**GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW**

The *Global Peace Operations Review* is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the *Review* aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the *Country & Regional Profile pages*, the *Review* provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN’s peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the *Data & Trends* section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our *Data guide*. The *Strategic Summary* provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The *Review* covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the *Review*, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU’s Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Thematic Essays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Tunisia Conundrum: Sowing Dictatorship, Harvesting Terrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanny Megally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Civilians Needs to be Understood as a Collaborative Strategy and not a Campsite</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannah Dönges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Commentary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating a “Responsibility to Prevent” at the UN</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristoffer Tarp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The South China Sea and the Limits of UN Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Della-Giacoma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU-UN Partnership is a Necessity not an Option</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesley Connolly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Related Publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Featured Data and Global Statistics on Peace Operations</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THEMATIC ESSAYS

June 28, 2016

THE TUNISIA CONUNDRUM: SOWING DICTATORSHIP, HARVESTING TERRORISM

Hanny Megally

Why is Tunisia producing the world’s largest numbers of jihadi foreign fighters when the country is seemingly the one success story emerging from the 2011 Arab uprisings? It is a conundrum that has confounded analysts not least because the answers have been very contradictory. Delving back into Tunisia’s modern history may help in contextualizing the answer to this question. It points to decades of heavy-handed top down secularization policies, oppressive human rights practices, a mismanaged economy that privileged the few and neglected large parts of the country, and bad neighbors. Ultimately, as Rachid Ghannouchi the head of the En-Nahda party, a leading Islamist partner in the governing coalition and the largest political force in the country with about 80-100,000 members, put it “if you sow dictatorship, you harvest terrorism”.

WHAT IS SO CONFOUNDING ABOUT THE DATA?

If as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism “we know that extremism flourishes when human rights are violated…. political space is shrunk”, this does not seem to match the profile of post-2011 Tunisia. According to Freedom House, it had become by 2015, “the Arab world’s only free country”, with many restrictions on freedoms lifted and a greater openness to participate in political processes. Yet according to the Soufan Group, out of a global figure of around 30,000 foreign fighters from about 86 countries who have gone to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic state or other violent extremist groups fighting there, Europe as a whole has produced around 5,000 and Tunisia 6,000 (though Tunisians authorities put the number around 3000).

Some analysts have sought to interpret these figures in a positive light, as an indication that Tunisia’s pluralistic society is hostile to extremists. They argue such militants cannot get a foothold or a base in the country and so are mostly fleeing abroad. They point to how civil society has strongly come together in a number of mass protests to condemn political violence - for example after the assassinations of two prominent political opponents – Chokri Belaid and Mohamed el Brahmi, in February and July 2013, or after the attacks on foreign tourists at el-Bardo National Museum and at a beachside resort near Sousse killing over sixty people. Others, however, argue that the numbers of foreign fighters are only the tip of the iceberg, pointing as examples to an Ansar al-Sharia rally in 2012 in Kairouan which drew some 10,000 followers, or to the large number of Islamist radicals in detention (estimated around 12,000), and of course the attacks on the Museum and the hotel and the assassinations as evidence to the contrary.

Finally, there is the argument that following the fall of Ben Ali in 2011 the transitional government was weak and divided and there was a collapse in the security apparatus, as a result those so inclined were easily able to travel (as compared with other countries...
in the MENA region where potential fighters were stopped from leaving). This is again countered by those who hold the view that security forces are still powerful, for example turning back some 15,000 to leave, seeking arresting 100,000 in the first six months of 2015 and utilizing an ongoing state of emergency and a strict anti terrorism law.

The reality is there is some truth in all of these explanations. Why?

THE ROOTS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA GO BACK DECADES

Two caveats to begin with. A wealth of information has been developed around the key factors or drivers that may lead to an environment conducive - a bit like an incubator - to turning individuals to terrorism or violent extremism. While this is essential groundwork, it is still a fact that that too many assumptions have not been rigorously tested and more empirical and evidence based research is needed. Otherwise we would be counting violent radicals in the tens of millions and not in the tens of thousands.

Additionally, radicalization in itself may not necessarily lead to violent extremism or to negative outcomes. Many radical movements in the past have brought about important positive changes and reforms. The issue is radicalization that leads to violence and the data about why particular individuals living in the same environment become radicalized and resort to violence while others do not remains sparse.

These caveats also apply to Tunisia, but what we do know is that the phenomenon of individuals going abroad to fight in “just wars” goes back a number of decades and should not be read as something that has arisen out of the new “democratic Tunisia”. Research shows that Tunisians were going to fight with the Afghans against the Soviets in the 1980’s or in Bosnia against the Serbs in the 1990’s. The US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 appear to have been turning points with increasing numbers of Tunisians going to wage “jihad” abroad. In those days there was no Islamic State or Daesh but there was al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Sinjar documents, the cache of al Qaeda personnel data discovered in the fall of 2007 by U.S. forces in the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, show that Tunisians were present in Iraq, mostly coming via Syria, though when some were denied access through that route they ended up in Lebanon at the Nahr al Barid refugee camp (joining Fath al Islam there). Research points to Tunisians being present among the very early foreign fighter networks arriving in Iraq and that Ansar al Sharia emerged from among Tunisians imprisoned in Iraq.

WHY WAS THIS HAPPENING?

There is no one explanation but a combination of reasons has been put forward as to why radicalization and travel to fight abroad was happening in the decades before the 2011 uprising. Many of them relate to frustrations arising from grievances and resentment about political repression, absence of freedoms, economic neglect and marginalization. But there are also strong elements of a search for identity, religion and meaning in life, and of exploitation by radical recruiters promising solutions, financial gain or a role in fighting back against the West. This is all very similar to experiences related in other countries where people have turned to violent extremism. More specifically:

• The sometimes heavy handed secularization policies from above during President Habib Bourguiba’s 30-year rule (1957-1987)- banning headscarves, abolishing religious courts, placing mosques, including al Zeitouna, under government control, nationalizing religious endowments, introducing secular universal education –jarred with religious sensibilities and conservative attitudes. Islamist recruiters exploited the resentment against these policies.
• The progressively oppressive human rights policies of Ben Ali’s 23 years of rule (1987-2011) - arbitrary imprisonment and untried detention; unfair trials; torture, restrictions on freedoms of expression and association - produced resentment, and even more so among Islamists after they did well in the 1989 elections and were then specifically targeted by the regime. Rachid el-Ghannouchi and some En-Nahda leaders were forced to flee into exile. Thousands of suspected Islamists and returnees from Afghanistan and Iraq were also imprisoned during this period (leading to further radicalisation processes and relationship formation in detention). Ben Ali then followed this up with stricter state control over mosques, education system and dress code. Conservative headscarves for women were banned; men with long beards were frequently harassed.

• The rampant corruption and unfair distribution of wealth in the country despite the glowing reports coming from the UN on how Tunisia was achieving its MDGs and was “far ahead in terms of governance, effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality”. According to a World Bank study in 2014, 21 per cent of the country’s private sector GDP was in the hands of Ben Ali and his clique.

• The neglect by the central government of parts of the country, even while Tunisia was supposedly meeting its MDGs was quite evident. The contrasts between the developments in coastal places like La Marsa or Carthage and the hinterland close to Algeria or Libya’s borders was stark. An estimated 92 per cent of Tunisia’s industrial production is concentrated in three urban coastal areas: Tunis, Sousse and Sfax, leaving the country’s western regions economically deprived. Many of the Tunisians foreign fighters tracked in the pre-2011 period came from these marginalized inland parts of the country, along the Algeria border to the West, the Chambi mountains or the Libya border to the south east - including places like Kasserine and Ben Guerdane.

• Neglect also included poor slums and neighborhoods of the major cities like Douar Hicher on the west of Tunis or Sejnane in Bizerte.

• The absence of decent jobs, particularly for those with a higher education. Job creation did not keep pace with population growth but additionally, thanks to free access to higher education, the number of university graduates coming into the job market rose from 11% in 2000 to 33.2% by the end of 2013. Basically the situation was “the higher the education level a person has the lower the probability of finding work”. Educated Tunisians were twice as likely to be unemployed as uneducated ones because the economy created so few professional jobs.

Geography also appears to have been a big factor. Being neighbours of Algeria (which until 2014 was the bigger challenge with infiltration into Tunisia of foreign fighters affiliated to AQIM, - who formed the “Uqba ibn Nafi” brigade, the biggest armed group in Tunisia at the time – and out to Europe and on to Turkey) and Libya (which more recently has become the biggest threat both in providing training grounds for Tunisian fighters, routes to Syria, and routes back to Tunisia for IS-linked groups) has helped facilitate this travel. Research has also found links with smuggling of contraband such as cars, cigarettes, oil and arms.

Pre-2011 one could point to areas from the western border areas of Jebel Chambi to the Libya border areas of the south east where repeated examples of neglect, social unrest and contraband smuggling lead to migration but also to foreign fighters following similar routes. Additionally, tribal and family connections influenced this process so that once one family member left others followed, and in some cases whole families were documented as having left to join the Jihad.
Ben Guerdane in the province of Medenine is a case in point. It is a mainly tribal community of around 79,000 people. It is conservative and religious but not historically known as a hotbed of extremists or radicals. That, however, began to change after the 2001 attack on the world trade center in New York and really took off after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Here we see a combination of recruitment drives taking advantage of outrage at events broad, unrest about the worsening economic situation, anger at the state’s repressive policies in putting down protest and easy access to routes for slipping way to join the Jihad. Despite its cultural vitality and natural wealth (ACRPS) it was marginalized in Tunisia's modern history with little agricultural or industrial investment. Sitting near the border with Libya made travel easier and there is a long history of smuggling (petrol, consumer goods and post 2011 human trafficking and weapons smuggling) and shadow economy. Large protests had been happening pre-2011 after economic decisions by the central authority based on a worsening of political relations with Libya. One was the switch to greater reliance on the maritime route between the ports of Sfax and Tripoli, reducing the land route via Ben Guerdane. Another was the tax imposed by the Libyan authorities on imports of around 150 dinars (then about 80 Euros); and third was the retaliation by Tunisia in imposing import/export licences for anyone selling Libyan goods. This effected livelihoods in Ben Guerdane and protests about growing unemployment erupted openly on several occasions. As a crackdown followed, and particularly targeted bearded men and Salafis the numbers leaving grew.

People interviewed from Ben Guerdane speak of youths and others “disappearing” individually or in groups and later it becoming apparent they had gone to fight in Iraq. Leaving was a conglomeration of those going to join a just cause, those fleeing state repression and those seeking economic opportunities abroad. In 2007 a prosecutor general referred ten Tunisians to trial caught fighting with Fath al Islam. Eight of them were from Ben Guerdane

WHAT CHANGED AFTER 2011 AND THE FALL OF BEN ALI?

With the "Jasmine Revolution" two separate and opposite processes began unfolding in the country. One process was taking the country towards greater openness and freedoms and another was seeking a take it towards strict application of the Sharia, restrictions on behavior and dress and on the role of women.

The first process saw Tunisians elect a president, voted for a representative parliament, form a technocratic government, adopt a constitution and establish a transitional justice mechanism. But while these were given the highest priority in terms of efforts to bring about change and progress – and involved much debate and negotiation – there was a failure to adequately address the economic promises of the revolution, something I will come back to later.

The second process needs a bit more elaboration. Initially there had an immediate lessening of the Ben Ali era restrictions on freedoms of expression and association, and there was a temporary collapse in the functioning of the security apparatus and in overall surveillance. An early visible outcome was the increased appearance in the public domain of bearded Salafis, who until then had been working underground fearing state repression, and of women wearing conservative head scarves - something that in the Ben Ali era was frowned upon.

An amnesty in 2011 released more than 2,000 prisoners, including suspected Salafis and Jihadi leaders who had returned from fighting global jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They included the likes of Abu Iyad al Tunisi, a founder of Tunisia’s Ansar al Shariah, who in the year 2000, while fighting in Afghanistan, helped found the Tunisian Combat Group - an al Qaeda
affiliate calling for regime change in Tunis. He escaped Bora Bora in 2001 with Ben Laden but was later captured in Turkey, handed over to the Tunisians and subsequently tortured, then in 2003 sentenced to more than 40 years imprisonment.

Soon black flags began appearing on buildings in some of the slum areas around Tunis and other cities. Over time, these Salafi extremists (who were essentially opposed to parliamentary elections - which they saw as maintaining the old regime ways - and calling for an Islamic insurrection) were going beyond proselytizing to seeking to impose their ways and beliefs. They did so by taking over hundreds of mosques and kicking out Imams, trying to enforce Islamic dress codes in the streets, ransacking stores selling alcohol, attacking cultural events and even desecrating Sufi tombs.

At first state policy was at best more accepting of these actions or at worst too weak or divided to act on them. The En-Nahda party, a leading Islamist partner in the governing coalition and the largest political force in the country with about 80 -100,000 members, argued the Salafis as well as the radical syndicalists (extreme leftists) should be included in the political process and not ostracized.

But 2012 and 2013 were tense years with the country watching these two seemingly inexorably oppositional processes developing alongside each other. When the security apparatus began to act against the Salafis, they complained that the old order was back pointing to the use of arbitrary detention and torture. Some mounted armed attacks on security personnel - which brought further security restrictions and surveillance on their activities - and eventually on non-military personnel, such a the political activists Chokri Belaid and Mohammad Brahmi, tourists at el Bardo museum and at a resort hotel in Sousse, and diplomatic property such as the ransacking of the USA Embassy.

IF YOU SOW DICTATORSHIP, YOU HARVEST TERRORISM

En Nahda, was gradually getting blamed for these violent actions. EnNahda and the Salafis had spent time together in detention and shared many common experiences, which partly explains the slowness to react. But as the violence increased and the targets became civilians and tourists, it eventually took the step in 2014 of banning Ansar al Shariah as a terrorist group. With the ensuing state crackdown, which saw more than 100,000 arrested in the first half of 2015; many Salafis went underground or left the country, some heading to Syria. In his in-depth analysis on “exporting Jihad” in the New Yorker George Packer quotes Mohamed, a local from the poor Douar Hicher district of Tunis. He relates how once the crackdown began many of the disenchanted youths whom he had grown up with began to leave. “Ninety per cent have , and not to Italy. They went to Syria and Iraq”. He goes on “two weeks ago, thirty people disappeared from here” - on the run from the police. He gave the main reasons for them going as “marginalization and joblessness.”

The failure to seriously tackle the economic situation has been admitted by Ghannouchi as one of the reasons En Nahda lost in the 2014 elections. More attention had been given to political reforms and the constitution and less to social and economic issues. The revolution had raised expectations that were then frustrated, creating a conducive environment for radicalization. The Salafis were playing on the aspirations that were unfulfilled by the revolution.

So to review the post 2011 period and answer the question as to why even more Tunisians have been departing to fight a jihad abroad:
• Initially a lifting of restrictions allowed groups like the Salafis to come into the open and to proselytize and exercise their newly acquired freedoms of expression and association. This coupled with a temporary breakdown in the functioning of Ministry of Interior and in the security services, made it easier for recruits to travel to join the Jihad in Syria.

• The reason for the increase in numbers of radicals or Jihadis amongst Tunisian Salafis trying to impose their views on behavior and dress code relates to the role of the returnees from jihads in Afghanistan and Iraq and their interface with local Salafis calling for change at home. That radicalization process was happening in the prisons during the Ben Ali era and took off the once they were all released in the October 2011 Amnesty.

• The resort to violence, and particularly the attacks on civilians, tourists and politicians lead to increased repression by the state, including by declaring a state of emergency and the banning the Ansar al Sharia in 2014 and promulgating a strict Anti Terrorism law in 2015. Those who did not go underground were soon leaving the country.

• Events next door, after the fall of the Qaddafi regime brought a proliferation of arms to the Tunisian-Libyan border. Libya was lawless and a terrain for Tunisians to find safe haven, to train before going to Syria or to plan and prepare for return to Tunisia equipped to bring down the system of governance.

• The tough structural steps needed to improve Tunisia's economy have not been taken. Five years after the revolution national unemployment rate is 15.3% but goes up to 32% for the under 25's. That number is even higher in the west and south of the country. More than one third of the 650,000 unemployed are graduates according to Zied Ladhari Employment Minister. The wide disparities between the wealthy coast and the underdeveloped hinterland remain stark.

Kasserine, 30 kilometers from the Algerian border and close to the Chambi moutains paints a similar picture to Ben Guerdane. The population is about the same size and it lies on the smuggling route, bringing in cheap petrol from Algeria. A fifth of adults in Kasserine are involved in the contraband trade. Analysts point to symbiotic smuggling and terrorism networks on the Algerian border with jihadists controlling routes and levying taxes on contraband such as drugs or weapons. Official figures for unemployment in May 2015 were around 20.6 per cent virtually unchanged from pre-2011.

If we return to Ben Guerdane in 2016 we will hear that the USA is helping the state to build a berm on the Libya border, directly imperiling their smuggling and, in their eyes, cutting off livelihoods. On March 12, the Tunisian newspaper El-Shorouk released a detailed report, citing the Asia News Agency, stating that dozens of Tunisians had recently been killed in Syria. It included their names, their pictures, and their home provinces, as well as the places and dates of their deaths in Syria. It noted that most jihadists originated from the town of Ben Guerdane.

A few new elements have also crept into an individual's calculation about joining the Jihad abroad, namely the lure of financial support ($3,000 a month), the promise of property, positions of authority and power, and the excitement of being a part of something being created in Syria/Iraq (the Caliphate) that holds the promise of solving all the problems the region has faced.

Perhaps one last factor to put on the table is the evolution of En Nahda party, under the leadership of Ghannouchi, something which came to fruition last month at the party's Congress in Hammamet when it took the historic step of separating the party's religious, cultural and social mission from the party's political activities, in essence creating a political party that is separate from
the religious organization or movement. Under Ben Ali the party was banned and Ghannouchi fled the country. After 2011 the party was legalized and then won a landslide election to get to power. Since then the party has been evolving as Ghannouchi put it “from defending identity to ensuring the democratic transition” and arguing that mosques should be completely neutral and play no role in politics.

Its pragmatic approach lead to compromises in the drafting of the Tunisian constitution that now does not mention implementation of al-Shariah and bans polygamy. That evolution also saw En Nahda defend, then tolerate, then move away from and finally ban Ansar al Sharia in 2014 when the latter resorted to acts of violence.

Many rightly see this evolution as having prevented the democratic transition in Tunisia from coming apart, but it may also have lead to some, perhaps only a small minority, of it conservative/religious supporters drifting to the right as they no longer see the party as representing their ideals.

**SO HOW IS ALL OF THIS USEFUL FOR DEALING WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA?**

A central theme in the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism is the call to member states like Tunisia to develop national plans, policies and strategies with the promise of an “All United Nations” support to help them do this. However, knowledge gaps will need to be plugged in two key areas for this to work effectively for Tunisia.

First, information about what programmatic responses developed by other states facing similar challenges should be made more readily accessible. Tunisia should not be starting from scratch or inventing the wheel. There can be no template approach, but Tunisia can benefit from looking at other relevant experiences around the world and lessons learned from them and the UN from its vantage point should be globally collecting, comparing, analyzing and providing this information in a useful form. It has not been doing this in any systematic way so far, neither for Tunisia nor for anyone else.

Second, there is very little solid information about what programmatic responses to violent extremism have actually worked or which have not and why. At a time when resources are limited no nation can afford to try everything set out in the menu proposed by the UN Plan of Action and hope some of it will work. This requires an investment by the UN and donors into evidence-based field research and in comparative analysis to learn much needed lessons so we avoid wasted resources and repeating past mistakes.

To close, key grievances that may have radicalized young Tunisians before 2011 had to do with the economic situation, the neglected regions of the country and the state’s repressive human rights policies. The World Bank report of 2014 pointed to key structural weaknesses that need tackling if there will be headway on unemployment and a decrease in the neglect and marginalization of large parts of the country. Progress on rights issues has been impressive and dramatic, but risks being undermined by the “war on terror” and how the state of emergency and the Anti Terrorism law are enforced.

The good news is that most Tunisians have shown time and again that they want to pursue the peaceful path of transition that is currently underway and do not want to resort to violent means to force a particular change. The formation of the National Youth Initiative Against Terrorism is one expression of this affirmation for peaceful transformation. The ability of En Nahda to evolve and to compromise may be another. The massive demonstrations against terrorist acts are also strong indicators. We should also note that despite the deep resentment against the state for cutting off their livelihoods and not prioritizing their economic needs, when
in March this year supporter of the Islamic State came across the border from Libyan seeking to establish a base in Ben Guerdane it was the local population that rose up against them and worked with the security forces to defeat them.

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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS A COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY AND NOT A CAMPSITE

Hannah Dönges

In Bentiu and other protection of civilian sites in South Sudan, the UN peacekeeping mission performs all the functions of a state within a state. With the help of humanitarian partners, it feeds, protects, and organizes those displaced by a bitter internal conflict into what are small towns. At this UNMISS PoC site, there are 98,000 internally displaced people, the biggest fraction of the estimated 170,000 IDPs living in similar sites across South Sudan in June 2016. It is a huge challenge and heavy responsibility for UN peacekeeping that stretches its traditional principles and practices.

At the sites I visited in May and June, the UNMISS peacekeeping forces are supposed to provide security from external threats, while within the fences UNPOL maintains the internal security of the camp. But of those needing protection only a fraction have made inside these boundaries and many vulnerable citizens remain outside these sprawling tent cities.

Protecting civilians is not just the responsibility of the UN mission’s uniformed forces. It is a job shared with many with the mission and partners from the humanitarian community. It should, of course, be first and foremost the government’s responsibility. But how did the UN mission come to be in such a position? What are the challenges on the ground when protecting civilians? Who shares in the responsibility for this mandate that the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations identified as a core responsibility for the for UN peace operations? How can constructive collaboration among organizations with a common goal of protection be enhanced?

RECURRING CONFLICTS

South Sudan’s government failed soon after independence when civil war broke out. The deliberate targeting of civilians took drastic forms after a fight in the military barracks in Juba between soldiers of two of the main ethnicities in December 2013. This mirrored an earlier split in the political leadership in July 2013 and fighting broke out between the Dinka of President Salva Kiir and the Nuer of ousted Vice President Riak Maachar. With government forces, the SPLA, being one of the main conflict parties, this social contract broke down. On an unprecedented scale, people from both ethnic groups fled to UN peacekeeping bases to find shelter from the violence that spiraled out of control across the country.

Decades of armed conflict preceded South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011. Historically existing local conflict dynamics lured in the background of the struggle for independence. This newest member of the UN was bequeathed a long history of inter-communal violence with limited national capacity to manage its own security or protect its civilian population from harm.
Even after it formally broke away from the north, there has been persistent fighting among armed groups, sometimes tribes and clans—often related to cattle rustling—and government forces in several parts of the country. Power struggles and ethicized conflict dynamics became very visible when President Kiir ousted part of its cabinet as well as his Vice President Machar in July 2013. After fighting broke out in Juba following a dispute within the presidential guard, the country has faced its third civil war since December 2013.

It remains to be seen whether the ongoing ‘IGAD-PLUS peace process’ will be create sustainable results. President Kiir’s 28-state-decree contradicts the process’ postulations and amplifies ethnic rivalries over land and resources, and may likely lead to renewed intense fighting in Upper Nile, particularly around Malakal.

Years of international humanitarian and political intervention in the region have given South Sudan a high international profile. This has meant the post-independence violence, which has had a surprising intensity and cruelty that was unmatched in the previous civil wars (according to reports in particular in its use of gender based and sexual violence), has not been ignored by media and politicians. Still, any actual armed violence impact assessment remains astonishingly incomplete, as far as to say “in South Sudan, no one is even counting the dead.” Many areas have not been accessed or monitored at all when fighting took place, and access still remains limited—as the result of security restrictions, small staff numbers, and geographical inaccessibility by any other means than limited air assets due to insurmountable road conditions during the rainy season (about six months per year).

But while a sustained struggle for self-determination is different from the ongoing internecine fight, Alex de Waal has argued that both conflict and crisis have retained basic structures across time. These were not sufficiently addressed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and have been to different degrees overshadowed historical rivalries and conflict cleavages. The different conflict dynamics share that impunity and a lack of accountability for committing as well as failing to halt human rights abuses have fueled it. It seems that the “intractable culture of impunity” is even reflected throughout the country. Understanding reoccurring patterns is crucial to the developing current responses, both concerning specific local dynamics as well as the development of a rule of law system in conjunction with traditional court practices.

The UN’s own human rights reports have highlighted the immense difficulties and scale of atrocities faced by the South Sudanese population (even if most likely only scratching the surface as bags of bones of unidentified people are still being found) as well as actors engaged in the protection of persons and livelihoods. The conflict between government and opposition forces has reached new levels of violence and ethnicization and ethnic targeting has reached levels that reach far beyond the characteristics of previous fighting. “Where you would see one or two tukuls burned during cattle rustling, we only now saw entire villages being burned down in one instance,” one ICRC staff member told me. Human Rights Watch has said “all conflict we see is ethnicized.” Armed groups have long recruited along ethnic lines in South Sudan, but UNMISS fears a “Balkanization” across the country.

**A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY**

Without planning or foreseeing the scale nor timeline, the UN mission suddenly found itself in the business of protecting civilians on its own bases in unprecedented numbers. This security crisis created a both a new peacekeeping and humanitarian challenge for which the UN Security Council had not provided a mandate. At PoC sites, aid workers and peacekeepers now had to work closely together within UN bases to manage an emergency response.
The way they did this was different at each site. International actors had often diverging and, at times contradictory, understandings of what should be done. At some sites, they cooperated closely. At others, they regarded coordinating their efforts as only a necessity for security. For this reason, the experience of UNMISS is an interesting case study about the wider implications that PoC mandates have for future of UN peacekeeping as well as civil-military cooperation.

In UNMISS, the implementation of PoC mandate collided with the complex realities of the conflict. These challenged the traditional principles of peacekeeping with its emphasis on consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and the defense of the mandate. The mission was caught in the middle of a difficult peace process between two main armed rivals, one of whom was the host government.

While the mission’s mandate may seem clear and strong (under Chapter VII) when issued in New York, the contradictions were self-evident on the ground. UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014) tasked UNMISS to protecting civilians, monitor and investigate human rights, create conditions to deliver humanitarian assistance, and support the implementation of a cessation of hostilities agreement. With the government being often the cause of threat, source of abuse, and creator of the humanitarian crisis, the mandate has put it at odds with the host, created tension, and often hostility to the mission.

Each of the four POC site locations I visited have their own composition and dynamic, and are in this aspect similar to refugee camps. They differ from refugee and IDP camps to the extent that they are built on UNMISS premises. The peacekeeping operation is the de-facto “landlord,” making decisions about its premises also affecting the humanitarian activities, and their main goal is the physical protection (and thus closely related to the force component of peacekeeping operation).

**IN SOUTH SUDAN, THE UN’S PEACE OPERATION DOES NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS A TASK SHARED BY THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN THE FIELD. POC SITES AS MICRO COSMS FOR THIS COLLABORATIVE EFFORT CONSTITUTE CHALLENGES BUT ALSO SPACES TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER.**

The protection dynamics differ from site to site, and have changed across time. I have visited Bentiu, Malakal, Bor as well as UN House in Juba. Most visibly in Malakal, the population within the POC site changed depending on who held the town at the time. Ethnic tensions exist within these sites and may lead to tensions as well as fighting. In Bentiu, Bor, and UN House in Juba, the majority of the people living on the sites are Nuer, but at times internal tensions lead to violence. A small-sized city a gang was formed at the POC site in UN House; in Bentiu families and clans from the same ethnic group sometimes fight each other. It is the job of the small number of UNPOL at each site to police these micro-conflicts, and they often call on help of the Formed Police Units as well as the military when they turn violent.

The sites each have unique arrangements for civil-military coordination depending on who is running them and posted there. In each location, UN civilian, military, and police lived and worked alongside humanitarian partners. They not only protected the IDPs from the threat of physical violence, but also provided them with food, water, and basic medical care, although without complying with humanitarian *sphere standards*. But cooperation works more due to personalities rather than systems. It is well known that contingent rotation and staff turnover can impact the effectiveness of protection. There are synergies, but also tensions in the
relationships between the UN and NGOs at the sites. Different mentalities, principles and mandates of a spectrum of humanitarian organizations on the one hand and the big peacekeeping operation on the other hand, are not always well understood and lead to (in parts natural and important) tensions.

Organizations outside of the UN family, like Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), emphasize and reiterate their independence and humanitarian principles as well as trying to maintain distance from all “combatant parties,” including UNMISS. But the difficult security situation – as well as needs within the POC sites - has at times still seen the same NGOs seek help from UN forces to evacuate them, store supplies, or provide them with space for their own facilities on UNMISS premises, within the POC site boundaries, and under the protection by UNMISS battalions.

In Bentiu and Malakal, MSF is part of the wider “humanitarian” hub behind the first line of UNMISS protection. The ICRC also encourages UNMISS to conduct long-range patrols in areas where is not present or the civilian population caught in crossfire between warring parties. This makes understanding the conflict dynamics – as well as a nuanced understanding of civil-military relations between a variety of international and national actors - in South Sudan an important pre-requisite to finding ways of protecting civilians in a concerted effort.

AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE

The phrase “POC site” has now entered the UN peacekeeping lexicon. It was first created in the field in UNMISS as informal term to refer to its facilities, where internally displaced persons (IDPs) sought refuge. The name was later formalized in May 2014 in UNSC Resolution 2155 when it mandated the mission. That civilians seek shelter at UN bases is not a new phenomenon. Civilians have done this before; most well known is in Rwanda in 1994, but also in the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999. UNMISS itself did have contingency plans for providing physical security to a couple of hundred civilians, but only up to 72 hours.

No one foresaw the scale of the crisis that would peak in mid-2015 with almost 200,000 IDPs living at these sites. This huge presence triggered new discussions about the state – and limitations - of POC within South Sudan, the future of such mandates, as well as need for better and closer cooperation between peacekeepers and humanitarians and the need for policy guidelines and “exit strategy” as well as a balance of living conditions within and outside the sites. In improvising, the UN Security Council was been pushed by events into the humanitarian business without a serious discussion about the long-term implications for this expansion of its role.

While by UN standards UNMISS is a large mission with is 12,523 uniformed personnel and a $1,085,769,200 annual budget, the scale of crisis within South Sudan is outsized and remains volatile. It has been described as human rights as well as a humanitarian disaster. There are no comprehensive or up-to-date figures on the scale of it. A widely cited figure says that at least 50,000 people have been killed, 2.2 million displaced, and as many as 3.9 million pushed to the brink of famine.

It is unclear how long UNMISS must – and is able – to sustain its POC sites to protect what has been estimated to be only 10 per cent of the IDPs in South Sudan. It all combines to create a natural focus on the UN’s effectiveness in protecting of the civilian population and preventing human rights abuses.
LIMITATIONS OF THE PEACEKEEPING POC IN SOUTH SUDAN

Civilians in South Sudan have been in a precarious position for some time. Almost five years ago, Security Council Resolution 1996 included a strong protection of civilians mandate, which reflected that POC was already an important issues in UN peacekeeping. Despite this, the role of POC in relation to other parts of the mission was disputed within the mission, even before civil war onset.

Prior to this 2011 mandate, the challenges of implementing POC were well known. In 2009, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) jointly commissioned the study Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. On the first pages of the ‘Bible of POC’, it noted the ‘chain of events to support the protection of civilians – from the earliest planning phases, to Security Council mandates, to the implementation of missions in the field – is broken.’ The bluntness of this critique – and the openness about shortcomings - spurred internal and cross-institutional learning processes beyond ad hoc cooperation when faced with immediate crises.

As with other norms of protection, the host state holds the primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens. The situation changes when the state as armed actor(s) targets its own population or views parts of its citizens as opponents. When the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) became main party to the conflict, the UNMISS mandate had to shift and protection of civilians became its most prominent part. All forms of capacity building, including the training of police, were suspended.

The mission’s mandate now includes four key tasks: POC, human rights monitoring and investigation, creating conditions for delivering humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. The Security Council mandate on “protection of civilians” has often been called the “impossible mandate” – a peacekeeping operation cannot substitute state and society structures that have been eroded through decades of armed conflict, and now often leading to the repeated question: “How much deeper do we have to go to reach rock bottom?” When the life of a cow is more protected than that of a woman or a man, in a place where human life is worth so little, the spectrum of protection actors struggle with where to start, and priority areas are often those that are at least possible to access – logistically and for security reasons.

This line chart shows the increase in the number of uniformed personnel deployed (red line) and UN authorized levels of uniformed personnel (blue line) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from its inception (August 2011) to present.

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A SPECTRUM OF PROTECTION ACTORS

Within South Sudan, there is a vast spectrum of international organizations engaged in their own interpretations of protection – reaching from the civil-military actor UNMISS, over a wide array of UN agencies and funds operating under humanitarian principles, to humanitarian organizations outside of the UN system with a pronounced distinct approach like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

UNMISS’ operational concept on POC includes three pillars. First, the protection through political process; second, providing protection from physical violence; and third, establishing a protective environment. Within UNMISS, protection of civilians’ advisory...
section not operational but delivers support and policy guidance to other sections. The Relief, Reintegration and Protection section (RRP) is the “humanitarian interface” of the mission and coordinates with the different humanitarians within the POC site, and may at times be closest to the role of a POC advisory unit if there is no permanent representative of the POC section itself. From the mission’s perspective, all contact should be directed towards RRP first. However, at times humanitarians may directly communicate with other sections, for example UNPOL in cases of urgent security incidents on a POC site.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the coordinating body. OCHA coordinates need assessments and humanitarian activities on the ground. It is also the body most prominently consulted for the development of peacekeeping mandates in New York. UNHCR is the coordinator of the protection cluster, which humanitarians as well as UNMISS (mostly represented by RRP) attend. With partners, for example the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) UNHCR delivers trainings on protection, with an emphasis on developing protection oriented mindsets that lead to “protection mainstreaming” and taking into account what impacts small and big actions may have on the safety of the populations. The ICRC’s protection of the civilian population (PCP) approach is built on engaging in “protection” dialogue with the armed actors (here also including UNMISS) to promote the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Further (and here sometimes collaborating with UNICEF in particular) the ICRC engages in family tracing and reunification.
Civilian protection by UN peacekeeping has been criticized as doctrinally deficient because its implementation remains ambiguous at the operational level. It has been criticized for encompassing too many (albeit important) concepts rather than focusing on a set of precise and clear-cut tasks and achievable goals for which actual on-the-ground capacities exist.

The criticism towards POC in peacekeeping does not only concern its perceived doctrinal “inefficiency,” but also that it includes the use of force as part of protection activities, making it a “combatant entity.” On a tactical level, this is further coupled by troop contributing countries’ diverging abilities – as well as willingness – to actively engage in protection. The ability – and mandate – to use force is a unique feature that UN peacekeeping brings to the protection arena, but it has its limits. The mission’s ability to muster and apply armed force is very weak and restrictive tool that works well in very few circumstances. As the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations or HIPPO report noted, the natural ‘difficulties of mandate implementation increase exponentially when there is little or no peace to keep.’

The ICRC and MSF have traditionally placed a strong emphasis on the importance of maintaining humanitarian space as well as the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. This distinction and differentiation remains important. “We are stronger overall, by not being visibly or publicly being associated with each other,” one ICRC staff member told me. In the middle between them and peacekeepers stand the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UN agencies are more obligated to work closer with governments.

Scattered across the spectrum are a variety of NGOs at POC sites engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection work such as the prevention of gender based violence. Their knowledge and inclusion in formulation of strategies of these external actors is most crucial in developing protection practices and supporting communities’ own coping mechanisms. The HIPPO report also recommends that peacekeeping missions ‘work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment’ re-emphasizing the third pillar of the Operational Concept on POC.

It is apparent that UN peace operations do not, cannot, and also do not wish to “own” the concept of protection. The 2009 joint study stressed this was a joint responsibility. A UN mission’s strength is that it can bring its multi-dimensional response with civilian, military and police skills and assets to any operational arena where others actors are present, including the host state, UN agencies, and NGOs, but it can be slow to adapt to change.

The slow process of recruiting additional uniformed contingents is well known, and its fault for this lies in the general way peacekeeping operations are deployed. The situation in Unity State has considerably improved since fighting peaked over the course of 2014 up until the second half of 2015. The peacekeeping operation, at that point, was only one battalion strong and UNMISS staff emphasized that “it would have made a difference if (the Ghanaian Battalion) had arrived earlier.” The slow relocation/new request for troops have led to gaps, but these gaps are even more structural also among existing force and UNPOL levels. If well planned and coordinated, it can do this in a near simultaneous way that amplifies the limited personnel and assets it may have in any one location.
With the escalation of violence in late 2013 the UNMISS mandate evolved and humanitarian agencies adapted their strategies. Outside of the UN mission, with its centralized budgeting and complex recruitment procedures, organizations like the ICRC were able to rapidly refocus their efforts. Before the conflict, it had focused on livelihood assistance, protection and capacity building. For the ICRC, the “protection dialogue” refers to the promotion of knowledge and respect for international law. To do this, it trained and disseminated on IHL to members of the armed forces, armed groups and other weapon bearers. With the outbreak of violence in December 2013, the delegation changed tack and scaled up its emergency response. It began airdropping food and relief items to remote parts of the country as well as providing emergency medical services.

The opening of its gates to people fleeing from killings across the country is described by many as the most noticeable success of UNMISS. By doing so, the mission managed to prevent the experience of the genocide in Rwanda when UN peacekeepers were accused of standing by in the face of genocide. The ad hoc and timely decision of the SRSG as well as her management team in Juba, state coordinators, their staff and force members set a precedent that helped reshape the mission’s mandate. However, the scale and sheer endurance of the POC sites have also caught the mission by surprise and been exemplary for its (and New York’s) helplessness in finding long-term solutions.

POC sites have been criticized as tying down peacekeeping personnel. By the estimate of one UNMISS staff member between two thirds and three quarters of the mission’s soldiers and police are committed to protecting the sites from external threats as well as maintaining the camp’s internal security. This is to the detriment of establishing a presence throughout the country through long-range patrols. Inside the mission, views are conflicted as some worry that the sites neither provide a long-term solution nor constitute effective peacekeeping. Most notable, with a finally subsiding conflict in Southern Unity (where some of the most brutal and widespread cases of sexual violence had been reported) UNMISS opened a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) in Leer, partly responding to advocacy by humanitarian organizations within the UN family.

Attacks on the POC have only heightened these concerns. The most recent assault on the Malakal POC site in February 2016 as well as on Bentiu POC and Bor POC in Jonglei in April 2014 called into question not only the ability of UNMISS to fulfill its protection mandate beyond its own gates, but also within them. The attacks eroded respect for UN peacekeeping and the integrity of the mission’s mandate, and have led to a loss of trust into the mission’s capabilities on part of the IDPs on the site despite the formulation of new contingency plans. Questions have been asked whether the attacks could have been prevented through conflict mediation, better camp management, or other interventions by civilian and police personnel as well as effective protection from external intrusions by UN force.

Each of the POC sites reflects the surrounding conflict dynamics of the people fleeing from the groups or forces targeting them. With this divide, the POC sites have often been blamed by parties to the conflict for being partial towards the other side. But given the sites are filled with the population targeted by those who controls the surrounding territory, such accusation of partiality need to be treated carefully. The population of the Malakal POC has switched between different groups many times, depending on whether the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) or the SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A–IO) were in control of the nearby provincial town in Upper Nile state. The town switched hands twelve times and after the almost complete destruction of the city, all three main ethnic groups – Shilluk, Nuer and Dinka – lived inside the POC site. According to several sources, fighting has at many times been averted due to well-managed coordination between humanitarians and peacekeepers under inclusive leadership of a former state coordinator. Under a different leadership and style, the February 2016 events escalated and the Dinka population fled the base.
UNPOL has the primary responsibility for ensuring security and safety on the sites, which also became its primary activity with the stop of capacity building under the new mandate. UNPOL, however, is unarmed, and not equipped for more robust crowd control, unless it calls on Formed Police Units (FPUs). If any firearms are involved in fighting on site (some reports show their prevalence on the sites), the military is called directly.

This means that simply ensuring the external (force’s responsibility) and internal security – of POC sites that well have the structure of a small town or in the case of Bentiu, a city - binds the manpower of the UN in unprecedented forms. They limit mobile capacities of the forces and constitute hotspots for own conflict dynamics which may be abused and fostered by conflict parties. Thus, the POC sites may constitute one of the biggest successes of UNMISS but also one of the biggest threats to the role UN peacekeeping wants to play. Solutions Working Groups have been established to discuss the future of the sites. They include UNMISS (RRP as well as POC advisors) as well as humanitarians.

The physical protection of the sites does not only stand and fall with the troop numbers, but also with the diverging quality of the troops sent, trained and equipped by troop contributing countries (TCCs). Frustration about non-action of troops to killings in direct proximity to their watchtowers, allowing access to armed soldiers to the UN House have led to actual calls of naming and shaming certain TCCs.

**PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS**

**POC is not a one-size-fits-all concept.** It is used by a variety of actors as an umbrella for several practices and different ways of deploying civilians and military forces in a conflict area. In South Sudan, the UN's peace operation does not have a monopoly on this responsibility. It is a task shared by the UN and other actors in the field. While concepts and practices among the organizations on the peacekeeping and humanitarian spectrum diverge, in few or no other conflicts do humanitarians and peacekeepers cooperate as closely as this and on a large scale as they do in South Sudan. Also on a subnational level, POC sites need to be understood each as their own challenging environment rather than as a group. The projection of force as well as delivery of humanitarian assistance outside of the POC sites in Unity in the “Beyond Bentiu” strategy has yielded positive results and lessons learned in terms of referring to local conflict analysis in surveys and in particular women's groups involvement should be seen as best practices for analysis but should not lead to generalizations on solutions for inherently different settings.

**Peace operations need to better communicate within and without about what its POC mandate and capabilities are and are not.** Within UNMISS, the POC mandate is differently understood by various contingents and among individuals. Since 2011, much has been done to create a “coherent strategy and operational guidelines.” Dialogues with local populations about the meaning of the mandate have been initiated, but tensions within the peace operation and with humanitarian partners highlight the need for good communication and finding agreement on what action to take. In settings, where communication is open and transparent – particularly depending on the leadership and often times on the individuals constituting the interface between the different organizations – relationships have been better than in settings where decisions and decision making procedures are not explained. The crisis is not over for UNMISS. It has learnt throughout its deployment, but the HIPPO report shows that the protection of civilians is still a contested concept. A common language to describe the responsibilities for protection and how to implement these is still a work in progress.
UNMISS’ limitations as well as learning processes should contribute to future missions. UNMISS has worked hard at improving its implementation of protection practices. In many ways, it has performed admirably on the backdrop dire conditions and its limited strength restricted mobility in a large country with virtually no road network. POC sites limit and prevent mass atrocities. However, humanitarian and protection disasters such as the attack on the POC site in Malakal tragically show protection by international actors gone wrong. POC mandates can distort expectations for security and by absorbing a mission’s resources in static locations it restricts the deployment of its forces. It is a weakness that is exploited by parties to a conflict. It frustrates peacekeepers deployed and challenges the assumptions of those who mandate them. In many ways, the dependency on the host state reflects the peacekeeping set-up globally and should lead to broader engagement with the question which role UN peacekeeping is most suited to play in the broader protection framework.

POC needs to be understood as a collaborative strategy and not a campsite. POC sites were an UNMISS innovation, but a reactive one. Rather than being understood as a defensive “band aid” applied by the military or police component of a UN mission more needs to be done to articulate a positive political strategy for POC. The deployment of POC advisors on site has led to phrasing constructive questions and raising awareness - sometimes contested – reflecting a protection oriented mindset. More needs to be done to find a way forward that involves a partnership with the UN Security Council, the peacekeepers it mandates, the humanitarians with whom they work side-by-side with, and the local communities they all intend to serve. The exertion of political pressure on the main conflict parties - in conjunction with South Sudan’s neighbors – is crucial so that these efforts do not fizzle out in vacuum.

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CREATING A “RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT” AT THE UN

Kristoffer Tarp

Much of the High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) on Peace and Security in the General Assembly in May was predictably centred on prevention. Participants made the case for greater efforts to prevent conflict from erupting or re-erupting in the first place and committing to sustaining peace. But maybe it is time, as Youssef Mahmoud has argued, for prevention as a term to be disconnected from conflict?

This would entail moving towards a notion of “positive peace” as first coined by Johan Galtung; a comprehensive approach to identifying and nurturing the attitudes, institutions and structures, which we know create societal resilience and sustainable peace by addressing root causes and potential triggers of conflict long before conflict turns violent.

In line with this thinking, others have argued that assistance to the prevention of conflict should apply similar approaches as efforts to prevent diseases by improving public health. Medical practitioners and experts have known for centuries that enhancing prevention decreases the need for expensive cures. Similarly, efforts to sustain peace should focus on developing permanent local agency and capacity to prevent conflict that might turn violent - just as we do when ensuring cold chains, improving medical education, rolling out public health campaigns and introducing vaccination programs to prevent diseases.

The discussions during the HLTD also demonstrated that the three key peace and security reports of 2015, with their crosscutting focus on prevention and sustaining peace, are now triggering a range of reflections on our approaches to, and understanding of, efforts to address the risks of violent conflict.

MAKING PREVENTION A REALITY IN THE UN SYSTEM

Reflection is good and collective reflection even better when the aim is to advance a global understanding of the most critical challenges relating to preventing violent conflict. However, at some point one needs to look for the tangible changes these discursive shifts may or may not bring about. Much of the discussion during the HLTD dealt with the capacity and ability of the UN System to support preventive efforts.

One discussion focused on the proposal to strengthen the Department of Political Affairs’ mediation and preventive diplomacy capacity as well as its early warning mechanisms. This would necessitate expanded, professionalised and more rapidly deployable mediation capacities and an increased use and spread of political envoys and good offices. Such improvements and expansions ought to be a no-brainer for those Member States expected to foot the bill. Preventive actions cost a fraction of any form of response to the outbreak of violent conflict. Needless to say that the self-evident nature of these investments will not automatically
lead to Member State action in times marked by siloed financing and diminishing investments in the UN System from a range of donor countries.

**MAKING PREVENTION WORK OUTSIDE THE UN SYSTEM**

While the discussions of the UN System’s mediation capacities and approaches remain extremely relevant, the focus on institutional fixes and capabilities also provide a convenient excuse to walk around the elephant in the room: the political dynamics and decisions that often lead to indecision and inaction when it comes to early prevention efforts and commitment to finding political solutions. Most of the seemingly intractable, protracted, and bloody conflicts we face today have little to do with the UN’s mediation capacity or the number of regional envoys. Their protraction and intractability are caused by the lack of appetite of local, national, regional or geopolitical actors to find viable political compromises, solutions and settlements. In fact, many of the conflicts transcend the interests, positions and worldviews of local actors and have instead become either proxy wars waged by regional actors or/and have fallen prey to geopolitical endeavours to project power and influence. The three reviews of last year also fully acknowledged this *primacy of politics* when it comes to sustaining peace.

This recognition evidently begs the question: What do we do when the question is not about mediation capacities and finding the most effective arrangements for international assistance to prevent violent conflict but about the deliberate reluctance of key actors to activate these capacities and forms of assistance? The big question here - the size of the elephant in the room - is, whether the UN’s Member States are ready to agree to obligating and committing principles ensuring that local, regional or geopolitical interests or proxy interest are not allowed to prevent prevention i.e. that preventive efforts can bypass political deadlocks and decision-making impasse by calling on the *Responsibility to Prevent*.

**RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION?**

The semantic reference to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is neither accidental nor an attempt to ignore the history of contestation and disagreement around R2P as a concept. One of the on-going tensions concerning the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security continues to relate to state sovereignty and interference therein. The UN Charter grants the Security Council the power to authorise interfering, including with military means, in the internal affairs of any country in the world if a situation posses a *threat to international peace and security*.

In recent decades, peacekeeping missions have indeed increasingly been deployed to deal with intra-state conflict and civil war - and increasingly without the full content of the belligerent parties. There have, however, also been several examples of inaction or inadequate action by the Security Council mainly linked to one or more permanent members of the Security Council vetoing decisions to intervene out of geopolitical interests, concerns over breaching state sovereignty or using the latter argument to cover over the former.

The R2P principles were endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to “prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. The principles would allow the international community to respond, including through military means, if and when a range of criteria were met and a set if principles applied. These principles stressed that intervention, including the use of force based on R2P principles, could only happen as a means of last resort. Protecting civilians would remain the primary responsibility of the individual state, the international community would commit to assisting a state in
its efforts to protect its civilian population and only in cases where the state proved unwilling or unable to adequately protect its citizens would an R2P intervention be warranted - but in these situations no longer as a choice but rather as a responsibility.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT PRINCIPLES

If UN Member States were to endorse a principle of Responsibility to Prevent (an R2P v.2), similar principles should apply i.e. that states themselves carry the primary responsibility to prevent conflict - if needed supported by the international community. Only in cases where countries fail to sustain peace would the Security Council or other international actors initiate preventive efforts.

The main difference between the responsibility to protect and that to prevent would be a) the absence of the use of force in preventive efforts) at least under the Responsibility to Prevent principles) and b) action at the earliest possible stages of emerging conflict - ideally before conflict turns violent at all and thus addressing root causes and potential triggers of conflict. A such, the Responsibility to Prevent should appear significantly less threatening to Member States worried about the Responsibility to Protect principles being used to authorise and expand the use of force beyond the original intention and lacking appropriate proportionality as well as a realistic end stage. Those following the application of the R2P principles will recall such concerns expressed with regards to past interventions namely in Libya in 2011.

OPERATIONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT

The increased political and institutional focus on prevention obviously begs the question what prevention actually means in more "operational terms". While there is no single answer to this question, efforts might include the establishment of Good Offices and/or deployment of a mediator or a team of mediators to a country or region displaying distressing signs of tension and inability to sustain peace. This would include addressing structural root causes of conflict and thus involve a much broader understanding of what sustains peace along the lines of the positive peace vision embodied in the sustainable development goals and namely goal 16.

THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT COULD EMPOWER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REFER PREVENTION CONCERNS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAKING IT A STANDING ITEM ON THE COUNCIL’S AGENDA WITHOUT GIVING THE COUNCIL’S PERMANENT MEMBERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BLOCK OR REMOVE THE AGENDA ITEM.

Also, early action evidently depends on early knowledge and acknowledgement. Implementing the principles of Responsibility to Prevent would therefore require an in-depth understanding of - often latent - conflict drivers at the local, national and regional levels. The principles are consequently linked to enhancing the capacity of the UN System and local actors to identify early indications of escalating conflict. From a UN angle this is currently particularly challenging in countries with no “political presence” of the UN System i.e. no peacekeeping or political mission and no political envoy covering the territory. Circling back to DPS’s call for enhanced coverage and capacity, such presences must be expanded and capacitated to fulfil this role.
The Responsibility to Prevent could also entail the issuance of Security Council resolutions requesting local stakeholders showing signs of division to engage constructively in negotiations - potentially accompanied by punitive measures (through sanctions panels and monitoring groups) towards parties failing to comply. The Security Council might also request a regional organisation to initiate preventive efforts or endorse and support (including financing) a regional organisation already doing so. Responsibility to Prevent could also mean that the Security Council will keep a prevention challenge in a given country as a standing item on its agenda until a political settlement leading to sustainable peace has been identified and implemented.

The Security Council could also request, and the Secretary-General could support through the Secretariat, the development and implementation of national road maps for prevention including through building early warning systems, institutional response mechanisms and longer-term strategies to ensure political, and socio-economic inclusivity and cohesion. In many contexts, this will require significant investments from external bilateral and multilateral actors. While this is true for all preventive work, post-conflict situations are likely to require particularly substantial investments to deal with the trauma and legacy of conflict - including the physical destruction, absence of sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunity.

Hence, there is a need for not only increased but also predictable financing if efforts to sustain peace are to prevail. Ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, including for conflict prevention at the earliest stages of potential conflict, was one of the unresolved issues in the recently adopted resolution on peacebuilding. The question was left for the incoming Secretary-General to consider and return with options for the membership to consider during the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

Finally, the principles of Responsibility to Prevent could empower the General Assembly to refer prevention concerns to the Security Council making it a standing item on the Council's agenda without giving the Council's permanent members the opportunity to block or remove the agenda item. While this is unlikely to change potential geopolitical dynamics it could, at least, help to making these known to the broader global public and discussed (and criticised) out in the open.

**CONCLUSION**

The recent reviews of the UN's role in maintaining international peace and security and the subsequent momentum in terms of UN and Member State attention, marks somewhat of a leap forward in our conceptual understanding of efforts to sustain peace. They reinforce the understanding that prevention must be put front and centre at the earliest stages of potential conflict while, and by, acknowledging the primacy of politics in efforts to sustain peace. This requires reformed and enhanced efforts within the UN System.

The acknowledgement of the primacy of politics highlights the limitations of the UN System and the critical role played its Member States in supporting prevention thorough addressing political root causes of conflict and supporting fair and inclusive political settlements. There are cases where local, regional or geopolitical interests stand in the way of such dedicated and serious prevention efforts. These deadlocks could potentially be addressed by introducing the principles of Responsibility to Prevent. These are some very premature ideas about what such principles could entail and how they could be operationalized. It is now up the UN's Member States to complement the needed institutional fixes with genuine Member State action. A binding agreement on the Responsibility to Prevent and its operational implications could be an important step in this direction.

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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE LIMITS OF UN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Jim Della-Giacoma

This week has seen major talks on the biggest brewing conflict in Asia. At the annual Shangri-La Dialogue of Asia-Pacific defense officials and the high-level United States-China talks in Beijing, the dispute over the South China Sea has been front and center. Beijing's unapologetic expansionist behavior in a group of previously uninhabited islands is making waves, raising tension, and fueling a regional arms race. You might think this would be fertile ground for some old-fashioned United Nations preventative diplomacy?

In New York, where 11 candidates are angling to become the next UN secretary-general, talk about prevention is everywhere. In a landmark joint resolution in April, the UN Security Council and General Assembly agreed on the importance of a comprehensive approach to “sustaining peace” through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes, including “strengthening the rule of law at the international and national levels.” But where is the UN in the biggest challenge to peace and security in the most populous and prosperous region in the world?

Thanks to the realpolitik of the Security Council chamber, the world body is somewhere over the horizon. Its tools of preventative diplomacy just do not work in this context. When the call goes out for the UN to “do something”—as in a recent article suggesting the next stop for the South China Sea conflict might be the Security Council—does it mean that we have run out of all other good options?

As the candidates promise everything to everybody to win the secretary-general role, the open secret is that there are some things they will not do to imperil their candidacy, at least not at this point; first and foremost is offend any members of the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, China among them.

Almost 10 years ago, two of my Center on International Cooperation colleagues, Barnett Rubin and Bruce Jones, made it clear that the UN’s conflict prevention powers were finite when they contemplated what Ban might do after he replaced Kofi Annan. On the prevention of violent conflict, the UN’s record has been “mixed to poor” they wrote. “A review of the UN’s track record...shows its success has been limited to cases of interstate conflict between smaller powers.”

Rubin and Jones broke down conflict prevention into three classic types: operational prevention, which is when an envoy is dispatched to use diplomacy to stop violent conflict; structural prevention, which might be thinking how the political economy of a place could be altered to make it more resilient to conflict; and systemic prevention, which is creating “herd immunity” by using the global web of treaties and international laws to guard against violence, particularly between states.
In all the talk we've heard in recent days, there is no senior UN diplomat ready to fly across the Pacific Ocean to save Asia from conflict. “No one expects the UN do anything about the conflict in the South China Sea,” a UN headquarters official working in the field of conflict prevention told me recently. Similarly, the dispute does not lend itself to structural solutions, as the players are as strong as the referee is weak. The previously uninhabited islands involved are not poor, unstable, undemocratic, or fragile states that could benefit from a World Bank intervention.

Systemic prevention, such as the Philippines has pursued by going to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, could, in theory, be one way to avoid a military showdown. But with China calling the process “illegal,” this, too, is failing. It does not help that neither of the two significant parties at the center of this conflict are signatories to the Law of the Sea treaty. But thinking of the Security Council as a “court of appeal” following after this process misunderstands the political nature of the UN’s more powerful organ.

After listening to the latest secretary-general candidates speak in the informal dialogues this week, we should have modest expectations. If they are flying anywhere near the South China Sea these days it is on their way to Beijing seeking the foreign minister’s consent for their campaign. There is no magic that can do away with the broad and permanent interests at play. Nor is there an easy way to “resolve” any other dispute where a veto-yielding Council member has allies, such as Syria or Western Sahara.

To give another example: if the Argentine Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra, the 11th SG candidate, should be elevated to the UN's top job with the backing of the US, it might cause the United Kingdom some discomfort, but it is more likely there could be an agreement to disagree with the UK over Las Malvinas, or the Falkland Islands as they are known in Britain. It may well be a case of “don't mention the war,” at least not for the next 10 years.

Such diplomatic compromises and inaction frustrate civil society and regional groups. This was vocalized in a recent joint submission to the General Assembly’s high-level thematic debate on peace and security:

“Participants in the regional discussions were of the opinion that the current emphasis on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts has led to protracted crises, with damaging consequences for the countries and regions involved in the conflicts, as well as the credibility of the UN.”

General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, who chaired the recent debate, has said the challenge for the UN in peace and security is to be seen as truly relevant. But the Cold War taught us the United Nations is not made for some jobs. Sometimes the big powers have to manage conflict themselves. This is the message from China specialist Linda Jakobson in her recent study for the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney. She argues the US and China have “A Mature and Interdependent Relationship,” despite all the tough words on display this week.

Jakobson argues that the US and China are not on a collision course, but as they jostle over the South China Sea, asserting sovereignty on one side and the rights of free navigation on the other, the risks of military conflict are real. “For China and the United States to avoid conflict, leaders on both sides of the Pacific will have to remain intensely and constantly committed to crafting policies that maintain stable ties,” she writes in her report.
This is referred to as conflict management; hopefully it too can stop anything like the violence, death, destruction, and massive displacement we’ve seen in the Middle East in recent years. Some, like the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, prefer to think of these stern words in the hotel conference rooms of the region as preventative diplomacy. Whatever the name, as the conflict escalates, this is a slow dance for two, with no UN chaperone required.

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AU-UN PARTNERSHIP IS A NECESSITY NOT AN OPTION

Lesley Connolly

As the African Union (AU) has become a stronger actor in peace operations, coordination with the United Nations Security Council has risen in importance. Beyond just working together on a case-by-case basis, such as the Somalia hybrid mission, the two organizations are said to be seeking a broader and more complimentary relationship. In the last year, we have witnessed an increasing convergence with the development of the AU Common Position on the Peace Operations Review and Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. These were followed by the recommendations stressing the important of partnership with regional organizations from High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Secretary-General's response to this seminal report. But it is not an easy task for the two organizations to converge. As preparations for a recent high-level meeting showed, there remain some institutional and political challenges that make working together inherently difficult for both organizations.

COMPETING AGENDAS

The 10th annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was held in New York on 23-25 May 2016. The meeting's final agenda was set to discuss the crisis in Burundi and the mandate of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires at the end of May. It was dictated by the UNSC, with little compromise over the issues raised by the AU. The initial agenda proposed by the AU PSC members in mid-April included discussions on Western Sahara, South Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and countering terrorism and violent extremism - all key challenges on the continent with global implications. On 25 April, the President of the Security Council responded proposing only two topics - Burundi and Somalia.

The UNSC said it preferred a more manageable agenda rather than a comprehensive one. The AU-PSC chair replied in early May stressing that if there was going to be a limited agenda, it should also include two other issues of high priority to Africa - the long-running conflict in Western Sahara and the reform of the Security Council. The UNSC President responded that Security Council reform is an agenda item of the UN General Assembly and it was not appropriate for the Council members to discuss this issue. Western Sahara could not be included as there was no agreement among its members about its inclusion. This left Burundi and Somalia as the only common ground - both of course important and central peace and security issues on the continent but certainly not the only pertinent concerns at the moment.

COMPLEMENTING OR DUPLICATING?

Somalia had the greatest urgency as the AMISOM mandate was set to expire only days after the meeting on 30 May. In the long term, PSC member states support a re-hatting of AMISOM, the largest African peacekeeping operation, as a UN mission. In the short to medium term, the UN and EU are supporting it. A UNSC delegation paid a one-day visit to Somalia on 19 May. There are some differences in how to approach the financial, logistical and operational challenges facing this AU Mission. The PSC is pushing
for greater funding of the AMISOM to pay for helicopters and increased troop allowances, which have suffered after a 20 per cent cut in EU funding caused a major shortfall. The focus on mission support issues is not be shared by the UNSC. The meetings draft communiqué was consistent with the key messages delivered during the Security Council’s visit to Somalia earlier in May when it called on Somali stakeholders to keep their commitment that there shall be no extension of the electoral process timelines. On 27 May, the UNSC voted to extend AMISOM’s current mandate as is until 8 July 2016.

The AU PSC is deeply involved in Burundi, where it has plans to deploy some 200 human rights and military observers. The number of observers was increased from 35 to 200 following the visit of a High-Level Delegation of Heads of State and Government to Burundi in February 2016. So far, a third of those authorized have been sent to Burundi. The UNSC has attempted to be more involved by calling fora parallel deployment of a police component to monitor human rights and protect civilians, none of which have been sent due to objections by the host government. The draft joint communiqué reiterated the members’ deep concern about the continuing political impasse and violence in the country, as well as the attendant serious humanitarian consequences without taking any new action. This meeting ended with no movement on a months long stalemate.

“THE AFRICAN UNION, DIRECTLY OR NOT, IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTNER OF THE UN IN PEACEKEEPING”
- UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HERVÉ LADSOUS

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had outlined policy options regards to Burundi in a letter to the UNSC suggesting members deploy one of the following:

- A police component of 3,000 in order to protect civilians, monitor human rights and promote the rule of law;
- An unarmed police component dedicated to the monitoring of human rights violations; or
- A police component of 20–30 staff that would mentor the Burundian national police in the areas of rule of law.

The AU’s reaction to the UN Secretariat’s proposal was mixed. While it welcomed the involvement of the UN, the AU Commission correctly underlined the fact that the mandate of a UN police component would duplicate the role of its own human rights observers. This highlights need for better strategic alignment between AU and UN objectives and field presences that is based on the recognition of each other’s strengths and informed by principles of complementarity and burden sharing.

CO-DEPENDENT PARTNERS

The importance of this relationship is clearly recognized. At the Open Debate as part of this two-day meeting, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said “the African Union, directly or not, is the most important partner of the UN in peacekeeping.” Ethiopia’s Permanent Representative Amb. Tekeda Alemu told a related seminar “the mutual dependence of the UN and the AU for effective peace operation has made their partnership indispensable for both.” This relationship is not only important because the crises and conflicts in Africa take up the largest portion of the time of the UN Security Council, but
also because African capacities are an important resource for UN peacekeeping. Africa contributes approximately 51 per cent of all the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers, 60 per cent of its international civilian peacekeepers and 80 percent of its national peacekeeping staff. This is an increase in contributions from 10,000 peacekeepers ten years ago to more than 53,000 today. There is no denying the value the AU plays in regards to UN mission especially regarding stabilization forces.

The peace operations that the AU undertakes are to a large extent a regional response to global problems. Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are heavily influenced, if not driven, by external factors such as the global war on terror; the UN-NATO-led intervention in Libya; the exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies; capital flight facilitated and solicited by the international financial system; and transnational organized crime, driven by markets in the West and Asia for narcotics, human trafficking, timber and illegally caught fish. Effective African peace operations represent a significant contribution to the global common good.

With the changing nature of conflict and rise of extremist violence, there is a greater need for forces that can act where there is no peace to keep and who can be tasked to neutralize the spoilers of peace. The AU has a proven track record of being able to deploy fast and a willingness to use force to stabilize a conflict situation such as in CAR and Somalia. Such peace enforcement and counter-terror operations fall outside current UN peacekeeping doctrine. But the AU does not have the capacity to develop multi-dimensional missions that can sustain peace over the long-term. This is where the UN’s ability to recruit a large civilian component in every mission and its predictable funding give it a competitive advantage. Hybrid missions such as the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN’s support for AU missions like AMISOM show that a strategic relationship between the two institutions is possible and useful to managing conflict on the continent.

**PARTNERSHIP IS A NECESSITY**

In the quest for better coordination, there are some challenges. While PSC member states recognize the primacy of the UNSC in matters of international peace and security, there is growing frustration about the perceived unwillingness of the UNSC to fulfill this duty. There is also frustration with the lack of financial support the AU receives from the UN for those tasks the AU is undertaking on behalf of the UNSC in the global public interest. The PSC feels that for the AU to be strong the UNSC should not only authorize it to take responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in Africa, but it should properly resource it to do so.

In 2015, African heads of state decided that by 2020 they would pay for at least 25 per cent of the AU’s peace and security activities. In order to realize this goal, the AU has appointed Dr. Donald Kaberuka, the outgoing President of the African Development Bank, as the High Representative for the AU Peace Fund. He has been tasked with putting in place a clear road map for financing the AU’s peace and security activities.

An effective relationship between the AU and UN is not just an option. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations El Ghassim Wane called it “an absolute necessity” as neither organization has the capabilities to face these challenges alone. Over the past decade, there has been some improvement in this regard. Security Council members and PSC members have held annual joint meetings since 2007, alternating between their respective headquarters. The last meeting between members of the two Councils was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in March 2015. Council members also met informally with members of the AU PSC in Addis Ababa in January this year after a visit to Burundi to discuss the situation in that country. The
AU-UN Joint Task Force has convened and desk-to-desk meetings held, which together have shown a growing commitment to structurally bringing the organizations together.

Beyond Somalia and AMISOM, there is collaboration in mediation processes, including Sudan, where the AU is leading the mission with UN contributions and in South Sudan, where the UN is leading the process with AU Support. The AU has built up its capacity to respond to crisis and support peace operations over the past decade. In Mali and CAR, the AU was the first responder followed-up with a UN mission.

TOWARDS A BROADER RELATIONSHIP

When the AU intervenes in a conflict in Africa it show a form of solidarity and how the organization is taking responsibility for resolving problems on its own continent. These interventions often have close coordination with national governments as well as other partners such as the EU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). African peace operations should be seen as different to UN peacekeeping operations, but complimentary to each other. The AU does peace enforcement and the UN peacekeeping. But the relationship could be stronger, deeper, and wider. As the recent UNSC and AU PSC shows, Africa wants to do more than just provide boots on the ground as part of this relationship. The next step for the two bodies will be to move beyond the narrow agenda of the numbers of troops or police and who pays for them to a much broader outlook of working together to resolve the political problems underlying Africa’s conflicts.

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Increase in Uniform Personnel on UNMISS (2011 - Present)

This line chart shows the increase in the number of uniformed personnel deployed (red line) and UN authorized levels of uniformed personnel (blue line) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from its inception (August 2011) to present.

Current UN Peace Operations: Number of Years Active

This graph shows the duration of the 16 current UN peace operations, from youngest to oldest, highlighting the diversity of durations and relative recency of several major missions.

Increased in Uniformed Personnel on MINUSMA, 2013-present

This line chart shows the increase in the number of uniformed personnel deployed (red line) and UN authorized levels of uniformed personnel (blue line) of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from its inception (July 2013) to present.
Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Nepal to UN Operations (2000-Present)

This pie chart shows Nepal’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of April 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission. Nepal currently makes the 6th largest personnel contribution of any country.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Nepal to UN Operations (2000-Present)

This line chart shows Nepal’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 2000 (top line), as well as the seven missions to which Nepal made its largest personnel contributions from January 2000 through April 2016.
Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to MINUSMA, being made by the top five contributing countries as of April 2016 – in absolute terms and as a percentage of total uniformed personnel on MINUSMA.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Burkina Faso to UN Operations (2008 - April 2016)

This line chart shows Burkina Faso’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 2008 (top line), as well as the two missions to which Burkina Faso made its largest personnel contributions from January 2008 through April 2016.
RWANDA

Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to UN missions, being made by the top five contributing countries as of April 2016 – in absolute terms and as a percentage of the combined contributions of the top five.

Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Rwanda to UN Operations (April 2016)

This pie chart shows Rwanda’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of April 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Rwanda to UN Operations (1999-April 2016)

This line chart shows Rwanda’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 2005 (top line), as well as the three missions to which Rwanda made its largest personnel contributions from May 2005 through April 2016.
Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Pakistan to UN Operations (March 2016)

The above chart shows Pakistan’s contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions as of April 2016, broken down by number of personnel contributed to each mission.

Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations, as of April 2016

The above chart shows the total contributions of uniformed personnel, to UN missions, being made by the top five contributing countries as of April 2016 – in absolute terms and as a percentage of the combined contributions of the top five.

Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Pakistan to UN Operations (1999-March 2016)

This line chart shows Pakistan’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 1999 (top line), as well as the eight missions to which Pakistan made its largest personnel contributions from August 1999 through April 2016.
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