

Global
Peace Operations
Review



MARCH 2017

A monthly newsletter from the Center on International Cooperation

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

The **Global Peace Operations Review** is an interactive web-portal presenting in-depth analysis and detailed data on military **peacekeeping operations** and civilian-led political missions by the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad-hoc coalitions. The web-portal is a product of the [New York University Center on International Cooperation \(CIC\)](#) and a continuation of its long-standing print publications the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* and the *Review of Political Missions*.

Providing the most comprehensive overview of multilateral contributions to **peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding**, the *Review* aims to initiate and inform discussions on the comparative advantages and appropriateness of different missions, and through constructive analysis to further strengthen existing partnerships necessary for them to succeed.

Through the **Country & Regional Profile pages**, the *Review* provides background information and regularly updated key developments on peace operations and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis is further enhanced by the provision of detailed data on each of the UN's peace operations, and headline data on missions fielded by regional organizations and ad hoc missions, which can be accessed in full through the **Data & Trends** section. Data on non-UN peace operations was compiled by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute \(SIPRI\)](#). For more details, please see our [Data guide](#). The **Strategic Summary** provides an overview of main developments in mission settings over the past year and presents analysis on trends and the impact these may have on shaping peace operations of the future. Thematic essays presented in the In Focus section unpack issues critical to peace operations, providing analysis and guidance on possible approaches.

The Library section enables readers to download full text .pdf files of past editions of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2006-2012) and the *Review of Political Missions* (2010-2012). For those interested in conducting their own analysis using the data generated for these publications, we have provided spreadsheets of all the **statistics** used to compile these reports.

Scope of the Global Peace Operations Review

The *Review* covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in the previous year including missions fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS and coalitions. It uses a **broad definition of peace operations** that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilian led political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping missions, the *Review*, mindful of the need for peace operations to adjust to the changing nature of conflict, also includes peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat.

Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their core. This includes, for example, the EU's Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the implementation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve more as regular diplomatic or developmental presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

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THEMATIC ESSAYS



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March 22, 2017

DEMOCRATISE OR DISINTEGRATE: HOW THE AU CAN HELP SOUTH SUDAN

Amanda Lucey and Liezelle Kumalo

The implementation of South Sudan's latest peace agreement appears to be at a standstill. Insecurity, food shortages and the breakdown in governance have forced more than 1.5 million people to flee the country. President Salva Kiir's announcement of a forthcoming national dialogue offers some hope. Yet people are divided on the legitimacy of the process: is this a ruse to detract attention from important reforms, or is it an opportunity to finally broaden the political process in South Sudan? External actors, including the African Union (AU), are also at odds with one another. This report looks at how the AU can enhance the prospects for peace in South Sudan.

DOWNLOAD THE FULL PUBLICATION **DEMOCRATISE OR DISINTEGRATE HOW THE AU CAN HELP SOUTH SUDAN**

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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COMMENTARY



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March 28, 2017

PEACEKEEPING AND THE WPS AGENDA: 'LESS TALK AND MORE ACTION'

Deen Sharp and Gizem Sucouglu

THIS ARTICLE IS PART OF A SERIES ON 'WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY' THAT THE STRATEGIST IS PUBLISHING IN RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY 2017.

In the Security Council debate around [Resolution 2242](#) in 2015—which marked 15 years since the adoption of the ground breaking Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)—a key refrain was: 'we've been paying lip service to the importance of this issue for 15 years. It's now time for less talk and more action'.

Resolution 1325 has become the guide for all UN policies and programs in supporting women in conflict and post conflict societies. In this context it's essential that our work focuses not only on protecting women but on empowering them to participate fully in all the processes that affect them. UN Peacekeeping implements this mandate primarily through gender advisers at headquarters and in the field.

Our first gender advisers were deployed to Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and as mandated we now have them on the ground in all 16 peacekeeping missions. Their core functions, as articulated in our [Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy \(2010\)](#) are to provide technical guidance and support to senior management of the peacekeeping mission; to mainstream gender issues into all civil, military and police components; and to build the capacity of personnel to guide the gender mainstreaming efforts.

After a recent DPKO internal evaluation of our work on WPS, it's clear that the UN has put an impressive amount of effort into putting policies, guidance and training programs and materials in place to support implementation of this mandate. Unfortunately, what remains is a general lack of understanding of why gender mainstreaming is important and how it adds value to our broader peacekeeping mandate and responsibilities.

Firstly, there is a lack of leadership on this mandate from senior management in UN peacekeeping. This isn't surprising given the competing priorities faced by the leaders of peacekeeping missions. Secondly, the level of gender adviser posts and their structural location within our missions have reduced the access of our Senior Gender Advisers to mission leadership and created a kind of 'gender enclave' rather than supporting the mainstream effort.

We have had a high turnover of gender advisers, have an under resourced Gender Unit at headquarters and had posts removed or reallocated in our missions. These factors have also led to a lack of perceived career path for gender advisers. Due in part to

our inability to show the value-added of the WPS mandate to the overall mandate of the missions, it's sometimes perceived as a technical/niche area and not the responsibility of all mission staff. This is problematic because of the positive impact that our WPS work could potentially have on issues like community access, information gathering and analysis, and early warning mechanisms.

Nevertheless, there are several examples of what we know works. All our missions now hold 'Global Open Days' on WPS every year, where the head of mission reaches out to local women's groups across the country to give high level political attention to their concerns and to enhance their roles. In Darfur for example, at the most recent **Open Day** women from four states came together to create an institutional mechanism to support the implementation by government of Resolution 1325 and create a women's protection network.

The **Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Forward Looking Gender Strategy (2014-2018)**, combined with Resolution 2242 and a series of high-level peace and security reviews have generated new momentum and strengthened the hand of those working to improve our work on gender within the Secretariat. DPKO leadership will now elevate the Senior Gender Adviser at UN headquarters to the office of our Chief of Staff to facilitate regular access to both Under Secretary-Generals. We have finalised standardised gender reporting training materials and are developing gender-based conflict analysis training for mission planners to ensure a gender lens is applied from the start-up of our missions.

In the field, our Senior Gender Advisers now report directly to our Heads of Mission. Gender targets will now be used as specific indicators of individual performance of all senior managers. Now all gender officer posts that have been mandated must be budgeted for in missions and filled with appropriate staff.

At the UN we now focus on five entry points for WPS: through policies such as one addressing gender-specific conflict analysis; through women's participation in post conflict decision making processes; through personnel by creating an enabling environment to achieve 50-50 gender parity; through protection by ensuring that all UN action takes into account the protection of women and girls; and finally through partnership that can broaden mainstreaming efforts and make our impact more sustainable.

This article was originally published by the **Australian Strategic Policy Institute** on March 27, 2017

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A BOY RIDES HIS BICYCLE AMIDST A DESTROYED NEIGHBOURHOOD IN HOMS, SYRIA, IN 2013. (ART PRODUCTION/SHUTTERSTOCK)

March 23, 2017

SUSTAINING PEACE IN AN URBAN WORLD

Deen Sharp and Gizem Sucouglu

IF THE NEW URBAN AGENDA IS TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE URBANIZATION PROCESS, IT MUST ADDRESS URBAN VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT AND INTEGRATE EFFORTS TO SUSTAINING PEACE INTO ITS OWN GUIDELINES

The conflict in Syria has turned formerly thriving urban centres such as Aleppo and Homs into landscapes of rubble and decay. Those escaping the violence in these cities and elsewhere in the country have fled to predominantly urban areas in neighbouring countries. This influx has placed intense pressures on housing, livelihoods and basic urban services, sometimes resulting in tensions between host and displaced communities.

Meanwhile, in countries such as Mali, Haiti and the Central African Republic, U. N. peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in city centres. There they often struggle to address urban warfare. The U. N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti, for instance, withdrew its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme for gang members and [continues to find it difficult to find a suitable DDR programme for its urban peace-building efforts](#).

Furthermore, the presence of U. N. peacekeepers can leave behind long-lasting impacts on the political, economic and social fabric of these cities, oftentimes negative. This can include compounds placing extra burdens on already fragile infrastructure and increasing pressure on scarce local resources.

Each of these examples demonstrates some of the complexities of contemporary urban violence and conflict, as well as the challenges these are bringing to the international system. On the one hand, according to [a study by the United Nations University](#), the pace of urbanization in conflict-affected countries has increased by 298 percent over the past 40 years. This acceleration has made it more difficult to achieve peace, bringing with it multi-layered conflict, urban violence and new forms of exclusion.

On the other hand, cities also create tremendous opportunities for their inhabitants. Human development metrics are typically higher in urban areas, a trend that holds true throughout the world. Cities also consistently rank better than rural areas when it comes to health indicators and access to basic services.

Increasingly, then, U. N. and other policymakers are recognizing that the urbanization process is instrumental to societal transformation. As yet, however, the United Nations is not adequately adapting its operations and policy frameworks to the new urban reality of violence and conflict.

BREAKING CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

Still, the U. N. system is rapidly creating new tools with which to deal with this reality. That includes adapting and transforming its peace and security, development and humanitarian responses to cope with the demands of a rapidly changing world.

Last year, for instance, parallel resolutions by the U. N. Security Council and the General Assembly endorsed the concept of “sustaining peace”, introduced for the first time by a 2015 review of the United Nations’ peacebuilding architecture. This idea has gained traction ever since. **In one of his first addresses to the Security Council**, new U. N. Secretary-General António Guterres stressed that sustaining peace and preventing conflict must a top U. N. priority.

So what does this concept entail? Sustaining peace means going beyond short-term responses to conflict such as delivering aid or sending troops to preserve peace. These actions are still significant, but sustaining peace focuses on the importance of having a long-term vision in mind in all responses to end conflict, primarily to prevent constant cycles of lapse and relapse into conflict.

In practical terms, this means that if the peace and security sector doesn’t find ways to address the root causes of conflict — exclusion, social injustice, violence and inequality — in places such as Haiti, Liberia or the Central African Republic, it might spend billions of dollars and many years placing bandages on unrest that erupts as soon as peacekeepers leave.

Of course, addressing root causes of conflict cannot and should not be done by external actors alone. It requires connecting better with national and local actors, including municipalities, city governments and civil society organizations.

But what does this mean for cities? At least in theory, it means that in a rapidly urbanizing world, addressing exclusionary challenges and stresses that cities face everyday, particularly in conflict-affected cities such as Port-au-Prince, Bangui or Kabul, becomes central from the perspective of peace and security.

The sustaining peace agenda realizes that peacekeepers, peace-builders and humanitarian actors do not operate in a vacuum in these cities. On the contrary, their actions can either contribute to or harm the future well-being of cities. This approach forces the United Nations and other international actors to take account of the increasingly urban contexts in which they operate.

URBAN GAPS

The U. N.’s discussion on cities is being bolstered by parallel global agreements struck over the past two years. The new **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs) include an urban goal (**SDG 11**) that places an emphasis on achieving safe and sustainable cities. In addition, the New Urban Agenda, the vision on sustainable cities adopted in October, makes reference to “conflict and post-conflict contexts”.

Importantly, these two share common goals with the sustaining peace agenda: achieving sustainable development, fostering national and local ownership, building inclusive communities and resilience, and encouraging transformation toward durable solutions.

Yet these frameworks also fill important gaps for each other. As yet, for instance, the city is absent from the sustaining peace agenda, while the New Urban Agenda does not provide a substantive guide for how to address urban violence and conflict.

Now is the time to devise practical frameworks that bring together the SDGs and New Urban Agenda with the concept of sustaining peace. While there have been many theoretical discussions on the importance of broadening inclusion and addressing long-term challenges in the past two years at the United Nations, the practical implications have not yet been fully understood.

Despite its significant new focus on cities, for instance, the United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian response continues to struggle to understand the impact of rapid urbanization. U. N. officials may recognize that their peacekeeping efforts are increasingly located in urban contexts and that urban actors (such as mayors, municipalities and urban dwellers) are critical to sustaining peace, but they are not framing their policy frameworks around this reality.

In order for the sustaining peace agenda to be achieved, we argue, it must attend to these urban dynamics. Likewise, if the New Urban Agenda is to provide a comprehensive guide to the urbanization process, it must address urban violence and conflict and integrate efforts to sustaining peace into its own guidelines.

DEFINING THESE LINKAGES

We are not alone in this call for the United Nations to pay greater attention to the urban dynamics of violence and conflict. In December, experts gathered at U. N. Headquarters in New York to look at how the SDGs, New Urban Agenda and sustaining peace approach could complement each other, as well as how urban perspectives can facilitate efforts to sustain peace in an urbanizing world. ([See video of the event here.](#))

Participants made clear that that these new frameworks would all require a major rethink, emphasizing the need for greater localization at the urban scale. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, assistant secretary-general for the U. N. Peacebuilding Commission, warned that this would require a transformation in how the entire U. N. system operates. This would include, for instance, recognizing the role of urban authorities (that remain absent in many agreements) and building local urban capacity.

Izumi Nakamitsu, assistant secretary-general for U. N. Development Programme, noted that the different agendas present opportunities to advance integrated responses to sustaining peace. The international system needs to address the complexity of the urbanization agenda, and more emphasis needs to be placed on the localization of support, she stressed.

Typically, U. N. peacekeeping compounds and refugee camps are no longer located in rural areas, meaning that the United Nations now has missions, compounds and troops in hundreds of cities around the world. Malkit Shoshan, who lectures on “the architecture of peace” at the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University, noted that about 180 cities in the Sahel host U. N. bases, the structure and set-up of which have the potential to dramatically impact efforts to sustain peace.

Shoshan said that peacekeeping bases are not designed to consider the long-term needs and rights of urban dwellers in conflict-affected cities, thus often disrupting the communities they are intended to assist. She highlighted how too often U. N. peacekeeping camps are shut off from their local context, make no contribution to improving the lives of local inhabitants and can even compete for resources with them. If, however, the United Nations took design and urban planning into account, peacekeeping missions could be integrated into local contexts and spaces created for community engagement — reinforcing efforts to sustain peace.

Better research, data and a stronger knowledge base is required to understand the dynamics of contemporary urban violence and stronger connections between the United Nations, member states, urbanists and urban communities. Participants stressed that urban violence is a complicated and under-researched phenomenon, and that more attention is required to comprehend contemporary urban violence and conflict in order for strategies to be developed to sustain peace.

Several participants also highlighted the importance of linking **Goal 16 of the SDGs** — on peaceful, inclusive and just societies — to Goal 11 in the contexts of violence, fragility and conflict. Urban dwellers are the most likely to fail to meet the SDGs. Importantly, if the sustaining peace agenda and New Urban Agenda are approached together, highlighting the urban dynamics of socio-economic, security and environmental stresses, connections between SDG 11 and SDG 16 will become increasingly apparent.

The December event signalled that the significance of urban perspectives and the urban dynamics of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and displacement is gaining recognition by U. N. officials, policymakers and member states. But more needs to be done to bridge the gaps between the peace, development and urban agendas and to move towards common responses.

This article was originally published by **CitiScope** on March 23, 2017


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INTERVIEWS



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March 17, 2017

CEDRIC DE CONING: ADAPTING THE UN PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE TO STABILIZATION MISSIONS, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATES AND NEW THREATS

Cedric de Coning

*In this book, **UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats**, edited by Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi and John Karlsrud, the contributors examine the new challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations and question whether it is necessary for the UN to revise its doctrine to reflect the way peacekeeping has adapted to these challenges on the ground. CIC Visiting Scholar Alexandra Novosseloff, herself a contributor (with Thierry Tardy) to the edited volume, together with GPOR's Editor-in-Chief Jim Della-Giacoma recently spoke to de Coning about what needs to change.*

Alexandra Novosseloff (AN): What is the new era in peacekeeping doctrine that you describe?

Cedric de Coning (CdC): In the book we have analyzed the last decade's peace operations, in particular those that we think may have gone beyond the existing 2008 UN Capstone doctrine. We did not deal with those operations where the UN is assisting with the implementation of a peace process, as these operations do not pose a doctrinal challenge. We organized the rest in three typologies. In the first category, we address those missions that helped to establish new states, namely Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. In the second, we dealt with operations that have a protection of civilians mandate amidst ongoing conflict, like in Darfur and South Sudan. In the third, we analyze stabilization operations which we frame as missions where the UN is tasked to protect the government and its people against an insurgency or identified aggressors. We argue that these three types of operations - the latter more so than the former - place a strain on the existing 2008 Peacekeeping Capstone Doctrine and the core principles of peacekeeping. In particular, we argue that the widening gap between the actual practices of these operations and the existing consensus on what UN peacekeeping is and is not, as captured in the principles and doctrine, is creating a series of new problems and challenges.

AN: I noticed that you are talking about the traditional versus what could be considered more modern types of peacekeeping operations. Is this an actual division or are more recent peacekeeping operations just examples of how the UN is adapting to the evolution of conflicts, new environments, and the needs of international community in dealing with them?

CdC: Twenty years ago two thirds of UN peacekeepers were deployed in operations where the UN was implementing comprehensive peace agreements in places like Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Cambodia, and more recently in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burundi. Today two thirds of peacekeepers are deployed amidst ongoing conflict. The principles and doctrine is based on the

assumption that a cease-fire or peace agreement is a precondition for considering the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. This shift away from using the UN as a tool to keep the peace, towards using the UN to protect civilians amidst ongoing conflicts, or to protect governments from insurgencies, pushes UN peacekeeping beyond the principles of peacekeeping and existing doctrine.

AN: Indeed, but can we really compare the missions of the past with those of today? Or if we can, should we see the difference more as the evolution and adaptation of the UN to the new challenges instead of saying that then we had “traditional” peacekeeping and now we have “new” peacekeeping?

CdC: There has been significant adaptation and evolution in UN peacekeeping over the years, but we argue that what we are now witnessing is approaching a tipping point. The [High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations \(HIPPO\)](#) panel's report notes that 98 per cent of peacekeepers are currently deployed in missions with a protection of civilians mandate. Two thirds of these missions are what the HIPPO report refers to as ‘conflict management’ missions, i.e. missions where there is no peace agreement in place. In this latter category we have paid special attention to UN stabilization operations, where the UN Security Council has tasked the missions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali to extend state authority, if necessary by force, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to “neutralize” identified armed groups. In these cases, the UN missions does not have the consent of the parties to the conflict, only that of the host government. The UN missions also can't be said to be impartial towards the parties to the conflict, as they are acting to protect the governments against specific parties identified as aggressors by the Security Council. In some cases, the UN missions are also operating alongside the security forces of the host government in joint operations against the identified aggressors. In our analysis, these developments go beyond the outer limits of the existing principles of peacekeeping.

Jim Della-Giacoma (JDG): But do you still draw a difference between the robust use of offensive force and defensive force? What other changes are taking place?

CdC: The most significant departure from existing doctrine has been the authority given to the Force Intervention Brigade to employ offensive force on an operational level to neutralize the M23 and other armed groups in eastern DRC. In CAR and Mali the mandate is still framed in more defensive terms, but there we also note that the forces are encouraged to take proactive steps to protect the government and the people against insurgents and aggressors, and in both cases these missions have on occasion proactively used deadly force to protect civilians or themselves. In Mali, the UN is facing armed and terrorist groups that wants to do it harm, and in those circumstances the mission has to adopt a different posture then one would expect in a mission where the parties to the conflict has consented to the role of peacekeepers. For instance, in Mali the UN peacekeeping missions makes use of intelligence, is instructed to proactively use force, and at times move around with stealth, using camouflaged rather than the usual white painted UN vehicles. In the concluding chapter by Chiyuki Aoi and myself, we raise the question whether the UN should consider a new doctrine when it comes to stabilization operations. We argue that making a clear distinction between UN peacekeeping operations and UN stabilization operations will, on the one hand, protect peacekeeping as a distinct tool with its own principles and doctrine, and on the other hand it will help to ensure that when the UN Security Council tasks the UN Secretariat to deploy a stabilization operation, that it is clear to all stakeholders what the task entails, so that such a mission can be planned and deployed with the appropriate troops, capabilities and preparation.

AN: But is stabilization only the responsibility of the UN? Also we know stabilization is expensive and the annual cost of 16 UN peace operations was the equivalent of one month of NATO's stabilization mission in Afghanistan at the height of operations there. If stabilization is going to be more expensive, do we need to re-examine the way UN operations are funded and not just their doctrine?

CdC: Our findings are consistent with the HIPPO report. We agree with the HIPPO report that the UN should not do peace enforcement or counter-terrorism operations. We agree that regional arrangements or coalitions of the willing are better suited for such operations. However, we observe that despite the Brahimi and HIPPO guidance, and regardless of the consensus that exist around the core principle of peacekeeping, and the broad acceptance of the 2008 capstone doctrine, the UN Security Council has authorized the UN to undertake stabilization operations in the three cases mentioned in Africa, including offensive operation in the case of FIB. The FIB is widely regarded as a success by members of the Security Council and several other countries. These operations also solved other important challenges, such as how to finance and support African-led peace operations and how to avoid or manage the parallel deployment of two or more forces in the same theatre of operations. For these reasons, we think that it's likely that the Security Council may continue to authorize such operations under UN auspices. Aoi and myself are not advocating for UN stabilization operations, but we are saying if the Council continues to task the UN to undertake such operations, then the UN should consider if it will not be more effective if it has a doctrine that is more suited to the stabilization task. We argue that doing stabilization with a peacekeeping doctrine and mindset has had sub-optimal results to date. It has prevented the UN from protecting civilians more effectively and it has resulted in the highest number of peacekeeper casualties in 20 years.

AN: But if the UN is conducting these two different types of operations, isn't there a risk of having some confusion, especially on the ground? Are the troop contributing countries (TCCs) ready to send their personnel to stabilization missions? And are the financially contributing countries (FCCs) ready to fund those operations?

CdC: What we are describing in our book is the actual practices that have occurred over the last decade and a half. We observe that doing stabilization with a peacekeeping doctrine and mindset has caused confusion on the ground. The gap between the existing doctrine and current practices in places like Mali, CAR, and DRC is too large. The troop contributing countries, the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the host nations do not have a shared understanding of the role and tasks of these missions. Some countries, especially the Europeans in Mali and some African countries in the DRC, are comfortable with missions that have a stabilization mandate and have been prepared to deploy their troops to these missions. Other countries still believe that they are deploying to traditional UN peacekeeping operations when they send their troops to CAR, the DRC or Mali, and they prepare and deploy their troops accordingly. When it comes to cost, the UN Security Council has authorized the stabilization operations in Mali, CAR and the DRC, despite their costs. Perhaps this may change under the financial pressure that is now coming from the Trump Administration, but on the other hand the impression one gets is that the Trump Administration will be more willing to fund UN operations that have a counter-terrorism orientation, than those that implement a peace agreement or protect civilians. It is thus not necessarily obvious to me, from the UN experience over the last fifteen years, that it will be more difficult to find funding or troops for stabilization missions.

AN: Are you are advocating for a better division of labor in crisis management recognizing the comparative advantages of different international organizations? Are you arguing for the UN to do peacekeeping and other coalitions, countries, or organizations should be responsible for military stabilization operations?

CdC: We are not advocating for a specific policy direction. We are identifying the challenges, and pointing out the problems or dilemmas with different policy choices. We agree with the HIPPO guidance that the UN should not do peace enforcement and counterterror operations. We also agree with the HIPPO that the UN need to clarify what stabilization means in the UN context. What we observe however, is that the Security Council has authorized UN stabilization operations in the past, and is likely to continue to authorize such operations, regardless of the HIPPO panel recommendations or the preferences of the UN Secretariat or some TCCs.

JDG: We have been talking about stabilization missions and your argument for a new doctrine, but does the book make a similar argument regarding transitional administrations or those missions with a protection of civilian (POC) mandate without a peace agreement?

IN AN IDEAL WORLD THE UN SHOULD NOT BE DOING STABILIZATION OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES TO SEND UN PEACEKEEPERS ON MISSIONS WHERE THERE IS NO PEACE TO KEEP, DESPITE THE ADVICE FROM THE BRAHIMI AND HIPPO PANELS.

CdC: Transitional administration mandates, where the UN has executive authority and responsibility, go beyond the boundaries of UN peacekeeping. This is a very challenging topic that needs further exploration, especially now that the issue of trusteeship is being raised in the context of South Sudan. The requirement to protect civilians amidst ongoing conflict, in situations without a peace agreement, has forced the UN to operate on the edge of the limits of its doctrine, and in the case of stabilization missions at times over the edge, but for the most part the UN has been able to find ways to maintain consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. Some would argue that these compromises have come at too high a cost. In South Sudan, and elsewhere, the perception is rather that the UN should be more robust and more proactive in carrying out its protection mandate. This is especially challenging when there are armed forces or proxy militias associated with the host state, that pose a risk to civilians. This latter dilemma, which juxtapose the need for consent of the host state against the mandate to protect civilians, regardless of the source of threat, is not adequately addressed in the current doctrine or guidance. Overall, the shift in focus to protection in the late 1990s have resulted in the current situation where two thirds of UN peacekeepers are deployed in conflict management operations, and this has changed many aspects of UN peacekeeping. For instance, we observe that conflict management missions like the missions in the DRC and Darfur are not linked to a political settlement agreement and thus lack a clear political exit strategy. As a result they end-up staying in place as long as there is a need to protect civilians and as long as there is a risk of relapse.

JDG: Consent of the host country is a challenge in all missions. Will a new doctrine help resolve this very political issue?

CdC: Doctrine can't solve specific political problems, but it can serve as a guide to prevent the UN from becoming trapped in situations, because it has used the peacekeeping instrument to try to manage situations that is was not designed for. In all the stabilization operations, we don't have consent from the parties to the conflict in the classical sense, i.e. where the UN is implementing a cease-fire or peace agreement that all sides have agreed to, and where they have requested the UN to be the neutral third party that is assisting them in the process. In stabilization operations, the only consent is the agreement with the host

government. This is a very different form of consent than what was intended with consent as a core principle of peacekeeping, or as it is foreseen in the capstone doctrine.

JDG: Earlier you alluded to the need for better [triangular cooperation](#) between the Security Council, Secretariat, and TCCs. What role do you see for the TCCs in the development of a new doctrine of stabilization?

CdC: We haven't really gotten into the details of a potential stabilization doctrine because in our concluding chapter, Professor Aoi and I, are suggesting that the UN should start thinking about whether such a doctrine would be useful. We have not reached the point of suggesting what such a doctrine could look like. But what we have observed at this stage in the TCC chapter is that some TCCs are more comfortable with the stabilization than others. What we find in the stabilization context is that those TCCs who are willing to contribute to a stabilization operation, and who are thus willing to face potential combat, typically have a strategic or political interest in the conflict, for example SADC in eastern DRC, or Europe in Mali. This is very different from traditional peacekeeping, where TCCs are expected to be disinterested, and where having a link to a conflict may disqualify a specific TCC from being considered for that particular mission. Another consideration for European nations, as a result of their experiences in Bosnia and elsewhere, are that they are more willing to deploy into a situation where they have the authority and capability to use force to protect themselves, and this is why they are deploying with their own enablers such as attack helicopters as well as transport helicopters that are able to do medical evacuations under combat conditions.

AN: In Mali, it is certainly the case, but the Europeans are really reluctant to engage under the UN flag. This creates a two-tier operation that is very difficult to manage and where the end state is not very clear. And I am wondering if it would have been simpler for the UN and some TCCs to just have had a more modest UN operation that did the political work necessary to engage the parties to comply with the peace agreement and to have alongside that a military operation in the form of a coalition of the willing that would engaged in counterterrorism or robust stabilization?

CdC: If the AU mission in Mali had remained in place, perhaps with a more robust counter-terrorism mandate, that would have enabled the kind of division of tasks that you describe. However, for financial, support and political reasons the Security Council tasked the UN to take over the mission. What we observe is that the UN Security Council has not chosen to undertake stabilization operations in CAR or Mali, or to deploy the FIB in the DRC, because it thought that the UN should do stabilization operations, but rather because that was what, given the alternative options, was financially and politically feasible. Tasking the UN to do stabilization was thus not a choice driven by doctrinal considerations, but what we point out is that it has doctrinal implications, and these implications impact on the ability of the mission to achieve its mandate, to protect civilians and to protect itself. The division of work you are describing may also be the exit strategy for the UN in Mali, as I understand that the AU and UN is considering the feasibility of some kind of African-led counterterrorism mission in northern Mali.

AN: Is it not also a matter of having a more balanced relationship between the Council, Secretariat, and the TCCs? In recent years, the Secretariat has been unable to stand up to the Council.

CdC: In the past the Secretary-General, senior managers in the Secretariat, and many in the Security Council were deeply committed to the core principles of peacekeeping, and they tried to protect peacekeeping as an institution from overreach and over exposure. I think that has changed, and now many members of the Security Council, and even some senior managers in the Secretariat, are more concerned about appearing to be assertive in the moment, than about being consistent with the principles of peacekeeping

or with UN peacekeeping doctrine. As you may recall, the ability of the M23 rebels to capture Goma in eastern DRC, which was also the HQ of the UN in Northern Kivu, was highly damaging to the credibility of the UN. Equally, if not more, damaging was the ongoing rape and murder of civilians, despite the UN presence in the region. These circumstances have made the Security Council, the Secretariat and some TCCs, especially those in the region, more willing to experiment with more robust, and even the offensive use of force. Some TCCs seem to be going along with that, whereas other TCCs are still strongly adhering to the core principles of the peacekeeping. As pointed out earlier, those TCCs that come from the immediate region, for instance those from the G-5 Sahel countries in the case of northern Mali, or the IGAD countries in the Horn of Africa in the case of South Sudan, or the countries from central Africa in the case of CAR, and the SADC countries in the case of the DRC, tend to be more willing to use force than those from further away, that have deployed under the expectation that they are contributing troops to a peacekeeping operations. There has also been a number of recent notable exceptions to this general trend, for instance, Mongolian troops in South Sudan and Portuguese commandos in the Central African Republic have both recently used force in order to protect civilians.

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
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
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


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The Global Peace Operations Review has received generous support from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, French Ministry of Defence, German Federal Foreign Office, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

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