humanitarian intervention; my chapter examines the evolution of the UN collective security agreement; Mona Khalil and Siobhan Wills deal with relevant legal issues; while chapters by Stian Kjeersrud, Fiona Blyth and Patrick Cammaert examine practical aspects of using of force to protect civilians.

JDG: You mention the use of force, there is the perception that protection of civilians is the responsibility of the military component but there is a much broader responsibility. What is the role of non-military personnel in PoC?

RM: A number of chapters address unarmed aspects of protection. In my chapter I trace the historical development of both armed and unarmed concepts of protection; chapters by Andrew Clapham, Michael Keating and Richard Bennett address human rights protection; Jamie Williamson, Sara Pantuliano and Eva Svoboda deal with humanitarian protection; Erin Mooney addresses protection in the context of refugees and IDPs; from a development perspective Lise Grande considers building protection capacities; and the chapter by Aditi Gorur and Nils Carstensen deals with community self-protection.

We also have chapters by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Ben Kioko, Lydia Wambugu, Stian Kjeersrud, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Andreas Øien Stensland, Cedric de Coning, and Walter Lotze that compare organizational approaches to PoC across the UN, African Union, European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, considering both armed and unarmed aspects.

JDG: The HIPPO report says PoC is a core obligation for UN peace operations and everyone on them is responsible for it. How does the analysis in your book connect with these ideas?

RM: The HIPPO report reflects many of the currents of thought on PoC in the book. The preparation of the book was a two year process that both preceded and succeeded the HIPPO report.

HW: Certainly, the analysis in our book agrees that PoC is a central tenant of UN peace operations, in fact we go further to assert that it is both a central function and obligation of the UN arising from the UN Charter. The responsibility for PoC is widely spread, not just among mission components, but across the UN community. Our authors examine the protection responsibilities and human rights obligations of host States. They consider the responsibility of UN Member States, particularly in the Security Council and the Fifth Committee, which is responsible for financing missions. They also consider the operational and legal responsibilities of troop contributing countries, and individual troops when deployed to protect civilians. A number of our authors consider UN Secretariat responsibilities for effectively planning and managing missions, and advising Member States. We also address the protection rights and responsibilities accruing to other actors, such as regional organizations and NGOs, including those arising from international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law. PoC is a common responsibility of the UN community. Effective protection requires wide support and complementary action.
JDG: How has our understanding of PoC evolved during the last fifteen years?

HW: Our book looks expansively at the concept of protection, considering antecedent concepts in the three main monotheistic religions, just war theory, the work of enlightenment thinkers, and the relevance of the concept to early military doctrine, such as the Lieber Code. In the UN context, we consider the development of PoC through the broader lens of the evolution of the UN Charter – the collective security agreement. When the Charter was promulgated in 1945 it focused on the maintenance of international peace and security between states, not within them. Since that time there has been a remarkable evolution to the current focus on the security and well being of human populations within States. If and how that translates into effective action, is another line of inquiry that we explore. This significant pendulum swing has been most pronounced in the last fifteen years – since 1999.

SS: To understand what comes next in the evolution of PoC is difficult. While the analysis in the book enables us to better see the practical, political and legal issues for PoC, it is challenging to chart the course for future development to enable the UN to effectively fulfill its protection responsibilities. The conceptual development is relatively mature, and the ‘low hanging fruit’ in implementation are gone. Next steps require tackling bigger problems in UN peacekeeping. A key conclusion of the HIPPO, that PoC must be linked to a political strategy and solution, is an easy statement to make in theory, but difficult to implement in practice.

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AN: What are your expectations about shaping the debate and future development of PoC, especially towards member states who may be reluctant to shift their positions?

HW: The book can operate to shape the debate on two levels. First, the value of gathering such multidisciplinary analysis and expertise in one place should not be underestimated. It is a singular resource for people working on protection issues, who may want to gain an understanding of other aspects and perspectives. For example, the book shines a light on how the use of the veto and selectivity of Security Council actions can adversely affect civilians, while discussing how humanitarian policies might be well served by better incorporating community self-protection strategies. At the same time it considers the utility of different types of force to counter different types of threats to civilians, and examines protection obligations under international human rights law. Making some of these points more accessible, should positively influence the debate. Second, in the conclusion we offer three practical and concrete suggestions to move things forward: 1) reconcile existing concepts to develop a common definition; 2) identify a cohesive legal framework; and, 3) articulate a set of principles to bring coherence to the disparate streams of effort that comprise protection.

SS: While a book may not change the politics around PoC, we hope it might play an important role in raising the profile of the debate and addressing implementation challenges. It offers ideas on what is needed, such as enablers, and what works, such as joint protection teams. UN missions also need the political and financial support of Member States to better protect civilians.
**RM:** Effectively protecting civilians is not about tightening one screw or fixing one part of the UN, the entirety of the organization needs to be fixed. However, the book offers smaller ways to move forward, such as agreeing a common definition of PoC. This is a political issue but also an area where there are serious misunderstandings. Misunderstandings that can negatively impact effective implementation in the field.

**AN:** It is also about managing or reducing expectations. We know that resources are limited and there is only so much you can do with what is provided by member states to protect civilians. What is your perspective on this challenge?

**RM:** Expectation management around PoC is challenging. In the UN we try and manage expectation to all audiences – media, Member States and local populations. Sadly, the public hears most about PoC when peacekeepers have failed to protect civilians. Improving our mandates and communications strategies so that people better understand what peacekeepers are supposed to be doing is key.

**SS:** There is a genuine gap between the expectations or aspirations of the public, including local populations, and that of the Council. The UN must be realistic and support what is possible. The HIPPO report is very strong on managing down the expectations and overreach by the Council, but there are different ways of going about that. Several of the chapters provide possibilities for moving forward, such as looking at how forces can be reconfigured to operate differently and more effectively. The book also considers what could be achieved if the deeper political dimensions were tackled.

**HW:** While some of the information may result in managing expectations, that is not the purpose of the book. Expectation management is about dealing with the world as it is now, with the resources and political will as they presently exist. The book looks much more broadly. Historically, we look at the world as it has been; we look at it as it is now, with its myriad of constraints; but we also look at the possibilities for the future, the way it could be. It is much broader than just the here and now.

**JDG:** You mentioned there is an ambiguity in the legal framework guiding protection of civilians. What kind of process would fill this gap?

**SS:** We are not suggesting highly prescriptive and abstract demands of the law in this field, but there is a genuine gap. For example, there is a Secretary-General’s bulletin on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which talks about how peacekeepers should understand their IHL obligations, but there is nothing similar in terms of human rights. Human rights is where you draw a lot of legal clout for PoC. Soldiers should not be able to observe violence against civilians without taking action. This is raised in Brahimi and HIPPO but in HIPPO there is a stronger legal basis whereby it stipulates that regardless of your mandate, you have the authority act. There is more clarity needed for Rules of Engagement as there is a disconnect and clear differences of opinion.

**HW:** There is no single body of law that regulates PoC. It lies at the intersection of jus ad bellum, jus in bello / international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international refugee law, and international criminal law. As a result, there are many overlaps and gaps. For example, it is unclear how broad or deep the responsibilities of certain actors are; what are the obligations for the force commander to actively and preemptively protect civilians? PoC may be well served by the development of something akin to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which reviewed several bodies of law and brought together the relevant principles to form a set of international standards.
The introduction to Protection of Civilians can be downloaded here.

Haidi Willmot is currently on leave from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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Scott Sheeran is a Counsellor at the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations and on leave from the School of Law and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.
African borders and their lack of clear demarcation have been identified as one of the root causes of conflict on the continent. The African Union’s Border Programme (AUPB) works toward reducing this conflict risk.

The PSC Report spoke to Ambassador Aguibou Diarrah, head of the AUPB in the Peace and Security Department.

What is the Border Programme all about?

The aim of the programme is the structural prevention of conflicts. We are constantly faced with the need to solve violent crises, but the aim is to prevent them, to anticipate conflicts.

This programme is based in the conflict prevention division of the Peace and Security Department. It has four main pillars. The first is the demarcation of borders, which for a long time has been the cause of conflict between countries, notably between Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cameroon, Chad and Libya, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These are cases where the demarcation of borders causes the problems, and that’s why the heads of state [of the AU] decided to start this programme.

The second pillar is cross-border cooperation. One has to go beyond demarcation and work towards the gradual integration of countries through stronger cooperation across frontiers. The third pillar is capacity building. The aim is to train staff so that borders are managed more effectively. Finally we also work towards creating partnerships with other institutions and on mobilising resources.

What are the benefits of this programme in terms of peace and security?

The programme is about prevention. The benefits are the creation of a peaceful environment between states. Instead of states’ entering into conflict with one another, we promote negotiations. For example, we managed to create a space for dialogue between Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan.

We are also busy creating a space for dialogue between certain West African countries. Everywhere you find latent tensions, this programme could be used to achieve a peaceful outcome.

How can the programme deal with the migration crisis that is so much in the news at the moment?

Migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to be solved. You don’t solve migration, it is a phenomenon that has existed since time immemorial. The starting point of our programme is cross-border cooperation. The Niamey Convention could be an effective tool to promote development because the border is the culmination of movement by people towards new horizons.
If we can establish good cross-border cooperation, we create a dynamic between states. If we can get states to work together to establish health and education services at borders we can limit illegal migration.

Legal instruments can also be crucial in regulating migration. The relations between states and between cross-border communities can have an impact on curbing illegal migration. Working together to pool resources and in border activities can help to keep young people – the candidates for migration – from migrating. States have to ratify the convention and commit to getting involved, collectively, to stem illegal migration.

**How do you judge the impact of the Border Programme, after 10 years?**

The programme has actually been operational since 2009. When it was started, only one-third of the 83 000 km of land borders in Africa were demarcated. Today, more than half are demarcated.

When it comes to cross-border cooperation, we adopted the Niamey Convention, the first convention on cross-border cooperation since the Cairo Resolution in 1964 on the intangibility of Africa's borders. The Niamey Convention is being ratified, but to date only Niger has ratified it. Nine others are in the process of doing so. We have to do much more lobbying in order to have a higher rate of ratification of this important instrument.

In terms of capacity building, we've produced five books, practical guidebooks, and we've produced two documentary films about the activities of our programme from 2010 to today.

**What are the main challenges facing the Border Programme?**

The challenges are huge. The first challenge is that heads of state decided that all borders should be demarcated by 2017. And as I said before, to date only half of Africa's borders have been demarcated. So the first challenge is demarcation, but when we'll achieve this is still an open question. We're going to have to work hard to get to this point.

Our second big challenge is the ratification of the Niamey Convention mentioned above. The third main challenge is mobilising resources. The only donor financing the programme is our German partner, which is planning to put an end to this funding. African countries will have to commit to financing this programme.

**What are the measures that could improve cross-border cooperation at the level of the AU?**

The Niamey Convention is aimed at removing the bureaucratic procedures at borders. We should strive to create a so-called soft border. Instead of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, we need to streamline the procedures by getting member states to work on joint activities at the borders. Every state is sovereign, but this is about achieving a pragmatic management of the borders.

*This interview was originally published by ISS Africa on May 9, 2016*
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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

The protection of civilians is a highly topical issue, which has been of increasing importance.
FEATURED DATA AND GLOBAL STATISTICS ON PEACE OPERATIONS

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL

Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel (1990 - April 2016)

This line chart chronicles the growth of UN peacekeeping operations since 1990, showing the increase in total uniformed personnel as well as each personnel type: troops, police, and military experts.

Uniformed Personnel Contributed to UN Operations by Region or Origin (April 2016)

The pie chart on the left shows the proportions and numbers of uniformed personnel contributed to UN operations by Africa and the rest of the world, with the smaller pie on the right breaking down contributions by region and personnel type.

Total Uniformed Personnel Contributed to UN Operations by Region of Origin (April 2016)

This bar chart shows the proportions and numbers of uniformed personnel contributed to UN operations by region, highlighting the large contributions made by Africa and Asia.
**ETHIOPIA**

Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie graph shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to UN missions, being made by the top five contributing countries as of April 2016 – in absolute terms and as a percentage of the combined contributions of the top five.

Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Ethiopia to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows Ethiopia’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of April 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Ethiopia to UN Operations (1999-April 2016)

This line chart shows Ethiopia’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 2003 (top line), as well as the five missions to which Ethiopia made its largest personnel contributions from October 2003 through April 2016.
Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to UN missions, being made by the top five contributing countries as of April 2016 – in absolute terms and as a percentage of the combined contributions of the top five.

Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Bangladesh to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows Bangladesh’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of April 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Bangladesh to UN Operations (1999-April 2016)

This line chart shows Bangladesh’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 1999 (top line), as well as the seven missions to which Bangladesh made its largest personnel contributions from September 1999 through April 2016.
India

**Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (March 2016)**

This pie chart shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to UN missions, made by the top five contributing countries – in absolute terms and as a percentage of the combined contributions of the top five.

**Uniformed Personnel Contributions by India to UN Operations (March 2016)**

This pie chart shows India’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of March 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission.

**Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by India to UN Operations (1999-March 2016)**

This line chart shows India’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 1999 (top line), as well as the six missions to which India made its largest personnel contributions from January 1999 through March 2016.
The Global Peace Operations Review has received generous support from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, French Ministry of Defence, German Federal Foreign Office, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.