GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

The Global Peace Operations Review is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and the Review of Political Missions.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the Country & Regional Profile pages, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2006-2012) and the Review of Political Missions (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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November 22, 2016

BETTER LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Patrick Cammaert

STRONG LEADERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE ESSENTIAL. MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS LIVES UP TO THE VALUES ITS PEACE OPERATIONS PROMOTE.

Many UN peacekeepers do their utmost to save lives and protect people, but the troops and police deployed in sixteen missions can improve and do better. Based on my experience serving in the field in uniform and later in UN headquarters, my honest impression, also expressed in our Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response, is that there are a number of reasons why UN peace operations are sometimes not successful in the implementation of their Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates.

First, there is a lack of integrated planning for a worst-case scenario in a non-permissive environment. Second, there are serious restrictions of the freedom of movement. Third, there is an unwillingness of troop contributing countries (TCCs) and the military leadership in missions to be proactive to prevent violence against civilians and to take any risk. Fourth, the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and TCCs do not have a common understanding of what peace operations under Chapter VII of the Charter means. Fifth, there is a lack of honest reporting by the leadership of some Missions on the security situation and the under performance of troops and police deployed. Sixth, there is a lack of the responsible persons or units being held accountable for their role in the execution of the mandate. Seventh, there is a serious lack of knowledge at the junior and senior leaders level of military and police units on the mandate and Rules of Engagement (ROEs)/Directives on the Use of Force and Fire arms (DUFFs) and the use of force is not sufficiently lectured on or subjecting to training as part pre-deployment preparations.

This was manifest in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) during the Independent Special Investigation that I lead recently, but unfortunately it is also manifest in other missions. The problems are not always in the field where people work under sometimes very difficult circumstances. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) in New York can do more to find ad hoc, tailor made, outsourced, and creative solutions to support the missions in their implementation struggle.

In my view, it is not that there is a lack of guidance, or a lack of policy or training tools. At the political level, there are Kigali principles endorsed by 39 countries and a series of summits where governments seemed to be united in how they view peace operations. In 2009, DPKO and the Office for the Coordination on Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) produced an important study on POC. In 2015, there was the HIPPO report and the Global Study on UNSC Resolution1325. For a number of years UN WOMEN...
and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) developed and are conducting successful Female Military Officers Courses FMOC and peacekeeping operations contingent commanders courses (PKOCCs). DPKO is providing leadership courses such as Senior Mission Leadership, Senior Leaders’ Program and Intensive Orientation Courses for Force Commanders. DPKO-DFS is drafting now integrated POC training modules.

But with respect, that is not where the real problem is. On the ground we still see that “the Mandate is strong as the Will of the leadership and the TCC to implement it.” The challenge is in the implementation of the mandate.

PEACEKEEPING IS AT A CROSS ROADS

UN peacekeeping is in deep trouble politically and in terms of security. It is at cross roads. Will peacekeeping continue the way it is going, keep on failing, disappointing the population in the missions and the international community? Or should it change course? In our recent Independent Special Investigation, a number of recommendations were made, specifically for UNMISS, but also addressing the above problems in more general terms. Now, we are at a moment of change in leadership in the UN. This could be a crucial time for the new Secretary-General, who in my view should personally lead DPKO and peace operations out of this dilemma.

The most important message to the new Secretary-General is that peacekeeping is first and foremost a political tool and must be used as such. Sustainable solutions require addressing the political dimension of conflict and a negotiated political settlement is the fundamental objective of any UN peacekeeping operation. Political efforts must be backed by firm resolve, including, where required, the use of force.
Peacekeeping operations have been most effective when they have been deployed to implement or facilitate a political process. It should also be noted that peacekeeping operations have proven to be effective tools to prevent and mediate crises. Peacekeeping missions are much less effective, arguably set up for failure, when they are deployed to unstable environments without strong political roles.

Many of our missions grapple today with the consequences of political failure and the preference for quick fixes. In many cases, international efforts reproduce earlier formulas for conflict resolution: disarmament, elections, infrastructure and institutions, which are critical for a country’s recovery. However, they must be built on political foundations and result in mechanisms that can accommodate diversity and differences. Technical interventions alone cannot replace the difficult task of assisting parties in finding political solutions.

Strong leadership and accountability are essential. More needs to be done to demonstrate that the UN lives up to the values its peace operations promote. There is an urgent need for the new Secretary-General to engage his Special Representatives and Head of Missions to ensure that they have a political strategy guiding their action on the ground in support of mandate implementation. Added focus will need to be placed on finding ways to select the right leaders and ensuring that they have the support necessary to provide political direction and executive management of often large and complex operations. At the same time, the Secretary-General should ensure that leadership teams with relevant experience and skills assist heads of peace operations. They should be able to draw on and work as part of a mutually reinforcing management team, in particular during crisis situations.

Some of the shortcomings of military and police contingents and their leaders could be addressed through the provision of training and mentoring support by experienced peacekeepers in the mission and during mandatory pre-deployment training on the mission’s mandate, rules of engagement and use of force directives. Training should include scenario and rehearsal training on protecting civilians, including from conflict related sexual violence. It is imperative that peacekeepers’ adopt an outward-looking, robust posture, and use dismounted patrols by day and night, including with female peacekeepers, to reach out to local interlocutors and dominate terrain as required.

Several of UN peace operations face extremely challenging circumstances as they are caught on the frontlines of active conflict where civilians are under threat from local warlords, criminals or government forces. On several occasions, uniformed personnel are said to underperform in the execution of their mandated duties, in particular to protect civilians and UN personnel. In the Secretariat, there are few tools to monitor peacekeeping performance. A 2014 report from the Office of Internal Oversight Services on physical protection of civilians, could not find a single instance of the use of force to protect civilians across four missions and five years, but it does not provide a detailed picture of the situation. There is a lack of clear standards for protecting civilians and few penalties for glaring failures to protect. There is no real overview of the scale of this underperformance or how pro-active uniformed peacekeepers are in their activities to prevent violence against civilians.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT SG**

Before the new Secretary-General addresses the (under) performance of troops, police and their leaders; he should request from the responsible departments a realistic idea of the scale of the problem of underperformance of peacekeepers. After that, he should under his personal leadership take urgent steps to consult and discuss in New York the implementation of protection of civilians...
mandates with the major troop (infantry) and police contributing countries in the presence of the Heads of Military components and to find common ground for the way forward.

This commentary was originally presented as remarks to The Protection of Civilians and Accountability Workshop hosted by the Permanent Missions of Australia and Uruguay to the UN and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in New York City on 18 November 2016.

Major General Patrick Cammaert (retired) has served as the UN Force Commander in Ethiopia/Eritrea, as General Officer Commanding the Easter Division in MONUC in DR Congo, and as the Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General and DPKO. He has also participated in a number of recent special investigations into UN peace operations.
November 16, 2016

AFTER THE SHOCK: RECALIBRATING FOR PRESIDENT TRUMP

Elsina Wainwright

WHILE TRUMP HAS PROVEN IT POSSIBLE TO WIN AN ELECTION BEING RESOLUTELY OFF PISTE AND WITH A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISERS, IT’S HARDER TO GOVERN THAT WAY: MANY MORE PEOPLE NEED TO BE DRAWN IN TO CRAFT AN AGENDA AND RUN THE GOVERNMENT.

It was hard to overstate the shock in Washington and here in New York the day after the US election. But now it’s time for sober analysis of Trump’s possible foreign and defence policy, and it’s difficult to know where to begin. While Trump has made statements anathema to the foreign and defence policy establishment, he has offered little in the way of detailed policy. He is also known to have said privately—and his advisers have assured many—that his ideas are more ‘guideposts’ than blueprints.

So it’s unclear what his foreign and defence policy will look like. Given his business background, many issues may well be negotiable, as we are already seeing on healthcare reform. Trump comes from the deal-making world of putting forth far-reaching ambit claims as an opening position, then moving closer to the middle. This trait could account for some of his more radical campaign pronouncements, such as some of his immigration proposals. He could also do this as President, which would be a profound departure from the precisely-worded positions of traditional foreign policy. A compounding variable is the importance of face to this President-elect. The world will need to recalibrate how to conduct affairs of state with the US.

Still, some of Trump’s ideas are more baked in than others, including on trade and alliances. He’s long held a transactional view of alliances and believed the US pays too much for allies’ security—a view that resonated with his supporters (and even President Obama had complained about freeriding). Allies will almost certainly be expected to contribute more to their own and regional security. President Trump will likely have a narrower conception of America’s national interest than his predecessors.

While Trump has proven it possible to win an election being resolutely off piste and with a small group of advisers, it’s harder to govern that way: many more people need to be drawn in to craft an agenda and run the government. The fact his candidacy was so light on detail means his appointments are even more consequential than usual. But many Republican foreign policy experts disavowed Trump in open letters earlier this year. There is, for instance, a lack of senior Asia hands among the current Trump cohort who could give the region a steady policy focus without distraction from domestic, Middle Eastern and European imperatives.

A few may now step forward to serve, often out of a desire to keep the country on an even keel. But with a hastily-assembled team fleshing out detail on the fly and choosing between often contradictory positions, the world should prepare for policy lurches rather than steady policy roll out.
There are some promising initial signs, including reassuring calls to Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and London, and President Obama’s 
description of the President elect’s interest in sustaining ‘core strategic relationships’, including a commitment to NATO. A number of Republicans rallying around Trump will stress the enduring benefits of alliances in today’s complex security 
environment: how they amplify US power projection, deter conflict and restrain allies from destabilizing postures. Some will also 
make the economic case for global engagement to this businessman-President elect: that it is cost effective for the US to maintain 
strong alliances and a forward presence, rather than reinsert into theatres and rebuild relationships in a crisis.

But US allies are already reassessing their security postures. This scrutiny has laid bare the fact that some US security guarantees 
were becoming less structurally credible than during the Cold War, and credibility has strained further with Trump's questioning 
of US alliance obligations. Wholesale weakening of America's alliance system rebounds on all allies, because it undercuts stability, 
as other allies' postures change and rivals are emboldened.

Each alliance will have its own trajectory in the face of a Trump Presidency, depending on whether Trump's view of alliances 
evolves in office and his perception of each ally's reliability, geostrategic importance and level of burden-sharing. It will also depend 
on the personal relationships he and his senior team forge: the fraying US–Philippine relationship under Duterte demonstrates the 
impact individuals can have on alliances.

At this stage, Australia seems relatively well-positioned with the incoming Administration. Trump didn't question ANZUS during the 
campaign, and his team seems seem well-disposed towards Australia (though Trump has little business experience of Australia). 
Prime Minister Turnbull and the President-elect appear to have had a constructive businessman-to-businessman conversation, 
and discussed the importance of America's ongoing engagement to Asia-Pacific stability.

But it's ever more important for Australia to view ANZUS as a tool to further the national interest, not as an end in itself. Regional 
military modernisation and the shifting strategic environment mean Australia still needs the US: without America's strategic 
protection and access to US intelligence and defence platforms and systems, Australia would need to spend a great deal more on 
defence. Canberra must ensure ANZUS serves Australia's interests, including helping to maintain regional stability. That requires 
counseling Washington on remaining constructively engaged in the Asia–Pacific and finding pathways for China into the regional 
order.

It's also vital for Australia to enmesh ANZUS more squarely within the burgeoning web of Asian linkages by strengthening 
relationships with other Asian nations, including Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and India.

Donald Trump’s election has ushered in an unstable period, as the world’s hitherto linchpin becomes less predictable and states 
recalibrate accordingly. It’s going to take a while for the shock to wear off.

The article was originally published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) on November 16, 2016

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SPOTLIGHT: COLLABORATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEBUILDING

Amanda Lucey

PEACEBUILDING POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES OFTEN COMPETE WITH ONE ANOTHER, MAKING PEACEBUILDING LESS EFFECTIVE.

A new joint project on peacebuilding responses in Africa will analyse the comparative advantages of African peacebuilding actors, such as bilateral, subregional and regional organisations, and how these can support national actors.

‘Given their vast experience, support from African countries, and others in the global south, could be crucial for peacebuilding,’ says Amanda Lucey, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). ‘Many of these countries have gone through similar processes and may better understand regional dynamics – but they need to work better together.’

Peacebuilding policies and activities by the United Nations, African Union, Regional Economic Communities and bilateral actors often run in parallel, duplicate, or even compete with one another, making peacebuilding less effective. The project will help build coherence taking into account the role of underlying political interests.

Funded by the Carnegie Foundation of New York and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the project will be implemented by the ISS, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) in New York. Partners bring complementary qualities to the project. The ISS contributes research skills, practical policy advice and access to contacts in the field. PRIO has academic and research expertise and the CIC will engage with UN actors, especially the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to ensure the project’s relevance in these circles.

The project is especially relevant now. By critically examining the role of politics and underlying national interests in peacebuilding, it responds directly to a recommendation of last year’s UN peacekeeping review on ‘the primacy of politics’ and avoiding one-size-fits-all solutions. Both the UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding reviews, as well as the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the World Humanitarian Summit, underscored the need for international support for local and national plans, and enhancing partnerships with African actors.

‘Successful peacebuilding is dependent on all stakeholders understanding the root causes of conflict and implementing key peacebuilding recommendations,’ said Ambassador Edith Ssempala, a member of the UN peacebuilding review’s Advisory Group of Experts. Speaking at the first project advisory panel meeting on 4 October, she said the project could offer important perspectives at a critical time.

The project will focus on case studies in Liberia and South Sudan. To understand how African actors engage in peacebuilding, the role of the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the governments...
of Nigeria and South Africa will also be examined. The case studies are timely. The UN mission in Liberia is wrapping up and elections are due to be held in 2017. In South Sudan, the UN has approved the mandate for a more robust peacekeeping force.

The consortium team is currently undertaking field research in Liberia and preliminary results are expected in late 2016. The project complements the ISS’ other work to strengthen peacebuilding policy and responses in Africa.

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SARAH-MYRIAM MARTIN-BRÛLÉ: EVALUATING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Alexandra Novosseloff and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé’s book “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions: A Typology of Success and Failure in International Interventions” proposes a new definition of the success of a peace operation based on two crucial elements: the reestablishment of order and the accomplishment of the mandate. It explains the different outcomes of UN peace operations by outlining the effect of the combination of the key ingredients-strategy and the type of interveners. The following is an edited transcript of an interview by CIC Senior Visiting Fellow Alexandra Novosseloff with the author undertaken in Montreal in the margins of the workshop “Peace First: Canada’s Role in Peace Operations” organized conjointly by Bishop’s University and the Center for International and Defense Policy.

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): You have written a book on evaluating peacekeeping operations. You first highlight what best practices can be learned from the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations. This is your starting point for evaluating peacekeeping operations. Could you briefly summarize the main arguments of your book?

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (SMMB): Two main lessons emerge from this book. First, you cannot win on the cheap. Interveners need to invest in communication, cultivate knowledge and have the capacity to show resolve. The second lesson is that boots on the ground matter and that a great power needs to send troops alongside a UN peace operation for it to succeed. In my book I put forward a new definition of peace operation success based on the establishment of institutional authority and capacity and one in which the mandate is accomplished. Based on my research, a successful peace operation is one that allows the establishment of institutional authority and capacity and one in which the mandate is accomplished. My book refutes the pessimism about UN peace operations in countries that fall into what has been qualified as the worst context for transitional politics. I argue that even in the hardest cases, in failed states settings, international peace operations can be effective if the right combination of strategy and interveners is applied. My research showed that for a peace operation in an intra-state war, the adoption of a deterrence strategy works best for re-establishing order and it is the involvement of a great power that facilitates the best the accomplishment of the mandate.

AN: In a way you’re looking at what are the ambitions of peacekeeping and should we be so ambitious when drafting mandates or, on the contrary, should we reduce our ambitions and expectations and then have a measurement of success that is more realistic?

SMMB: Using peace operations’ mandates to evaluate success is problematic because they are highly political. Mandates are made strategically ambiguous to satisfy Members of the Security Council and to ensure flexibility in order to adapt to changing conditions. If we were to assess peace operations’ outcomes focusing only on the mandate, this assessment would end up being more about the clarity of the mandate than about the achievements of the operation itself. Peace operations vary in the details...
of their mission and in what constitutes the successful accomplishment of their operations but all share the common aim of restoring order, legitimately enforced by the state. To assess the accomplishment of the mandate, I take into account the context, the duration of the peace operation, and its resources. With these criteria I strived for a thorough assessment of what was actually being accomplished by a peace mission. This framework has the added benefit of considering the accomplishment of the mandate based upon the particular conditions of peace operations in failed state settings.

Yet to me, looking at the accomplishment of the mandate is insufficient. Success depends as well on the reestablishment of order. I employ Huntington's definition of order, which is a function of authority and capacity. Authority is the power to command without having to threaten the use of coercion, and which must be independent of enforcement or of the specific person who rules. Capacity refers to the monopoly over coercive use of force, which should ideally be legitimate but not necessarily. It extends to the importance of being able to establish a certain degree of stability, which sometimes can be at the cost of legitimacy.

The third peacekeeping operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, deployed between 1993 and 1995, is a prime example of why one cannot look exclusively at the establishment of order to assess a peace operation's success. In this case, the operation's mandate was broad, unclear, and unrealistic in terms of goals and means deployed. Those who have qualified this operation as an outright failure have not looked at the whole picture. If UNOSOM II had been given a more realistic/precise mandate, the operation would have been judged a greater success, particularly given the constraints and the challenges that it faced and in light of its accomplishments. Over the course of two years, it is estimated that an estimated 250,000 lives were saved. Also extremely significant is the fact that the number of refugees dropped from 1.5 million to 750,000. Militarily speaking, achievements included the capture of General Aideed's associates and the killing of roughly 500 to 1,000 of Aideed's soldiers. The operation also brought unprecedented amount of money in the country. It created employment opportunities, which stimulate and reinforced legitimate businesses. The operation succeeded in eradicating starvation. The most vulnerable population groups were receiving food aid, and ‘food-for-work’ schemes were established to help with the rehabilitation of schools and hospitals, as well as water, sanitation and other services.

AN: Generally, the UN is not telling the story of its successful missions. Which missions in your view have been the most successful? When you are talking about measuring success, how do you measure success against initial ambitions?

SMMB: In my book, I study eleven peace operations that occurred in three countries, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2009. Peace operations aim to create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to thrive. They comprise diverse types of activities from support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents are also part of peace operations activities. The peace operations covered in this book are missions, carried by the UN or by a Member States (such as the United States in the case of Restore Hope) or by the Economic Community of the West African States which acted under United Nations Security Council authorization, with or without the consent of the parties to the conflict.

From these eleven peace operations, I found three to be what I call total successes based on the reestablishment of order and the accomplishment of mandate: UNITAF (the peace operation in Somalia deployed from 1992 to 1993), UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia that I studied from 2003 to 2009) and UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone examined from 2001 to 2004). In all three,
a combination of a deterrence strategy and great power intervention led to fewer casualties and less confrontation with the warring parties. UNITAF, UNMIL and UNAMSIL invested significantly in establishing good communication with the population and also made sure to maintain good communication amongst their troops and with “the international community”, the actors and organizations outside the mission and outside the country. Doing so helped each operation to gain and maintain wide support for their mission, at home, abroad and of course in the host country.

For all three operations, order was re-established, and the mandate was accomplished largely thanks to the quantity and quality of the material deployed by the peacekeepers, whose ranks included a great power. These operations showed that capacity also matters, not so much in terms of quantity but in terms of whether the equipment and means are tailored to the setting of the intervention.

Also in all three operations, the great power’s strong commitment to the peace operation, as well as of the operational latitude and capabilities granted to the peace operation’s forces, convinced the belligerents to avoid prohibited actions. Reputation and known interests were used to adapt the intervention to the setting and to the population (civilians and belligerents), and such adaptation was key in assuring both the re-establishment of order and the accomplishment of the mandate.

This leads to your question about initial ambitions that, in my view, may be considered as guidelines but not as measurement of success. To succeed, peace operations must adapt. Peace operations are organic pieces. By definition, initial ambitions of interveners are based on their understanding of the conflict and of its dynamic prior to the intervention. These initial ambitions must then be adjusted to fit with how the intervention factors in the dynamic of the conflict.

AN: Can there be an honest evaluation of peacekeeping operation when we know that there are so many interests at stake, those contributing countries, those of the Security Council, those of the host nations?

SMMB: It depends what you mean by honest evaluation. The difficulty with circumscribing success lies in the multidimensionality of peacekeeping missions. How can we define success when all the different dimensions of success of peace operations are not compatible? How do we address blurry outcomes? To provide an honest evaluation, one must clarify thresholds that will delineate a failed peace operation from a successful one. In my book I introduce intermediate outcome categories between success and failure to refine the understanding and classification of scenarios in which different dimensions of success are not compatible.

With this book, my goal was to provide a clearer definition of success. There are many excellent analyses of peace operation success that are useful for understanding the impact of many criteria separately. However, what seemed to be missing was an attempt to assess the outcome of these various criteria when combined together. To address this gap, I studied these eleven peace operations and classified them into one of four categories: failure, partial failure, partial success and success.

In the book, I thus look at the four peace missions in Liberia to show how it this case, it took 20 years for peace operations to succeed. I thus examine the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL: 1993-1997), which proved to be a failure; the ECOMOG in Liberia (1990-1998), a partial failure; ECOMIL, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia, in 2003, a partial success; and UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia: 2003-2009), which turned out to be a successful peace mission. Chapter 4 is devoted to peace missions in Sierra Leone. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL: 1998-1999), ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (1998-2000) and the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL: 2001-2004) are examined to explain how, in this case too, the missions followed
the path of failure, to partial failure, partial success and success. The peace operations in Somalia were key in highlighting that failure and success do not necessarily follow a chronological order. The cases of UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia: 1991–1992), UNITAF (Unified Taskforce: 1992-1993) and UNOSOM II (1993-1995) are addressed to discuss how these operations went from failure, to success and, finally, partial failure.

More particularly, I examined the process by which each peace operation succeeded or failed at accomplishing its mandate while simultaneously contributing to or hindering its chances at re-establishing order. Since the constituent parts, communication, capability, and knowledge interacted differently depending on which strategy was adopted, I highlighted whether the strategy (whether it was compellence, deterrence or self-defense), combined with the type of intervener (a great power, a regional power, or a collective intervener) influenced the communication, the use of capacities, and the knowledge of the intervener and of the population (based on reputation and known interests). My research revealed that strategy either enabled or hindered the interveners to quickly achieve important part of their mandates. But by doing so, they can sabotage the very means by which they re-establish order in the country.

THE BOOK OFFERS A REFUTATION OF THE POLITICAL PESSIMISM ON THE USE OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE WORST CONTEXTS OF INTERVENTION.

The difficulty in defining success of peace operations is that beyond the multidimensionality of outcomes of these missions, the means for accomplishing mandates are not necessarily those that will contribute to achieving order. Peace operations may well succeed in one dimension while failing in another: two dimensions of success are not always compatible. This was one of the main puzzles that lead me through my research for this book. How do we clarify or make sense of mixed outcomes? So of my eleven cases studies, five fall into one of the two categories of either partial failures or partial successes.

My research showed that for the ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as for UNOSOM II, the adoption of a compellence strategy (the use of coercive means to persuade an adversary to undertake a certain action), in a peace operation led by a major power facilitated the accomplishment of the mission’s mandate, yet hindered its capacity to establish order.

For missions like ECOMIL and UNAMSIL, in which a deterrence strategy was adopted without the intervention of a great power, order was re-established but the mandate was not accomplished. In the case of ECOMIL, by the end of its mission, it had created a safe and secure environment in Monrovia and its surrounding areas such that humanitarian organizations could resume their operations. ECOMIL’s presence slowed down the amount of bloodshed caused by the rebel factions. The intervention appeased the concerns of rebel groups who fought because they felt no other organization was able to defend them. Another peace agreement was signed a few weeks after the arrival of ECOMIL. Yet, while rebel movements withdrew, they still retained the option of a quick redeployment in the event of failure of the peace agreement. Once the peacekeepers retreated from key areas, the persistent resumption of violence continuously impeded the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. All sides of Liberian society, from civilians and civil society groups to fighters from the warring parties, repeatedly called for an intervention by the United States.
AN: So you studied in your book three main operations, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. What are the criteria of success that you can take from those operations from the 1990’s and apply them to more recent operations? What could be the common features of some of those successes and failures ... an alarm that could show that this or that operation goes to a failing path or more of a successful one?

SMMB: To me the criteria of success remain the extent to which authority and capacity of institutions is restored due or in the wake of the peace operation and at the tasks achieved by the operation or because of the peace operation.

For more recent peace operations, these would be lessons learned. Important achievements can develop through the presence of the interveners. These achievements must be taken into account when measuring the success, of peace missions challenging and hostile contexts and given peace operations’ limited resources and duration.

UN peace operations pour enormous amount of money as well as sizeable employment and contract opportunities into countries. They thus help to stimulate and strengthen legitimate businesses, thereby shifting business activities away from a war economy toward construction, telecommunications, trade and services. In the process, it helped to reshape local interests in security and rule of law, and eventually local power as well.

DOES THE PEACE OPERATION FACILITATE THE PROCESS FOR POLITICAL Factions TO COMPete POLItically TO LEad AND ESTABLISH POWER BASES THROUGH STATE-INSTITUTIONS?

Many accounts of success focus on humanitarian and political development in the capital city, yet we need to pay attention to its impact in improving living conditions in the rest of the country. Is the population receiving humanitarian assistance? Are the schools and hospitals being rebuilt? Are Internally Displaced Persons and refugees returning to their home and/or country? More importantly, one must look at the local, regional, international initiatives aiming at restoring peace. Does the peace operation facilitate the process for political factions to compete politically to lead and establish power bases through state-institutions?

As for common features of successful operations, communication, capacity and ability to use force and knowledge proved clear determinants of success. The ability to communicate clearly on three fronts: with the population (including the belligerents), within the mission itself and between the mission and the Member States of the UN (those of the Security Council, the financial contributors, the troop and police contributing countries, and the countries of the region) is a clear determinant of success. In all peace operations in which there was clear intent to establish and improve communication with the population, the operations fared better than in missions in which the communication was left aside.

All my case studies confirmed that communication with the population, with the capacity and resolve to use force, is a key combination in the success of any peace operation. These aspects should thus be the cornerstone of any intervention strategy. The cases also made it clear that communication is central to any tactic adopted by the belligerents. Belligerents are increasingly using the Internet, wireless communications, satellite TV and other communication tools to collect and disseminate information as part of their struggle. Communication in intervention missions is widely used, from psychological operations to information operations, from gathering human terrain data so as to facilitate operations to aiding with the capacity building of local governments.
Second, the capacity and the will to use force was another determinant of success. This is where the type of intervener made a difference. Great powers had more resources and were more determined to use it. That boosted their credibility and hence the efficiency of their intervention. Finally, the more the interveners were knowledgeable about the context of the missions, the better they were able to adapt in order to tailor their missions according to the context of their intervention.

As for alarms or warning signs that a peace operation is going badly with regards to order, an alarm is when no party is able to command obedience without threatening coercion. This shows a clear lack of authority since the different parties only follow rules with the use of coercive force. Alarms or warning signs for mandate can be found in the access granted to humanitarian assistance delivery. In most peace operations in which this access was denied, the mandate remained unaccomplished. All in all, missions that succeeded were the ones having a proper deterrence strategy and where a great power put boots on the ground.

AN: So what you are saying, is that one of the main criteria of success of peacekeeping identified by the Brahimi report fifteen years ago, i.e the full and sustained political support of the Security Council to operations it creates, remains one of the key elements of success.

SMMB: Of course, the full support of the Security Council is important. But the type of support and commitment matters. If we look at the ECOMIL mission in Liberia, it was an ECOWAS advance force. While it was a regional peacekeeping mission in the country, the formation of ECOMIL had been encouraged by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Security Council Resolution 1497 (in August 2003), which called for Member States to form a multinational force to intervene. Both the international community and the parties in conflict called for the United States to lead a new multinational force. The Americans refused but nonetheless agreed to provide financial and transportation support to ECOMIL. Therefore, while the United States supported the mission financially and diplomatically, the lack of a great power’s boots on the ground made it difficult for the peace operation to be efficient or to accomplish its mandate. In fact, financial support might also contribute to the deterioration of conditions on the ground as it sets expectations. The fact that the bulk of US support for the mission was financial created a mixed impression amongst the population and has been responsible for several setbacks due to disappointment with regards to the actual accomplishment of the mission. In fact, all the case studies in my book show that the type of commitment of a great power matters and impacts the success of a peace operation, in particular in terms of putting boots on the ground. What came out of my interviews, it that the belligerents would say, “We will not pull back unless you bring the Americans.” There was a similar echo in Sierra Leone, where it is only when the British sent troops on the ground that the belligerents backed down. The continued effective communication strategies coupled with an impressive show of potential overwhelming force convinced the belligerents to work with the intervener to re-establish order and accomplish the mandated tasks.

AN: Is there anything you want to add to on that we might not have covered in this conversation but was one of the key elements in your book?

SMMB: The process by which decisions are made would also be interesting to further investigate. In my book I looked at how the choice of strategy affected the success of a peace operation. However, further investigation of how the type of operation leads to a choice of strategy, which in itself leads to the type of outcome of the peace operation, merits further investigation. The question of mission creep would be interesting to address, as would the extent to which it can even lead to an eventual successful outcome. The example of Sierra Leone could be employed to examine such a situation. For UNAMSIL, a deterrence strategy was adopted and a great power intervened – but I did not consider how the United Kingdom came to such a decision. In fact, the government was engaged in what was believed to
be a short evacuation operation. Britain was the commander on the ground that decided otherwise, by using the evacuation operation as an excuse to get the country involved in a robust way so as to deter the rebels and successfully convince them to back down. This points toward another avenue of investigation: How does each great power or each intervener decide which strategy to adopt, why do they make that choice, and what are the costs involved? Such an investigation would be quite fruitful.

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