Global Peace Operations Review

Annual Compilation 2016
Global Peace Operations Review
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Global Peace Operations Review
The Global Peace Operations Review (http://peaceoperationsreview.org) is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military peacekeeping operations and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and the Review of Political Missions.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Review aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the Country & Regional Profile pages, the Review provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the Data & Trends section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more details, please see our Data guide. The Strategic Summary provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2006-2012) and the Review of Political Missions (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the statistics used to compile these reports.

**Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review**

The Review covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the Review, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
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<td>CRG</td>
<td>Congo Research Group</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department for Field Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
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<td>GPOR</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Review</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>SPMs</td>
<td>Special Political Missions</td>
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<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
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EDITOR’S PREFACE

This is the second edition of the Global Peace Operations Review (GPOR) annual compilation. It is the first to collect a full year’s worth of content from the website in a single publication. Using an online platform allows us to constantly innovate, and we plan to continue to evolve between these annual releases. Producing the annual compilation allows GPOR (http://peaceoperationsreview.org) to curate this material thematically in a fully searchable and citable electronic book. If you’re reading this in PDF format, any text highlighted in blue is hyperlinked back to the website. Like last year, the book will be available for free online. It will also be available for a modest fee to cover costs as a print-on-demand edition via Amazon.

For those implementing and studying UN peace operations, 2015 was the “year of reviews.” In June there was the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, formally titled Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, but affectionately known as the HIPPO report. In the same month, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) for the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture delivered its report, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace. In October 2015, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace was the report of the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325. 2016 was the year the system digested this vast body of information. These reports identified many complex issues beyond the mandate of the outgoing UN Secretary-General. His so-called implementation report picked the low-hanging fruit from the HIPPO, but much remained to be debated. The content of the Review in 2016 can therefore be regarded as capturing much of this unfinished business. These are the difficult challenges being passed to the new Secretary-General for implementation in 2017 and beyond.

Many, but not all, of these issues made the pages of the Global Peace Operations Review in 2016. In the quest for better peacekeeping, the United Nations still struggles with implementing mandates that commit it to protecting civilians in conflict zones such as DR Congo or South Sudan. Too often, when crisis arrives in a UN peace operation, the leadership discovers hidden caveats that expose the gaps between what the Security Council has authorized and what troop contributing countries are willing to implement. Such gaps are defining the limits of usefulness of this tool and raising questions about the conditions under which the UN should walk away from peace operations.

The annual compilation is divided along thematic lines. Starting with our traditional strategic summary, we then focus the largest amount of our content on better peacekeeping, in line with CIC’s goal in its peace and security programming to support the continuous improvement and effectiveness of peace operations. Conflict prevention, a theme that emerged from all the big reports of 2015, comes next. Our chapter on Women, peace, and security then follows. Given the concentration of UN peace operations on one continent, this year we started a thematic page on African peace operations. We have replicated this in the annual compilation. We have also expanded our focus on peacebuilding, which now has its own section to emphasize the fluidity of the spectrum of operations and illustrate that there is no distinct place where a peace operation ends and peacebuilding begins. Finally, looking ahead throughout the year we had several pieces that examined the specific challenges facing the next UN Secretary-General.

For those of us who study peace operations, our New York-centric community can feel like a small and insular group. Since its launch in June 2015, the Global Peace Operations Review has shown that many of the issues we are debating do in fact resonate with larger and wider audiences. Our analytics have identified more than 36,000 users who have visited the site more than 55,000 times to read more than 88,000 pages of content.
In 2016, our first full calendar year, GPOR had more than 25,000 unique visitors. The website has significant groups of readers clustered in Washington, London, Stockholm, Paris, and Geneva. Among the top 25 cities in 2016 are growing visitors from Nairobi, Berlin, Ottawa, Monrovia, Oslo, Addis Ababa Canberra, New Delhi, Cairo, and The Hague. More recent statistics show new cities such as Lagos, Rio de Janeiro and Hong Kong popping up. Besides these numbers, we continue to receive positive and direct feedback from readers in primary target audiences in international organizations, permanent missions, foreign ministries, and peace operations. The growing number of readers in academic institutions is also welcomed.

Such growing support from our readers and contributors is gratifying, but we could not have continued this year without the generous financial and in-kind support from our donors. In particular, we would like to thank the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Carnegie Corporation of New York, the French Ministry of Defence, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

**JIM DELLA-GIACOMA**

**EDITOR-IN-CHIEF**

**GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW**

**JANUARY 2017**
On 1 January 2017, a new UN Secretary-General took office. From day one, he will be responsible for more than 100,000 uniformed and civilian personnel on some 24 peace operations. The report of the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) catalogued the challenges facing the system and made the case for change in the way the UN conducts its core business of peace and security. The statistics featured on the Global Peace Operations Review throughout 2016 have provided a snapshot of peace operations in the 21st century. They can help illustrate where UN peacekeeping is [after 70 years], current conundrums, and where it may be heading.
UN PEACE OPERATIONS

UN peace operations, comprise of 16 peacekeeping operations and 11 special political missions. The average age of peacekeeping operations is 23.6 years, some classic monitoring operations such as UNSTO, stretch back almost to the beginning of the UN. These missions are those funded through the assessed peacekeeping budget.

SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS

Special political missions are younger in age, averaging 10.3 years, and include UN Mission in Colombia, the most recent mission authorised by the Security Council in September 2016. They are funded through the UN’s regular budget.
TRENDS IN DEPLOYMENT

Detailed statistics on UN peacekeeping operations have been available since 1990. They show how UN peace operations have gone through a number of phases since the end of the Cold War. Originally conceived as a tool for ceasefire monitoring, these were small missions with modest mandates. They are best represented by the older missions such as UNMOGIP, UNTSO, UNFICYP, and UNDOF. The surge in peacekeeping in the late 1990s and in the last decade reflects a shift to large, multi-dimensional missions such as UNTAET, UNMIL, UNIFIL, MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNMISS.
THE CHANGING FACE OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

At the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping consisted of small ceasefire monitoring operations and the personnel on these missions was dominated by contingents from Europe.

THE DECLINE OF WEOG CONTRIBUTIONS

As missions surged at the end of the Cold War, member states from the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) were still active but others were drawn in to fill the ranks of these new large missions in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor. This trend can be viewed as a slideshow here.
THE RISE OF ASIAN PEACEKEEPERS

But in the “second wave” of operations that started from 2005, participation from troop contributing countries from the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG), which includes Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, dropped off as missions shifted to Africa and contributors came from either the continent itself or a few key Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. A motion graphic tracing Bangladesh's rise as a contributor to peace operations can be viewed here.

WHO’S WHO IN UN PEACEKEEPING

In 2016, there were no longer any WEOG countries in the Top 20 contributors to UN missions.
**SOUTHEAST ASIA STEPS UP**

This can also be analyzed by looking at contributions through the lense of uniformed personnel contributions by members of various regional organizations. The rising participation of the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is driven by Indonesia’s commitment to reach a contribution of 4,000 personnel by 2019.

**FRANCOPHONE CONTRIBUTIONS**

Large UN missions in French-speaking countries such as CAR (MINUSCA), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUSCO), and Mali (MINUSMA) have encouraged French speaking countries from La Francophonie to become significant contributors. Often these countries are neighbors with regional interests also at stake.
AFRICA’S GROWING ROLE

As African peace operations came to dominate the UN’s deployed missions, neighbours became involved in rapid response operations. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) had high levels of political motivation to support such interventions but limited resources to sustain them. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiated operations in their regions but then had them “re-hatted” as UN missions to allow them to be sustained for years and not just months. The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in MONUSCO became a reality only because regional countries were willing to contribute to it. The combination of these factors help explain the rising role AU member states have played in UN peace operations.
WOMEN IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Against these dramatic increases in contributions by nationality, there has been a different story to tell on uniformed personnel and gender. UN missions have struggled to increase the number of women in peace operations. For the period since statistic collection was begun in 2006, there has been little change in women’s participation in UN peace operations. As the HIPPO reported noted, “there remains a poor understanding of the potential of both integrating a gendered perspective and increasing the participation of women at all levels of political and civil life, and most especially at leadership level”. The panel called on the Secretariat to develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy to address the recruitment, retention, and advancement of female uniformed personnel. The way the forces of key troop contributing countries are structured makes changing uniformed participation rates difficult.

THE CHALLENGES OF GENDER PARITY

But as the analysis of former SRSG Karin Landgren has shown, there is a lost agenda for increasing women’s participation in the UN Secretariat itself. In 2015, she found that more than 90 per cent of senior appointments by UNSG Ban Ki-moon were male. In 2016, the number was only somewhat better at 72 per cent. If leadership on gender parity is to come from the Secretariat, then it would be important to set a tone in how headquarters and senior appointments are managed. The incoming Secretary-General has already signalled his intent during the selection process to rectify this obvious gender imbalance. After his swearing in, he called it the number one priority of his first 100 days. Mr. Guterres committed in his vision statement to “implement a roadmap for gender parity at all levels, with clear benchmarks and timeframes within the next mandate, giving priority to senior staff selection”. The turnover and number of new appointments in the early part of the new SG’s tenure will be large and any real policy shift should be readily apparent.
FINANCING PEACE OPERATIONS

Despite their under-representation on the ground, the financial contribution of WEOG countries to UN peace operations as a percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget has remained steadier. In recent years, as the budget has shrunk, it has increased in percentage terms. At the same time, as its economy has grown, the contribution of China has been increasing.
AN ASYMMETRY IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

This creates a gap between those who pay for UN peacekeeping and those who contribute. China’s growing role as a contributor and payer to UN peacekeeping makes it unique among the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

What are some of the challenges that have arisen in 2016 that can be or have been represented statistically or graphically? Even as there is increasing evidence that protection of civilian (POC) mandates are challenging UN peacekeeping operations and there is consider discord about these mandates, the numbers of civilian seeking sanctuary in the UN Mission in South Sudan has increased.
HURRY UP AND WAIT

Rapid deployment is still a challenge for the UN, with peace operations taking almost eighteen months to reach 85 per cent deployment.

The Security Council authorized a regional protection force for UNMISS in Juba following violence in July, but there is a mismatch between what the Council mandates and what troop contributing countries are prepared to provide.
This is going be a greater challenge after Kenya announced it planned to withdraw its contingent from UNMISS after the force commander, also a Kenyan national, was dismissed in early November 2016 by the UN Secretary-General as a result of the findings of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response. It is a delicate balance when the UN generates peacekeeping forces encouraging countries to contribute the types, quality, and quantity of personnel needed.

A DANGEROUS JOB

Peacekeeping is still a dangerous business, but not necessarily for the reasons that grab the headlines. A recent IPI report by Marina Henke suggests, seemingly counterintuitively, that fatalities resulting from malicious acts and accidents are not on the rise. Instead, illness related UN fatalities are steadily increasing, and this increase is strongly statistically significant.
The September 2016 London Ministerial called for improvements in UN peacekeeping in three areas, the “three Ps” of peacekeeping: planning, pledges and performance, but since the HIPPO report, many have not yet heeded its call to understand UN peace operations as first and foremost as political tool. In 2017, troop contributing countries will meet again in Canada to consider progress.
IS CANADA COMING BACK?

Domestic politics can also influence UN peace operations. Since the election of the Trudeau government in November 2015, Canada has committing to returning to UN peacekeeping after a decade of very low rates of participation.

WHAT IMPACT WILL THE US ELECTION HAVE?

The big question mark as 2016 ends and the new UN Secretary-General takes office in 2017 will be the impact of the new Trump Administration in the United States. Many see difficult times ahead and a return to the troubled relationship the US had with the UN under President George W. Bush. Historical statistics tells that there has been no clear impact between changes in government in the United States and UN peace operations. Numerically, since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have gone up and down under both Democrat and Republican administrations. The impact at the end of 2016 is difficult to predict as the new administration comes to office in January 2017 with some anti-UN rhetoric, but no actual policies or working level personnel who might develop them. Until then, the default may well be the status quo.
CONFLICT ON THE RISE

The goal of Global Peace Operations Review is to contribute to the increased effectiveness of peace operations. Whatever their actual or perceived shortcomings, this is a tool of international policy that can work if used appropriately. With conflict globally on the rise, the need for it is obvious.

The consequence of the increase in conflicts is a corresponding rise in fatalities, which have also risen in recent years. The bottom line is larger number of people, often civilians, are being killed.
UN peace operations are one tool available to try to reverse this trend, but often used as a Band-Aid after efforts to prevent a conflict have failed. With the new Secretary-General and five fresh members on the UN Security Council, the challenge now for these institutions is to do a better job than their predecessors at conflict prevention, making peace, supporting the political processes that undergird it, and then sustaining peace.

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HAS UN PEACEKEEPING BECOME MORE DEADLY?

Marina E. Henke

TO ASSESS TRENDS, THE PAPER MERGES THIS MONTHLY FATALITY DATA WITH MONTHLY DEPLOYMENT DATA AND CALCULATES FATALITY RATIOS (I.E., FATALITIES RATES RELATIVE TO DEPLOYMENT LEVELS) BY NATIONAL CONTINGENT, MISSION, AND GLOBALLY (I.E., ALL UN MISSIONS COMBINED).

Many practitioners believe that peacekeeping has become an increasingly dangerous undertaking in recent years. My research paper “Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities”, tries to get at the heart of this question. It examines trends in fatalities using a new dataset compiled by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The dataset accounts for monthly fatalities by type of fatality (accident, malicious act, illness, and other causes), nationality of the deceased as well as personnel type for each UN operation worldwide during the time period of 1948 - June 2015. To assess trends, the paper merges this monthly fatality data with monthly deployment data and calculates fatality ratios (i.e., fatalities rates relative to deployment levels) by national contingent, mission, and globally (i.e., all UN missions combined). This is a novelty. All previous studies have worked with yearly deployment averages. As a result, the analysis of fatality trends presented in this paper constitutes the most detailed study of this phenomenon thus far.
The principal findings of the paper are as follows: overall UN fatalities are not substantively on the rise. Indeed, total fatality ratios are sharply declining. Nevertheless, this good news does not equally apply to all types of UN fatalities. While fatality rates and ratios due to accidents and malicious acts are declining, the same cannot be said for illness-related fatality rates and ratios. Indeed, the report provides strong evidence, that fatalities due to illness follow an upward trajectory: increasingly troops, police and military observers die due to illness-related causes while serving in missions.

These findings go against analyses that UN peacekeepers face increasing risk due to changing peacekeeping mandates and more dangerous peacekeeping environment. Both of these changes would imply increases in fatalities due to malicious acts or accidents. Instead it appears that illness-related fatalities constitute the most worrisome development – at least when it comes to peacekeeping fatality rates.

**WHILE FATALITY RATES AND RATIOS DUE TO ACCIDENTS AND MALICIOUS ACTS ARE DECLINING … INCREASINGLY TROOPS, POLICE AND MILITARY OBSERVERS DIE DUE TO ILLNESS-RELATED CAUSES WHILE SERVING IN UN MISSIONS**

The report does not make claims with regard to UN casualties. The UN currently does not provide systematic data on injuries and/or attacks on UN peacekeepers. It is possible that the number of those has increased in recent years. Due to medical advances, more wounded personnel are able to survive. Without a doubt, these injuries and attacks need to be taken into account when assessing the overall risks peacekeepers face.

**THE NEEDS**

The report suggests that the UN needs to reassess the importance of health issues in the realm of peacekeeping deployments. Risks in this area urgently need to be addressed in order to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers.

More research is necessary to fully understand why illness-related fatalities have increased in recent years and how to reverse this trend. To do so, the UN should commission a report to examine the reasons for the stark increase in health-related fatalities. In the meantime, DPKO must better enforce its own health-related principles and guidelines, notably with regard to pre-deployment health checkups as well as health and hygiene conditions of in-mission medical facilities.

Health considerations should also inform the ongoing development of capability standards. In the C-34 and other UN fora most attention has thus far been given to the prevention of hostile acts (i.e., better protective equipment in the field, anti-mine vehicles etc.). Ill health and the prevention of health related death have garnered much less attention.

Nevertheless, fatalities are not necessarily the best measure to assess the entirety of risks peacekeepers face. To accurately address the latter question, the number of wounded soldiers that survive because of medical care also needs to be taken into account. The UN should start to systematically collect and make publicly available data across missions with regard to injuries and/or attacks on peacekeepers. To date, no such single medical database exists.
This report was published by Providing for Peacekeeping and the International Peace Institute (IPI). You can download the full report “Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities” here.

Marina E. Henke is an Assistant Professor at Northwestern University. Her research focuses on military interventions, UN peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy. | Twitter: @mephenke
CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS SECTIONS OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS
Alexis Guidotti

RECENT ADAPTATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE ARE BRINGING INTO QUESTION THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN COMPONENTS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS, NOTABLY THE HUMAN RIGHTS SECTIONS.

When António Guterres succeeds Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General, many problems will be waiting for him, including challenges to the fundamental values underpinning UN peacekeeping. Uncooperative host governments and shifting conflict environments, including asymmetrical threats and violent extremism, are testing blue helmets on the ground. Recent adaptations of peacekeeping practice are also bringing into question the role of civilian components in UN peace operations, notably the human rights sections. The growing use of offensive mandates to quash negative forces and ensure protection of civilians has sometimes made the UN a party to the conflict and has cast doubt on the civilian staff’s protection under international humanitarian law. Recommendations by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) on the primacy of politics also bring into question the principles of impartiality and transparency that lie at the core of credible human rights monitoring. How can UN peace operations ensure robust protection of civilians and broker political solutions while maintaining a transparent and impartial human rights agenda?
At its conception, peacekeeping was formed around three core tenets, often referred to as the ‘principles of peacekeeping’. These included the requirement of consent from the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defense. For the most part, they have stood the test of time since Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld defined them while devising the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Suez in 1956. However, in recent years UN peacekeeping has departed from these principles as operational environments have become less permissive and in key theaters there has been less or little peace to keep. Consent has proven less reliable in conflict areas where governments or non-state armed groups deny access to peacekeepers, like in Sudan, South Sudan or Mali. Impartiality has become questionable for missions specifically deployed to support a host state Government, sometimes against non-state armed groups opposing national authorities. Since exceptions to the non-use of force principle include the defense of the mandate, as outlined by the Capstone Doctrine, and as mandates now prioritize the protection of civilians by all necessary means for most UN missions, peacekeepers are increasingly called upon to use force against potential perpetrators of violence. Current concepts of operations and rules of engagement have made it clear that blue helmets are authorized to use force to protect civilians from imminent threat of physical violence by any party. More generally, the posture of modern peace operations has adapted by the adoption of robust mandates. In some theatres, special military units with offensive directives were authorized, such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) initially deployed in 2013 in eastern DRC to neutralize armed groups, or the soon-to-be-deployed Regional Protection Force in South Sudan, mandated to engage any actor preparing attacks.

EVOLUTION

This evolution naturally poses many questions and challenges for the UN military forces on the ground. But these shifts also are of equal consequence for the civilians working in peace operations. Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized the central role of civilians in peacekeeping in his Agenda for Peace, and from the 1990s, the UN ushered in the era of multi-dimensional and integrated peacekeeping where civilian, police and military components would work together to implement Security Council mandates. Civilian experts and advisors, specialized in specific areas such as Civil Affairs, Justice or DDR were expected to operate alongside blue helmets in order to provide a more comprehensive response to conflict and post-conflict challenges. As a result of human rights mainstreaming throughout the UN, civilian human rights sections were also formed and bound to the forefront, constituting one of the largest segments of civilian peacekeeping components.

Tasked with sensitizing the parties and communities on the norms of human rights and humanitarian law as well as monitoring and investigating human rights violations, the human rights sections play a key role in supporting the rule of law and documenting abuses in order to help bring perpetrators to justice. Human rights sections support host governments in upholding their human rights obligations and as an accountability measure, human rights reporting keeps pressure on governments to uphold the rule of law.

However, for human rights monitoring to be credible, it is essential that human rights officers operate according to international standards, which include a set of basic principles outlined by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including impartiality and transparency. Any perceived siding with one party or another poses very distinct challenges to human rights work and undermines the credibility of reporting. In most UN peace missions, offensive or politically charged mandates as well as non-permissive environments raise fundamental challenges for human rights sections.
Integrated peacekeeping establishes that civilian components will work with military components in support of the mandate and they do so notably by contributing to situational awareness and providing information analysis through the missions highly institutionalized reporting mechanisms. Human rights officers report daily and weekly activities to the mission leadership and log confidential information related to individual cases in an online database. On occasion, senior human rights officers can assume the role of Head of Office and represent the mission at meetings with government officials or with non-state armed groups. Human rights officers coordinate on a daily basis with the UN military component on protection of civilian concerns and to organize their own security when moving about the country. They are closely integrated into all aspects of the mission and it is reasonable to question the supporting role those civilian peacekeepers play in robust military operations.

**UNCOOPERATIVE HOST GOVERNMENTS AND SHIFTING CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS, INCLUDING ASYMMETRICAL THREATS AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM, ARE TESTING BLUE HELMETS ON THE GROUND.**

The growing perception of the partiality of peace operations has contributed to a certain loss of trust between the human rights section and many of the other important actors on the ground. When peace operations are perceived as neutral and impartial by local actors, the human rights sections enjoy greater access to all parties, including rebel groups and militias who often demonstrate a willingness to respect human rights and stop abuse. However, in parts of the Central African Republic, dialogue with certain armed groups has faltered because MINUSCA is viewed as siding with rival armed groups or the government. The recent criticisms against MINUSCA from the FPRC, an ex-Séléka group accusing UN peacekeepers of supporting the UPC, another ex-Séléka militia, further challenged the work of human rights officers in FPRC-controlled areas. In the DRC, MONUSCO adopted a rather partial approach when it decided to avoid any interaction with M23 and to suspend human rights activities in areas controlled by the armed group. Since the UN Mission received its mandate to “carry out targeted offensive operations” against armed groups, the areas under control of the FDLR and ADF Nalu became troublesome for human rights officers since the mission had a clear mandate to neutralize and disarm those groups. The space for negotiation and discussion was severely reduced for human rights work, and access to communities living in those areas has proven increasingly difficult. Similarly in Mali, human rights officers have very limited access to much of the north of the country due to severe security risks and regular attacks on MINUSMA peacekeepers by extremist groups that consider the UN to be the enemy. In all those environments, human rights officers have lost some of the leverage they used to have for influencing armed groups behavior and pushing for the respect of human rights and humanitarian law.

**HUMANITARIAN SPACE**

In addition, relationships with humanitarian actors and UN agencies have also been affected by the robust stance adopted by some peacekeeping operations. Humanitarians are understandably protective of their impartial status and willing to preserve their “humanitarian space” and access. They are consequently less and less keen to be seen as having any affiliation with a UN mission that could be perceived as partial or politically biased. This greatly impacts the work of human rights officers, who often rely on information sharing with humanitarians to document abuse and support their investigations.
Moreover, trust can also be strained inside the UN Mission itself, between human rights officers and blue helmets. UN troops operating under an offensive mandate or engaging in robust military operations are likely to be wary of human rights officers potentially monitoring the conduct of military operations, which can potentially result in a breakdown of internal cooperation and information sharing.

Peacekeeping missions have been marked by a militarization of their modus operandi and an increasing politicization of their stance. Far from the original peacekeeping model, based on the deployment of a small number of military observers keeping an eye on cease-fires, modern peacekeeping has evolved to respond to more complex and demanding conflict and post-conflict situations. They generally act in support of a host state, might be mandated to target ‘negative’ armed elements or spoilers in order to protect civilians, and often have to compromise and adapt to changing international, national or local political dynamics to continue operating. In this context, the civilian components, and more specifically the human rights sections, face difficult contradictions and have to make delicate choices. Human rights officers have to find the right balance to continue to respect the basic principles of human rights monitoring and investigation, while being embedded in a highly political and militarized entity. If the new secretary-general chooses to perpetuate the dynamics launched by the Human Rights up Front initiative and to prioritize human rights, he will have to decide where human rights fits in this new era of peacekeeping. He will notably have to address the challenges of redesigning the structure and role of civilian components in peace operations for a new type of integrated missions.

Although solutions will not come easy, one option for the human rights sections could be to consider the feasibility of an independent presence of OHCHR in countries with particularly challenging operations. A stand-alone OHCHR office would allow human rights teams to regain a sense of impartiality because they would operate independently of the mission, but this would jeopardize the integrated approach. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and OHCHR should also regularly review, discuss and adapt the existing policy on human rights in peace operations in order to take into consideration the new challenges related to the role of human rights officers in robust missions, and to provide detailed guidance for field personnel facing daily contradictions between OHCHR principles and DPKO positions. A thorough analysis of the consequences of robust operations for the civilian components, and of lessons learned in DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Darfur or Mali in this regard, could also contribute to inform upcoming reforms for the Secretariat in order to preserve a viable and balanced integrated approach of multidimensional peacekeeping.

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Ultimately, national caveats and acts of disobedience will only disappear when trust has been increased among the different stakeholders of peacekeeping operations.

For years, the UN Secretariat said caveats were not allowed in peacekeeping operations. Mentioning them was a kind of “taboo”. They existed on the ground but were rarely acknowledged at the political level in New York. But when operations faced a crisis and troops needed to take more risks than usual, the hitherto hidden restrictions quickly appeared, creating obvious command and control issues. Unfortunately, with peacekeeping operations now facing increasingly challenging environments, contingents refusing to follow orders, or waiting for their national authorities to confirm or countermand orders received from the UN mission’s authorities, has become the norm rather than the exception. Should we condemn this or understand the reasons why UN missions are facing such situations? It is time to stop lamenting that caveats exist and try to better learn how to manage them.
CAVEATS ARE CAUSING INCREASING CONCERN

In June 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report recognized that “the ability of field commanders to ensure performance is severely hampered by caveats and national controls”. The report's language was strong and it said that after deployment “any further caveats beyond those national constraints accepted at the outset, cannot be condoned”. Undeclared national restrictions, it stated “should be treated as disobedience of lawful command”.

The September 2015 Secretary-General's report on The future of United Nations peace operations called on every contributor to communicate during negotiations over possible deployment those national caveats that would apply to their military or police contingents. The UN Secretariat would take these caveats into account, including whether to proceed with deployment. “Additional caveats beyond those explicitly agreed by the Secretariat cannot be accepted after deployment”, the report said.

In the course of 2015, the Secretary-General instructed the leadership of all missions to inform Headquarters of any incidents where contingents refused to follow orders given by the Force Commander or Police Commissioner, whether on grounds of new or existing national caveats. The language of this directive was equally forceful and in such cases the Secretariat would immediately inform the concerned Member State and, the Security Council. Where no remedial action was forthcoming, the Secretariat pledged to repatriate the unit concerned. In addition, the Kigali principles adopted in May 2015 under the theme “Protection of Civilians through Peacekeeping: From Mandates Design to Implementation” asks member states “not to stipulate caveats or other restrictions that prevent us from fulfilling our responsibility to protect civilians in accordance with the mandate”.

In March 2016, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34) under the item on “strengthening operational capacity” endorsed “the call for every contributor to communicate, during negotiations over possible deployment and before deployment, any and all national caveats regarding the use of their military or police contingents”. But it did not endorse any sanction for those countries that produced new caveats in the course of the operation.

These recommendations highlight the confusion in thinking about the nature of caveats and how they should be properly managed. In the context in which UN missions increasingly deploy, the presence of caveats can undermine the coherence of the chain of command and the effectiveness of operations on the ground. However, the reports that condemn them seem to confuse caveats with disobedience, inability to perform, or differences of opinion on the security environment. None of the reports tried to analyze, understand, or explain the reasons why they might be legitimate responses to domestic political concerns back within the contributing country.

CAVEATS ARE A NORMAL PRACTICE THAT NEEDS TO BE BETTER DEFINED

Caveats are a part of any international military deployment abroad. Parallel chains of command always exist as no member state releases the full command of its troops to any international organization or to a military coalition. It could be said they are only providing an operational or a tactical control. The role of a national representative, or contingent commander, among contingents shows the overall acceptance of national reporting lines between capitals and national contingents. As explained by Claes Nilsson and Kristina Zetterlund in a report from the Swedish Ministry of Defense, when countries “participate in
a UN-led peacekeeping mission they place their troops under the operational control of the Head of the Military Component. The specific terms for each national contingent, including where they are to be deployed and for what purposes, should be specified in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the country and UN Headquarters. The problem is that for the time being, this is only done in the “statement of unit requirements” that is never signed. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is trying to change this and link those two important documents.

In this context, caveats set political safety limits. They are strategic warnings, explanations to prevent misinterpretation, cautionary details to be considered when evaluating, interpreting, or conducting an operation. They are “red lines” used by member states to maintain control of how their troops are used and they help manage the political implications of their deployment at home. They ensure the strategic national interests of a contributing member state are met when participating in multinational operations. They ensure compliance with their own doctrine and that the troops are deployed within their means and capabilities. In short, caveats are a risk management tool.

**THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HIGHLIGHT THE CONFUSION IN THINKING ABOUT THE NATURE OF CAVEATS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE PROPERLY MANAGED.**

Moreover, they set the level of risk a contributing country is willing to take – in the use of force for self-defence and defence of the mission mandate – within the framework of its strategic national interests. The type of troops deployed, the force protection provided to them, and their location are usually good indicators in this regard. For some countries, this reluctance “to put troops in danger” is the result of national legislative and political processes. Parliaments put restrictions on to what level of risk their country’s personnel should be exposed. This often leads governments to try to reduce the risks run by their personnel to ensure they do not exceed these limits. The level of acceptable risk is generally proportional to the intensity of strategic national interests. The national caveats are geared to the type and extent of risks that a country is prepared and willing to take. Troops deployed in countries where contributors have great interests tend to take more risks. Conversely, where there is no national interest, it is rare to find troops prepared to take high risk (i.e be prepared to die) on behalf of the UN.

There are in fact two sorts of “caveats”:

- The “real” or general caveats that have been declared by states beforehand and discussed during the negotiations over the Memorandum of Understanding conducted with each and every contributing country by DPKO, but not necessarily written in the concept of operation or operations plan of the mission. Such a process does not ensure that the Force Commander knows of them when he is deployed to the mission. Most often, he tends to find them out once on the ground in a crisis.
- The “hidden” caveats that are acts of tacit disobedience due to a misunderstanding on the mission assigned or to an inability or unwillingness to behave as ordered by the mission’s military leadership in times of crisis or during regular operations. They are inevitably less predictable than the general caveats. They are often the result of misunderstandings between the leadership of the UN mission and the contingents facing new, uncertain situations or when contingents are asked to
conduct operations that their contingent commander does not consider to be part of their approved assignment, or to be lying within their risk parameters. Under these circumstances, the default position tends to be to do nothing and make excuses for inaction later.

Caveats and acts of disobedience often emerge in times of crisis when circumstances change and when troop-contributing countries (TCCs) get the impression that what they are being asked to do exceeds their capacities and their original mandate. They should obviously be dealt with differently by the Organization. DPKO has started to tackle the issue but some other measures are needed improve the clearance procedures of the planning and operational documents and to increase the trust between the different stakeholders.

**CAVEATS CAN ONLY BE TACKLED BY IMPROVED PLANNING, DIALOGUE AND LEADERSHIP**

How does NATO deal with caveats? In their command and control structures, caveats are declared, written and negotiated by each contributing country during the elaboration of the concept of operations and the operations plan. These two operational documents prepared by SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and the IMS (International Military Staff) are agreed upon through the Military Committee by all member states. This means not only are caveats known by all contributing countries, but by all NATO structures in Brussels and the Force Commander in the field. They are taken into consideration during the strategic and operational planning. If the situation on the ground evolves, the concept of operations will be changed accordingly as well as the operations plan. These caveats, as well as cases of concern, will also be discussed within the Military Committee among the Chiefs of Defence military representatives of all contributing nations. This results in discussions and negotiations in capitals at the strategic level and at NATO headquarters in Brussels. If such procedures cannot simply be replicated in a UN context with more than 120 troop-contributing countries, the UN can still find inspiration in them to create its own mechanism to deal with such issues in New York.

As far as the general “caveats” are concerned, those TCCs expected to get involved in conducting major operations should declare their caveats not only in the MoU signed with DPKO but also in the concept of operations and the operational plan. This would encourage early discussion on the way operations will be conducted, and would later inform the Force Commander on the ground of the different caveats he will have to accommodate. In addition, these documents should be sent to the strategic level of each member state for validation. The strategic level of each member state is the only one to be able to link the political orientation given by national authorities to the requirements of their troops on the ground. The strategic level of member states needs to know and validate what is written in the concept of operations in order to feel committed to the conduct of that operation. This would avoid the current practice of getting those documents through informal channels, with the member state’s strategic level having no ownership of the documents’ implications and the Secretariat having no way of holding troop contributors accountable to documents that have not been formally signed and approved by the appropriate authorities of the member state. This should be a military/technical discussion, not a political one that aims at changing the mandate given by the Security Council.

To deal with acts of disobedience, DPKO has undertaken a few measures. Through its work on performance and force generation, it is now better able to select contributors and troops that meet UN standards and requirements. Furthermore, DPKO has recently repatriated contingents that were not up to UN standards or that had not followed through orders given by
the Force Commander. If such rigorous measures can be taken in extremis, the long-term solution probably lies elsewhere, at the policy level. In order to act against cases of disobedience, a mechanism should be set up by which military concerns of TCCs could be expressed. This could be done either by using the Military Staff Committee or by creating small (preferably military) coordination committees for each and every mission. The aim would be to have a military discussion behind closed doors involving the Military Adviser of the Secretary-General and his colleagues, the military attachés of the permanent missions of the members of the Security Council, and the military attachés of the main TCCs involved. At times, the Mission’s Force Commander would be involved in order to find a military solution to the issues raised by cases of disobedience. Having such a discussion in New York could mitigate that tendency to refer back to capitals and deal directly with disobedience cases, even of it will never replace the needed political discussion on how to implement the mandate.

AN ISSUE COMPLICATED BY THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS BEHIND UN PEACEKEEPING

Ultimately, national caveats and acts of disobedience will only disappear when trust has been increased among the different stakeholders of peacekeeping operations. But that is unlikely to be regained in the short-term as there is no consensus between the decision-makers, the implementers, and the contributors on how to use force to give robustness to peacekeepers and to protect civilians.

Despite the reflection led by some member states and the UN Secretariat in 2009-2011 in the context of the New Horizon document, the concept of “robust peacekeeping” has never gained whole-hearted support among the main TCCs. The current reform trends pushed by Western countries have ignored this. This creates tensions rather than solidarity at all levels, as the burden of peacekeeping remains unevenly shared; those who mandate and pay for missions are not generally the same as those who contribute troops or police. The so-called return of Western and European countries to peacekeeping is unlikely to change that as they will not be in a position to replace the contingents sent by the African or Asian countries. Obviously, China might change that configuration as it has become in a unique position of a P5 who mandates, pays (second main financial contributor), and contributes (with 2,622 peacekeepers). Nevertheless, the lack of unity and clarity at the strategic level inevitably translates into uncertainty on the ground, leading to unexpected caveats, and sometimes cases of disobedience or insubordination.

It is all the more complicated by the current lack of genuine dialogue between the key stakeholders: the Security Council which is always asking more from underequipped peacekeepers and the TCCs who are ready to accept the reimbursement cheque but less prepared to accept the responsibilities that come with it. But who is to blame? Indeed, who is ready to die for another country’s problem, for Juba, Kinshasa or Kidal? With the financial incentives to join a mission being so strong, the tendency for troops from less developed countries will remain. There will also be an incentive to agree to the terms of reference requested by the Secretariat without fully disclosing intended caveats, in order to be accepted as contributors, and reap the financial benefits of deployment. When caught by surprise, a contingent commander will immediately consult the capital and so-called “unwritten”, “hidden”, or “sudden” caveats appear. In this context trust can only be regained through dialogue and effective triangular cooperation and by giving peacekeepers more achievable missions.
In essence, trust can only be regained by improving leadership: troops that trust his/her leadership, no matter what nationality he or she is, will more likely obey their orders. It is therefore important that Force Commanders are well selected, know the caveats (through the concept of operations in particular) and assess the tactical limitations of their contingents. It takes good and experienced leaders to know and assess their troops, and to test and train them in advance. TCCs need also to better trust the UN’s command and control structures. A 2013 DPKO survey showed that two-thirds of all member states found UN command and control structures “somewhat clear”. Furthermore, command and control arrangements between different components in the UN were said in interviews to be unclear at times. As the above mentioned report from the Swedish Ministry of Defense pointed out, “it is possible that member states for various reasons have an outdated understanding of UN command and control, but the issue remains: UN command and control is often seen as unclear and inefficient.” Having TCCs participate one way or another in the validation of operational documents would contribute to deal with that lack of clarity on command and control.

The debate is not about whether member states will or will not abandon caveats but how to set up a mechanisms to deal with the inevitability of them. Full command over their troops will always be kept by member states; reducing national caveats and cases of disobedience comes with improving the processes by which operations are better planned and operational documents regularly updated. It comes with better transparency and information sharing, improved leadership and strengthened command and control arrangements for operations and better information sharing between all contributors. And finally, it comes with an improved triangular dialogue between all stakeholders to promote the professionalization of peacekeeping operations. Despite their complex environments, UN operations should strive to avoid having too many caveats, that undermine their responsiveness and the integration between all the various contributors, as recently pointed out by the Canadian Defence Minister, Harjit Sajjan. But for that to happen, it is also up to the Security Council to decide on more realistic and achievable mandates and to be politically more robust to back up peacekeepers on the ground.

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THE CHALLENGES OF FULL DEPLOYMENT ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Ryan Rappa

MODERN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, ON AVERAGE, TAKE JUST OVER TEN MONTHS TO REACH THEIR PEAK DEPLOYMENT.

The UN has always had problems deploying its largest, infantry-heavy missions. The 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping and this week's 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London are Member State driven initiatives to do better. Broader participation in contributing to missions is a key part of rapid deployment as well as reaching full strength.

A Global Peace Operations Review analysis of data from UN peacekeeping operations over the last 25 years indicates that modern UN peacekeeping missions, on average, take just over ten months to reach their peak deployment. In Africa, where countries on the continent are often left to take the lead, average time to deploy is worse -- almost twelve months to reach peak deployment. In fact, the average non-African mission in our analysis reached peak deployment in less than seven months, the fastest of any grouping.

Moreover, few missions actually reach their full authorized strength. The average peak deployment has been about 92.5 per cent of the total authorized personnel ceiling, both globally and in those missions in Africa (with significant variation between
missions). European missions, by contrast, come much closer to full deployment with an average peak of 98 per cent of total authorized personnel. European missions have also tended to reach peak deployment more quickly than others, within 9 months on average.

As Alischa Kugel has pointed out, it is not only geography that plays a role in slow or weak deployment. These African missions struggling to reach full strength are deployed in high-risk environments. Missions that are slow to deploy are often complicated multi-dimensional missions. European locations with good infrastructure facilitate rapid deployment, whereas countries like CAR, DRC, Mali, and South Sudan are logistically challenging with fewer good roads. European contingents are also better equipped and prepared to be highly mobile, whereas many other contributors rely on the UN to arrange their transportation, which involves slow contracting processes.

For this analysis, GPOR examined the monthly personnel levels, both authorized and actually deployed, on every UN peacekeeping mission that had UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing specific increases in personnel since November 1990, which is the earliest available UN data. The primary personnel type of each mission was used in the analysis. For example, UNMIBH was a police mission with a minimal military component and so data on authorized and actual levels of police was used.

This analysis excluded missions without specifically authorized personnel ceilings (e.g. most missions before circa 1998), missions with less than 1,000 authorized personnel, missions that lasted less than a year, and missions that were dedicated to personnel drawdowns rather than deployments. Within these parameters, this analysis included 22 UN peacekeeping
missions taking place between 1990 and the present day, with 43 total instances of increases in authorized personnel. You can download the full data set [UN PKO Peaks After Increased Authorizations as an Excel file](#).

A few cases best illustrate the deployment gap between those missions with active European participation and those where African nations are in the lead.

As Richard Gowan noted in his [10 Trends in Peace Operations](#) essay, when the Security Council mandated the reinforcement of the UN force in Lebanon in 2006, European nations got the troops on the ground in a matter of months. The slow processes in Mali and CAR highlight the need for the UN to develop more consistent rapid strategic deployment capabilities, both to launch new missions and reinforce old ones in crisis – or alternatively assist better-placed regional organizations to strengthen their rapid deployment systems as a precursor to blue helmet missions. While the AU was able to play this role in Mali and CAR, many of its units were short on the equipment they needed in the early phase of operations, and the missions were also prey to funding problems. These issues should not be allowed to hinder future deployments.

Gowan has also made the case how to increase [European Military Contributions to Peace Operations in Africa](#). These arguments are not just historical. With the crisis in South Sudan and the UN Security Council in August 2016 increased the mandated strength of UNMISS by 4,000 troops. These challenges are clear and present ones for UN peacekeeping.

UNMISS is another example of a particularly pronounced deployment gap in a high-risk environment – a scenario that has played out in several other African missions such as UNISFA and MINUSMA. As GPOR has [previously written](#), UNMISS was authorized to deploy 5,500 additional troops and 423 additional police as of December 2013, as the ongoing crisis in South
Sudan escalated. Six months later, the mission was only at three-quarters of its authorized strength. It took about 21 months for UNMISS to reach its peak deployment after the authorized personnel increase of December 2013.

The situation in South Sudan has deteriorated further in recent months, prompting the Security Council to authorize a new total of 17,000 uniformed personnel to staff UNMISS. And while we cannot draw a direct causal line from relatively slow or low deployment to an intensification of conflict, it is worth bearing in mind – when discussing any mission – the well-documented relationship between peacekeeper presence and actual peace, whereby greater numbers of UN troops and police have been strongly associated with reduced civilian deaths and battlefield deaths.

As the Member States meet in London to review their pledges from 2016, they should underline the greater role that troop contributing countries might play to improve the capabilities of UN peacekeeping. Of course, this is not just a numbers game. The commitment of transport, engineering, intelligence, medical, and transport units to a peacekeeping mission can make significant contributions to its effectiveness. However, the latest DPKO statistics show that there are no European countries in the Top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. This has raised questions about whether European countries could or should do more.

Data published by the CIC in its 2007 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations shows how this situation has changed in the last decade. In October 2006, France, Italy, and Spain were all in the Top Twenty, mainly due to their contingents in UNIFIL in Lebanon.
At the last United Nations summit on peacekeeping, in September 2015, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the international community to “explore every possible avenue to prevent conflicts before they begin,” by more efficiently and effectively supporting UN peacekeeping missions. In London on 8 September, representatives from more than 70 countries and international organizations will revisit Mr. Ban’s exhortation. They will assess peacekeeping progress, consider challenges, and coordinate on a way forward.

There is no doubt that UN Peacekeeping has made substantial progress while protecting millions of civilians over the last several years and decades. The rise in peacekeeper presence has coincided with shortened conflicts and durable peace in many cases. However, hostilities continue to flare up from the Middle East to the Congo, in areas where peacekeeping missions may be able to have greater positive impact and truly prevent further conflicts before they begin.

GPOR’s data supports the oft-cited notion that in many cases UN peacekeeping missions can and should be deployed more rapidly. It suggests that African missions in particular are sometimes deployed less efficiently than others when the pool of troop contributors is less broad. Of course, expeditious deployment is not enough on its own to achieve #BetterPeacekeeping. It is also essential that peacekeepers – and mission leaders – have a clear mandate, are well trained and equipped, stay focused, and use their resources wisely. But this data shows where UN Peacekeeping can improve and provides the tools to measure future progress.

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TODAY SOLOMON ISLANDS STILL HAS REAL CHALLENGES, NOT LEAST THE CHALLENGE OF AN ISLAND ECONOMY. NATION BUILDING HAS PROVEN ENORMOUSLY HARD IN EVERY INSTANCE GLOBALLY

To mark the 15th anniversary of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), CIC non-resident fellow Dr. Elsina Wainwright reflected on the role her policy advice played in the deployment of what became known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

I vividly remember learning in mid-2003 that the Howard Government was going to intervene in Solomon Islands along the lines of ASPI's Solomon Islands report. It was exciting that ASPI was contributing to government policy. But I was also apprehensive: while think tank analysts are used to putting forth ideas, they’re far less used to seeing their ideas implemented, particularly with such a policy shift.

I had worked with ASPI Director Hugh White to prepare the paper, along with contributors Quinton Clements, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, and Greg Urwin, and with Solomon Islands’ perspectives from Sir Fr John Ini Lapli and Sir Peter Kenilorea. Hugh White and I believed Canberra’s longstanding Southwest Pacific policy of providing aid but expecting states to solve their own
problems was not addressing Solomons Islands’ political and security crisis. Australia’s interests were engaged by this crisis, the Solomons government wanted Australia’s help, and we believed the policy should change.

ASPI was able to do three things with the Solomons report. First, it provided an input to the government’s decision to intervene. According to the recently-released official history of Australian peacekeeping, Prime Minister John Howard overruled his officials and decided to intervene in response to Solomons Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza’s written request for assistance.

Second, once that decision was made, it needed implementation. The ASPI report provided a ready-made, high-level blueprint. We proposed the operation should be police, rather than military, led: the security challenges facing Solomon Islands were of a kind best tackled by police, and the optics of a police-led operation would be more benign.

Such an intervention would require Solomon Islands’ consent and should be multinational, with regional endorsement and participation. It should have two phases: the first would address the law and order crisis, and the second would be a comprehensive, long-term capacity building program to tackle governance and economic challenges which were fuelling the crisis.

\textbf{WHILE THINK TANK ANALYSTS ARE USED TO PUTTING FORTH IDEAS, THEY’RE FAR LESS USED TO SEEING THEIR IDEAS IMPLEMENTED.}

And third, ASPI contributed to public discussion on why Australia was embarking on such an operation and how Australia’s strategic interests were engaged. It helped explain how the crisis could destabilize the broader region, particularly PNG, and how Australia might not be able to insulate itself from any fallout. We also described how Australia, as the largest regional power, had a responsibility—and interest in being seen—to be a good neighbour and assist.

While the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) broadly accorded with the ASPI report, it departed from our recommendations in a few key ways. In particular, we had recommended setting up an ad hoc agency, acting on behalf of Solomon Islanders, to temporarily control police and financing functions. RAMSI, however, left those functions under Solomon Islands government’s control. RAMSI’s minimal model was certainly easier to implement, but it left some of those implicated in the crisis in positions of power and RAMSI exposed to changing political alignments.

RAMSI quickly brought an end to the violence in Solomon Islands. The capacity building phase was always going to be imperfect, difficult and costly. Today Solomons Islands still has real challenges, not least the challenge of an island economy. But RAMSI could never have solved all Solomons’ challenges, as it couldn’t overcome Solomons’ geographical constraints. And nation building has proven enormously hard in every instance globally.

When I moved to a New York think tank in 2008, it became clear that the United Nations policy community and the US State Department stabilisation operations section regarded RAMSI and Australia’s deployable policing capability as real policy innovations, from which lessons could be learned.
Along with other early ASPI papers on East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the merits of a deployable civilian policing capability, the Solomons report recommended an increased regional focus for Australia and an increased role for Australia’s police in protecting Australia’s interests abroad. It exemplifies how policy contributions can come from outside conventional bureaucratic channels.

An external contribution seemed to work especially well at a moment of policy inflection; perhaps it was easier for a significant change in policy direction to come from outside. ASPI could propose a policy alternative so far from the orthodoxy that it would have been hard to formulate within government. It also would have been easier for the government to disavow if it received strong criticism or didn’t work. With its perspectives from and communication with eminent Solomon Islanders, ASPI could also serve as an indirect intermediary between Australia and the Solomon Islands. Such policy contributions should be one of the key roles of think tanks. There should be more interaction between government, think tanks and academia and the private sector, with more policy contestability and cross-fertilization of ideas, and less territoriality about their provenance. Canberra still trails Washington in this regard.

It was a privilege to be ‘present at the creation’ of ASPI and the expanding foreign and defence policy think tank space in Australia. Under the masterful guidance of Hugh White and ASPI Chair Robert O’Neill, and with tremendous colleagues in Mark Thomson, Peter Jennings and Aldo Borgu, ASPI was an intellectually stimulating and collaborative place to work. Hugh, Bob and the board encouraged policy entrepreneurship, and supported us when there was pushback. It was a pleasure to come to work each day. I’m proud of what ASPI achieved in its early years and pleased it remains such an important voice on Australian strategic policy.

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I BECAME INTERESTED IN IMPARTIALITY BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE MEANING OF IMPARTIALITY, HOW IT WAS TALKED ABOUT AND REPRESENTED IN PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE. THIS NEW CONCEPTION WAS MORE ASSERTIVE AND CALLED FOR ROBUST USES OF FORCE TO PROTECT CIVILIANS.

Emily Paddon Rhoads’ book “Taking Sides in Peacekeeping: Impartiality and the Future of the United Nations” is an important study of the meaning, reality, and consequences of impartiality for peacekeepers. The issue of impartiality is one of the core principles of UN peacekeeping, but it is also one of the most challenging for those on the ground in multidimensional peace operations. Consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict is another founding principle and missions cannot deploy without it. But what can a mission do when after they are on the ground this consent becomes weak or is withdrawn when the host government becomes displeased with the UN’s presence? Alexandra Novosseloff and Jason Stearns recently discussed these issues with the author.
Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): What do you mean by impartiality? How do you define it? What is the book's main argument?

Emily Paddon Rhoads (EPR): Impartiality has been a core norm of UN peacekeeping since its inception during the Cold War. It is a norm in that it prescribes how peacekeepers should behave: namely, that they be unbiased and informed when making decisions or in taking action. It is integral to the identity of peacekeepers, to what peacekeeping is and what it is not (i.e. warfighting), and to the values and principles that the UN seeks to project. It is a form of authority derived not only from a lack of bias but critically from what peacekeepers, like other ‘impartial actors’, are supposed to represent and further in the absence of particular interests. These are largely the values outlined in a mission’s mandate, which relate to the specific mission context as well as to broader norms of international peace and security. It is important to note that impartiality is not a given. My argument is that claims to impartial authority are just that – claims, and as such are disputable. For peacekeepers and the UN to command such authority, there must be some agreement on the underlying values.

I became interested in impartiality because of a change in the meaning of impartiality, how it was talked about and represented in peacekeeping doctrine, at the end of the 1990s. This new conception was more assertive and called for robust uses of force to protect civilians.

The book sets out to analyse the politics surrounding this new, more assertive conception of impartiality – at the global level (UN headquarters), and at the local level (as implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and it considers the implications. I argue that the transformation has deeply politicized peacekeeping at all levels and, in cases such as Congo, has effectively converted UN forces into one warring party among many. While member states generally agree that impartiality should remain a core norm of peacekeeping, there is very little consensus over what that actually means, and thus over the purposes of and actions involved in contemporary peacekeeping. This raises pressing questions about the sustainability of peacekeeping, the acceptance of peacekeepers locally, and it calls into question the UN’s future role and ability to act as the legitimate guarantor of international peace and security if it is perceived as partial, as having taken sides.

Jason Stearns (JS): You describe the shift in impartiality as a radical transformation. What do you mean? What does this look like at the UN?

EPR: The radical transformation is seen in the roles prescribed for peacekeepers in conflict and post-conflict settings and the basis on which they now claim authority. During the Cold War, it was easier to frame and perceive peacekeepers as impartial mediators or monitors. Their authority was limited to that which the parties conferred upon them in their mandates. They were “passively” impartial, beholden to the wishes and policies of those parties to a dispute, and only in areas permitted by the superpowers. They could smile, or frown, but they couldn’t bite. When an agreement disintegrated or consent was retracted, peacekeepers did not have recourse to defend their mandate and they withdrew. That was how UNEF, the first peacekeeping mission, ended.

The reality today is very different. Starting in 2000, the role prescribed for peacekeepers in many contexts has been more akin to the impartial police officer that enforces the law evenhandedly, penalizing infractions, regardless of who is the aggressor. Whereas traditional mandates did not point fingers and treated parties with moral equivalence, contemporary peacekeepers...
are expected to make judgments about who is right and who is wrong and to punish perpetrators of violence irrespective of whether the individual or group has given their consent for the mission. That's a very significant change.

It should be noted that this transformation is not specific to peacekeeping. In other areas of international engagement, claims to impartial authority, which were once based exclusively on terms to which all parties consented, are now premised on a more ambitious and expansive set of human-rights-related norms around which consensus is presumed. For example, through the principle of universal jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court asserts an unprecedented claim to impartially investigate and try alleged perpetrators of international crimes — independently of whether their states have given consent to the organization by ratifying the Rome Statute.

AN: Nowadays peacekeeping operations are increasingly sent in countries where there is not such a stable peace agreement. How does this challenge the principle of impartiality? And how can impartiality be maintained when consent of the host nation weakens and the mission become unwelcome?

EPR: Changes in the operating environment during the 1990s were critical in bringing about the transformation, the new conception of impartiality. As peacekeepers and other international actors became more heavily engaged in inter-state conflicts in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia – where peace agreements frequently lacked buy-in or broke down and consent for their operations was tenuous – they confronted difficult questions about the sources of their own authority and how to adjudicate disputes between local competing claimants for authority. Whose consent was necessary? What to do when civilians were attacked? The UN’s future relevance depended on finding answers to these questions. Human rights and protection seemed to offer a basis for claiming authority and for adjudicating between parties. The spread of the idea of human rights over decades implied that these were values on which everyone could agree; peacekeepers, it was thought — perhaps more, hoped — could protect civilians and still be impartial, above politics.

CHANGES IN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT DURING THE 1990S WERE CRITICAL IN BRINGING ABOUT THE TRANSFORMATION, THE NEW CONCEPTION OF IMPARTIALITY.

This, as my book shows, has been anything but true. Judgments as to who is perpetrator and who is victim, as well as to who is the protector and who the party in need of protection, are often subjective, fluid and deeply contested by actors on the ground as well as by members of the international community. Politics permeates decision-making at all levels. We still live in a world made up of sovereign, autonomous, self-determining states, a world in which human rights and protection still requires the engagement and, you could say “agreement”, of those states. And so, as you note, consent is still a relevant principle in peacekeeping and missions must work with host states. But that means that there are tensions, visible in most peacekeeping mandates today, which give rise to a number of dilemmas and operational challenges. That’s what the book explores.
JS: How do you observe that transformation of the UN's role in the Congo?

EPR: The UN mission in the Congo is an interesting case because it has been a standard bearer for more assertive approaches. It was first deployed in 1999 just as the new conception of impartiality was beginning to take hold at the UN. From very early on, we see the transformation reflected in the mandate given to it by the Security Council. Since 2000, blue helmets have been endowed with a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians and their rules of engagement have steadily strengthened to allow for the proactive use of force. This makes it an interesting case to look at the challenges surrounding the implementation of the “new” conception of impartiality, but also to draw out the linkages with the more global politics of peacekeeping during this time.

JS: What are these challenges?

EPR: There are many but I will just mention a few. Some of the thorniest challenges concern the mission’s relationship to the state. In particular, the mission has struggled with how to reconcile its core task of civilian protection with the necessity of maintaining host state consent and its mandate to support the government. This has been particularly tricky in instances where the state itself or elements of the state pose a threat, if not the greatest threat, to civilians. Similarly, the mission has grappled with how to be both a forceful defender of human rights in the short-term, undertaking robust action against particular groups, and also be accepted as a convener and animator of peace and political processes in Congo that are really the only long-term solution to ending the conflict and reducing civilian imperilment.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT IMPartiality IS NOT A GIVEN. My ARGUMENT IS THAT CLAIMS TO IMPartial AUTHORITY ARE JUST THAT – CLAIMS, AND AS SUCH ARE DISPUTABLE.

There are also challenges, which stem from the broader politics of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is something of a hydra-headed institution. No single actor is forced, let alone able, to assume the complete costs, political or otherwise, of a UN collective decision. This splitting up of burdens increases the likelihood of political evasion and posturing. Those member states that have the greatest policy influence in Congo and that have authored these ambitious mandates, are rarely the same ones that put forces in the field, and the lines of accountability are weak. Over time this has bred resentment amongst troop contributing countries (TCCs). As a result, they have become more risk-averse, less willing to step into the line of fire. People often forget that during the transition period (2003-2006), traditional TCCs – Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi troops – undertook some of the most robust and forceful peacekeeping action in the UN's history.

JS: Was the UN able to be more impartial during the transition period, than in the post-transition period?

EPR: Yes, in some ways the UN did find it easier to be impartial during the transition. In the absence of an elected sovereign, peacekeepers could be more even-handed vis-à-vis the different parties. There was a coherent strategy, a goal, which the mission, backed by donors, could get behind. Nonetheless, there were a number of cases during the transition, such as Bukavu
in 2004, when the mission proved unwilling to use force against certain groups, in particular, against the main signatories of
the peace agreement that established the transition, or those allied to them, for fear of losing consent and being expelled.
There was also the issue of Rwanda. Close ties between members of the Security Council and Rwanda, meant that the mission
did not address Kigali’s culpability in fomenting instability in eastern Congo. This undue deference to Rwandan interests and
unwillingness to militarily confront those backed by Rwanda, has engendered and continues to engender local perceptions
that the UN is partial.

Following the transition, with the election of Joseph Kabila, impartiality became even more difficult. Kabila has played the
sovereignty card very well and prevented the UN from having any real leverage or meaningful authority. From the get go, he
made it be known that he was in charge and that MONUC/MONUSCO was there on his terms, and his terms only. So there
is a change, there definitely is a change from the transition period to post-transition period, but some of the same political
dynamics and tensions are at play across the duration of the mission.

JS: It seems to me that there are cases where the UN is partial because of inaction and there are cases where it is partial
because of its action. The former seems to apply more to the transition period in the Congo and the latter to the post-transition
during which the UN has partnered with the state and engaged in joint operations (e.g., the Umoja Wetu, Kimia II operations,
Amani Leo),…

EPR: That’s an interesting way of framing it. I agree that the UN’s partnership with the state, its mandate to support and
strengthen the state in the post-transition period, has rendered it distinctly partial in the eyes of many and made its relationship
with other actors, humanitarians in particular, very tricky. However, understanding the mission’s partiality post-transition
solely through the lens of “action”, actions taken to support the state, leaves out a number of important political dynamics
that have resulted in instances of peacekeeper inaction, compounding perceptions of partiality and further delegitimizing the
mission. A good example of this is the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)– a specialized unit within the UN mission in Congo.
Deployed in 2013 with a mandate to ‘neutralize armed groups’ in the east, it is comprised of roughly 3,000 troops from South
Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. The FIB has been widely praised for the crucial role it played in helping to defeat the M23. Less
acknowledged was the particular set of interests that made such action possible– the forces that made up the FIB were from
neighbouring states closely allied to Kabila, two of which had significant beefs with Rwanda. This convergence of interests was
not sustained, however, and as a result the FIB has since been reluctant to forcefully engage other armed actors. A recent
internal UN report, described the FIB as having assumed a “largely passive and reactive stance” post M23.

That issues of impartiality/partiality arise in the context of partnerships within the peacekeeping system and not solely with
external actors, like the state, is important given that regional actors, particularly African states, are increasingly willing to
deploy forces and lead broader crisis management processes on their continent. What’s more, in recent years they have
emerged as proponents of robust uses of force.

AN: In a way, regionalisation of peacekeeping operations undermines the impartiality of those operations, right?

EPR: Yes, I would say so. The very characteristics that often make regional actors suited to rapid and robust response (i.e.,
proximity, local knowledge, an incentive to contain violence) can make their lack of bias – real or perceived – all the more
questionable. As in Congo, they often have their own political agendas, which can play out through operations and impact UN
peacekeepers deployed alongside or following such arrangements.
JS: Do you think, then, that the UN should not partner with the host state? If it gets too afraid it can lead to paralysis?

EPR: Partnership with the state, or at the very least a working relationship with the state, is inevitable so long as host-state consent continues to be a requirement for mission deployment. And I don’t think consent is about to disappear. States just aren’t willing to field forces for that type of operation. The question then is how to balance, how to navigate, these competing and often conflicting priorities. Several policy innovations have attempted to address these challenges. None has completely resolved the issue. For example, the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), which makes the UN’s assistance to non-UN security forces conditional on respecting human rights, has encountered a number of difficulties during implementation. And in Congo, the policy was actually instrumentalized by the government when it appointed two “red-listed” generals to lead joint operations last year. Another innovation example is the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operation’s (the HIPPO report) recommendation for the establishment of political compacts between host governments and the UN (with donor involvement) with a view to bolstering national ownership and managing consent. This is an interesting idea, particularly if it strengthens donor coordination and leverage. However, I am wary of how effective it will be where a mission is already deployed and where the host-state has no intention of honouring its commitments, where consent is only in name. These contexts—where there is no meaningful political process to support—raise some really hard and difficult questions about whether a peacekeeping mission is in fact appropriate, whether support should continue, questions that in my opinion, the Security Council has been reluctant to seriously consider.

AN: The problem is that UN missions are also often deployed because some states do not want to engage on more enforcement action alone or in a bilateral way or because some other states do not have the will to engage politically. Peacekeeping operations have therefore become the last resort and they are far from perfect.

EPR: Indeed, that is one of the main points I make in the book. Peacekeeping missions have in many ways become a last resort, a lowest common denominator response, in places of relatively minor strategic interest but where the Council is under pressure to do something, particularly when there are headlines of suffering. In this way, ambitious protection mandates authorized by the Council offer a way to be seen to be doing something without any real political engagement.

And this has very real consequences, consequences that are not just about how or whether the mandate is implemented. The policies of international actors don’t exist in a vacuum. Stated promises of protection, pronouncements and statements of policy have vastly influential effects on the ground. They raise expectations, create incentives amongst local actors, and encourage behaviour that would not have occurred otherwise. Civilians, for example, who are told that peacekeepers will protect them may be emboldened to take even greater risks. And as I show in the Congo case, armed groups have at various points instrumentalized and co-opted the discourse and practices associated with the mission’s robust mandate to self-legitimize and de-legitimize others.

JS: Does the book only highlight the political dynamics? Does it also provide prescriptions?

EPR: First and foremost, the book is about understanding the transformation, the politics associated with it and the implications for peacekeeping and the UN. By bringing to light some of the challenges we’ve talked about, my intention is not to discredit protection as a goal and it doesn’t mean that I think we should abandon such efforts entirely or peacekeeping more generally. My hope is rather that a better understanding of the politics helps to illuminate areas of reform. It definitely reinforces the
value of a political, less technical, approach to peacekeeping and to having a clear strategy in contexts where peacekeepers are deployed. But also practically, it points to possible reforms like more equitable burden sharing by widening the base of contributors as well as greater TCC involvement in mandate formulation. Ultimately, though, I do think many of the challenges we see today are likely to persist given the nature of the political dynamics we've discussed. And so, by exposing the politics - by calling a spade a spade – and by considering where this is all leading us, the book is a call for caution, for greater prudence and pragmatism in peacekeeping.

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WHEN SHOULD BLUE HELMETS WALK AWAY FROM A CONFLICT?

Richard Gowan

NOBODY WANTS TO CLOSE A MISSION AND SEE MASSACRES SPREAD AS THE LAST PEACEKEEPERS LEAVE. HOW DID THE UN GET INTO THIS MESS? CAN IT EVER ESCAPE IT?

The renewed crisis in South Sudan is turning into a decisive test for the United Nations. There is a growing international outcry over reports that local forces raped and killed civilians almost in front of UN peacekeepers. The Security Council has struggled to persuade the South Sudanese government to accept the deployment of an additional 4,000 troops with a robust mandate to stabilize the capital, Juba. Having initially rejected the proposal, which has strong African support, President Salva Kiir now seems willing to at least consider the reinforcements. There are tensions in the Security Council over how to handle Kiir: the U.S. wants a tough line, but China and Russia insist on respect for that South Sudan’s sovereignty.
Kiir and his advisers profoundly distrust the UN. According to a leaked South Sudanese document they believe that “The UN Secretary General [Ban Ki Moon] has constantly advanced negative views against the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and its leadership,” and even pursued a “regime change strategy.” This is unjust. A few outside analysts have advanced ambitious and probably unworkable plans to turn South Sudan into an international protectorate on the Kosovo model. But the UN is largely struggling to stay on top of the crisis and get aid to the suffering, rather than plotting to overthrow Kiir.

The grim reality is that, far from being in a position to depose the president, the UN has little choice but to work with him and his allies. The alternative could be a severe increase in violence, with peacekeepers in the firing line. This is neither a new or unique dilemma. In “The Peacekeeping Quagmire”, published by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs exactly a year ago, I argued that the UN’s “greatest strategic weakness” in South Sudan was its ties to an insecure and often aggressive leader such as Kiir.

Yet, as I noted then, peacekeeping forces have ended up in similarly dangerous relationships with other leaders, including Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Joseph Kabila. While Kiir may be in the news today, there are also growing fears that Kabila’s efforts to quash political opposition and secure an unconstitutional third term as president in the DRC this year will also lead to serious violence – and once again, a large UN peace operation will be on the frontline trying to keep order.

These crises are a reminder that, in trying to understand why UN peace operations succeed or fail, it is necessary not only to look at the technical details of their mandates and functions (DDR, SSR, and so forth) but also at political personalities and dynamics. The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) argued that the UN must emphasize the “primacy of politics” in all its peacemaking efforts. But what happens when politicians are fundamentally unwilling or unable to work constructively with
international peacekeepers? As I argued last year, and still believe today, there may be times and places where the UN has to walk away from countries where local political elites set ethically unacceptable conditions for keeping blue helmets on the ground, whatever the dangers of retreating.

In January 2015, protests broke out in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in response to an attempt by President Joseph Kabila to circumvent constitutional term-limits and run for a third term as head of state. Security forces killed dozens. Kabila backed down but many Congolese and foreign observers thought this retreat is only temporary. The violence raised concerns not only about the DRC’s political future but also about Kabila’s relationship with the United Nations.

The UN has deployed peacekeepers in the DRC since 1999 and in July 2016 had more than 18,000 troops and police on the ground. It oversaw the president’s two previous electoral victories in 2006 and 2011, although his supporters were widely believed to have rigged the latter. UN troops have assisted the Congolese army, which has an ugly track record of human rights violations, in efforts to defeat militias in the east of the country. Yet if the UN and Kabila have developed a symbiotic relationship, it is also an abusive one. The President and his advisers have accused the peacekeepers of failing to fight hard enough in the east and accused the UN of “neo-colonization”.

This line chart shows the increase in the number of uniformed personnel deployed (red line) and UN authorized levels of uniformed personnel (blue line) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from its inception (August 2011) to present.
The UN Stabilization Force in the DRC (MONUSCO) has become an emblem of the flaws of the UN’s broader peacekeeping project. The organization in July 2016 had more than 101,000 uniformed personnel worldwide, a record. Some of the largest and highest-profile UN missions, including those in South Sudan and Darfur, are trapped in quagmires of endemic violence and dysfunctional politics. UN contingents are often under-equipped and under-motivated, reducing their tactical impact. Yet the UN’s greatest strategic weakness in these cases is that it has become entangled in fractious and arguably unethical relationships with national leaders who, driven by greed or fear, have little real interest in stable, open and inclusive political systems.

The DRC is by no means the worst case. In South Sudan, President Salva Kiir has marginalized the UN mission (UNMISS) since the country slumped into civil war in December 2013. In July 2016, the peacekeepers are sheltering an estimated 200,000 civilians on their compounds but can do little more. In Darfur, troops and militias loyal to President Omar al-Bashir regularly harass peacekeeping patrols. UN officials have allegedly covered up cases where government troops have attacked international personnel.

The Security Council has regularly renewed the mandates for these missions and the UN continues to work with Kabila, Kiir and Bashir. Having aspired to instill democracy and good governance in countries like the DRC and South Sudan, the UN has ended up propping up unreliable and even autocratic leaders in the absence of better alternatives. Peacekeepers have to try to defend civilians from precisely the governments and security forces they are meant to partner with.

It might be honest to declare defeat in Darfur or announce that the UN will pull out of DRC or South Sudan if national leaders do not engage in less destructive politics. But the risk of renewed chaos after the peacekeepers hangs heavily over the Security Council: Nobody wants to close a mission and see massacres spread as the last peacekeepers leave. How did the UN get into this mess? Can it ever escape it?

FROM ELECTIONS TO AUTOCRATS?

To understand how the UN finds itself in its current predicament, as argued in previous articles, it is necessary to have a sense of both irony and tragedy. The irony is that the UN’s dilemmas arise from earlier efforts at democratization and humanitarian protection by the UN a little more than a decade ago. The tragedy is that in cases such as the DRC and the Sudans, UN officials, having lost whatever political leverage they initially had, are stuck trying to mitigate cycles of violence that they can foresee but not prevent. Some historical context is necessary here.

Twenty years ago, the UN’s reputation nosedived in the wake of Rwanda and Srebrenica. Blue helmet missions dwindled as alternatives such as NATO took the lead in the Balkans and swathes of Africa, including the DRC, toppled into conflict. Yet from 1999 on, the Security Council and then Secretary-General Kofi Annan collaborated to revitalize UN peacekeeping to manage crises and instill peace, above all in battered African countries such as Sierra Leone and Sudan. The UN also took on small trouble spots elsewhere, like Haiti, Kosovo and Timor-Leste. But Africa has been the priority: over 80,000 of the personnel now under UN command are on the continent.

The new generation of UN missions not only managed to bring a series of bloody conflicts under control but also looked like an effective force for democracy promotion. The peacekeepers facilitated technically impressive elections in cases such as Liberia.
and the DRC. “Helicopters were deployed, bulletins were printed and electrical generators were sent to remote voting centers,” former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno recalls of the Congolese effort in a new memoir, *The Fog of Peace*. “For the presidential elections, some 50,000 polling stations were opened.” Yet as Guéhenno underlines, the sheer scale of these processes obscured far deeper political challenges to democratization.

Almost everywhere the UN deployed in the early 2000s, it found it hard to grasp, let alone unpick, complex local political alliances and patronage systems. In some cases, power-brokers were able to delay elections for long periods: The UN sent a mission to Côte d’Ivoire with a mandate to prepare for polls in 2004, but was unable to deliver on this until 2010. Elsewhere, national leaders took advantage of elections to consolidate their power and do down their rivals. Guéhenno noted in his book that Joseph Kabila pushed his rival in the 2006 elections, Jean-Pierre Bemba, out of the DRC by force. “At enormous and unsustainable cost,” he adds, “the international community consolidated the presidency through elections and largely ignored the other institutions of state,” limiting parliamentary and legal restraints on Kabila.

This focus on bolstering a leader rather than more credible institutions points to a deeper challenge for the UN. Officials sometimes opt for a version of the Great Man theory of history, emphasizing the personal qualities and weaknesses of the leaders they have to work with. Alan Doss, a UN veteran who led the UN mission in Liberia in 2005-2007 and that in the DRC from 2007 to 2010, concludes that while peaceful states require strong institutions, “strong institutions also require strong men and women capable of making a qualitative difference to the way those institutions function.”

Doss contrasts the “particularly effective” Liberian president and former World Bank official Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (elected on the watch of UN peacekeepers in 2006) with the “reluctant communicator” Kabila. *Recent research* affirms that leadership is indeed an important factor in shaping weak states. But peacekeepers and aid agencies have arguably invested too much political capital in individual leaders, raising their sense of entitlement and compromising the UN’s impartiality.

**TWENTY YEARS AGO, THE UN’S REPUTATION NOSEDIVED IN THE WAKE OF RWANDA AND SREBRENICA. BLUE HELMET MISSIONS DWINDLED AS ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS NATO TOOK THE LEAD IN THE BALKANS AND SWATHES OF AFRICA**

Even the widely admired Johnson Sirleaf, a joint winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, has been accused of taking unfair advantage of her position. She appointed three of her sons to senior positions, including a senior position in the Central Bank. The tensions inherent in peacekeepers’ relations with national leaders were much more brutally illustrated in Liberia’s neighbor Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011. President Laurent Gbagbo did a fine job of neutering the UN mission in his country, reducing it to a bit part in internal political dialogues. When Gbagbo lost the long-delayed Ivorian elections in 2010, and the UN validated the results, he took the offensive, unleashing mobs on both his political foes and ill-prepared peacekeepers.

The UN mission came close to collapse in 2011 but, reinforced with Ukrainian attack helicopters, eventually helped to restore order in tandem with French forces. Gbagbo surrendered and was later transferred to the ICC. For a brief moment, the UN’s actions seemed to confirm its credentials as a robust defender of democracy.
Yet the Ivorian crisis may have been the exception to a rule: In general, UN missions fail to respond decisively to national leaders’ abusive tendencies. Leaders such as South Sudan’s Salva Kiir have found more effective ways to assert their leverage.

The case of Kiir is striking because he once looked like a natural partner for the UN. Having first deployed peacekeepers to facilitate the end of the intra-Sudanese civil war in 2005, the UN oversaw an unexpectedly smooth independence referendum in the south in 2011. Almost 99 per cent of voters supported secession from Khartoum. The Security Council gave UNMISS an explicit mandate “to help establish the condition for the development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically.” This sounded like vote of confidence in Kiir’s leadership. But their relations with the authorities in Juba soured. The UN worried that the government was growing rapacious and unaccountable. The government complained that the peacekeepers were not doing enough to stop Sudan aiding to revolts on its territory.

James Copnall paints a nuanced portrait of Kiir’s position. “The man with ultimate responsibility for South Sudan,” he writes, “probably never imagined himself running a country.” John Garang, the charismatic leader of the South Sudanese independence movement, died in a helicopter crash in 2005. Kiir has had to keep his supporters satisfied. “Generals and politicians have built multi-story houses in South Sudan and abroad,” Copnall complains, “and drive cars the size of ordinary people’s huts. Corruption has become a defining feature of the new country.” Catering to such an avaricious political base, Kiir bridled at criticism from UNMISS.

These tensions peaked in 2013, when violence between Kiir’s supporters and backers of his former deputy, Riek Machar, spiraled out of control. Kiir scape-goated the UN, accusing it of bidding to form a “parallel government” while his supporters have harassed UNMISS convoys and allegedly shot down one of its helicopters (Machar’s forces have also threatened the UN, and there is a proliferation of armed groups that answer to neither leader). The government and its regional allies cut the UN out of peace talks in Ethiopia. The Security Council ordered UNMISS to focus on protecting civilians – including those on its bases – monitoring human rights and facilitating aid. The dream of close coordination between Kiir and the UN had given way to a more minimalistic focus on saving lives.

**COMPROMISE AND COMPLICITY**

It is hard to quibble with saving lives in a crisis. But what should the UN do over the longer term when its relations with national governments have gone off the rails? In many cases, international officials choose to temporize, hoping that they can nudge abusive leaders towards better governance over time. The leaders themselves may find this irritating (Joseph Kabila has refused to meet top UN officials for months at a time) but they do have incentives not to cut off relations completely. The presence of a peacekeeping force offers them some extra security and, perhaps most temptingly, may facilitate international aid. As Giulia Piccolino and John Karlsrud point out, the UN finds itself in a state of “mutual dependency” with these abusive leaders. If Bashir, Kabila or Kiir were to turn against the UN completely, peacekeeping would become impossible. But they would also lose “the opportunity to blame the international peace operation for everything that is not working.”

Nonetheless, abusive leaders can extract a high price from the UN for maintaining even the tenuous cooperation. In the DRC, Kabila has pushed the peacekeepers to assist a series of military offensives against militias in the east of the country. The UN
has frequently worried that these are likely to cause unjustifiable human and political harm, and international NGOs have highlighted the presence of notorious alleged war criminals in Congolese officer corps. But UN officials have argued that it is necessary to play along to limit the damage of these adventures. "We were left with no choice, either we were in or we were out," an anonymous official explained to Human Rights Watch after one notably brutal operation in 2009. "We believed that being on the inside would give us a better chance to protect civilians."

The UN has tried to place some conditions, such as the vetting of senior personnel, on its Congolese military counterparts, creating new frictions. Kabila's relations with MONUSCO reached a nadir after the UN failed to halt rebels from seizing the city of Goma in late 2012. The following year, the Security Council tried to regain his trust by mandating a special brigade to neutralize militias in the eastern DRC. Kabila also agreed to enter a regional political dialogue aimed at resolving the east's problems, and the brigade was initially successful. Yet by early 2015, both the military and political processes were losing steam as Kabila prepared for the 2016 elections.

At least Kabila and MONUSCO remain nominally on the same side. In Darfur, the Sudanese government has sometimes treated the joint UN-African mission (UNAMID), launched with Western backing in 2007, as an enemy. The government views the UN with suspicion, believing that it aims to dismember the state. The International Criminal Court's 2009 decision to indict President Bashir for war crimes in Darfur further poisoned relations. In early 2014, Foreign Policy released leaked UNAMID emails about attacks by the Sudanese military and pro-government irregulars on its personnel. The army even threatened to bomb a UN convoy. Yet the investigation found that, fearing a rupture, "the UN leadership has routinely withheld information linking Khartoum to threats – let alone violence – against UN personnel."

UN officials insist that their presence does still provide some security for imperiled Darfuris. But this leaves deeper strategic questions open. At what point do efforts to maintain relations with abusive leaders and regime become morally and politically unsustainable? Does such collaboration contribute to protecting civilians over the long term, or does it simply allow abusive rulers to fortify their positions?

CONCLUSION: TIME TO GO?

UN officials are fully conscious of these dilemmas. They are able to identify how they might have been avoided. If the UN had not rushed to early elections in so many cases, or focused less on national politics and more on local conflict dynamics, it might not be in so many quagmires today. It should not have cultivated certain leaders so naively. The Security Council should never have sent peacekeepers to some places, like Darfur, at all. There are important lessons from these past mistakes for current and future UN deployments. But while the organization has recently been tasked with stabilizing Mali and the Central African Republic, it still has to grapple with its “legacy operations” in the DRC, the Sudans and West Africa.

Having tried to parlay with Bashir, Kabila and Kiir, the Security Council and UN officials are losing patience. While divisions between the West, Russia and China have complicated diplomacy in the Security Council, in March 2015 it established a sanctions regime for South Sudan that could be used to freeze Kiir's assets. In February the same year, MONUSCO suspended its backing to a Congolese anti-militia operation over the involvement of two generals accused of human rights abuses. The U.S. has also leant on Kabila, with President Obama calling his Congolese counterpart to discuss how his "legacy as a leader
who brought the DRC out of war and set it on a path of continued democratic progress would be consolidated by free and fair elections in 2016.” (A date for these polls remains to be set.)

If Kabila ultimately concludes that he cannot run for a third term in office – or hold onto power by a ruse such as delaying the polls – it will send a signal that national leaders cannot ignore international opinion and the UN indefinitely. But there is no guarantee that his successor will be vastly more accommodating towards the UN: the Congolese elite is divided between relatively pro-Western moderates and hardliners who might prove tougher on MONUSCO. If Kabila does go, it will also make Bashir and Kiir even more suspicious that the UN plans to oust them as well.

Perhaps not coincidentally, Kabila and Bashir launched parallel campaigns to downsize the UN forces on their territory in late 2014. The Congolese president proposed cuts to MONUSCO of a quarter (6,000 personnel) or more. Bashir called for plans for a complete end to the “burden” of UNAMID. In both cases, the Security Council responded with smaller cuts, but the UN set up a working group with the African Union and Sudanese authorities to explore exit strategies for UNAMID. It is likely that the UN’s representatives in the DRC, Darfur and South Sudan will face endless negotiations over further reductions to these missions. A series of gradual reductions could render the peacekeepers less operationally and politically robust, leaving them ever more vulnerable to bullying and manipulation.

The Security Council and UN officials should maintain, and be willing to threaten, the nuclear option of withdrawing peacekeeping forces more rapidly in those cases where national leaders grow too confrontational or autocratic. While it may be hard to imagine pulling peacekeepers out of countries where civilians remain at risk, there have to be moral limits to the sort of regimes that peacekeepers are asked to fight and die for. The longer the UN continues to prop up leaders and governments that treat the organization with contempt, the more that contempt will be deserved.

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Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine

Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff

We all know that the UN Secretariat has been walking on eggs with this issue of intelligence for years.

In a way, the title of our research paper “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine”, speaks for itself. We all know that the UN secretariat has been walking on eggs with this issue of intelligence for years; doing it without saying it and without realizing it. But with peace operations involved in increasing complex and demanding situations and one senses that this “fog about intelligence” can no longer be sustainable. This report complements other earlier attempts to “demystify” that charged term of intelligence and to define what “intelligence” means in the UN context and its peace operations.
THE CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS

We think that the expression “UN intelligence” is different from the intelligence conceived by each and every member states and that it cannot summarize itself to “military intelligence”. It is different by the mere nature (multidimensional, multinational and multicultural) of the UN and its peace operations because it is a “club” of all countries and distinct from regional organizations or military alliances.

It is different also because UN operations are constrained by several limitations.

The first limitation is the existence of a weak system for the protection of information. The existing classification of documents is unfortunately not linked to any prosecution procedures, no proper system of sanctions to individuals breaking that confidentiality. This creates difficulties in sharing information with parallel forces deployed along peace operations.

A second limitation is due to the need for the UN to keep its impartiality if it wishes to maintain its credibility towards the different parties to the conflict. The line should therefore be drawn at engaging in unethical covert and clandestine methods of information gathering.

INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A MAGIC TOOL: IT IS USELESS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR POLITICAL STRATEGY. GOOD ANALYSIS, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS IS NOT A SCIENCE: IT IS AN ART. MODESTY AND PATIENCE ARE KEY IN USING IT.

The third limitation is its (increasingly difficult) relationship with the host nation depending on the political context, on the degree of acceptance of the UN presence and of the peace/political process. The host-country government is very suspicious of the possibility of the UN mission of “spying” on it or infringing on its sovereignty. One has to say also – it is not political correct but it is a reality – that the presence of national staff in UN missions is, indeed, an asset for better understanding the local environment but can also be an issue in sharing information within the mission.

THE NEEDS

Intelligence, in general, is the result of information analysis as well as a capacity to analyze information, along with a capacity to protect it. Fundamentally, we think that what is really needed is for the UN to improve its analytical capabilities in all peace operations, and at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical. This is the reason why we conceived “UN intelligence” as first and foremost a “multidimensional situational analysis”. That analysis is indeed targeted for a specific audience, within a particular decision-making process and is not accessible to everyone. For intelligence to be effective it requires process and structures that favor common assessment, information sharing and integration across the civilian, the police and the military components; it needs to be governed by strict rules and procedures, tasking and guidance.
Improving information analysis can indeed help set priorities in a context where the Mission cannot be present everywhere and to make those priorities evolve over time and circumstances. These improvements in information gathering and analysis must all be geared towards decision-making, to allow decision-makers to make better-informed decisions in order to effective response to the situation. Information analysis is needed to drive practical decisions of the senior mission leadership. They also need to improve the planning process as well as the chain of command and control.

Last but not least, improved “UN intelligence” should serve the larger objective of ensuring the safety and security of the UN personnel and the local populations, and to contribute to obtaining a long-term political solution to the country in crisis.

Intelligence or multidimensional situational analysis is a tool that needs expertise and training, and that has a cost. Strong information gathering and analysis requires adequate training and human resources, as well as the need to increase or strengthen institutional memory of Missions. Training is particularly important when it comes to senior mission leadership; they have to be educated to understand what assets are at their disposal and then request information and provide feedback. They need to use intelligence as a tool in their everyday work with the following understandings:

- It is best being developed in a work environment that is not siloed, where you confront ideas, analysis and information.
- It requires trust to function and this is lacking currently throughout the chain of command.
- Intelligence is not a magic tool: it is useless in the absence of a clear political strategy. Good analysis, multidimensional situational analysis is not a science: it is an art. Modesty and patience are key in using it.
- But the benefits of good intelligence could be dramatic for the UN and its peace operations. It is worth the investment of all member states.

You can download the full report “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine” here. This report has been written with Olga Abilova from IPI and with the support of the Training for Peace program at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS A COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY AND NOT A CAMPSITE

Hannah Dönges

SOUTH SUDAN, THIS NEWEST MEMBER OF THE UN WAS BEQUEATHED A LONG HISTORY OF INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE WITH LIMITED NATIONAL CAPACITY TO MANAGE ITS OWN SECURITY OR PROTECT ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM HARM.

In Bentiu and other protection of civilian sites in South Sudan, the UN peacekeeping mission performs all the functions of a state within a state. With the help of humanitarian partners, it feeds, protects, and organizes those displaced by a bitter internal conflict into what are small towns. At this UNMISS PoC site, there are 98,000 internally displaced people, the biggest fraction of the estimated 170,000 IDPs living in similar sites across South Sudan in June 2016. It is a huge challenge and heavy responsibility for UN peacekeeping that stretches its traditional principles and practices.
At the sites I visited in May and June, the UNMISS peacekeeping forces are supposed to provide security from external threats, while within the fences UNPOL maintains the internal security of the camp. But of those needing protection only a fraction have made inside these boundaries and many vulnerable citizens remain outside these sprawling tent cities.

Protecting civilians is not just the responsibility of the UN mission's uniformed forces. It is a job shared with many with the mission and partners from the humanitarian community. It should, of course, be first and foremost the government’s responsibility. But how did the UN mission come to be in such a position? What are the challenges on the ground when protecting civilians? Who shares in the responsibility for this mandate that the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations identified as a core responsibility for the for UN peace operations? How can constructive collaboration among organizations with a common goal of protection be enhanced?

**RECURRING CONFLICTS**

South Sudan’s government failed soon after independence when civil war broke out. The deliberate targeting of civilians took drastic forms after a fight in the military barracks in Juba between soldiers of two of the main ethnicities in December 2013. This mirrored an earlier split in the political leadership in July 2013 and fighting broke out between the Dinka of President Salva Kiir and the Nuer of ousted Vice President Riak Maachar. With government forces, the SPLA, being one of the main conflict parties, this social contract broke down. On an unprecedented scale, people from both ethnic groups fled to UN peacekeeping bases to find shelter from the violence that spiraled out of control across the country.

Decades of armed conflict preceded South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011. Historically existing local conflict dynamics lured in the background of the struggle for independence. This newest member of the UN was bequeathed a long history of inter-communal violence with limited national capacity to manage its own security or protect its civilian population from harm.

Even after it formally broke away from the north, there has been persistent fighting among armed groups, sometimes tribes and clans – often related to cattle rustling - and government forces in several parts of the country. Power struggles and ethicized conflict dynamics became very visible when President Kiir ousted part of its cabinet as well as his Vice President Machar in July 2013. After fighting broke out in Juba following a dispute within the presidential guard, the country has faced its third civil war since December 2013.

It remains to be seen whether the ongoing ‘IGAD-PLUS peace process’ will be create sustainable results. President Kiir’s 28-state-decree contradicts the process’ postulations and amplifies ethnic rivalries over land and resources, and may likely lead to renewed intense fighting in Upper Nile, particularly around Malakal.

Years of international humanitarian and political intervention in the region have given South Sudan a high international profile. This has meant the post-independence violence, which has had a surprising intensity and cruelty that was unmatched in the previous civil wars (according to reports in particular in its use of gender based and sexual violence), has not been ignored by media and politicians. Still, any actual armed violence impact assessment remains astonishingly incomplete, as far as to say “in South Sudan, no one is even counting the dead.” Many areas have not been accessed or monitored at all when fighting took place, and access still remains limited – as the result of security restrictions, small staff numbers, and geographical inaccessible by any other means than limited air assets due to insurmountable road conditions during the rainy season (about six months per year).
But while a sustained struggle for self-determination is different from the ongoing internecine fight, Alex de Waal has argued that both conflict and crisis have retained basic structures across time. These were not sufficiently addressed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and have been to different degrees overshadowed historical rivalries and conflict cleavages. The different conflict dynamics share that impunity and a lack of accountability for committing as well as failing to halt human rights abuses have fueled it. It seems that the “intractable culture of impunity” is even reflected throughout the country. Understanding reoccurring patterns is crucial to the developing current responses, both concerning specific local dynamics as well as the development of a rule of law system in conjunction with traditional court practices.

The UN’s own human rights reports have highlighted the immense difficulties and scale of atrocities faced by the South Sudanese population (even if most likely only scratching the surface as bags of bones of unidentified people are still being found) as well as actors engaged in the protection of persons and livelihoods. The conflict between government and opposition forces has reached new levels of violence and ethnicization and ethnic targeting has reached levels that reach far beyond the characteristics of previous fighting. “Where you would see one or two tukuls burned during cattle rustling, we only now saw entire villages being burned down in once instance,” one ICRC staff member told me. Human Rights Watch has said “all conflict we see is ethnicized.” Armed groups have long recruited along ethnic lines in South Sudan, but UNMISS fears a “Balkanization” across the country.

**A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY**

Without planning or foreseeing the scale nor timeline, the UN mission suddenly found itself in the business of protecting civilians on its own bases in unprecedented numbers. This security crisis created a both a new peacekeeping and humanitarian challenge for which the UN Security Council had not provided a mandate. At PoC sites, aid workers and peacekeepers now had to work closely together within UN bases to manage an emergency response.

The way they did this was different at each site. International actors had often diverging and, at times contradictory, understandings of what should be done. At some sites, they cooperated closely. At others, they regarded coordinating their efforts as only a necessity for security. For this reason, the experience of UNMISS is an interesting case study about the wider implications that PoC mandates have for future of UN peacekeeping as well as civil-military cooperation.

In UNMISS, the implementation of PoC mandate collided with the complex realities of the conflict. These challenged the traditional principles of peacekeeping with its emphasis on consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and the defense of the mandate. The mission was caught in the middle of a difficult peace process between two main armed rivals, one of whom was the host government.

While the mission’s mandate may seem clear and strong (under Chapter VII) when issued in New York, the contradictions were self-evident on the ground. **UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014)** tasked UNMISS to protecting civilians, monitor and investigate human rights, create conditions to deliver humanitarian assistance, and support the implementation of a cessation of hostilities agreement. With the government being often the cause of threat, source of abuse, and creator of the humanitarian crisis, the mandate has put it add odds with the host, created tension, and often hostility to the mission.
Each of the four POC site locations I visited have their own composition and dynamic, and are in this aspect similar to refugee camps. They differ from refugee and IDP camps to the extent that they are built on UNMISS premises. The peacekeeping operation is the de-facto “landlord,” making decisions about its premises also affecting the humanitarian activities, and their main goal is the physical protection (and thus closely related to the force component of peacekeeping operation).

The protection dynamics differ from site to site, and have changed across time. I have visited Bentiu, Malakal, Bor as well as UN House in Juba. Most visibly in Malakal, the population within the POC site changed depending on who held the town at the time. Ethnic tensions exist within these sites and may lead to tensions as well as fighting. In Bentiu, Bor, and UN House in Juba, the majority of the people living on the sites are Nuer, but at times internal tensions lead to violence. A small-sized city a gang was formed at the POC site in UN House; in Bentiu families and clans from the same ethnic group sometimes fight each other. It is the job of the small number of UNPOL at each site to police these micro-conflicts, and they often call on help of the Formed Police Units as well as the military when they turn violent.

The sites each have unique arrangements for civil-military coordination depending on who is running them and posted there. In each location, UN civilian, military, and police lived and worked alongside humanitarian partners. They not only protected the IDPs from the threat of physical violence, but also provided them with food, water, and basic medical care, although without complying with humanitarian sphere standards. But cooperation works more due to personalities rather than systems. It is well known that contingent rotation and staff turnover can impact the effectiveness of protection. There are synergies, but also tensions in the relationships between the UN and NGOs at the sites. Different mentalities, principles and mandates of a spectrum of humanitarian organizations on the one hand and the big peacekeeping operation on the other hand, are not always well understood and lead to (in parts natural and important) tensions.

Organizations outside of the UN family, like Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), emphasize and reiterate their independence and humanitarian principles as well as trying to maintain distance from all “combatant parties,” including UNMISS. But the difficult security situation – as well as needs within the POC sites - has at times still seen the same NGOs seek help from UN forces to evacuate them, store supplies, or provide them with space for their own facilities on UNMISS premises, within the POC site boundaries, and under the protection by UNMISS battalions.

In Bentiu and Malakal, MSF is part of the wider “humanitarian” hub behind the first line of UNMISS protection. The ICRC also encourages UNMISS to conduct long-range patrols in areas where is not present or the civilian population caught in crossfire between warring parties. This makes understanding the conflict dynamics – as well as a nuanced understanding of civil-military relations between a variety of international and national actors - in South Sudan an important pre-requisite to finding ways of protecting civilians in a concerted effort.
AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE

The phrase “POC site” has now entered the UN peacekeeping lexicon. It was first created in the field in UNMISS as informal term to refer to its facilities, where internally displaced persons (IDPs) sought refuge. The name was later formalized in May 2014 in UNSC Resolution 2155 when it mandated the mission. That civilians seek shelter at UN bases is not a new phenomenon. Civilians have done this before; most well known is in Rwanda in 1994, but also in the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999. UNMISS itself did have contingency plans for providing physical security to a couple of hundred civilians, but only up to 72 hours.

No one foresaw the scale of the crisis that would peak in mid-2015 with almost 200,000 IDPs living at these sites. This huge presence triggered new discussions about the state – and limitations - of POC within South Sudan, the future of such mandates, as well as need for better and closer cooperation between peacekeepers and humanitarians and the need for policy guidelines and “exit strategy” as well as a balance of living conditions within and outside the sites. In improvising, the UN Security Council was been pushed by events into the humanitarian business without a serious discussion about the long-term implications for this expansion of its role.

While by UN standards UNMISS is a large mission with is 12,523 uniformed personnel and a $1,085,769,200 annual budget, the scale of crisis within South Sudan is outsized and remains volatile. It has been described as human rights as well as a humanitarian disaster. There are no comprehensive or up-to-date figures on the scale of it. A widely cited figure says that at least 50,000 people have been killed, 2.2 million displaced, and as many as 3.9 million pushed to the brink of famine.

It is unclear how long UNMISS must – and is able – to sustain its POC sites to protect what has been estimated to be only 10 per cent of the IDPs in South Sudan. It all combines to create a natural focus on the UN’s effectiveness in protecting of the civilian population and preventing human rights abuses.

LIMITATIONS OF THE PEACEKEEPING POC IN SOUTH SUDAN

Civilians in South Sudan have been in a precarious position for some time. Almost five years ago, Security Council Resolution 1996 included a strong protection of civilians mandate, which reflected that POC was already an important issues in UN peacekeeping. Despite this, the role of POC in relation to other parts of the mission was disputed within the mission, even before civil war onset.

Prior to this 2011 mandate, the challenges of implementing POC were well known. In 2009, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) jointly commissioned the study Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. On the first pages of the ‘Bible of POC’, it noted the ‘chain of events to support the protection of civilians – from the earliest planning phases, to Security Council mandates, to the implementation of missions in the field – is broken.’ The bluntness of this critique – and the openness about shortcomings - spurred internal and cross-institutional learning processes beyond ad hoc cooperation when faced with immediate crises.
As with other norms of protection, the host state holds the primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens. The situation changes when the state as armed actor(s) targets its own population or views parts of its citizens as opponents. When the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) became main party to the conflict, the UNMISS mandate had to shift and protection of civilians became its most prominent part. All forms of capacity building, including the training of police, were suspended.

The mission’s mandate now includes four key tasks: POC, human rights monitoring and investigation, creating conditions for delivering humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. The Security Council mandate on “protection of civilians” has often been called the “impossible mandate” – a peacekeeping operation cannot substitute state and society structures that have been eroded through decades of armed conflict, and now often leading to the repeated question: “How much deeper do we have to go to reach rock bottom?” When the life of a cow is more protected than that of a woman or a man, in a place where human life is worth so little, the spectrum of protection actors struggle with where to start, and priority areas are often those that are at least possible to access – logistically and for security reasons.

This line chart shows the increase in the number of uniformed personnel deployed (red line) and unauthorized levels of uniformed personnel (blue line) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from its inception (August 2011) to present.
A SPECTRUM OF PROTECTION ACTORS

Within South Sudan, there is a vast spectrum of international organizations engaged in their own interpretations of protection – reaching from the civil-military actor UNMISS, over a wide array of UN agencies and funds operating under humanitarian principles, to humanitarian organizations outside of the UN system with a pronounced distinct approach like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

UNMISS’ operational concept on POC includes three pillars. First, the protection through political process; second, providing protection from physical violence; and third, establishing a protective environment. Within UNMISS, protection of civilians’ advisory section not operational but delivers support and policy guidance to other sections. The Relief, Reintegration and Protection section (RRP) is the “humanitarian interface” of the mission and coordinates with the different humanitarians within the POC site, and may at times be closest to the role of a POC advisory unit if there is no permanent representative of the POC section itself. From the mission’s perspective, all contact should be directed towards RRP first. However, at times humanitarians may directly communicate with other sections, for example UNPOL in cases of urgent security incidents on a POC site.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the coordinating body. OCHA coordinates need assessments and humanitarian activities on the ground. It is also the body most prominently consulted for the development of peacekeeping mandates in New York. UNHCR is the coordinator of the protection cluster, which humanitarians as well as UNMISS (mostly represented by RRP) attend. With partners, for example the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) UNHCR delivers trainings on protection, with an emphasis on developing protection oriented mindsets that lead to “protection mainstreaming” and taking into account what impacts small and big actions may have on the safety of the populations. The ICRC’s protection of the civilian population (PCP) approach is built on engaging in “protection” dialogue with the armed actors (here also including UNMISS) to promote the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Further (and here sometimes collaborating with UNICEF in particular) the ICRC engages in family tracing and reunification.

Civilian protection by UN peacekeeping has been criticized as doctrinally deficient because its implementation remains ambiguous at the operational level. It has been criticized for encompassing too many (albeit important) concepts rather than focusing on a set of precise and clear-cut tasks and achievable goals for which actual on-the-ground capacities exist.

The criticism towards POC in peacekeeping does not only concern its perceived doctrinal “inefficiency,” but also that it includes the use of force as part of protection activities, making it a “combatant entity.” On a tactical level, this is further coupled by troop contributing countries’ ‘diverging abilities’ – as well as willingness – to actively engage in protection. The ability – and mandate – to use force is a unique feature that UN peacekeeping brings to the protection arena, but it has its limits. The mission’s ability to muster and apply armed force is very weak and restrictive tool that works well in very few circumstances. As the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations or HIPPO report noted, the natural ‘difficulties of mandate implementation increase exponentially when there is little or no peace to keep.’

The ICRC and MSF have traditionally placed a strong emphasis on the importance of maintaining humanitarian space as well as the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. This distinction and differentiation remains important. “We are stronger overall, by not being visibly or publicly being associated with each other,” one ICRC staff member told me. In the
middle between them and peacekeepers stand the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UN agencies are more obligated to work closer with governments.

Scattered across the spectrum are a variety of NGOs at POC sites engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection work such as the prevention of gender based violence. Their knowledge and inclusion in formulation of strategies of these external actors is most crucial in developing protection practices and supporting communities' own coping mechanisms. The HIPPO report also recommends that peacekeeping missions 'work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment' re-emphasizing the third pillar of the Operational Concept on POC.

It is apparent that UN peace operations do not, cannot, and also do not wish to “own” the concept of protection. The 2009 joint study stressed this was a joint responsibility. A UN mission's strength is that it can bring its multi-dimensional response with civilian, military and police skills and assets to any operational arena where others actors are present, including the host state, UN agencies, and NGOs, but it can be slow to adapt to change.

**IN SOUTH SUDAN, THE UN’S PEACE OPERATION DOES NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS A TASK SHARED BY THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN THE FIELD. POC SITES AS MICRO COSMS FOR THIS COLLABORATIVE EFFORT CONSTITUTE CHALLENGES BUT ALSO SPACES TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER**

The slow process of recruiting additional uniformed contingents is well known, and its fault for this lies in the general way peacekeeping operations are deployed. The situation in Unity State has considerably improved since fighting peaked over the course of 2014 up until the second half of 2015. The peacekeeping operation, at that point, was only one battalion strong and UNMISS staff emphasized that “it would have made a difference if (the Ghanaian Battalion) had arrived earlier.” The slow relocation/new request for troops have led to gaps, but these gaps are even more structural also among existing force and UNPOL levels. If well planned and coordinated, it can do this in a near simultaneous way that amplifies the limited personnel and assets it may have in any one location.

With the escalation of violence in late 2013 the UNMISS mandate evolved and humanitarian agencies adapted their strategies. Outside of the UN mission, with its centralized budgeting and complex recruitment procedures, organizations like the ICRC were able to rapidly refocus their efforts. Before the conflict, it had focused on livelihood assistance, protection and capacity building. For the ICRC, the “protection dialogue” refers to the promotion of knowledge and respect for international law. To do this, it trained and disseminated on IHL to members of the armed forces, armed groups and other weapon bearers. With the outbreak of violence in December 2013, the delegation changed tack and scaled up its emergency response. It began airdropping food and relief items to remote parts of the country as well as providing emergency medical services.
The opening of its gates to people fleeing from killings across the country is described by many as the most noticeable success of UNMISS. By doing so, the mission managed to prevent the experience of the genocide in Rwanda when UN peacekeepers were accused of standing by in the face of genocide. The ad hoc and timely decision of the SRSG as well as her management team in Juba, state coordinators, their staff and force members set a precedent that helped reshape the mission's mandate. However, the scale and sheer endurance of the POC sites have also caught the mission by surprise and been exemplary for its (and New York's) helplessness in finding long-term solutions.

POC sites have been criticized as tying down peacekeeping personnel. By the estimate of one UNMISS staff member between two thirds and three quarters of the mission's soldiers and police are committed to protecting the sites from external threats as well as maintaining the camp's internal security. This is to the detriment of establishing a presence throughout the country through long-range patrols. Inside the mission, views are conflicted as some worry that the sites neither provide a long-term solution nor constitute effective peacekeeping. Most notable, with a finally subsiding conflict in Southern Unity (where some of the most brutal and widespread cases of sexual violence had been reported) UNMISS opened a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) in Leer, partly responding to advocacy by humanitarian organizations within the UN family.

Attacks on the POC have only heightened these concerns. The most recent assault on the Malakal POC site in February 2016 as well as on Bentiu POC and Bor POC in Jonglei in April 2014 called into question not only the ability of UNMISS to fulfill its protection mandate beyond its own gates, but also within them. The attacks eroded respect for UN peacekeeping and the integrity of the mission's mandate, and have led to a loss of trust into the mission's capabilities on part of the IDPs on the site despite the formulation of new contingency plans. Questions have been asked whether the attacks could have been prevented through conflict mediation, better camp management, or other interventions by civilian and police personnel as well as effective protection from external intrusions by UN force.

Each of the POC sites reflects the surrounding conflict dynamics of the people fleeing from the groups or forces targeting them. With this divide, the POC sites have often been blamed by parties to the conflict for being partial towards the other side. But given the sites are filled with the population targeted by those who controls the surrounding territory, such accusation of partiality need to be treated carefully. The population of the Malakal POC has switched between different groups many times, depending on whether the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) or the SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A–IO) were in control of the nearby provincial town in Upper Nile state. The town switched hands twelve times and after the almost complete destruction of the city, all three main ethnic groups – Shilluk, Nuer and Dinka – lived inside the POC site. According to several sources, fighting has at many times been averted due to well-managed coordination between humanitarians and peacekeepers under inclusive leadership of a former state coordinator. Under a different leadership and style, the February 2016 events escalated and the Dinka population fled the base.

UNPOL has the primary responsibility for ensuring security and safety on the sites, which also became its primary activity with the stop of capacity building under the new mandate. UNPOL, however is unarmed, and not equipped for more robust crowd control, unless it calls on Formed Police Units (FPUs). If any firearms are involved in fighting on site (some reports show their prevalence on the sites), the military is called directly.
This means that simply ensuring the external (force's responsibility) and internal security – of POC sites that well have the structure of a small town or in the case of Bentiu, a city - binds the manpower of the UN in unprecedented forms. They limit mobile capacities of the forces and constitute hotspots for own conflict dynamics which may be abused and fostered by conflict parties. Thus, the POC sites may constitute one of the biggest successes of UNMISS but also one of the biggest threats to the role UN peacekeeping wants to play. Solutions Working Groups have been established to discuss the future of the sites. They include UNMISS (RRP as well as POC advisors) as well as humanitarians.

The physical protection of the sites does not only stand and fall with the troop numbers, but also with the diverging quality of the troops sent, trained and equipped by troop contributing countries (TCCs). Frustration about non-action of troops to killings in direct proximity to their watchtowers, allowing access to armed soldiers to the UN House have led to actual calls of naming and shaming certain TCCs.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

POC is not a one-size-fits-all concept. It is used by a variety of actors as an umbrella for several practices and different ways of deploying civilians and military forces in a conflict area. In South Sudan, the UN's peace operation does not have a monopoly on this responsibility. It is a task shared by the UN and other actors in the field. While concepts and practices among the organizations on the peacekeeping and humanitarian spectrum diverge, in few or no other conflicts do humanitarians and peacekeepers cooperate as closely as this and on a large scale as they do in South Sudan. Also on a subnational level, POC sites need to be understood each as their own challenging environment rather than as a group. The projection of force as well as delivery of humanitarian assistance outside of the POC sites in Unity in the “Beyond Bentiu” strategy has yielded positive results and lessons learned in terms of referring to local conflict analysis in surveys and in particular women’s groups involvement should be seen as best practices for analysis but should not lead to generalizations on solutions for inherently different settings.

Peace operations need to better communicate within and without about what its POC mandate and capabilities are and are not. Within UNMISS, the POC mandate is differently understood by various contingents and among individuals. Since 2011, much has been done to create a “coherent strategy and operational guidelines.” Dialogues with local populations about the meaning of the mandate have been initiated, but tensions within the peace operation and with humanitarian partners highlight the need for good communication and finding agreement on what action to take. In settings, where communication is open and transparent –particularly depending on the leadership and often times on the individuals constituting the interface between the different organizations – relationships have been better than in settings where decisions and decision making procedures are not explained. The crisis is not over for UNMISS. It has learnt throughout its deployment, but the HIPPO report shows that the protection of civilians is still a contested concept. A common language to describe the responsibilities for protection and how to implement these is still a work in progress.
UNMISS’ limitations as well as learning processes should contribute to future missions. UNMISS has worked hard at improving its implementation of protection practices. In many ways, it has performed admirably on the backdrop dire conditions and its limited strength restricted mobility in a large country with virtually no road network. POC sites limit and prevent mass atrocities. However, humanitarian and protection disasters such as the attack on the POC site in Malakal tragically show protection by international actors gone wrong. POC mandates can distort expectations for security and by absorbing a mission’s resources in static locations it restricts the deployment of its forces. It is a weakness that is exploited by parties to a conflict. It frustrates peacekeepers deployed and challenges the assumptions of those who mandate them. In many ways, the dependency on the host state reflects the peacekeeping set-up globally and should lead to broader engagement with the question which role UN peacekeeping is most suited to play in the broader protection framework.

POC needs to be understood as a collaborative strategy and not a campsite. POC sites were an UNMISS innovation, but a reactive one. Rather than being understood as a defensive “band aid” applied by the military or police component of a UN mission more needs to be done to articulate a positive political strategy for POC. The deployment of POC advisors on site has led to phrasing constructive questions and raising awareness - sometimes contested – reflecting a protection oriented mindset. More needs to be done to find a way forward that involves a partnership with the UN Security Council, the peacekeepers it mandates, the humanitarians with whom they work side-by-side with, and the local communities they all intend to serve. The exertion of political pressure on the main conflict parties - in conjunction with South Sudan’s neighbors – is crucial so that these efforts do not fizzle out in vacuum.

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LA PROFESSIONNALISATION DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DES NATIONS UNIES
OU LE TRAVAIL DE SISYPHE

Alexandra Novosseloff

CETTE PROFESSIONNALISATION DES STRUCTURES ÉTAIT INDISPENSABLE POUR UNE ORGANISATION QUI
EST PROGRESSIVEMENT DEVENUE LE PREMIER DÉPLOYEUR DE TROUPES AU MONDE, DE PERSONNELS
DÉPLOYÉS DANS DES ENVIRONNEMENTS DE PLUS EN PLUS DANGEREUX, OÙ LE BRICOLAGE ET LE MANQUE
D’EXPERTISE MILITIALE ONT UN IMPACT DIRECT SUR LA VIE DES GENS DÉPLOYÉS

Les critiques à l’égard du maintien de la paix des Nations Unies, de ses Casques bleus, sont nombreuses et font souvent, plus
que ses succès, les gros titres de la presse nationale ou internationale ; le maintien de la paix subit les railleries d’opinions
publiques, de classes politiques et de militaires qui comprennent mal comment fonctionnent les Nations Unies, où se situent,
dans cette structure, l’ONU, les responsabilités des uns et des autres.

Chaque fois qu’une nouvelle crise surgit dans un pays où ils sont déployés, souvent en dernier recours faute d’autres candidats,
et qu’ils ont du mal à y faire face, avec leurs moyens toujours limités, le ton des uns et des autres à leur égard oscille alors
souvent entre la moquerie et la condescendance. Et cette image a la vie dure. 20 ans après, les commentateurs de tous poils parlent encore des échecs des Casques bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, en Somalie et au Rwanda. Mais cela fait aujourd'hui plus de 20 ans : deux décennies que l’ONU a utilisé pour faire son autocritique dans plusieurs rapports majeurs (rapport sur Srebrenica, rapport sur le Rwanda et rapport Brahimi, HIPPO). D’ailleurs, les véritables responsables de ces échecs ne sont souvent pas ceux auxquels on pense de prime abord. Ces opérations sont des actions collectives et si échec il y a, il ne peut alors qu’être collectif, celui des donneurs d’ordre comme celui des contributeurs de tous ordres. De plus, l’ONU est la seule organisation de sécurité où ceux qui décident ne sont pas les mêmes que ceux qui contribuent et que ceux qui financent. Cette dilution des responsabilités amène souvent à des dérives que les Casques bleus ne peuvent que tenter de contenir.

Il n’en reste pas moins que le maintien de la paix de 2016 ne ressemble plus guère à celui des années 90. Il s’est affirmé, structuré et professionnalisé. Beaucoup reste encore à faire (notamment dans la qualité du recrutement des personnels, la formation et l’organisation du soutien des opérations), mais il s’est amélioré dans ses structures et dans ses procédures. Ceci est mal connu, surtout par les plus critiques. Il est vrai que l’ONU a souvent péché par l’absence de stratégie de communication offensive qui combatte les idées reçues. Ceci est bien dommage dans un contexte où l’ONU a une véritable valeur ajoutée dans la gestion des conflits par son approche (multidimensionnelle et politico-militaire où le politique guide toujours le militaire).

UNE AMÉLIORATION DES STRUCTURES

Le Département des opérations de maintien de la paix (DOMP) est une jeune organisation de 24 ans qui a émergé du Département des Affaires politiques spéciales en charge de ces opérations depuis 1956. Au moment de leur augmentation exponentielle au début des années 90, le Secrétaire général a très vite compris qu’il ne pourrait suivre la conduite de ses opérations en bricolant ici et là, en sous-effectif constant et sans réelle expertise militaire. Il a donc, en la personne de Boutros Boutros-Ghali, entamé une « remise à niveau » progressive de ses structures en charge du suivi des opérations, avec les moyens (notamment financiers) qu’ont bien voulu lui accorder les Etats membres. En 1993, le DOMP ne comprenait que 46 personnes ; il en comprend aujourd’hui environ 450, avec à ses côtés, depuis 2007, un Département de l’appui aux missions (DAM), aux effectifs similaires, en charge de toute la logistique des opérations. Ces réformes se sont faites par à-coups, après de multiples crises donnant lieu à de nombreux rapports, souvent avec la réticence de certains Etats. On peut le déplorer, mais la réalité est que toute réforme au sein d’une organisation intergouvernementale de 193 Etats membres ne peut qu’être incrémentale.

Dans les années 90, la professionnalisation passe par la création d’une série de nouvelles structures : un Centre de situation de 20 personnes, fonctionnant 24 heures sur 24 qui doit recueillir les informations provenant des différentes missions et pouvoir présenter à tout moment la situation existant sur les théâtres d’opération (celui-ci sera intégré en 2013 au Centre d’opérations et de crises de l’ONU) ; une équipe de gestion des forces en attente (Standby Forces Management Team) qui s’est transformée en 2016 en une unité pour la génération de force stratégique et la planification des capacités (Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell) ; une Unité des leçons apprises (devenue Unité des pratique optimales en 2010). Le Bureau du conseiller militaire est renforcé grâce notamment à la mise à disposition de militaires par leurs Etats (pratique à laquelle il sera mis fin en 1999) et devient une Division militaire puis un Bureau des Affaires militaires.

Dans les années 2000, un autre train de réformes est engagé, notamment suite aux recommandations du rapport Brahimi. Les effectifs du DOMP sont à nouveau augmentés (de 93 personnes) ; des cellules politico-militaires d’analyse de l’information
(JMAC) voient le jour sur le terrain à partir de 2004 ; des réseaux de communication et d'information standardisés sont développés ; le Bureau des Affaires militaires est renforcé (planification, missions en cours, génération de forces, formation et évaluation) et comprend depuis une centaine d'officiers qui couvrent pour les opérations de l'ONU les compétences gérées dans l'OTAN par Shape, SACT (Commandant suprême allié Transformation) et l'Etat-major militaire international (avec plus de 2 000 personnes !) ; un Bureau chargé des institutions de sécurité et de l'état de droit est créé en 2007 pour prendre en compte les aspects transversaux des crises ; une Division de police est créée puis renforcée ; le poste d'une sorte d'Inspecteur général des personnels en uniforme (Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships) a été mis en place en 2011 ; un Bureau en charge de la formation, de la doctrine et de l'élaboration de directives est créé ; une base de stocks en réserve est mise sur pied au sein de la base logistique des Nations Unies de Brindisi, afin d'accroître le volume et la disponibilité d'équipements et de matériels stockés, et de limiter alors les délais qu'occasionne la passation de contrats de fournitures lors du lancement de chaque opération.

UNE PROFESSIONNALISATION DES MANIÈRES DE TRAVAILLER

Cette professionnalisation des structures était indispensable pour une organisation qui est progressivement devenue le premier déployeur de troupes au monde, de personnels déployés dans des environnements de plus en plus dangereux, où le bricolage et le manque d'expertise militaire ont un impact direct sur la vie des gens déployés. Au-delà des structures, il fallait donc améliorer les procédures et les manières de travailler entre toutes les composantes d'une mission. Le DOMP, et en particulier le Bureau des affaires militaires, ont ainsi conduit un travail sans précédent d'amélioration des standards et d'élaboration d'une série de documents de doctrine et de lignes directrices permettant de mieux encadrer les manières de travailler et de donner du sens à ces différentes activités.

LES STRUCTURES DU SECRÉTARIAT ONT AINSI FAIT LEUR PART DU TRAVAIL VERS UNE PLUS GRANDE PROFESSIONNALISATION DE LA PRATIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ET UNE TENTATIVE D'INTEROPÉRATIONNALISATION DES UNITÉS MISES À DISPOSITION PAR LES ÉTATS.

En 2008, le DOMP publie pour la première fois une « Doctrine fondamentale » (Capstone Doctrine) pour asseoir la spécificité comme les limites d'une pratique qui s'est développée au fil des opérations et mieux définir les conditions de leur succès. Elle constitue un premier pas vers une compréhension commune de ces opérations, mais elle reste malheureusement méconnue faute de n'avoir pas été formellement endossée par l'ensemble des États membres. Elle existe pourtant et devrait être à la base de toutes les formations données dans le monde sur le maintien de la paix.

Cette doctrine a permis l'élaboration progressive d'un certain nombre de directives et de standards permettant de définir un langage commun entre le Secrétariat, les missions sur le terrain et les contributeurs de troupes. Ces standards militaires fondent aussi les processus de planification et d'expression des besoins. En 2014, une série de « manuels » a été rédigée, en coopération avec les États membres, pour standardiser les concepts d'emploi, les organisations, les capacités, l'entraînement et l'évaluation des différents types d'unités engagées dans les opérations de maintien de la paix : le génie, l'état-major de force,
la logistique, la composante maritime, la police militaire, les unités de reconnaissances, les unités fluviales, les forces spéciales, les unités de transport, l'aviation. En 2015-2016, le DOMP a élaboré une directive sur « l'amélioration de la performance et l'assurance d'une préparation opérationnelle » qui définit le cycle de préparation opérationnelle et d'emploi des contributions des États membres. Cette directive est complétée de deux documents permettant formellement l'évaluation opérationnelle des unités et états-majors déployés.

Ce corpus réglementaire fondamental oblige désormais les États membres à certifier, avant déploiement, que leurs unités soient véritablement opérationnelles. Cette certification doit se faire sur les compétences de base du soldat, sur la formation de pré-déploiement reçue et sur les questions de conduite et de discipline. L'évaluation opérationnelle exige que les commandants de force et les commandants de secteur inspectent les unités qui leur sont subordonnées et rapportent leurs évaluations au Secrétariat en précisant si ces critères ont bien été respectés par le contributateur de troupe. Les troupes de celui-ci peuvent être immédiatement rapatriées en cas de manquements – ceci a été fait pour la première fois à la MINUSCA à l'encontre des contingents ayant commis des abus sexuels. Le DOMP a rédigé un manuel d'état-major de force (Force Headquarters Handbook) comme référence pour la constitution de cet élément clé d'une opération. Enfin, un système de préparation des capacités était mis en place en remplacement du système des forces en attente. Ce système se veut plus dynamique au sens où il permet l'enregistrement des promesses de contribution des États membres en plusieurs étapes : la déclaration d'intention stratégique, une évaluation par le Bureau des Affaires militaires de l'état de préparation des unités, la négociation d'un accord d'entente (Memorandum of Understanding) générique pour l'engagement de telle ou telle unité à être déployée en 30, 60 ou 90 jours. Ceci doit permettre d'améliorer les échanges entre les besoins de l'Organisation et les capacités de ses États membres.

Le troisième chantier en cours est celui du développement capacitaire. Dans ce cadre, une structure de coordination générale a été mise en place (Uniformed Capability Steering Group) qui travaille directement pour les deux Secrétaires généraux adjoints. Dans ce cadre, huit projets ont été lancés pour répondre aux besoins capacitaux des Nations Unies dans les domaines suivants : la mobilité des troupes sur le théâtre d'opérations, la lutte anti-IED (Improvised Explosive Device, pour « engins explosifs improvisés »), les capacités en attente, le soutien médical, la planification, le renseignement et les menaces transversales. Cette définition doit permettre aux États de mieux calibrer leur contribution et ainsi d'améliorer la performance des contingents, non d'apporter des capacités qui ne seraient pas adaptées aux façons de travailler des Casques bleus. Un travail est également conduit par le DOMP pour réviser ses directives concernant les structures d'autorité, de commandement et de contrôle pour qu'elles soient mieux adaptées au contexte opérationnel actuel et mieux comprises par tous. Un autre travail est conduit sur l'amélioration des capacités de collecte et d'analyse de l'information (autrement dit, le renseignement), capacités indispensables pour assurer une meilleure protection de la mission et une meilleure connaissance de son environnement.

L'ensemble de ces documents fait l'objet d'un programme de mise en œuvre ambitieux avec des présentations organisées dans chaque région du monde. Des modules de formation sont également systématiquement développés et mis à disposition de l'ensemble des écoles de formation au maintien de la paix de par le monde. De fait, il ne tient qu'à l'ensemble des États membres, et tout particulièrement aux États contributeurs de troupes et de policiers, d'utiliser ces différents outils dans la formation de leurs personnels en uniforme et dans l'élaboration de leur contribution (planification, processus décisionnel, projection sur le terrain).
DE NOUVEAUX CHANTIERS À LANCER

Les structures du Secrétariat ont ainsi fait leur part du travail vers une plus grande professionnalisation de la pratique du maintien de la paix et une tentative d'interopérationnalisation des unités mises à disposition par les États. Une base de travail commune est désormais disponible : aux États de l'utiliser. C'est là le prochain chantier, le bon qualitatif que les États contributeurs doivent accomplir pour appliquer toutes ces mesures qui donnent une plus grande cohérence à ces opérations.

Les autres chantiers de réforme à venir concernent le soutien des opérations de maintien de la paix, les procédures de recrutement et une meilleure coordination interne. Le soutien d'opérations déployées dans des contextes sécuritaires fluides ne peut plus reposer sur des modes d'action reposant sur le temps long. Le déploiement d'une opération de maintien de la paix ne peut se faire sur le même mode que l'organisation d'une conférence internationale ou le fonctionnement des structures du Secrétariat. Il y a un tempo, des outils et des procédures qui doivent forcément être différents. De plus, le soutien d'opérations militaires ne peut plus exclusivement s'appuyer sur des procédures d'achat ou des contrats civils ; la professionnalisation du soutien de ces opérations doit sans doute passer par une certaine militarisation de ce soutien. Ces opérations doivent aussi pouvoir bénéficier de procédures de recrutement plus rapides que les 213 jours actuels. Ces recrutements doivent davantage privilégier l'expertise. Enfin, ces opérations doivent s'éloigner d'une approche en silos qui conduit chacun à rendre compte dans son domaine particulier mais qui empêche le partage d'information et la coordination indispensable à toute action multidimensionnelle. Pour cela, le leadership de chaque mission doit aussi pouvoir exercer une autorité plus grande sur les différents piliers de la mission dans le respect des spécificités de chacun.

Quels que soient leurs défauts, les opérations de maintien de la paix sont un outil à préserver ; il est le seul, le moins cher, dont la « communauté internationale » dispose pour gérer les crises de relative basse intensité. Avec plus de 126 000 hommes et femmes déployés de par le monde (si l'on compte les missions politiques spéciales), l'ONU est aujourd'hui le premier « déployeur » de troupes au monde pour un coût extrêmement bas (8,2 milliards de dollars, soit 0,5% des dépenses militaires mondiales). L'efficacité de ces opérations est l'affaire de tous, décideurs comme contributeurs. Il faut que les États qui composent ces opérations ou qui les décident les prennent plus au sérieux, politiquement et militairement.

Politiquement, une opération de maintien de la paix doit être soutenue, sur le long terme et presque au quotidien (pas simplement au moment du vote de la résolution la créant ou renouvelant son mandat), par les États (notamment ceux qui ont un poids sur les autorités locales en question) qui l'ont voulu et l'ont décidé. On ne peut que saluer à cet égard la volonté du DOMP de vouloir signer des « compacts » avec l'État-hôte et les autres institutions du système des Nations Unies (tel que l'avait recommandé le rapport du HIPPO) afin de guider la mise en œuvre des mandats des opérations de maintien de la paix et de rappeler à l'ensemble des parties leurs obligations. Une opération de maintien de la paix équivaut, en effet, à un contrat passé par un pays pour le remettre sur pied et le sortir de la crise : il reviendrait même au Conseil de sécurité de signer un tel « compact » et pas seulement au Secrétariat. Au-delà une série d'analyses devra sans doute aussi être menée sur les facteurs d'appropriation et de désappropriation des processus proposés par la « communauté internationale », comme sur les mesures additionnelles possibles pour faire plier certaines parties au conflit voire l'État-hôte (sanctions ciblées, pressions politiques, conditionnement de l'aide internationale).
Militairement, on ne peut que redire ici qu’une opération de maintien de la paix solide au plan militaire donne une plus grande autorité à son équipe dirigeante et permet de mieux faire avancer le processus politique qui la sous-tend. Ainsi, la robustesse politique accompagne la robustesse militaire et vice-versa. Et la robustesse militaire n’a rien à voir avec l’usage inconsideré des armes : elle est question de posture, d’adaptation et de connaissance de son environnement, et de volonté. Les deux dépendent de la définition d’une stratégie cohérente au service de l’application impartiale du mandat.

La professionnalisation du maintien de la paix est une œuvre de longue haleine, un travail de Sisyphe, en raison du nombre d’acteurs impliqués, mais elle progresse. Le maintien de la paix, comme toute autre entreprise collective, a besoin d’investissement, de sérieux et de volonté d’agir. Dans cette entreprise, les pays occidentaux doivent reprendre toute leur place en apportant des capacités rares (nouvelles technologies, moyens de collecte du renseignement) tout en respectant les spécificités de ces opérations pour éviter de créer un maintien de la paix à deux vitesses. La cohésion de ces opérations est certainement un autre défi de leur quotidien.

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India has a long history of UN peacekeeping and in recent months it has been the second largest contributor of troops. After last year’s reports and the recent round of debates on the future of peace operations and peacebuilding, the Global Peace Operations Review asked India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin for his perspective on the HIPPO report, protection of civilians (PoC), and peace operations in high-threat environments. Below is an edited transcript of the interview conducted by GPOR’s Jim Della-Giacoma and Alexandra Novosseloff.

Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): India’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has always been significant. With such a large stake in UN peace operations, what is your perspective on last year’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, the Secretary-General’s follow-up, and the debates it has spurred?
Syed Akbaruddin (SA): India has traditionally been a large contributor to peacekeeping operations. In fact, if you take the total number of troops that have been contributed by all countries, we, cumulatively have the largest numbers. In addition, in 1962, India almost lost 100 peacekeepers in a mission, which is the largest number of peacekeepers killed in one mission from one country ever.

When you look at the common themes in regards to peacekeeping operations these days, there are many that resonate with India. For example, PoC, there was no such concept 50 years ago, but there was an Indian Captain in the Congo who was awarded Indian’s highest award for paying the ultimate sacrifice in defense of civilians at that time. As far as we are concerned, we have a tradition of support for the UN and concepts inherent in peacekeeping operations, whether they are articulated or not.

We see peacekeeping operations essentially as a ‘band aid’ while other solutions are being worked on. We have seen over the years that peacekeeping has been looked at as an instrument that serves multiple purposes. We have witnessed over time that it has become a blunt instrument because it tries to do too many things. Instead of being focused and targeted, it is an all-purpose approach. We need to reassess if we are doing things the right way and if there are better ways to improve this to meet the challenges of peacekeeping.

JDG: One of the candidates for the next Secretary-General said recently that he would support the “next generation” of peacekeeping missions, which he defined as including robust peacekeeping and stabilization missions. You seem to suggest that peace operations have over-reached. In your opinion, is taking peacekeeping in direction going too far?

SA: When I arrived (in New York in early 2016) and went to the C34 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), the first thing that struck me was that the room was full of military personnel in uniform. If peacekeeping is, at its heart, a political tool, then something had changed in how it is operated (since my last posting in the 1990s). I do not have an issue with seeking advise from experts, but if we agree that peacekeeping is a political activity then we should look at those options and not look only at its “robust” nature or technology to help it meet its goal. Not that this is bad for peacekeeping, but we should not forget what the ultimate goal is. I feel that the change in the approach and focus of peacekeeping has resulted in the inherent goal being lost. Therefore, if you hold the premise of the primacy of politics as important, then we need to look at how we address this. The armed forces are one aspect, but we need to look at the other aspects too and give those the same amount of attention.

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): In a way, I agree with you that in many of those operations, the political goal has been lost. However, the newest emphasis on the military aspect comes also from the fact that in order to be politically robust and stable, you need to have an operation that is militarily strong and this has been a weakness of the UN for a long time. With the changing environment that peacekeeping operations are found in, don’t we need to give them more resources so they can operate in these new environments?

SA: It is certainly no one’s case that we should not use available means and technology. But look at the balance of these: if you have robust mandates regarding force then you need to have robust political mandates too. We do not see this but rather an over-stretch in the military aspects and a lack of follow up in the political aspects. We have now the Security Council virtually all throughout the year approving and extending mandates of peacekeeping operations, but look at what happens on the
ground? We do not see as much action in terms of the political aspects of peacekeeping operations. There is a gap between the theory and the practice. The military dimensions are easy to cater for—you need more troops, more technology etc. But the political aspects require more diligence, require more effort and skill. We do not see this being as much the focus. We need to ensure that attention is given to both the political and military aspects.

**JDG:** Did the Peacekeeping Summit last year exacerbate this problem by focusing on the Western “return” to peacekeeping operations and the use of technology?

**SA:** No, not at all. It was good because the summit encouraged more countries to provide troops to missions but more Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are not the full solution. When we look at TCCs, we do not see many of them being perceived as stakeholders regarding contributing inputs to mandate development. The TCCs are not given a serious stake in peacekeeping operations. No one takes their input seriously or asks them about mandates. Of course, some many not respond but there should be a platform to allow stakeholders to have the opportunity to provide inputs. This new system may still be coming and the Peacekeeping Summit did encourage a broader base of contributors, which will start a trend towards change. We just need to adjust the approach to have more input given to these TCCs.

This line chart shows India’s total contributions of uniformed personnel to UN missions since 1999 (top line), as well as the six missions to which India made its largest personnel contributions from January 1999 through March 2016.
AN: What you are talking about is to increase triangular cooperation, which involves improved cooperation between TCCs, the Secretariat and the Security Council. What would you regard as the best formula to encourage all these stakeholders to sit down in one room and really talk about how to implement a peace operation and discuss the daily challenges and difficulties that peacekeepers are facing on the ground?

SA: There have been some individual initiatives to look at this idea, but these do not address the problem. We have the challenge that rotating members of the Security Council want to leave their mark during their presidency and this does not result in an institutionalization of processes. We have had these discussions going back to the 1990s, where there were meetings between the TCCs, Secretariat and Security Council one day before a mandate was to be extended to discuss the development. This was not a serious effort to be inclusive and encourage change. In the past, there may be some instances where there may not have been adequate inputs given by those involved. But lack of adequate inputs in the beginning is no justification for not utilizing adequate communication channels. I do not have a set idea but I think before the mandate is expanded or changed, it would be useful to have all inputs before the report of the Secretary-General or the resolution is drafted. There must be adequate time indicated for this. There is no obligation for all the contributions to be accepted, but a process of providing input should be permitted. This would serve the UN well. If you are looking at a longer-term architecture, then these changes should be initiated. At the start, there may be little input, but over time a habit will develop of giving input and the UN should encourage this now to start a longer term trend.

THE ABOVE CHART SHOWS THE TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNIFORMED PERSONNEL, TO UN MISSIONS, MADE BY THE TOP FIVE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES – IN ABSOLUTE TERMS AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE COMBINED CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TOP FIVE.
JDG: The HIPPO report made the case for a “spectrum of peace operations”. In the coming years, we will see a number of peacekeeping operations transitions to other kinds of missions. How do you see operationalizing such transitions?

SA: In theory, everyone agrees that peace is a spectrum and recently the General Assembly and Security Council passed the Peacebuilding resolution agreeing it is not only in post-conflict that peacebuilding should be a focus but that it can be used prior to the conflict, during, and after. But when we compare the budgetary requests for peacebuilding, even 1 per cent of what is being given to peacekeeping was not accepted. How do we expect to do all of this with not even 1 per cent of the budget, perhaps $80 million? Several countries feel that such requests should go through extra-budgetary channels. Other member states see peacebuilding as a good way to protect or restore institutions before you even need peacekeeping. If peacebuilding is so important, then why not commit at least 1 per cent to such initiatives? There is a disconnect between what is being said and what is being done. If you claim the whole spectrum is important, then you need to put equal resources behind this.

JDG: What is your sense on how we should be assessing the effectiveness of peace operations and their mandates?

SA: First of all, we can't have this mandate renewal with numbers as the basic notion. I do not see any effort of working down the continuum of peace and security. There are peacekeeping operations that have been going on for 20 years plus and with no effort being made to look at how they are addressing the needs they were set up for or working in different ways. We need to seriously look at the politics of these missions. There is a huge amount that needs to be done after the mandate is developed and I am not sure how much effort member states put in this. Many feel their job is done but if solutions needs to be arrived at there needs to be more interest for member states to push these changes to address issues on the ground.

WE SEE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ESSENTIALLY AS A ‘BAND AID’ WHILE OTHER SOLUTIONS ARE BEING WORKED ON. WE HAVE SEEN OVER THE YEARS THAT PEACEKEEPING HAS BEEN LOOKED AT AS AN INSTRUMENT THAT SERVES MULTIPLE PURPOSES.

JDG: India is active in a “robust mission” in the DRC and involved in implementing a complicated mandated in South Sudan. Do you think India will continue to be involved and contribute troops to high-risk environments?

SA: If we ran away from high-risk operations then we would not be in any operation from 1962 because we lost about 100 soldiers in that year in Congo. Our general orientation is that we see our contribution as a tangible one to peace and security globally. The more complex operations are, the more political support you need. We would be more comfortable if operations would be measured in terms on how they have progressed on the mandates. If you have a high-risk operation, for example, you could measure if have you brought this down. Risk is intrinsic to a peacekeeping operations and that is what armed forces are trained to handle. Whether they should be peacekeeping operations with anti-terrorist aspects are calls that we will need to decide case by case. In general, support for peacekeeping should not be based on how high the risk is and this will not deter us. What is important to us is whether our contribution will bring down the threat to international peace and security.
JDG: One of the next SG candidates stated his priorities would be “prevention, prevention, prevention”. We have heard similar rhetoric since the Agenda for Peace. How do we move things forward to start see some change? How do we encourage the member states to be more open to allowing some high level of intervention from the organization?

SA: That idea that prevention is better than cure is something we all accept and have been accepting for some time now. But if you accept this, then you need to put some resources behind it. I think development is a key aspect to prevention. If you say that an issue such as development is important but you only focus on it when it comes to prevention of a conflict, then people are bound to question this ideology. You are not in a post-state era. Many see the state as an effective tool in development activities, but in many places the state structures are still coming of age. There is a concern that they will be undermined. There are various models we talk about to deal with this. For example, can prevention be separated from conflict? Can we build institutions and state structures in a pre-conflict mode without focusing on conflict aspects, maybe calling this nation building or development? If you are willing to move it in this manner, there will be less resistance because **people will not see it as a political tool**.

AN: But prevention is also about having good analysis of information and when you have this, you are able to tell beforehand what the risks are, the drivers of conflict and how to address these. Do you think the UN as a whole is ready to act in this way rather than wait for conflict to erupt?

SA: Most of the present day conflicts, the lack of a resolution or solution is not because of a lack of information. Look at the most serious crisis we are facing today. Nobody can say we did not know this was going to happen; it is just that there are rivalries of a sort that are not enabling you to prevent it. On the risk assessment, all the tools you need are not going to help you when you have a situation on the globe that is more disturbing than before. We are increasingly moving in a direction where the UN’s role was most effective in the Post-Cold war era, when all the major powers allowed a space for the UN to do its work. Today that coordination and collaboration is giving way to more competition and we need to address what the bigger issue is.

AN: But the role of the UN is also to force governments to deal with conflicts because it can raise awareness. I think a large role of the UN is to raise awareness on issues such as emerging conflicts or crisis such as the refugee crisis. The role of the UN is not to go against member states but do push them to do what is needed and to do what they may be reluctant to do. What do you think about this?

SA: I have no problem with that thinking and ultimately in issues such as global public goods or climate change that is the role of the UN—to push everybody to realize there is action needed. However, issues of war and peace are more circumscribed, because you have an architecture of international peace and security that was determined by the outcome of the last world war. You have a Security Council based on a certain mode of functioning based on the results of WWII; the problems of today and the challenges the UN is facing in peace and security are different to then. If you do not evolve, you will have stakeholders who want to take control and resolve these issues themselves outside the institution. Ultimately, if there is an issue that people and states want to get involved in, there must be a means of communication to allow them to share this. If you do not have this, then states look for other means to get involved. This is the reality of many developing countries in regards to peace and security – they are not given the opportunity to give input.
JDG: Will the next office holder be able to facilitate this better relationship?

SA: It is not only the Secretary-General. The SG has a role and a pulpit that he or she can use, but there needs to be a restructuring of the world order. The Secretary-General is one aspect of that but the world order is changing so rapidly and the institution needs to match that. If the UN and its decision-making mechanisms remain frozen in the status quo, it will not be perceived as a nimble organization that can meet the challenges we are facing. There needs to be more than a change in the Secretary-General for the UN to become ‘fit for purpose in the 21st century’. Fit for purpose doesn't only mean the Secretary-General and the Secretariat; it means reflecting the new global order.

Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin is the permanent representative of India to the United Nations. | Twitter: @AkbaruddinIndia
THE NETHERLANDS WAS THE FIRST WESTERN COUNTRY TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO MINUSMA IN MALI, AND THIS HAS HELPED BRING OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON BOARD.

The blue helmet is perhaps the most powerful symbol of hope for a better world. In the 70 years since the UN was founded, its peacekeepers have saved lives and restored peace all over the world. From the Far East to Europe and on to Africa and Central America, soldiers, police officers and civilian experts have worked for peace and security at the behest of the international community, often putting their own lives at risk.

There are currently 123,000 blue helmets operating in 16 UN peace missions. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is proud to be contributing military personnel, police officers and civilian experts. But that pride does not alter the fact that there is plenty of scope for improvement in UN peace operations.
This week, the UN General Assembly will discuss how to improve the UN’s efforts in peace missions. This is badly needed. Despite all the good work being done, UN missions have attracted criticism: it takes too long for missions to arrive and be operational, mandates are often too broad, bureaucracy gets in the way and UN troops are not sufficiently equipped. They lack the flexibility to deal with the fast-changing security landscape.

At the same time, it is often only the UN that has the legitimacy and the ability to intervene. So standing on the sidelines and complaining is simply not an option. Taking part in missions and proposing how to improve peace operations is the only way to take UN missions to the next level.

Indeed, the lack of proper support for missions is the main reason for much of the criticism. After all, the UN is dependent on the troops provided by its member states, and often they are insufficiently trained and badly equipped. Critical enablers such as helicopters, medevac capabilities, medical care and good logistic support are hard to come by. Troops need armoured vehicles if they are to operate in areas where they may be the target of attacks.

I want to encourage Western countries in particular to step up to the plate. It is high time they took part more in UN missions. Last year President Obama urged the heads of government of UN member states to do what they could to enhance both the quality and quantity of the troops and equipment available, but still not enough is being done.

Western countries’ share in UN missions has fallen sharply in the past twenty years. Yet they are precisely the countries that are able to make high-tech, robust equipment available. For example, European countries are currently developing the concept of intelligence as a key component of UN missions.

The Netherlands was the first Western country to make a substantial contribution to MINUSMA in Mali, and this has helped bring other European countries on board. MINUSMA was the first UN mission to have a substantial intelligence capability. Such steps help boost the quality and strength of UN missions. Without the involvement of Western countries, many peacekeeping missions will lack the resources to sustain their operations and fulfil their mandates – and people’s lives will be at risk.

In order to make all this work, the missions’ mandates should also be improved. They have become too broad, resulting in a lack of focus. They must take more account of the specific circumstances on the ground. Putting the people in need first – the local population – must be the primary motive and therefore the instinctive reflex of all personnel involved in a mission. The UN and its staff must give absolute priority to the protection of civilians. In some missions, the UN already provides direct protection to civilians in need, for instance by admitting refugees to UN bases.

But the UN needs to do more to protect civilians – not just from the external threat posed by terrorists, militias or the military, but also from abuses committed by UN personnel. There must also be protection for those who report such abuses. Victims and whistle-blowers must be kept safe, and this extends to being safe within the walls of the UN.

If the blue helmet is to remain a symbol of hope and protection, we need to do more to improve peacekeeping missions. So I call on the UN Security Council, our other fellow UN member states and the UN organisation to join forces. Because ultimately, the responsibility for the success of UN missions lies with us all.

**Bert Koenders** is the Minister of Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the former Special Representative the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
UNDERSTANDING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AS A CORE OBLIGATION

Jim Dell-Giacoma and Alexandra Novosseloff

OUR BOOK TAKES A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO POC. IT IS A MULTIFACETED TOPIC, AND WHILE OTHER WORKS ACKNOWLEDGE THIS, THEY THEN TEND TO GUIDE THE READER INTO ONE AREA OR ANOTHER, SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P). OUR BOOK AIDS TO LOOK HOLISTICALLY AT POC

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in calling for new approaches concluded that the Protection of Civilians (PoC) was a core obligation of the United Nations, but also noted that expectations and capabilities needed to converge. While significant progress has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the Protection of Civilians, also the name of a new book on the subject, the editors and contributors to the volume on this sometimes controversial subject have analyzed and laid out suggestions for the next steps. The Global Peace Operations Review’s Alexandra Novosseloff and Jim Dell-Giacoma recently spoke with three of them - Haidi Willmot, Ralph Mamiya, and Scott Sheeran – about the past, present, and future of PoC.
Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): There have been many books looking at PoC. What is the added value of this book and what is the message you are trying to convey that is not present in other works?

Ralph Mamiya (RM): Our book takes a comprehensive approach to PoC. It is a multifaceted topic, and while other works acknowledge this, they then tend to guide the reader into one area or another, such as peacekeeping, international humanitarian law or the responsibility to protect (R2P). Our book aims to look holistically at PoC.

Haidi Willmot (HW): It harnesses perspectives from international law and international relations, traversing academia and practice. The book brings together a wide array of eminent academics and respected practitioners, incorporating contributions from legal scholars and ethicists, political commentators, diplomats, UN officials, military commanders, development experts and humanitarian aid workers.

The UN Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, wrote the foreword, which I think reflects the importance of the issue to the UN. And we have a brilliant collection of authors who have written with insight and passion, including Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who heads the International Crisis Group; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, a former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York; and Major-General (rtd) Patrick Cammaert, who was the DPKO military advisor as well as the deputy Force commander in MONUC.

Scott Sheeran (SS): As well as having expansive breadth, the book goes into real depth on a range of sub-topics, shining a spotlight on key issues and challenges and providing cross-cutting analysis. This allows the reader to understand the development of PoC, how the concept has changed over time, and its significance for the UN. Bringing together in-depth academic analysis with practical experience is the key value add. Other books on PoC have not taken this approach.

Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): What are some examples from the book of these authors bringing a new approach to understanding PoC?

HW: The book is divided into three parts: 1) Conceptual and Historical Foundations; 2) Legal Framework; and 3) Policy and Practice. Usually PoC commentary focuses on just policy or practice. As we cover all of those spheres the chapters speak to each other in a number of ways. For example, the use of force to protect civilians is considered from a number of perspectives. The chapter by Hugo Slim looks at the ethics of the use of force; Scott Sheeran and Catherine Kent analyse the conceptual and political interaction between PoC, R2P and humanitarian intervention; my chapter examines the evolution of the UN collective security agreement; Mona Khalil and Siobhan Wills deal with relevant legal issues; while chapters by Stian Kjeksrud, Fiona Blyth and Patrick Cammaert examine practical aspects of using of force to protect civilians.

JDG: You mention the use of force, there is the perception that protection of civilians is the responsibility of the military component but there is a much broader responsibility. What is the role of non-military personnel in PoC?

RM: A number of chapters address unarmed aspects of protection. In my chapter I trace the historical development of both armed and unarmed concepts of protection; chapters by Andrew Clapham, Michael Keating and Richard Bennett address human rights protection; Jamie Williamson, Sara Pantuliano and Eva Svoboda deal with humanitarian protection; Erin Mooney addresses protection in the context of refugees and IDPs; from a development perspective Lise Grande considers building protection capacities; and the chapter by Aditi Gorur and Nils Carstensen deals with community self-protection.
We also have chapters by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Ben Kioko, Lydia Wambugu, Stian Kjeksrud, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Andreas Øien Stensland, Cedric de Coning, and Walter Lotze that compare organizational approaches to PoC across the UN, African Union, European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, considering both armed and unarmed aspects.

**JDG:** The HIPPO report says PoC is a core obligation for UN peace operations and everyone on them is responsible for it. How does the analysis in your book connect with these ideas?

**RM:** The HIPPO report reflects many of the currents of thought on PoC in the book. The preparation of the book was a two year process that both preceded and succeeded the HIPPO report.

**HW:** Certainly, the analysis in our book agrees that PoC is a central tenant of UN peace operations, in fact we go further to assert that it is both a central function and obligation of the UN arising from the UN Charter. The responsibility for PoC is widely spread, not just among mission components, but across the UN community. Our authors examine the protection responsibilities and human rights obligations of host States. They consider the responsibility of UN Member States, particularly in the Security Council and the Fifth Committee, which is responsible for financing missions. They also consider the operational and legal responsibilities of troop contributing countries, and individual troops when deployed to protect civilians. A number of our authors consider UN Secretariat responsibilities for effectively planning and managing missions, and advising Member States. We also address the protection rights and responsibilities accruing to other actors, such as regional organizations and NGOs, including those arising from international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law. PoC is a common responsibility of the UN community. Effective protection requires wide support and complementary action.

**JDG:** How has our understanding of PoC evolved during the last fifteen years?

**HW:** Our book looks expansively at the concept of protection, considering antecedent concepts in the three main monotheistic religions, just war theory, the work of enlightenment thinkers, and the relevance of the concept to early military doctrine, such as the Lieber Code. In the UN context, we consider the development of PoC through the broader lens of the evolution of the UN Charter – the collective security agreement. When the Charter was promulgated in 1945 it focused on the maintenance of international peace and security between states, not within them. Since that time there has been a remarkable evolution to the current focus on the security and well being of human populations within States. If and how that translates into effective action, is another line of inquiry that we explore. This significant pendulum swing has been most pronounced in the last fifteen years – since 1999.

**SS:** To understand what comes next in the evolution of PoC is difficult. While the analysis in the book enables us to better see the practical, political and legal issues for PoC, it is challenging to chart the course for future development to enable the UN to effectively fulfill its protection responsibilities. The conceptual development is relatively mature, and the ‘low hanging fruit’ in implementation are gone. Next steps require tacking bigger problems in UN peacekeeping. A key conclusion of the HIPPO, that PoC must be linked to a political strategy and solution, is an easy statement to make in theory, but difficult to implement in practice.
AN: What are your expectations about shaping the debate and future development of PoC, especially towards member states who may be reluctant to shift their positions?

HW: The book can operate to shape the debate on two levels. First, the value of gathering such multidisciplinary analysis and expertise in one place should not be underestimated. It is a singular resource for people working on protection issues, who may want to gain an understanding of other aspects and perspectives. For example, the book shines a light on how the use of the veto and selectivity of Security Council actions can adversely affect civilians, while discussing how humanitarian policies might be well served by better incorporating community self-protection strategies. At the same time it considers the utility of different types of force to counter different types of threats to civilians, and examines protection obligations under international human rights law. Making some of these points more accessible, should positively influence the debate. Second, in the conclusion we offer three practical and concrete suggestions to move things forward: 1) reconcile existing concepts to develop a common definition; 2) identify a cohesive legal framework; and, 3) articulate a set of principles to bring coherence to the disparate streams of effort that comprise protection.

SS: While a book may not change the politics around PoC, we hope it might play an important role in raising the profile of the debate and addressing implementation challenges. It offers ideas on what is needed, such as enablers, and what works, such as joint protection teams. UN missions also need the political and financial support of Member States to better protect civilians.

RM: Effectively protecting civilians is not about tightening one screw or fixing one part of the UN, the entirety of the organization needs to be fixed. However, the book offers smaller ways to move forward, such as agreeing a common definition of PoC. This is a political issue but also an area where there are serious misunderstandings. Misunderstandings that can negatively impact effective implementation in the field.

AN: It is also about managing or reducing expectations. We know that resources are limited and there is only so much you can do with what is provided by member states to protect civilians. What is your perspective on this challenge?

RM: Expectation management around PoC is challenging. In the UN we try and manage expectation to all audiences – media, Member States and local populations. Sadly, the public hears most about PoC when peacekeepers have failed to protect civilians. Improving our mandates and communications strategies so that people better understand what peacekeepers are supposed to be doing is key.

SS: There is a genuine gap between the expectations or aspirations of the public, including local populations, and that of the Council. The UN must be realistic and support what is possible. The HIPPO report is very strong on managing down the expectations and overreach by the Council, but there are different ways of going about that. Several of the chapters provide
possibilities for moving forward, such as looking at how forces can be reconfigured to operate differently and more effectively. The book also considers what could be achieved if the deeper political dimensions were tackled.

**HW:** While some of the information may result in managing expectations, that is not the purpose of the book. Expectation management is about dealing with the world as it is now, with the resources and political will as they presently exist. The book looks much more broadly. Historically, we look at the world as it has been; we look at it as it is now, with its myriad of constraints; but we also look at the possibilities for the future, the way it could be. It is much broader than just the here and now.

**JDG:** You mentioned there is an ambiguity in the legal framework guiding protection of civilians. What kind of process would fill this gap?

**SS:** We are not suggesting highly prescriptive and abstract demands of the law in this field, but there is a genuine gap. For example, there is a Secretary-General's bulletin on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which talks about how peacekeepers should understand their IHL obligations, but there is nothing similar in terms of human rights. Human rights is where you draw a lot of legal clout for PoC. Soldiers should not be able to observe violence against civilians without taking action. This is raised in Brahimi and HIPPO but in HIPPO there is a stronger legal basis whereby it stipulates that regardless of your mandate, you have the authority act. There is more clarity needed for Rules of Engagement as there is a disconnect and clear differences of opinion.

**HW:** There is no single body of law that regulates PoC. It lies at the intersection of jus ad bellum, jus in bello / international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international refugee law, and international criminal law. As a result, there are many overlaps and gaps. For example, it is unclear how broad or deep the responsibilities of certain actors are; what are the obligations for the force commander to actively and preemptively protect civilians? PoC may be well served by the development of something akin to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which reviewed several bodies of law and brought together the relevant principles to form a set of international standards.

*The introduction to Protection of Civilians can be downloaded [here].*

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**Scott Sheeran** is a Counsellor at the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations and on leave from the School of Law and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.
U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS NEED LESS JARGON AND MORE DIRECTION

Jim Della-Giacoma

In today’s divided U.N., some feel it is something of an achievement that member states agreed on a resolution with 31 operative paragraphs and 21 normative ones. They say it is the most comprehensive resolution on peace building agreed to by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, representing a first step in breaking down silos.

Peace and the United Nations go together; at least that’s what its founders intended. But in the meeting rooms of the organization’s New York headquarters, diplomats often argue over the buzzword vocabulary of compound words and phrases for advancing the U.N.’s peace mandate. They parse whether an operation is a special political mission or a peacekeeping mission. They worry that calling something a “peace operation” is too imprecise. When they cannot agree whether something should be peace building or “sustaining the peace,” they compromise by using both terms.
Maybe it’s time for the semantic arguments to be replaced with a focus on results. A good start on how to do so is a joint resolution of the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council finalized Thursday, which should be tabled and passed by both bodies in mid-April. The resolution, shepherded over months by Angola and Australia, follows up on a report last year by an advisory group of experts who reviewed the U.N.’s “peace-building architecture.” They aptly titled their final document “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace.”

In today’s divided U.N., some feel it is something of an achievement that member states agreed on a resolution with 31 operative paragraphs and 21 normative ones. They say it is the most comprehensive resolution on peace building agreed to by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, representing a first step in breaking down silos. It firmly connects peace building with prevention and talks about how to implement it. It sees sustaining peace as part of a continuum, rather than just a post-conflict activity. It calls for a stronger relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Security Council, conceiving of them as partners rather than rivals. It tries to build a better bridge across the Delaware River between the U.N. system based in New York and the World Bank in Washington, D.C.

But some key issues were placed in the “too hard to resolve now” basket, especially how peace building should be paid for. The advisory group of experts had proposed the Peace Building Fund receive core funding of either $100 million or a “symbolic” 1 percent share of the total U.N. budgets for peace operations, comprising both peacekeeping and Special Political Missions, but member states couldn’t agree. Instead, they asked the next secretary-general to look into this issue and report back in two years time.

This reflects how, for the U.N., funding and naming are always sensitive issues. A case in point is the new mission established by the Security Council in January for a team of international observers to monitor an imminent peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Though it looks like a traditional peacekeeping operation, it was called a special political mission.

This could be because the peacekeeping “brand” has acquired an image problem over the past few years. A quick look at the map of current operations, especially in Africa, makes it clear why member states associate peacekeeping with failed states. For this reason, Colombia is more comfortable with a political rather than a peacekeeping mission. This also means the mission will be funded from the U.N.’s regular budget, rather than by assessed contributions to its peacekeeping account.

The decision displays an obvious lack of consistency. The U.N.’s missions in Western Sahara and Cyprus wrestle with glacial political processes, but are technically peacekeeping missions. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq has more than 400 personnel, but is a special political mission. As the “Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations” recounts, the U.N.’s 1965 mission in the Dominican Republic had a task similar to the forthcoming mission in Colombia—namely, monitoring a cease-fire alongside a regional organization—but was called a peacekeeping operation.

But there is an explanation for the semantic games played over the mission in Colombia: Anything that reaches the Security Council is by definition a political problem, on which member states’ interests prevail. This means that a policy designed to save face and money for member states prevails over determining the best form or function for a future peace operation. Rather than pay a little now to prevent a conflict, we pay much more later to manage a crisis.
U.N. peace operations have the capacity to change; they have demonstrated this in the past 15 years since the landmark Brahimi report. They need to continue to evolve, because the environments where peace operations are deploying are fluid and resist the application of templates. Circumstances on the ground change, and missions need to constantly adapt. The U.N.’s expert advisory reports from the past year have re-emphasized the political nature of conflict and the need for the international system to think more creatively about preventing it. Last year’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), for instance, called for the U.N. to deliver “right fit” missions along a “continuum of response and smoother transitions between different phases of missions.”

Ian Johnstone believes the process should start with asking the right questions. What is the political process? Where is the conflict? Who are the targets of violence? What are the reasons for it? How legitimate is the state? Is it cooperating with or consenting to a U.N. mission? What role are the neighbors, regional actors and global powers playing?

A U.N. peace operation, Johnstone argues, performs a range of tasks including political engagement, protection, capacity-building, monitoring, service delivery and coordination. In addition to its blue helmets and uniformed police, it has at its disposal civilian instruments, such as envoys and mediators as well as human rights, political and civil affairs officers.

Thinking of a spectrum of peace operations rather than a type of mission would require profound changes in behavior at all levels, Johnstone acknowledges. To start with, locals cannot be bypassed if a mission is to work; U.N. envoys must stop legitimizing “imported peace” or “elite peace.” Mandates from the Security Council also need to be simpler. Troop-contributing countries who are reimbursed based on the size of their contingents will have to accept that an operation with lots of battalions might not always be the best international tool to resolve a conflict. At U.N. headquarters, the secretary-general would require much better planning and analysis capabilities to understand how the organization’s instruments fit with the actions of regional and subregional groups. The General Assembly’s administrative and budgetary committees must stop micromanaging mission finances to allow the Secretariat to become much more flexible in the way it deploys operations.

In short, Johnstone argues, U.N. peace operations need less bureaucracy and more “adhocracy.” This is an organizational form that lends itself to innovation in a fluid environment. It is flexible, adaptable and informal. Indeed, in its purest form, it functions without bureaucratic policies or procedures.

At the very least, thinking with greater flexibility about peace operations would quickly start a discussion about the artificial departmental split between political affairs, peacekeeping operations and field service. There is little appetite for a debate on restructuring, but it has to happen.
The expert reports released in 2015 have done a thorough job of mapping the challenges and plotting a few possible ways forward. When the declared candidates for the position of U.N. secretary-general appear before the General Assembly later this month, someone should ask them a question or three about the future of peace operations—not just the buzzwords, but the goals and processes. We will be all be listening to see in which direction they want to lead the organization.

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BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND ADHOCRACY: CRAFTING A SPECTRUM OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Ian Johnstone

THERE IS NO NEED TO ENDORSE LET ALONE COME UP WITH A NEW LIST OF DESIRABLE END STATES FOR A PEACE PROCESS. IT IS BOTH RISKY AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO ASSUME THERE IS A FORMULA FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The array of tools the UN has developed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict has expanded in recent years. They are being deployed in new formats, from political missions and small peacebuilding teams, to large observer missions and multidimensional peace operations with offensive capabilities. But the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and other recent reports question whether the tools are being used as effectively as they could be.
The HIPPO recommended, “the full spectrum of peace operations must be employed more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground”. It said the UN must deliver more “right fit” missions, a “continuum of response and smoother transitions between different phases of missions.” This message was echoed in the Secretary-General’s follow up report, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the Peacebuilding Architecture Review, and the Global Study on the implementation of resolution 1325. It is also implicit in the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which calls for creativity in how to respond to that threat.

A central message of the reports is the need to get away from supply-driven interventions in mandating and designing missions. They call for a more flexible, demand-driven approach that is context-appropriate and harnessed to an overarching political strategy. They critique the tendency to fall back on peace operation templates, and to allow budgets and bureaucratic structures to drive the planning process, rather than what the circumstances require.

There is a need to re-focus attention on those circumstances. The practical challenge is not to envision some ideal end state and design a mission to achieve that, but rather to determine what is achievable in light of conditions on the ground. That in turn requires an assessment of what conditions lend themselves to the successful use of one instrument in the peace operations toolkit as opposed to another.

The term peace operations as used in the reports encompasses peacekeeping, political missions and other instruments the UN deploys to maintain peace and security. As such, it enables a more substantive discussion of the spectrum without getting distracted by the traditional dichotomy UN intergovernmental bodies draw between peacekeeping and political missions for budgetary reasons.

**WHAT IS DRIVING THIS INQUIRY?**

At oe level, it is a need to conceptualize an approach to mandate design and mission planning that mitigates the distorting effects of budget and bureaucratic categories. At a deeper level, it is to mitigate the effects of a design and planning process that is driven more by Security Council dynamics and Fifth Committee negotiations than careful analysis of what the circumstances require. This is a tall order. Security Council politics, budgets and bureaucratic rivalry are powerful forces that won’t be overcome simply through better analysis. The goal is less ambitious. It is to reinstitute a mode of mandate design and mission planning that starts with conditions on the ground and then turns to these other factors, rather than the other way around.

Beyond that, three other considerations are driving this inquiry. First, the environments into which peace operations are being deployed are fluid and do not lend themselves to easy application of the existing templates. These include places where the host government is obstructive or outright hostile to the presence of a peace operation, where state authority is weak or perceived by the population to be illegitimate, or where there is substantial intervention by outside actors in an internal conflict.

Of particular note are places where the threat of violent extremism is high. The HIPPO report expresses the widely shared view that a UN peacekeeping mission should not engage in military counter-terrorism operations and offers suggestions as to what it should do when asymmetric threats are present in the operating environment. The Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism provides further insight. But many questions are left unanswered, including what do to do when a protection of civilians mandate seems to call for forceful measures against threats emanating from extremists groups.
These complicated dynamics rarely resolve into a clear picture of what form a UN presence should take. They create a risk that the UN may get drawn into situations where it does not belong. This may happen because the organization is called on when all other options are politically unviable, or because deploying a UN operation can be an excuse for not taking other actions the situation may require. These concerns have stimulated a good deal of thought about the appropriate parameters for peacekeeping, going back to the three traditional principles set out in the UNEF I guidelines (1956), through Agenda for Peace (1992), Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995), the Brahimi Report (2000), Capstone Doctrine (2008) and now the HIPPO report (2015).

But there has been less thought about conditions that lend themselves to the effective use of other instruments, such as UN country teams, political missions, peacebuilding support offices, or regional offices. It is tempting to assume that, when a peacekeeping mission with a large military component is not the answer, a smaller purely civilian presence necessarily is. Yet even the decision to appoint a special envoy needs to be examined in each case. Beyond flying the UN flag, what value does he or she add? Too many envoys, after all, can complicate a peace process.

THE PRACTICAL CHALLENGE IS NOT TO ENVISION SOME IDEAL ENDSTATE AND DESIGN A MISSION TO ACHIEVE THAT, BUT TO DETERMINE WHAT IS ACHIEVABLE IN LIGHT OF CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND.

Because these environments are so fluid, peace operations have to be adaptable and able to change shape quickly in order to be effective. That is a second factor driving the inquiry into the spectrum operations. Their configuration and mandate will vary at different phases of the conflict cycle: from escalating violence and all-out war, to peace negotiations, peace process implementation, or post-conflict recovery. Hopefully the conditions will improve over time; but sometimes they degrade. Whether the situation moves in a positive or negative direction, there has to be a regular process of assessment and reassessment to ascertain whether and how the conditions are changing. The notion of “adhocracy” is an organizational form that lends itself to innovation in a fluid environment. It is flexible and responsive, unencumbered by rigid structures or procedures. Such an approach can facilitate transitions from one kind of operation to another, for example when a large peacekeeping operation is succeeded by smaller political or peacebuilding mission, which in turn hands over to a reinforced UN country team. But this pattern is not inevitable. The more agile the UN is in reconfiguring a mission, scaling down when appropriate, or adding components when necessary, the more likely it is to succeed in its goals.

Third, a thread that runs through the HIPPO and other recent reports is “the primacy of politics.” While the idea is not new, consensus around it opens space for innovation in how the various tools at the UN’s disposal can be harnessed to a political strategy. The reports call for a renewed emphasis on conflict prevention, a goal that has been notoriously difficult to operationalize because it is hard to mobilize political will for something that has not happened. The emphasis on politics and prevention is an invitation to think creatively about how all UN instruments can serve to prevent the lapse into conflict, to prevent violence from getting worse, or to prevent a relapse once the violence has subsided. Not only mediators and envoys, but everything from small human rights offices to robust military operations can have a preventative effect, ideally by deterring would be spoilers.
IDEAL END STATES V. ACHIEVABLE GOALS

There has been no shortage of thinking about the desirable end state of a peace process, articulated in numerous UN reports. In 2001, “No exit without strategy” defines “sustainable peace” to exist “not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of state Sovereignty and generally, participatory governance.”

In 2008, the Capstone Doctrine identifies four elements of sustainable peace and therefore a focus for early peacebuilding: a) restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain public order; b) strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; c) supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; d) promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return of refugees and IDPs.

In June 2009, the Secretary-General wrote that the most “urgent and important peacebuilding objectives [are] establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends, and expanding core national capacity.” These and national frameworks were synthesized in a volume on Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction produced by the United States Institute for Peace. It identifies five end states: a safe and secure environment; rule of law; sustainable governance; a sustainable economy; and social well-being.

There is no need to endorse let alone come up with a new list of desirable end states for a peace process. It is both risky and counter-productive to assume there is a formula for sustainable peace – as the extensive debate on liberal peacebuilding makes clear. Ultimately, desirable outcomes depend on context and can only be determined through a process of dialogue and consultation with internal actors. The real challenge is not to articulate some ideal of peace and fashion new templates for how to get there, but to grasp what is achievable in the particular circumstances of a crisis and to design a mission accordingly. The prospects of achieving any outcome will depend heavily on the geo-political and local conditions. In some circumstances, negative peace (the absence of all-out war) may be all that is achievable; in others, elements of positive peace are possible; in still others, the peace operation can get at the root causes and help to build institutions and governing practices that will prevent a relapse into conflict.

What then can be done to facilitate the design of context-appropriate and adaptable missions? The concern is not with planning processes but rather content. The starting point is to ask the right questions about the conditions on the ground. These can be derived from the practice of contemporary operations and the most significant challenges they are facing. They provide a framework for conflict management analysis (a counter-part to conflict analysis). “Conflict management” as used here is shorthand for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. An indicative list of such questions that is neither exhaustive nor random could be:

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS?

Is it viable, nascent or non-existent? After the failures of Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, a mantra in UN circles was that peacekeeping operations should not be deployed when there is no peace to keep. This may have been a useful check on the tendency to imagine that peacekeeping was the solution to all problems, but as a threshold for deciding when to deploy an operation, it is not helpful. Rarely is there a perfectly reliable peace to keep; the question
is how much peace is enough. A more helpful rule of thumb is articulated in the Capstone Doctrine: “a United Nations peacekeeping operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process”. In other words, peacekeeping missions should only be deployed to support a viable political process. But that raises a host of second order questions: how do we know when the commitment of the parties is genuine, that the political process is viable? Can a UN presence help to create the conditions for such a process? Will a military presence with a protection mandate create space for political dialogue, or undermine it? If there are other external actors involved in the political process, what value does the UN add?

WHAT IS THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF CONFLICT?

Is it local, national, regional, or global? Most conflicts in which the UN gets involved today are intra-state wars that pit two or more national actors against each other. Yet they almost invariably have transnational, regional and/or global dimensions, often because outsiders are intervening in the internal conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, the roots of conflict and triggering events for violence are often at the sub-national and community levels. Different approaches and different tools are needed depending on the level of the conflict.

WHO ARE THE TARGETS OF VIOLENCE?

Is it against other combatants, political opponents or civilians? A mission whose security focus is primarily to protect civilians will look different from one that is trying to deter violence between combatants, or from one that is trying to help a new government to consolidate its authority against spoilers. If the threat of violence against civilians is high, then a strong military and police presence may be needed to provide physical protection. If the threat is less acute, other civilian protection measures like human rights monitoring, humanitarian action and community engagement may suffice. If women and children are facing particular risks – for example if rape is being used as a weapon of war – then the inclusion of gender and child protection advisers in missions is particularly important.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE VIOLENCE?

Is it to take over the government, control territory and resources, secure a seat at the negotiation table, or to terrorize a population? The answer to those questions will have an impact on how large a security presence is required, with whom mediators should be negotiating, and how the incentives for spoilers can be altered. Moreover, beyond measures to address the immediate threats, understanding the reasons for the violence can shape the types of institutional reform that may be needed to channel conflict away from the battlefield. Building more inclusive political machinery may be the priority in some places; a more independent justice system could be more important in others.

WHAT IS THE CAPACITY AND PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE?

Are the national government and institutions strong or weak? Are they legitimate in the eyes of the local population? Are there local authorities and non-state actors that have greater capacity to fulfill governance functions? Are those other sources of authority perceived to be more legitimate than the central government? Extension of state authority is a prominent feature of Security Council mandates, and capacity building is a big part of that. But how authority is
extended and how capacity is built have an important impact on legitimacy. Helping to extend the authority of a state that is perceived to be illegitimate by its population is not likely to contribute to sustainable peace. Conversely, political engagement with other sources of authority – including non-state actors – may be both necessary and useful.

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF CONSENT TO AND COOPERATION WITH A UN PRESENCE?

What type of UN presence with what mandate will the host government accept? What will the other parties to the conflict accept? What is the attitude or the broader population? The answers may be reflected in a peace agreement, but the agreement does not tell the whole story because a) commitment to the agreement may not be genuine; b) how the parties interpret it may differ; and c) circumstances change. Nor do peace agreements tell us what political elites expect to gain (or lose) from an external presence, or what the broader population wants. The Advisory Group of Experts on the peacebuilding architecture calls for inclusive national ownership of a peace process, while taking care to stress that the role of the UN is to work with – not against – the host government. The extent to which the UN has the space to reach out to political parties, local levels of government, community groups, women’s groups, youth, the private sector and civil society organizations will affect the shape of a mission.

WHAT ROLE DO NEIGHBORS, REGIONAL ACTORS AND GLOBAL POWERS PLAY?

Outside actors are always involved in internal conflicts, whether in the form of military assistance from friends and neighbors, development assistance from international financial institutions and bilateral donors, or in any number of other ways. Sometimes these interventions contribute to the cause of peace; sometimes not. If they are constructive, what sort of UN presence – if any – can add value vis-à-vis other external actors? If destructive, what UN instruments are most useful for engaging with those interveners? If the UN is deployed to support a regional organization, what form should that support take? How can it best contribute to diplomatic efforts that involve a multitude of external actors?

The answers to these and similar questions can provide valuable insight into the design of a peace operation. However, it is important to understand that the conditions are not necessarily immutable. For example, what sort of presence the parties will accept is obviously an important determinant of the shape of a peace operation, but the attitude of those parties is susceptible to change through negotiation or pressure. Even geo-political “realities” are not immutable. The political will of great powers can change; a well-designed and well-timed peace operation can be an agent of that change.

TASKS AND INSTRUMENTS

The range of functions UN peace operations serve spans five areas: political/governance, security, humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic – although not every mission operates in all five areas. To fulfill these functions, the UN performs a range of tasks including political engagement, protection, capacity-building, monitoring, service delivery, and coordination.

Which instruments can best be used to perform what tasks? The answer depends on the conditions on the ground. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be used for monitoring communal violence, but if community groups are suspicious of drones, then relying on civil affairs officers may be more appropriate. If sustaining a political process requires engagement with a number of neighboring countries, then a regional envoy may be a more appropriate instrument than one assigned to a single country. Matching instruments with tasks to meet strategic objectives in light of prevailing conditions is the challenge.
WHAT, MORE PRECISELY ARE THE TASKS?

**Political engagement** includes activities such as political advice to governments, mediation and good offices, engaging with political parties and parliamentarians, electoral and constitution-making assistance, local reconciliation efforts, the promotion of political inclusion, and reaching out to community leaders, women’s groups and civil society. It occurs at the national, subnational and local levels. As many conflicts have transnational dimensions, peace operations must often engage with regional and global actors as well. Political engagement also includes supporting governance functions and, on occasion, performing those functions (like conducting elections or running transitional administrations).

**Protection** may entail robust military or police action to create a secure environment or to physically protect civilians facing imminent threats of violence. It also means insisting on compliance with humanitarian and human rights law, and demanding humanitarian access to people in need. Protection may occur through dialogue and political pressure on national actors, or as DPKO’s policy states by “establishing a protective environment” by creating conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. In a recent report, the particular challenges of DDR in the context of violent extremism was highlighted. Protection tasks overlap with political engagement, capacity-building and monitoring.

**Capacity-building**, a core feature of peacebuilding, means helping to create, reform or strengthen governance institutions. These could be in the political sector, such as electoral management bodies and parliaments. They could be in public administration, including institutions that manage natural resources and other aspects of the economy. They could be in the security sector, both military and police. Or they could be in the justice sector – justice ministries, courts, corrections facilities, and indigenous dispute settlement bodies. Helping to “extend state authority” is tied to capacity-building, an increasingly problematic mandate if the state authorities have less legitimacy in the eyes of a local population than the informal governance actors they may displace.

**Monitoring** mandates go back to the earliest days of peacekeeping when monitoring ceasefires, troop withdrawals and buffer zones was the main task of a peace operation. These remain common tasks, but other forms of monitoring are also prevalent. In the security field, missions now monitor the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, communal violence and, on occasion, arms embargoes. Human rights monitoring is regular feature of mandates, as is keeping track of humanitarian conditions. In addition to providing electoral assistance (a task listed under ‘political engagement’ above), peace operations often monitor elections and referenda.

**Service delivery** refers mainly to the provision of humanitarian aid in the form of food and shelter. Quick-impact projects to deliver peace dividends also fall in this cluster. UN peace operations must be attentive to the challenges of delivering health, education and other social services in conflict zones – including in zones controlled by extremist groups. While they are rarely involved in delivering health directly, the Ebola crisis raises questions about whether they could play a greater role.
Coordination refers to a diverse mix of tasks. The coordination of economic and social recovery programs is an example, as is the coordination of humanitarian assistance. It may also mean the coordination of envoys and other external actors, for example, through “friends” groups. The UN sometimes coordinates security sector reform efforts, where the military and police training may done by bilateral actors, but governance issues fall within a UN mandate.

The table below listing the instruments deliberately avoids the words “missions,” “operations,” or “offices” to connote the fact that they can be deployed in many different combinations. A large multidimensional, robust UN peace operation will include most of these tools; an observer mission will have fewer. A political mission may be restricted to providing advice and good offices; or it may perform peacebuilding functions, in which case it would need more components. The same is true of regional offices. A UN country team lacks most of these tools, but it could be enhanced to take on prevention or residual peace-building tasks. Characterizing them as modular units in this way helps to conceive how they can be mixed and matched to craft a context-appropriate mission that can be reconfigured as circumstances change.

For some of the six tasks listed above, UN instruments may need to be strengthened, for others, new tools may be necessary. While the UN has well-developed capacities for political engagement to support implementation of a peace agreement, it has fewer tools for conflict prevention. Instruments for capacity-building are much more well-developed in peace operations than for non-mission settings. Monitoring by human beings has long been the norm for the UN; it has only recently begun to experiment with the use of drones for that purpose. While UN operations have substantial experience trying to protect civilians against known spoilers, they have less experience dealing with asymmetric threats. Should preventing violent extremism advisers be added to the UN toolkit?

**IMPLICATIONS**

A number of implications for peace operations reform can be identified.

First, to avoid the twin evils of an “imported peace” and an “elite peace”, engage in inclusive consultations with local actors at every stage. The main determinant of constructive external intervention is the relationship with internal actors. Consultations about the mandate of a peace operation or other presence must begin at the earliest stages of planning, and must continue throughout the life of a peace process. The challenge is to identify the appropriate local interlocutors. This has to include the main parties in a conflict or peace process, but – to the extent possible – should reach beyond them to other stakeholders: opposition groups, local authorities, community leaders, and representatives of civil society, especially from the most conflict-affected segments of the population. Phased mandates can help with that by giving the UN the time and space to consult a broad cross-section of local actors before committing to a particular response. A peace agreement or political settlement, if it exists, ought be treated as a “relational contract” - not a simple bargain or transaction, but a rather a framework for managing a long-term relationship that implicates multiple actors and evolves over time.

Second, in surveying the conditions that determine what sort of UN presence is likely to be most effective, consider whether multiple mandates reinforce or undermine each other. Protecting civilians and supporting the extension of state authority may be compatible in one context but not another. Prioritized mandates can help with that by assigning
missions tasks that are achievable in light of conditions at a particular moment, but that may change, grow or shrink as the conditions change.

**Third, peace mission design must account for the impact of other measures the UN can take for the maintenance of international peace and security.** Other measures include Security Council-authorized no-fly zones, sanctions regimes, international criminal trials, arbitration proceedings, and commissions of inquiry. These can either reinforce or constrain the work of a peace operation. Criminal justice mechanisms may sideline actors who can get in the way of a political process; or they may make it impossible to engage with actors who are needed for that process. How to leverage those other tools should factor in the design, planning and transition of a peace operation.

**Fourth, UN analysis and planning must include an assessment of how its instruments can best be used in relation to those of other actors.** Regional and sub-regional organizations are active players in peace operations, coalitions of the willing are sometimes authorized, and bilateral actors often dispatch envoys and experts to conflict-affected states. Some of these actors have a similar list of tools at their disposal, if less capacity, like the African Union. Others have greater resources but fewer tools, like NATO and the World Bank. Partnering with other actors expands the range of instruments the international community can bring to bear in a peace process: regional mediation teams, over-the-horizon security guarantees, and donor compacts.

**Fifth, ensure missions, financing arrangements, and headquarters structures are able to adapt quickly to changing conditions.** The notion of “adhocracy” nicely captures how peace operations must be able to adapt and transform. It is an organizational form that exhibits fluidity in response to a changing environment, collaboration on a particular task, and the ability to reconfigure to perform new tasks as a peace process unfolds. In order to provide “tailored and flexible” responses, the UN has to be able to innovate, and to innovate it must avoid the trappings of rigid bureaucratic structures, with sharp divisions of labor and hidebound operating procedures. Bureaucratic silos, cumbersome hiring practices and outdated budgeting processes must give way to more fluid arrangements, both at headquarters and in the field.

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**WHICH INSTRUMENTS CAN BEST BE USED TO PERFORM WHAT TASKS?**

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<td>Judicial and corrections advisors</td>
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HURRY UP AND WAIT: EU BATTLEGROUPS AND A UN RAPID REACTION FORCE

Yf Reykers

Throughout its public discourse, the EU keeps expressing a strong commitment toward supporting the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This includes habitually recommitting to deploying the EU Battlegroups.

There have been many calls for the UN to develop a peacekeeping rapid reaction capacity that would allow blue helmets to fly over the horizon and save the day. In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace of 1995, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said its “time has come”. The 2015 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) suggested a “small UN ‘vanguard capability’ should be considered”. In his response, the Secretary-General called this “an intriguing concept”. Why have we been waiting for so long for such a force to arrive?
Recognizing that the UN moves slowly, the HIPPO and the Secretary-General’s reports proposed a burden-sharing solution. Relying on existing regional rapid response mechanisms could deliver this capability in the case of an emergency in the near future. “In situations of major conflict and mass violations of human rights,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted, “national, multinational and regional responses are often faster to deploy and more capable of combating well-equipped and determined belligerents”. In the response to the HIPPO report, he even welcomed African Union (AU) efforts and “the commitment by the European Union (EU) to engaging European Union Battlegroups”.

The sad track record of the EU’s rapid response capabilities make these promises sound rather hollow. While the EU has been a reliable partner in civilian and security operations, EU members have been far less inclined to offer military capabilities — and certainly not in a rapid fashion. Publicly endorsing commitments to engage EU Battlegroups is more a symbolic expression of hope rather than a credible proposal.

**THE EU-UN PARTNERSHIP**

Ever since the 1992 Agenda for Peace called upon regional organizations to assist the UN in maintaining international peace and security, the EU has taken the most prominent position of them all. The EU-UN relationship particularly intensified after Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1484, the EU rapidly deployed 1,800 troops to Bunia (in the Ituri province) for the period May-September 2003. It also assisted the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in securing the airport and protecting civilians and internally displaced persons in 2006.

The success of Operation Artemis led to two developments that significantly shaped the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and impacted its relationship with the UN. The first was an awareness in the EU and UN that increased cooperation and the institutionalization of the relationship could be mutually beneficial. This was formalized through the EU-UN Joint Declaration of 2003, wherein the EU stressed “its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management”, and the 2007 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management. In the field this translated to increased EU presence, often in support of UN operations. The EU has since 2003 conducted about 30 peace and security operations, with the large majority of them being deployed in areas where there was also a UN operation underway.

The second development was the creation of the EU Battlegroups, a CSDP rapid response force that strongly reflects the modalities of Operation Artemis. These battlegroups, consisting of a brigade of around 1,500 troops, were designed to be deployed within fifteen days for a period of maximum 120 days, and could be set up for the full range of crisis management tasks, even including intervention in a sudden crisis. Interestingly, these Battlegroups were envisioned to be deployed only under the explicit condition of a request by the UNSC. By doing so, the EU reaffirmed the Council’s role as the primary organ responsible in maintaining international peace and security, while seemingly indicating EU commitment to support the UN anywhere necessary.

**A SEEMINGLY CONTINUOUS COMMITMENT?**

Ever since they reached full operational capacity in 2007, the EU Battlegroups have excelled only in their absence. Throughout its public discourse, however, the EU keeps expressing a strong commitment toward supporting the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This includes habitually recommitting to deploying the EU Battlegroups. In the European
Security Strategy of 2003 it was argued that “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority”. Five years later in 2008, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy stressed “everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives”. At the European Council of 19/20 December 2013, it was even explicitly concluded that there was a “need to improve the EU rapid response capabilities, including through more flexible and deployable Battle groups”. At the Peacekeeping Summit of 28 September 2015, the EU again committed itself to “strengthen cooperation on rapid response”.

True commitment of the EU Battlegroups to the UN’s crisis management efforts is not only an expectation created by the EU’s public discourse. It is also a desire that is to some extent present in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). A reliable EU Battlegroup mechanism might offer a chance to “reverse the decline in contributions from many high-capability countries”, as it was called in the HIPPO report, although they are mainly created for short-termed deployment in sudden crisis situations. In addition, it would also (finally) provide active and material backing to the EU member states’ moral support for UN peacekeeping. In that sense, an EU Battlegroup commitment would clearly serve the UN’s interests.

A CONTRADICTIO IN TERMINIS

In his response to the HIPPO report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized that “[t]he Panel's call for stronger global-regional partnerships is central to effective international peace and security engagements.” However, he also noted that “Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the foundation, but its operationalization depends on our collective will and ability to put in place predictable and efficient responses from diverse partners.” While the number of EU peace and security operations suggests that the EU is a reliable partner, its rapid response record has been patchy and EU Battlegroup deployment remains a distant dream.

In the period 2003-2008, the EU-UN cooperation in crisis management looked somewhat promising. Not only was the EU a reliable provider for civilian and policing missions, it also deployed a series of military operations in support of the UN — some even rapidly. Examples are the temporary deployments of Artemis in 2003 (authorized by UNSC Resolution 1484), EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1671) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008 (UNSC Resolution 1778).

EVEN IN THOSE FEW OCCASIONS WHERE EU MEMBER STATES WERE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DEPLOYING A MILITARY OPERATION, THEY NEITHER MADE USE OF THE EU BATTLEGROUPS NOR WERE THEY CAPABLE OF RAPIDLY DEPLOYING THESE TROOPS.

Since 2008, however, EU military support to the UN has become rather the exception than the rule. This is largely a result of financial constraints and a lacking interest in committing troops to the African continent, where the majority of the crises take place. The most widely cited example is the case of the DR Congo in late 2008. When Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was confronted with increased violence in eastern Congo, he requested the EU to send military reinforcements to support MONUC. EU member states were unable to reach agreement on any form of military deployment. Commentators repeatedly stressed
the thwarting of the EU Battlegroup deployment by the UK and Germany, the two countries leading the Battlegroups that were on standby.

Even in those few occasions where EU member states were able to reach agreement on deploying a military operation, they neither made use of the EU Battlegroups nor were they capable of rapidly deploying these troops. Most recently, this was illustrated in the response to the quickly escalating crisis that broke out in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. Having received UNSC authorization to deploy troops to the CAR through Resolution 2134 at the end of January 2014, the EU Council on 10 February reached agreement on deploying the military operation called EUFOR RCA. But EUFOR RCA made little use of the EU Battlegroups, nor could it be described as a rapid response: it was deployed in April and it took until June to reach full operational capacity.

The commitments made by the EU member states during the UN Peacekeeping Summit of 28 September 2015 might at first sight look promising. However, these are at best scattered. Some EU members did pledge to upgrade their commitment toward specific operations, such as the Netherlands and Nordic pledges to reinforce MINUSMA. But overall, EU member states remain at the lower end of supporting UN peacekeeping and are mainly committed to providing personnel for training purposes. The EU’s shifting focus is to niche capabilities such as training missions like the one in Mali (EUTM). The idea of building a rapid response capability by relying on the EU Battlegroups sounds like a *contradictio in terminis*.

**LEARNING FROM THE EU BATTLEGROUPS**

Does this mean that the suggestions made by the High-Level Panel and the Secretary-General are completely futile? Maybe not. First, they express a hope, indicating that the idea of the EU Battlegroups is still supported by the UN’s Secretariat, even if chances for actual deployment are remote. Second, and moving beyond wishful thinking, the patchy history of the EU’s rapid response and the absence of EU Battlegroup deployments can also be constructively used in discussions on developing a UN rapid reaction force.

Any analysis of the reasons why these EU Battlegroups have not been deployed identifies three key obstacles. The first is the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’, meaning that those countries that equip the EU Battlegroup are also expected to carry the costs. Obviously, this seriously impedes actual deployment. The UN Secretariat should consider if and how such a UN rapid response force could be funded through the UN’s existing financial system, as it is exploring doing for the AU’s contributions. Keeping troops on standby is a more expensive endeavour than providing peacekeepers on an ad hoc basis. This principle has led to a fear among EU members of creating a precedent, making them resort to ad hoc solutions. A UN rapid reaction force should be wary of creating future obligations that may scare away potential (European) contributors.

Second, EU national interests do not match conflicts where the UN is deploying. The EU Battlegroups are provided through a rotation scheme whereby every six months a new pair of Battlegroups is put on standby. As a result, actual deployment is dependent on whether or not the member state involved at the time sees any benefit in committing military troops (and financial resources) to that particular conflict. National interests seriously impede the chances of actual deployment. While there was enthusiasm over the Chinese pledge at the Peacekeeping Summit to deliver 8000 standby troops to the UN, their deployment could face the same problem. An expression of a commitment does not guarantee that these troops will be made available for any conflict in just any region. Ideally, the creation of a UN rapid reaction force should be accompanied
by a serious discussion on how to guarantee that troops put on standby will also actually be deployed when required. A clear analysis is needed regarding which commitments can be used for what purposes, based upon the national stakes that drive these commitments. That starts with an analysis of the China’s interests.

Third, discussions of EU military deployments have all too often been bogged down in a disagreement over the use of force. Commentators have in that regard frequently pointed toward the German reluctance to use military force. Germany’s position in the Libyan conflict in 2011 is an often-cited illustration. As UN peace operations are increasingly deployed to hazardous environments, discussions on providing an authorization to use force will undoubtedly arise. In order to convince member states to commit troops to this UN rapid reaction force, a clear vision should already be in place on both the extent to which these forces would be allowed to use force, and on the modalities under which such force would be allowed.

CONCLUSION

In the words of the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, “the value of this arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency.” The history of the EU Battlegroups is an indispensable guide to the pitfalls confronting a rapid response force from any region or country. Realism regarding the expectations of EU contributions is equally essential. We have waited more than twenty years for an actual UN rapid response capability. Unless problems are resolved in paying for it, aligning national interests, and agreeing on how much force it will use, we may be waiting another two decades — if not longer — before we see it deployed.

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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS STRATEGY: A GREATER ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL

Ralph Mamiya

THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATE IN PEACEKEEPING WAS A REACTION TO THE CHALLENGES PEACEKEEPERS DIRECTLY FACED IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS AND MORE GENERALLY A REACTION TO THE ‘NEW WARS’ OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD.

Fifteen years ago, the Brahimi Report established the importance of the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping. The recent report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations and the Secretary-General’s follow-up report on the Future of UN Peace Operations each highlight the importance of the protection mandate while also recognizing that the mandate is in need of clarity. The moral and legal foundations are clear, but the mandate’s political and strategic direction often goes undefined. The protection of civilians has raised unachievable expectations and continuing debates about its interpretation inhibit effective action. It has been claimed by a broad swathe of actors, caught between concepts of the responsibility to protect, humanitarian access, and human rights advocacy. Providing strategic direction for the mandate will require greater dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat, and Troop Contributors. It will also require acknowledging that protecting
civilians is not always straightforwardly selfless, an end in itself, but rather should form part of the mission’s overall goals for bringing stability and security to the country. This idea is simple to state in general terms but difficult to implement without strong support from the Council and its Members.

BACKGROUND TO THE MANDATE

The protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping was a reaction to the challenges peacekeepers directly faced in Rwanda and the Balkans and more generally a reaction to the ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Some scholars argued that civilians were killed at astonishing rates in these ‘new wars’, including that civilians accounted for 90 percent of war-time deaths. These claims that are now disputed, and many researchers argue that civil wars are actually on the decline. Yet it was clear that peacekeepers could not conscientiously operate in the environments to which they were sent without the ability to act to protect civilians. This was not necessarily a new aspect of peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), one of the first peacekeeping missions, took action that today would likely be called ‘protection of civilians’, despite the absence of an explicit mandate. The Brahimi report similarly implied that the obligation to protect was inherent in the peacekeepers’ role regardless of mandate, a position that the High-level Panel now echoes in framing the protection of civilians across the full spectrum of peace operations and which the Secretary-General supported in his follow-up report.

The concept of the protection of civilians is traceable to International Humanitarian Law and the protection dialogue is highly influenced by humanitarian practice. While sometimes treated as an historical footnote, the roots of POC in humanitarian and human rights action continue to be highly influential in discussions of protection: Protection is often considered as an end-in-itself and neutrality is often viewed as a prerequisite for effective protection. These views often do not square well with modern peacekeeping missions, which retain political aims and are generally considered a means towards sustainable peace and security. The closest that the Secretary-General or the Security Council has come to providing a definition of the protection of civilians is in thematic discussions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, a broad definition encompassing a range of human rights and humanitarian issues. In a 2001 report, the Secretary-General wrote: “Protection” is a complex and multi-layered process, involving a diversity of entities and approaches... [including] the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the monitoring and recording of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and reporting these violations to those responsible and other decision makers; institution building, governance and development programmes; and, ultimately, the deployment of peacekeeping troops...’ Also in 2001, a group of humanitarian and human organisations chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross agreed upon a similarly broad definition of ‘protection’, where protection encompasses ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law... [conducted] in an impartial manner’.

The protection of civilians mandate has become a standard element of mandates for armed peacekeeping yet remains subject to different interpretations. A few months after the first thematic resolution on POC in 1999, the Security Council provided the first POC mandate in peacekeeping to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. This mandate, a Chapter VII authorization to use force, was described at the time as ‘a new, fundamental, legal and moral dimension’, ‘an insurance policy’, ‘deterrent’, and a ‘guarantee [of] protection’. No armed UN mission since 1999 has been newly deployed without a POC mandate. Whether peacekeepers were sent into active conflicts, such as the Central African Republic, or stood guard in non-conflict nations, such as Haiti and Liberia, they were directed to protect, with force if necessary.
The specific implications of the mandate were never clear, and different understandings continue to exist. On its face the mandate changed little in the next 10 years, yet a 2009 OCHA-DPKO Study on the protection of civilians in peacekeeping concluded that peacekeepers and civilian staff held widely varying interpretations of the mandate, often within the same mission. The language of Council mandates can be read as supporting these varying interpretations, including viewing POC as a specific set of activities. MINUSMA, for instance, considers POC within the overarching goal ‘security, stabilization and the protection of civilians’. UNISFA’s POC mandate stands alone but may be read as an element of its overall security and stabilization mandate. Others see it as a general approach to coordination that linked a range of activities MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA, UNAMID and UNMIL have all been directed to develop comprehensive POC strategies. UNMISS and UNAMID, and MONUSCO in its past configuration, have been directed to reorient their operations around civilian protection. Security Council resolution 1894 has also called on all POC-mandated missions to prioritise the use of resources in implementing those mandates. A further group of missions see their POC mandates as an authorization to use force as a last resort. MINUSTAH and UNIFIL frame their POC mandates in this manner, with POC adding little apparent strategic value to the missions’ orientation.

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

The mandate has legal, moral, and strategic elements; only the strategic aspect remains ill-defined. The Brahimi report made clear the moral importance of protection in peacekeeping, and the legal aspects of the mandate are well established by the Office of Legal Affairs and international legal scholars. These moral and legal elements do not direct a particular strategy or approach to POC, however, and this strategic element remains undefined.

Security Council mandates on POC have become more prominent over time yet they continue to delegate the most challenging strategic questions to the mission. It has been very willing to identify POC as a priority in many missions. POC has been identified as the priority, or one of a handful of priorities, for UNMISS, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMIL, ONUCI, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA. Resolution 1894 also directs all missions with POC mandates to prioritise resources and capabilities to that mandate’s implementation.

Some missions have received detailed operational instructions that can only be read as a sign of the Council’s interest in more dynamic approaches to protection. The Council’s calls for ‘robust patrolling’ in Sudan with Resolution 1769 in 2007, ‘early warning mechanisms’ in Resolution 1996 in 2011, encouragement of ‘the full use of [the mission’s] mandate and capabilities’ in Resolution 1870, and regular ‘reviews of deployment’ in Resolution 1919 as well as encouraging ‘coordination between civilian and military components’ in the DRC with Resolution 1906.

Despite these small technical and operational changes to mandate language in certain missions, the Council is generally silent on the strategic or political direction for the protection of civilians. In some instances, it has identified groups in particular need of protection, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur and DRC, yet this direction to protect has often been vague and has never been exclusive; missions have come under regular criticism for protection failures beyond these groups, such as criticism of UNAMID for incidents in Darfur involving settled communities rather than IDPs.

The absence of clear direction from the Council and Member States has placed a great deal of the strategic and political burden on the Secretariat and missions. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support have developed a policy on the protection of civilians and associated military guidelines, but these remain primarily technical documents. The
means, methods and strategies for protecting civilians are highly dependent on context. With mission environments as varied as Lebanon, South Sudan, and Mali, headquarters-level guidance remains necessarily general.

This leaves the peacekeeping mission itself to answer some of the most significant political and strategic questions about its mandate. Missions develop their own context-specific POC strategies, however, these often focus on the operational issues that field staff are accustomed, and well placed, to address. Without clear guidance from the Council, such mission-based strategies may not carry significant weight with the military component or contributed troop contingents. An independent UN evaluation noted a broken ‘chain’ regarding the protection of civilians: Where peacekeepers’ lives are placed in danger, policy and operational decisions are not easily ceded to the Secretariat or civilian mission leadership.

The absence of strategic direction in protection only compounds the resource, capability, and will problems faced by peacekeepers. The expectation upon peacekeepers to protect — expectations from the media, humanitarians, the Council, or others — is often supremely high regardless of resources, and those expectations are difficult to change when strategic objectives are unclear. The vast disparity in resources between missions further complicates the setting of reasonable expectations. The UN Mission in Abyei has one troop for every 2.5 square kilometers and the Mission in Lebanon has one troop for every 0.1 square kilometer, yet the Mission in Darfur has one troop for every 12 square kilometers and the Mission in South Sudan one troop for every 54 square kilometers.

Successes in protection have been recognized most frequently in situations where the strategic and political imperatives of the POC mandate are clear. The current crisis in South Sudan, the highly robust operations by MONUSCO (whether through the Intervention Brigade or past operations), and the highly focused security mission in Abyei are all examples of missions that have received plaudits for their protection work. These missions have also faced situations or mandates that made clear a particular strategic direction, whether that is defending civilians in their bases or conducting operations against enemies. Most missions, however, are not faced with crises that force such clarity. A variety of categories of strategy exist for peacekeeping, enumeration of which is beyond the scope of this paper but many of which can contribute to better defining expectations and improving the mission’s unity of effort.

WAYS FORWARD

The challenge of strategic direction is neither simple nor straightforward. Many aspects of a mission’s political strategy can and should be left to the Secretariat, to SRSG’s who lead the mission and to headquarters staff who support them. In addition, the role of troop contributors and host government should not be forgotten, particularly where protection of civilians mandates are concerned. Yet the Council has a key The Secretary-General’s recent report on the Future of UN Peace Operations highlights the importance of the protection of civilians mandate while also recognizing some of the challenges outlined above. The Secretary-General’s proposals are applicable generally to peace operations, but they can be tailored to the protection mandate:

• **The Council and Council Members can play a greater role in providing strategic focus for each mission.** The Secretary-General fully endorsed the High-level Panel’s call for the Council to bring the full weight of its authority not only to starting peace operations, but also to help them navigate politically difficult terrain. In Darfur, for example, thousands of peacekeepers have worked in difficult and often dangerous conditions for nearly a decade despite a political vacuum. This support could include greater strategic guidance in mandate language, potentially including the Council’s
acknowledgement and approval of mission strategies for protection (including acknowledgement of the mission’s stated limitations). This will require greater engagement from the Council and from mandate pen-holders, as well as a willingness amongst the Secretariat to relinquish a degree of its operational prerogatives in mandate implementation.

• **A stronger Council role will require better dialogue and reporting.** Past examinations of the protection of civilians, such as the OCHA-DPKO Study and the OIOS independent evaluation have consistently called for improved reporting to the Council, and better-defined mandates will require dialogue with the mission and the Secretariat. The Secretary-General reaffirmed his commitment to frank reporting on peacekeeping resources, capabilities and escalating situations. DPKO is also exploring ways to provide the Council with reports that focus more on political analysis than operational updates.

• **Dialogue with troop contributors remains essential.** Triangular cooperation between troop contributors, the Secretariat, and the Security Council has long been recognized as important to effective peacekeeping. The Secretary-General proposed multiple rounds of consultations with troop contributors before missions are established, to ensure that all potential contributors are aware of the capabilities required to address a given situation and what will be expected of them if they deploy their troops.

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CONFLICT PREVENTION
CHINA’S APPROACH TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS), THE PCA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE WAS IN STARK CONTRAST TO INDIA’S SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT IN 2008 (WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM WASHINGTON) OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP TO SEEK A ONE-TIME WAIVER.

The ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague against China’s claim on the South China Sea in a case brought before the court by the Philippines should prima facie have remained a bilateral matter between the litigants. In reality, however, it has become an exemplar of China’s role in the ongoing contest to determine the world order. China’s shrill and bellicose response during and after the ruling has only served to heighten alarm over Beijing’s intentions and behaviour among all the major powers, including India.

China’s attitude ranged from benign disengagement and denial of the court’s jurisdiction to rabid intimidation and downright threats. It made little effort to engage with either the PCA or to build support for its cause. Instead, it erroneously assumed that as a global power, it had earned the right to violate the very rules that it had signed up to earlier.
Among China’s paltry and dubious supporters were land-locked Afghanistan and Niger. Ironically, though Taiwan’s rejection of the PCA ruling was along the lines of China (as the former also claims the South China Sea), Taipei’s support is of no consolation to Beijing. Bizarrely, Pakistan supported China’s rejection of the ruling and called for resolution of the dispute “through consultations and negotiations by states directly concerned, in accordance with bilateral agreements” even as Islamabad’s representative at the UN demanded implementation of international resolutions to address bilateral disputes. Had China garnered some modicum of support, its “optional exception” argument—though legally untenable—might have had some political viability. Instead, as US defence secretary Ashton Carter foretold, China’s actions have built a “Great Wall of self-isolation”.

China’s approach to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the PCA and the South China Sea case was in stark contrast to India’s successful engagement in 2008 (with a little help from Washington) of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to seek a one-time waiver. This exception was granted partly in recognition of India’s growing global role and partly on account of New Delhi’s constructive diplomatic outreach and engagement with key capitals (apart from its non-proliferation record).

The PCA ruling also challenges two additional myths of an emerging peaceful world order. First, that the greater the economic and trade links, the less the geopolitical competition between countries. However, this is not the experience vis-à-vis China.

In 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became China’s third largest trading partner. According to Chinese statistics, in 2015, bilateral trade between China and the Philippines grew by 2.7% and hit a new record of $45.65 billion. The Philippines was one of only four ASEAN countries to retain a positive growth with China. Similarly, according to Philippine statistics, in 2015, China was the second largest trading partner and third largest export market of the Philippines. Yet, as the bitter stand-off over the PCA ruling underlines, none of this translated into political bonhomie.

Second, there is also the perception that the closer the web of international institutions and arrangements, especially with dispute resolution mechanisms, is woven, the less the inclination of nations to resort to brute force or the threat of use of force. This too has been belied by China’s actions.

In fact, contrary to the benign perception of international cooperation buttressed by closer economic, trade and institutional integration, it is more likely that China’s reaction to the adverse ruling will have a negative impact on other multilateral processes; it will certainly cast a shadow on the China-led September G-20 summit in Hangzhou and the October BRICS summit in Goa, and diminish the already dim prospects of UN Security Council reforms. Conceivably, even the resolution of the China-India border is likely to regress.

Similarly, although the PCA ruling is unlikely to be enforced (given that the only country which could do so—the US—has not ratified UNCLOS and is presently unwilling to challenge China militarily) Beijing has issued a not-so-veiled threat to escalate military tensions by unveiling a pair of so-called “carrier-killer” missiles.

Welcome to a more chaotic, dangerous and disorderly world.

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GETTING CLEAR ABOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION AT THE UN

Gustavo de Carvalho and Adriana Erthal Abdenur

IN GENERAL, THE UN HAS - EVEN IF IMPLICITLY - ADOPTED SHORT-TERM AND INSULAR VIEWS ON THE CAUSES OF CONFLICTS, WHICH CONSEQUENTLY SHAPE ITS RESPONSES TO INSTABILITY. EXISTING CONFLICT-PREVENTION MECHANISMS, SUCH AS EARLY-WARNING SYSTEMS, ARE MOSTLY DESIGNED TO DETECT ONLY IMMINENT OR RECURRING CONFLICTS.

The 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN) last year has prompted new questions about the organisation’s ability to effectively address peace and security problems around the globe.

The UN peace and security architecture has expanded dramatically since the Cold War. This has partly been in response to the changing nature of conflict, but it is also a reflection of the organisation’s own ability to provide effective responses.

After an increased number of complex intra-state conflicts in the 1990s, the world saw a sharp decrease in numbers in the early 2000s. However, in the past five years, these numbers have again been on the rise.
This is particularly important for peace operations; perhaps the most visible of international responses to conflicts. Peace operations have, at best, delivered mixed results. This is particularly true for robust missions, which are drawn out over prolonged periods, and face increased challenges in their ability to deal with transnational threats such as terrorism and the protection of civilians.

Attempts to reform the UN's peace and security mechanisms have been undertaken since the 1990s.

The so-called Brahimi Report of 1999 was a response to the challenges faced by UN peacekeeping in the '90s, especially the failure to protect civilians in Bosnia and prevent the genocide in Rwanda. The report led to positive changes – including the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005.

Problems of effectiveness, funding, coordination and coherence remain, however. Peace operations have not, for example, been able to fulfil the goals of protecting civilians; nor has the UN been effective in preventing conflicts and sustaining peace.

It is not surprising that a new series of reviews of the UN's peace and security architecture were conducted in 2015, namely on peace operations; the Peacebuilding Architecture; and women, peace and security. These reviews focused on bettering the role played by the UN and recommended that conflict prevention be placed at the core of responses.

The 2015 reviews argue that the fragmentation and 'silos' that typify UN responses to conflict are not just costly, but also reduce the overall impact of UN efforts. Many – both within the UN and outside of it – believe that an increased focus on conflict prevention would be far cheaper than a continued narrow focus on ongoing or recurring conflicts.

But if the idea of turning conflict prevention into a core UN responsibility is broadly accepted among stakeholders, why has the UN been so slow to implement it?

One challenge is the difficulty that any organisation faces in shifting to behave in a precautionary manner; even when such a stance is considered to be more cost-effective than remedial measures.

Likewise, it is hard to get stakeholders to think about the root causes and to adopt a long-term view of conflict, precisely given difficulty in assessing the overall impact of preventive measures.

How do we know when conflict prevention works? Without better mechanisms to plan and evaluate conflict prevention, it will be difficult to alter the structure of incentives, and this principle will remain a secondary function of the UN.

In general, the UN has – even if implicitly – adopted short-term and insular views on the causes of conflicts, which consequently shape its responses to instability. Existing conflict-prevention mechanisms, such as early-warning systems, are mostly designed to detect only imminent or recurring conflicts.

Outbreaks of conflict are typically the manifestations of much longer trends and underlying factors, which means this short-sighted approach is suited only to a small number of instances.

The emphasis on imminent conflicts, rather than long-term trends, has also made conflict prevention a politically sensitive topic. Member states fear that being included on such lists may lead to stigma and even undesired intervention.
In addition, early-warning mechanisms at the UN have widely been designed and implemented in an ad hoc and piecemeal manner; involving different components within the mission structure and UN agencies – from the UN Security Council to the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC).

The JMAC, in particular, illustrates some of the limitations of the current UN approach. Although it aims to coordinate analysis and provide early warning, in reality, it often does not optimally utilise the information and capabilities of all mission components, such as police and the UN Department of Safety and Security.

This results in skewed and incomplete analysis, which is insufficient for effective early warning and operational planning. An effective early-warning system should provide integrated analytical tools, which would allow decision-makers to take quick and calculated operational decisions, but also long-term assessments. This should become an intrinsic part of sustainable peace-planning processes.

However, the biggest challenge is that only focusing on conflict prevention still won't be sufficient. The concept of conflict prevention remains too vague; and therefore difficult to implement.

There are still critical questions on what it really means for specific roles and responsibilities, especially within the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Peacebuilding Architecture.

In order to translate the concept into policies and mechanisms within the UN and partner organisations, such as the African Union, there must be more to conflict prevention than just principled acceptance from stakeholders. Specifics are needed, along with practical elements that would allow for concrete strategies and plans to be formulated.

For conflict prevention to become a central element in the UN's approach to peace and security, there is essential groundwork to be done. This includes an improved understanding of what makes conflict prevention effective; to better identify the types of mechanisms that should be put in place.

This is particularly important in reducing the fragmentation between different components – such as peace operations, peacebuilding efforts and conflict prevention.

In the end, strategic choices will have to be made. If everything counts as conflict prevention, then conflict prevention means very little indeed. The UN needs to focus on understanding not only the key drivers of conflicts, but also the conditions needed for durable peace. Only then will it be able to anticipate and address the root causes of conflict; and design and implement innovations for effectively preventing it.

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CREATING A “RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT” AT THE UN

Kristoffer Tarp

IF UN MEMBER STATES WERE TO ENDORSE A PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT (AN R2P V.2), SIMILAR PRINCIPLES SHOULD APPLY I.E. THAT STATES THEMSELVES CARRY THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT CONFLICT - IF NEEDED SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

Much of the High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) on Peace and Security in the General Assembly in May was predictably centred on prevention. Participants made the case for greater efforts to prevent conflict from erupting or re-erupting in the first place and committing to sustaining peace. But maybe it is time, as Youssef Mahmoud has argued, for prevention as a term to be disconnected from conflict?

This would entail moving towards a notion of “positive peace” as first coined by Johan Galtung; a comprehensive approach to identifying and nurturing the attitudes, institutions and structures, which we know create societal resilience and sustainable peace by addressing root causes and potential triggers of conflict long before conflict turns violent.
In line with this thinking, others have argued that assistance to the prevention of conflict should apply similar approaches as efforts to prevent diseases by improving public health. Medical practitioners and experts have known for centuries that enhancing prevention decreases the need for expensive cures. Similarly, efforts to sustain peace should focus on developing permanent local agency and capacity to prevent conflict that might turn violent - just as we do when ensuring cold chains, improving medical education, rolling out public health campaigns and introducing vaccination programs to prevent diseases.

The discussions during the HLTD also demonstrated that the three key peace and security reports of 2015, with their crosscutting focus on prevention and sustaining peace, are now triggering a range of reflections on our approaches to, and understanding of, efforts to address the risks of violent conflict.

**MAKING PREVENTION A REALITY IN THE UN SYSTEM**

Reflection is good and collective reflection even better when the aim is to advance a global understanding of the most critical challenges relating to preventing violent conflict. However, at some point one needs to look for the tangible changes these discursive shifts may or may not bring about. Much of the discussion during the HLTD dealt with the capacity and ability of the UN System to support preventive efforts.

One discussion focused on the proposal to strengthen the Department of Political Affairs' mediation and preventive diplomacy capacity as well as its early warning mechanisms. This would necessitate expanded, professionalised and more rapidly deployable mediation capacities and an increased use and spread of political envoys and good offices. Such improvements and expansions ought to be a no-brainer for those Member States expected to foot the bill. Preventive actions cost a fraction of any form of response to the outbreak of violent conflict. Needless to say that the self-evident nature of these investments will not automatically lead to Member State action in times marked by siloed financing and diminishing investments in the UN System from a range of donor countries.

**MAKING PREVENTION WORK OUTSIDE THE UN SYSTEM**

While the discussions of the UN System's mediation capacities and approaches remain extremely relevant, the focus on institutional fixes and capabilities also provide a convenient excuse to walk around the elephant in the room: the political dynamics and decisions that often lead to indecision and inaction when it comes to early prevention efforts and commitment to finding political solutions. Most of the seemingly intractable, protracted, and bloody conflicts we face today have little to do with the UN's mediation capacity or the number of regional envoys. Their protraction and intractability are caused by the lack of appetite of local, national, regional or geopolitical actors to find viable political compromises, solutions and settlements. In fact, many of the conflicts transcend the interests, positions and worldviews of local actors and have instead become either proxy wars waged by regional actors or/and have fallen prey to geopolitical endeavours to project power and influence. The three reviews of last year also fully acknowledged this **primacy of politics** when it comes to sustaining peace.

This recognition evidently begs the question: What do we do when the question is not about mediation capacities and finding the most effective arrangements for international assistance to prevent violent conflict but about the deliberate reluctance of key actors to activate these capacities and forms of assistance? The big question here - the size of the elephant in the room - is, whether the UN's Member States are ready to agree to obligating and committing principles ensuring that local, regional or
geopolitical interests or proxy interest are not allowed to prevent prevention i.e. that preventive efforts can bypass political deadlocks and decision-making impasse by calling on the Responsibility to Prevent.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION?

The semantic reference to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is neither accidental nor an attempt to ignore the history of contestation and disagreement around R2P as a concept. One of the on-going tensions concerning the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security continues to relate to state sovereignty and interference therein. The UN Charter grants the Security Council the power to authorise interfering, including with military means, in the internal affairs of any country in the world if a situation poses a threat to international peace and security.

In recent decades, peacekeeping missions have indeed increasingly been deployed to deal with intra-state conflict and civil war - and increasingly without the full content of the belligerent parties. There have, however, also been several examples of inaction or inadequate action by the Security Council mainly linked to one or more permanent members of the Security Council vetoing decisions to intervene out of geopolitical interests, concerns over breaching state sovereignty or using the latter argument to cover over the former.

THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT COULD EMPOWER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REFER PREVENTION CONCERNS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAKING IT A STANDING ITEM ON THE COUNCIL’S AGENDA WITHOUT GIVING THE COUNCIL’S PERMANENT MEMBERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BLOCK OR REMOVE THE AGENDA ITEM.

The R2P principles were endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to “prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. The principles would allow the international community to respond, including through military means, if and when a range of criteria were met and a set if principles applied. These principles stressed that intervention, including the use of force based on R2P principles, could only happen as a means of last resort. Protecting civilians would remain the primary responsibility of the individual state, the international community would commit to assisting a state in its efforts to protect its civilian population and only in cases where the state proved unwilling or unable to adequately protect its citizens would an R2P intervention be warranted - but in these situations no longer as a choice but rather as a responsibility.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT PRINCIPLES

If UN Member States were to endorse a principle of Responsibility to Prevent (an R2P v.2), similar principles should apply i.e. that states themselves carry the primary responsibility to prevent conflict - if needed supported by the international community. Only in cases where countries fail to sustain peace would the Security Council or other international actors initiate preventive efforts.
The main difference between the responsibility to protect and that to prevent would be a) the absence of the use of force in preventive efforts) at least under the Responsibility to Prevent principles) and b) action at the earliest possible stages of emerging conflict - ideally before conflict turns violent at all and thus addressing root causes and potential triggers of conflict. A such, the Responsibility to Prevent should appear significantly less threatening to Member States worried about the Responsibility to Protect principles being used to authorise and expand the use of force beyond the original intention and lacking appropriate proportionality as well as a realistic end stage. Those following the application of the R2P principles will recall such concerns expressed with regards to past interventions namely in Libya in 2011.

OPERATIONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT

The increased political and institutional focus on prevention obviously begs the question what prevention actually means in more “operational terms”. While there is no single answer to this question, efforts might include the establishment of Good Offices and/or deployment of a mediator or a team of mediators to a country or region displaying distressing signs of tension and inability to sustain peace. This would include addressing structural root causes of conflict and thus involve a much broader understanding of what sustains peace along the lines of the positive peace vision embodied in the sustainable development goals and namely goal sixteen.

Also, early action evidently depends on early knowledge and acknowledgement. Implementing the principles of Responsibility to Prevent would therefore require an in-depth understanding of - often latent - conflict drivers at the local, national and regional levels. The principles are consequently linked to enhancing the capacity of the UN System and local actors to identify early indications of escalating conflict. From a UN angle this is currently particularly challenging in countries with no “political presence” of the UN System i.e. no peacekeeping or political mission and no political envoy covering the territory. Circling back to DPS's call for enhanced coverage and capacity, such presences must be expanded and capacitated to fulfil this role.

The Responsibility to Prevent could also entail the issuance of Security Council resolutions requesting local stakeholders showing signs of division to engage constructively in negotiations - potentially accompanied by punitive measures (through sanctions panels and monitoring groups) towards parties failing to comply. The Security Council might also request a regional organisation to initiate preventive efforts or endorse and support (including financing) a regional organisation already doing so. Responsibility to Prevent could also mean that the Security Council will keep a prevention challenge in a given country as a standing item on its agenda until a political settlement leading to sustainable peace has been identified and implemented.

The Security Council could also request, and the Secretary-General could support through the Secretariat, the development and implementation of national road maps for prevention including through building early warning systems, institutional response mechanisms and longer-term strategies to ensure political, and socio-economic inclusivity and cohesion. In many contexts, this will require significant investments from external bilateral and multilateral actors. While this is true for all preventive work, post-conflict situations are likely to require particularly substantial investments to deal with the trauma and legacy of conflict - including the physical destruction, absence of sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunity.

Hence, there is a need for not only increased but also predictable financing if efforts to sustain peace are to prevail. Ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, including for conflict prevention at the earliest stages of potential conflict, was one of the unresolved issues in the recently adopted resolution on peacebuilding. The question
was left for the incoming Secretary-General to consider and return with options for the membership to consider during the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

Finally, the principles of Responsibility to Prevent could empower the General Assembly to refer prevention concerns to the Security Council making it a standing item on the Council’s agenda without giving the Council’s permanent members the opportunity to block or remove the agenda item. While this is unlikely to change potential geopolitical dynamics it could, at least, help to making these known to the broader global public and discussed (and criticised) out in the open.

CONCLUSION

The recent reviews of the UN’s role in maintaining international peace and security and the subsequent momentum in terms of UN and Member State attention, marks somewhat of a leap forward in our conceptual understanding of efforts to sustain peace. They reinforce the understanding that prevention must be put front and centre at the earliest stages of potential conflict while, and by, acknowledging the primacy of politics in efforts to sustain peace. This requires reformed and enhanced efforts within the UN System.

The acknowledgement of the primacy of politics highlights the limitations of the UN System and the critical role played its Member States in supporting prevention thorough addressing political root causes of conflict and supporting fair and inclusive political settlements. There are cases where local, regional or geopolitical interests stand in the way of such dedicated and serious prevention efforts. These deadlocks could potentially be addressed by introducing the principles of Responsibility to Prevent. These are some very premature ideas about what such principles could entail and how they could be operationalized. It is now up the UN’s Member States to complement the needed institutional fixes with genuine Member State action. A binding agreement on the Responsibility to Prevent and its operational implications could be an important step in this direction.

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THE TUNISIA CONUNDRUM: SOWING DICTATORSHIP, HARVESTING TERRORISM

Hanny Megally

There is no one explanation but a combination of reasons has been put forward as to why radicalization and travel to fight abroad was happening in Tunisia in the decades before the 2011 uprising.

Why is Tunisia producing the world’s largest numbers of jihadi foreign fighters when the country is seemingly the one success story emerging from the 2011 Arab uprisings? It is a conundrum that has confounded analysts not least because the answers have been very contradictory. Delving back into Tunisia’s modern history may help in contextualizing the answer to this question. It points to decades of heavy-handed top down secularization policies, oppressive human rights practices, a mismanaged economy that privileged the few and neglected large parts of the country, and bad neighbors. Ultimately, as Rachid Ghannouchi the head of the En-Nahda party, a leading Islamist partner in the governing coalition and the largest political force in the country with about 80-100,000 members, put it “if you sow dictatorship, you harvest terrorism”.

A Tunisian protester in March 2015 carrying a poster says “No fear and no terror” and reaffirms “Tunisia will be protected by its people”. The years immediately following the 2011 revolution have been tense years as extremists mounted violent attacks on security and military personnel but gradually expanded this to political activists, civilians and tourists, and diplomatic property. ©Al Fanar Media
WHAT IS SO CONFOUNDING ABOUT THE DATA?

If as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism “we know that extremism flourishes when human rights are violated... political space is shrunk”, this does not seem to match the profile of post-2011 Tunisia. According to Freedom House, it had become by 2015, “the Arab world's only free country”, with many restrictions on freedoms lifted and a greater openness to participate in political processes. Yet according to the Soufan Group, out of a global figure of around 30,000 foreign fighters from about 86 countries who have gone to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic state or other violent extremist groups fighting there, Europe as a whole has produced around 5,000 and Tunisia 6,000 (though Tunisians authorities put the number around 3000).

Some analysts have sought to interpret these figures in a positive light, as an indication that Tunisia's pluralistic society is hostile to extremists. They argue such militants cannot get a foothold or a base in the country and so are mostly fleeing abroad. They point to how civil society has strongly come together in a number of mass protests to condemn political violence - for example after the assassinations of two prominent political opponents – Chokri Belaid and Mohamed el Brahmi, in February and July 2013, or after the attacks on foreign tourists at el-Bardo National Museum and at a beachside resort near Sousse killing over sixty people. Others, however, argue that the numbers of foreign fighters are only the tip of the iceberg, pointing as examples to an Ansar al-Sharia rally in 2012 in Kairouan which drew some 10,000 followers, or to the large number of Islamist radicals in detention (estimated around 12,000), and of course the attacks on the Museum and the hotel and the assassinations as evidence to the contrary.

Finally, there is the argument that following the fall of Ben Ali in 2011 the transitional government was weak and divided and there was a collapse in the security apparatus, as a result those so inclined were easily able to travel (as compared with other countries in the MENA region where potential fighters were stopped from leaving). This is again countered by those who hold the view that security forces are still powerful, for example turning back some 15,000 to leave, seeking arresting 100,000 in the first six months of 2015 and utilizing an ongoing state of emergency and a strict anti terrorism law.

The reality is there is some truth in all of these explanations. Why?

THE ROOTS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA GO BACK DECADES

Two caveats to begin with. A wealth of information has been developed around the key factors or drivers that may lead to an environment conducive - a bit like an incubator - to turning individuals to terrorism or violent extremism. While this is essential groundwork, it is still a fact that that too many assumptions have not been rigorously tested and more empirical and evidence based research is needed. Otherwise we would be counting violent radicals in the tens of millions and not in the tens of thousands.

Additionally, radicalization in itself may not necessarily lead to violent extremism or to negative outcomes. Many radical movements in the past have brought about important positive changes and reforms. The issue is radicalization that leads to violence and the data about why particular individuals living in the same environment become radicalized and resort to violence while others do not remains sparse.
These caveats also apply to Tunisia, but what we do know is that the phenomenon of individuals going abroad to fight in “just wars” goes back a number of decades and should not be read as something that has arisen out of the new “democratic Tunisia”. Research shows that Tunisians were going to fight with the Afghans against the Soviets in the 1980’s or in Bosnia against the Serbs in the 1990’s. The US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 appear to have been turning points with increasing numbers of Tunisians going to wage “jihad” abroad. In those days there was no Islamic State or Daesh but there was al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Sinjar documents, the cache of al Qaeda personnel data discovered in the fall of 2007 by U.S. forces in the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, show that Tunisians were present in Iraq, mostly coming via Syria, though when some were denied access through that route they ended up in Lebanon at the Nahr al Barid refugee camp (joining Fath al Islam there). Research points to Tunisians being present among the very early foreign fighter networks arriving in Iraq and that Ansar al Sharia emerged from among Tunisians imprisoned in Iraq.

WHY WAS THIS HAPPENING?

There is no one explanation but a combination of reasons has been put forward as to why radicalization and travel to fight abroad was happening in the decades before the 2011 uprising. Many of them relate to frustrations arising from grievances and resentment about political repression, absence of freedoms, economic neglect and marginalization. But there are also strong elements of a search for identity, religion and meaning in life, and of exploitation by radical recruiters promising solutions, financial gain or a role in fighting back against the West. This is all very similar to experiences related in other countries where people have turned to violent extremism. More specifically:

• The sometimes heavy handed secularization policies from above during President Habib Bourguiba's 30-year rule (1957-1987) - banning headscarves, abolishing religious courts, placing mosques, including al Zeitouna, under government control, nationalizing religious endowments, introducing secular universal education – jarred with religious sensibilities and conservative attitudes. Islamist recruiters exploited the resentment against these policies.

• The progressively oppressive human rights policies of Ben Ali's 23 years of rule (1987-2011) - arbitrary imprisonment and untried detention; unfair trials; torture, restrictions on freedoms of expression and association - produced resentment, and even more so among Islamists after they did well in the 1989 elections and were then specifically targeted by the regime. Rachid el-Ghannouchi and some En-Nahda leaders were forced to flee into exile. Thousands of suspected Islamists and returnees from Afghanistan and Iraq were also imprisoned during this period (leading to further radicalisation processes and relationship formation in detention). Ben Ali then followed this up with stricter state control over mosques, education system and dress code. Conservative headscarves for women were banned; men with long beards were frequently harassed.

• The rampant corruption and unfair distribution of wealth in the country despite the glowing reports coming from the UN on how Tunisia was achieving its MDGs and was "far ahead in terms of governance, effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality". According to a World Bank study in 2014, 21 per cent of the country's private sector GDP was in the hands of Ben Ali and his clique.

• The neglect by the central government of parts of the country, even while Tunisia was supposedly meeting its MDGs was quite evident. The contrasts between the developments in coastal places like La Marsa or Carthage and the hinterland
close to Algeria or Libya’s borders was stark. An estimated 92 per cent of Tunisia’s industrial production is concentrated in three urban coastal areas: Tunis, Sousse and Sfax, leaving the country’s western regions economically deprived. Many of the Tunisians foreign fighters tracked in the pre-2011 period came from these marginalized inland parts of the country, along the Algeria border to the West, the Chambi mountains or the Libya border to the south east - including places like Kasserine and Ben Guerdane.

- Neglect also included poor slums and neighborhoods of the major cities like Douar Hicher on the west of Tunis or Sejnane in Bizerte.
- The absence of decent jobs, particularly for those with a higher education. Job creation did not keep pace with population growth but additionally, thanks to free access to higher education, the number of university graduates coming into the job market rose from 11% in 2000 to 33.2% by the end of 2013. Basically the situation was “the higher the education level a person has the lower the probability of finding work”. Educated Tunisians were twice as likely to be unemployed as uneducated ones because the economy created so few professional jobs.

Geography also appears to have been a big factor. Being neighbours of Algeria (which until 2014 was the bigger challenge with infiltration into Tunisia of foreign fighters affiliated to AQIM, - who formed the “Uqba ibn Nafi” brigade, the biggest armed group in Tunisia at the time – and out to Europe and on to Turkey) and Libya (which more recently has become the biggest threat both in providing training grounds for Tunisian fighters, routes to Syria, and routes back to Tunisia for IS-linked groups) has helped facilitate this travel. Research has also found links with smuggling of contraband such as cars, cigarettes, oil and arms.

Pre-2011 one could point to areas from the western border areas of Jebel Chambi to the Libya border areas of the south east where repeated examples of neglect, social unrest and contraband smuggling lead to migration but also to foreign fighters following similar routes. Additionally, tribal and family connections influenced this process so that once one family member left others followed, and in some cases whole families were documented as having left to join the Jihad.

IF YOU SOW DICTATORSHIP, YOU HARVEST TERRORISM

Ben Guerdane in the province of Medenine is a case in point. It is a mainly tribal community of around 79,000 people. It is conservative and religious but not historically known as a hotbed of extremists or radicals. That, however, began to change after the 2001 attack on the world trade center in New York and really took off after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Here we see a combination of recruitment drives taking advantage of outrage at events broad, unrest about the worsening economic situation, anger at the state’s repressive policies in putting down protest and easy access to routes for slipping way to join the Jihad. Despite its cultural vitality and natural wealth (ACRPS) it was marginalized in Tunisia’s modern history with little agricultural or industrial investment. Sitting near the border with Libya made travel easier and there is a long history of smuggling (petrol, consumer goods and post 2011 human trafficking and weapons smuggling) and shadow economy. Large protests had been happening pre-2011 after economic decisions by the central authority based on a worsening of political relations with Libya. One was the switch to greater reliance on the maritime route between the ports of Sfax and Tripoli, reducing the land route via Ben Guerdane. Another was the tax imposed by the Libyan authorities on imports of around
150 dinars (then about 80 Euros); and third was the retaliation by Tunisia in imposing import/export licences for anyone selling Libyan goods. This effected livelihoods in Ben Guerdane and protests about growing unemployment erupted openly on several occasions. As a crackdown followed, and particularly targeted bearded men and Salafis the numbers leaving grew.

People interviewed from Ben Guerdane speak of youths and others “disappearing” individually or in groups and later it becoming apparent they had gone to fight in Iraq. Leaving was a conglomeration of those going to join a just cause, those fleeing state repression and those seeking economic opportunities abroad. In 2007 a prosecutor general referred ten Tunisians to trial caught fighting with Fath al Islam. Eight of them were from Ben Guerdane

WHAT CHANGED AFTER 2011 AND THE FALL OF BEN ALI?

With the “Jasmine Revolution” two separate and opposite processes began unfolding in the country. One process was taking the country towards greater openness and freedoms and another was seeking a take it towards strict application of the Sharia, restrictions on behavior and dress and on the role of women.

The first process saw Tunisians elect a president, voted for a representative parliament, form a technocratic government, adopt a constitution and establish a transitional justice mechanism. But while these were given the highest priority in terms of efforts to bring about change and progress – and involved much debate and negotiation – there was a failure to adequately address the economic promises of the revolution, something I will come back to later.

The second process needs a bit more elaboration. Initially there had an immediate lessening of the Ben Ali era restrictions on freedoms of expression and association, and there was a temporary collapse in the functioning of the security apparatus and in overall surveillance. An early visible outcome was the increased appearance in the public domain of bearded Salafis, who until then had been working underground fearing state repression, and of women wearing conservative head scarves - something that in the Ben Ali era was frowned upon.

An amnesty in 2011 released more than 2,000 prisoners, including suspected Salafis and Jihadi leaders who had returned from fighting global jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They included the likes of Abu Iyad al Tunisi, a founder of Tunisia’s Ansar al Shariah, who in the year 2000, while fighting in Afghanistan, helped found the Tunisian Combat Group - an al Qaeda affiliate calling for regime change in Tunis. He escaped Bora Bora in 2001 with Ben Laden but was later captured in Turkey, handed over to the Tunisians and subsequently tortured, then in 2003 sentenced to more than 40 years imprisonment.

Soon black flags began appearing on buildings in some of the slum areas around Tunis and other cities. Over time, these Salafi extremists (who were essentially opposed to parliamentary elections - which they saw as maintaining the old regime ways - and calling for an Islamic insurrection) were going beyond proselytizing to seeking to impose their ways and beliefs. They did so by taking over hundreds of mosques and kicking out Imams, trying to enforce Islamic dress codes in the streets, ransacking stores selling alcohol, attacking cultural events and even desecrating Sufi tombs.

At first state policy was at best more accepting of these actions or at worst too weak or divided to act on them. The En-Nahda party, a leading Islamist partner in the governing coalition and the largest political force in the country with about 80,000 -100,000 members, argued the Salafis as well as the radical syndicalists (extreme leftists) should be included in the political process and not ostracized.
But 2012 and 2013 were tense years with the country watching these two seemingly inexorably oppositional processes developing alongside each other. When the security apparatus began to act against the Salafis, they complained that the old order was back pointing to the use of arbitrary detention and torture. Some mounted armed attacks on security personnel - which brought further security restrictions and surveillance on their activities - and eventually on non-military personnel, such as the political activists Chokri Belaid and Mohammad Brahmi, tourists at el Bardo museum and at a resort hotel in Sousse, and diplomatic property such as the ransacking of the USA Embassy.

En Nahda, was gradually getting blamed for these violent actions. En Nahda and the Salafis had spent time together in detention and shared many common experiences, which partly explains the slowness to react. But as the violence increased and the targets became civilians and tourists, it eventually took the step in 2014 of banning Ansar al Sharia as a terrorist group. With the ensuing state crackdown, which saw more than 100,000 arrested in the first half of 2015; many Salafis went underground or left the country, some heading to Syria. In his in-depth analysis on “exporting Jihad” in the New Yorker George Packer quotes Mohamed, a local from the poor Douar Hicher district of Tunis. He relates how once the crackdown began many of the disenchanted youths whom he had grown up with began to leave. “Ninety per cent have, and not to Italy. They went to Syria and Iraq”. He goes on “two weeks ago, thirty people disappeared from here” - on the run from the police. He gave the main reasons for them going as “marginalization and joblessness.”

The failure to seriously tackle the economic situation has been admitted by Ghannouchi as one of the reasons En Nahda lost in the 2014 elections. More attention had been given to political reforms and the constitution and less to social and economic issues. The revolution had raised expectations that were then frustrated, creating a conducive environment for radicalization. The Salafis were playing on the aspirations that were unfulfilled by the revolution.

So to review the post 2011 period and answer the question as to why even more Tunisians have been departing to fight a jihad abroad:

- Initially a lifting of restrictions allowed groups like the Salafis to come into the open and to proselytize and exercise their newly acquired freedoms of expression and association. This coupled with a temporary breakdown in the functioning of Ministry of Interior and in the security services, made it easier for recruits to travel to join the Jihad in Syria.

- The reason for the increase in numbers of radicals or Jihadis amongst Tunisian Salafis trying to impose their views on behavior and dress code relates to the role of the returnees from Jihads in Afghanistan and Iraq and their interface with local Salafis calling for change at home. That radicalization process was happening in the prisons during the Ben Ali era and took off the once they were all released in the October 2011 Amnesty.

- The resort to violence, and particularly the attacks on civilians, tourists and politicians lead to increased repression by the state, including by declaring a state of emergency and the banning the Ansar al Sharia in 2014 and promulgating a strict Anti Terrorism law in 2015. Those who did not go underground were soon leaving the country.

- Events next door, after the fall of the Qaddafi regime brought a proliferation of arms to the Tunisian-Libyan border. Libya was lawless and a terrain for Tunisians to find safe haven, to train before going to Syria or to plan and prepare for return to Tunisia equipped to bring down the system of governance.
• The tough structural steps needed to improve Tunisia’s economy have not been taken. Five years after the revolution national unemployment rate is 15.3% but goes up to 32% for the under 25’s. That number is even higher in the west and south of the country. More than one third of the 650,000 unemployed are graduates according to Zied Ladhari Employment Minister. The wide disparities between the wealthy coast and the underdeveloped hinterland remain stark.

Kasserine, 30 kilometers from the Algerian border and close to the Chambi moutains paints a similar picture to Ben Guerdane. The population is about the same size and it lies on the smuggling route, bringing in cheap petrol from Algeria. A fifth of adults in Kasserine are involved in the contraband trade. Analysts point to symbiotic smuggling and terrorism networks on the Algerian border with jihadists controlling routes and levying taxes on contraband such as drugs or weapons. Official figures for unemployment in May 2015 were around 20.6 per cent virtually unchanged from pre-2011.

If we return to Ben Guerdane in 2016 we will hear that the USA is helping the state to build a berm on the Libya border, directly imperiling their smuggling and, in their eyes, cutting off livelihoods. On March 12, the Tunisian newspaper El-Shorouk released a detailed report, citing the Asia News Agency, stating that dozens of Tunisians had recently been killed in Syria. It included their names, their pictures, and their home provinces, as well as the places and dates of their deaths in Syria. It noted that most jihadists originated from the town of Ben Guerdane.

A few new elements have also crept into an individual’s calculation about joining the jihad abroad, namely the lure of financial support ($3,000 a month), the promise of property, positions of authority and power, and the excitement of being a part of something being created in Syria/Iraq (the Caliphate) that holds the promise of solving all the problems the region has faced.

**WHILE EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE AND PROGRESS WERE GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY – THERE WAS A FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ECONOMIC PROMISES OF THE REVOLUTION**

Perhaps one last factor to put on the table is the evolution of En Nahda party, under the leadership of Ghannouchi, something which came to fruition last month at the party’s Congress in Hammamet when it took the historic step of separating the party’s religious, cultural and social mission from the party’s political activities, in essence creating a political party that is separate from the religious organization or movement. Under Ben Ali the party was banned and Ghannouchi fled the country. After 2011 the party was legalized and then won a landslide election to get to power. Since then the party has been evolving as Ghannouchi put it “from defending identity to ensuring the democratic transition” and arguing that mosques should be completely neutral and play no role in politics.

Its pragmatic approach lead to compromises in the drafting of the Tunisian constitution that now does not mention implementation of al-Shariah and bans polygamy. That evolution also saw En Nahda defend, then tolerate, then move away from and finally ban Ansar al Sharia in 2014 when the latter resorted to acts of violence.
Many rightly see this evolution as having prevented the democratic transition in Tunisia from coming apart, but it may also have lead to some, perhaps only a small minority, of it conservative/religious supporters drifting to the right as they and no longer see the party as representing their ideals.

**SO HOW IS ALL OF THIS USEFUL FOR DEALING WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA?**

A central theme in the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism is the call to member states like Tunisia to develop national plans, policies and strategies with the promise of an “All United Nations” support to help them do this. However, knowledge gaps will need to be plugged in two key areas for this to work effectively for Tunisia.

First, information about what programmatic responses developed by other states facing similar challenges should be made more readily accessible. Tunisia should not be starting from scratch or inventing the wheel. There can be no template approach, but Tunisia can benefit from looking at other relevant experiences around the world and lessons learned from them and the UN from its vantage point should be globally collecting, comparing, analyzing and providing this information in a useful form. It has not been doing this in any systematic way so far, neither for Tunisia nor for anyone else.

Second, there is very little solid information about what programmatic responses to violent extremism have actually worked or which have not and why. At a time when resources are limited no nation can afford to try everything set out in the menu proposed by the UN Plan of Action and hope some of it will work. This requires an investment by the UN and donors into evidence-based field research and in comparative analysis to learn much needed lessons so we avoid wasted resources and repeating past mistakes.

To close, key grievances that may have radicalized young Tunisians before 2011 had to do with the economic situation, the neglected regions of the country and the state’s repressive human rights policies. The World Bank report of 2014 pointed to key structural weaknesses that need tackling if there will be headway on unemployment and a decrease in the neglect and marginalization of large parts of the country. Progress on rights issues has been impressive and dramatic, but risks being undermined by the “war on terror” and how the state of emergency and the Anti Terrorism law are enforced.

The good news is that most Tunisians have shown time and again that they want to pursue the peaceful path of transition that is currently underway and do not want to resort to violent means to force a particular change. The formation of the National Youth Initiative Against Terrorism is one expression of this affirmation for peaceful transformation. The ability of En Nahda to evolve and to compromise may be another. The massive demonstrations against terrorist acts are also strong indicators. We should also note that despite the deep resentment against the state for cutting off their livelihoods and not prioritizing their economic needs, when in March this year supporter of the Islamic State came across the border from Libyan seeking to establish a base in Ben Guerdane it was the local population that rose up against them and worked with the security forces to defeat them.

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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE LIMITS OF UN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Jim Della-Giacoma

FOR CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID CONFLICT, LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PACIFIC WILL HAVE TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO CRAFTING POLICIES THAT MAINTAIN STABLE TIES

This week has seen major talks on the biggest brewing conflict in Asia. At the annual Shangri-La Dialogue of Asia-Pacific defense officials and the high-level United States-China talks in Beijing, the dispute over the South China Sea has been front and center. Beijing’s unapologetic expansionist behavior in a group of previously uninhabited islands is making waves, raising tension, and fueling a regional arms race. You might think this would be fertile ground for some old-fashioned United Nations preventative diplomacy?

In New York, where 11 candidates are angling to become the next UN secretary-general, talk about prevention is everywhere. In a landmark joint resolution in April, the UN Security Council and General Assembly agreed on the importance of a comprehensive approach to “sustaining peace” through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes, including “strengthening the rule of law at the international and national levels.” But where is the UN in the biggest challenge to peace and security in the most populous and prosperous region in the world?

Thanks to the realpolitik of the Security Council chamber, the world body is somewhere over the horizon. Its tools of preventative diplomacy just do not work in this context. When the call goes out for the UN to “do something”—as in a recent article suggesting the next stop for the South China Sea conflict might be the Security Council—does it mean that we have run out of all other good options?
As the candidates promise everything to everybody to win the secretary-general role, the open secret is that there are some things they will not do to imperil their candidacy, at least not at this point; first and foremost is offend any members of the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, China among them.

Almost 10 years ago, two of my Center on International Cooperation colleagues, Barnett Rubin and Bruce Jones, made it clear that the UN's conflict prevention powers were finite when they contemplated what Ban might do after he replaced Kofi Annan. On the prevention of violent conflict, the UN's record has been “mixed to poor” they wrote. “A review of the UN's track record...shows its success has been limited to cases of interstate conflict between smaller powers.”

Rubin and Jones broke down conflict prevention into three classic types: operational prevention, which is when an envoy is dispatched to use diplomacy to stop violent conflict; structural prevention, which might be thinking how the political economy of a place could be altered to make it more resilient to conflict; and systemic prevention, which is creating “herd immunity” by using the global web of treaties and international laws to guard against violence, particularly between states.

In all the talk we've heard in recent days, there is no senior UN diplomat ready to fly across the Pacific Ocean to save Asia from conflict. “No one expects the UN do anything about the conflict in the South China Sea,” a UN headquarters official working in the field of conflict prevention told me recently. Similarly, the dispute does not lend itself to structural solutions, as the players are as strong as the referee is weak. The previously uninhabited islands involved are not poor, unstable, undemocratic, or fragile states that could benefit from a World Bank intervention.

IF THEY ARE FLYING ANYWHERE NEAR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA THESE DAYS IT IS ON THEIR WAY TO BEIJING SEEKING THE FOREIGN MINISTER’S CONSENT FOR THEIR CAMPAIGN. THERE IS NO MAGIC THAT CAN DO AWAY WITH THE BROAD AND PERMANENT INTERESTS AT PLAY.

Systemic prevention, such as the Philippines has pursued by going to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, could, in theory, be one way to avoid a military showdown. But with China calling the process “illegal,” this, too, is failing. It does not help that neither of the two significant parties at the center of this conflict are signatories to the Law of the Sea treaty. But thinking of the Security Council as a “court of appeal” following after this process misunderstands the political nature of the UN's more powerful organ.

After listening to the latest secretary-general candidates speak in the informal dialogues this week, we should have modest expectations. If they are flying anywhere near the South China Sea these days it is on their way to Beijing seeking the foreign minister’s consent for their campaign. There is no magic that can do away with the broad and permanent interests at play. Nor is there an easy way to “resolve” any other dispute where a veto-yielding Council member has allies, such as Syria or Western Sahara.
To give another example: if the Argentine Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra, the 11th SG candidate, should be elevated to the UN’s top job with the backing of the US, it might cause the United Kingdom some discomfort, but it is more likely there could be an agreement to disagree with the UK over Las Malvinas, or the Falkland Islands as they are known in Britain. It may well be a case of “don’t mention the war,” at least not for the next 10 years.

Such diplomatic compromises and inaction frustrate civil society and regional groups. This was vocalized in a recent joint submission to the General Assembly's high-level thematic debate on peace and security:

“Participants in the regional discussions were of the opinion that the current emphasis on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts has led to protracted crises, with damaging consequences for the countries and regions involved in the conflicts, as well as the credibility of the UN.”

General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, who chaired the recent debate, has said the challenge for the UN in peace and security is to be seen as truly relevant. But the Cold War taught us the United Nations is not made for some jobs. Sometimes the big powers have to manage conflict themselves. This is the message from China specialist Linda Jakobson in her recent study for the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney. She argues the US and China have “A Mature and Interdependent Relationship,” despite all the tough words on display this week.

Jakobson argues that the US and China are not on a collision course, but as they jostle over the South China Sea, asserting sovereignty on one side and the rights of free navigation on the other, the risks of military conflict are real. “For China and the United States to avoid conflict, leaders on both sides of the Pacific will have to remain intensely and constantly committed to crafting policies that maintain stable ties,” she writes in her report.

This is referred to as conflict management; hopefully it too can stop anything like the violence, death, destruction, and massive displacement we've seen in the Middle East in recent years. Some, like the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, prefer to think of these stern words in the hotel conference rooms of the region as preventative diplomacy. Whatever the name, as the conflict escalates, this is a slow dance for two, with no UN chaperone required.

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U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE BETTER USE OF ‘ROAD-TRIP DIPLOMACY’

Jim Della-Giacoma

WHILE TALK OF SECURITY COUNCIL “REFORM” OFTEN FOCUSES ON WHO SITS AT THE TOP TABLE IN ITS MEETINGS AND THE USE OF THE VETO BY ITS FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS, ALTERING ITS WORKING METHODS ARE WHAT EXPERTS HAVE CALLED THE “UGLY DUCKLING OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM.”

A United Nations Security Council debate can feel like traveling in an airplane at cruising altitude: a quick continental overflight in a rarefied atmosphere, far above the dirty reality of the conflict below. The debate can be driven by factors that may have little to do with what may be happening on the ground.

But from time to time, council members come back to earth and get dust on their shoes when they engage in road-trip diplomacy. In January members went to Burundi; this month they were in West Africa.

Firsthand fact-finding has not always been the body’s first instinct. As the Security Council Report (SCR) noted in its March monthly forecast, the council’s first visit to the field was to Vietnam and Cambodia in 1964. But only after the Cold War ended...
did Security Council missions take off, with some 51 visits to 45 countries and territories in the period since. Through January 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo held the record with 12 visits; Burundi was second with nine.

Some think this is a habit that should be encouraged. Last year’s reports on U.N. peace operations and peacebuilding urged the council to change its ways. The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations lamented that the council was too aloof, leaving early engagement to the Secretariat. It urged its members to visit “turbulent areas” and consult regional stakeholders on emerging conflicts.

While talk of Security Council “reform” often focuses on who sits at the top table in its meetings and the use of the veto by its five permanent members, altering its working methods are what Liechtenstein’s U.N. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser has called the “ugly duckling of Security Council reform.” Support for such incremental adjustments is a realist argument for behavioral and not institutional change.

**IF IMPROVING COUNCIL INITIATIVES LIKE FIELD VISITS IS A NEAR-TERM OBJECTIVE, IT IS WORTH LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT HOW SUCH VISITS WORK.**

But if improving council initiatives like field visits is a near-term objective, it is worth looking more closely at how such visits work. Dispatches from the field by SCR’s correspondents describe crowded agendas full of meetings with local political leaders past and present, U.N. envoys, mission chiefs, regional offices heads and country teams. The schedule includes checking in with opposition figures and NGO representatives.

In Burundi in January, the delegation traveled to a presidential facility in the town of Gitega to meet with President Pierre Nkurunziza. Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a disputed third term last year in an election he went on to win had triggered a constitutional crisis and subsequent violence, leading the African Union to mandate the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi.

Nkurunziza’s reaction was to shoot the messenger: He told council members the situation in Burundi was much better than reported in the media. Standing next to the president, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power looked forlorn. The Financial Times reported her as saying that “we did not achieve as much, frankly, as I think we would have liked.”

Despite the frustrations and modest return, Congo Research Group’s director, Jason Stearns, who follows the region closely, told me he believed such visits are important, even if only for symbolic reasons. They refocus the international spotlight on forgotten countries and conflicts; they put pressure on reluctant authorities to move toward some sort of peace process.

“To have the author of ‘A Problem from Hell’ in your country makes news,” he said, referring to Power’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book about America’s response to genocides, written while she was still a professor at Harvard University.

But Stearns admits that local analysts find it hard to discern any lasting impact once the wheels have gone up on the council’s plane. In Burundi, South Africa is still disengaged, and the permanent members of the Security Council remain divided on a common approach; the African Union leadership is still reluctant to make a forced intervention.
One criticism of council visits is that they take too long to arrange. They become bound in protocol, and less effective as a result. They are also getting shorter. The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is as complex as its name suggests, but the council visitors only spent two days in Mali.

The council has not always been so hesitant. In September 1999, proxies for the Indonesian military in East Timor went on a violent rampage after voters in a U.N.-sponsored referendum rejected an offer of autonomy in favor of independence. The council made the decision to go to Jakarta, and then departed on the same day.

The field mission, and in particular the delegation's willingness to challenge the Indonesian military’s narrative of events on East Timor, was an integral part of a broad international effort to address the crisis. Importantly, the five permanent members were on the same page. So was then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who, while the delegation met with the head of the Indonesian military, declared, “The time has clearly come for Indonesia to seek help from the international community in fulfilling its responsibility to bring order and security to the people of East Timor.”

The visiting mission cabled back their analysis before the Security Council met in open session. Member states then lined up to condemn Indonesia for failing to keep the peace and called on Jakarta to accept an international mission. The country was caught by surprise.

“Nobody, including myself, had ever imagined that the problem of East Timor would eventually develop in such a way so as to become part of a global issue and portrayed to the international community as a tragic humanitarian drama,” the head of the Indonesian military at the time, Wiranto, wrote in his autobiography “Witness in the Storm.” “And as such, it was necessary to bring in some kind of multinational force in order to stop it.”

The Security Council’s mission played a pivotal role in bearing witness to the tragedy. Its members were back in New York on Sept. 15, where they mandated and deployed a multinational force to restore order. Five days later it had deployed, in record time.

Wiranto now has to be careful where he flies. His 2003 indictment for crimes against humanity by a U.N.-backed tribunal for his role in the East Timor violence in 1999 still stands, as does a warrant for his arrest.

Security Council members have no such travel restrictions. They are free to roam. And when they visit trouble spots like Burundi, they should remember the 1999 mission to East Timor and the dramatic diplomatic impact it had. They should be encouraged to fly more frequently, so that their traveler’s tales can improve the quality and weight of their deliberations.

Editor’s note: Guest columnist Jim Della-Giacoma is filling in for Richard Gowan, who is on leave until early April.

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PUTTING PREVENTION BACK IN THE U.N.’S VOCABULARY

Jim Della-Giacoma

DRAWING ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE SDGS, MEMBER STATES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE THAT PREVENTION PRESENTS.

Prevention has long been a dirty word at the United Nations: Some member states equate it with interference, and the need for early warning that accompanies it with spying. But in a time of crisis, some think the time has come to reconsider what role the world body should play in stopping conflict before it happens.

It is hard to argue against the idea that preventing conflicts from breaking out is better than dealing with their tragic consequences. Take those currently enveloping the Middle East in Libya, Syria and Yemen, where the counterfactual is strong, if hard to prove. If they had been prevented, hundreds of thousands of deaths could have been avoided. And the international system would not now be paying such a high and unsustainable price to address the plight of the millions that have been displaced.
Prevention would require more interference, as some member states fear. It would force states to trespass on each other’s sovereignty, often held as sacred, or have the U.N. to do it on their behalf. But being more intrusive should not be equated with the increased use of internationally sanctioned violence. Prevention does not necessarily mean bombing more often, just paying attention sooner. As former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali put it almost 25 years ago, in his landmark 1992 document “Agenda for Peace,” the U.N. must aim “to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results.”

Prevention has now come back onto the agenda thanks to three big reports that U.N. expert panels prepared in 2015 on U.N. peace operations and peacebuilding, as well as on women, peace and security. Published between June and October last year, the reports are now coming up for sustained debate in various U.N. fora, including resolutions before the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, and a High-Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security in the General Assembly on May 10-11. The way they are discussed will tell us if the big shifts the expert panels argued for are finding constituents among the U.N.’s membership.

Few busy diplomats have thoroughly read all three reports, but there is help in understanding them. A global process of civil society groups is digesting them ahead of the upcoming high-level debate. Eli Stamnes and Kari Osland from the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) have also provided a great service with their very readable synthesis. All three reports make the same point: We cannot have peace without prevention.

**PREVENTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN BOMBING MORE OFTEN, JUST PAYING ATTENTION SOONER**

There is some hope that a new agenda for prevention might be emerging. The world of high policy is not as static as a cynic might suggest, and one hopeful development is the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were adopted last year after a lengthy negotiation process in New York. Though more generally focused on development, the SDGs are an important fulcrum for change on conflict prevention, as well. Their universal commitments include, as part of SDG 16, the goal to achieve peaceful societies. Prevention is not a new idea. The first lines of the U.N. Charter invoke it. The body was founded to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. But the SDGs now make prevention everyone’s responsibility. It is a small, but important step in the right direction.

But what exactly might prevention look like? What might the U.N. do differently to pursue it? There are some old elements, as well as some new ones still emerging, that are worth noting.

First, Boutros Boutros Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” would be a good place to start. It recognized the primacy of peacemaking, and underlined the importance of understanding conflict, or fact-finding; getting into the habit of looking ahead, or early warning; acting sooner, or preventative deployment; using existing tribunals, such as the World Court; and using development assistance to avoid fragility, or amelioration through assistance, before resorting to sanctions or the use of military force.
Second, the U.N. General Assembly high-level debate on peace and security should include frank discussions of why we have failed to prevent today’s headline-grabbing conflicts. That will require member states to reflect on their own failings. Last year’s three reports, for instance, noted the changing nature of conflict. While interstate conflict is still with us, the reports highlight how in this century international bodies are increasingly grappling with conflict between different groups within a society or between the society and the state itself.

It is no mystery why some groups are often going to war against their own states: The dirty secret is that those states’ governments—that is, U.N. member states—are often the problem, through their abusive practices. Open conflict is often the visible proof that they have failed at prevention. But rather than write the U.N. off as rotten from the inside, because it is composed of imperfect states, this is a moment to acknowledge its strengths. While far from perfect, the Security Council and General Assembly are still good places to put pressure on underperforming governments.

Third, member states need to see the component parts of the U.N., with its many different departments, agencies and funds, as primary tools of prevention. In the forthcoming debates, they should tone down their opposition to using the good offices of the secretary-general to head off conflict, and instead task and resource the Secretariat to do a better job of it. They should support the principle that the U.N.’s peacemakers should be allowed to speak to all sides. This is what political solutions require.

Fourth, member states need to recommit to multilateral and regional diplomacy. Conflicts are spilling across borders and bedeviling whole regions. As the displaced people from these conflicts travel the globe, the stakeholders in any one conflict are increasingly numerous and dispersed. U.N. diplomacy is better able to intervene in such settings due to its reach across borders, and it should be encouraged and better-resourced.

Finally, drawing on the universality of the SDGs, member states should recognize the global challenge that prevention presents. Working with regional organizations is not the solution to every problem, but having a presence in each region is a start. In the field of peace and security, the U.N. has struggled to see all regions as needing attention. Its peace operations are overwhelmingly focused on Africa, and it only has regional centers from which to conduct preventative diplomacy in Central Asia, Central Africa and West Africa. The pushback from stronger sovereign states maintains the fiction that there is no need for these tools in Asia or Latin America. This blinkered vision on prevention needs to be lifted.

In an era when war has proved to be a poor option for achieving end goals and coercive tools have been shown not to be working, the time may have come to more firmly embrace prevention. Listen closely to the coming debates. If member states reflect thoughtfully more than they rant reflexively, it may be a subtle sign that last year’s reports are shifting the debate. A change of tone may be the first indication that prevention is back in the everyday vocabulary of international diplomacy.

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THE MOUNTING SENSE OF DISORDER IS SHAPING HOW THE WORLD’S POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS ARE THINKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. SOME OF THEM ARE CALLING FOR A RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM: FOCUS ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO GLOBAL HOT SPOTS AND LITTLE ELSE.

It’s official. Global instability is the new normal. Political and economic uncertainties, combined with climate change and the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, are all contributing to create unparalleled volatility. Diplomats and defence specialists have fretted over these interlocking threats at major conferences in Davos and Munich over the past two months.

The potential for catastrophic outbreaks of violence between the US, Russia, and China is more apparent now than at any time since the Cold War came to an end. Proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen, Russian aggression over Ukraine and its neighbours, and tensions in the South China Sea are in some ways a “correction” after two decades of relative stability.
And the problems don't end there. Many of the world's 40-odd armed conflicts are becoming more vicious and fragmented. Civil wars and factional fighting in Syria, Libya and Yemen are generating record levels of population displacement. More people were killed as a result of “terrorist” acts in the past few years – especially in Africa and the Middle East – than ever before. These latest trends are in stark contrast to a half century decline in organized violence.

**A UN SYSTEM STRETCHED TO ITS LIMITS**

The strain of these transnational challenges on the UN system is stretching the organization to its breaking point. There are currently 16 peacekeeping operations deployed around the world – nine of them in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in the Americas. There are currently more blue helmets on the ground than at any time in history. The cost of keeping over 125,000 personnel in the field hovers at roughly $8 billion a year.

The mounting sense of disorder is shaping how the world's political and military leaders are thinking about international peace and security. Some of them are calling for a return to isolationism: focus on humanitarian relief to global hot spots and little else. Others are clamouring for more muscular forms of intervention, especially to snuff out radical extremism in North Africa and the Middle East. The space for moderation and balance is shrinking.

Faced with this ominous state of affairs, what is the UN to do?

The organization started by doing what it knows best – commissioning reports. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon did not just ask for one report, but several. In 2014, he requested that the UN set up high-level panels to deliberate on the future of peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the relationships between women, peace and security.

All of this soul searching is intended to have a real-world application. Everyone knows that the UN has to repurpose itself in order to better engage with a turbulent global system. After a few years of reflection and consultation, the results are in. Not surprisingly, the three panels concluded that a credible, legitimate and well-resourced UN is part of the solution.

At least six recommendations stand out from the three high-level reviews.

**REFORMING THE UN**

First, conflict prevention is the order of the day. The best way the UN can save lives and reduce spiralling costs is by preventing war from breaking out in the first place. This means the UN needs to adopt a culture of prevention across the organization. And the UN cannot go it alone. There needs to be more burden-sharing by member states, including both traditional donors and emerging powers.

Second, the form and function of peacekeeping should be shaped by the situation on the ground, not the (often competing) political interests at the UN headquarters in New York. The UN also has to abandon cookie-cutter approaches to peace support missions. To do this, the UN Security Council has to be more flexible about determining when troops should enter, how long to stay, and when to exit.

Third, strategic and inclusive partnerships are essential. UN agencies have to stop navel gazing and fighting petty turf wars and get better at reaching out to regional bodies, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups that have a stake
in peace. Moreover, UN-resourced activities need to be **people-oriented, field-focused** and much better targeted at actual and potential hot spots.

Fourth, the focus cannot be limited to “building” peace, but rather making peace “sustainable”. This rhetorical shift is important. Rather than confining activities to post-conflict settings, the UN and its partners need to double down on peace before wars break out. This recommendation dovetails with the freshly minted Sustainable Development Goals, particularly goal 16, which calls for promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

Fifth, national ownership of “peace”, while difficult, is fundamental. Ownership cannot be limited to national government institutions alone, but must be extended to political parties, labour unions, chambers of commerce, women’s organizations, veteran’s associations, minority groups and more. When key players are excluded from peace processes, wars are much more likely to restart.

**ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, THERE ARE ALSO MANY NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THE UN CAN PARTNER. THESE GROUPS ARE DISTRIBUTED (UNEVENLY) ACROSS THE AMERICAS, AFRICA, AND ASIA.**

Finally, and perhaps most important, there must be a much more proactive engagement with **women’s participation** in peace at all stages of the process. This includes involving women at multiple levels of the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding process, together with support and protection services for women and girls. Investment in women peacebuilders and respecting gender rights can also help undermine extremism.

**A NEW UN FOR A NEW GLOBAL ORDER**

All of these recommendations are eminently sensible. UN member states would do well to act on them immediately. It is worth recalling that we’ve seen some of them before. Back in 2000, the **Brahimi Report on peace operations** made some of the same points, not least the importance of political solutions over military ones, matching peacekeeping needs with resources, increased coherence in UN responses to emergencies, and **stronger partnerships** to deliver results.

So why do these new proposals matter?

Well, for one, they reflect a world that has qualitatively transformed. As the global scenario continues changing, so too must the UN. The three reviews – together with a new plan of action to counter extremism – acknowledge the evolving interconnected threats facing the international system, including transnational organized crime, cybercrime and **terrorism**. They also note how the UN is a target in ways it never was before.

On a more positive note, there are also many **new regional organizations** with which the UN can partner. These groups are distributed (unevenly) across the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Some of them – including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – are assuming a more proactive role in brokering
peace deals and supporting recovery. While still too state-centric, regional organizations have a key role to play when it comes to preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and supporting peace more generally.

Finally, the UN is building a peace architecture that – while needing more robust financing from member states – should help implement the recommendations set out by the three panels. Today, the peace architecture consists of a more proactive and multi-mandate UN Department of Peacekeeping, a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Fund. A stronger Department of Political Affairs and Office for South-South Cooperation is also advisable.

The UN is finally starting to get its act together to confront the most intractable threats to international peace and security. While silent on the UN’s most systemic problems – not least the unrepresentative nature of its Security Council and the veto powers of its permanent members – the panels offer some hope. Many of their recommendations deserve financial backing, including a meaningful expansion in the UN’s assessed budgets for peacekeeping and peacebuilding institutions. The big question is whether these proposals are sufficient to make the world safer.

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RWANDA SHOULD HAVE BEEN A WAKE-UP CALL. WHY DO THE CRISSES CONTINUE?
Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally

NATO’S 2011 INTERVENTION IN LIBYA UNDER THE R2P BANNER HAS WIDELY BEEN INTERPRETED AS COVER FOR WESTERN-DRIVEN ASPIRATIONS OF REGIME CHANGE, SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED. THE FACT THAT LIBYA HAS SUBSEQUENTLY DESCENDED INTO AN EVER GREATER SPIRAL OF CIVIL WAR HAS NOT HELPED MAKE THE CASE.

Twenty-two years ago this spring, more than a million men, women and children in Rwanda waited in vain for international protection to save them from death at the hands of government security forces and government-inspired militia.

Years later, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine — known widely as R2P — was approved by the United Nations in the spirit that “never again” should the world stand by and watch such carnage reoccur. Yet in the past 10 years, deaths from worldwide conflict have tripled.
An estimated 470,000 Syrians have been killed during nearly five years of that country’s civil war, and the cities of Aleppo and Madaya are in danger of becoming this century’s Guernica, the Spanish civil war massacre commemorated by Pablo Picasso and universally known as a symbol of civilian suffering in war (parallels to the 1930s abound these days — the Munich agreement last week may yet deliver the promised cease-fire, but the historical references are not promising). Even in Rwanda’s tiny neighbor Burundi, far from the center of geopolitical struggles, the international community has failed to protect more than 200,000 people who have been forcibly displaced from their homes in the past year.

R2P as a concept was groundbreaking. It brought about a now widely accepted shift in the understanding of state sovereignty; emphasized the role of the international community in helping states to fulfill this responsibility; and sought to build a more consistent and coordinated response to crises.

SO WHY HAVE CRISSES PROLIFERATED? WHY IS IT STILL POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT MASS ATROCITIES WITH IMPUNITY?

R2P is a legacy of post-Cold War idealism on peace dividends, an idea introduced at exactly the time that new great power tensions were rising: Major powers (both on and off the security council) have not been prepared to abandon their allies on human rights grounds, and fast-growing developing countries have never bought into the potential infringement on sovereignty that R2P implies.

NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya under the R2P banner has widely been interpreted as cover for Western-driven aspirations of regime change, successfully executed. The fact that Libya has subsequently descended into an ever greater spiral of civil war has not helped make the case.

And at a practical level, the “last resort” military intervention allowed under the principle is not always simple. It is doubtful that any military in the world would be able to restore order and protection of human rights in Syria in the absence of a political solution, even before the Russian intervention on the side of the Assad government. U.N. peacekeeping forces certainly do not have the capabilities, even if they were authorized to do so.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES?

First, we should be “uncompromising” in the pursuit of the protection of civilians, as the U.N. secretary general states in a recent report. This means focusing efforts in peace talks, such as those in Geneva on Syria, on both short term efforts to stop the bombing and get humanitarian access and longer-term justice for victims and protection from retribution after the fighting stops. For international organizations, it means improving early warning capabilities and speaking out whenever civilians are threatened despite pressure from governments not to do so, a role Alex Bellamy notes that the U.N. has not always fulfilled.

Second, we should take an institution-building approach to protection. R2P emphasizes that a state bears the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Greater attention needs to be given to strengthening the institutions that can help guarantee these protections: a social compact between state and citizens that includes minority groups; a strong and independent judiciary; professional and accountable
army, security forces and police; a free press and vibrant civil society organizations. Of official development aid, for example, only 2 percent is invested in access to justice and strengthening justice institutions.

Third, greater pressure is needed on the Security Council to act where the risks to civilians are high. A “cost of inaction” analysis could have increased the pressure on the council to act on Syria three years ago — the cost of their inaction now counts hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars. The council should also refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities, and it should make greater use of the non-military tools covered under R2P, in particular those to stem the financing of conflict.

Fourth, it would be wise to give serious consideration to adopting the concept of “Responsibility While Protecting,” raised in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council by Brazil in 2011. This would emphasize that military action is a last resort to be used only following agreed guidelines and ensure that force used is proportionate to the gravity of the situation. It would also establish extra monitoring, review and accountability mechanisms for delegated Security Council mandates.

**IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY MILITARY IN THE WORLD WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTORE ORDER AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SYRIA IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION**

Finally, we should build a bottom-up campaign for peace and justice. Advocating for the responsibility to protect is not just the business of international lawyers and diplomats — it is the business of citizens who want to see their governments do the right thing at home and abroad. Launching a global campaign “to prevent the erosion of international humanitarian and human rights law” is crucial to create pressure on states, whether to protect civilians during warfare or to ensure safe passage and asylum for refugees.

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PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM BY PROTECTING RIGHTS AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES

Hanny Megally

SHORT-SIGHTED POLICIES, FAILED LEADERSHIP, HEAVY-HANDED APPROACHES, A SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ONLY ON SECURITY MEASURES AND AN UTTER DISREGARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE OFTEN MADE THINGS WORSE.

Short-sighted policies, failed leadership, heavy-handed approaches, a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights have often made things worse.

The eagerly-awaited United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) is an ambitious and much-needed shift toward tackling the root causes that lead to radicalization. It is a bold strategy that combines a UN system-wide response with an “all of government approach” to violent extremism. Put simply, the Plan emphasizes the importance of prevention, the centrality of respecting human rights and the necessity of a coordinated multidisciplinary UN response.

But if it is to succeed, it will require more than a sea change in attitudes and improved coordination – though both will be essential. It will need to address the definitional issues that have long hampered an effective global response, invest in...
empirical research and comparative analysis to understand what works, and move beyond rhetoric to ensure that human rights are no longer trampled upon at the first sign of crisis.

The Plan contains more than 70 recommendations, including that each Member State develop a National PVE Plan of Action with UN assistance. It also makes a startling but frank admission: over the past decade, counter-terrorism efforts have mostly “overlooked” two of the four pillars of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, namely tackling root causes and ensuring respect for human rights and rule of law. Instead, the emphasis has been on preventing and combatting terrorism, and building countries’ capacity to combat it.

This admission is a conscious effort to retool and refocus on preventive measures for addressing violent extremism. It is also a confirmation of the need for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive steps to address underlying conditions driving individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups.

It is a welcome reaffirmation of the centrality of human rights in any policies, strategies or actions by Member States, and indeed by the UN itself. Speaking before the UN General Assembly, the Secretary-General recognized that this is a tall order given past record. He warned that “short-sighted policies, failed leadership, heavy-handed approaches, a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights have often made things worse.”

THE PLAN IN A NUTSHELL

There are four key components to the Plan.

1. National PVE Plans of Action: each Member State should create their own plan that addresses the local drivers of violent extremism and in a way that complements any existing national counter-terrorism strategies. These should be developed in a multidisciplinary manner with input from governmental and non-governmental actors to:

   • fortify the social compact against violent extremism;
   • address the Foreign Terrorist Fighter threat;
   • prevent the financing of violent extremist and terrorist groups;
   • align national development policies with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); and
   • include effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

2. Regional PVE Plans of Action: regional cooperation needs to be enhanced by adopting comprehensive strategies and strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations.

3. Seven Priority Areas for Action: the Plan identifies as priorities dialogue and conflict prevention; strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; gender equality and empowering women; education, skill development and employment facilitation; and strategic communications, the Internet and social media.
4. **Supporting Member States, Regional Bodies and Communities through the United Nations:** while recognizing that the primary responsibility to prevent violent extremism rests with Member States, the Plan of Action notes that the Secretary-General will instruct UN entities to prioritize, sensitize and adapt existing programs to target the drivers of violent extremism more precisely. The UN will need to adopt an “All-of-UN” approach through peace operations, country teams and strengthening early and effective action through the Human Rights up Front initiative.

**IF WE BECOME LIKE THEM ... THEN THEY HAVE WON**

The Plan has received quick support from advocates who have bemoaned the continued sacrificing of fundamental rights at the altar of “state security” or “national interest”. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies said the Plan “constitutes an indirect call for some Arab governments and their international backers to revise their counter-terrorism and violent extremism strategies, which have demonstrated their failure over the past decade in respecting human rights as well as in preventing the proliferation of terrorism.”

Rami Khouri, director of AUB’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, added: “When governments stifle peaceful dissent, muzzle the media, and prevent the legitimate activities of non-violent civil society organizations, they are not countering extremism; they are fomenting it.”

Respecting human rights is key to effective prevention. But how does the Plan help make this happen? The Secretary-General highlighted that national counter-terrorism strategies have often lacked basic elements of due process and respect for the rule of law. “Sweeping definitions of terrorism or violent extremism are often used to criminalize the legitimate actions of opposition groups, civil society organizations and human rights defenders,” he commented. This has led to drastically narrowed space for freedoms of expression, association and assembly. But how will the Plan change this? The problems go much deeper, including how the international community itself has violated rights in addressing violence and acts of terror.

By declaring a “war on terror,” states have blurred the distinctions between armed conflict and terrorism, between criminal law enforcement and war-related military action, and ultimately between the legal regimes of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL). Such declarations have had adverse consequences for legal safeguards and rights protections. This includes prioritizing targeted killings or assassinations over pursuing arrest; the muddying of legal status of individuals in detention; and the targeting of individuals beyond the territory of the parties to a conflict.

Tactics of war in pursuing criminal suspects abroad have produced a number of undesirable outcomes:

- the legally questionable use of unmanned drones;
- targeted killings of a state’s own citizens (if they have gone abroad to join a terrorist group);
- unilateral decisions to send fighter planes to bomb targets in another sovereign state;
- the creation of “black sites” abroad to detain and interrogate suspects; and
- the creation an off-shore detention sites such as at Guantanamo Bay.
Using similar logic, the Syrian regime has declared its own “war on terror”. It has barrel bombed its own citizens, bypassed judicial authorities to detain people in prolonged detention without charge, and conducted extrajudicial killings rather than arresting suspects. It has also systematically employed torture. Similar justifications are now used by every government dealing with internal violence.

Respect for rule of law and human rights are essential in any counter-terrorism strategy. The link between the violation of such rights, the grievances this creates, and radicalization that may lead to violence is a central thesis in prevention strategies. According to the Secretary-General, “violent extremism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity of unlawful behavior engaged in by the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive state policies and practices which violate human rights and rule of law, the potency of the lure of violent extremisms tends to be heightened.” But when crisis hits – such as the recent attacks in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Egypt, France, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia or Tunisia – security responses trump rights imperatives. The resort to language of “war” is quickly adopted and basic safeguards, which are the essence of the UN Charter, are left far behind. Are leaders who quickly adopt such rhetoric being reckless and causing more harm?

Arguing, as the Plan does, that there is a connection between successfully countering or preventing violent extremism and respecting basic human rights has not worked so far. Do politicians, policymakers and practitioners fear that respecting rights may weaken or undermine their strategies? Have advocates failed to prove irrefutably that respecting rights can be part of an effective holistic strategy? Does the problem lie in the lack of strong evidence-based data that shows respect for human rights can help decrease the risk of violent extremism? If so, where is that data being compiled and analyzed, and when will it be presented?

Framing the argument in such terms risks undermining States’ commitments that constitute the basis of what we call universal values and principles. What if research does not show a clear link between respect for rights and effective prevention? What if it actually shows the opposite? Does that make it acceptable to continue to violate rights? One would think not, but it presents a potential slippery slope. Respecting fundamental rights should not be based on arguments of effectiveness. This should come as added value, not the main reason. The Plan is silent on the challenge of marshaling empirical evidence to support the effectiveness argument. The strongest message might be moral, rather than rational: “If we become like them in order to defeat them, then they have won.”

Counter-terrorism has been a priority for the UN for decades. Eighteen legal instruments (fourteen conventions and four amendments) have come into force. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373. There is also the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) established in 2005 to enhance coordination that now includes some 34 entities. In 2006, the General Assembly approved a “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, and now there is the Plan of Action. Despite all this work, there is still no agreement. The Secretary-General told the GA in January that definitions of “terrorism” and “violent extremism” are the prerogative of Member States.

Since the 1970s, the failure to define terrorism has hindered effective global cooperation. We now have a Plan of Action that does the same with “violent extremism.” It does attempt to explain that addressing violent extremism by adopting security-based counter-terrorism measures has not worked, and tries to put distance between the two terms: “Violent extremism
encompasses a wider category of manifestations," it states, adding that relying on counter-terrorism measures may justify actions against “conduct that should not qualify as terrorist acts.” Ultimately, then, the Plan aims to pursue a “practical approach" without venturing to address questions of definition.

**PUSH AND PULL FACTORS**

Why is it important to have a definition? Because in seeking a solution to a problem, it helps to understand it. Otherwise one risks prescribing the wrong remedies or wasting scarce resources on a hit-or-miss approach. Delving into the term “violent extremism,” we quickly run into a discussion about radicalization and what causes an individual to turn to violence.

The Plan ably describes some of the key drivers or “push and pull” factors that a growing consensus of analysts see as being conducive to an environment for violent extremism to take root. While we can point to a set of grievances or identity or belief issues as factors, we still do not know why only certain individuals within that society or community turn to violence or join extremist violent groups.

The reasons for radicalization are complex and local. Research has found they often converge around a combination of ideology (including religion), grievance, identity, economic factors, and the propaganda that feeds on them. But these studies are limited. We do know with some certainty that there is no straightforward link between poverty and violent extremism, unlike in civil conflict. Alexander Lee, in his 2011 study on *Who becomes a Terrorist*, found violent extremists tend to be “lower-status individuals from the educated and politicized section of the population.” This suggests the opportunity costs for rich individuals to join a terrorist/violent extremist organization will in most (although not all) cases be too high. The absolute poor are too disconnected from politicized social networks.

**BY DECLARING A “WAR ON TERROR,” STATES HAVE BLURRED THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ARMED CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND WAR-RELATED MILITARY ACTION, AND ULTIMATELY BETWEEN THE LEGAL REGIMES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW.**

Available research also indicates that a lack of opportunities to create change through normal politics *increases the chance that opposition groups* will turn to terrorism. Mostly, this occurs during or shortly before and after civil wars. Only a small group will mobilize in response to an opposition group's violent appeals. In such cases, asymmetric (terrorist) tactics are more likely to be adopted, as symmetrical conflict tactics rely on larger mobilization of supporters. Violent extremist groups mostly operate in fragile and failed states, parts of the world with the highest concentration of development and governance failures, political injustice and proxy wars.

As with civil war, financial opportunity plays a role. Successful extremist movements have been able to mobilize recruits and expand activities where resources, particularly those linked to trafficking, are easy to capture.
Good qualitative research is also available on the role of ideology and grievance, but this tends to be case- or country-specific rather than systematic in nature. We do know violent extremist movements use grievances over both global and local factors to mobilize recruits, extending from the occupation of Iraq and Palestine and the use of drone attacks to mistreatment of Muslim populations who are forcibly displaced – not only in Syria but as far afield as Myanmar.

In failing to agree on, or avoiding having, a clear definition, does the Plan risk reaching the wrong diagnosis to the problem? Could it be then prescribing the wrong medicine? It would seem that those who have worked to develop the Plan have sought to cast the diagnostic net widely to cover all eventualities. It runs the risk of hugely investing in many attractive remedies, some of which may work and others that may not.

**DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES ARE THE ANSWER—BUT WHICH ONES**

Most country-level approaches are still evolving. On the developmental and human rights side, these include efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants through community and family oversight, and more generalized approaches aimed at bringing jobs and services into communities deemed vulnerable. Civic education and social media are also used to combat extremist messages. Important as they are, the link between such approaches and improvements in the area of PVE is not well researched (or even documented). It is not yet known under what circumstances (and in combination with what other policies) they can be effective.

It is imperative to fill gaps in the limited available empirical data and analysis. Data on terrorist attacks has not yet been analyzed in cross-country regressions using developmental variables, and public source data on recruitment is partial. Even less information is available on what works (or doesn't) when it comes to development and access to justice policies and interventions in dealing with violent extremism. Many developmental actions that have been suggested (e.g., adopting political and economic reforms that address the frustrations of citizens) are highly compatible with long term commitments, as laid out in Agenda 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals. But evidence on how to design these efforts, as well as their prioritization, is lacking.

The struggle to prevent violent extremism is universal, given both the location of attacks and the origin of recruits and financing. Information should be more readily available for exchange on experiences and evaluation of lessons learned at the country level. Analysis drawing upon comparative experiences to develop good practices and guidelines remains a rare commodity. Unless this is given greater recognition and resource investment, the Plan risks repeating past failures in tackling root causes.

There is a need to share good practices. As States develop their National PVE plans they will need to assess the prevailing domestic conditions conducive to violent extremism while avoiding stigmatizing a particular belief, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race. Each context will be unique, but there will also be commonalities and similarities. Comparative research that analyzes what works, what does not, and why will be vital in helping develop effective plans.

**WE MUST BREAK DOWN THE SILOS**

The hit-or-miss approach of casting the net widely is a hugely expensive endeavor that also risks shifting resources from other worthy programs. It will likely antagonize and alienate those who do not wish to have their efforts labeled “preventing violent extremism.” The Secretary-General identified this challenge in his address to the General Assembly: “We must break down the
silos between the peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian actors at the national, regional and global levels – including at the United Nations.” But how will this be done, and under what coordination mechanism?

For some this is an extension of the old Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine revived this century in Afghanistan and Iraq. This “may be defined as ‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes”’. This approach is intended to increase effectiveness by combining and coordinating security, development, humanitarian and political interventions, while ensuring that these remain within the remit of international human rights and humanitarian law. Sound familiar? The problem is that COIN approaches have also been greeted with some suspicion because of their origin from within the security forces: many development and humanitarian actors have viewed them as an attempt to co-opt development activities for short-term security goals. Such wariness, at times well-founded, has hindered partnerships from forming, preventing well-coordinated approaches, or agreed platforms or strategies, and at times led to actions that have undermined rather than reinforced separate efforts.

Until now, the debate about “silied” approaches has also focused on the need for a new coordinating architecture. Discussions have been bogged down in institutional, budgetary and resource questions, each of course carrying political implications. The Secretary-General, in introducing the Plan of Action, has referred to his aim to create a High-Level PVE Action Group to spearhead coordinated implementation. More information will be needed to see how this Action Group can overcome historical suspicions and ensure the integrity of all its parts. It would benefit greatly if the SG ensured its leadership came from the very top of the UN, rather than from one of the competing departments, and if it placed greater value on evidence-based research and analysis.

So where do we go from here? In April the Swiss government will co-host an international conference on implementing the Plan of Action. It would be useful to reaffirm the premise that tackling violent extremism is not simply a security issue and that this approach has failed. In addition, there should be a focus on three areas:

1. **Increasing knowledge** by investing in empirical research to overcome key information sharing gaps on drivers that lead to radicalization, and also on what works or does not work in PVE programming. The latter requires combining expertise from a multiplicity of fields, a variety of actors, including civil society, and a range of policy and operational responses.

2. **Enhancing coordination** by creating informal multilateral platforms to develop ideas between development, human rights, political and security actors, while remaining respectful of each community’s integrity and autonomy of action.

3. **Recommitting to rights protections** by ending the blurring of legal distinctions (e. war on terror) that have undermined individual safeguards, and ensuring that accountability for violations is part of the monitoring and evaluation mechanism promised by this Secretary-General and his successor.

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WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY
Fixing UN Peacekeeping Operations: The World’s Most Complicated Army

Barbara Crossette

European countries should not see UN peacekeeping as purely humanitarian endeavor or a “soft” alternative to NATO operations, but as part of the broader picture of transatlantic burden sharing.

It has been almost a year since a sweeping assessment of United Nations peacekeeping operations by experts recommended significant changes from top to bottom: a reformed hierarchy in New York and greater coordination and discipline among military contingents in ever-more dangerous missions around the world. Few of their substantive ideas have been adopted.

As outrage mounts over reports of the exploitation and sexual abuse of children by soldiers over the last two years in the Central African Republic and its neighborhood, it is clear that there are still many loose ends needing attention. All indications suggest that the problem is getting worse globally or it is occurring at an undiminished level annually.

“We can stop admiring the problem, and begin to pursue vigorously solutions to this problem,” said Jane Holl Lute, the plain-speaking American whom Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed as his special coordinator on improving UN responses to abuse, at a briefing for the UN General Assembly on May 13. “No one has been standing still.”
Yet Lute acknowledged that the job required significant mind-set changes in the field, where she found “pockets of resistance.”

In December 2015, a subsequent, separate independent reports sharply focused on the abuses in the Central African Republic revealed that a stunning lack of communication and cooperation within the organization ranked high among the failure to deliver justice and protect the human rights of the people the UN was sent to save.

That report described the UN’s response to sexual abuses of children as bungled and bureaucratic, amounting to a “gross institutional failure.” Though the soldiers initially involved in the abuses were French troops, not formally UN peacekeepers, their presence in the crisis-wracked country had been authorized by the UN, and the organization’s mission there was responsible for reporting and acting on allegations of misconduct by anyone connected with the UN.

Instead, UN officials all the way to the top squabbled over who leaked the bad news regarding the abuse, and the welfare of victims was never a priority.

In February 2016, Secretary-General Ban, who fired the Senegalese general leading the mission in the Central African Republic in August 2015 and produced several preliminary statements and reports over the past year, provided disturbing new data on the global situation in a report to the General Assembly. The report found that scores of allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation across the UN system had been registered in 2015 alone, up nearly 25 percent over the previous year.

Thirty of the allegations were outside peacekeeping, occurring in UN agencies and other civilian programs, and 69 were directly related to peacekeeping missions. (Some of the allegations were later found not to be true and some were still being investigated at the time of the report.)

By contrast, in 2003, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations reported that it had investigated allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against only 19 military personnel and five UN staff members, although this was widely assumed to be a gross undercount. After new complaint procedures were hastily introduced, the number of allegations in 2004 jumped to 72, of which 68 were filed against soldiers and four against civilian UN staff. Ban has only about seven months left in office, and no one watching this issue closely would predict that the situation will or can change dramatically in that time.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, led by Hervé Ladsous, a French diplomat and security expert, presides over 123,053 people in 16 peacekeeping operations, as of March 31, 2016. Of the personnel, 89,546 are soldiers from 123 countries, 13,434 are police officers and 1,793 are military observers. They are backed by thousands of civilian personnel, international and local, and more than 1,800 UN volunteers.

**LUTE’S TRIP TO THE FIELD**

In her briefing to the General Assembly in May 13, Lute, the new coordinator appointed in February as head of efforts to stop sexual exploitation and abuse — and who had been UN assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping from 2003 to 2007, responsible for ground support for missions worldwide — reported on her recent trip to the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo to meet UN mission leaders and others involved in peacekeeping work in the region to test commitment on the ground. Her impressions and findings were mixed.
“We found in the first instance very clear commitment by the leadership in both of these missions from the very top to eradicate any instance of sexual exploitation and abuse, and to vigorously respond when allegations arise,” she said. “But I can tell you that there are still pockets of resistance and pockets of reluctance to take this on personally by each and every member who serves under the UN in the field.

“Some of the resistance stems from still-held views that the problem of discipline, the problem of comportment, is not everyone’s problem.” The message that UN leadership wants to enforce, she said, is that “every single individual must personally associate themselves with this agenda, both in terms of their personal comportment and in terms of their attitude in the field when they become aware that transgressions have occurred.”

Some of the reluctance, she added, “stems from the fact that people don’t know in all cases what to do or where to go or to whom to report. We are taking steps, both in the field and at headquarters, to put together toolkits and mechanisms that clarify the appropriate response when individuals become aware of this.” Lute, she said, is working with a 90-day plan.

At the center of the behavior issue, as it applies to peacekeeping troops directly under UN command, are formal agreements between the UN and troop-contributing countries. These govern numerous aspects of deployment, from the health of soldiers, the risks to which they may be exposed, the value of the equipment they may bring with them (or what they may have stolen or damaged) and what level of reimbursement the governments who send them will receive.

Under a current agreement, reimbursement for each soldier is more than $1,300 a month, but troops in the field have long claimed they get a small fraction of that in pay, with their governments taking the bulk of the money. Peacekeeping is a source of considerable income to some developing countries, such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Rwanda.
What has caused the most trouble in these agreements with governments is the legal protection from prosecution for soldiers, national police and indeed the commanders of national contingents grouped under a UN force commander. Infringement of rules of behavior, including allegations of rape or other sexual abuses or exploitation, require that troops be sent back to their home countries for trial and, if convicted, for punishment. This happens only in a minority of cases, prompting critics to suggest that such blanket “hands off our troops” limitations on the UN peacekeeping department agreements should be reconsidered, and a new status of forces model be drawn up.

Some diplomats and nongovernment specialists who study UN peacekeeping strongly recommend revision of the rules to give the UN more power to act in cases alleging abuse, especially if it rises to the level of criminal activity. Paul Williams, a professor with the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., who has written extensively on UN peacekeeping, asked in an email that although the agreement with troop-contributing countries is fundamentally flawed in allowing them full legal power in dealing with their soldiers outside the reach of the UN Secretariat, “Is there any alternative?”

Referring to sexual exploitation and abuse, he added: “The best solution would be for UN member states to simply carry out proper discipline and punishment of their personnel if they are found guilty of SEA” — sex-abuse allegations.

The panel of experts on UN peacekeeping operations that published its global report in June 2015 said that there needed to be more consultation with troop and police commanders who face daily dangers themselves and sometime resist orders or fail to discipline soldiers under their commands. But it concluded: “In the face of imminent threats to civilians, there must be no tolerance for national constraints and the failure to follow orders.”

A succession of UN secretaries-general has said over the years, however, that leaning too hard on troop contributing nations, which governments would consider an intrusion into national sovereignty, might cause them to withdraw from UN missions. Troops can be hard to find as the number of missions grows.

TRAUMATIZED SOCIETIES, VULNERABLE PEOPLE

In a 2005 report that many in the UN system and diplomats who have worked with it say could have headed off many later problems, the author, Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein, went so far as to recommend courts martial.

“An on-site court martial for serious offences that are criminal in nature would afford immediate access to witnesses and evidence in the mission area,” Zeid wrote in his report for Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general then. “An on-site court martial would demonstrate to the local community that there is no impunity for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse by members of military contingents.”

Zeid, a widely respected Jordanian diplomat who holds an undergraduate degree from Johns Hopkins University and a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, was the first president of the governing body of the International Criminal Court and is now the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Ironically, Zeid was caught up in the Central African Republic scandal in 2014-2015 when the UN human-rights office in Bangui, the country’s capital, deliberately withheld information on sexual abuse allegations from the high commissioner’s headquarters.
in Geneva, according to the December 2015 report. A Western diplomat, speaking on background, said recently that the whole affair had left Zeid deeply frustrated, since he, of all people, knew how bad conditions and behavior could be in the field.

In preparing his 2005 report, Zeid found that it was the “inability on the part of many peacekeepers to discern the extent to which the society is traumatized and vulnerable that is at the root of many of the problems.”

He recalled earlier reports from West Africa that indicated “the difficulty of identifying perpetrators because victims are often frightened, poorly educated young women and children who have difficulty in identifying their foreign assailants.”

Lute, in her recent briefing to the General Assembly related the explanations, or excuses, for bad behavior that she heard in the field. She also described the leadership of some battalion commanders who set very high standards for their troops.

“"In the field, I saw a number of examples of what I considered to be the very best practice that I have seen anywhere," she said. "For example: One of the commanders, from Malawi, walked us through the rigorous process that they go through to select the commander to lead a contingent in peacekeeping. He was asked as part of his selection process to develop a philosophy in combating SEA [sex-abuse allegations] and to develop a training plan to pursue over the course of his unit's deployment. I asked to see both [his essay and plan] and they were immediately available and presented to me. This was not just an academic exercise, this was not just a rhetorical exercise. It was a tangible exercise, and a tangible demonstration of follow-up on the kind of best practice that we would like to see promulgated widely in the field.

“We have a number of contingents that don't send commanders into the field unless those commanders have prior peacekeeping experience. In our view, that is a very good, indeed, best practice. We have a number of contingents that have daily accountability checks on their units. The Indian contingent, for example, has daily announced and unannounced checks of the location of their contingent members. There are restrictions on the ability of contingent members to travel in civilian clothes, restrictions on their ability to wander around local marketplaces or local villages and clear accountability throughout the chain of command.”

On the other hand, Lute found that excuses were still being made for violations of the rules, which are set out clearly in guidelines monitored by the peacekeeping department's conduct and discipline unit, formed in 2005 and working with conduct teams or designated individuals in missions.

“Some voices have raised problems or issues that we have had to take into account," Lute said. “Some said, We don't have enough training. Some have said, Training is not the answer. Others have said, We have a focus too often on the military and not civilians; that's unfair. We've had some who have said, The length of tour is the problem. We've had some who have said that the lack of welfare and recreation [for troops] is a problem. We've had some who have said, We don't know what widespread [abuse] means. And we have some who have said that it is too difficult to overcome a culture of impunity, and we will never fix this problem.”

Her answers at the General Assembly were direct. “Military voices know that with good command and control, good leadership engagement, proper attentiveness to the conditions under which you are asking troops to operate requires constant, steady engagement irrespective of how long you are deployed. We all know that some of the most serious allegations have been
committed by contingents that have a rotating period of four months. And we also know that there is no correlation between length of time in the field and the propensity for these acts to occur. The danger of sexual exploitation and abuse is ever present from those who are determined to commit these acts.

“Widespread [abuse] can be one soldier in five, or one soldier in 10, because a soldier’s failing almost never in a military context belongs to his or herself. Military operates deeply on a joint approach to mission achievement. You have a role to play, but we will all help you play your role, and you will help me play mine.”

WILL THINGS CHANGE?

Célhia de Lavarène, a French journalist who reported for Jeune Afrique and Radio France International before she became enraged by abusive behavior of UN peacekeepers she saw in her work in countries from Cambodia to Bosnia to Liberia, among many other places. It was a period in the 1990s during which a UN mission chief famously said, “Boys will be boys,” when nongovernment organizations complained about the behavior of peacekeepers.

De Lavarène set aside her journalism career and joined the UN in Cambodia from 1991-1993, working for an information section writing a bulletin. She went back to work as a journalist for a period and then back to the UN. Over the years, she worked in seven missions with the UN but started to fight human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Bosnia in 2001 and in Liberia in 2004.

What she saw was not only individual cases of exploitation of vulnerable women and sometimes men, but also the broader picture of large-scale trafficking that often springs up around large peacekeeping forces as well as national armies. In one case, she encountered a UN force commander who had acquired two young girls and installed them in his living quarters.

De Lavarène’s efforts were encouraged and supported by Jacques Paul Klein, an American commander in Bosnia and later in Liberia, and she was credited with rescuing hundreds of girls and women from bars and clubs where they were effectively held prisoners by traffickers. Returning to full-time journalism, she became a freelance correspondent based at the UN for the French investigative publication Mediapart and the news magazine L’Obs (formerly Le Nouvel Observateur) and also co-founded a nongovernment organization, STOP, an acronym for Stop Trafficking of People. De Lavarène is the author of a 2006 book on her experiences, “Un Visa pour l’Enfer” (“A Visa to Hell”).

Asked whether all the recent international attention to ending sexual abuse and exploitation involving peacekeepers would finally make progress in diminishing such tragedy and criminality, de Lavarène was skeptical. Too many people are involved in turning a blind eye to the corrupt system, which has to be tackled by governments from both developed and developing countries — soldiers and police officers have been sent home for misconduct by both rich and poor nations — as well as by local law enforcement in countries where peacekeepers are stationed and, above all, by UN officials, she said. “The DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] has been talking about this since 2003-2004,” she said. “Why are they talking about it again now? Are things going to change? Never.”

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HERE’S HOW TO END UN PEACEKEEPING’S HISTORY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Jeni Whalan

WHY HAVE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS SO FREQUENTLY BEEN GUILTY OF ABUSING THOSE THEY WERE SENT TO PROTECT? AND GIVEN THAT ONLY A TINY FRACTION OF PEACEKEEPERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABUSES, WHY HAS THE UN PROVED SO INCAPABLE OF HOLDING THEM TO ACCOUNT?

After years of moral outrage and stern official rhetoric, the odious scandal of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers of the vulnerable people they are sent to protect may finally attract tangible penalties for the organisation. US senators this month threatened to withdraw funding from the UN over its leaders’ failure to prevent sexual violence by peacekeepers and to hold perpetrators to account when it occurs. Given that the US funds 28% of the US$8.3 billion annual peacekeeping budget, it’s a threat with teeth.

This latest legitimacy crisis for UN peacekeeping has been brewing a long time. Since the first widely publicised abuses by peacekeepers in Cambodia in 1992, allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation have followed the UN’s deployments to crises around the world: Bosnia, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan and Mali.
But it is stories of widespread sexual violence against women and children in the Central African Republic (CAR) that have captured global media attention and which may finally prompt meaningful reform.

Reports of children being sexually assaulted and raped in CAR emerged in May 2014. UN investigators recorded numerous reports from young boys, aged 8–13 years, of their abuse by French troops serving under the (UN-authorised but French-commanded) Operation Sangaris. Gross mishandling by UN and French officials saw nearly a year pass before the reports surfaced publicly, thanks to the scrutiny of the NGO AIDS-Free World; only then did French officials begin criminal investigations. A month later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed a panel to investigate the UN's response. Their damning report concluded that the UN's mishandling amounted to 'gross institutional failure' and 'an abdication of responsibility' on the part of senior officials. In the meantime, Mr Ban sacked the head of the UN's peacekeeping mission in the CAR.

But as the UN focused inward on the inadequacies of its own bureaucratic procedures, new reports of abuse continued to emerge. In February 2016, 120 peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo were sent home over new accusations of sexual abuse brought to light by Human Rights Watch. Other allegations involved troops from Georgia, France, Burundi, Morocco and Tanzania.

And then in late March 2016 came the revelation that the UN had investigated 108 further cases of abuse by French and Gabonese forces. The vast majority of victims were children and the allegations included grotesque violence and bestiality by a French commander. Just a few weeks later, AIDS-Free World uncovered another 41 cases of sexual violence.

SOME BLAME THE UN’S RELIANCE ON UNPROFESSIONAL, INADEQUATELY TRAINED TROOPS FROM COUNTRIES WITH POOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS. TO BE SURE, THE DEMAND FOR PEACEKEEPERS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH AND THEY ARE DEPLOYED OVERWHELMINGLY FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

Why have peacekeeping missions so frequently been guilty of abusing those they were sent to protect? And given that only a tiny fraction of peacekeepers are responsible for the abuses, why has the UN proved so incapable of holding them to account?

Some blame the UN's reliance on unprofessional, inadequately trained troops from countries with poor human rights records. To be sure, the demand for peacekeepers is at an all-time high and they are deployed overwhelmingly from developing countries. But that can't explain the involvement of French troops in the CAR scandal — including in its most depraved incidents — nor the fact that most peacekeepers do not sexually abuse or exploit local people.

At the same time, while the vast majority of peacekeepers serve honourably and professionally, this is not simply a case of a few bad apples: the peacekeeping system is woefully deficient when it comes to the local accountability of peacekeepers.

The primary obstacle is the legal basis on which peacekeepers are deployed, according them immunity from prosecution by the host state. Intended to allow peacekeepers to operate without host state interference, in practice immunity has enabled impunity. The rules of UN deployments protect peacekeepers, not their victims. Countries contributing peacekeepers remain
fully, and solely, responsible for investigating, prosecuting and punishing their own personnel. If their home countries turn a blind eye to abuse allegations, there is little the UN — or survivors of abuse — can do about it. Recent recommendations for ‘naming-and-shaming’ recalcitrant UN member states and withholding payment for their troop contributions reflect welcome progress, but these are weak mechanisms for preventing or remedying these crimes.

A range of other factors is at play. Field missions answer to UN headquarters in New York, not to communities on the ground. Sexual abuse and exploitation has been treated as misconduct, requiring disciplinary action, rather than as criminal acts requiring a legal response. A lack of transparency, systematic monitoring and public reporting means that local populations rarely have a voice, and it has required ad hoc efforts by civil society organisations to bring abuses to light. Finally, peacekeeping is fundamentally a foreign activity, involving the deployment of international troops within societies they usually know little about. In her book Peaceland, ethnographer and former UN peacebuilder Séverine Autesserre finds that derogatory views of local populations are alarmingly common, recounting ‘blatantly racist and shockingly offensive’ attitudes and behaviours described variously as degrading, belittling, humiliating, dehumanising and denigrating of local people.

Together, these features of peacekeeping create a permissive, even enabling environment for sexual violence and exploitation. A slew of organisational reforms over the past decade has not, it seems, made the UN any more effective in curtailing these abuses.

**SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?**

Withholding funding from the UN, as US senators have threatened, is a powerful form of leverage. The 1964-65 session of the UN General Assembly, for example, essentially ground to a halt after several countries — including the USSR and France — refused to pay their share of the peacekeeping budget in protest over what they saw as the illegitimate authorisation of peacekeeping operations.

Today, the top five financial contributors to UN peacekeeping provide 60% of the entire budget: US (28%), Japan (11%), and France, Germany and the UK (each around 7%). These big contributors can wield substantial influence. While reforming the system of legal immunities is impractical, their leverage could exact reforms from UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to improve the process for dealing with abuse allegations. More importantly, their concerted attention could help to move attention from the politics of New York to the survivors of abuse in host countries, in the form of assistance and compensation.

They could also lend their political and financial weight to two more ambitious accountability reforms.

First, UN peacekeeping needs an ombudsperson, with budgetary and reporting independence from peacekeeping operations in the field and from peacekeeping bureaucracy in New York. The experiment with an ombudsperson in Kosovo provides both a precedent and a demonstration of the limits of an accountability mechanism that depends for its authority and funding on the very actors it is trying to hold to account.

Second, the extent of sexual violence in the CAR — and the UN’s mishandling of it — only came to light through the determined but ad hoc reporting of international NGOs, including AIDS-Free World, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Friends of UN peacekeeping, like Australia, should promote and fund systematic civil society monitoring of peacekeeping,
ideally through a mix of host country and international NGOs, to monitor operations and give voice to those made most vulnerable by violent conflict.

This commentary was first published on The Interpreter on 29 April 2016.

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The women, peace, and security agenda is often treated as one coherent process when in it is a myriad of questions and challenges each demanding different responses. The Folke Bernadotte Academy’s Louise Olsson is the co-editor a book entitled *Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325*. The Global Peace Operations Review’s Lesley Connolly recently asked her how this agenda is moving forward after last year’s three key reports on peace operations, peacebuilding, and resolution 1325 and what the book can tell us about the way forward.

Lesley Connolly: Many books have been written about gender. What does this book contribute to the debate around gender policies in peace operations?

Louise Olsson: While there has been a lot of good policy and critical research, there is still a shortage of systematic empirical, and not least statistical, research that can test assumptions and try to find out what works – and what doesn’t – when we try to realize the resolutions on women, peace and security. The Folke Bernadotte Academy has worked since 2009 to support
this form of research by organizing a network called the Research Working Group on 1325. In this book, Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325, my co-editor Ismene Gizelis and I bring together new knowledge from the network and try to move the debate forward.

The book focuses on three themes of the resolution – participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming. It tests some of our assumptions and arguments quite openly. For example, how should we better understand what it takes to increase women's participation in a peace process? Is it so “easy” as to just focus on ensuring access – or is it about understanding what the different power platforms which underlie participation look like so we can act more strategically? Another example is Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad's chapter on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse which finds that missions operating in areas with many vulnerable groups are more likely to have personnel commit these crimes. We need more of this form of research if we are to take implementation further and we hope that the book contributes to those efforts.

**LC: What are the greatest challenges facing the implementation of Resolution 1325?**

**LO:** As we see in the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report and the Global Study on Resolution 1325, some of basic challenges remain in how we address the underlying reasons for why the resolution was adopted in October 2000. Since then, we have come further in understanding that women and men are differently affected by conflict, how we see women as actors, and we know that peace automatically does not mean the same for men and women. But we still have far to go in terms of understanding how to best adapt to these facts in a systematic and effective manner. To address this, the reports suggest that the Security Council should receive an improved form of conflict analysis that includes a more explicit gender perspective.

Other challenges lie in how we have approached implementation. The HIPPO report talks about the need for a stronger leadership responsibility. We need to get this firmly integrated through the chain of command. We are not there yet.

However, as Ismene and I also note in a blog on Political Violence a few months ago, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda today encompasses most issues and themes on the whole of the Security Council's vast agenda. Still, we often treat WPS as one coherent process. This is in itself presents a challenge. WPS now consists of a myriad of questions and problems which require different forms of actions and competences in order to be effectively addressed – each in their own fashion.

**LC: How do we start to overcome these challenges and start progressing the women, peace, and security agenda? Will the recommendation on senior gender advisers help?**

**LO:** Perhaps it is time to get even more strategic in how we address the different questions and challenges on the vast WPS agenda. As an example, it is important not to mix up gender mainstreaming with women's participation in peace operations, or to mix it up with women's participation in peace negotiations. These are three distinct areas with their own challenges. The first is about mandate delivery – does an operation contribute to a more equal peace? The second is about recruitment and equal opportunities. The third is about a more inclusive peace process. All are very important but in order to be successful, we have to address them as separate challenges – although they all require a better understanding of gender equality dynamics. To address them, we need to make use of the increasing empirical evidence and systematic research that is now quickly growing in all areas as we can see in the book.
A more strategic approach needs assistance by a senior gender adviser as outlined in the Secretary-General’s report following up on the Global Study. This decision is not unique to the UN. In NATO, the recommendation has long been that the gender adviser should be placed directly in relation to the most senior management. Gender mainstreaming is essentially about understanding how to turn the main mandate into action – which is a leadership responsibility. In order to be able to do that in a way which benefits men and women, and which contributes positively to a country’s gender equality developments, he or she needs support from a gender adviser.

**LC:** How does this book resonate with the findings of the Global Study?

**LO:** The book was published ahead of the study so it does not address the results directly, but there are many common denominators with the recommendations from both the study and the HIPPO report.

Ismene Gizelis and Jana Krause’s chapter finds that we need to get even better at ironing out how to more effectively adapt to both men’s and women’s situations and security needs, i.e. how to get functioning gender mainstreaming in place. This requires a solid understanding of each given context. The same is true for funding and inclusion of women’s local participation which must be specific to the given setting.

**GENDER MAINSTREAMING IS ESSENTIALLY ABOUT UNDERSTANDING HOW TO TURN THE MAIN MANDATE INTO ACTION – WHICH IS A LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY.**

The chapter by Helen Basini is a good example of this _problematique_ in a DDR context. She finds that in Liberia, women were part of demobilization and demilitarization phases but that a similar inclusion did not occur in the reintegration phase. This, she argues, demonstrates the importance of also having a clear and concrete understanding of the situation for both men and women in the transition process from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, which was addressed by both HIPPO and the peacebuilding review.

**LC:** In both the HIPPO and Peacebuilding Architecture reports there are recommendations looking at leadership and the need for more gender balanced representation within peace operations. How does your book address this recommendation?

**LO:** The book provides insights into the many challenges that come with working to improve participation in peace operations. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley examine the reasons for why it is so difficult to increase the number of women in uniform and find that the incentives of the contributing countries are central. However, they also warn us from making oversimplified solutions focusing on numbers. First of all, working to increase the number of women personnel requires strong leadership that seeks to change and improve the working environment and to rid the organization of negative gender stereotypes. Second, we need to understand that having, for example, twenty per cent women employees does not mean that we automatically have a gender perspective.
LC: We have just seen the appointment of Elizabeth Spehar as Special Representative in Cyprus and Lisa Buttenheim as Deputy of the Department of Field Support, but women are under represented in the senior ranks of the UN Secretariat. Where is the problem and how do we overcome this gap?

LO: This is an additional important theme under the WPS agenda that needs to be more strongly addressed in its own right. While we have not looked at that specific issue in the book, there is quite a lot of growing research – and many lessons learned from other spheres – which shows that it can be addressed successfully if there is will. It is also a question which was much discussed already when I started doing research on WPS in 1999, so it is disturbing that we have not come further.

LC: It has been acknowledged that 1325 has not yet been implemented fully; now we have the Global Study that has provided renewed focus on gender issues. How do we ensure a sustained focus on the WPS agenda?

LO: We need to become more specific in how we measure our progress on addressing the different problems and questions that fall under the implementation of the resolutions. We have made progress in many areas which we need to recognize and build on in our continued work. We will discuss this and how to support progress further at the Challenges Forum 20th anniversary meeting on 8-9 May here in New York.

I also think that gender mainstreaming needs to be more strategically channeled into the major processes and big questions facing the UN around prevention and the changing nature of conflict. Much depends on how the next Secretary-General, regardless of whether it is a male or female, addresses the challenges recognized in the resolutions on women, peace and security and in the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

So far, we have seen less focus on the Global Study and the gender specific recommendations of the HIPPO report. Unless we all take this seriously, there is a risk that we will not see the progress which is much needed.

LC: Who is the target audience of this book and what message do you aim to get out there with this book?

LO: The target audience is both policy makers and researchers; those interested in WPS questions but also those focusing more broadly on peace and security. The aim is twofold: bring out new and central lessons learned which can assist us in progressing the implementation of resolution 1325 in the areas of participation, protection and gender mainstreaming. The other is to demonstrate what systematic research can contribute with in terms of bringing us more and nuanced knowledge on how the UN can continue to contribute to a more equal peace.

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WOMEN IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE UNSUNG CHAMPIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Liezelle Kumalo and Riana Paneras

WOMEN REMAIN MORE VULNERABLE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS THAN MEN

Special envoys are, by definition, agents appointed by a principal or a group of principals for a particular task. Yet their scope of power and authority varies across institutions. Different international organizations have made distinct decisions in terms of selecting special envoys; defining their mandates; deploying, financing and supporting an envoy's support team; and establishing report and oversight mechanisms. These formal decisions occur in the context of informal customary practices, which are for the most part beyond the scope of this study.

On 21 March 2016, South Africa celebrates Human Rights Day, commemorating the 1960 shooting of police upon peaceful protestors, which killed 69 people. This year, reflecting on the role of police in relation to human rights seems more relevant than ever given that the African Union (AU) dedicated 2016 to human rights, with a specific focus on the rights of women.

As South Africans reflect on the events of 1960, it would be useful to consider the broader responsibility of police in Africa.

Discussions around the role of police should include questions regarding the role of police in promoting human rights, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Considering that women are disproportionately affected by conflict, police peacekeepers must be mindful of ensuring that women's rights, in particular, remain protected. This is especially true for conflict situations where sexual violence against women has become an accepted norm that does not receive due attention. Cases in countries such as Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan are but some examples where these abuses are often not investigated or prosecuted.
Women remain more vulnerable in conflict and post-conflict environments than men. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an estimated 25 000 cases of sexual violence against women and children are committed each year. It is in these spaces where police peacekeepers are mandated provide public safety and promote the rule of law.

In conflict and post-conflict environments, security and justice mechanisms are often non-existent or partially operational. In Mali, for example, the police fled from certain areas when fighting broke out in 2013. Police presence is non-existent in Darfur and South Sudan localities such as Korma, Tawilla and Kutum.

Police officers in peace operations offer international legitimacy. They also have an important role in re-establishing the confidence of local communities in the police and the security system. But this needs to happen in a way that takes into account the realities and challenges facing many women. Women are blamed for crimes and have little recourse, which is often compounded by a lack of local female law enforcers.

FEMALE POLICE OFFICERS SERVE AS ROLE MODELS BY ENSURING THAT WOMEN ARE NOT JUST SEEN AS VICTIMS

The vital role of female police officers in peace operations and the promotion of human rights should not be underestimated. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, the Executive Director of United Nations-Women, said that the most under-used tool for building peace was the meaningful inclusion of women; and that more women in the police and military forces are needed. The United Nations (UN) Police Division, under its Global Effort Plan, aimed to have 20% female officers among police components of global peace operations by 2014. However, female police officers are still underrepresented and make up only 9.6% of those forces.

There is clearly a need to have more women peacekeepers. The importance of women in peace operations has been dealt with in UN Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009). In Africa, the AU’s Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa also calls on member states to increase the participation of women and gender perspectives in peace support operations. These mechanisms all speak to the powerful and influential role of women in creating sustainable peace and highlight that when it comes to conflict resolution, women are an untapped resource.

In addition, UNSC resolutions 1820 (2008) and 2242 (2015) specifically task peacekeepers with preventing and responding to sexual violence and crimes against women and children. UNSC resolution urges for better integration of gender perspectives into peace operations and to double the numbers of women in peace operations by 2019. The High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations also noted that female personnel play an important role in gaining the trust of women and girls in local communities.

Having more female police officers means communities are better represented and served by the police, and encourages people to report crimes committed against women. Female police officers in peace operations ensure that interaction with the local female population takes place. They also help women and communities gain self-respect and develop livelihood projects, and this establishes a relationship of trust, which assists the implementation of the mission mandate.
The presence of female peacekeepers also empowers local women to enjoy improved access to justice and relevant support. Female police officers serve as role models by ensuring that women are not just seen as victims, but also as providers of safety and security who bring a diverse set of skills and competencies. The presence of women officers can also have a positive impact in supporting gender sensitivity among their male counterparts.

The AU and UN need to make a more concerted effort to provide enabling environments for women to join security services, especially the police force. Various UNSC resolutions have focused on increasing participation of women, but strategies to change perceptions or entrenched discriminatory patriarchal attitudes are more elusive.

The call for more women to be involved in peace processes is also complex because it depends on the availability of member state contributions to AU and UN missions. In many instances, women are underrepresented in security sectors in police-contributing countries or are relegated to administrative or support roles. This negatively impacts on their availability for senior positions. Ensuring female police are represented in peace operations requires member states to recruit more women into domestic police forces.

Female police are a critical resource for achieving sustainable peace and ensuring the protection of human rights in local communities. They are the champions for many women in conflict and post-conflict settings to better protect themselves and work towards a more just and peaceful Africa.

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IS THE UN REALLY MOVING TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY?

Ourania S. Yancopoulos

NEW RESEARCH RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE UN IS BURYING STATISTICS ON GENDER REPRESENTATION IN ORDER TO COVER UP LACK OF PROGRESS.

The United Nation’s founding charter highlights not only the mission “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” but “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” - specifically, “in the equal rights of men and women.” Moreover, the organization claims that a female perspective should have greater influence in its humanitarian and peace-promoting efforts, insisting that women are central to economic development and conflict prevention. To this end, much has been made of improving female representation at the most senior levels of UN leadership, especially under current Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

In a speech given just last month, before 2,000 people and thousands more via web-cam, Secretary General Ban, claimed to have appointed “50 or 60 women” at the UN’s most senior level - “all Assistant-Secretary-Generals and Under-Secretary -
Generals” and thereby claimed to have single-handedly “changed the whole landscape for women.” This month he claimed to “have signed nearly 150 letters of appointment to women” in these high positions. Such discrepancies raise questions about the UN’s rate of progress toward gender balance in its senior ranks.

So, has progress really been made? And why is it so hard to tell?

The UN’s convoluted data practices mean there is no single, consistent way of knowing the gender composition of its senior staff. There are serious inconsistencies in official data about senior staff numbers. Sex-differentiated tables were only introduced in 1971. Periodically, methods for recording staff numbers change to include, variously, those appointed to an internal formula for ensuring fair shares of positions to all geographic regions, or those appointed under specific types of contracts. An investigation I conducted using UN published and publicly available data attempts to piece together the proportion of women in UN leadership since its founding.

Table 1 shows the percentage of women holding USG/ASG level posts by year, broken down by each Secretary General’s tenure. The graph on the left shows the percentage of women USG/ASG over time. The graph on the right shows both the percentage of women and men USG/ASG over time to visualize the UN’s progress toward gender balance in the Secretariat’s leadership from 1976 – 2015. Relevant definitions are also explained.
My analysis is limited to the UN’s Secretariat, and does not include its many funds and agencies. Headed by the Secretary-General, the Secretariat serves as the U.N.’s diplomatic face and contains the organization’s core entities for addressing political affairs, peace and security, as well as communications. This main organ comprises over 41,000 international staff members and is led by “Under-Secretaries-General” (USG) and “Assistant-Secretaries-General” (ASG). In 2015, the Secretariat’s leadership was concentrated in 166 individuals of USG/ASG status. According to UN reports, these senior staff members - heads of important U.N. departments and offices, directly appointed by the Secretary-General - make up over 50% of the entire UN system’s senior leadership.

The Secretary General’s report on the Composition of the Secretariat, released annually since 1946, presents demographic data on staff. In the report, many of the data are buried in tables, and public claims, such as those made by Mr. Ban, refer to subsets of the U.N.’s total population, which are difficult to understand and sometimes seem only to obscure the broader picture. Only since 2006 has the Composition of the Secretariat reports included all staff, regardless of their contract type, term, or source of funding. Indeed, most would consider the overall numbers of the combined USG and ASG population — not the subsets — to be most relevant and reflective of gender representation in senior leadership of the Secretariat, and these percentages are the most disappointing.

As of June 30, 2015, just 37 of the 166 total USG/ASG Secretariat population were women, or about 22 percent. As visualized in Table 2, changes over time are even more troubling.
Table 2: The UN’s “Progress” Toward Gender Balance in the Last Decade (2006 - 2015)

Representation of women has actually dropped from an unimpressive, though record high, of 24 percent in 2012 (35 women, 108 men) to 22 percent in 2015 (37 women, 129 men). At the current rate of increase during the current Secretary General’s tenure—from 20 percent in 2007 to 22 percent in 2015—it would take another 112 years to reach 50/50 gender parity in the UN’s senior leadership.

Today, on the 107th International Women’s Day, marked by the #PledgeForParity campaign slogan, we are reminded of just how difficult it is for any organization to reach true gender parity. If it is this hard for an international organization overtly dedicated to achieving it, how can we expect national governments and corporations to live up to it?

THE UN’S CONVOLUTED DATA PRACTICES MEAN THERE IS NO SINGLE, CONSISTENT WAY OF KNOWING THE GENDER COMPOSITION OF ITS SENIOR STAFF.

Take the United States: according to a McKinsey/Lean-In study, women in corporate America “are underrepresented at every level in the corporate pipeline.” In the Senate, of the 31 women who have ever been elected, 20 are serving now (compared to 80 current male counterparts). Of the 112 Supreme Court Justices in history, four have been women, and three of them are currently serving. And the most obvious: of 44 U.S. Presidents, not one has been a woman.
The truth is that Mr. Ban’s track record is better than his predecessors’. But “better” is relative. If we focus on absolute numbers, 37 women in the UN’s most senior posts might seem impressive. However, as has been recently pointed out, the overall number of total senior staff has markedly increased overall. And so, while there are now 37 women in 166 senior posts (compared to 20 out of 110 in 2006), the overall expansion of the UN’s senior leadership - and consistent hiring of men over women - has diluted the impact of new female appointments. While the absolute number of women in the UN’s senior leadership has grown, the proportion of women leaders has not increased so dramatically.

Additionally, in the UN’s most high-level body, chaired by the Secretary General - the Senior Management Group - only 12 of the team’s 39 members are women. That’s 30 percent - far short of the 50/50 goal.

Considering the confusing, even misleading rhetoric of the UN system that papers over the glacially slow progress in women’s share of senior staff positions at the UN Secretariat, it is important to check these findings against another source. A visualization of the comparison of these data with the Chief Executive Board’s list of “regular budget staff” shown in Table 3 below, show how this analysis is in fact correct.
Table 3: Bearing in mind definitional changes, a different way of counting produces similar results

The CEB’s reports provide annual statistical tables on UN staff, employed by the regular budget, with appointments for a period of one year or more. In contrast to the Composition of the Secretariat reports that cover data from the end of the fiscal year (June 30), CEB reports cover data from the end of the calendar year (December 31). In spite of these definitional and timeline differences, the CEB reports confirm our previous findings - women hold about 22 percent of senior leadership positions in the Secretariat, and there is a recent trend of even further privileging men over women in the U.N.’s most senior leadership. But we must recognize that the United Nations is making some progress. As Mr. Ban prepares to step down at the end of 2016, the election process for his successor, which has traditionally been cloaked in mystery, is becoming more transparent. For the first time, member states will not only nominate but also interview official candidates. And for the first time, these official nominees include women.

Still, the disappointing statistics on gender representation are not addressed to any serious degree in the most recent UN annual reports; they are instead presented as raw numbers in tables, absent any analysis. It takes hours and hours to sift through thousands and thousands of pages to find these numbers, suggesting the UN is interested in burying them.
Now, with these data published and publicly available, everyone will be watching. Now, it is up to the United Nations to a better job at meeting its commitments.

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AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS
TOWARDS A CONTINENTAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

Tarek A. Sharif and Joanne Richards

THE AFRICAN UNION HAS A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM FRAMEWORK PROMOTING LAW-ENFORCEMENT, INTELLIGENCE SHARING, AND TRADITIONAL MILITARY RESPONSES. HOWEVER, THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ALSO REQUIRES MORE PREVENTATIVE, GRASSROOTS MEASURES THAT ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

Violent extremism is now recognized as a growing threat to peace and security in Africa, as exemplified by the recent terrorist attacks in Garissa, Abidjan, and Ouagadougou. While much of the policy discussion on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) focuses on the return of radicalized foreign fighters to the West, less attention is directed to those foreign fighters who may eventually return from Iraq, Syria, and Libya to other areas of North Africa, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa. Tunisia is one of the world’s largest contributors to the Islamic State in terms of foreign fighters, with smaller contributions from Algeria,
Morocco, Libya, Sudan and Somalia. Issues concerning the return of foreign fighters to Africa are particularly salient not only because these individuals may return to their communities, but also because they may link up with other extremist armed groups present across the continent. These include groups affiliated to either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Attempts to counter violent extremism began in Europe in the 1980s with the advent of programs to dissuade and disengage right-wing extremists in Norway, Sweden and Germany. Although no common definition exists, since that time CVE has come to be associated with a range of measures designed to prevent and reverse the radicalization of individuals and groups, and to forestall the participation of these groups and “lone wolves” in acts of terrorism. Given that CVE is preventative and reactive, different CVE strategies are necessary for different stages of the radicalization continuum, including for individuals and communities with no exposure to extremist networks, those with some exposure, and those already radicalized. The latter is often associated with attempts to shift extremists towards acceptance of more moderate ideologies and is known as “deradicalization.”

In some ways, CVE is difficult to distinguish from conventional counter-terrorism, which often includes traditional military measures and the sharing of intelligence between nation states. However, because conventional counter-terrorism does not address the root causes prompting radicalization, policy interventions under the rubric of CVE have more recently been designed to focus attention on the grassroots factors, which may render certain individuals more susceptible to radicalization than others. Social exclusion, poverty, and a lack of education are often named as typical contenders in this regard, although CVE practitioners generally acknowledge that no single causal pathway to radicalization can be identified. Reflecting these general trends, this essay charts the development of African Union policy, from its roots in conventional counter-terrorism, to efforts to devise a continental strategy for CVE in Africa. It also outlines a number of policy measures, which any such continental strategy should take into account.

**TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREAT TO AFRICA**

The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new to Africa, and the resurgence of terrorism on the continent (and elsewhere) in the early 1990s is often traced back to veterans of the anti-Soviet Muslim army, the “Mujahideen.” Trained by the CIA during the Cold War, a number of foreign Mujahideen fighters returned to their countries of origin following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in February 1989. Mujahideen veterans returning to Algeria founded the radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and also participated in its splinter faction, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Formed in 1998, GSPC trained individuals from Chad, Sudan, Libya, Mali and Mauritania, and extended its operations throughout southern Algeria, northern Mali, and regions of Niger and Mauritania. In 2007, GSPC pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and renamed itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, later announced that the group would provide arms and training to Nigeria’s Boko Haram. This association was illustrated when Boko Haram attacked the United Nations office in Abuja in 2011, using tactics strikingly similar to those employed by AQIM.

The early connections between AQIM and Boko Haram are indicative of a broader trend in which the many different extremist groups across Africa have become loosely linked to one another, and to either the Islamic State or al-Qaeda in the Middle East. Despite differences in ideology, al-Murabitun (a splinter of AQIM) and Ansar Dine (an AQIM ally in northern Mali) collaborate at least marginally. There is also evidence suggesting that the Ansaru group (a Boko Haram splinter formed in 2012) has
trained and collaborated with both AQIM and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. Like AQIM, al-Shabaab has remained affiliated to al-Qaeda, despite the recent establishment of Islamic State footholds in both Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Libya. Boko Haram’s recent pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015 has also seen dozens of its fighters travel to Libya to provide support for the group. Exacerbated by the Arab Spring, open borders and ungoverned spaces throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions have significantly contributed to both the transnational connections between extremist groups and the movement of fighters. Members of the Tunisian Ansar-al-Sharia group hold out in mountainous regions along the border with Algeria and benefit from the open border with Libya. AQIM and other affiliated groups also move freely across the border between southern Algeria and northern Mali.

AU COUNTER-TERRORISM: NORMATIVE AND IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORKS

In response to these transnational terrorist threats, in 1992 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) took initial steps to strengthen the cooperation and coordination of African states in counter-terrorism. This effort was later followed by the adoption, in 1999, of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocols. The Convention entered into force in December 2002 and, to date, 41 Member States have ratified. In order to implement the Convention, the AU developed a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism that lays out several measures related to improvements in border control, inter-governmental information exchange, countering terrorist financing, and necessary legislative and judicial steps. As part of the implementation of the 2002 Plan of Action, the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 in Algiers. ACSRT serves as an information center for research and analysis on terrorism and terrorist groups, and for the development of counter-terrorism capacity building programs. The AU also appointed a Special Representative for counter-terrorism in October 2010, and, the following year, the AU Commission adopted the African Model Law on Counter-Terrorism at the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Malabo (July 2011). The Model Law provides a template designed to harmonize domestic counter-terrorism legislation and to ensure compliance with relevant international instruments.

The Islamic State’s recent call for jihadists to make their way to the “African provinces” further intensified AU efforts. In September 2014, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a communiqué at its 455th meeting, at the level of Heads of State and Government, on the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. This communiqué was seen as a second action plan with the PSC calling upon the AU Commission to intensify its efforts in a number of areas, including the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Fund, the elaboration of an African arrest warrant for persons charged with or convicted of terrorist acts, and the establishment of specialized joint counter-terrorism units at the sub-regional and regional levels within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). These steps complement the AU’s ongoing Nouakchott (2013) and Djibouti (2015) processes, which bring together heads of intelligence, from across the Sahel and East Africa regions respectively, to share information and strengthen regional security cooperation against transnational threats. In 2015, the PSC also authorized a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to fight Boko Haram made up of troop contingents from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The MJTF’s specific tasks include cross-border military operations, regional coordination, and joint border patrols. In addition to these military efforts, the PSC decision establishing the MJTF also noted the need to improve livelihoods, education, and job creation in the region in order to address “alienation and marginalization as conditions conducive to violent extremism.”
**CVE: TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN APPROACH**

While the AU Commission has devoted considerable attention to building the capacities of AU Member States to conduct conventional counter-terrorism, such as joint military operations and the sharing of intelligence, more must be done to address the root causes of violent extremism and the so-called “battle of minds.” This requires a multi-sectoral approach with different policy interventions for different stages of radicalization.

For those not (yet) exposed to extremist ideology, CVE interventions should aim to prevent and build resilience to radicalization. A holistic approach is necessary, including the expansion of educational programs that promote critical thinking and the use of mainstream development projects, which can be implemented with a CVE sub-objective, to prevent the marginalization of individuals and communities. Efforts to promote religious moderation may also be undertaken, including the use of radio and television to promote moderate teachings, and the review of textbooks and syllabi to remove radical exhortations to violence.

**THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ALSO REQUIRES MORE PREVENTATIVE, GRASSROOTS MEASURES THAT ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

More targeted interventions are required for those individuals and groups already exposed to extremist networks and identified as “at risk” of radicalization. Counter-messaging is one means of undermining the appeal of violent extremist messaging and can make use of counter-narratives provided by former terrorists and the victims/survivors of terrorist attacks. In this regard, the AU Commission organized two meetings on “Victims of Terrorist Acts” in October 2014 and November 2016. The meetings provided a forum to discuss how best to assist victims of terrorism and how to promote their role as active partners in CVE. Recent experience from past counter-messaging initiatives has shown that the content, source, and scale of the message must be taken into account. While the message must be clear and the source credible, the scale of counter-message dissemination must also be large enough and sustained enough to be heard, particularly in the vast expanse of the internet. To achieve the required volume and credibility, partnerships with terrorist victim associations, former fighters, religious leaders and civil society must be further explored. Counter-messaging can also be provided face-to-face, as is currently taking place within the AU's peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Here, AMISOM and the Somali authorities engage Imams and religious scholars to sensitize local communities and to provide a counter-narrative to the violent rhetoric propagated by al-Shabaab. As part of the Mission's Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), Mosques and Islamic schools, or Madrassas, are also currently being rehabilitated to provide a platform for community mobilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding.

In addition to counter-messaging, it is also important for CVE programs to gain the support and trust of individuals who are well positioned to detect behavioral changes suggestive of radicalization, particularly in “at risk” communities. This can include those with close personal ties to the individual(s) in question, such as friends, teachers, and family members. Providing education to help these bystanders assess the potential signs of radicalization and recruitment may help to encourage reporting to law-enforcement or to other CVE networks. However, any such educational program will also have to address the fact that
bystanders will likely be reluctant to report close friends and may fear repercussions. Community policing may be able to make some in-roads in this regard, particularly if community projects aimed at countering violent extremism encourage relationship and trust-building activities as well as communal problem solving. In the African context, the strong role of civil society and women's organizations could also be leveraged to build confidence in this regard.

A final set of policy interventions is required for individuals who have already radicalized. These policy interventions should facilitate both disengagement (the rejection of violence), and deradicalization (a shift towards more moderate ideology). Disengagement and deradicalization are often prison-based activities, and may be carried out by moderate religious authorities that visit inmates and lead prison-based prayers. This occurs in Morocco, where deradicalization is accomplished through religious supervision carried out by authorities from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and members of regional and local religious councils. In 2013, these officials visited approximately 5,000 inmates. Support for reintegration into civilian life upon release is also paramount. In this respect, much can be learnt from the African Union and United Nations' experience of reintegration during programs of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). In the case of CVE, vocational training traditionally associated with DDR could be combined with religious re-education and support for the (re-)establishment of relationships away from extremist networks.

One additional issue of concern is the use of the Internet by still active radicals to spread information on methods of guerrilla warfare, and on the construction of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and other forms of Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). This could allow terrorist groups and their operatives to develop expertise to further wreak havoc and destruction. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) allegedly publishes an on-line magazine, “Inspire,” with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for jihad at home. This calls for concerted efforts at the national, regional and global levels, to prevent the exploitation of the Internet by terrorist groups. This could be achieved through legislation against cybercrime and Internet counter-terrorism, and the use of enhanced technical capabilities to monitor and track its misuse.

**CONCLUSION**

The African Union has a comprehensive counter-terrorism framework promoting law-enforcement, intelligence sharing, and traditional military responses. However, the fight against terrorism also requires more preventative, grassroots measures that address the root causes contributing to the development of violent extremism. As a result, at its 592nd meeting in April 2016, the AU Peace and Security Council called for the establishment of a “platform for reflection” to inform the development of a comprehensive continental strategy for both counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism. This platform will need to examine the themes outlined above concerning education for the prevention of radicalization, counter-messaging, the engagement of bystanders, legislation against cyber-crime, and means for disengagement and deradicalization. The particular challenges posed by CVE will also need to be addressed. For example, CVE programs have the potential to do considerable harm if seen to alienate and stigmatize particular communities. The root causes that lead to radicalization are difficult to identify and CVE programs that focus only on deprived and marginalized communities may neglect to counter the radicalization of those who do not fit a standard profile. Careful context specific analysis will be required to identify the different drivers of extremism in different settings.
Countering violent extremism in Africa will ultimately be a long-term process inextricably linked to events beyond the continent. The AU will therefore continue to work towards the development of an overarching CVE framework and the provision of support to AU Member States in the design and implementation of counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs. These programs should be appropriate to specific national contexts, dealing sometimes with the prevention of radicalization and sometimes with the return, deradicalization and reintegration of former fighters. Moving forward will require enhanced levels of cooperation and collaboration with both international and domestic partners. Capacity building in emerging CVE concepts and methods will also be necessary, and the training of select DDR officers and AU Mission personnel, such as those working within Somalia (AMISOM) and Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), may be particularly desirable. Furthermore, in order to provide a facilitating environment for CVE, the AU will continue to assist Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and AU Member States in complementary counter-terrorism efforts, including improvements to border control and the review, drafting, and domestication of counter-terrorist legislation in line with the AU Model Law.

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The recent UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo are notable for their size and longevity. In 1999, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo or MONUC was mandated to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In 2010, it was transformed into the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), now the largest and most expensive peace operation, with 22,498 personnel and an annual budget of $1.2 billion. These missions have also been a critical laboratory for innovations in peacekeeping, especially with regards to the protection of civilians. Concepts such as Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) were pioneered in the Congo, and the mission experimented with various kinds of robust peacekeeping in Ituri and the Kivus, most recently with the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB).
However, since the 2006 elections and the end of the Sun City peace process, the mission has been marginalized from what it did best: the implementation of a political process. In 2010, it was transformed into a stabilization mission, mandated to help strengthen the Congolese and to protect civilians in imminent danger. Unfortunately, these two imperatives have often been at loggerheads. The government security forces with which MONUSCO has partnered have proven to be extremely abusive, and members of the army have backed other armed groups in the eastern Congo. What should the UN do when the same army it is sent to support abuses the civilians it is supposed to protect? Meanwhile, the mission has been unable to broker an effective peace process to deal with the remaining 70 armed groups in the eastern Congo or to play a critical role in bringing an end to the political turmoil in Kinshasa.

It is in this context that the Congo Research Group (CRG) at the Center on International Cooperation set about to understand how the people feel about the mission that is supposed to serve them. The Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International (BERCI) and CRG conducted a nationally representative political opinion poll across the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Between May and September 2016, researchers interviewed 7,545 people in face-to-face interviews. This survey should be seen as complementary—and many of our findings were similar—to the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s surveys in the Congo.
We asked many questions, but the main ones related to MONUSCO were:

- Is MONUSCO doing a good job at protecting civilians?
- Should the mission downsize, stay, or leave?
- Is MONUSCO corrupt?

General public opinion is mixed regarding MONUSCO: 55.1 per cent think the peacekeepers should stay and 29.4 per cent think they should leave. But the blue helmets are especially unpopular in the very areas where most of them have deployed: in Nord-Kivu (56.7 per cent), Sud-Kivu (50.2 per cent) and Ituri (45.2 per cent) a preponderance of respondents said the UN mission should leave. An alarming high number of Congolese also felt that the peacekeeping mission was very corrupt (17.4 per cent) or slightly corrupt (an additional 18.5 per cent). Only 36 per cent felt it was not at all corrupt.

People also felt that the mission should not wait for government approval or partnership to attack armed groups. Around half of those asked said the mission should engage in unilateral operations against armed groups who pose a threat to the local population, while 29.2 per cent said it should not.

THE BLUE HELMETS ARE ESPECIALLY UNPOPULAR IN THE VERY AREAS WHERE MOST OF THEM HAVE DEPLOYED

How should we interpret these figures? What should the mission do? MONUSCO has always suffered from the problem of excessive expectations and the poor popular understanding of its mandate. The mission cannot be everywhere at the same time, and carrying out an effective counterinsurgency is dangerous and extremely difficult. At the same time, the mission's failings, especially in the area of civilian protection have been well-documented. Other parts of our poll can help us analyze this data.

First, MONUSCO is not alone in terms of Congolese antipathy toward foreign actors. Many Congolese feel that they do not benefit from foreign aid, private sector investments or humanitarian work. We asked whether the Congo would be better off without foreign aid—31.3 per cent said yes. Similarly, high levels said the country would fare better without international NGOs (33.4 per cent) and foreign investment (31 per cent). Surprisingly, these responses are even higher in some of the provinces most affected. For example, in Nord-Kivu, which sees most activity by international NGOs, 47.2 per cent said they would be better off without them.

Secondly, Congolese have a remarkably sophisticated understanding of their political situation. Overwhelmingly, Congolese felt that elections should be seen as the priority. We asked: “The country is facing numerous challenges, including poverty, a complicated electoral process, and violent conflict.” Respondents then replied whether security and development should be prioritized over elections, go hand in hand, or elections are more important. The results were clear: most respondents (46.7 per cent) felt all three are linked and should be worked on at the same time, 39.1 per cent said elections were more important than any other consideration, and only 14 per cent said security and development are a greater priority than elections.
The takeaway is that MONUSCO and the UN Security Council should redouble efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Kinshasa. If there has been one lesson from seventeen years of peacekeeping and stabilization in the Congo it is this: Without an accountable and willing government as a partner, it will be extremely difficult for the UN mission—as well as other foreign actors—to make any headway.

The complete survey report can be downloaded here.

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‘SUSTAINING PEACE,’ WHICH RECOGNISSES THE COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL SOCIETIES, HAS BECOME A CORNERSTONE FOR CURRENT PEACEBUILDING THINKING.

Worsening climate conditions directly threaten prospects for attaining the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with them the conditions for peaceful societies.

As the Paris Agreement comes into force on 4 November, the world will be committed to the best existing global strategy for limiting and reversing climate change. Advancing sustainable development and peace will require bold climate action that looks beyond short-term political constraints.
‘Sustaining peace,’ which recognises the comprehensive social, political and economic factors that contribute to conflict prevention and maintenance of peaceful societies, has become a cornerstone for current peacebuilding thinking. ‘How can we avoid conditions that can lead to conflict in the first place?’ asked Juan José Gómez Camacho, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations (UN), during a meeting on sustaining peace and preventing conflict on 22 September.

While the UN often cites the SDGs as a powerful tool for achieving these conditions, climate action and the Paris Agreement to limit the global temperatures temperature rise to below two degrees Celsius have so far remained on the periphery of the discourse on sustaining peace.

In 2015, the UN conducted a Peacebuilding Review, which noted that climate change is a driver of conflict, and also underlined limitations in the understanding of links between climate and fragility.

Last April, drawing on this review, the UN General Assembly and Security Council adopted identical resolutions on sustaining peace. While the final texts do not explicitly mention climate conditions, they do state that, ‘development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.’

By expanding the perspective of conflict prevention to include the holistic maintenance of environments that are conducive to peace, the UN linked building safe and peaceful societies to the full spectrum of SDGs. Given the significant threat that climate change poses to African developmental gains, efforts on sustaining peace require responses to rising global temperatures.

INCREASINGLY VARIABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN LINKED TO THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT

Climate change directly threatens socio-economic development outcomes. As a 2013 World Bank report outlines, the impacts of climate change are widespread and increasingly severe, with successive degrees of warming beyond pre-industrial levels. For example, a temperature increase of up to two degrees Celsius by the 2050s could reduce total crop production in sub-Saharan Africa by 10%, with further warming increasing the potential loss to around 15 to 20%. These reductions correspond to potential increases in hyper-arid and arid areas across the continent, especially in southern Africa.

Reduced water access will dramatically affect both food security and livelihoods, not least because agriculture is predicted to remain the employer of 46% of Africans by 2020. Warming is also forecast to increase undernourishment and the prevalence of diseases, such as malaria, which may hinder childhood education. Climate change will impact the social, political and economic landscape of the continent, and with it the potential to achieve the SDGs and conditions for sustaining peace.

The dual UN resolutions highlight the SDG priorities of ‘sustainable economic growth’ and ‘poverty eradication’ as important for sustaining peace – both of which are threatened by climate change.

As outlined in a paper by Health and Environment International Trust researcher Tord Kjellstrom, the physical and mental stresses of exacerbated heat exposure negatively impact working capacity around the world. Correspondingly, it inhibits countries’ ability to achieve sustainable economic growth.
For example, using the Climate Vulnerability Monitor, Kjellstrom notes that Ghana and Nigeria’s 2030 projections have total climate change costs amounting to 8.9% and 7.6% of GDP respectively. While workplace-cooling schemes may be used to alleviate these losses, recommendations maintain that the ‘global mitigation of climate change’ is the most effective means of protecting health and economic progress.

Climate shifts disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, often with limited government support. ‘There won’t be durable peace unless people can enjoy the benefits of development,’ Miguel Ruiz Cabañas, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, said at the 22 September UN meeting.

Anticipating increasing climate changes, the UN has prioritised resilience-building strategies that seek to sustain peace by preparing communities for climate shocks and increased resource stresses.

**EFFORTS ON SUSTAINING PEACE REQUIRE RESPONSES TO RISING GLOBAL TEMPERATURES**

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, for example, is a non-binding agreement adopted by UN member states in March 2015 aiming to reduce the substantial ‘disaster risk and losses.’ Similarly, the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Resilience Initiative seeks to ‘accelerate action to strengthen climate resilience in support of the 2030 Agenda.’

If successful, improved resilience may better insulate vulnerable populations against excessively negative climate impacts that could contribute to a breakdown of peaceful social relations.

In certain cases – northern Mali, for example – extreme and increasingly variable weather conditions have been linked to the outbreak of conflict. However, the relationship between climate change and violence is complex, and is often viewed as a compounding factor rather than a root cause. A report by Adelphi, titled New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks articulates this relationship, defining climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that can ‘aggravate fragile situations and may contribute to social upheaval and even violent conflict.’

Despite the link between conditions for sustaining peace and climate change, action to improve these conditions is far from assured. Proactive strategies will help people manage climate change peacefully. But proponents of sustaining peace must also look beyond improved anticipation and preparation toward advancing the necessary changes in energy production and consumption to keep global temperatures well below the two degrees stated in the Paris Agreement.

Encouraging politicians and businesses to invest in climate action to sustain peace over the longer-term can be difficult. ‘We live in a world that has become highly enamoured and driven by short-term gains and short-term returns,’ explained Macharia Kamau, who holds the three positions of Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN, Peacebuilding Commission Chairperson, and UN Special Envoy on El Niño and Climate.

Lacking incentive to think beyond current election or business cycles may lie at the heart of abbreviated timelines for investment and policy action on issues like climate change and conflict prevention. But this does not make the shift in thinking any less necessary.
During numerous meetings at the UN General Assembly this September, senior diplomats and UN officials emphasised the emergence of a proactive mindset associated with the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the sustaining peace resolutions. This prioritises reimagining the UN’s role as less of a crisis response unit, and more of a pre-emptive long-term planner for crisis aversion.

Mexico’s establishment of a Group of Friends on Sustaining Peace, which currently includes 30 UN member states with four from Africa, is a good step toward galvanising and normalising long-term, comprehensive thinking for sustaining peace. But more political momentum is certainly necessary.

As the Paris Agreement comes into force with over 55 ratifications (only 16 from Africa) representing over 55% of global emissions, this broad-based political momentum must be harnessed to highlight the links between climate action and conflict prevention.

‘Action and implementation’ of the Paris Agreement commitments is the stated objective of this November’s COP22 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco. Action on climate change will require looking boldly past immediate political and economic costs in favour of long-term stability, developmental dividends, and conditions for peace. In the short term, countries may see the economic rationale for immediate investment in climate action, but countries should also realise and act upon the opportunity this provides for sustaining peace.

This piece was written as part of an ongoing partnership with adelphi, and adapted from its original publication in the Resilience Compass Blog.

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El Ghassim Wane of Mauritania has been appointed on December 3rd by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. He was previously the Director of the Peace and Security Department at the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa since 2009. At the Global Peace Operations Review, we thought it would be interesting to get his analysis on the current state of peacekeeping and its challenges after a bit more than six months in office. The following is an edited transcript of an interview conducted by CIC Senior Visiting Fellow Alexandra Novosseloff.

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN) : Il est indéniable qu'il y a eu une professionnalisation du maintien de la paix depuis plus de vingt ans. Il est clair que le maintien de la paix d'aujourd'hui ne ressemble plus guère à celui d'hier, même s'il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Nombre d'analystes considèrent que les opérations de maintien de la paix se trouvent à la croisée des chemins, et sont confrontés à une crise de croissance, même si l'on sait qu'une telle situation est récurrente. Qu'en pensez-vous ? Et un an après la diffusion du rapport du Groupe indépendant de haut niveau chargé d'étudier les opérations de paix des Nations Unies, quelles seraient, selon vous, les réformes qui restent à faire et les réflexions qui restent à mener ?
El Ghassim Wane (EGW) : L’on dit effectivement souvent que l’on est à la croisée des chemins. Ce qui est vrai, c’est que les choses changent, elles évoluent et que si l’on ne s’adapte pas, la capacité à influer sur le cours des événements devient extrêmement réduite. Cinq des huit opérations de maintien de la paix déployées sur le continent africain le sont dans un contexte où la frontière qui sépare la situation de guerre de la situation de paix est assez ténue, où l’on traite avec une multiplicité de groupes qui n’obéissent pas à une chaîne de commandement donnée, où le fait de cibler les populations civiles fait partie des stratégies de guerre de certains acteurs. Nous sommes dans une situation où le consentement des pays qui reçoivent ces missions n’est pas forcément quelque chose de garanti à l’avance, ni dans le temps ; alors que dans le passé, entre deux États, la situation était plus claire : quand le consentement était donné, on pouvait alors travailler sur cette base. Ce n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui dans certains des environnements dans lesquelles nous opérons : le consentement est donné pour la forme mais est souvent entravé dans les faits. Des fois, même si au début de la mission le consentement est sans réserve, il peut s’effriter au fil du temps et devenir « qualifié » -- le consentement est bien une réalité « vivante ». Enfin, ce n’est pas l’ensemble du maintien de la paix qui est affecté par ce défi : la FINUL au Liban, la MINUSTAH en Haïti et la MINUL au Liberia, pour ne citer que ces missions-là, jouissent toujours d’un large consentement des autorités hôtes. Par ailleurs, le maintien de la paix opère dans un contexte médiatique totalement différent. On n’a donc pas tort de parler de croisée des chemins précisément du fait de ce contexte totalement différent aujourd’hui. Ainsi, soit l’on continue à opérer comme on a l’habitude de le faire, soit l’on s’adapte aux réalités auxquelles nous sommes confrontés.

Pour ce qui est de la question des réformes, il faut mentionner tout le travail qui continue d’être fait pour renforcer la capacité des troupes pour mener à bien leur mandat, pour améliorer leurs équipements, pour accroître leur capacité à connaître leur environnement sécuritaire grâce à de meilleurs outils de renseignement. Il faut des troupes mieux équipées, mieux entrainées, qui assument pleinement leur mandat de protection des populations civiles – nous avons rencontré quelques défis récemment à cet égard. Ces efforts doivent se poursuivre. C’est un processus continu d’adaptation à une réalité fortement mouvante.

**LE PREMIER PROBLÈME A, EN EFFET, TRAIT À L’UNITÉ DU CONSEIL. PLUS LE MANDAT EST AMBITIEUX PLUS IL EST DIFFICILE À METTRE EN ŒUVRE CAR LES OBJECTIFS DEVIENNENT COMPLEXES**

Un aspect me semble extrêmement important et cela a été souligné par le Groupe indépendant de haut niveau chargé d’étudier les opérations de paix des Nations Unies : c’est le fameux primat du politique. A la fin des fins, ces missions de maintien de la paix ont une finalité politique, c’est-à-dire que la mission n’est pas une fin en elle-même, elle est là au service d’une volonté politique, d’un accord politique ou d’un objectif politique. Cette dimension-là doit être intégrée avec beaucoup plus de vigueur. Autant nous devons poursuivre le travail visant à renforcer l’efficacité opérationnelle des missions, autant nous devons aussi garder de vue qu’une telle efficacité sans un contexte politique propice à la conduite d’une opération de maintien de la paix ne risque pas de nous conduire à l’objectif recherché ; les troupes ne peuvent dans de telle conditions pas pleinement remplir les objectifs pour lesquelles elles ont été déployées. Il faut que l’on trouve ce bon équilibre entre efficacité opérationnelle et stratégie politique et trouver le lien entre les deux si on veut atteindre les objectifs poursuivis. La sortie de l’UNFICYP, par exemple, passe forcément par le règlement politique de la question cypriothe, auquel tout le monde s’attèle.
AN : Deux questions se posent là : la relation avec le Conseil de sécurité, qui est le donneur d'ordre, et la question de l'impartialité, notamment dans la relation avec l'État-hôte. De fait, les relations entre le Conseil, le Secrétariat et le pays-hôte doivent être mieux équilibrées. Mais, il semble aujourd'hui que les différents canaux ne fonctionnent pas de la meilleure façon qui soit pour que l'État hôte trouve un intérêt à mettre en œuvre avec les Nations Unies le mandat qui est décidé par le Conseil de sécurité.

EGW : Le premier problème a, en effet, trait à l'unité du Conseil. Plus le mandat est ambitieux plus il est difficile à mettre en œuvre car les objectifs deviennent complexes. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de donner un mandat mais aussi de maintenir un engagement politique, une unité de vue au niveau du Conseil qui permette d'exercer la pression nécessaire aussi bien sur les acteurs étatiques concernés, le pays-hôte, que sur les acteurs non étatiques. Le mandat est le point de départ d'une action de longue haleine, mais pour mener à bien sa réalisation qui veut s'étaler sur une quinzaine d'années, la pression politique et l'unité de vue du Conseil sont très importantes car les parties au conflit lisent l'attitude du Conseil, le texte de la résolution et ce qu'elles croient percevoir derrière la résolution en termes d'ambiguïtés, de divisions ou de divergences entre les membres du Conseil. Leur volonté politique et leur disposition à mettre en œuvre les engagements qui sont les leurs est fonction de l'interprétation qu'elles ont du degré d'unité et de volonté politique du Conseil.

Le Conseil a une responsabilité principale, c'est lui le donneur d'ordre, mais nous devons aussi, en tant que Secrétariat, trouver le moyen de susciter cette volonté politique du Conseil. Ce n'est pas un exercice facile mais cette volonté politique ne tombera pas du ciel et est plutôt le résultat d'un processus pour lequel les membres du Conseil ont une responsabilité principale et le Secrétariat une responsabilité certes résiduelle mais néanmoins importante. De la façon dont on interagit avec le Conseil, on peut aider ou pas à générer cette volonté politique.

AN : Les principes de base du maintien de la paix sont aujourd'hui bousculés, même s'ils restent pertinents dans leur essence. En effet, on ne voit pas comment aujourd'hui l'ONU pourrait, par exemple, se priver du consentement de l'État-hôte pour déployer des troupes. Mais ce consentement est très fluctuant ; certains accusent les Casques bleus de ne pas être impartiaux. Que faudrait-il faire pour que l'ONU retrouve son impartialité tout en mettant en œuvre les mandats du Conseil de sécurité ?

EGW : Vous posez ici deux questions fondamentales : celle de l'impartialité et celle du consentement. L'impartialité est là au service d'un mandat que l'on doit mettre en œuvre. La vérité est que nous opérons dans des contextes difficiles où les acteurs gouvernementaux et locaux s'attendent à ce que les Nations Unies prennent des actions assez volontaristes pour qu'elles puissent faire face aux menaces présentes. Par exemple au Mali, la population, menacée par des groupes terroristes, donc non signataires de l'accord de paix, dit ne pas comprendre pourquoi l'ONU ne prend pas des actions plus volontaristes pour éliminer cette menace. Au Mali, nous sommes là pour restaurer l'autorité de l'État : il n'y a pas d'impartialité par rapport à cet objectif. Mais l'État n'est pas le gouvernement qui change au gré des alternances démocratiques. L'État est une réalité beaucoup plus permanente que le gouvernement. Nous ne sommes pas neutres par rapport à cette entité-là que nous voulons soutenir dans le cadre d'un certain nombre de principes.

Il y a la question de l'attente des populations par rapport à ce que nous pouvons faire ou pas face à un certain nombre de menaces. Pour évoquer à nouveau le cas du Mali, les populations disent ne pas comprendre que les Casques bleus présents n'aient pas de mandat de lutte contre le terrorisme. Je comprends leur frustration mais le fait est que les Nations Unies n'ont pas vocation à mener la lutte contre le terrorisme. Mais ce que nous ne pouvons pas faire, nous pouvons aider d'autres acteurs.
à le faire. Ainsi, dans le cas du Mali, nous allons soutenir les forces armées maliennes, reconstituées dans le cadre de l’accord de paix, à mener à bien leur mandat, y compris la lutte contre le terrorisme. Nous allons aussi voir comment mieux soutenir les initiatives régionales de coopération sécuritaire pour faire face aux menaces régionales qui ont un impact sur la mise en œuvre du mandat de la MINUSMA (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali).

Les Nations Unies arrivent à s’adapter à travers des formules un peu créatives qui permettent de dépasser ces catégories qui semblent nettes sur le papier mais qui sont sur le terrain beaucoup plus complexes. Au Mali, nous ne pouvons pas mettre en œuvre l’accord de paix aussi longtemps que la menace terroriste posée par les acteurs qui sont en dehors de l’Accord est là. Nous n’avons pas vocation à les combattre de façon offensive et directe, mais en même temps, nous ne pouvons pas ignorer que permettre à d’autres acteurs de jouer le rôle qui est le leur nous permet de remplir notre mandat. La voie est étroite. La fameuse impartialité ne nous condamne pas à l’inaction. A nous de saisir ces pistes et d’être créatifs.

**AN :** Les Casques bleus peuvent-ils tout faire ? Ne sommes nous pas aujourd’hui arrivés à un degré d’ambition qui dépasse les moyens des opérations de maintien de la paix ?

**EGW :** On peut le penser en voyant la durée de certaines missions. On peut se demander : ce que nous n’avons pu faire en dix ans, va-t-on le faire en quinze ans ? Très certainement, il existe une tendance ces dernières années à donner des mandats assez larges, en forme de sapins de Noël, qui couvrent toutes les sphères d’activité nationale et pour lesquels on a du mal à définir des priorités. Nous devrions être un peu plus sélectifs, en effet : identifier les domaines dans lesquels les missions de maintien de la paix peuvent apporter une contribution ou ont un avantage comparatif par rapport à d’autres structures.

Cela nous amène à la question de la coordination avec d’autres acteurs. En réalité, la mission de maintien de la paix répond à un petit bout d’un problème beaucoup plus complexe. Les missions sont déployées dans des situations conflictuelles où la société (au-delà des seuls acteurs politiques) est totalement bouleversée. Dans ce contexte, la mission de l’ONU est une nécessité dans une phase donnée du conflit, quand il s’agit de mettre fin à la violence armée, d’aider au désarmement et à la réintégration des ex-combattants, de créer les conditions de base pour assurer l’émergence d’une société politique capable de fonctionner sur des bases consensuelles. Mais la mission de l’ONU ne peut pas répondre à toutes les problématiques, d’où l’importance de travailler avec d’autres acteurs à l’intérieur du système des Nations Unies, mais également en dehors de ce système. D’où également l’importance d’un travail à long terme où la phase sécuritaire cède progressivement le pas à une phase axée sur le développement économique et politique. Mais l’ambition pour la paix est légitime, car il s’agit de réformer une société et de comprendre quel peut être le rôle dans ce cadre d’une mission de maintien de la paix et d’articuler ce rôle-là avec celui d’autres acteurs.

**AN :** Ce processus où doit interagir un certain nombre d’acteurs n’est, semble-t-il, pas encore pleinement pris en compte ou mis en œuvre.

**EGW :** C’est, en effet, un chantier qui n’est jamais achevé. Le maintien de la paix survivra s’il sait s’adapter. On ne peut avoir une approche statique face à des réalités mouvantes. On a partout affaire à des sociétés, à des acteurs qui savent agir, manipuler, qui savent trouver les failles. Et par rapport à cela, le maintien de la paix doit être beaucoup plus flexible, dynamique et attentif aux réalités locales qui évoluent constamment. Ce travail est permanent. Encore une fois, nous devons être au service d’un objectif politique et même quand il n’existe pas encore d’accord politique entre les parties, il faut que nous, Nations Unies,
sachions pourquoi nous sommes là, ce que nous voulons et devons faire. Il faut travailler sur la durée en comprenant que le maintien de la paix n’est qu’une réponse à une phase donnée du conflit, et à un moment donné, d’autres acteurs devront prendre le relais pour mener à bien l’ambition de la paix.

**AN:** Les francophones sont des acteurs essentiels du maintien de la paix. La France organise une conférence importante les 26-27 octobre à ce sujet à Paris. Qu’est-ce que l’ONU pourrait faire en direction des francophones pour qu’ils augmentent leur contribution et qu’est-ce que la Francophonie peut faire pour l’ONU pour que celle-ci prenne mieux en compte cette dimension-là ?

**EGW:** L’**Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)** peut aider en favorisant la participation des pays francophones aux opérations de maintien de la paix et à faire entendre le discours de la diversité linguistique plus fortement, qui n’est plus simplement une demande culturelle mais une demande pragmatique. Elle conduit un travail de sensibilisation indispensable en direction de ces pays qui doivent – c’est essentiel – enregistrer leurs capacités dans le Système de forces et moyens en attente des Nations Unies (le **PCRS** en anglais – Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System), et la conférence de Paris sera une contribution importante à cet égard. Cela est d’autant plus nécessaire qu’aujourd’hui la plupart de nos missions sont déployées dans des pays francophones où l’interaction avec la population civile est une donnée permanente. Les Nations Unies sont à la disposition de l’OIF pour que ce travail de sensibilisation puisse être mené à bien.

**CELA NOUS AMÈNE À LA QUESTION DE LA COORDINATION AVEC D’AUTRES ACTEURS. EN RÉALITÉ, LA MISSION DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX RÉPOND À UN PETIT BOUT D’UN PROBLÈME BEAUCOUP PLUS COMPLEXE.**

**AN:** Vous avez parlé de la nécessité pour l’ONU de travailler avec d’autres acteurs. La relation entre l’ONU et l’Union africaine reste difficile, peu coordonnée entre processus politique et processus opérationnel. Vous avez travaillé pendant des années à l’Union africaine. Comment résoudre cette équation, faire en sorte qu’une meilleure confiance puisse s’établir entre les deux organisations ?

**EGW:** Le point de départ est de reconnaître les avancées qui ont été faites. Les deux organisations travaillent beaucoup plus étroitement ensemble aujourd’hui qu’elles ne l’ont jamais fait par le passé. La quête de la paix est une entreprise complexe qui demande l’engagement de beaucoup d’acteurs. Les Nations Unies et l’Union africaine gagnent beaucoup à travailler ensemble dans cet objectif et pour pouvoir influer sur le cours des événements. Leur division les priverait de toute capacité en ce sens. Il y a une prise de conscience sur ce point. Les difficultés au Darfour ne sont pas liées à la nature hybride de l’opération mais à l’absence de processus politique viable.

Il faut régler les problèmes liés au financement des opérations de l’Union africaine. Les Africains ont pris un certain nombre d’initiatives et fait un certain nombre de propositions aux Nations Unies (notamment pour assurer un meilleur partage du fardeau financier). Il faudrait travailler plus étroitement en termes de coordination pour assurer des transitions harmonieuses...
entre les missions africaines et les missions de l’ONU. Il faudrait maintenant travailler sur la question de la coordination politique : le fait que l’Union africaine soit présente sur le terrain ne signifie pas que l’ONU n’ait pas de rôle politique à jouer et inversement. C’est en combinant ces deux rôles politiques, chaque organisation venant avec son histoire, ses avantages, ses relations privilégiées avec tel ou tel acteur, que l’on arrivera à certains résultats. Le fait que le Conseil de sécurité et le Conseil Paix et Sécurité se réunissent une fois l’an à Addis-Abeba ou à New York est déjà en soi une indication et une reconnaissance qu’il existe suffisamment d’intérêts communs entre les deux organisations pour qu’elles travaillent ensemble.

Quel serait le cap supérieur à atteindre : une Union africaine plus forte avec des moyens plus importants, qui donnera une relation plus équilibrée et donnera plus d’allant à la relation. Une vision stratégique partagée : aucun des conflits qui sévissent sur le terrain ne pourra être réglé par l’un ou par l’autre isolément. Même agissant ensemble, la capacité à les régler est limitée, alors si l’on agit de manière isolée, on se prive de tout moyen de les régler. Les bonnes volontés sont requises ; il faut donc sortir de cette approche dichotomique. L’une et l’autre organisation doivent travailler ensemble tout au long du cycle de gestion d’un conflit, tout en ayant un rôle différent en fonction de l’étape dans laquelle on se trouve.

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Sunday, 18 September. Some 10 km outside of Ndola, Zambia, a group of people has gathered at the site where 55 years ago, Dag Hammarskjöld – the second secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) – perished in a fatal plane crash.

The military band strikes up a plaintive tune. Their thick, red uniforms seem to belong to a different time and climate. The sounds drift into the stifling heat, across to the clearing where tall trees surround the memorial site. On 18 September 1961, Hammarskjöld was en route from Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) to try and broker a ceasefire to end fighting in Katanga over secessionist policies. Shortly after the crew had radioed for permission to descend, the DC-6 nicknamed the Albertina crashed into a stretch of wooded bushland.
Although widely attributed to pilot error, the cause of the crash has never been established conclusively. Described by the Washington Post as ‘one of the Cold War’s greatest mysteries,’ it remains cloaked in conspiracy theories. Since 2014, there have been several reports of moves by the UN to reopen its investigation into the case. Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said that a renewed investigation ‘may be our last chance to find the truth’.

Hammarskjöld remains one of the most revered UN leaders; and in Africa, his legacy is particularly relevant given his commitment to decolonisation and upholding the values of the UN Charter. In many ways, Hammarskjöld set a benchmark: for leadership, for successfully navigating the institutional difficulties facing the UN, and for bold and timely responses to the challenges of his time.

Five-and-a-half decades after his death, it is timely to recall his legacy. Soon, the next UN secretary-general will be elected.

The pressure to make the institution more efficient and proactive is reflected by the three UN reviews on peacebuilding, peacekeeping and women, peace and security in 2015. These reviews state the need for conflict prevention and a holistic notion of sustaining peace that builds on partnerships. Calls for a reform of the UN Security Council continue to raise questions over the legitimacy of its decision-making processes.

While much had been achieved in Hammarskjöld’s lifetime and since; the work he set out to do in giving Africa the means to address its problems remains very much incomplete.

Hammarskjöld set a benchmark for bold and timely responses to the challenges of his time

Many African countries had attained independence in Hammarskjöld’s lifetime; but today, few of these can be said to function as effective democracies. Elections are being held, but often these are contested and seem to act as trigger points for pre- and post-electoral violence instead of heralding milestones for peace.

This includes what seems to be a slow but conspicuous narrowing of the political space through media intimidation and state bias. In June, The Post, a newspaper critical of the government was shut down and two of its editors arrested. Shortly before the elections in August, the alleged media clampdown continued as three broadcasters were reportedly forced to close shop.

Although Lungu claims to have won the elections fair and square, some citizens are further concerned by the support he enjoys from former president Rupiah Banda. Banda is a divisive figure whom many continue to see as ‘a corrupt leader who abused his powers as head of state and enriched himself indiscriminately – even though he has successfully proven his innocence in several corruption charges...’

Some analysts present at the commemoration described African electoral processes as a nasty hangover from colonial days, where aspects of archaic systems have been cherry-picked and adapted to form a pliable model of democracy, which is often fundamentally hamstrung by ‘winner-takes-all’ politics.

Plainly put, it means there is too much at stake come election time. For the opposition, failure is complete and devastating. For those in power, losing one election means losing everything.
Zambia is a case in point.

The commemoration of Hammarskjöld’s death takes place just over a month after the recent elections in this country. The somberness of the commemoration event seems fitting; not just for the gravity of the occasion, but also because it comes at a time when the very fabric of the country’s democracy has been tested.

Political violence increased before the polls, and newly re-elected President Edgar Lungu’s victory was contested. While some say the Zambian voting system is hard to rig, others complain that the pre-electoral playing field was bitterly uneven.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries like South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia are often held up as a convenient poster child for stability and democracy, but it is becoming increasingly and alarmingly clear that peacebuilding processes in many of these states were neither as complete nor as advanced as many would like to believe.

In Mozambique, the elections held in October 2014 were described in a Freedom House report as ‘transparent and fair, despite some irregularities’. Yet unrest continues to flare up and the ghosts of a protracted civil war refuse to be put to rest. The opposition, the Mozambican National Resistance, or RENAMO, continues to fight for a share at the political table.

Hammarskjöld set a benchmark for bold and timely responses to the challenges of his time

Zimbabwe has seen growing anti-government protests; and in South Africa, violence is increasingly used as a first resort and the language of the frustrated.

Do these signs constitute the kind of ‘early warning’ that we need to heed with urgency and seriousness in the name of preventing conflicts before they break out? Or must there be open war and bloodshed for countries like Zambia to become ‘enough of a problem’?

The question of what conflict prevention means in practice needs to be answered not only by organisations like the UN and the international community at large, but also by the African Union (AU) and its regional blocs.

Regional economic communities (RECs) like the Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development are looking to implement more progressive early-warning systems, looking at countries’ structural vulnerabilities and engaging civil society in identifying problems and appropriate responses. But SADC seems to be lagging behind.

Its early warning continues to be intelligence driven. But SADC is fraught with mistrust among member states; which is not conducive to the useful sharing of intelligence, and which therefore means that early warning very seldom translates into early action. The AU also has its own early-warning system, but its engagement with the SADC early-warning system can be improved. Translating early warning into early response remains a problem mainly because the question of when to intervene raises questions over sovereignty and non-interference – principles that many African states hold dear.
‘Hammarskjöld died on mission in the search for peace in Africa,’ said Henrik Hammargren, Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, at the commemoration event in Ndola. He added: ‘The best way to honour Hammarskjöld is to recognise his work and work in his spirit.’

Policy circles recognise that collective action is the only way to make peacebuilding more effective, and that a larger focus is needed on conflict prevention and governance. But tackling conflict prevention means addressing issues of early warning more courageously.

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FROM CURSE TO BLESSING: HOW AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES CAN BUILD PEACE

Jonathan Rozen

THE AFRICAN UNION IS ALSO LOOKING TO DEVELOP GREATER COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR AS IT TAKES ON MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT

While natural resource development can generate economic success, it can also increase the likelihood of conflict, particularly in Africa. Ongoing violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta is a good example of the so-called “resource curse” in action. In response, African governments continue to grapple with how best to use their resource endowments to foster both economic opportunity and peace. At a time of much soul-searching for the United Nations, there is a unique opportunity to put responsible and effective resource development at the heart of African peacebuilding. But how might local communities take greater ownership of these processes?

The UN Peacebuilding Commission is now examining where and how it can contribute to better management of natural resource development, as part of its newly enhanced mandate to seek prevention of global conflict. “We’ve been supporting
the type of discussion that needs to happen between citizens and governments and between governments and companies,“ Oscar Fernández-Taranco, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, told me.

In Liberia, for example, the UN Peacebuilding Fund is looking to help improve resource contract management and community complaint mechanisms to ameliorate tensions that may lead to conflict. Over the last two years, Liberia has suffered from the effects of the Ebola epidemic and slumping global commodity prices. Resource extraction sites have correspondingly become loci of unrest, including hostage-taking and riots. The Liberian government sought support from the UN to improve, among other things, citizen engagement in natural resource investment deals, operations, and revenues. It is here—in helping manage the space between communities, governments, and companies—that UN agencies believe they are best positioned to act.

The African Union is also looking to develop greater community involvement in the extractive sector as it takes on more responsibility for ensuring peace and security on the continent. The AU adopted the African Mining Vision in 2009, followed by a corresponding Action Plan in 2011 and Country Mining Vision Guidebook in 2014. African regional economic communities have also developed additional governance frameworks. Notably, the Economic Community of West African States’ 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework includes initiatives for bolstering community involvement and empowerment around natural resources. These various plans all link natural resources to conflict prevention and stress the importance of community negotiation.

The UN and AU have in turn combined efforts to target illicit financial flows out of Africa. This is in keeping with the findings of February 2015’s Mbeki Report, which stressed the need for resource revenues to remain within their country of origin. The report also highlights unequal contracts that fuel bribery, tax avoidance through abusive transfer pricing, and the complicity of international financial institutions in these practices.

By restructuring natural resource contracts and limiting illicit financial flows, African countries may gain additional capacity to boost development and peacebuilding project spending. But this is by no means guaranteed to benefit remote communities, which are often negatively impacted by extraction projects, especially where government institutions are heavily centralized.

BUILDING RESILIENCE THROUGH LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

According to the African Development Bank 2014 Annual Report, the extractive sector accounts for over half of Africa’s exports, and in some countries up to 90%. This level of dependency creates significant risks during commodity market downturns such as the one currently being experienced.

Increasing interaction between communities and the extractive industries can help to diversify the types of extractive activities that take place and better cater to companies’ procurement and labor needs. Isabelle Ramdoo, Senior Adviser at the African Minerals Development Centre, has outlined the value of dedicated local content policies within extractive operations, as a means of achieving this.

Increased community engagement can also improve social resilience. Greater dialogue and coordination between communities, companies, and governments may serve to prevent social tensions. As an October 2015 assessment of mining
in Mali’s Kayes region notes, disputes between communities can arise over employment opportunities and the distribution of other benefits such as health centers or schools. In Kayes, company-community consultation processes failed to adequately consider negative impacts on villages outside of the mines’ direct areas. This heightened tensions over perceptions of unequal benefit distribution. Additionally, companies’ selective consultation and recognition of land title disagreements stirred inter-community disputes.

Increased land ownership and initiatives to formalize the extractive sector could reduce potential violence over natural resources, especially among vulnerable or marginalized groups. For example, a 2016 panel noted how legal frameworks could provide land rights and access to dispute resolution mechanisms for “artisanal” female miners. Additionally, formalization of this nature may offer avenues for **dividends from the inclusion of women** in peacebuilding processes. Improved and formalized community interaction with companies and governments around natural resources can prevent development of informal economies that may be more easily used to finance criminal or armed groups, and thus decrease fragility. Positive and mutually beneficial relations between communities and companies have, nevertheless, proven elusive until now.

From a business point of view, investing in responsible and locally focused operations can ensure a social licence to operate, as well as compliance with international standards such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and those contained in the UN Global Compact. Proactive investment in community relations and conflict prevention may also reduce operating risks, thereby improving productivity and profit margins. As a 2005 International Alert guide for extractive industries outlines, conflict imposes costs such as destruction of materials, as well as temporary delays in operations from strikes, stoppages over safety concerns, and supply chain disruptions. A 2014 Harvard Kennedy School report examined 50 cases of sustained company-community conflict around the world and found that lost productivity resulting from delays was the most frequently cited, but often overlooked, financial cost of community-level conflict.

While many resources companies do pursue strong community relations through the lens of corporate social responsibility, a 2013 study from the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining notes that community relations and development remain absent from the mining industry's core business model. This means that when commodity prices drop, investment in these areas may suffer from cost-cutting.

The Pan-African Investment Code being developed by several of the continent's governments offers an improved legal framework for companies operating in Africa. But further political commitment is needed to end the view of Africa as merely a lucrative business opportunity. “It cannot be that Africa is just a place where you go to do business in risky situations for high returns,” said Monica Juma, Principal Secretary at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, at an International Peace Institute event in May this year. “This must come to the table in terms of stabilizing risk factors for Africa.”

Meanwhile, the mining sector and affected communities are facing new challenges such as climate change, making social and economic stability even more important for conflict prevention. Indeed, the African Development Bank's High-Level Panel on Fragile States identifies issues around extractive industries, climate disruption, and resource conflicts as key drivers of fragility in Africa. Peacebuilding strategies must therefore promote conflict- and climate-sensitive contracts between all parties.
AFRICAN OWNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Maged Abdelaziz, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, told me that building the necessary linkages between resource extraction and resilience on the continent must begin with the AU. “The UN will not be able to start this kind of global approach on extractive industries because it will be faced with opposition from countries that have big multinational corporations that are benefiting,” he said.

Further progress will be tied to the UN and AU's continued consideration of how best to pursue the concept of “sustaining peace.” The UN Security Council and General Assembly adopted identical resolutions in April this year advocating this new vision of peacebuilding, which moves away from a reactive, peacekeeping-heavy approach to the deployment of more preventative strategies. Improved natural resource governance in Africa, principally through increased community involvement, has the potential to prevent conflict by fostering inclusion and promoting resilient economic development. The UN and AU should therefore pursue improved dialogue with local stakeholders and more equitable contracts for resource development, while continually stressing the business rationale for doing so. This is an invaluable opportunity to create African ownership of African peacebuilding.

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AU-UN PARTNERSHIP IS A NECESSITY NOT AN OPTION

Lesley Connolly

THE PEACE OPERATIONS THAT THE AU UNDERTAKES ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT A REGIONAL RESPONSE TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS.

As the African Union (AU) has become a stronger actor in peace operations, coordination with the United Nations Security Council has risen in importance. Beyond just working together on a case-by-case basis, such as the Somalia hybrid mission, the two organizations are said to be seeking a broader and more complimentary relationship. In the last year, we have witnessed an increasing convergence with the development of the AU Common Position on the Peace Operations Review and Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. These were followed by the recommendations stressing the important of partnership with regional organizations from High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Secretary-General’s response to this seminal report. But it is not an easy task for the two organizations to converge. As preparations for a recent high-level meeting showed, there remain some institutional and political challenges that make working together inherently difficult for both organizations.
COMPETING AGENDAS

The 10th annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was held in New York on 23-25 May 2016. The meeting’s final agenda was set to discuss the crisis in Burundi and the mandate of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires at the end of May. It was dictated by the UNSC, with little compromise over the issues raised by the AU. The initial agenda proposed by the AU PSC members in mid-April included discussions on Western Sahara, South Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and countering terrorism and violent extremism - all key challenges on the continent with global implications. On 25 April, the President of the Security Council responded proposing only two topics - Burundi and Somalia.

The UNSC said it preferred a more manageable agenda rather than a comprehensive one. The AU-PSC chair replied in early May stressing that if there was going to be a limited agenda, it should also include two other issues of high priority to Africa - the long-running conflict in Western Sahara and the reform of the Security Council. The UNSC President responded that Security Council reform is an agenda item of the UN General Assembly and it was not appropriate for the Council members to discuss this issue. Western Sahara could not be included as there was no agreement among its members about its inclusion. This left Burundi and Somalia as the only common ground - both of course important and central peace and security issues on the continent but certainly not the only pertinent concerns at the moment.

COMPLEMENTING OR DUPLICATING?

Somalia had the greatest urgency as the AMISOM mandate was set to expire only days after the meeting on 30 May. In the long term, PSC member states support a re-hatting of AMISOM, the largest African peacekeeping operation, as a UN mission. In the short to medium term, the UN and EU are supporting it. A UNSC delegation paid a one-day visit to Somalia on 19 May. There are some differences in how to approach the financial, logistical and operational challenges facing this AU Mission. The PSC is pushing for greater funding of the AMISOM to pay for helicopters and increased troop allowances, which have suffered after a 20 per cent cut in EU funding caused a major shortfall. The focus on mission support issues is not be shared by the UNSC. The meetings draft communiqué was consistent with the key messages delivered during the Security Council’s visit to Somalia earlier in May when it called on Somali stakeholders to keep their commitment that there shall be no extension of the electoral process timelines. On 27 May, the UNSC voted to extend AMISOM’s current mandate as is until 8 July 2016.

The AU PSC is deeply involved in Burundi, where it has plans to deploy some 200 human rights and military observers. The number of observers was increased from 35 to 200 following the visit of a High-Level Delegation of Heads of State and Government to Burundi in February 2016. So far, a third of those authorized have been sent to Burundi. The UNSC has attempted to be more involved by calling fora parallel deployment of a police component to monitor human rights and protect civilians, none of which have been sent due to objections by the host government. The draft joint communiqué reiterated the members’ deep concern about the continuing political impasse and violence in the country, as well as the attendant serious humanitarian consequences without taking any new action. This meeting ended with no movement on a months long stalemate.
The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had outlined policy options regards to Burundi in a letter to the UNSC suggesting members deploy one of the following:

- A police component of 3,000 in order to protect civilians, monitor human rights and promote the rule of law;
- An unarmed police component dedicated to the monitoring of human rights violations; or
- A police component of 20–30 staff that would mentor the Burundian national police in the areas of rule of law.

The AU’s reaction to the UN Secretariat’s proposal was mixed. While it welcomed the involvement of the UN, the AU Commission correctly underlined the fact that the mandate of a UN police component would duplicate the role of its own human rights observers. This highlights need for better strategic alignment between AU and UN objectives and field presences that is based on the recognition of each other’s strengths and informed by principles of complementarity and burden sharing.

**CO-DEPENDENT PARTNERS**

The importance of this relationship is clearly recognized. At the Open Debate as part of this two-day meeting, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said “the African Union, directly or not, is the most important partner of the UN in peacekeeping.” Ethiopia’s Permanent Representative Amb. Tekeda Alemu told a related seminar “the mutual dependence of the UN and the AU for effective peace operation has made their partnership indispensable for both.” This relationship is not only important because the crises and conflicts in Africa take up the largest portion of the time of the UN Security Council, but also because African capacities are an important resource for UN peacekeeping. Africa contributes approximately 51 per cent of all the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers, 60 per cent of its international civilian peacekeepers and 80 percent of its national peacekeeping staff. This is an increase in contributions from 10,000 peacekeepers ten years ago to more than 53,000 today. There is no denying the value the AU plays in regards to UN mission especially regarding stabilization forces.

The peace operations that the AU undertakes are to a large extent a regional response to global problems. Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are heavily influenced, if not driven, by external factors such as the global war on terror; the UN-NATO-led intervention in Libya; the exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies; capital flight facilitated and solicited by the international financial system; and transnational organized crime, driven by markets in the West and Asia for narcotics, human trafficking, timber and illegally caught fish. Effective African peace operations represent a significant contribution to the global common good.

With the changing nature of conflict and rise of extremist violence, there is a greater need for forces that can act where there is no peace to keep and who can be tasked to neutralize the spoilers of peace. The AU has a proven track record of being able to deploy fast and a willingness to use force to stabilize a conflict situation such as in CAR and Somalia. Such peace enforcement and counter-terror operations fall outside current UN peacekeeping doctrine. But the AU does not have the capacity to develop multi-dimensional missions that can sustain peace over the long-term. This is where the UN’s ability to recruit a large civilian component in every mission and its predictable funding give it a competitive advantage. Hybrid missions such as the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN’s support for AU missions like AMISOM show that a strategic relationship between the two institutions is possible and useful to managing conflict on the continent.
PARTNERSHIP IS A NECESSITY

In the quest for better coordination, there are some challenges. While PSC member states recognize the primacy of the UNSC in matters of international peace and security, there is growing frustration about the perceived unwillingness of the UNSC to fulfill this duty. There is also frustration with the lack of financial support the AU receives from the UN for those tasks the AU is undertaking on behalf of the UNSC in the global public interest. The PSC feels that for the AU to be strong the UNSC should not only authorize it to take responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in Africa, but it should properly resource it to do so.

In 2015, African heads of state decided that by 2020 they would pay for at least 25 per cent of the AU's peace and security activities. In order to realize this goal, the AU has appointed Dr. Donald Kaberuka, the outgoing President of the African Development Bank, as the High Representative for the AU Peace Fund. He has been tasked with putting in place a clear road map for financing the AU's peace and security activities.

An effective relationship between the AU and UN is not just an option. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations El Ghassim Wane called it “an absolute necessity” as neither organization has the capabilities to face these challenges alone. Over the past decade, there has been some improvement in this regard. Security Council members and PSC members have held annual joint meetings since 2007, alternating between their respective headquarters. The last meeting between members of the two Councils was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in March 2015. Council members also met informally with members of the AU PSC in Addis Ababa in January this year after a visit to Burundi to discuss the situation in that country. The AU-UN Joint Task Force has convened and desk-to-desk meetings held, which together have shown a growing commitment to structurally bringing the organizations together.

Beyond Somalia and AMISOM, there is collaboration in mediation processes, including Sudan, where the AU is leading the mission with UN contributions and in South Sudan, where the UN is leading the process with AU Support. The AU has built up its capacity to respond to crisis and support peace operations over the past decade. In Mali and CAR, the AU was the first responder followed-up with a UN mission.

TOWARDS A BROADER RELATIONSHIP

When the AU intervenes in a conflict in Africa it show a form of solidarity and how the organization is taking responsibility for resolving problems on its own continent. These interventions often have close coordination with national governments as well as other partners such as the EU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). African peace operations should be seen as different to UN peacekeeping operations, but complimentary to each other. The AU does peace enforcement and the UN peacekeeping. But the relationship could be stronger, deeper, and wider. As the recent UNSC and AU PSC shows, Africa wants to do more than just provide boots on the ground as part of this relationship. The next step for the two bodies will be to move beyond the narrow agenda of the numbers of troops or police and who pays for them to a much broader outlook of working together to resolve the political problems underlying Africa’s conflicts.

Lesley Connolly has recently joined the Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute. She is the former research assistant at the Center on International Cooperation. | Twitter: @lesleyconnolly3
AFRICAN BORDERS AND THEIR LACK OF CLEAR DEMARCATION HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT ON THE CONTINENT. THE AFRICAN UNION’S BORDER PROGRAMME (AUPB) WORKS TOWARD REDUCING THIS CONFLICT RISK.

The *PSC Report* spoke to Ambassador Aguibou Diarrah, head of the AUPB in the Peace and Security Department.

What is the Border Programme all about?

The aim of the programme is the structural prevention of conflicts. We are constantly faced with the need to solve violent crises, but the aim is to prevent them, to anticipate conflicts.
This programme is based in the conflict prevention division of the Peace and Security Department. It has four main pillars. The first is the demarcation of borders, which for a long time has been the cause of conflict between countries, notably between Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cameroon, Chad and Libya, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These are cases where the demarcation of borders causes the problems, and that's why the heads of state [of the AU] decided to start this programme.

The second pillar is cross-border cooperation. One has to go beyond demarcation and work towards the gradual integration of countries through stronger cooperation across frontiers. The third pillar is capacity building. The aim is to train staff so that borders are managed more effectively. Finally we also work towards creating partnerships with other institutions and on mobilising resources.

**What are the benefits of this programme in terms of peace and security?**

The programme is about prevention. The benefits are the creation of a peaceful environment between states. Instead of states' entering into conflict with one another, we promote negotiations. For example, we managed to create a space for dialogue between Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan.

We are also busy creating a space for dialogue between certain West African countries. Everywhere you find latent tensions, this programme could be used to achieve a peaceful outcome.

**How can the programme deal with the migration crisis that is so much in the news at the moment?**

Migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to be solved. You don't solve migration, it is a phenomenon that has existed since time immemorial. The starting point of our programme is cross-border cooperation. The Niamey Convention could be an effective tool to promote development because the border is the culmination of movement by people towards new horizons.

If we can establish good cross-border cooperation, we create a dynamic between states. If we can get states to work together to establish health and education services at borders we can limit illegal migration.

Legal instruments can also be crucial in regulating migration. The relations between states and between cross-border communities can have an impact on curbing illegal migration. Working together to pool resources and in border activities can help to keep young people - the candidates for migration - from migrating. States have to ratify the convention and commit to getting involved, collectively, to stem illegal migration.

**How do you judge the impact of the Border Programme, after 10 years?**

The programme has actually been operational since 2009. When it was started, only one-third of the 83 000 km of land borders in Africa were demarcated. Today, more than half are demarcated.

When it comes to cross-border cooperation, we adopted the Niamey Convention, the first convention on cross-border cooperation since the Cairo Resolution in 1964 on the intangibility of Africa's borders. The Niamey Convention is being ratified, but to date only Niger has ratified it. Nine others are in the process of doing so. We have to do much more lobbying in order to have a higher rate of ratification of this important instrument.
In terms of capacity building, we've produced five books, practical guidebooks, and we've produced two documentary films about the activities of our programme from 2010 to today.

What are the main challenges facing the Border Programme?

The challenges are huge. The first challenge is that heads of state decided that all borders should be demarcated by 2017. And as I said before, to date only half of Africa’s borders have been demarcated. So the first challenge is demarcation, but when we’ll achieve this is still an open question. We’re going to have to work hard to get to this point.

Our second big challenge is the ratification of the Niamey Convention mentioned above. The third main challenge is mobilising resources. The only donor financing the programme is our German partner, which is planning to put an end to this funding. African countries will have to commit to financing this programme.

What are the measures that could improve cross-border cooperation at the level of the AU?

The Niamey Convention is aimed at removing the bureaucratic procedures at borders. We should strive to create a so-called soft border. Instead of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, we need to streamline the procedures by getting member states to work on joint activities at the borders. Every state is sovereign, but this is about achieving a pragmatic management of the borders.

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Ambassador Aguibou Diarrah is head of the AUPB in the Peace and Security Department.
PSC INTERVIEW: ‘WE’RE ASKING TOO MUCH FROM THE AU’

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah

Veteran Mauritanian mediator Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah was the United Nations (UN) Special Representative to Burundi (in the early 1990s), Sudan and Somalia, and headed the UN Office for West Africa.

The PSC report asked him how successful the African Union (AU) is in dealing with conflicts in Africa.

There are a number of conflicts on the continent where the AU is trying to intervene. Does the AU have the capacity to solve these conflicts?

The major problem is the AU has very good intentions to solve conflicts, but it doesn’t have the capacity to do so.

This is what we are facing in Burundi, for example. In my view, we speak a lot about prevention [of conflicts], but that’s easier said than done. You need to have a strong moral authority and the material and financial capacity to carry this out.
Burundi remains the best example because it is an old problem. I was representative in Burundi since the 1994 agreements, which led to the Arusha Accord of 2005. But for countries to implement these you need agendarme [policeman], otherwise it won't work.

**Can the AU play the role of gendarme?**

**Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah:** The AU can't fix this problem [of Burundi], in the same way that the Union of South American Nations can't solve the problems in Latin America, like in Colombia, for example.

The Arab League can't solve the problems between the Arab countries. We are asking the AU to do things that don't correspond to the global reality. We have given the AU a mandate and responsibilities that do not exist in international relations. What I'm saying is very serious.

The AU cannot solve these problems, partly because it doesn't have the material and financial capacity – it has the moral capacity, which is good – but one has to find a way to strengthen its capacity. Still, the AU can't be the gendarme, it doesn't have the means to do so.

**Whenever there is a conflict, we see a multiplicity of special envoys, of the UN, the AU, regional organisations. There is also the AU's Panel of the Wise. How effective are these envoys?**

**Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah:** Today, mediation has become a problem, but it's not the fault of the AU. There is a multiplicity of external actors in every conflict – some are freelance, some represent governments and organisations. It's become so bad that we need a mediator to mediate between the mediators. But there is also an advantage to this because every one of these brings their own sensibilities, their own approach. It has really become a problem that has to be sorted out.

**When it comes to intervention in conflicts, the last word seems to be with the regional organisations, as we are seeing in Burundi. Is this more effective?**

**Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah:** The question of the relations between the AU and regional organisations is very complicated. Take the case of Burkina Faso. It was very difficult for ECOWAS [the Economic Community of West African States], which is a very respected organisation, to intervene. In the end the people and the army stood together to solve the problem. The East African Community, to which Burundi belongs, has a lot of expertise, but we always come back to the same problem, the interests of individual states: Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and others.

**Is there a country in Africa today that has the moral authority and the means to back it up, to successfully intervene in conflicts?**

**Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah:** The neighbours can play an important role, but the problem is that in many African countries there is not a proper integration of everyone in the country. So it is difficult to give moral and ethical lessons while you have problems at home. You have to set an example. There has to be model recognised by all. Between the desire [to make peace] and the capacity to do so, there is a big gap.
The question of sanctions comes to mind. The AU is doing a good job and it is looking at ways to convince countries to do the right thing, without resorting to sanctions.

One of the perverse effects of these sanctions is that where a leader comes to power through rigging elections, you’re telling him: you’re safe, whatever happens, there won’t be a coup d’état because we’ll impose sanctions.

It is a good rule, but it must be imposed when there are coups against a government that was freely and fairly elected. But when you rig an election and people say you can go on governing, that isn’t good. The AU’s position is good, but it has to be qualified.

Many say that the nature of conflicts in Africa has changed and so it needs a new approach. What do you think of that?

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah: Every region and every country has its own specific problems, but we mustn't push this too far to make Africa a separate case. Africans, just like all other communities, stand up to defend themselves when their vital material, spiritual, moral or political interests are under threat. Then, when you have irresponsible and populist politicians, they exploit these same political and ethnic considerations. When you have presidents who don’t have a vision for their country, they do the same to marginalise regions or communities. The nature of conflicts is the same everywhere. In fact, conflict forms part of daily life. Only violent and bloody conflicts don’t form part of life.

The specificity when it comes to Africa lies in the level of exclusion. When one group takes power, they simply don’t want to share the power or apply the rules that they helped to make. Secondly, they don’t contribute to the development of the country. The country stays poor, so there is not enough wealth to go around. Besides that, the demographic explosion in Africa is a time bomb. I know people say it could be an advantage for Africa, but it is something we can’t control.

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Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah is a Mauritanian diplomat who was a senior United Nations official.
CEDRIC DE CONING: A UNIQUE MODEL OF AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS

Lesley Connolly

WE HOPE THE BOOK WILL “ENCOURAGE THE RECOGNITION THAT AFRICAN PEACE OPERATIONS ARE UNIQUE, AND NOT JUST DEFICIENT UN PEACE OPERATIONS. AFRICA DOES NOT NEED SAVIORS, BUT PARTNERS...THOSE THAT STILL BASE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AU AROUND CAPACITY-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT NEED TO ADAPT TO THE FACT THAT ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AU TODAY SHOULD BE ABOUT STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.”

In recent years, the world has witnessed increasing commitment by African nations to contributing to peace and security on the continent. Dr. Cedric de Coning, a South African scholar based at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and also associated with ACCORD, is an expert in the field of peace operations in Africa. Together with Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud, he has edited a new book entitled The Future of African Peace Operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram. On a recent visit to New York City, de Coning spoke with the Global Peace Operations Review’s Lesley Connolly.
Lesley Connolly: This book has been years in the making. How was it conceived, and how do you think it now fits into the current debates around peace operations?

Cedric de Coning: When the African Standby Force (ASF) was conceived, United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations was the only frame of reference. The Gambari Independent Panel of Experts, which assessed the progress of the ASF in 2013, found that a decade later, the African Union (AU) had enough mission experiences of its own to assess and develop its own concept of peace operations. The Panel felt that the challenges the AU faced in 2013 were very different from the period in 2003/2004 when the ASF was conceptualized. We convened a seminar in December 2013 on Strategic Options for the Future of African Peace Operations. The practitioners are so focussed on day-to-day crisis management that they seldom have the opportunity to consider their strategic options. The aim was to take a strategic look at where we were in the process of an emerging African peace operations capacity. We asked several seminar attendees who presented papers to contribute chapters to this book. The subtitle, from Janjaweed to Boko Haram, gives a sense of the trajectory for the future of African peace operations.

LC: The book talks about the emergence of an African model of peace operations. What do you mean by this, and how would you characterize an African model?

CdC: AU operations differ from the UN in several important aspects. First, they are not guided by the three principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and minimum use of force), nor by the charter’s differentiation between Chapters VI and VII. Second, there is less of a sense of intervention from the outside to ensure compliance with international standards and more a sense of solidarity or good neighbors coming to each others’ aid. There is also a strong feeling of shared identity and common African identity. Third, African peace operations have a history of coming to the aid of people at risk when the UN was not able or ready to deploy UN peacekeepers, starting in Darfur, then in Burundi, Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR). African regional organisations and the AU were the first responders in each of these cases, and deployed into situations which the UN deemed not yet fit for UN peacekeeping. Fourth, in each of these missions the UN provided support to the AU in some form, and in each of these cases, accept Somalia, the UN subsequently took over the AU missions. The AU lacks the resource base and peacebuilding tools to consolidate the peace, so the UN takes over from the AU to help ensure sustained international support for the peace process. In this context the AU has essentially become a specialist in stabilization operations.

LC: What do you mean by “stabilization operations”?

CdC: These are typically operations where the intervening organization has to employ force to deny one or more parties the option of using violence to achieve their political aims. One implication of such operations is the need for troop contributing countries (TCCs) who have the will and means to use force. Often, the only countries that will be willing to do that are those whose national security interests are affected by the conflict. This is very different from UN PKOs, where TCCs should ideally have no interest. Another implication is that you need a command and control system geared for combat. In this context, civilian leadership and military command can range on a spectrum from a lead nation approach, such as in the early days of AMISOM, to a more networked approach, as in the case of the LRA and Boko Haram operations. In networked approaches, the AU provides overall political direction and coordination, but the members of the coalition act independently and coordinate at the operational and tactical level. AU operations are not proxies for UN operations; they have their own unique characteristics.
We now have enough AU peace operation experiences (Darfur, Burundi, Comoros, Somalia, LRA, Mali, CAR, Boko Haram) to start to see a unique African model of peace operations emerging.

**LC: The book looks at the notion of Hybrid-Peace Operations as well as challenges with the “UN Take-Over”. What can be done to improve joint peace operations and general coordination between the UN, AU and RECs?**

**CdC:** The relationship with the UN has changed significantly. Ten years ago, it was more of a donor relationship – the UN was helping the AU to build capacity. The AU has fought hard to change the narrative to a relationship of partnership. It seems that the UN now recognize some of the comparative advantages of the AU. There are now regular interactions between the UN and the AU. There are usually two formal meetings at the highest level between the Security Council and the members of the PSC; regular meetings between the Under Secretary-Generals of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the AU. There are also many desk-to-desk interactions as well as specific initiatives and projects they cooperate on, such as the joint transitions exercise looking at the lessons the AU and UN can learn from the transitions in Mali and CAR. The UN and AU are looking at how these interactions can be further improved. I feel the relationship has improved a lot and this bodes well for the future of both AU and UN peace operations.

**LC: What impact has the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) had?**

**CdC:** The HIPPO helped a lot too. During the consultation process, the AU developed a specific document called the *Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations*. The HIPPO panel said it was the most detailed, comprehensive contribution they received. Their *final report* reflected many of the issues raised by the AU. It described the relationship in positive and constructive terms, and argued for the need for a strong strategic partnership with the AU. The *SG has picked up many of the HIPPO’s recommendations in his own report*, and most of these are already underway. For instance, the AU and UN is undertaking a joint study that will look into options for improving the predictability and sustainability of financing and supporting African peace operations.

**LC: Did the HIPPO report shift the way we look at African peace operations?**

**CdC:** There was a narrative, in some quarters, before the report that the AU was unable to manage its own operations and the UN needed to come in and help it. The AU’s common position and the HIPPO has been able to change this perception. Post-HIPPO, it the narrative is about a complementary and strategic relationship between the AU and the UN.

**LC: What are the strengths and weaknesses of African peace operations?**

**CdC:** The AU is a willing first responder, but they don't have the same resources and the know-how that the UN has on how to consolidate the post-conflict peace process. This is an division of work that has emerged organically, and that will continue to evolve over time. In Mali, the AU was unhappy about how the transition was managed, but both the AU and the UN has learned from the experience, and the subsequent experience in CAR has already been much improved. The AU and UN are now developing a joint lessons learned document and a set of transition guidelines that will help to manage such transitions in the future.
LC: One of the criticisms of the HIPPO report was that the mandates of UN peace operations are too ambitious. Do you feel this is a challenge facing African peace operations?

CdC: The AU has the opposite problem. It does not suffer from Christmas tree mandates, but from an overly military or securitized approach to stabilization. It lacks the civilian expertise necessary to ensure that its military operations are directed towards enabling and supporting political and governance objectives. In Somalia, the AU was able to help to liberate cities and towns from Al Shabaab, but it then lacked the ability to follow-up with the civilian expertise necessary to help the federal government and local authorities to re-establish basic governance structures and services. This is not necessarily the task of the AU. It should be the government itself and there are other actors involved such as UNDP and the UN mission in Somalia and other partners who have also been unable to meaningfully assist, partly because of the security situation. The reality is that those areas are still very unsafe so you won’t have UN and other people staying there and therefore, it becomes the AU’s responsibility to provide the bridge between international actors and the Somali Government. The question that needs to be addressed in this context is what kind of civilian expertise does the AU need to support this kind of stabilization operations. The AU does not have the resources or capacity to deploy the kind of civilian component you find in a UN peace operation.

The AU needs a small but specialized civilian capacity that can help the mission to assess, plan and manage the political and governance dimensions of stabilization missions, as well as to serve as a liaison for the AU mission with the government, UN and other partners. This expertise should emphasize that force should directed towards political and government role. You are not going to defeat Al Shabaab militarily; you will defeat them if the Government of Somalia can provide better security, governance and opportunities than what Al Shabaab can offer.

LC: What are some of the main accomplishments and challenges of African peace operations?

CdC: Looking at the bigger picture, we have seen Africa, with the help of its international partners, develop a significant capacity of its own over the last twenty years. If you look at the Middle East, for instance, and the crises facing that region, you notice that they do not have a comparable regional peace operations capacity, despite the fact that many individual countries in the region having large armed forces. Africa has embarked on a significant political project when it decided to invest in setting up the African Standby Force (ASF). As a result we can see a considerable increase in troop contributions by Africa to the UN. Ten years ago there were 10,000 troops from African nations in UN peacekeeping. Today African TCCs provide approximately 48,000 troops to the UN, and in addition there are a further 22,000 in AMISOM in Somalia. And then we have not taken into account the soldiers engaged in anti-LRA and anti-Boko Haram operations.

Over the same period, the AU has developed the political and bureaucratic capacities to manage conflicts, and today the AU is in the lead or deeply engaged in preventing or managing all the crises and conflicts in Africa. The UN, the EU and others are also involved, but this situation is very different from ten years ago when it was expected that the USA or France or the UN would intervene or lead international mediation efforts in Africa. The French interventions in Mali and CAR stand out as exceptions, rather than what was the norm a decade ago. The AU is more assertive and willing to assume its responsibility for managing African crises, as the current situation in Burundi shows.

The challenges ahead relate to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of AU operations. It has established its willingness and ability to take responsibility for a first responder and stabilization role, and now it needs to improve its ability to assess,
plan, deploy, manage and evaluate its own operations. The AU’s most serious challenge is the capacity to support its own operations. Funding is a major issue, but more importantly the AU lacks a mission support concept and the people and systems necessary to implement such a concept. The good news is that the AU, with the support of the UN, has embarked on a process to develop a mission support policy this year. So this challenge has been identified and is being duly addressed. The AU has also appointed Donald Kaberuka, the past-president of the African Development Bank, as its High Representative for the AU Peace Fund. This is a very positive development as Kaberuka has the credibility and networks to help the AU address the funding aspects of these challenges.

**LC:** AU peace operations remain dependent on funding and support from international organizations and partners. How can this be changed to increase the effectiveness of African peace operations?

**CdC:** Several options are being looked into. The AU has decided to significantly increase its own contributions and a new scale of assessment is under negotiation. This will see the AU take up at least 25 per cent of the cost of AU-led peace operations in the future. In addition, the AU is considering alternative and voluntary sources. The UN Secretary-General has also tasked the UN to look into options and a joint AU-UN team will report on this later this year.

There is of course no silver bullet. The AU, UN and partners will have to develop a range of funding options, and they will have to make use of these depending on the needs and context of each operation. I think it will not be possible to find a predictable source of funding for AU operations, but we can develop a more predictable coordination mechanism and process for finding the necessary funding for each operation.

This funding situation is the main structural driver for the aforementioned division of work that has emerged between the AU and the UN, where the AU acts as first responder to stabilize the situation, with the UN taking over the AU mission (because it has the assessed contribution funding) as soon as is feasible.

**LC:** Is there too much of a focus on the financing?

**CdC:** It is important to recall the larger strategic context within which any funding discussion should take place. The UN is responsible for international peace and security. When the AU undertakes a peace operation, it does so under Chapter VIII (and Chapter VII if authorized to use force) of the UN Charter. There are very few, if any, crises and conflicts in Africa where external factors are not a major contributing factor, and the consequences of these conflicts do not remain in Africa. When the AU deploys a peace operation, it is in service of international peace and security and it is a global public good. The rhetoric that Africa should fund its ‘own’ peace operations is not helpful. We need to distinguish between the reasons why a mission is deemed necessary by the UNSC, and who is in the best position to undertake such a mission. That is why the concept of strategic partnership is so important. The HIPPO and the Secretary-General's implementation report capture this spirit of partnership and the new ‘networked’ peacekeeping reality very well.

**LC:** What role will the African Standby Force (ASF) play in the future of African Peace Operations?

**CdC:** The January 2016 AU Summit has declared that the ASF is now operational. The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), which was a temporary measure until the ASF became operational, may be dissolved and its capacities
integrated into the ASF's rapid response mechanisms. The ASF will be the main vehicle for cooperation, standardization, joint training and joint exercises. It is the foundation for force generation for future AU peace operations.

However, I think the ASF concept needs to be updated to take into account that in all the AU operations to date, the selection of TCCs emerged from the political realities unique to that context, to form a just-in-time coalition of the willing. Off-the-shelf regional standby forces will rarely, if ever, be used as designed. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and EU Battlegroups experiences reflect the same pattern. The ASF is a very useful coordination and capacity building tool, but it is unlikely to be used to deploy a regional brigade. If so, the ASF structures need to adapt to that new role. The UN should study the ASF experience closely when it considers its own standby or vanguard force options.

LC: Who should be reading this book and why? What impact do you hope this book will have on the international peace and security community?

CdC: I hope the book is useful for both practitioners and scholars engaged in working on or researching peace operations in general, and African peace operations in particular. The primary readership would be African countries and those in the political and military sphere who are working in or with Africa. And, of course, the African Union and the RECs themselves who are involved in peace operations. Additionally, there are the partners who work with the AU, such as those in the United Nations and European Union that deal with the AU, as well as those in Brazil, Britain, China, India, France and the United States who support the AU.

The secondary readership would be the scholarly community who work on trying to promote and make sense of African peace operations in general. Within that larger group, there is a smaller group with a particular interest in Africa.

We have two main hopes for the book. First, that it will encourage the recognition that African peace operations are unique, and not just deficient UN peace operations. Africa does not need saviors, but partners. The situation today is very different from ten years ago when the AU deployed its first operation in Darfur. The AU has now proved that it has the political will and the ability to deploy and undertake stability operations under very difficult situations. Africa has significant peace operations capacity, contributing almost 50 per cent of all UN peacekeepers in addition to undertaking its own operations. Those that still base their relationship with the AU around capacity-building and development need to adapt to the fact that any relationship with the AU today should be about strategic partnership.

Second, a unique African model of peace operations is emerging. African operations are not just regional copies of UN peacekeeping. They have their own normative and historical context, regional dynamics and drivers. If partners want to contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of African peace operations, they have to understand them on their own terms and not as proxies for UN peace operations.

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WHO ARE THE KILLERS OF BENI?

Jason Stearns


Since October 2014, the region around the town of Beni in north eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) has been the site of some of the worst massacres in the country's recent history. Over five hundred people have been killed and tens of thousands have fled their homes. The UN mission and the Congolese government have publicly stated that the massacres are the work of Ugandan rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Research by the Congo Research Group (CRG) based on interviews conducted with over a hundred witnesses and local leaders indicates that the definition of the ADF needs to be revised. Rather than a foreign Islamist group driven by revenge, our research points to a group that has forged strong ties with local interest groups and militias over the course of twenty years
of insurrection around Beni. Moreover, our preliminary findings indicate that responsibility does not lie with the ADF alone. In addition to commanders directly tied to the ADF, members of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the national army; former members of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie—Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD–K/ML); as well as members of communal militias have also been involved in attacks on the civilian population.

We cannot comment on the chain of command or motivation driving these groups, but it is clear that the Congolese government and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) have not put sufficient effort into addressing this crisis and have incorrectly identified the enemy. Despite losing hundreds of soldiers in operations conducted against the ADF prior to July 2014, the FARDC have frequently failed to react in time to protect the population during and after events—and MONUSCO has demonstrated a similar lack of initiative. Our researchers have documented cases in which FARDC officers discouraged their units from intervening during massacres and there is extensive evidence that members of the FARDC have actively participated in massacres.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- The government should quickly appoint a special investigation led by a high-ranking military prosecutor to investigate the acts of violence committed around Beni since October 2014. The commission’s findings should be made public;

- MONUSCO should conduct an investigation to determine who is responsible for the Beni massacres. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should also review the performance of the mission with regard to these massacres;

- The Senate and National Assembly should create a joint investigative committee to identify political responsibility, in particular the role that leaders from within the security forces may have played in the massacres committed around Beni;

- The Congolese government should introduce a stabilization and security plan for the Beni region that involves the FARDC, local communities and MONUSCO. This plan should be implemented in the context of the provincial stabilization plan, in coordination with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (STAREC) and in accordance with the recommendations of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S).

**NEW YORK/KINSHASA, MARCH 21, 2016**

*Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent and non-profit research project dedicated to the understanding of the violence affecting millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on various aspects of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our work draws on a deep understanding of the social and historical dynamics at hand.*

*We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and work in collaboration with the Centre d’études politiques at the University of Kinshasa. All of our publications, blogs, and podcasts can be found at [www.congoresearchgroup.org](http://www.congoresearchgroup.org). We can be reached at congoresearchgroup@gmail.com. | Twitter: @CEG_CRG

**DOWNLOAD THE FULL PUBLICATION IN FRENCH - QUI SONT LES TUEURS DE BENI?**
When the decision [around Burundi] reached the level of the Assembly of Heads of States, it showed that in absence of consent there is no political willingness of African leaders to act against their own.

Burundi has been moving toward greater instability since President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to stand for a third term in May 2015. Nkurunziza claimed he was entitled to a third term because his first was a post-transition mandate and he was not actually elected by the people. He argued that this made him eligible to stand again. The move, defying years of international efforts to build peace and stability, reignited what has turned into a deadly conflict. It has also created a situation that now vexes the African Union (AU) and its efforts to reach a resolution.

Nkurunziza’s political opponents and civil society immediately contested the third term, seeing it as a direct violation of the 2000 Arusha Agreement and the Burundian constitution. Their protests went unheard in the presidential palace.
where held in July 2015 and Nkurunziza received close to 70 per cent of the vote. Since then, the crisis has only grown more acute. Hundreds of opposition politicians, civil society activists and journalists have left for exile in Rwanda, Kenya or Belgium. Another 240,000 Burundians now live as refugees in neighboring countries. An internal political dispute has become a regional crisis.

The AU did not send any observers to Burundi for the July 2015 elections. Only after the polls closed did it deploy around twenty military and human rights observers. The number was supposed to increase to a total of 50 human rights and 50 military observers, but by late 2015 that had not happened.

As the crisis deepened, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) tried to stop its escalation. On 17 December 2015, the PSC authorized the deployment of a force of 5,000 troops. The Mission africaine de Prévention et de Protection au Burundi (MAPROBU) was mandated for six months with the option to renew. It was tasked ‘to prevent any deterioration of the security situation, [to] monitor its evolution and report developments on the ground [and] to contribute, within its capacity and in its areas of deployment, to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat’. This was a groundbreaking move for the AU, as it was the first time the organization authorized the deployment of a force against the wishes of a host country. The hesitant UN Security Council, unsure of what it should do, welcomed the action by AU in Security Council Resolution (S/Res/2248 (2015).

Receiving permission of the host country is one of the holy trinity of UN peacekeeping principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence. Having host state cooperation keeps peacekeepers safe. Without it, the legitimacy of the intervention can be challenged and the intervention might feel more than an invasion than a rescue mission. After making its move to intervene, the AU has now found itself with a new dilemma following President Nkurunziza’s refusal to accept the deployment of MAPROBU.

FAILURE TO ACT

What is stopping the AU? Burundi signed and ratified the protocol creating the PSC and thus is legally bound to accept and implement any decision of this body, and the intervention in this time of crisis should not need Burundi’s approval. This, though, is a contentious issue within the AU, and other international organizations, who are dependent on their member states for troops contributions. International law relating to state sovereignty adds further complications.

After giving the Burundian government 96 hours to approve the deployment, the PSC expressed its determination to invoke Article 4(h) of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act. This stipulates “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. The PSC recommended such an intervention to the Assembly, which ultimately decides on the deployment.

There is, however, widespread debate on this move. One reason stems from the question of under what authority the AU could launch MAPROBU, and whether it would conform to existing international law. Because the mission’s mandate envisions the potential use of force beyond self-defense and in defense of the mission’s mandate, there would be a need for a Security Council Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, even if the Burundian government did consent. This, however, is the lesser issue. The AU’s use of article 4(h) would only be permitted if cases of crimes against humanity could be proven. Given
the contention over the status of the situation on the ground, this is more challenging to show. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ fact-finding mission visited Burundi in December 2015, and the AU’s own human rights observers have also deployed in Bujumbura. It remains to be determined if there is sufficient evidence of these crimes to convince the AU Heads of State to deploy.

The AU has only once deployed under Article 4(h). This was in support of the trial of the former President of Chad, Hissene Habre, on charges of political killings and torture of thousands of civilians between 1982 and 1990. The AU has thus set itself a very high threshold: Article 4(h) was not even used in the situation in Darfur. The likelihood of a deployment in Burundi was always very low. But when the Assembly could not agree, the issue was passed to the AU Heads of State Summit on 27-28 January 2016.

The United Nations Security Council visited Burundi a week before the African leaders met. They left the country stressing the urgency of addressing the situation in Burundi before it deteriorated further and possibly took on ethnic dimensions. The government in Bujumbura countered that their concern was misplaced. The Council members were worried by President Nkurinziza’s lack of willingness to compromise on either the deployment of any AU troops or on the inclusiveness of the dialogue with the opposition. Some had high hopes that the AU Summit might break this impasse.

WORDS WITHOUT ACTION

Ahead of the meeting, the news from Burundi became increasingly dire. There were reports of mass graves, widespread displacement, growing militias and fears that the country was plunging itself back into a state of civil war. Despite this growing alarm, the deployment of MAPROBU was not approved. Instead, in the face of an escalating crisis, the PSC reversed its December action by not even raising its plan to deploy a peacekeeping force with the AU’s General Assembly.

MAPROBU WAS A LARGE STEP FORWARD FOR THE PSC. IT DEMONSTRATED A POLITICALLY PROACTIVE APPROACH TO A CRISIS, AND IT WAS A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF AN ALREADY BAD SITUATION.

The summit did not end without any action. Instead of a peacekeeping force, the AU voted to send a high-level panel to Bujumbura to promote “inclusive dialogue”. The panel is still to be appointed and its time frame determined. The AU also revisited its commitment to increase the number of human rights and military observers from under twenty to 100. The first of these observers were deployed after the July 2015 elections, and the force is now being increased to the promised 100. But even this modest move is contingent on approval from Bujumbura. In addition, the East Africa Community (EAC) mediation process will continue, though there is limited hope for this process.

The EAC is the official regional block working with Burundi, acting as mediator in the crisis in line with the AU’s principles of subsidiarity. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is leading this mediation, but he has been criticized for not doing enough to get the talks going. The first round of talks took place in July 2015 but did not render any success. The second round of talks were supposed to happen in December 2015 but were postponed to a later date. It has been speculated that Museveni’s
involvement in the mediation does not have the support of the actors involved in the conflict, considering Musuveni himself amended the Ugandan constitution to remove term limits and is now serving a third term in Uganda.

OBSTACLES TO DEPLOYMENT

It was no surprise that MAPROBU never deployed. Burundi was always very unlikely to accept the deployment of troops and, if they did, there would be very strict conditions on the deployment and with limited leverage of the mission as a whole. The AU took a similar path when troops were deployed to Darfur in Sudan: the government in Khartoum reluctantly accepted a joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to save face internationally, although it has not made things easy for it. But the Darfur mission showed that being flexible on the terms of a deployment aimed at protecting civilians ultimately hampers the effectiveness of the mission.

In addition, it was always going to be a challenge to find the troops to deploy. There has been some confusion over whether this is a task for the African Standby Force (ASF), which is nearing readiness, or whether it should be based on member state contributions. The PSC communiqué of 17 December indicates that MAPROBU will be placed under the command of the special representative of the AU Commission Chairperson, but the PSC also urges consultations with countries in the region within the framework of the East African component of the ASF. It is unknown, however, if the East African Standby Force (EASF) would have troops available for this mission.

WHEN THE DECISION [AROUND BURUNDI] REACHED THE LEVEL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATES, IT SHOWED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSENT THERE IS NO POLITICAL WILLINGNESS OF AFRICAN LEADERS TO ACT AGAINST THEIR OWN.

If not deployed under the ASF, options for troops are limited. Tanzania is against the deployment in Burundi and is pushing for peace talks to end the conflict. The next option would be South Africa, especially considering their involvement in negotiations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But South Africa does not have the spare capacity, as its forces are already overstretched with deployments to Darfur and the Congo. Rwanda, the biggest troop contributor to the AU, would be unlikely to contribute to MAPROBU due to the political tensions between the two countries. Uganda is similarly constrained because of its current involvement in South Sudan.

Assuming the troops could be found, there are still key issues regarding agreement over what level of force might be employed by MAPROBU. This is a challenge for all such missions. The latest debate facing the UN is the question of how much force should be used in an intervention, and whether we should be looking toward the model of the EU Battlegroups as a guide, as Ys Reykers recently argued.
HOW MUCH FORCE—AND WHEN

If the mission was ultimately to be sent in against the wishes of the Burundi government, the environment would be hostile. It would not be a classic peacekeeping mission, but rather more of a peace enforcement operation. A balance would need to be struck between using force in self-defence, or using force to carry out the mandate. Every peace operation needs robust leadership and political strategy. But when could force be used, and against whom? While 5,000 troops sounds like a large number, it is in actuality very small—especially if the mission had a mandate under Article 4 (h) to protect civilians, which, Ralph Mamiya argues, is a central tenet of peacekeeping missions after the Rwanda and Balkans disasters. It is unclear how long it would take for troop contributors to come to a common understanding about this.

Even if the troops could be found and deployed, questions arise over how the force would be paid for. The AU’s expeditionary deployments, such as in Darfur or Somalia, rely on external support. With one of the major donors the European Union found to be in budgetary crisis as it deals with mass immigration and an influx of refugees, there would be little cash to spare for a mission such as this, which is far removed from the EU’s national interests.

The creation of MAPROBU was a large step forward for the PSC. It demonstrated a politically proactive approach to a crisis, it was focused on protecting civilians, and it was a genuine attempt to prevent further deterioration of an already bad situation. However, the PSC’s inability to carry through on its resolution is a set back. When the decision reached the level of the Assembly of Heads of States, it showed that in the absence of consent there is no political willingness of African leaders to act against their own. Moreover, even if there was, the logistical and financial support does not exist to support such interventions. Ultimately, the action on Burundi gives the strong sentiment that the key institution of peace and security on the continent is more words than action.

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Jim Della-Giacoma and Gizem Sucuoglu

Sweden joins the UN Security Council in January with the daunting task of immediately assuming its presidency. It is a time of great change and uncertainty at the United Nations with not only a new Secretary-General taking over at the same time but also a new administration in the United States that many observers fear could be hostile to the international organization. On the eve of their term, the Global Peace Operation Review’s Jim Della-Giacoma and Gizem Sucuoglu spoke with Sweden’s Permanent Representative Olof Skoog about their plans for the next two years, conflict prevention, peace operations, and how peacebuilding can fit in with the work of the Council.

Jim Della-Giacoma: Your membership will start with a challenging task with the Council Presidency in January. What will Sweden’s main priorities be? Given the challenges faced by the global system and the UN, how do you plan to move these priorities forward?

Ambassador Olof Skoog: We have a two-phase plan. The first phase is setting ambitions regarding our Council Presidency in January, and to successfully conclude this task. The second phase relates to what we want to achieve over our two-year membership term.
Let’s start with the two-year term. I think there is a broad expectation for Sweden to be active in key horizontal issues: human rights, the implementation of the resolutions on women, peace and security, respect for international humanitarian law, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and conflict prevention. Instead of solely organizing big debates at the Council on these thematic issues, we want to move towards a Security Council that deliver on its responsibilities and is more results oriented, inclusive and transparent in its working methods. We want to ensure that there is concrete implementation and an improved way of dealing with these horizontal issues, by bringing them into the day-to-day work of the Council. For instance, on women, peace and security, we would seek to consistently integrate this perspective in all our deliberations, bringing examples and making proposals on how to operationalize the agenda in the field. So when Mali appears on the agenda, for instance, we would like to ask about the role of women in peace negotiations, and make sure that the Council implements its commitments on this issue.

January will be a challenging month, to be very honest. The working climate at the Council is not at its best; and we see that the Council is not able to take decisions in some key conflicts as a result. The UN, the international community and the Council are criticized for not taking sufficient responsibility. We have to work towards reversing this trend, starting the first of January. As a member of the Council, we would want to put conflict prevention and peacebuilding at the core of UN efforts. Preventing conflict is not only morally right; it’s also economically smart. We need a shift in mindset, to prioritize prevention, peaceful resolution of conflict and addressing root causes of conflict in our engagement.

As a member of the Council, we would want to put conflict prevention and peacebuilding at the core of UN efforts.

JDG: Next month will also be the first for the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres. What do see as being the impact of this change?

OS: The appointment of a new Secretary-General provides a unique opportunity for a fresh approach. After all, the UN system was set up to sustain peace, and we want to help António Guterres move towards this vision. We want to re-energize the relationship between the Council and the Secretary-General’s office on prevention and reaffirm the commitment that the Council has made on sustaining peace. Beyond the day-to-day challenges regarding peacekeeping operations, the Council should be able to conduct a real analysis on what are the threats to peace in the countries on its agenda, and which instruments and tools are available to the UN system to address these threats. I would love to have a Secretary-General that comes to the Council and says: “Here are the issues on the horizon, here are my suggestions to the Council to act on these issues”. I would like to see different parts of the system, the ECOSOC or the PBC, or UNDP, UNICEF, and OCHA, to work holistically in identifying and addressing threats to peace and security. It should not only be DPKO that brings issues to the Council, but the Secretary-General, based on input from the broader system. So that’s a little bit of paradigm shift.

JDG: Peace operations will be a preoccupation for both the new SG and Sweden from your first day. What urgently needs to be done to address current crises, such as UNMISS and South Sudan? At the same time, how can the Council move forward some of issues identified by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) such as
prioritizing prevention, having better focused mandates, improving triangular cooperation, and making better use of Council field visits?

**OS:** South Sudan is a perfect example that once the genie is out of the bottle, it is difficult to put it back in. We can talk as much as we want about prevention, but the prevention issue is not on the table when it comes to issues such as Syria. For some of the worst conflicts right now, the most important first step is about finding a new unity within the Council for it to act. Syria is also proof of the importance of finding political solutions to conflict, as military solutions do not work. We have to think what can we do now to promote political process in South Sudan, and how to ensure the Council is united on this.

In South Sudan, we need to talk about the possibility of a genocide happening. Peacekeeping as a Band-Aid solution in war-torn countries is not going to work; this is exactly what we see in UNMISS in South Sudan. Someone has to come and say that the peacekeeping operation is not strong enough or robust enough or efficient enough in a way to protect civilians. I can also understand the UN's limitation here about turning that kind of very difficult information into a coherent and practicable plan for action. To move forward, we need more coherent input from the SG from the ground, in terms of what his system sees as a whole and thinks as a suggested way forward. We need peacekeeping with political mandates, empowered to do the necessary work to find (or underpin) solutions to conflict and bed for the possibility of sustained peace. Again, the onus is on the Council but also the Secretariat and the troop contributing countries (TCCs). The triangular cooperation you mention can happen both informally and formally, the most important is that there is a joint vision as regards the mandate and what the UN ultimately is there to do – resolve conflict and keep the peace.

One other lesson from contexts such as the DRC is that when things are not going well in a country, even when there is road-trip diplomacy, it is difficult to ensure practical outputs from the Council, even in the form of presidential statements. Of course, there are different views on how these statements can change the situation on the ground, but at least the mediators on the ground know that there is a united Council behind them. In January, we want to start looking into the possibility of the Secretary-General giving more detailed information from the ground to the Council, as well as options to move forward. Worrisome trends can also be discussed discreetly, in more private settings. Through these informal meetings, the Council can identify the most credible actors to work with in advance, such as the African Union and the European Union.

**JDG:** 2015 was a year of big reviews and processes: The reports from the HIPPO and the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture. There was also the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC resolution 1325. During your two years on the Council, how do you plan to move forward some of the ideas and recommendations in these reviews?

**OS:** The Women, Peace and Security agenda is a top priority for me and for my Government. We now have a solid normative framework, but implementation and follow-up is lacking. As member of the Council, we would seek to consistently integrate this perspective in all our deliberations, bringing examples and making proposals on how to operationalize the agenda in the field.

I think all the reviews and processes of 2015 make it clear that the system is working in silos. They also emphasize that there is too much faith in military solutions to what are essentially political problems. For us, we see the need to reverse the thinking towards the primacy of diplomacy, and the primacy of politics, detecting crisis before they erupt. We need to make sure there
is a connection between peace and security and development and human rights. This is one of big conclusions from both the AGE and HIPPO reports. And they are very coherent, the three of them fit together nicely in the innovations they suggest.

Gizem Sucuoglu: Sweden was a key actor during the peacebuilding review, and has assumed several positions at the PBC, most recently the Chair of the PBC Configuration and the Chair of the PBC. What do you see as the biggest opportunities brought forward by the sustaining peace concept, the AGE report, and the sustaining peace resolutions? Which opportunities do you see as the best ones for taking forward this agenda in the Council in a concrete way?

OS: I think the resolution on peacebuilding is a commitment to a paradigm shift, for the UN system to act in a more holistic manner and to place prevention or sustaining peace at the core of what this organization should be about. The Council has committed to the agenda through its Resolution 2282. For me, sustaining peace can be seen as an instrument to get better information to the Council, deriving information in a holistic manner from different parts of the system. It also stipulates that the UN system works more holistically than in the past, accepting that, in essence, everything that the UN system does on the ground relates to upholding and sustaining peace. From this angle, there is nothing disturbing with bringing the UNDP perspectives, for example, to the Council, in relevant situations. The UN is sensationally well represented globally through its field missions and has access to important information. The whole system should to be able to analyze and use this information, and work in holistic way based on joint strategic analysis. This idea is very important. The implementation is of course difficult, but at least I think it helps break down the barriers where countries used to say 'hang on, prevention is not part of the book'. It's clear that this is no longer true. I think we have broken down these walls with these resolutions and I think that's very crucial.
GS: Sweden has played a key role as the Chair of Liberia configuration. You have worked to improve the PBC’s relationship with the Security Council. Liberia is now transitioning from a Security Council mandate and the challenge is to find holistic responses together with the UN country team. Can you tell us more about how Sweden has focused on fostering these holistic responses, including through a stakeholders forum it put together in Monrovia?

OS: In Liberia, we have made special efforts to contribute in our advisory role. In my capacity as chair of the configuration, I travelled to Monrovia in October to consult a wide range of stakeholders in Liberia to identify peacebuilding priorities during the upcoming transition and beyond the peacekeeping presence in the country. A primary objective of the trip was to co-host the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on “Sustaining Peace through Transition in Liberia” together with the Government of Liberia. The Forum sought to deliberate on the longer-term peacebuilding needs in light of the Security Council’s upcoming decision on the future UN presence in the country. Throughout the visit in Liberia, two questions were at the forefront of the deliberations: “What must be done to address remaining root causes of conflict in Liberia?” and “What should UN support look like after UNMIL?” The outcomes and recommendations of the visit have been put forward to the UNSC, in the form of a trip report, a briefing at the formal meeting of the UNSC last week, as well as through an informal consultation at the expert level between the Chair of the configuration and UNSC members. The stakeholders forum was very successful, a prime example of having the government and national stakeholders owning peacebuilding processes and engaging with the UN system. We were very well received by the government and had excellent bilateral meetings. This helped making the Council interested in hearing our conclusions from the trip.

GS: And, so far, how have the UN Security Council and PBC worked together on Liberia?

On substance, our concern in Liberia is that the peacebuilding agenda has not been sufficiently advanced, despite many years of UNMIL presence. There are important outstanding elements on reform agenda that has not been implemented. Our concern is, if the security presence pulls back too early, there might be repercussions that the Council should consider. This has been the core of our discussion with the Council.

The relationship between the PBC and the Council is far from ideal. The peacebuilding commission is unique in its working methods, because it can actually work with countries and meet with different stakeholders from the countries on its agenda. This sort of working method is lacking in the way the Council works. However, the PBC will never be completely relevant, if the Council is not ready to take on its advice or listen to it, even if it is not exactly what every member of the Council wants to hear. The PBC should be allowed to bring a fresh perspective into deliberations. I think there needs to more readiness and openness from the Council, including permanent members in particular, to listen to the advice from the PBC, so there is room for improvement.

JDG: I remember being in Liberia in 2003 to 2005 when Swedish troops were participating in UNMIL as members of the rapid response force. Looking back now at Liberia using your peacebuilding lens, how would you evaluate the UN’s role overall?

OS: I haven’t seen Liberia when you were there. I was there at the end of the 90’s, probably a much worse time. To answer your question, probably yes and no; I have mixed feelings. I have no doubt that the contributions of peacekeeping operation have been huge, I don’t see a huge risk for this country falling back to the kind of conflict we have seen fourteen years ago. That’s
already a huge achievement. We are soon to have another set of elections; with high hopes for a peaceful transition from one elected President to another. These are big achievements, compared to the devastation thirteen years ago. This is all despite the bad economic situation in that part of the world, falling prices of raw materials, and Ebola. Having said that, I still wonder, how much better it could have been, if the peacebuilding agenda had been more prominent from the outset. What if we had more coordinated international support from the beginning, including from donors such as my own country, working with the Americans and the EU and other big players, to ensure that there is one coordinated message about what we want and expect the government to do in terms of reconciliation, land reform and similar reforms. I do believe we need the mission to stay on for a while, but I also think there could have been much more work done on the peacebuilding agenda over the years. Given the amount money and human resources invested in peacekeeping, I’m still concerned about the lack of economic development, the many outstanding issues in Liberia. For instance, 63 per cent of the kids still do not go to school, despite some years of pretty good economic development.

JDG: Now that you are going to be the Council President, do you have plans to change the way the Council and the PBC relate to each other? How do you plan to interact with the PBC as President? How will you encourage other members of the Council to do so?

OS: I think there isn’t any way around this right now. If you are a chair of configuration, you are invited to brief the Council, in accordance with what has been agreed by the entire PBC membership. Of course, you can also make use of that opportunity to additionally offer your personal account as the PBC Chair. This way, the Council will hear what you really think.

I think, as a Council member, we can work together with other countries that are keen to improve the way we deal with peacebuilding more broadly. The approach on women, peace and security that I have mentioned earlier could provide a model. When the time for briefing on a country situation arrives, with input coming to the Council from the secretariat, there is need to put out control questions: ‘Hang on...What is the UN system doing to ensure the effectiveness of the peacebuilding components of the mandates in Libya or Côte d'Ivoire?’. This will ensure looking beyond the DPKO brief, that highlights the immediate current challenges for the mission, and looking for broader information on the whole peacebuilding agenda. We are already talking to other members of the Council to ensure this kind of an approach.

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WITH “SUSTAINING PEACE” CAN THE UN TURN RHETORIC INTO ACTION?

Gizem Sucuoglu and Tanisha Hewapola

FOR BURUNDI, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UN’S PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BRING MUCH NEEDED INTERGOVERNMENTAL ATTENTION AND RESOURCES.

In April 2015, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would be seeking a third-term of office—a move that his opponents decried as unconstitutional. Protests and clashes between opposition supporters and security forces followed. Amid a rapidly deteriorating climate of serious human-rights violations, extrajudicial killings, intimidation, media suppression, and the stoking of ethnic tensions, fears of widespread violence rose, triggering mass cross-border displacement.

For nearly a decade prior to these events, however, Burundi had been largely hailed as a success story for United Nations-assisted peacebuilding. Following a devastating civil war that left 300,000 dead, Burundi had passed a new Constitution and held relatively peaceful elections in 2005 and 2010, successfully integrated various rebel groups into a new national army and police, and instituted a power-sharing form of government that guaranteed quotas for women, ethnic groups, and other minorities. The relative stability that ensued enabled around half a million refugees to return home, and the economy grew, albeit modestly.
The wave of political instability and violence last April set back much of this progress, and Burundi quickly found itself back on the UN Security Council’s agenda. Nkurunziza’s controversial reelection that July exacerbated the political violence, ethnically divisive rhetoric, refugee flows, and growing authoritarianism that had taken hold.

The episode was a prime example of the deep and ongoing challenges that the United Nations faces in preventing conflict and building peace. At inception, conflict prevention was one of the organization’s principal goals. Through the first article of the UN Charter, Member States pledged to “take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.” Since then, the rhetorical commitment to prevention has continued. In recent months, all of the candidates to replace Ban Ki Moon as Secretary-General have highlighted conflict prevention as a priority, and each of the 2015 reviews (which are aimed at making the organization more “fit for purpose” and responsive to global challenges) emphasized prevention as the primary formula for peace. In parallel, the UN improved its ability to identify early warning signs of conflict, through such initiatives as Human Rights Up Front. However, as the Burundi case shows, early warning has rarely led to early action, and the UN has too often been unable to act in a timely and effective way to prevent countries from lapsing or relapsing into conflict.

One key reason for this has been the chronic lack of systematic attention that countries at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict have received. Instead, the priority has been the urgent need for the UN to respond to the crises of the day. Scarce attention and resources have consequently been diverted from longer-term structural-prevention efforts that seek to address root causes of conflict and prevent violence. Better balancing of these priorities could save lives and resources in the long term.

THE RESOLUTIONS CALL FOR A LONG-TERM, HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO SUSTAINING PEACE, TO BE BROUGHT FORWARD IN ALL OF THE ORGANIZATION’S ENGAGEMENTS—BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER CONFLICT. THEY EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR THE UN TO PIVOT AWAY FROM A LINEAR APPROACH TO ADDRESSING CONFLICT, AND TOWARD A CONTINUOUS, CROSS-PILLAR, AND CROSS-SECTORAL APPROACH TO PREVENTION.

When the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture—the New York-based Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)—was established in 2005, it aimed to help bring attention to countries’ peacebuilding priorities, under the framework of national ownership. However, the sensitivity of some Member States to the possibility that conflict prevention efforts could lead States’ sovereignty to be violated resulted in the curtailment of the UN’s peacebuilding mandates from the outset. Conflict prevention was excluded, and peacebuilding was limited to post-conflict situations, where the ravages of war had already been borne out.
For Burundi, the establishment of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture had the potential to bring much needed intergovernmental attention and resources. In 2006, it was one of only two countries that were referred by the Security Council to the Peacebuilding Commission. Between 2007 and 2014, the Peacebuilding Fund provided more than $60 million to fund post-conflict peacebuilding activities in Burundi. Financing from other donors poured in as well and the Peacebuilding Support Office employed dedicated specialists to the country. Following the immediate post-conflict period, however, international attention waned, and with it, the associated political and financial support. The Peacebuilding Commission—which had proved to be a useful venue for convening relevant actors to discuss in-country developments beyond the strictures of the Security Council—was shown to be ill-equipped to secure donor support on the scale required, and to reacting to indicators that the risk of violence in Bujumbura and beyond was increasing.

By the time Burundi’s political crisis erupted in 2015, the UN presence on the ground had dwindled, with much of its field expertise lost during the transition from a Security Council–mandated peace operation to a UN country team structure. Budget cuts, incomplete security-sector reforms, inadequate reconciliation, a failure to address ongoing political divisions from the previous conflict, political malfeasance, rising ethnic tensions, and misdirected development assistance (which focused on institutional reform, rather than on the provision of services to communities), all took their toll.

The 2015 Advisory Group of Experts, which was tasked with reviewing the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, starkly revealed how inadequate the existing architecture was to the task of bringing a long-term approach to conflict response. This was in part because of the aforementioned prioritization of urgent humanitarian and military responses—especially in light of the scale and number of simultaneous crises that were occurring across the globe, which were triggering vicious cycles of conflict and response, and overloading the Security Council’s agenda. Beyond this, however, the Advisory Group found that the post-conflict focus of the peacebuilding architecture had, in effect, stifled its potential to provide advice, convene key actors, and bridge different parts of the UN system to prevent conflict. The impact of this cleavage between peacebuilding and conflict prevention was having profound consequences. The Advisory Group pointed to the urgent need to bridge different parts of the UN system around a long-term vision of peace, one that did not follow the common sequenced model for UN intervention, of humanitarian action, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development.

In April 2016, UN Member States, acknowledging the importance of bringing coherence to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, resolved to rectify this situation. Overcoming their own endemic divisions and longstanding disagreements about the contours of the concept of “prevention,” the General Assembly and Security Council laid out, in identical resolutions, a narrative of how the UN could bridge its silos and work together with common purpose around the core concept of “sustaining peace.”

The “sustaining peace” resolutions, which were heralded by UN officials as “visionary,” suggest a fundamental shift in the way the organization looks at conflict and prevention. However, in many ways this shift signals a return to its founding goals, and to earlier notions of how it should work in pursuit of those aims.

The resolutions call for a long-term, holistic perspective to sustaining peace, to be brought forward in all of the organization’s engagements—before, during, and after conflict. They emphasize the need for the UN to pivot away from a linear approach to addressing conflict, and toward a continuous, cross-pillar, and cross-sectoral approach to prevention. They reflect the fundamental need for all parts of the UN system, at both the intergovernmental and operational levels, to understand their responsibility for sustaining peace, and to be held accountable for achieving it.
Among the resolutions’ key innovations is the expansion of the work of the Peacebuilding Commission beyond post-conflict situations. In keeping with the principles of national ownership and inclusivity, the role of the Peacebuilding Commission has been enhanced, to enable it to provide a venue where conflict prevention priorities and cross-cutting thematic issues can be brought to the attention of Member States, the UN system, and other relevant actors. A recent series of Peacebuilding Commission–related events, including the Commission’s Annual Session, a dialogue with ECOSOC on implementing the Sustainable Development Goals in conflict affected countries, a visit to West Africa, and an interactive dialogue with the Security Council, point to the current enthusiasm for enhancing the Peacebuilding Commission’s capacity to take the sustaining peace agenda forward. However, this energy and interest will need to be built upon in a coordinated way over the coming months. This could include the Peacebuilding Commission working with other UN bodies to provide additional opportunities to broaden understanding—including within Member State delegations—of the interrelated aspects of the sustaining peace agenda, and the linkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.

Preventing conflict, just like sustaining peace more broadly, is a monumental task, which no one body or organ in the UN system can undertake singlehandedly. The call in the resolutions for Member States and the system to be jointly responsible for implementing the sustaining peace agenda will require clear communication channels to be set up. Mexico’s recent establishment of a Group of Friends on Sustaining Peace has the potential to serve a key role, helping to bring leverage, legitimacy, resources, and support to the agenda.

As the process of advancing the UN prevention agenda takes hold, one of the major challenges likely to arise is the current lack of a definition of “conflict prevention”—one that encompasses what different parts of the UN system understand by the term, which tasks fall within its remit, what gaps in the system need to be filled in order to achieve it, and how to improve coordination and coherence in order to ensure progress. As Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute puts it, the policy, programmatic, and financial implications of the renewed focus on prevention needs to be fully appreciated, and have adequate resources to match such efforts. The prevention aspects of recent reviews and processes on peace operations, World Humanitarian Summit, preventing violent extremism, and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda may provide some useful insight into how the different parts of the system can work together to identify key issues, plan prevention activities, gain political support, attract resources and capacities for implementation, and engage in follow-up and evaluation. The upcoming review by the UN Development Group, which will focus on the capacities of agencies, funds, and programmes to undertake conflict prevention, could also catalyze these discussions.

To address the multi-faceted challenges of prevention, the UN will also need to draw upon, in an integrated and strategic manner, its full array of tools, including its monitoring and early warning systems, common analytical and strategic frameworks that connect mission components, and cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations. It will also need to address the current fragmentation between peacebuilding discussions at UN headquarters and the realities on the ground. This will require establishing more flexible, context-specific approaches that enable global processes to support national and local-level peacebuilding, and which ensure coherence between political analysis and operational capacities, promote the agreement of realistic UN mandates that are adequately resourced, facilitate different UN actors as they work together around their comparative advantages, and encourage effective on-the-ground leadership around a common purpose and a long-term vision.
The adoption of such far-reaching and comprehensive resolutions was no small feat. It sends a clear message from Member States that UN business as usual is no longer adequate to preventing conflict and sustaining peace, and that a change in approach is expected. The success of these resolutions, however, will ultimately be measured by how effectively they are implemented. On the prevention side in particular, this will require bold leadership from both within the UN and among Member States.

While conflict prevention has long been a difficult issue for the UN to make real progress on, the sustaining-peace framework provides an opportunity to put into action the UN’s longstanding rhetorical commitment to conflict prevention, by making sustaining peace a common driver of UN action across all of the organization’s pillars. Strong leadership from both the current and next Secretary-General will be critical to taking the collective support and energy behind the sustaining-peace agenda and transforming it into a renewal of focus and purpose for the organization.

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The recently adopted landmark General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the United Nations peacebuilding architecture tasks the entire UN system to work together to prioritize efforts to sustain peace in all its engagements. As the UN moves forward to the implementation phase of the resolutions, Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes’ new book, entitled “UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years”, provides timely analysis of the challenges, missed opportunities, and potential for improvement. During a recent visit to New York City, de Coning spoke with the Global Peace Operations Review’s Gizem Sucuoglu.

Gizem Sucuoglu: Your book comes at a time when the United Nations is in the process of improving its peacebuilding architecture to prioritize efforts to sustain peace. How does it fit in with the current developments and debates?
Cedric de Coning: The primary motivation of the book was to reflect on the impact of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture since its establishment. Our goal was to look beyond the more limited scope of the New York-based architecture, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to assess the impact and effectiveness of the establishment of the architecture had on the UN system and the international peacebuilding community, both at the policy and practitioner levels. We shared earlier working paper versions of the chapters in the book with the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), that were responsible for the analysis behind the recently adopted General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. In fact, the AGE had a similar approach, they looked at ways to improve the UN’s peacebuilding efforts across the system, and the potential of the architecture to help bring forward a longer-term vision of peace, including in the field. As such, the analysis and recommendations of our book fit nicely with the results of the peacebuilding review, and we hope it can be helpful to the UN system and wider peacebuilding community, as they move forward with the implementation of the resolutions on the peacebuilding review.

GS: From your perspective, what are the most significant achievements and failures of the peacebuilding architecture?

CdC: Our overall finding is that the UN’s peacebuilding architecture has contributed to peacebuilding being adopted as an overarching framework for peace consolidation; that is has contributed to improved coordination across the UN system, especially at country level; and that it has helped the UN system to realise that too much focus on resource mobilization generates unintended consequences, including reducing peacebuilding to a programmatic and technical undertaking, thus undermining attention to the political dimension. I think the bigger lesson here is that you cannot avoid the internal and regional political dynamics when you do peacebuilding in contexts like Burundi or South Sudan. In the last few years, it has become clearer to the broader peacebuilding community that peacebuilding is essentially a political project. This was not the case when the peacebuilding architecture was established a decade ago. Then peacebuilding was seen as something essentially technical, e.g. building institutions according to international best practice without being influenced by local politics. I am glad to see that the UN’s member states now unequivocally acknowledge the imperative of political solutions in the recent peacebuilding resolutions. One of our key recommendations is that the UN peacebuilding architecture should focus on its original intended role of addressing the root causes of conflict. For peacebuilding to be sustainable, the UN system must go beyond preventing imminent relapse, and engage with structural problems through a longer-term and system-wide perspective. This is the vision for sustaining peace.

For peacebuilding to be sustainable, the UN system must go beyond preventing imminent relapse, and engage with structural problems through a longer-term and system-wide perspective.

GS: So peacebuilding is political, and its primary focus should be in the field. What is the potential of the Peacebuilding Commission in this case? Is there a role for a New-York based architecture?

CdC: The PBC has great potential for connecting political and policy level headquarters discussions with the national and local needs and priorities of specific countries and regions. It can bring realistic perspectives from the ground to New York, to nourish discussions and decisions at the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC both on country situations and thematic issues. It can be a bridge between these principal organs, helping them to move forward jointly around a shared longer-term vision of sustaining peace. It can bring a medium and long-term perspective to ongoing peace efforts, and in so
doing help to lift the discussion beyond immediate crisis management. It can host discussions that can help link humanitarian, development, security and peacebuilding action, especially in certain scenarios such as protracted displacements. It can ensure that the follow-up of processes such as the World Humanitarian Summit, the 2030 Agenda and the COP21 include a vision to contribute to sustaining peace.

One way the PBC could be more visually engaged in such efforts is if it had specific products of its own. For instance, the PBC can consider commissioning independent rapporteurs to produce country or thematic reports. Such objective reports on field-level progress towards sustaining peace in specific contexts will inform and focus PBC deliberations. These reports could also help the PBC to provide concise and focused advice to the Security Council during the formulation or renewal of peace operation mandates, particularly those with a prominent peacebuilding dimension. Finally, in the drawdowns of mission mandates, in scenarios such as the current one in Liberia, such reports can help the PBC to advise the Security Council on how best the peace can be sustained during the transition process, especially from a longer-term peacebuilding perspective.

GS: The book also highlights why the peacebuilding architecture’s potential has not been fully realized until now. Can you elaborate on this?

CdC: Yes. In fact, we have two chapters devoted to the founding and establishment of the peacebuilding architecture, and we have contributions by the first and last (when the research was undertaken) Assistant Secretary-Generals for peacebuilding that speak to this question. Our overall assessment is that the space for the peacebuilding architecture, and thus also for its further development and evolution, was and remains constrained by internal UN structural boundaries as well as the current turbulence in the state of global governance. As a result the Security Council and General Assembly are unlikely to entertain radical changes in the role and structure of the peacebuilding architecture. However, I must say that the recent resolutions passed by these two organs have gone further than our assessment anticipated. Although no major structural changes were considered, the degree to which the recent resolutions embraced the notion of sustaining peace and with it a broadened interpretation of peacebuilding that now includes prevention, goes beyond what our analysis suggested would be possible.

GS: As frequently underscored in the book, strengthening coordination across the UN system is a prerequisite for sustaining peace. What are the concrete steps that could be taken in this direction?

CdC: If we want to make the UN system better able to work together towards sustaining peace in specific country and regional contexts, then we need to focus more on pursuing coherence among different parts of the system. The first step is to have a shared understanding of the situation, informed by the rich variety of perspectives and disciplines represented by the different parts of the UN system engaged in a specific country or region. The next step is to have a predictable and regular process for generating a shared strategic objective, as well as a process for tracking and reporting the effects the system is having on the situation. The PBC can play a key role in bringing such information to the attention of Member States and the principle organs of the UN in New York, and generating political attention and direction to these processes. The recent peacebuilding resolutions also sent a strong message from Member States on the need to move towards better system-wide coherence. This has also been a recurrent theme during the informal dialogues for a new Secretary-General as well as for the new Security Council members.
GS: Based on the book’s findings, what recommendations would you offer to those currently working on peacebuilding in the UN system?

CdC: I have mentioned two important recommendations already, firstly the need to have a medium- to long-term approach to sustaining peace, so that we can escape from being trapped in an iterative short-term crisis management approach focused on preventing imminent relapse. Secondly the critical importance of having a shared and coherent strategic objective, as well as a process of regularly adapting it, informed by a system for tracking the effects the effort is having on the situation we are trying to sustain. I would like to add three key recommendations from our book. That the PBC use its broad representative base to foster agreement among its members on ways to address external factors that undermine sustaining peace, such as soliciting and facilitating corruption and illicit financial flows, transnational organized crime and extractive industries, both globally and specifically in the countries on the PBC agenda. That the PBC give serious attention to incorporating regional approaches into its work, including developing a strategic partnership with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, sub-regional organisations in Africa and African civil-society. And lastly, that the PBC help to empower national and local ownership by giving a greater role to the governments and civil society of the countries on the PBC agenda to undertake self-assessments, to brief the PBC on its visions, plans and progress, as well as its own perceptions of risks and challenges, including those posed by its regional and international partners, and by playing a leading role in monitoring its own progress towards sustaining peace.

GS: Who should be reading this book and why? What impact do you hope this book will have on the peacebuilding community?

CdC: There are only a few books that focus on the role of the UN in peacebuilding, and even fewer that have the UN peacebuilding architecture as its main subject of enquiry. In this context we hope that our book contributes to the institutional memory of the Member States and the entities that make up the UN system. Only a few of the people that currently make decisions that affect how the UN does peacebuilding have been involved when the UN peacebuilding architecture was founded and established. Even fewer will be around 5 and 10 years from now when the peacebuilding architecture is reviewed again. It is important for our shared knowledge to understand how the peacebuilding architecture has evolved over its first decade. In this context we hope that our book will be of value for fellow researchers, peacebuilding practitioners and policy makers in the UN system and in Member States, both those that are currently working to implement the review of the peacebuilding architecture as well as those that will become engaged in this work over the next decade.

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WHAT DOES NEW MOMENTUM FOR UN PEACE AND SECURITY REALLY MEAN?

Gustavo de Carvalho and Jonathan Rozen

THE CORE UN GOAL OF SUSTAINING PEACE INCREASINGLY RISKS BECOMING LOST WITHIN ITS BUREAUCRACY

A famous maxim of uncertain origin defines insanity as doing the same thing repeatedly, but expecting different results. In her opening statement at the United Nations (UN) High-Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security, Nobel Peace laureate Leymah Gbowee used this definition to describe challenges faced by UN engagements in peace operations and peacebuilding.

The 10-11 May meeting, called by the president of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and themed In a world in risks: a new commitment for peace, provided a platform to reflect on current challenges to international peace and security. These focused, in particular, on responses to the 2015 reviews on peace operations, peacebuilding, and women, peace and security.

The reviews were a response to the realisation that the important role of the UN in supporting many countries emerging from conflict is often challenged by the re-emergence of such conflict. Following a period of increased peace in the early 2000s,
global conflict has again risen in the past five years. Additionally, with the growing presence of violent extremism, the need for different approaches from the UN and others, including the African Union (AU), is becoming ever more urgent.

The UN is currently scrutinising candidates for the position of secretary-general, and this person will have a critical role in implementing the outcomes of the different reviews. The election of a new secretary-general must therefore be kept in mind when considering the process of reviewing UN peace and security tools.

Whoever succeeds Ban Ki-moon will have the difficult task of coordinating and pushing for real changes within the UN system. Many of the most salient recommendations provided at the different reviews require much institutional change and political buy-in. For these to be used effectively, the incumbent will need to be capable of making contentious decisions; and not only those that solely depend on the UN Secretariat to be addressed.

The next secretary-general will have to push for difficult political conversations among member states on how the agenda could be made more effective. Along these lines, the Ethiopian foreign minister, Tedros Adhanom, stated that implementation is absolutely critical in the aim of a paradigm shift and for credibility to be restored.

Ahead of the high-level event, many governments and global think tanks shared their concerns and hopes surrounding the UN peace and security reviews. This included the risk of failing to focus on effective implementation, and the need for strong buy-in from countries to ensure that changes actually occur.

The new UN secretary-general will not be able to respond to all of these issues alone – nor should they be expected to. Member states must support the UN peace and security architecture through continued funding and political will, beyond providing positive responses in an open thematic debate.

Promisingly, member states largely supported the findings of the review reports. Member states, civil society, and academics all emphasised the findings of the reports in relation to prevention, the primacy of politics, the role of regional organisations (particularly the AU) and the need for more sustained financing for UN engagements in peace operations and peacebuilding processes.

South Africa’s statement summarised this. It presented that the UN and regional organisations should adopt a more holistic, long-term preventive approach in addressing conflicts and its root causes, thereby moving beyond managing conflicts as they arise.

That there seemed to be consensus among such a diverse group of countries is a promising indication of increased unity on some of the evolving principles surrounding peace and security responses.

Many actors, for example, mentioned the importance of creating an enabling environment where implementation, leadership and political will become the core aspects of UN peace and security structures and responses. There were also, however, words of caution. Brazil and Egypt stressed that for the three reviews to be successful, broader and more systemic reform of the UN system is needed. Another key challenge was how coordinated approaches among different UN organs could be enhanced.
Countries like Mali and Sweden also emphasised that peacebuilding efforts are likely to fail without honest acceptance of national and local ownership over processes. Margot Wallström, Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that peacebuilding takes place at a national level, undertaken by national actors – and that while international actors can provide support, facilitation and accompaniment, they can never lead.

The UNGA meeting also indicated that a difficult road lay ahead in convincing member states of the need to change their methods of interaction. This is significant from an African perspective. Many agree on the importance of respectful cooperation among international, regional and sub-regional partners. However, stronger mutual understanding of comparative advantages for addressing conflicts, notably between the UN and AU, must also be fostered.

This was well presented by Macharia Kamau, Kenya's Permanent Representative to the UN and Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Kamau stated that we cannot have peace in the world when we don't respect each other as regions and treat our institutions as equals.

The key idea of bringing conflict prevention to the forefront of the UN responses seems, in principle, to be well accepted. But there are still many questions on what it really means for specific roles and responsibilities within the UNGA, the Security Council, and the Peacebuilding Architecture.

MANY ACTORS, MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT WHERE IMPLEMENTATION, LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL WILL BECOME THE CORE ASPECTS OF UN PEACE AND SECURITY STRUCTURES AND RESPONSES.

Some countries presented concerns around the risk of equating prevention to interventions. However, Ramos Horta, former president of Timor Leste and chair of the peace operations review panel, highlighted an important interpretation of the concept.

He stated that prevention is not just an action, it is the space to provide assistance in addressing root causes, including those related to development. Similarly, while many agree that sustaining peace is a core goal of the UN, there is also a risk that this concept is increasingly becoming lost within its complicated and complex bureaucracy.

Currently there are diverse views on how stronger coherence can be created between different organs of the UN; notably the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the role of UN Agencies, Programmes and Funds. Many called for stronger coordination between these organs, and it was also mentioned that trust has to be rebuilt between member states and the Secretariat.

The P5 members remained notably reserved during the discussions at the debate. Given that the P5 hold disproportionate influence over the potential success of the reviews' objectives, a more significant contribution could have bolstered political momentum on the three reviews.
In her opening speech, Gbowee emphasised that if we want peace, we must invest in peace. Therefore, the role of the P5 in providing resources for peacebuilding initiatives is critical.

If the UN wants different peace and security results, it must be serious in its ‘new commitment for peace.’ A new focus on preventative action is important, but risks becoming a vague concept that is neither fully understood, nor effectively implemented. Rather, to be holistic, pragmatic and nimble, the UN must ensure that the necessary requirements – notably funding, political will and member-state leadership – are provided.

And thus, the UN must not only be able to identify when and where its actions went wrong, but also boldly act on its own recommendations.

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SUSTAINING PEACE IS A CORE ACTIVITY OF THE UN

Oscar Fernandez-Tarango

SUSTAINING PEACE ALSO REQUIRES BREAKING SILOS AND COMBATTING FRAGMENTATION AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL, STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS

On 27 April 2016, as an end result of an over a year long process aimed at reviewing the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, the member states of the United Nations agreed by consensus on two substantially identical, parallel resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. The comprehensive and far-reaching resolutions successfully capture the ambitious and innovative content of the 2015 Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture.

The AGE Report starts by acknowledging that while any effort that does not tackle the root causes of conflict and seek durable solutions will do little more than set the stage for the next round of violence, peacebuilding is still often left as an afterthought - under-recognized, under-prioritized, and under-resourced. In the meantime, the failure to successfully prevent lapse and relapse into conflict is having irreversible repercussions for the credibility of global action, and of the United Nations.
The adoption of the two resolutions indicate that the membership of the United Nations is ready to stand up to the challenge set by Dag Hammarskjold, who once said that ‘the pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned’. At a time of recurrent divisions within the Security Council and among the membership of the General Assembly, it is very encouraging that member states were able to produce such a substantial, forward looking document.

The resolutions, first and foremost, should be seen as a pledge by the international community to go beyond mere rhetorical commitments to devise innovative, concrete and lasting solutions to conflict – not as a peripheral activity, but as a core task of the UN.

One important innovation of the Report and the resolutions is the introduction of the idea ‘sustaining peace’. Reflected throughout the text, the ‘sustaining peace’ approach seeks the UN and other peace and security actors to move beyond looking at peace and conflict in a sectorial way. Instead, it advocates more flexible, content appropriate and demand-driven approaches, while acknowledging peacebuilding as a political activity that must avoid templates, formulas and one-size-fits-all solutions.

Sustaining peace also requires breaking silos and combatting fragmentation at the intergovernmental, strategic and operational levels including in the field; further exploring the interlinkages between the political and security, development and human rights pillars of the United Nations; partnering better with regional and sub-regional organizations and international financial institutions; and emphasizing the importance of inclusivity and people-centered approaches for successful peacebuilding.

**THE FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY PREVENT LAPSE AND RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT IS HAVING IRREVERSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF GLOBAL ACTION, AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS.**

The notion of peacebuilding as a thread running throughout the life cycle of conflicts resonates throughout the resolutions. Peacebuilding is no longer a set of specific tasks and interventions promoted primarily by the three New York-based entities. Rather, it is connected to conflict prevention and peacekeeping, with a view to making, building, keeping and sustaining peace in an efficient, integrated and cost-effective manner.

In this way, the resolutions should be seen as supplementary to the normative consensus forming around conflict prevention especially since the adoption of UNSCR 2171 (2014), the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the Secretary-General’s Reports on Preventing Violent Extremism and the World Humanitarian Summit. However, the resolutions go beyond rhetorical commitments and talks about actual ways to implement the prevention agenda. Improving joint action and strategic analysis capacity, coordinated and coherent action including during transitions, ensuring adequate and predictable financing, and establishing effective leadership and operational coherence on the field are presented as concrete steps.
The resolutions also underscore the importance of connecting humanitarian - development - peacebuilding action towards more effective and preventive UN responses. The resolutions not only underscore the joint role of the ECOSOC and PBC in bridging different agendas and breaking silos, but also highlight the importance of using the overarching UN development framework to further sustaining peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission particularly emerges as a key venue to implement the prevention agenda. By presenting peacebuilding as a goal that reaches beyond the pure post-conflict realm, for the first time member states are provided with a venue to bring their conflict prevention and peacebuilding priorities to the UN, without running the risk of stigmatization. The role of the PBC to provide political accompaniment and advocacy to conflict-affected states, and bridge the silos between and among the UN's principal organs and entities is specifically highlighted in this respect. In the next year, we will be working closely with the PBC leadership, to ensure that it truly becomes a body, which fosters effective peacebuilding and prevention. In the meantime, the UN system and particularly the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Department of Political Affairs should jointly explore ways to more effectively use the PBC.

As all other major reviews and processes at the UN, the resolution recognizes that the UN cannot singlehandedly address all the global peace and security challenges, nor can it respond to the call to 'leave no one behind' in development processes on its own. As such, it recognizes the importance of partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly the African Union, as well as international financial institutions, civil society, and the private sector. There is very strong language on UN-World Bank cooperation, drawing a framework for them to jointly support the capacities of national institutions and local civil society, in support of inclusive national ownership and people-centered solutions.

Finally, the resolutions call for the next Secretary-General to provide options on increasing restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to UN prevention and peacebuilding activities. This is a good opportunity for the UN system to provide a comprehensive and realistic assessment on constraints to achieve adequate and predictable financing and innovative solutions, in connection with other discussions being held at the UN and beyond, on better funding arrangements. The new Secretary-General should be able to provide these options in conjunction with thinking in the humanitarian and development areas on funding and financing UN action. The resolutions also recognize the value of the Peacebuilding Fund as a flexible, rapid, effective tool, and emphasize the importance of multi-year commitments to the PBF to ensure adequate, sustained, predictable financing.

Paradoxically, while there is general consensus and political commitment to prevention, funding for prevention and peacebuilding is not forthcoming. This is, perhaps, not surprising given the growing costs associated with escalating humanitarian crises. Nonetheless, all agree that our best chance of reducing humanitarian suffering and cost is to build more durable and just political solutions. The UN will now have to live up to and deliver on the commitments set by these groundbreaking resolutions.

This post reflects the views of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

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Benjamin Franklin once said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The United Nations membership acknowledged this, by consensus, by adopting on 27 April the most comprehensive and far-reaching peacebuilding resolutions in the Organization’s history.

To say that the world is going through difficult times is an anodyne understatement. The number of simultaneous security and humanitarian crises facing the world is enormous – affecting millions and placing unprecedented strain on the United Nations system to respond.

The extent of the situation was laid bare in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture entitled “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace”, released on 29 June 2015. This Report was commissioned by the United Nations as the first stage of a comprehensive Review of the UN’s peacebuilding efforts.
Led by former Guatemalan Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, the assessments were stark as to the global peace and security challenges faced, and the sustainability of UN peacebuilding efforts to date. The Review presented the international community with a call to action and outlined an extensive range of practicable and far-reaching recommendations to fundamentally shift how the UN works to build and sustain peace.

As co-facilitators of the second or intergovernmental stage of the Review, we were entrusted with the responsibility of transforming the ambitious recommendations of the AGE report into comprehensive and substantially identical resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In January 2016, intergovernmental consultations began. Following three months of intense negotiations, consultations concluded in late March, with the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council meeting on 27 April in a rare parallel process to adopt, by consensus, the most comprehensive UN peacebuilding resolutions to date.

The General Assembly and Security Council adopting such detailed and cross-cutting resolutions is a clear reflection of the importance that the international community places on peacebuilding to collective peace and security efforts, and its willingness to explore options to find durable solutions.

‘SUSTAINING PEACE’ LOOKS TO SHIFT PEACE AND SECURITY RESPONSES FROM LINEAR AND SEQUENTIAL ACTIVITIES TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND STRATEGIC APPROACH

The resolutions include specific, innovative actions to bring greater coherence and effectiveness to UN peacebuilding. They affirm that effective peacebuilding is a shared responsibility of the entire United Nations system, and covers a wide-range of political, development, and human rights engagements. Of critical importance, the resolutions embed – for the first time at the United Nations – the concept of ‘sustaining peace’.

‘Sustaining peace’ looks to shift peace and security responses from linear and sequential activities to a more comprehensive and strategic approach aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. ‘Sustaining peace’ represents both a goal and a process that requires inclusive nationally-led responses, with the sustained support and attention of the international community. ‘Sustaining peace’ is fundamental to all of the UN’s peace and security, development and human rights engagements, and needs to be prioritized in the field and at UN Headquarters.

Critically, ‘sustaining peace’ requires a greater focus on efforts to prevent the lapse and relapse of conflict. Indeed, the need to better invest in conflict prevention was a central finding of all three UN peace and security reviews in 2015 - the AGF, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and the Global Study on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Through the peacebuilding resolutions, the UN membership has made clear its expectations of how the UN system should implement these efforts.
The important role of the Peacebuilding Commission is also affirmed through the resolutions. This particularly includes its work to: promote a strategic, integrated and coherent approach to peacebuilding; serve a bridging role between the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and other UN entities; and provide a platform for countries to bring their peacebuilding priorities to the international community's attention without the risk of stigmatization. The Peacebuilding Commission is also encouraged to diversify its working methods and rules of procedure to enable it to operate more flexibly and with a greater focus on regional and cross-cutting issues.

The peacebuilding resolutions additionally call for greater operational and strategic coherence across the UN system, improved joint analysis and planning, strengthened leadership, and a greater focus by the Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Council and UN development system on sustaining peace, including through the overarching framework of the UN's operational activities for development (the upcoming Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review).

In line with the findings of the 2015 reviews, the resolutions recognize that the scale of global peace and security challenges requires partnership and cooperation between the United Nations and other key actors, including regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union, international financial institutions, civil society, and the private sector. The importance of United Nations cooperation with the World Bank in assisting conflict-affected countries receives specific attention. The resolutions also emphasize the important role of women and youth to sustaining peace.

The resolutions close by inviting the next UN Secretary-General to report back on implementation of the resolutions at the 72nd session of the General Assembly held in 2017-18. This includes a request to provide options to increase, restructure and better prioritize funding to United Nations peacebuilding, consistent with Member States' recognition of the need for predictable and sustained financing to this work. Through this request, it is hoped that Member States will be provided with a range of comprehensive and innovative options on how to stabilize UN peacebuilding financing.

Of course, the long-term impact of these resolutions is contingent on their effective implementation. For this, we turn to the United Nations system and implore it – along with other international peacebuilders – to take the opportunity presented to build on the current global consensus, to bring a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated approach to sustaining peace, and to position the organization so that it is able to respond to the global challenges of our age.

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FOOD SECURITY, NUTRITION, AND PEACE

Sarah Cliffe

MANY COUNTRIES FACE FOOD PRICE OR NATURAL RESOURCE SHOCKS WITHOUT FALLING INTO CONFLICT.

What do we know about the links between food security, nutrition and peace? What makes countries resilient to these risks? And what does this mean for global policy development in future?

There are four points worth making between the links between food security, nutrition, other natural resource issues, and peace:

First, conflict of course has a deep impact on food security and nutrition – people living in conflict-affected countries are more than twice as likely to be malnourished as those in stable environments, and countries in prolonged conflict fall on average 20 percentage points behind in poverty reduction.
Second, there is some evidence that food insecurity can play a role in increasing conflict risk. In particular, food price shocks can increase the vulnerabilities. Studies have found that rainfall shocks in 41 African countries significantly increased conflict risks: a 5 per cent decline in economic growth due to rainfall costs increased the risk of conflict the following year by half. Countries in the Sahel have been notably vulnerable to this type of risk.

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity and conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations.

Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) is indirect rather than direct.

**WHAT MAKES SOME COUNTRIES MORE RESILIENT THAN OTHERS?**

Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict. Essentially, the two important factors in determining their resilience are:

First, whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009 drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of course have been one factor amongst many but it would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary driver of the Syrian conflict.

Second, whether countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens, providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance. During the 2007-2008 food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent. This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.

**WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL POLICY?**

First, consider food security - and in particular food price volatility – as one of the structural risks that may merit inclusion in a better strategic risks analysis at the UN.

Second, help countries develop scalable social protection programs that can help citizens when food shocks occur. Good examples would be Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program, which since 2005 has helped the rural poor resist shocks and create assets, increasing their resilience to chronic food security. More recently, the UN has helped countries surrounding Syria scale up social safety net programs to assist both their own vulnerable citizens and refugees, such as the work WFP, UNHCR, UNDP and UNICEF have done in support of the Lebanese Government’s national poverty targeting and education programs.
Third, and relevant for the UN Security Council, make efforts to ensure that peace operations can complement the restoration of food security and livelihoods. This may mean ensuring that peace operations can protect civilian cultivation and principal local trade routes; it may mean helping governments assess the impact of internal and border security measures on agricultural producers and the consumers of basic foods.

Fourth, support structural measures designed to reduce the risks of exceptional price volatility in global food markets.

*This is an edited version of the remarks made by CIC Director Sarah Cliffe to the Arria Formula meeting on food security, nutrition and peace in the UN Security Council on 29 March 2016.*

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DOES ANYONE KNOW WHAT GOOD PEACEBUILDING LOOKS LIKE?

Gustavo de Carvalho and Onnie Kok

PEACEBUILDING HAS EVOLVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE LAST 20 YEARS. NOW THAT WE KNOW WHAT IT IS MEANT TO ACHIEVE, THE TIME HAS COME TO DO IT WELL.

On 16 February, the world bid farewell to former United Nation’s (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he passed away at a Cairo hospital. Boutros-Ghali is often remembered for his tumultuous term at the helm of the UN, being the only UN secretary-general to have served only one term.

However, Boutros-Ghali is also remembered for his seminal 1992 policy document, the Agenda for Peace. This document shaped the way in which conflict-resolution responses are defined, underscoring the importance of peacebuilding not only at the UN, but also globally. His passing is therefore an opportunity to reflect on what has been learnt in terms of peacebuilding responses, and how these could be improved.
The Agenda for Peace guided the UN and the broader field of conflict resolution on the types of activities that could be conducted before, during and after conflict. Although many of the ideas on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding weren’t new, it assembled these in a policy-friendly framework and offered a coherent understanding of the tools available for resolving conflict.

Boutros-Ghali showed that peacebuilding could be an important tool to help countries in their processes of sustaining peace. He defined peacebuilding as the ‘action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.’

He also noted that peacebuilding responses should form a crucial part of a well-considered and integrated process within a wider and clear political strategy that aims at responding to conflicts. As he said, ‘Peacebuilding is not a therapy that the UN can attempt to impose to an unwilling patient.’

At the time, the definition and scope of peacebuilding was often limited to the range of tasks that would be conducted after conflict had ended, and following a peacekeeping operation. Today, all of these concepts and responses seem far less linear and the idea of post-conflict peacebuilding is becoming outdated. Peacebuilding is increasingly seen to be part of an overarching approach to sustain peace, which means it becomes embedded in other types of responses, including preventive actions and peacekeeping.

Today, 20 years later, Boutros-Ghali’s ideas continue to influence responses and structures at the UN, the African Union (AU) and elsewhere. Ten years ago, the UN created an entire peacebuilding architecture after the release of the Agenda for Peace. The AU, since its establishment in 2002, has increasingly evolved in creating its own frameworks for peace operations and has a promising – albeit underused – post-conflict reconstruction and development framework.

Although the concept of peacebuilding has evolved, the international community has not yet identified how to do it well; nor does it yet seem able to pinpoint what exactly constitutes successful peacebuilding. The field still seems hamstrung by its inability to effectively plan and execute, measure and use results, generate institutional learning, and identify better ways of engaging in highly complex environments.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process, constrained by short-term realities. Progress in peacebuilding processes has to be sustained, even when particular gains are seen. Mozambique and Burundi, for instance, are good examples of how plans have to be supported in the longer term to avoid relapsing into conflict. More fractured peacebuilding processes in countries like the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo show that there is still a lot to learn about engaging in effective peacebuilding.

It is widely accepted that monitoring and evaluation is no longer optional, but rather a critical component in identifying better ways to conduct peacebuilding: particularly in a conflict-sensitive context. Current research on the challenges of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding is diverse, but a number of key issues stand out.

Peacebuilding practitioners are under considerable pressure to show positive results, both for accountability and to demonstrate contributions made. This means that peacebuilding implementation often focuses on immediate and short-term responses, emphasising outputs rather than longer-term outcomes, which are more difficult to achieve.
This, in turn, leads to a messy, or retrospective, monitoring and evaluation approach, beset with insufficient allocation of resources and capacity, and made even more complicated by a lack of clarity on what success or impact is; and what the outcomes are and should be. In this way, many opportunities for learning are lost. It also compromises the ability to gather satisfying evidence of success; both for practitioners and their stakeholders.

How can these shortcomings be reduced? Timely and thorough planning is crucial, and a good monitoring and evaluation approach is one that focuses on stakeholder confidence. This implies that through monitoring and evaluation, the contribution of a peacebuilding intervention can be seen in meaningful and satisfying results. It further implies that there is potential for information to be used in institutional learning and improvement. In this way, focusing on stakeholder confidence can contribute to stronger evidence, which supports both future efforts and the peacebuilding community at large.

There is some global momentum to respond to these challenges and make peacebuilding more effective. The UN is currently conducting review processes and thematic debates of its peace and security tools, including a review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. This review states that peacebuilding remains a critically ‘underrecognised, underprioritised, and underresourced’, both globally and ‘within the UN system.’

The need to better design, plan and respond to peacebuilding needs is a critical issue that must be addressed with urgency. Currently, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is developing a new capacity-building process that aims to address individual and institutional shortfalls, and support the development of more effective responses. Peacebuilding practitioners who can draw on credible evidence and well-grounded arguments are better equipped to make a difference.

Of course, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Practitioners should therefore carefully identify approaches that are appropriate to their context, and which would yield valuable and usable results.

Now more than ever, peacebuilders need to learn how to do peacebuilding well. This means letting go of the idea that peacebuilding responses should be implemented simply through identifying a range of disconnected activities. Rather, peacebuilders need to design coherent processes, in a way that allows them to effectively demonstrate how their contribution reduces the likelihood of conflicts from recurring.

Peacebuilding plans and responses need to be realistic, more considered, and better monitored at all stages. This is how the field could see an important mind shift; one that focuses on effective results rather than quick-fix outputs, and which will ultimately help peacebuilders to implement their responses more effectively.

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GLOBAL LEADERSHIP NEEDS A SHOT IN THE ARM, STARTING WITH THE NEXT SG

Karin Landgren

THE NEXT SG WILL BE HOBLED FROM THE START BY STAFF LIMITATIONS. UN MEMBER STATES HAVE MADE IT HARD FOR THE SECRETARIAT TO SELECT THE BEST STAFF, AND FIRE THE WORST.

This week, the UN Security Council plans to hold its first, non-binding straw poll in the process of recommending the next Secretary-General. In our polarized, confrontational political climate, the choice matters greatly. The leader of our sole truly global intergovernmental body must bring singular qualities to the task of being a brake and a buffer against forces pulling the world apart, bridging big-power divisions while supporting the excluded peoples of the world.

A successful UN wields political weight derived from its standing in the world, as a recent open letter from UN staff rightly points out. The SG must constantly reinforce and deepen that weight. While some member states reputedly do not want a strong SG, they will all, at some point, find it in their interest to have one. Only a solidly-led organization can take on the great span of issues that demand international cooperation and compromise.
That the ideal SG be diplomatic, dexterous and charismatic goes without saying. Beyond this, the profile required for four roles needs particular consideration. The next SG will be expected to assert global intellectual leadership, while also maintaining a credible moral voice. He or she must orient the entire UN system towards greater candour, collegiality and coherence. Finally, the SG must communicate and represent the UN’s vision, deftly connecting the organization with a world of constituencies.

Global leadership needs a shot in the arm. Expectations of the new SG are high, and the Security Council would do a disservice to the world if it gravitated to the candidate perceived as ruffling the fewest feathers or offering the best backroom deals.

**ASSERT GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP**

UN colleagues remark on the bygone era when an independent-minded Secretariat functioned as a principal organ of the UN, as its founders intended, and its officials played more meaningful intellectual, political and operational roles. Over the years, something vital has been lost.

There is a hunger among many for an SG who will not only engage extensively with a range of thought leaders but also bring his or her own intellectual contribution to bear on the challenges of the era. The current SG deserves credit for major achievements, notably the *Sustainable Development Goals* and the Paris Agreement on climate change. For the next SG, these ambitious political commitments will need continued leadership for the test ahead, namely their implementation.

**A UN CORPORATE CULTURE THAT PREFERS TO GLOSS OVER PROFOUND CHALLENGES AND TO REWARD PLACIDITY IS ILL-EQUIPPED TO DELIVER THE VISION, INTEGRITY AND COURAGE NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE NEXT SG**

The UN needs a leader who will articulate and shape the UN’s role and place in the increasingly complex international security climate. Last year’s reviews of the UN peace and security architecture set out many ways in which the UN might respond to the challenges. There’s no shortage of proposals, but it is the SG who will set strategic direction, overall and on specific issues. This demands a candidate with policy depth, and in particular, deep understanding of the links among peace and security, development, and human rights.

In the age of social media, leaders are judged more hastily than ever. But resolution of international crises remains slow and tough, whether the issue is climate change, terrorism, drugs or wars; last month’s peace agreement in Colombia, for example, came after more than 50 years of conflict. The times may be past when an SG could take days away from the office to reflect and exchange ideas with thinkers and artists, as Dag Hammarskjöld did with the sculptor Barbara Hepworth and others. But resisting the siren song of quick fixes in favour of profound analysis and long-term strategies ranks high among challenges for the new Secretary-General.
MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE MORAL VOICE

Hammarskjöld is also remembered as the SG most clearly driven by principle, which determined his navigation of crises during the Cold War, in Congo and elsewhere. The sense of the UN as an organization based on principles is eroded every time the UN meets a crisis with acquiescence, paper-shuffling or delay.

There are too many examples from the recent past. Last month, Ban Ki-moon yielded to Saudi Arabia's demand to be taken off a UN “list of shame” for the maiming and killing of children in Yemen. Unusually, the SG made public the pressure he had faced, including the likelihood that “countries would de-fund many UN programmes.”

At every turn, the UN leadership mismanaged its response to the crime of child sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic during 2014–15, from failing to protect the children to diverting energy into an internal witch-hunt. It is thought that Nepali UN peacekeepers introduced a deadly cholera strain to Haiti in 2010, and for long years, the UN’s public posture was to squirm silently behind lawyers.

After parts of the UN failed to call out gross violations in Sri Lanka, human rights was elevated to an organization-wide operational priority in 2013, but this is not yet firmly entrenched at all levels. The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, acknowledging that declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern can lead to disagreements with governments, found that in this regard the WHO Director-General and Secretariat had not shown the necessary independent and courageous decision-making in the initial months of the crisis.

In seeking to maintain a moral voice for the UN, the SG will constantly come under great pressure. This is all the more reason for the SG to be supported by a staff that presents ethical, principled positions. While “humility” is often listed as a desirable quality for an SG, it is at odds with the heft the role requires. This quality might best be interpreted as personal restraint coupled with receptivity to alternative viewpoints. For this, the SG needs to begin by confidently appointing smart, tough-minded senior officials, and also insisting that they work as a team.

ORIENT THE UN SYSTEM TOWARDS CANDOUR, COLLEGIALITY AND COHERENCE

Unforeseen developments are the UN’s daily reality. A UN corporate culture that prefers to gloss over profound challenges and to reward placidity is ill-equipped to deliver the vision, integrity and courage needed to support the next SG. Changing this culture is a long-term project.

In re-establishing a positive UN culture, the tone from the top matters more than anything, including formal structures. The next SG needs to model new behaviours and signal expectations explicitly to senior staff, even to those who previously served as presidents or prime ministers in their own governments.

The new SG should introduce an expectation that problems will be dissected candidly at senior levels. Recently, 51 serving US diplomats called for a different approach to engagement in Syria via the State Department’s dissent channel, a formal alternative process for substantive policy matters. The UN has no equivalent. "Our dissent channel is Inner City Press," joked
a UN colleague, referring to a journalist known for asking difficult questions and publishing leaked internal documents. An active, managed internal forum would make that unnecessary.

The SG will be hobbled from the start by staff limitations. UN member states have made it hard for the Secretariat to select the best staff, and fire the worst. Staff themselves grow discouraged (or emboldened) when a lack of integrity brings rewards and no consequences. Only a bold approach with member states can change the current dispiriting inability to hold staff to the highest standards.

The staff’s disproportionate maleness has been well documented. By January 2015, women had fallen to 23 per cent of USG positions, and 22 per cent of ASGs; in the year that followed, men walked away with 92 per cent of USG and 77 per cent of ASG positions. As all declared candidates for the SG-ship have committed themselves to redressing this, their recent records should be scrutinized.

Every Secretary-General wants the Secretariat, UN agencies, funds and programmes to sing from the same song sheet. At country level, there have been attempts to gain greater coherence among UN actors, while inter-agency discourse has grown and improved. Nonetheless, as an SRSG, I often heard complaints from Headquarters that the SG could not “direct” the agencies. That is the wrong starting point. Rather than pressing for greater centralization, integration, and command-and-control, the leadership should invest in clearer articulation of the strategic direction, by country and by issue, engaging the partners in the discussion from the outset.

Member states have work to do, too, in supporting greater UN-wide coherence. However, the Secretariat’s work could start at home. A recent external review of the UN’s humanitarian coordination body, OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) found that the failure of its senior managers to communicate a common cohesive vision “led to confusion and a lack of clarity with both internal and external stakeholders.” The good news is that this should be among the easier internal problems to remedy.

**COMMUNICATE A VISION OF POSITIVE, PRINCIPLED OUTCOMES**

Surveys suggest that there is considerable global public support for the United Nations, but it is latent: electorates more often look inwards, making multilateralism generally a low priority. But with no other body able to play its role in peace and security, human rights, or setting global norms, the UN must sell itself. The SG is charged with communicating the purpose, vision and actions of the UN to build public understanding, trust and even warm feelings for the organization, while guiding and inspiring the UN and its member states towards better outcomes.

Does the SG have to be a born communicator? Yes, probably. The team has to give high priority to the communications strategy—it would be a mistake to approach this as a subsidiary task. But brilliant speechwriting takes an SG only so far: successful communication is audience-specific, and requires a leader able to gauge the room, adjusting tone and nuance on the spot. Credibly representing a positive, principled vision demands deep and diplomatic communication skills. If respect for the SG starts to crumble, no communications strategy will save it.
MAKING THE MOST OF THE NEW PROCESS

The General Assembly’s public hearing of the SG candidates is a victory for good sense and democratic consultation. The NGO 1 for 7 Billion campaign, the UN member states who took the lead, and General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft deserve warm praise for this innovation. Similar scrutiny should now, without delay, be brought to the selection of UN Undersecretaries-General heading the major Secretariat components and UN agencies, funds and programmes.

The GA hearings cannot convey all we’d like to know about how candidates will respond to pressure, threats and moral dilemmas, or if they will uphold their promises. Going for popular appeal and likeability is a risk in any review process, where an able raconteur tends to generate immediate goodwill. Greater due diligence is also required on the candidates’ past performance in their posts, an element which is not built in to the current process. There is still time to fix this, if done quickly.

Ultimately the choice of SG will lie behind closed doors, with governments that may disagree on the qualities they want to see. Even so, the current process is likely to leave all the UN’s member states, NGOs, and the interested public feeling far more strongly vested in the success of the chosen candidate. That alone ought to give the incoming SG a boost.

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KEY MESSAGES FROM CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE UN’S ROLE IN PEACE AND SECURITY

Ashraf Swelam, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Cedric de Coning and Karim Hafez

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP MUST BE SEEN AS A BENCHMARK FOR THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY. IT REQUIRES INCLUSIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF LOCAL ACTORS, NOT ONLY GOVERNMENTS.

On its 70th anniversary, the United Nations finds itself at a crossroads. Old and new threats, challenges and risks to international peace and security are increasingly testing the ability of the organization and the efficacy of the instruments available to it as it attempts to fulfill its primary promise: to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

Against this backdrop, timely and potentially groundbreaking reviews of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 were carried out in 2015 to take stock of UN involvement in peace and security and to recommend reforms for the future of the global peace and security architecture. Although the reviews were initiated independently of each other, they produced notable synergies and shared recommendations on a host of
vital reforms. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the UN, working in partnership with member states and regional organizations to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, as well as to build and sustain peace.

To draw conclusions from the larger picture in which the outcomes of the reviews connect, the President of the General Assembly (PGA), Mogens Lykketoft, took the initiative of organizing a “High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on UN, Peace and Security”. Held on 10-11 May, it aimed, in the words of the PGA, to move beyond “vaguely defined need for change” to focus on practical and concrete steps to effect that change. It provided a platform for member states to reflect on the recommendations of the reviews, with the aim of identifying synergies, bridging gaps, and easing potential tensions. The ultimate objective of this initiative is to identify priority areas and to present recommendations for systemic and realistic reforms at the UN that enjoy the support of the majority of its members.

Leading up to the HLTD, a series of regional and international expert meetings, consultations, workshops and retreats were organized in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America, with the objective of informing the HLTD. While varying in formats, the events were closely coordinated with the office of the PGA, and addressed a jointly developed set of themes and questions. They brought together hundreds of officials from national governments, regional and international organizations, with experts, academics, and representatives of civil society and the private sector. Viewed together, the recommendations that they collectively produced build upon bottom-up perspectives on the UN's future involvement in peace and security.

The outcomes of those regional meetings were comprehensive and are difficult to summarize, but a few key messages and recommendations emerged during these regional meetings. They were informed in great part by the recommendations put forward by the UN reviews, but not limited to them.

**THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS; PREVENTION, RESOLVING CONFLICT & SUSTAINING PEACE**

Without exception, all regional discussions reiterated the call of the UN reviews for a paradigm shift that emphasizes the “primacy of politics” in leading the wide spectrum of UN peace and security interventions, ranging from conflict prevention, management and resolution, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In this regard, “sustaining peace” - another term introduced by the reviews - was highlighted over and again as an appropriate overarching framework to guide all UN interventions, with an emphasis on “prevention”, rather than “reaction”, and an equal emphasis on a “continuum” of interventions, rather than the current sequential approach. As defined by the recent UNSC and the UNGA's resolutions 2282 and 70/262 passed on 27 April 2016, “sustaining peace” emphasizes the importance of prevention, especially by addressing the root causes of conflict. It also frees peacebuilding from its erroneous characterization as a “post-conflict” endeavor. In addition to setting the stage for post-conflict reconstruction and development, peacebuilding must be equally regarded as a means of preventing and resolving conflict, as well as catalyzing efforts for addressing its root causes. In addition, the “sustaining peace” approach was also viewed as a positive driver for integration that can overcome fragmentation and address the silos hindering coherence amongst the three pillars of UN work: peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as their respective governance structures.
The regional consultations emphasized the need for the UN and its member states to recommit to the peaceful settlement of disputes as per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The use of force should be an option of last resort, and when employed it should be in the service of a political strategy that seeks a viable and sustainable political settlement.

Participants in the regional discussions were of the opinion that the current emphasis on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts has led to protracted crises, with damaging consequences for the countries and regions involved in the conflicts, as well as the credibility of the UN. In deploying tools available to it in the pursuit of political settlements, the UNSC and the Secretariat must shift from a mentality of “conflict management” to an emphasis on “conflict resolution.”

**DEMOCRACY AT THE UN: SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM & REVITALIZING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

All regional consultations, without exception, highlighted that the unrepresentative nature of the UNSC is a major obstacle to the reform of the UN peace and security architecture. Deep frustration has been echoed for the lack of political will to address the issue, including membership of the Council and the veto power. The Arab African and Latin meetings, in particular, highlighted the unsustainable lack of permanent Arab, African and Latin American representation on the UNSC.

Preparatory meetings reluctantly recognized that as reform of the Security Council, including expanding its membership, is unlikely to be achieved in the short-term, other steps need to be taken to compensate for this lack of participatory decision-making in the UNSC. In this context, the regional consultations yielded suggestions, such as enhancing cooperation between the UNSC and regional organizations, and consulting troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) in the decision-making process.

**PARTICIPANTS IN THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON MANAGING, RATHER THAN RESOLVING, CONFLICTS HAS LED TO PROTRACTED CRISES, WITH DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICTS, AS WELL AS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN.**

The issue of revitalizing the UN General Assembly as the main body of the Organization—one that gives legitimacy to the UN’s actions and decisions - has been echoed in all regional consultations, without exception. Participants in the Arab, African and Latin American consultations all expressed acute frustration at the lack of the UN Security Council reform, and all highlighted the need to empower the UN General Assembly to be able to effectively act in the realm of peace and security.

The African, Arab, European and Latin American consultations affirmed that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is best placed to steer the organization away from military responses towards a “culture of prevention,” and they highlighted that the UNGA’s role in reconciling the interests of the P5 is key for a more balanced and representative UN peace and security architecture.
Preparatory meetings also underlined the importance of reviving and implementing UNGA resolution 337 A (Uniting for Peace) and UNGA resolution A/691007 (Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly). If implemented, these resolutions would empower the UNGA to respond to conflict where the UNSC has failed to act.

**COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIPS**

All regional consultations highlighted the importance of strengthening UN and regional cooperation, as an integral part of reforming the global peace and security architecture. The discussions highlighted that, while the international peace and security field is crowded with state and non-state actors, the UN is uniquely positioned to pursue and incentivize strategic partnerships that lead to timely, coherent and effective international response.

Partnerships with regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, most notably with the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), received considerable attention. The recommendation by the UN reviews for the UNSC to cooperate more closely with regional organizations in a new peacekeeping partnership was welcomed. The African and Arab, as well as the European and Latin American, consultations demonstrated considerable political willingness by these regions and their respective organizations to engage in meaningful partnerships with the UN. A common call that emerged, however, was for moving beyond capacity-building, information sharing and exchanges of views, towards a more strategic partnership between the UN and regional organizations.

Other important partnerships were highlighted during the regional consultations. On one hand, trilateral cooperation between the UNSC, the Secretariat and major troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) was underlined as one of the most important partnerships in peacekeeping. TCCs/PCCs must play an important role not only in mandate design, review and extension, but also in doctrinal and policy development. This is crucial for the effectiveness of the UN response. On the other hand, partnerships with international/regional financial institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations are all crucial elements for sustaining peace.

**PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH: ENHANCING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP**

National ownership must be seen as a benchmark for the work of the United Nations in peace and security. It requires inclusive engagement with a wide variety of local actors, not only governments. This inclusiveness would allow UN missions and country teams to better analyze each conflict and its root causes, to tap into local resources for peace, and to monitor and evaluate the impact of UN interventions. For national ownership to be meaningful, it should not be treated as a box-ticking exercise.

The Arab and African consultations underlined that elections tend to be seen by the UN and the international community as the main indicator of national ownership of peace processes. Instead of a narrow focus on elections, the consultations called for an approach that emphasizes participatory democracy throughout the governance cycle. The consultations also pointed out that in situations where societies lack the institutional capacity to manage local and national disputes, rushing into elections prematurely can sometimes be a “driver of conflict.”
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

A common key message, reiterated across the regional discussions, was the importance of regarding women as a “driver of sustainable peace.” Women’s participation in peace processes and agreements result in a more durable peace. It is also a precondition for achieving national ownership, inclusivity and the people-centered approach, suggested by the UN reviews.

The regional discussions cautioned, however, against reducing the women, peace and security agenda to appointing women to high-level positions in the UN Secretariat and missions or to insist on the participation of women for purposes of checking the box of representation. The discussions called instead for using the cross-cutting nature of the women, peace and security agenda in New York and in the field to integrate the organization’s work and achieving synergies across the silos of the UN system. The Women, Peace and Security agenda must be mainstreamed into national institutions through concrete and effective mechanisms like National Action Plans. The Latin American consultation in particular stressed the need for more action to end impunity with all sexual and gender-based crime.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

To achieve all the above, one of the strongest messages voiced in all regional meetings was the call to transform the way the UN works so that it can escape from the silos in which it appears to be trapped.

On the strategic and policy level, this translated into a clear call for both UN member states and the Secretariat to build on the momentum created by their recent successes, most notably the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, to work together across silos in the face of mounting threats to peace and security. As mentioned previously, the concept of “sustaining peace” was repeatedly referred to as a potential new organizing principle.

On the operational level, an integrated response was highlighted as a must. All regional meetings identified the “fragmentation” of UN system, both at the headquarters and in the field, as the biggest risk to the organization’s future relevance, coherence and effectiveness. It was also singled out as the most daunting and pressing task to be carried out by the new UN Secretary-General (UNSG). The next UNSG must champion a set of concrete, ambitious, yet practical, reform proposals that would: a) garner the support of the majority of member states; and b) incentivize the various parts of the UN system to work together in more a coherent way.

SUSTAINABLE AND PREDICTABLE FINANCING

Regional consultations addressed the issue of predictable and sustainable financing. Funding for the continuum of peace interventions must be predictable, including from the UN’s assessed contributions and voluntary contributions.

Regional discussions also addressed financial arrangements as one of the major impediments to achieving UN system-wide integration and coherence. Structural disincentives and prohibitions on pooling of funding streams must be overcome. At the same time that financing streams must be increased, the UN must be more effective in identifying and promoting innovative approaches to peace and security, for instance by providing greater support to South-South and triangular cooperation and helping stakeholders better integrate these modalities into broader efforts to prevent conflict and promote peace.
This essay was originally prepared as a policy brief for the UNGA’s High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security to reflect on key messages from a series of regional preparatory meetings held by civil society groups.

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AT THE U.N., ONLY OPTIMISTS NEED APPLY

Jim Della-Gioma

IT RECOMMENDED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT TO DEVELOP POLICIES TO EXPEDITE RECRUITMENT, EMPOWER MANAGERS IN THE FIELD, AND MAKE THEM ACCOUNTABLE.

The first time I heard the German word “zwangsoptimist” was in a meeting to discuss ways to improve how the international system functions. Meaning “someone who feels compelled to be an optimist,” the word not only succinctly sums up my work for and alongside the U.N. over the past 27 years, but could also be a one-word job description for the organization’s next secretary-general.

Not everyone sees the world, or the U.N., this way. In his recent op-ed in The New York Times, titled “I Love the U.N., but It Is Failing,” outgoing senior U.N. official Anthony Banbury saw the glass as more than half-empty. The U.N. Secretariat that the next secretary-general will administer, he wrote, has a sclerotic personnel system. He described a dysfunctional organization with
minimal accountability, where political expediency trumps universal values and facts on the ground, and whose peacekeeping operations apply antiquated tools to 21st-century conflicts.

It was quite an indictment, and an uncomfortable one for someone like me, whose day job involves reflecting on how to make peace operations more effective. A close relative, upon reading the Banbury op-ed, sent me a message asking, “Are you ready to give up?”

I am not, nor should any of us be.

The most surprising thing about Banbury’s op-ed is not its content, but that it even made the pages of The New York Times. It reads like a revelation, but anyone who was in the U.N. system for as long as Banbury was should already have been well familiar with the problems he enumerated.

Most people involved with the organization already are. The 16 members of the U.N.’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, for instance, pre-empted Banbury’s critique of U.N. peacekeeping last June:

“The messages the Panel has received from the field have been resounding: UN administrative procedures are failing missions and their mandates. Force commanders and troop contributors are exasperated by bureaucratic constraints that fail to meet reasonable demands in difficult settings. Senior managers complain of deep dysfunction and are frustrated by the inability to recruit rapidly on one hand and the obstacles to removing poor performers on the other.”

It recommended that the secretary-general allow the Department of Field Support to develop policies to expedite recruitment, empower managers in the field, and make them accountable. In emergencies, they needed leeway to do things quickly outside the normal rules.

WE ARE ONCE AGAIN IN AN ERA WHEN THE U.N. IS DIVIDED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, NORTH AND SOUTH.

What may not be evident to outsiders is that Banbury’s former role, and the target of his post-parting remarks, concerns the U.N. Secretariat, and not the organization’s myriad agencies, funds and programs—such as UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Programme—which manage their own operations, budgets and personnel systems, often far more effectively than the Secretariat’s peace operations.

But even in the area of peace and security, the U.N. has made many important and broad contributions to resolving conflict, restoring stability and ending disorder. I’ve seen it firsthand in East Timor, Liberia and Southeast Asia.

Presumably, Banbury has too. His first U.N. posting was as a human rights officer in a Cambodian refugee camp along the Thai-Cambodian border; his first peacekeeping mission was the U.N. Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC). Deployed in February 1992 after the fall of the Khmer Rouge and Cambodia’s subsequent civil war, UNTAC played a small part in resolving one of the great humanitarian tragedies of the Cold War. The operation was far from perfect: It was where sexual exploitation
and abuse by peacekeepers first came to widespread public attention. But the Cambodian conflict was a complex problem that took years to resolve, in which the U.N. and its agencies were central and a U.N. peace operation was a key part of the solution.

Of course, resolving conflict is never neat and tidy. Peace agreements are often made with people who have done much killing. But as the U.N. panel’s report on peace operations underlines, peace is all about getting the politics right. Resolving decades of conflict often requires the global and regional dynamics to change first. Only then are regional players and the representatives who exercise the secretary-general’s “good offices” able to negotiate peace agreements and plans of action, not only to resolve conflicts but also to deal with the massive displacement that often accompanies them. It becomes a team effort when the Secretariat and member states play on the same side.

Such behavior at the end of the Cold War made many believe again in the U.N.; some even saw the organization as an integral part of a New World Order. UNTAC ushered in a decade of active peace operations that ended with the U.N. and then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. Not all were immediate success stories. But painstaking recoveries often followed even some of the worst bloodlettings.

Preventing conflict is a complex quest, one that, from the first word of the U.N. Charter, is the U.N. Secretariat’s main job. But just as we project our aspirations onto politicians, we are now doing the same for the next secretary-general. Banbury ends his op-ed with a call for the U.N. to be led by people for whom “doing the right thing” is normal. The “zwangsoptimists” in the system are looking for leadership.

But with the post-Cold War period now in the past, we are once again in an era when the intergovernmental organization is divided between East and West, North and South. The Secretariat, its missions and its internal governance are all proxy battlefields for interstate competition, not cooperation. In such a time, the 193 member states should take responsibility for fixing the U.N.’s dysfunction, rather than tasking one Secretary-General to do so. Managing the organization’s internal conflicts will be as much of a struggle for whoever seeks Ban Ki-moon’s job as resolving global crises. Only optimists need apply.

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MOGENS LYKKETOFT: THE CHALLENGE FACING THE UN IN PEACE AND SECURITY IS HOW TO BE AND BE SEEN AS TRULY RELEVANT

Jim Della-Giacoma and Lesley Connolly

THE UN NEEDS URGENTLY TO KEEP PACE WITH EVOLVING CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM AND BEYOND.

H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft is the President of the 70th session of the General. One of his key initiatives upon assuming office was to propose a collective reflection on the key pillars of the United Nations – development, peace and security and human rights – and how the United Nations and the next Secretary General in particular can confront new challenges and transform them into opportunities.

On 10 and 11 May 2016, he will host a high-level thematic debate on UN, Peace and Security in order to examine how to strengthen the role and the performance of the United Nations’ engagement in these matters. The Global Peace Operations Review’s Jim Della-Giacoma and Lesley Connolly recently interviewed Mr. Lykketoft about his initiative.
Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): What motivated you to organize this High-level Thematic Debate?

Mogens Lykketoft (ML): Since taking office in September 2015, it has become clear to me that just as multilateralism is reasserting itself in relation to sustainable development, regrettably, in the area of international peace and security, the opposite appears to be happening.

This is partly related to the perception that the Security Council is unable to deal with some of the most complicated and dangerous conflicts the world has witnessed in recent years, including in Syria. The result is a lack of credibility and a declining image of the UN.

The international community needs urgently to engage in a serious and dispassionate reflection on the role of the United Nations in today’s world across the three inter-related pillars of the organization: development, peace and security and respect for human rights. This reflection needs to inspire all members of this organisation as they start considering who – as the next Secretary-General – will lead the UN in all those equally vital tasks.

The high-level thematic debate on UN, peace and security of 10-11 May is an integral part of this process. I will host two other complementary high-level thematic debates on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals on 21 April and on human rights on 12-13 July.

I hope that those debates will constitute adequate opportunities for the members of the United Nations to recommit to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

JDG: What do you hope to achieve from this debate?

ML: There is a good reason why the recent reviews – on UN peace operations, peacebuilding and on women, peace and security – were undertaken coincidentally: they are all inspired by the sense that the UN needs urgently to keep pace with evolving challenges and threats to international security, from climate change or violent extremism and terrorism which are now at the top of the global agenda.

They all seek to address weaknesses that undermine the efficiency and credibility of the UN, and its ability to meet the objectives outlined in the Charter. The three reviews coupled with the process for selecting and appointing the next UN Secretary General, constitute genuine opportunities to reassert the role of the UN in matters of peace and security.

I hope that my high-level thematic debate will contribute to this momentum and provide Member States with the right platform to engage in a strategic reflection about those challenges and the ways to enhance the efficiency and credibility of the UN.

Lesley Connolly (LC): What are the key issues from the three reviews of 2015 that will help keep the UN effective in the face of the changing nature of conflict?

ML: The reviews contain a remarkable set of converging recommendations – for example, regarding the need to recognize the primacy of politics; to increase investment in prevention; to strengthen the protection and participation of women in any conflict situations; to advance a people centred approach to peace and security and to strengthen partnerships in this area, particularly with regional organizations.
But I would like to encourage the General Assembly to look also at other global challenges.

Look at the refugee crises in Eastern Mediterranean and in Eastern Africa and the dramatic consequences of an international response which was not immediately commensurate with the magnitude of the needs. Failure to prevent conflicts and to address their effects at an early stage has also a cost – a cost that is becoming unbearable. As the report on humanitarian financing shows, $15 billion are needed for a decent effort to deal with refugees. It will require the right system of financing and better interaction between all parts of the UN.

In matters of peace and security also, there is no alternative to the establishment of a more predictable and sustainable financing mechanism for international action – be it for peace operations carried out by the UN or the Africa Union for example.

Another crucial dimension of any reflection on those matters is the interconnectedness between development, peace and security and human rights. We need to consider peace and security coupled with development. Genuine commitment to the implementation of Goal 16 is the best way to prevent conflict and put human dignity at the heart of governance. The two go hand-in-hand.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS URGENTLY TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS AND DISPASSIONATE REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN TODAY’S WORLD ACROSS THE THREE INTER-RELATED PILLARS OF THE ORGANIZATION: DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

JDG: Ahead of the debate, you have been encouraging a number of consultations around the world with civil society organizations in Brussels, Geneva, Brasilia, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Shanghai, Monrovia, and other places. What has been the most valuable outcome of these consultations and how do they relate to the even in New York?

ML: When I announced my intention to convene a high-level thematic debate on UN, peace and security, I was approached by a number of prominent research institutions, civil society organizations, think tanks with global and regional reach – all of them with a genuine wish to contribute to this reflection and inform the debate.

I encouraged them to work together, organize regional debates and meetings that would be open also to experts from Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations and the private sector.

The task was to bring the perspective of Europe, Asia, Africa, America and the Arab world, to go beyond abstract terms and identify the concrete implications of the primacy of politics, conflict prevention and mitigation. During the high-level thematic debate, they will be given an opportunity to outline their conclusions and recommendations, to inspire our action and the next UN leadership.
LC: It is vital for the Member States, civil society and other stakeholders to form a consensus on the role of the UN in the field of peace and security. How will the thematic debate approach this?

ML: The high-level thematic debate will combine a high-level plenary segment with interactive sessions to discuss today’s threats, challenges for sustainable peace, and how the UN system can support Member States as the primary actors.

Member States will be invited to participate at the highest possible level. Observers, UN entities, civil society, media, and other stakeholders will be invited to attend and some of them will have a special role to play.

I believe sincerely that civil society has a very important role to play in the field of peace and security. The contributions of civil society organizations are very diverse. They have field experience and ideas about what kind of system will be needed in the future. They are able to offer perspectives that are unique and important for us to hear.

Finally, it is also my intention to invite all declared candidates for the position of UN Secretary General to be present so that they are fully aware of what lies ahead of them, if selected.

JDG: This is the year that the new Secretary General will be selected. How do you see the high-level debate contributing to their future agenda?

ML: Clearly, the challenge is not only the reform of the Security Council, which is a core issue, but its interaction with the Secretary General and General Assembly.

It is very important that those who want to hold this office understand that the role of the UN Secretary General is very much to be the right moral authority towards the principle organs. The Secretary General needs to call the Security Council at the right time and challenge it if necessary while making all efforts to ensure that it takes action in the face of a crisis.

LC: How effective will a UNGA debate be in unlocking the entrenched positions of the P5 or G77 on these issues and challenges?

ML: You mentioned only two of many constituencies within the General Assembly and two constituencies that are also deeply divided on important issues such as the link between SDGs and sustainable peace.

I hope that a transparent and inclusive debate in a format that is carefully designed to be adequate to a particular discussion on the role of the UN in matters of peace and security can make a difference, go beyond the usual recognition of an ‘ill defined’ need for change to focus instead on concrete steps to make that change happen.

Only the search for a common ground on key threats and appropriate international responses to them will strengthen the will and ability of the Security Council to act in a more timely and efficient manner. Take terrorism and violent extremism, for example. Even the most powerful State on earth cannot address this threat alone. It has to be a concerted action from all the major world and regional powers. And it is not possible to deal with such threat with military might only.
JDG: One of the themes from the HIPPO report is that the UN should not work alone; it has to work with others and it should be conceived more as a facilitator rather than an implementer. What is your vision for the role of regional organizations in these peace and security challenges and how do you think the debate will bring these out?

ML: The nature of conflict has changed. It is widely recognized that the nature of conflicts has changed and that the vast majority of conflicts do not take place any more among States but within States and involving non-state actors – but at the same time with increasingly regional consequences, from a political, humanitarian, security point of view.

It requires obviously a change in the international approach, taking into consideration the regional dimensions of conflicts and the risk of spill-over. Designing and implementing regional strategies constitute only one of the responses to this phenomenon.

Another one if enhanced partnership with regional organisations. But it requires also from regional organisations to be ready for it. What has enabled the African Union to become an effective actor in the field of peace and security is firstly a political consensus on key values and key approaches, such as the principle of ‘non-indifference’ – sometimes opposed to the principle of non-interference – but also, very importantly, its concrete capacity to act. Building requisite administrative and military capacity has paid off. Today, the partnership between the AU and the UN is a concrete reality and it will only be further strengthened in the future.

LC: What will be the greatest challenge for the UN in peace and security moving forward?

ML: The challenge facing the UN in matters of peace and security is how to be and be seen as truly relevant.

In all my interaction with the General Assembly and its committees over the last few months – as the reviews and the way forward were being discussed –, I have urged member states to translate recommendations into action within a reasonable time frame.

There is a need to define both the division of labour between the UN and the regional organizations and ensure that policies, practices and funding mechanisms are adequate to the challenges linked with the objective to build sustainable peace. But a number of recommendations outlined in the reviews require more than a decision – it takes a change in mind-set to recognize the primacy of politics and put conflict prevention at the forefront of the international approach.

There is a need for a new vision, a new agenda that the next UN leadership will need to formulate and translate into action.

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**SEPTEMBER 2016**

BANGLADESH AND UN PEACEKEEPING

**SEPTEMBER 2016**

UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS GROUP (WEOG)

**AUGUST 2016**

TOP 10 FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET (AUGUST 2016)

**MARCH 2016**

BENI MASSACRES | OCTOBER 2015 - DECEMBER 2015

**MARCH 2016**

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BANGLADESH

TOP 5 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN OPERATIONS (JULY 2016)

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY BANGLADESH TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY BANGLADESH TO UN OPERATIONS (1999 - PRESENT)

BURKINA FASO

TOP 5 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTORS TO MINUSMA (APRIL 2016)

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY BURKINA FASO TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY BURKINA FASO
CANADA

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY CANADA TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, AUGUST 2016

CHINA

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY CHINA TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY CHINA TO UN OPERATIONS (2003 - PRESENT)
EGYPT

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY EGYPT TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY EGYPT TO UN OPERATIONS (2003 - PRESENT)

ETHIOPIA

TOP 5 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN OPERATIONS (JULY 2016)

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY ETHIOPIA TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY ETHIOPIA TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)
INDIA

**TOP 5 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN OPERATIONS (JULY 2016)**

**UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIA TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)**

**MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIA TO UN OPERATIONS (1999 - PRESENT)**

KENYA

**UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY KENYA TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)**

**UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY KENYA TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS, 1990-PRESENT**
NEPAL

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY NEPAL TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY NEPAL TO UN OPERATIONS (2000 - PRESENT)

PAKISTAN

TOP 5 UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTORS TO UN OPERATIONS (JULY 2016)

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY PAKISTAN TO UN OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2016)

MAJOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS BY PAKISTAN TO UN OPERATIONS (1999 - PRESENT)
**Rwanda**

**Top 5 Uniformed Personnel Contributors to UN Operations (July 2016)**

**Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Rwanda to UN Operations (August 2016)**

**Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Rwanda to UN Operations (2005 - Present)**

**Senegal**

**Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Senegal to UN Operations (August 2016)**

**Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions by Senegal to UN Operations (2001 - Present)**

**Top 20 Contributing Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Major Uniformed Personnel Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GENDER

UNIFORMED UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL BY GENDER, 2006-PRESENT

2016 UN SENIOR APPOINTMENTS, BY GENDER

2016 UN SENIOR APPOINTMENTS, BY NATIONALITY
MAPS

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